श्रीसिद्धसेनदिवाकरपादाः—

उदधाविव सर्वसिन्धवः
समुदीर्णास्त्वयि नाथ दृष्टयः ।
न च तासु भवान् प्रदृश्यते
प्रविभक्तासु सरित्स्विवोदधिः ॥

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PREFACE

I undertook to edit the Syādvādamañjarī many years ago, but other interests and preoccupations held up the work for a long time. Eventually I mustered up the 'will to do' and did it, but I regret that the press-copy could not be carried through the press as expeditiously as I had wished. This was due to a number of causes (which it is useless to relate), of which dilatoriness of the press was *not* one. In fact, I am grateful to Dr S. K. Belvalkar sometime Superintendent of the Bombay Samkrit and Prakrit Series and now Secretary of the B. O. R. Institute, and to the Manager of the Tatva-Vivechaka Press for the infinite patience they have shown in putting up with the delay. My thanks are also due to Mr Narvane for noting the Various Readings of the Text; also to M. Bhāskara Datta Miśra, M.A., LL.B., of the Sanskrit Department of the Central Hindu College for arran-ing the items of the Index (both English and Sanskrit) in alphabetical order.

In the interval a number of editions of the Syādvāda mañjarī were published of which the most noteworthy nd scholarly was the one brought out by Sheth Motilal Ladhaji as a number of the Ārhata-Mata-Prabhākara Series (often referred to as "AMP" in this book) published t Poona. I acknowledge my particular indebtedness to this publication for the facility it has provided for tracing the sources of the quotations made in this work. Eve though many of these are well known and could ha e been easily traced by m independently it is no small relief to find that some o has already done the work which it is useless to duplicate

It may be usef l to me tion some of the main features of this edition. As is well-known the "Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series to which this publication belongs is intended for th verage University student as well as for the advanced scholar Accordingly th Notes have been made sufficiently copious. Their main purpose has been to elucidate every argument as

fully and clearly as possible. However a fair amount of knowledge f Sanskrit on the part of the student has been assumed, and consequently no effort has been made to give the meanings of words and phrases. Secondly in the body f the Notes as well as in th Appendices to the Notes larg extracts ha been gi from Brâhmana, Buddhist and other Jaina works with various ends in view t enable the advanced stude t to weigh for himself the cogency of the guments on both sides, or to give an idea of the indebtedness f the utho to earlie writers, or to sh w how he has correctly recapitulated the position of the school unde review or to invit th attention of th reader to the influence which Mallisena has exercised upo later writers. Thirdly some xplanatio is due f the length f the Introduction. It is mainly intended to stim late the study of Indian Philosophy as ne whole with umerous branches whose history ranges ver wide xpanse both of time and thought. It is desirable that the student should, even t the threshold of his entering upon th study f uch comprehensive point of view as th Syâd âda, have some idea of the different schools of thought and their history if he is to unite them into single whole.

One word bout the Syâdvâda before I close. While th Vedânta seeks intellectual peace in the Absolute by transcending the antinomies of I tellect, th Jaina finds it i the fact of the Relativity f Knowledge and the consequent revelation of the many-sidedness of Reality—the one leading to religious mysticism, the othe to intellectual toleration. It may be that, in actual practice, the followers f both the schools have fallen short f the Ideal, b t the Ideal in both cases was great and that was all th Masters could be expected to provide.

Benares
Hind U versit
February 16, 1934

A B DHRUVA

Introduction

I HEMACANDRA AND MALLISEṆA

स्याद्वादमञ्जरी is a commentary by Malliṣeṇa on 'अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदिका द्वात्रिंशिका of Hemacandra, the great Jaina scholar preacher and author who lived in the time of Siddharāja Jayasiṁha and his successor Kumārapāla, two famous kings of Gujarat in the first and the second half of the twelfth century of the Christian era. Not much is known about the personal history of Malliṣeṇa except what he himself has told us at the end of the Syādvādamañjarī, that he was a disciple of Udayaprabhasūri* and that he composed and completed his work on "Saturday Āśvina Kṛṣṇa Amāvasyā in the Śaka year 1214† with the help of Jinaprabhasūri."

But his greater predecessor—Hemacandrācārya has been the hero of numerous biographical accounts which have been interwoven with those of his royal patron Siddharāja and his royal disciple Kumārapāla. Some of the stories related in these books are obviously coloured§ but all taken together present certain facts which are well—authenticated not only by their recurrence in the several accounts, but by their inherent probability in view of their historical setting and of the great learning which is clearly manifest in the works of their hero. Here are a few indisputable facts

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* Author of धर्माभ्युदय not t be confounded with धर्मशर्माभ्युदय of Haricandra.

† [illegible]-ऋषि-मित ([illegible]).

§ Dr Bühler puts the matter very clearly in the following words: "The objects with which the Caritas and Prabandhas were composed, were to edify the Jaina community to convince them of th glory and power of the Jaina religion, or in cases where the subject is a purely secular one to provide them with an greeable entertainment."

which was named Siddha-Hema-S'abdānuśāsana " after the combined names of the patron and the author consists of Sūtras, with such appendices as belonged to Pāṇini's grammar viz. Dhātupāṭha, Uṇādi, Liṅgānuśāsana etc. together with Vṛttis (commentaries), long and short, by Hemacandra himself. During Siddharāja's reign Hemacandra also composed two other works, Abhidhānacintāmaṇi " (also called Haimī Nāmamālā) and Anekārtha-Saṅgraha on the lines of similar sections in the famous Kośa of Amarasiṁha, the Buddhist lexicographer whose work was read then as now by Brāhmaṇas as well as Buddhists. It has been observed that Siddharāja honoured Hemacandra as scholar rather than as spiritual guide —a position which he acquired during the reign of his successor Kumārapāla. This is no doubt true to great extent, but it is also true that the influence on Siddharāja which Hemacandra originally acquired by his scholarship gradually grew till on many occasions his advice in religious matters was sought and accepted by Siddharāja. As Professor Tawney the translator of Prabandha-cintāmaṇi, remarks, Hemacandra gained his favour at first by his literary eminence and subsequently made good use of his gifts as a courtier to advocate the claims of his own faith. He did it, however with great patience and wonderful tact; for example, when he accompanied Siddharāja to Somanātha, he advised the King to give up for the time being wine and meat as practice of *brahmacarya* and not on the Jaina ground of its offending against the principle of the humane religion. Moreover when he was asked by Siddharāja to pay his obeisance to god S'iva at Somanātha, his utterance was a marvellous stroke of literary and religious genius. He bowed to the god in the following words

"भवबीजाङ्कुरजनना रागाद्याः क्षयमुपागता यस्य ।
ब्रह्मा वा विष्णुर्वा हरो जिनो वा नमस्तस्मै ॥
यत्र तत्र समये यथा तथा योऽसि सोऽस्यभिधया यया तया ।
वीतदोषकलुषः स चेद्भवानेक एव भगवन्नमोऽस्तु ते ॥

While Hemacandra's influence on Siddharâja, a latitudinarian in religious views, was considerable that on Kumârapâla was immense. Under his influence Kumârapâla not only gave up meat-eating but promulgated the principle of ahimsa throughout his kingdom visited Jaina temples and celebrated Jaina festivals. Hemacandra composed a large number of works, some educational and literary others frankly sectarian and polemical. The writings of this encyclopaedic author "are said to have amounted to "three crores and half verses"* Of these the first and perhaps the most celebrated is सिद्धहेमशब्दानुशासन (-व्याकरण). The work was written mainly on the lines of Pâṇini's Grammar with appendices as mentioned above; but, unlike the latter it also contains sections on Prâkrtas and Apabhramsa which till this day remain a standard work on the grammar of these *derived* languages. The works on Grammar were followed by those of Kośas (lexicons) viz., "अभिधानचिन्तामणि" "अनेकार्थसंग्रह" (with Vritti), "निघण्टु" and "देशीनाममाला" The last named work is particularly interesting as it places on record what in the days of Hemacandra were regarded as *deśya* as distinguished from Prâkrta Śabdas†. To illustrate the rules of his Grammar Hemacandra composed a Mahâkâvya called "*Dvyâśraya*" or "Kumârapâla caritram" which is both Sanskrit and Prâkrta and sings the glories of Caulukya (Solanki) Kings including Kumârapâla, the Prakrit portion dealing with Kumârapâla's reign being later addition made in the time of Kumârapâla. The next group of Hemacandra's works is that *relating to Poetics and Prosody* This *comprises* "काव्यानुशासन" with Vritti called अलंकारचूडामणि and a commentary on the same called विवेक; and "छन्दोनुशासन" with a commentary

* C. D. Dalal's Introduction to Yaśahpâla's "Mohaparâjaya," G. O. S.

† Some of Hemacandra's deśya words, however are Prâkrta and are traceable to Sanskrit. This does not diminish the value of Hemacandra's list.

Hemacandra was born in 1134 Vikrama Samvat, that is 1078 A. C. at Dhandhukā in a family belonging to Modha Vāṇia caste. His birth-name was Caṅgadeva or Cāṁgadeva his father's Cacca, Cāca or Cāṁgat and his mother's Pāhinī.§ Once upon a time, when Caṅgadeva was only five years old, a Jaina monk named Devacandra happened to visit Dhandhukā. While he was there at a Jaina temple Pāhinī went there with her boy to do the usual obeisance to the Jaina tīrthaṅkaras. While she was going round the shrine the boy went and sat on a seat beside the Ācārya. Struck by the boy's daring and on marking certain signs of high promise on his person Devacandra went to the house of Pāhinī and requested her to give him her boy for admission into the Jaina order of asceticism. After a slight hesitation and with such pain as a mother would naturally feel when asked to part with her child, Pāhinī gave away the young Caṅgadeva to the Ācārya. The father was all this time abroad. When he returned home and heard the story he was very angry but was eventually made to agree by Udayana, the Jaina minister of Siddharāja, who pacified the father and himself organised the function of the boy's dīkṣā. The incident is related somewhat differently by Mr. C. R. Dalal in his Introduction to Yaśaḥpāla's Mohaparājaya. He writes Once Devacandra Sūri of Pūrṇatalla gaccha came to Dhandhukā. Among the Jains who came for paying their respects and hearing his lectures, there was one young lad, Caṅgadeva, with his maternal uncle Nemicandra. Caṅgadeva hearing the lecture requested him to initiate him. The Sūri asked who he was. His maternal uncle said that he was his sister's son. The boy's heart was

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चच्च says प्रभावकचरित ("चच्चरिति चच्चरे देवे चाचित चच्चरः) Obviously this is misreading of चच्च which has crept into manuscripts.

† Bom. Gaz. p. 191

§ पाहिनी चाहिनी नाम देहिनी नमितेश्वरा—Prabhāvakacarita. चाहिणी—Kumārapālapratibodha.

turned to religion. The Ācārya replied that the boy should enter the order as he would, thereby be able to do good to the people like a Tīrthaṁkara, and asked him to take the permission of his father for initiation Cacha, however refused but the boy persisted and followed the Ācārya and took the vow at Cambay That the boy should have gone to the Ācārya with his maternal uncle is not unlikely but this and other minor differences of detail do not affect the main events of Hemacandra s life. On his thus entering the order of Jaina asceticism Cangodeva (the future Hemacandra) was given the name of " Somacandra " Asceticism in those days was combined with scholarship and the first duty of the young neophyte was, as usual, to study Logic, Grammar and Literature At the temple of Neminātha on mount Girnar Somacandra, says the legend, meditated upon the goddess Sarasvatī (Brāhmī) who out of the abundance of her grace bestowed upon him the *Sārasvata mantra*, nd told him that he need not go to any other land for perfecting his scholarship. Somacandra thus became great scholar A few years later i recognition of his profound scholarship his old Ācārya gave him the mantra and title of *Sūri* with a change of his name, from Somacandra to *Hemacandra*. The ceremony was performed at N go says one uthority When H E M A C A N D R A visited Anahilapura, the capital of Gujrat, he was introduced to Siddharāj Siddharāja, who had seen a work on grammar composed by Bhoja King f Mālava was anxious to see a similar w rk produced in Gujrat. When he consulted his literary advisers, all eyes fell on H macandra. Hemacandra undertook to prepare th work. When completed, the new Gramm was carried with great eclat in a procession on the back of n elephant, and copies of it were sent to different provinces of Indi The work

Stambhatīrtha = Skambhatīrtha = Khambhāt of the modern geography of Gujrat.

[illegible] सर्वक्षमापतिरेतया पर्वोणदह इत्युक्त ।

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C R. Dalal's Introduction to Y śahpāla s Mohaparājaya," G. O S.

¶ Some of Hemacandra's *deśya* words, however are Prākṛta and are traceabl to Sanskrit. This does not diminish the value of Hemacandra's list.

It now remains to note only those works whose subject matter is exclusively Jaina. There are "*Trisasti-Śalākā-Purusa-caritram*" or the Biographies of Sixty-three Supermen of Jainism, with "Pariśistaparvan" or supplements which he is said to have composed at Kumārapāla's request. They are written in a simple readable style, and are interwoven with much general information regarding the principles and practices of Jaina morality and religion. Of similar character is another work, 'महावीरचरित'. Another work of this class is a series of twenty "वीतरागस्तुति" Devotional Stanzas addressed to the Passion-free" i.e. the great saints of Jainism. These include two well-known "द्वात्रिंशिका" Sets of Thirty Two Stanzas, the "अयोगव्यवच्छेदद्वात्रिंशिका" and the अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदद्वात्रिंशिका i.e. that in which the author disproves the allegation that Jainism is wrong, and that in which he answers the claims of the systems that they are right† It is the last (अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदद्वात्रिंशिका) work—with its commentary— स्याद्वादमञ्जरी —by Mallisena with which we are here concerned.

[Original authorities and books of reference on the life and works of Hemacandra :—

Praśasti in Trisasti-Śalākā Purusacaritra of Hemacandra

" Prabhāvakacaritram of Candraprabhasūri.

Hemakumāracaritra of Somaprabhācārya.

Kumārapālapratibodha of

Kumārapālaprabandha of Jinamandanagani.

Prabandhacintāmaṇi of Merutungācārya.

Prabandhakośa of Candraśekhara.

Dr Buhler Uber das Leben des Jaina Mönches Hemacandra

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† 'अयोग'—non-possession (of truth), 'अन्ययोग'—others possession (of truth).

Dr. Peterson's Reports on Bombay Mss.

C. R. Dalal's Introduction to Yaśahpāla's "Moharāja parājaya" (G O S.)

Munirāja Jinavijaya's Introduction to Kumārapāla-Pratibodha (G O S)

Introduction to "Pramāṇa-mīmāmsā" (Ārhatamata-prabhākara edition).

> व्याकरणं पञ्चाङ्गं प्रमाणशास्त्रं प्रमाणमीमांसाम् ।
> छन्दोऽलङ्कृतिचूडामणी च शास्त्रे विभुर्व्यधित ॥
> एकार्थानेकार्था देश्या निर्घण्ट इति च चत्वारः ।
> विहिताश्च नामकोशा भुवि कवितानटयुपाध्यायाः ॥
> युत्तरषष्टिसमधिका नरेतिवृत्तगृहिव्रतविचारे ।
> अध्यात्मयोगशास्त्रं विदधे जगदुपकृतिविधित्सुः ॥
> लक्षणसाहित्यगुणं विदधे च द्वयाश्रयं महाकाव्यम् ।
> चक्रे विंशतिमुच्चैः स वीतरागस्तवानां च ॥
> इति तद्विहितग्रन्थसंख्यैव हि न विद्यते ।
> नामापि न विदन्त्येषां मादृशा मन्दबुद्धयः ॥
>
> —Prabhāvakacarita, Hemasūri-prabandha vv 832 to 836.

Aufrecht's Catalogus Catalogorum"—extracted in the Introduction to "Kāvyānuśāsana" of the Kāvyamālā Series

अनेकार्थशेष अनेकार्थकैरवः अभिधानचिन्तामणि (नाममाला व्याख्या) अलंकारचूडामणि (काव्यानुशासनव्याख्या) उणादिसूत्रवृत्ति, काव्यानुशासनम् छन्दोनुशासनम् छन्दोनुशासनवृत्ति देशीनाममाला सवृत्ति [मालवं काव्यं सवृत्ति] धातुपाठः सवृत्तिः धातुपारायणं सवृत्ति धातुमाला नाममाला नाममालाशेष, निघण्टुशेष [प्रमाणमीमांसा सवृत्ति], बलाबलसूत्रबृहद्वृत्ति, बालभाषाव्याकरणसूत्रवृत्तिः [योगशास्त्र विभ्रमसूत्रम्] लिङ्गानुशासन सवृत्ति शब्दानुशासनं सवृत्ति शेषसंग्रह शेषसंग्रहसारोद्धार

The Introduction to the "Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā" (A.M.P Edition) contains an exhaustive list of Hemacandra's works, but his authorship of some of them is doubtful. Aufrecht's list also contains some confusion.]

The "अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदिका द्वात्रिंशिका"—o "The Set of Thirty ✓ two Stanzas"—which is cast in th form of devotional

panegyric addressed to the last Tîrthamkara, Mahâvîra, is virtually criticism of the Brâhmaṇa and Bauddha systems of philosophy But before we attempt general review of its contents as unfolded in the text and its commentary the Syâdvâdamañjarî, it will be useful to give short account of the evolution Indian Philosophy

It is usual to confine such an account to the historical rise and gr wth of the different Darśanas but I think it will make for better understanding of the gist of each system if an ttempt is made to indicate their *logical* relations in the movement of thought before proceeding to consider their *historical or chronological* order

II EVOLUTION OF THE DARSANAS:

( ) *Logical* †

The History of the Indian Darśanas has been generally regarded not as history in the sens of an evolving process of thought, but only as ecord of brilliant guesses and speculations which have occurred from time to time to men of genius and scholastic bility This view however refutes itself by its very simplicity and unphilosophical haracter Another iew—that all Da śanas are broken lights of single Truth, and as uch are complementary of one another—has been propounded fully in Madhusûdanasarasvatî's Prasthâna-bheda and partially in Vijnânabhikṣu s Sâmkhya-Pravacanabhâṣya and Annambhatta's Tarkadîpikâ This is lat tradition f unded pon stray thoughts and points of view presented in earlie writings, uch as the Nyâya Kusumâñjali of Udayanâcârya. From a practical point of view of those who are not interested in the history of

† This Section has been reproduced with few changes from my Presidential Address" in the Indian Philosophical Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Benares in 1928.

philosophy for its own sake, but only in the *use* to be made of it for man's spiritual benefit, this view is natural and unimpeachable. Moreover such a synthesis had its analogues in the well-known attempts to harmonise the texts of the Brāhmaṇas, of the Upaniṣads, and of the Smṛtis, which lapse of time had consecrated. But the historian cannot overlook the fact that the founders of the Darśanas did not meet at a council distribute their work, and part, each to execute his own appointed piece. It is undeniably true that there were honest differences of opinion amongst them, which developed in the course of time into bitter controversies. However it is possible to reconcile in a higher synthesis the point of the historian with that of the practical religious man For the differences of opinion, though real and quite sharp, originate from differences of outlook, which *mark successive steps in a single evolutionary process.* Let us follow this thought-movement through its different stages.

The period of the Great Vision—that is my word for "Veda which means knowledge or thought, but which being philologically connected with Latin *videre*, to see I prefer to render by the word vision —closed with the teaching that "All this is Brahman" ('सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म'), and "Thou art That" ('तत्त्वमसि'). The earlier Ṛṣis, so at least it was thought, had seen the Truth. The generation that followed had heard but not seen it: it had received the tradition but had not had the sight. The later sages, therefore asked the question: How is it I do not see that all is Brahman and that I am Brahman? and tried to devise means for converting faith into experience, श्रुति into दर्शन And their first answer to the question was Because I m confounding matter and mind, or to go deeper Nature and Spirit, which it is necessary for me to distinguish (विवेकख्याति)—this is Wisdom ('सर्वं कर्माखिलं ज्ञाने समाप्यते'). B t note that this answer just carries us one step forward and no farther For the question still remains: How am I to turn this intellectual distinction into a reality of experience?" That points to the next step

which was to show the practical method ('योग') of the separation of Nature and Spirit. This was the योग—the practical complement of the theoretical सांख्य. The essential difference between सांख्य and योग is more correctly formulated as the difference between the theoretical and the practical side of single system of philosophy than as the difference between two Sāmkhyas, one of which was 'nirīśvara' and the other sesvara (atheistic and theistic), as is sometimes done. But the mysticism of both Sāmkhya and Yoga did not appeal to the scientifically-minded who thought that it was necessary to investigate the properties ('प्रमेय') of Nature and Spirit—(अनात्मन् and आत्मन्)—as we do those of any other natural object of experience. In order to carry on this investigation, the वैशेषिक (the investigator of विशेष = distinctive properties) divided Reality into certain categories and studied them in detail. But is not our investigation bound to go wrong unless our method is right? Hence the necessity of a sound system of Logic ('न्याय'). Thus न्याय became a necessary complement to वैशेषिक. But Natural Philosophy (वैशेषिक) and Logic (न्याय) cannot altogether satisfy man's spiritual needs. Moreover people were frightened by the growing rationalism of the new schools. They compared the rationalists of their day to 'jackals howling against one another' (M. Bh. S'āntiparva). Consequently "Back to the Vedas" was the next cry. And the first attempt in this direction was to 'reflect upon' (मीमांसा) and systematise the teachings of the sacrificial section of the Veda viz. the Brāhmaṇas." This was मीमांसा — पूर्वमीमांसा — कर्ममीमांसा — धर्ममीमांसा. But the mechanical religion of पूर्वमीमांसा was soon found unsatisfactory and was superseded by the spiritual religion of उत्तरमीमांसा or ब्रह्ममीमांसा which was a systematisation of the teachings of the Upaniṣads—the वेदान्त—the conclusion, the end, or the siddhānta of the Veda. The last two were revivalist schools whose ancient prototypes were the schools of the Yājñikas (ritualists) and Brahmavids' (the teachers of the Upaniṣads) respectively.

Such is the *logical* development of the six Darśanas of the Brāhmaṇas. To prevent misunderstanding it should be noted that no system wiped out of existence its predecessor and so all the systems sometimes appear running parallel to one another like mountain-streams. But this does not militate against the *logical* principle of evolution which gave them birth, and which binds them together in a single movement of thought.

Next, let us turn to Buddhism and Jainism. We treat them separately from the Brāhmaṇa darśanas, not because they had no organic relations with those darśanas, but because the *essential idea* of each of the schools falls within the inner history of that school itself, howsoever much some of its details may have been determined by the influence of neighbouring schools.

When the spiritual life and thought of the age of the Upaniṣads had, in certain quarters, degenerated into barren intellectualism on the one hand and superstitious sacerdotalism on the other there sprang those two movements of Religion which we know as Buddhism and J A I N I S M. Although their real beginnings go back to n earlier date when they were parts of one stupendous whol which we know as the Indian Religion, and even tho gh with Gautama Buddha and Mahāvīrasvāmin they were protests against the religion of their day and not independent religions as they are ordinarily represented, still they took a definite shape and acquired an individuality in the teachings of these two reformers who lived about the fifth or sixth ce tury before the Christian era

T the problem of the post Upa ṣadic age—How to reach Brahman ?‡—the answer of Gautama Buddha was: By getting rid of *tṛṣṇā* which is the root of all misery; and by ceasing to beli v in the self (*āt māa*) which is the centre of all selfishness which causes transmigrations from life to death

‡ See "T vijja Sutta."

and from death to another life, ad infinitum; and lastly by undergoing a course of discipline which would help in achieving the goal. To justify the ending of tṛṣṇā and prove it to be futile—in fact, in order to shift the standard of values from the external to the internal world, and even to destroy both altogether in the interests of 'tṛṣṇoccheda or 'vāsanākṣaya the Buddhist philosopher slipped into metaphysics inspite of the Master's repeated warning against it. Eventually the numerous schisms, which arose in the Buddhist Church soon after the death of the Master became crystallised in the four famous schools of Buddhist Philosophy viz., the schools of the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas, the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas, maintaining respectively the doctrines of Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, Idealistic Phenomenalism, and Nihilistic Monism—four logical steps in the process of thought from common sense to the highest wisdom, according to Buddhism. The Mādhyamikas, or Madhyamakas as they were sometimes called, were advocates of the metaphysical Middle Path an expression probably intended to correspond to the ethical Middle Path ('madhyamā pratipad') of Gautama Buddha. The two extremes which they repudiate are सत् and असत् which at the middle or meeting point destroy each other leaving nothing but शून्यता as the core of Reality. This शून्यता which is deduced as a logical consequence of the doctrine of the Middle Path is not to be confounded with असत् which is relative as distinguished from the former which is absolute.

अस्तीति नास्तीति उभेऽपि अन्ता
शुद्धी अशुद्धीति इमेऽपि अन्ता ।
तस्मादुभे अन्त विवर्जयित्वा
मध्ये हि स्थानं न ([1] मध्येऽपि स्थानं न) करोति पण्डितः ॥

—Samādhirāja Sūtra.

* अतो भावाभावान्तद्वयरहितत्वात् सर्वस्वभावानुत्पत्तिलक्षणा शून्यता मध्यमा प्रतिपत् मध्यमो मार्ग इत्युच्यते —Mādhyamika Vṛtti.

Of these, Sarvāstivāda or the doctrine that "All is real" associated with the school of the Vaibhāṣikas, is said to be the earliest. But obviously if there is any point in the सर्व (all) of 'सर्वास्तिवाद' it must have been preceded by a doctrine in which a part of Reality was affirmed and the rest denied. This must be evidently the doctrine of Idealism, in which ideas are declared to be the only reals. The conjecture is justified by our knowledge of the earlier schools of Buddhism of which one was called the school of Prajnaptivādins or Idealists, and another of Vibhajyavādins or part Realists. Thus originally there must have been only two schools of Buddhist Philosophy the school of Idealism and that of Realism. From the direct Realism of the Vaibhāṣikas the first step in the direction of Idealism is the Indirect Realism or half-hearted Idealism of the Sautrāntikas which in its turn logically leads to the complete Idealism of the Yogācāra school. The latter which was a resuscitation of the Vibhajyavāda and Prajnaptivāda§ passed into what is called S'ūnyavāda or Absolute Nihilism, but what, as noticed above, should more accurately be called

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§ These doctrines were at first expressed in terms of the reality of Time But Time in Buddhism, it should be noted stands for the contents of Time. Thus, सर्वम् अस्ति In the "Abhidharmakośa, the name Vibhajyavādin' has been traced to the fact that the school answer the old question: Does all exist?" with a distinction; the present and the past which has not yet borne its fruit exist; the future and the past which has borne its fruit do not exist (see Keith's " Buddhist Philosophy p. 153). The reason for the distinction is plain in the half-hearted Idealism of the Vibhajyavāda. For while the future and the past which has already borne its fruit and is no more, exist only in idea, the present and the past which h s yet to bear its fruit are real and cannot be denied. It will be noticed that, for what I consider to be valid reasons, I have modified the interpretations of the words Sarvāstivāda and Vibhajyavāda which are generally given.

Nihilistic Monism of the Mādhyamikas, or Madhyamakas, in accordance with its logic contained in the Mādhyamika Vṛtti.

The Jaina Darśana is only one. It formulates the doctrine of the relativity of Truth and thereby shows that each of the different schools represents certain aspect of Truth (सत्य) and is so far true. Thus partial truth (विकलादेश) belongs to the several darśanas while absolute and complete truth is revealed in the Jaina method of Syādvāda ('सकलादेश'). The doctrine of Naya ('नय') or leading point of view as indicated by its comparative simplicity is perhaps older than the Syādvāda ('स्याद्वाद') which is highly complicated. Besides, there is nothing in common between them except that both of them are expressions of the same point of view—viz. अनेकान्तवाद the doctrine of the many-sidedness of Truth. They cannot therefore be regarded as two stages of a single process of thought, but must be traced to separate sources united in a common point of view.

Such are the logical relations of the different systems of Indian Philosophy *inter se*. Each of the systems moreover, has a history which discloses a similar evolution of doctrines, determined partly by their inner principle of growth and partly by the influence of other systems. Thus, for example, Sāṁkhya which was originally theistic, as is clear from the evidence of the Upaniṣads the Bhagavadgītā, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas had become atheistic about the time of the later sections of the Mahābhārata, Sāṁkhya-kārikā and the Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras under the pressure of its own doctrine of Prakṛti, which being charged with the energy of evolutionary activity rendered God superfluous and made him drop off from the system like a unused limb, until restored artificially at long last by the author of the Sāṁkhya-Pravacana Bhāṣya under the influence of Vedānta. Another possible hypothesis which I put forward somewhat hesitatingly to explain the atheistic character of mediaeval Sāṁkhya is that the atheistic Sāṁkhya was not

a descendant of the Sāṁkhya of the S'vetāśvatara Upaniṣad, but of one of those systems which have been referred to and rejected in its introductory stanza "कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा" etc. Similarly such particular doctrines as those of पुरुष and प्रकृति have undergone evolution in the course of ages. पुरुष was originally the thinking substance and it was therefore absurd to deny that he was essentially प्रमातृ. This view is held by Vyāsa, the commentator of Pātañjala Sūtras. But it was felt that this was inconsistent with the transcendental nature of पुरुष the basic doctrine of the Sāṁkhya philosophy and it was consequently discarded and पुरुष was made mere साक्षिन् instead of प्रमातृ a view later rejected or modified by Vijñānabhikṣu in the Sāṁkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya. Similarly Prakṛti was at first either the power of God or the primordial subst nce from which had emanated the manifold universe like a tree from a seed. Afterwards it came to be regarded as an independent energy which was another name fo the potential unmanifested world. Later, the character of this Prakṛti or Avyakta came to be defined in a way which shows that the problem of philosophy had shifted from cosmogony to psychology and ethics. Prakṛti comes to be conceived as a complex of सत्त्व रजस् and तमस्, the three principles which represent respectively सुख दुःख and मोह in our life. Here is a unique form of idealism which is not cognitive, or conative, or imaginative, but emotional, that is to say an idealism in which the world is not conceived either as Idea or as Will or as Imagination but as Emotion, which it is the business of Puruṣa to get rid of. The Emotionalism, or Emotional Idealism if one can use such an expression without committing a paradox, was evidently preceded by a stage represented in the Bhagavadgītā in which the cognitive conative and emotional elements of idealism were still held together in th functions assigned to सत्त्व रजस् and तमस्. Moreover Vijñānabhikṣu restores the view in

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which Prakṛti is regarded as the *dravya* or *dharmin* of which सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् are dharmas or attributes as well as constituent elements.

A tenet of the Sâṃkhyas which is particularly interesting to us from the point of view of Jainism is their unreserved condemnation of 'hiṃsâ' including *sacrificial hiṃsâ*. (See Vijñânabhikṣu's commentary on the Sâṃkhya Sûtras quoted in the Supplementary XI. Notes on St. XI). This attitude seems to be due to the association of the Sâṃkhya with the Bhâgavata Dharma (see the Mahâbhârata, Sânti Parva). There is story in the Mahâbhârata which connects Kapila with opposition to sacrificial hiṃsâ. Hopkins notices a passage in the Mahâbhârata xii, 269 9 where Kapila is presented in the light of an adverse critic from the point of view of orthodox Brahmanism "On seeing a cow led out for sacrifice, Kapila, filled with compassion, cried out "O ye Vedas! an exclamation of reproof against the Vedas, as inculcating cruelty to animals. At this he was attacked by the inspired cow with long discourse, challenging him to show why the Vedas should be regarded as authoritative in any regard, if not in regard to the slaughter of animals. Kapila appears in this tale as teacher of unorthodox non-injury and maintains to the end (so that his view is presented as really correct) that not the sacrifice of animals but the 'sacrifice (worship) of knowledge' is the best" Prof Hopkins is mistaken in the view that in this passage there is any intention of representing Kapila as "unorthodox" K pil s exclamatio "O y Vedas! only means O Y Vedas!" what sins are committed in thy name!" The whole point of the story is to suggest that there was a higher kind of sacrifice in Vedism itself which had as much right to be considered orthodox as th sacrifice of animals, because the original meaning of the word यज्ञ as its root (यज्) would indicate, was only worship of God.

The system of Yoga which came into existence as a complement to Sāṁkhya retained its pristine purity probably for a century or two after the death of Gautama Buddha. In the Sūtras of Patañjali the white light of spirituality is somewhat dimmed by a black jet of miraculous 'विभूति's and 'सिद्धि's. Later the system split into two branches, the Haṭha Yoga and the Rāja Yoga, of which the former sometimes associated itself with certain degraded forms of Sakti-worship and Mahāyāna Buddhism, while the latter namely Rājayoga restored purity to the system under the influence of Vedānta.

The problem of the Vaiśeṣika was to distinguish Ātman from Anātman by the scientific method of investigating properties ('विशेष') of things. Its consequent silence, more or less, on the problem of God in the Sūtras has been misunderstood as a mild form of atheism. But subsequently it allied itself with Nyāya which is enthusiastic about developing a system of logic, and by means of it proving the existence of God Soul and Immortality In its later stages the Nyāya mistook the means for the end and spent all its energies in building up a science of Logic discussing its minutest details with a hair-splitting subtlety which has no parallel in the history of human thought.

The system of Pūrvamīmāṁsā was at first a logic of Vedic interpretation, b t since it was undertaken in the interests of the religion of the sacrifice, the sacrifice occupied a large place in the religious philosophy of that system. Every detail of the sacrifice became a fetish till at last in the philosophy of the system God was not and the gods were little more than *some things* which were expressed by words in the dative case in the formulae of offerings. Yet the principle which was responsible for this evolution or degeneration as some may call it, was far from ignoble If the Brāhmaṇas came to be regarded as the centre of Vedic literature and sacrifice has the essence of religion it was because *doing* and not *being* was regarded as the ideal of life. Secondly in attributing to the sacrifice a compelling power which governed gods as

well as men, the system of Pūrvamīmāmsā placed Law above the arbitrary will of gods. Besides this, by defining Pramāṇa as that which makes known what was not known already it virtually separated the spheres of Reason and Faith: so that the Veda ruled only where the senses and reason had no authority that is, in matters which transcended their sphere. The school also distinguished between the main propositions and biter dicta, and between a precept and the legend by which the precept was supported. It thus winnowed the wheat from the tares, and made for rationalisation of religion, although apparently no system could be more dogmatic.

The evolution of the doctrines of Vedānta is too well known to need much elaboration. H w ver brief review of the philosophy of the Ācāryas may be attempted just to mark the principal stages of its evolution. The earliest school f the Vedantic theology was *Bhedābheda-vāda* i. e. Difference-cum-Unity in which *bheda and abheda* were regarded as equally real, and the ideal of lif was supposed to consist in recognizing this fact or in progressing from one to the other (These were the doctrines of समुच्चय and क्रममुक्ति) respectively. Next came the *Upādhi-vāda* in which *abheda* was regarded as essential and real, nd *bheda* as dependent upon *upādhi* yet equally real. This more less self-contradictory formula of the भेदाभेदवाद and उपाधिवाद was superseded by the केवलाद्वैत f S'amkara in which the Unity was declared to be real and the difference as unreal. The next stage was to refuse to relegate Individual Spirits and Nature to the category of the Unreal and to substitute for S'amkara Absolute-Monism-with-Māyā the doctrine of triune (three-in-one) *complex Reality* (विशिष्टाद्वैत) consisting f th three principles of

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This school has not received th attention of Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa beyond one Stanza and its commentary; moreover portion of the history of its development falls after the age f these Jaina critics.

† This should not be unwelcome to the Jains.

God, Nature and Man, individual spirits, of which the two latter were forms of the first, but all the three were equally real. To the next Ācārya—Vallabha—all the preceding doctrines including Śaṁkara's Kevalādvaita which was based on Māyāvāda appeared to be a departure from rigorous Advaitism, inasmuch as in all of them something over and above Brahman was posited. Hence he claimed for his own doctrine of simple Brahman-without-Māyā the title of Brahmavāda or 'शुद्धाद्वैत' i. e. pure advaita as distinguished from the Kevalādvaita of Śaṁkara and the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja. The advaitisms of Rāmānuja and Vallabha remained stereotyped, but that of Śaṁkara assumed several forms. To use the simplest metaphor for illustrating the unreality of individual selves as against the reality of the Universal Self is to say that the former are प्रतिबिम्ब s or reflections of the latter. This was बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बवाद and it was as old as the Upaniṣads. But the difficulty felt in its acceptance was that this presupposes the existence of a separate medium of reflection, such as water or glass whereas Māyā or Avidyā cannot be said to be separate from Brahman. To meet this objection another theory known as 'अवच्छेदवाद' or the theory of delimitation, was started. According to it the individual selves were not the reflections of Brahman in a separate medium, but Brahman delimited or circumscribed by the walls of individuality. But walls, too are something other than the space which they enclose. To avoid this element of dvaitism, another interesting metaphor was suggested, namely 'कर्णराधेयवत्' i.e. as Karṇa, the famous Mahābhārata warrior mistook himself as the son of Rādhā when in truth he was the son of Pṛthā, in the same way Brahman mistakes itself for jīva. Such was the progressive attempt at illustrating the unity of jīva and Brahman. Similarly the objectiv world (विषयचैतन्य-प्रमेयचैतन्य) is at first made parallel with the subject (विषयिचैतन्य-प्रमातृचैतन्य) both being regarded as modes of a single Ideal Reality (चैतन्य). This form of Idealism which might appear to be a concession to Realism is carried further in the same direction,

so that we have next a distinction drawn between ईश्वरसृष्टि and जीवसृष्टि *i. e.* the world which is a creation of God, and the world which is creation of the individual self; thus the external world which I see round about me is God-made, whereas the personal interest which I take in it is what makes it my world; so that Moksa, in as-much-as it is my Moksa, is the cessation of the latter not of the former This is obviously a greater concession to Realism than that contained in the parallelism of प्रतिबिम्बवाद and अवच्छेदवाद Next, the pendulum swings back full length and Idealism is reinstated with vengeance; thus, the external reality may be regarded as creation of the individual mind which, in its turn may be supposed to be a fictitious manifestation of Brahman; this is known as दृष्टिसृष्टि; *i. e.* to see is t create, as opposed to the earlier सृष्टिदृष्टि, that is you see what is created lready This doctrine is coupled with एकजीववाद where एकजीव may be हिरण्यगर्भ in which case the world would be a dream of the cosmic soul this is bjective Idealism. The last and th extreme point to which Idealism could go but which it had never reached so boldly since the days of Gaudapāda and the Buddhist Nihilists and Śaṁkara, as he ppears in the commentary on Gaudapāda s kārikās, is that the external Reality does not exist at all, being no better than th footprint of bird in the sky' (यथा खे वै पक्षिणां पदम्).¶

Such is the evolution of the Darśanas, of the schools of the Ācāryas, and of the doctrines of some Śaṁkara commentators.

(b) *Historical or Chronological*

Let us now turn from the logical to the chronological evolution of the Darśanas. Th task of determining their chronology is not hopeless, but it is certainly very difficult,

¶ For the different schools f Ś aṁkara philosophy see Das Gupta very valuabl History f Indian Philosophy vol. II which I received after the foregoing paragraphs were ready for print.

because a number of confusions have to be avoided in drawing conclusions. First, it is to be remembered that early thought in the shape of stray ideas and references does not make a darśana in the sense of a system of philosophy which represents a later stage in its history; for example, in the case of Sāṃkhya and Yoga long centuries of thought and practice had to roll away before these darśanas came to be formulated in Sūtras. Secondly the age of the sūtras of a darśana should not be confounded with that of its beginning; for sūtras came only after the darśana had already undergone some systematisation. Thirdly the extant sūtras are not necessarily the first of their kind but the last, that have supplanted their predecessors by the law of the survival of the fittest; the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are an example to the point. Fourthly while determining the age of particular sūtras by means of external and internal evidence, it should be borne in mind that they were revised and enlarged from time to time as new opponents and new points of view presented themselves [illegible] and consequently such evidence cannot be taken to be conclusive as regards the entire work. Fifthly each of the darśanas, apart from the sūtras, has had its history and has not remained the same in every large and small detail, and therefore the form in which we find a darśana presented in latter-day summaries and manuals is not the form in which it has really existed throughout the ages. This long list of caveats is sufficient to account for the complexity of the chronological problem and the resulting difficulty of arriving at indubitable conclusions. A large mass of controversial literature relating to the history of the darśanas has thus grown, which it is impossible to present and discuss within the space at our disposal. All that we can do is to mention a few salient points leaving the reader to gather more information from standard books and articles bearing upon the subject.

(1) The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga are the two oldest Darśanas the former being found in a sufficiently volved form in the later Upaniṣads, and the practices of the latter being also

old and known to Gautama Buddha as an established method discovering Truth. And yet the extant sūtras of the Sāṁkh system seem to be unknown to Vācaspatimiśra (9th centu A.C.) and even to Mādhava the author of the Sarva-darśan Saṁgraha (1350 A. C.) and they appear for the first time wi the Vṛtti of Aniruddha (1500 A. C.) and a little later with t Bhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu (second half of the sixteenth centu A.C.) Even if such late date be not warranted it is sign ficant that no sūtra of the work has been quoted by any wri earlier than Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu† that Śaṁkara wh dealing with the system extensively does not quote sing one of the sūtras, and that the author of the Kārikās mentio the Ṣaṣṭitantra as his source and not the sūtras. All this tak with the fact that the sūtras contain references to the philosoph cal doctrines of later Buddhism raises a high probability th the sūtras of this school belong to a very late date§ Whoev

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Recently Marshall has opined that it existed even the pre-Vedic civilisation of the Indus valley

† Apart from the fact that Aniruddha had already writt the Vṛtti, it may be taken as certain that Vijñānabhikṣu h not committed forgery since the work contains some sūt such as ईश्वरासिद्धेः which Vijñānabhikṣu finds exceeding inconvenient for his theistic position.

§ It is not unreasonable to contend that on the oth hand this is only a argument from silence, and that li Bhāsa's plays which have been recently published, the Sāṁkh Sūtras may have remained buried for centuries until Anirudd and Vijñānabhikṣu—like Ganapati Sastri in the oth case—unearthed them. This is rendered plausibl by t fact that the fifth chapter of the work contains parables whic it is said, were found in the old Ṣaṣṭitantra, but are bee from all the late works except the sūtras. The nucleus of t sūtras may thus go back to the period of the Mahābhārat but not the work in its present form which discusses the tene of all the other darśanas including those of later Buddhism.

be the author of the sūtras there is no doubt that the first teacher of the Sāṃkhya system was Kapila, whom tradition knows as "आदि विद्वान्" or the first philosopher He is a semi-historical person to whom a reference seems to have been made in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad‡. Kapila taught this holy and

‡ It is curious that the author of the Bhagavadgītā who speaks frequently of "Sāṃkhya" does not refer to Kapila in connection with Sāṃkhya, but refers to him in a different context—in the chapter on the 'vibhūtis or glorious manifestations of God—as an ideal "siddha [सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः] But this difficulty is to some extent reduced by the occurrence of numerous passages in the Mahābhārata where Kapila is mentioned as the teacher of the Sāṃkhya. The word Kapila in the passage in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad in which it occurs [ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत्] has been interpreted by one commentator as the tawny sungod and this interpretation has been accepted and supported by Max Muller probably under the impression that the commentary was Śaṁkara's, which it is not. It is not possible to rule out this interpretation as absurd, but it is less probable than the other which makes a reference to the sage of that name. That Kapila was known as historical person long before the time of Gautama Buddha is clear from the name of the birth-place of Gautama which was Kapila-vastu the residence of Kapila [Keith's remarks to the contrary o p. 50 of his "Sāṃkhya System" in the "Heritage of India" Series are unconvincing] Moreover it is noteworthy that S'aṁkara in the course of his Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtras, in meeting the claim of the Sāṃkhyas that their system was the best exponent of the Vedic teaching inasmuch as the Veda (Śvet. Up.) itself declares Kapila as "perfect in knowledge says that Kapila in the passage might very well refer to some other Kapila than the teacher of atheistic Sāṃkhya, such as one who was elsewhere called Vāsudeva Kapila, the sage who burnt the sons of Sagara.

foremost system to Āsuri, and Āsuri taught it to Pañcaśikha, who amplified it.* From the last-named the system passed down, from master to pupil,† to "Bhārgava, Ulūka, Vālmīki, Hārita, Devala and others"‡ and finally to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, who made an abridgment of it in series of stanzas in āryā metre, work which is known as the "Sāṃkhyakārikās. This work says the author "contains all that is found in the Ṣaṣṭitantra, less the Parables and the controversies with other schools. In the Mahābhārata xii, 819 59 along with Kapila, Āsuri and Pañcaśikha, as teachers of the spiritual doctrine with twentyfifth principle, are mentioned Jaigīṣavya, Asita Devala, Parāśara, Vārṣagaṇya, Bhṛgu, Śuka, Gautama, Ārṣṭiṣeṇa, Garga, Nārada, Pulastya, Sanatkumāra, Śukra and Kāśyapa. The teaching of many of these, as we know from other sources, was by no means distinctively Sāṃkhya and this, the afore only goes to prove that the Sāṃkhya at one time, was a general term for philosophy and was hardly distinguishable from Vedānta. The Chinese tradition reveals one more name, that of Vodhu, as teacher of the Sāṃkhya systems of the epic age. Among writers who succeeded Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the literary history of the Sāṃkhya were Vārṣagaṇya (= Rainhost" in Chinese) Vindhyavāsin, Māṭhara, Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu. As Vārṣagaṇya figures in the list given in the MBh which knows nothing of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, he cannot be later than Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and so far the Chinese tradition must be wrong.

Of the next exponent of the Sāṃkhya system—Āsuri—we know nothing except that verse has been attributed to

* एतत्पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधाकृतं तन्त्रम् ॥
—Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa No. 70.

† भार्गवोलूकवाल्मीकिहारीतदेवलप्रभृतीनागतम् ।
—Māṭharavṛtti on the Sāṃkya-kārikā No. 71.

‡ शिष्यपरम्परयागतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।
संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ —S. K. 71.

§ See Syādvādamañjarī on St. XV

him in which he says that pleasure and pain which are really forms of Buddhi are reflected in the Puruṣa like the moon in water (Syād. St. xv).

✓ About Pañcaśikha however we know a great deal more from the Mahābhārata where his system has been presented in detail and he is associated with the teaching of the Pañcarātra doctrines, a distinctly theistic school of the Sāṃkhya known as early as in the time of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. Several quotations are made from his works by later writers such as Vācaspati and others. The famous work known as Ṣaṣṭitantra† has been attributed to him by a Chinese tradition, though doubtless by an error § since his teachings as given in the Mahābhārata, differ in several of their details from those found in the Sāṃkhya-kārikās which profess to be founded upon it. Some attribute this work to " Vārṣagaṇy who they say is is a definite

* Hopkins has made a hort sketch of Pañcaśikha s Sāṃkhya in his " Great Epic of India." See pp. 142-155 See also Keith s Sāṃkhya System " pp. 39-44

† Some think that '[illegible]'—is only a common name and like 'योगानुशासनम्' means only the teaching of the philosophy of the sixty principles. This, however is less probable. As a work it may be referred to about 150 B. C. If it is Varṣagaṇya s as has been suggested.

§ Keith; contra Hiriyanna. See the latter s article on " The Ṣaṣṭitantra and Vārṣagaṇya in J O. R. Madras Vol III Pt. ii. where he argues in favour of the Chinese tradition that Pañcaśikha was the utho of Ṣaṣṭitantra," a book of 60 000 verses. This me ni g of th wo l Ṣaṣṭitantra is different from the one give by \ ca patimiśra in his Sāṃkhya-tattva Kaumudi on the authorit f a RājaVārtik and contained lso in the Ahirbudh ya Samhitā. See Keith s Sāṃkhya System pp. 62-64 and Woo's Y ga Sūtra, Preface.

historical figure, perhaps the first historical figure in the Sâṃkhya and Yoga tradition.

Vârṣagaṇya (=the Rainbost in Chinese) is mentioned in the Mahâbhârata as one of the teachers of the Sâṃkhya-Yoga. Vâcaspati describes him in the Bhâmatî* as one of the teachers who expounded Yoga Śâstra ("योगशास्त्रव्युत्पादयिता"). Consequently it is probable that he belonged to the age when the Sâṃkhya and the Yoga were regarded as two branches of a single Śâstra. Some have gone the length of suggesting that he was Vedântin—in all probability a 'pariṇâmavâdin'* The great Ṣaṣṭitantra " has been ascribed to him, in the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitâ "; and if the table of contents given in the latter book can be trusted Vârṣagaṇya, as the author of the work was follower of theistic Sâṃkhya. Only four or five quotations from his work now remain, in one of which he is cited as opposing the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, in another as dealing with the fourfold character of Ignorance, in third as declaring that the phenomenal forms of the Guṇas (Prakṛti) were mere illusion and so on. Mâṭhara, the author of commentary on the Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ is mentioned in the Anuyogadvâra, a work of the S'vetâmbara Jaina canon, which was given its present form between the third and the fifth century of the Christian era† and therefore cannot be later than the second half of the second or the first half of the third century

Of Vindhyavâsin we know something from Chinese sources and also from verse in Kumârila's S'lokavârtika, Anumâna Pari 143 where he is said to have held the view that the inference of fire from smoke relates to particulars

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* See Hiriyanna article in J. O. R. Madras Vol. II Pt. ii.

† Weber

and not to universals To this some more light has been added recently by the publication of the "Tattvasaṃgraha" of S'āntarakṣita and its commentary by Kamalaśīla. In Paramārtha's "Life of Vasubandhu" which is found in Chinese it is recorded that Vindhyavāsin was successful in a debate with Buddhamitra, a teacher of Vasubandhu and after this triumph he returned to his home on the Vindhya mountain and died there. Attempts have been made to identify him with Īśvarakṛṣṇa. But Kamalaśīla in his commentary on the Tattvasaṃgraha quotes a verse in which "Rudrila" is given as the proper name of Vindhyavāsin§

V The last but not the least of the important landmarks in the history of the Sāṃkhya system is Vijñānabhikṣu a devout and learned theist who wrote a Bhāṣya known as the Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya" on the Sūtras attributed to Kapila, wherein he interprets the Sāṃkhya system in the light of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas, and thus restores the theistic character which at one time belonged to the Sāṃkhya system but had been replaced by atheism in the latter half of the Mahābhārata period, and during the whole of the Kārikā period from Īśvarakṛṣṇa to Vācaspatimiśra, the author of the Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī.

The history of the Sāṃkhya thought may be divided into five periods, which can be approximately fixed:—

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* ईश्वरमत्यनुमानवस्तुबोधात् प्रमाणता ।
विशेषदर्शमेवं स्थितं विन्ध्यवासिना ॥

§ अनेन दधि तत्क्षीरं तत्क्षीरं तद्दधीति च ।
वदता रुद्रिलेनैव ख्यापिता विन्ध्यवासिता ॥

G. O. S. Tattvasaṃgraha p. 22 Com.

Here Rudrila the Vindhyavāsin is ridiculed as 'a dweller in the forest who cannot distinguish between milk and curds. The reference is to the Sāṃkhya's 'Satkāryavāda

1. The Sāṃkhya of the Upaniṣads and that of the Bhagavadgītā [circa 1000 to 800 B. C.]

2. The Sāṃkhya just before the age of Gautama Buddha. Of this however we know very little.

3. The Sāṃkhya of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas: the earlier and the later stage the former theistic, the latter atheistic. [circa 600 to 200 B. C]

4. The Sāṃkhya as known to Bada āyaṇa, the author of the Vedānta sūtras, and the Sāṃkhya of the Kā ikās [circa 200 B. C. to 200 A. D.] both distinctly theistic.

5. The Sāṃkhya of Vijñānabhikṣu which is distinctly theistic. (16th century A D)

(3) The Yoga Darśana appears in its fully developed form in the existing Yoga Sūtras" of Patañjali who, if he is identical with the famous thor of the Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya" belongs to the middle of the second century B.C. The identity however has been questioned on fairly reasonable, but by no means conclusi e, grounds.† This darśana, owing to its mystic as well as practical character has been fa oured by the Brāhmaṇas, the Bauddhas and the Jainas alike, and has been passed over by Malliṣeṇa without criticism except in one or two places where the doctrines which re criticised are held by the Yogins as common property with the Sāṃkhyas. As bserved before, th system is undoubtedly pre-Buddhistic. Tradition ascribes its origin to "Hiraṇyagarbha (see Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad) who, like "Kapila"‡ may be either historical person or th Cosmic Spirit of the "Golden Egg " of the famous Hiraṇyagarbha Sūkta " of th Ṛgveda, Maṇḍala X. This, again is not

† See Wood's "Yoga Sūtras"; and Dasgupta's History of Indian Philosophy pp. 231-32

‡ The problem of interpretation is exactly similar

inconsistent with another tradition which makes Yājñavalkya the first ṛṣi who received his inspiration of Yoga from the Sun-god who is the spirit of the "Golden Egg" As already observed the Yoga darśana reveals two distinct strands, one mystic and truly religious, the other superstitious and gross. The case is similar to, or perhaps the same as that presented by the Atharvaveda and must be similarly explained It is due to the amalgamation, or rather the crude mixture of the religious ideas and practices of the Āryans and the pre-Āryan inhabitants of India, and also of those of the upper and lower strata of the Āryans themselves. The principal works of this school which are of philosophical interest are,—the Yogasūtras of Patañjali; the Bhāṣya thereon which i attributed to one Vyāsa, who cannot be the same as the author of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas in their earlier form; Vācaspati's commentary called Tattva Vaiśāradī"; Bhojavṛtti " a brief commentary attributed to King Bhoja and lastly Vijñāna bhikṣu's "Yoga-Vārtika on the Bhāṣya There are numerous other works dealing with Haṭha Yoga* and Tāntric elements in the system a nd t e of occult philosophy and superstition—which we need not pause to notice, as they possess little that is germane to our study of the Syādvādamañjarī.

(3 and 4). The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya as observed before originated as separate systems, but th former which was in its origin a child of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, soon became a supplement—an adopted child, to use a metaphor—of the latter Thus, Vātsyāyana the Ny ya-bhāṣyakāra treats the Vaiśeṣika as a prati tantr Siddhānta of Nyāya. In the post-Christian Buddhist ge their alliance seemed to be so complete that the Sūtras of the Nyāya School were sometimes referred to taken from that of the Vaiśeṣikas For exampl Vasubandhu seems to hav used th word V iśeṣika in this wider sense

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* See Tucci's "Pre-Diṅnāga B ddhist T ts (G O. S.), Introduction pp. xxvi xxvii.

and the commentator of Āryadeva refers to the quotations which the latter has made i his "S'ataśāstra" from the N. S. as those of th V S. Yet for a long time the two systems recei ed separate treatment an l their authors remained separately ttached to their respective systems. Udayana, in the tenth century was the first important writer who wrote on both, tho gh separately The alliance thus initiated by unity of uthorship ended i complete fusion in later times, so much so that the two systems often came to be designated by a single name, Nyāya " or Tarka "

✓ The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya are beyond doubt later than the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, and we owe their origin mainly to the spirit of inquiry which stirred the Indian mind about the time of Gautama Buddha. ✓Of the two again, the Vaiśeṣika is elder. This tradition seems to have been preserved as late as the time of Uddyotakara, who calls the author of the Nyāya Sūtras 'ऋषि' and that of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras 'परमर्षि' The Vaiśeṣika darśana deals directly with the problem of the 'viśeṣas or properties of things, its system of logic being subsidiary to the process, and not vice versa as with th Nyāya. The Sūtras of the Vaiśeṣika system are ascribed to sage named Kaṇāda or Ulūka, whose latter name occurs in th Mahābhārata as that of Sāṃkhya-Yoga‡ teacher—a fact which must be taken as indicating that the darśanas had not yet come to be clearly marked off from one anothe The uthor of the Nyāya-sūtras was Gautama, who may or may not be identical with the uthor of the Gautama Dharma Sūtras †

‡ Could not this have been the rigin of the designation औलूक्य as applied to the Vaiśeṣikas ?

† Except that 'Gautama is very common name among sages, there is nothing to favour the former alternative; at the same time it cannot be peremptorily rejected as a " worthless identification. That it ould involve very early date fo the Nyāya sūtras need not worry us. See my paper in the Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference."

ghoṣa's Sūtrālaṃkāra * which places the origin of the Vaiśeṣika system before Buddha.† Even if such an early date for the Vaiśeṣika darśana be denied, there can be no doubt that it must have originated long before the time of Aśvaghoṣa. According to Ui "the origin of the Vaiśeṣika was in the time of Mahāvīra and Buddha (the sixth fifth century B.C.)" although the systematisation [i. e. the composition of the Sūtras] of the Vaiśeṣika is later than 300 B. C., probably in the first century B.C."‡ The latter conclusion is deduced from the following facts :- First, "certain notions found in the Nyāya system and the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika are met in the Caraka Saṃhitā written by the physician of King Kaniṣka (1st century of the Christian era)§; secondly Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra (supposed to be work of the third century before Christ) divides Ānvīkṣikī into Sāṃkhya Yoga and Lokāyata but makes no mention of Vaiśeṣika which shows that the systematisation of the Vaiśeṣika is later than 300 B.C., at the earliest and it probably took place in the first century B.C., some time after the sixth schism (18 A. D) of Jainism.¶ As the date of Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra is now generally accepted to be century or two after the Christian era, and not 300 B.C., as it was uncritically believed at one time, the above argument may appear to be shaky. But it should be noted that the Introductory chapter of the "Arthaśāstra in

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* Aśvaghoṣa's authorship of the work has been questioned. But the tradition recorded there still remains and cannot be set aside as worthless.

† Ui's Vaiśeṣika Philosophy

‡ Ui; Dr Faddegon following Suzuki.

§ Faddegon. According to Keith, "not only is Caraka's date uncertain, but his work has suffered refashioning, and the authenticity of the text cannot be admitted.

¶ The value of this tradition which is recorded in the Avaśyaka is questioned by Keith who thinks that the passage in which it occurs is probably an interpolation.

which the reference is made to the branches of Ānvīkṣikī" may well have been older the chapters which underwent revision being only those which related to the subject-matter of the "Arthaśāstra Even taking the later date which is assigned to the "Arthaśāstra" it cannot be asserted that the Vais'eṣika was unknown as late as the second century A D For As'vaghoṣa in his "Sūtrālamkāra" refers to "Vaiśeṣika Śāstra Thirdly the doctrine of सामान्य and विशेष as presented in the "Vais'eṣika Sūtras is less advanced than that which is attributed to one Rohagutta who it is said imported it into Jainism about the time of the sixth Jaina schism (A. D 18.).‡

Whatever doubt may be cast on the value of the evidence mentioned above we are on absolutely solid ground when we come to later Buddhist writers A series of them—Nāgārjuna, Ārya Deva and Harivarman—ranging roughly from the second to the end of the third century A. D—show progressively detailed knowledge of the characteristic doctrines of the Vais'eṣika system § There can be no doubt, therefore, that the lower limit of the date of the "Vais'eṣika Sūtras is the end of th first century A D While the upper limit may be several centuries before the Christian era and may go as far back as the time of Gautama Buddha as believed by the auth r of the Sūtrālamkāra" ¶

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* The passage runs thus "Once there lived Brāhmaṇa Kauśika by name, who had thoroughly mastered the Sāṃkhya S'āstra, the Vaiśeṣika Śāstra and the S'āstra of Jñātiputra. — Ui • V is'eṣika Philosophy p. 40.

‡ सामन्नं तिविहं १ महासामन्नं २ सत्तासामन्नं ३ सामन्न-विसेस-सामन्नं । तत्र महासामान्यं सत्स्वपि पदार्थेषु पदार्थत्वबुद्धिकारि । सत्तासामान्यं सत्पदार्थेषु सद्बुद्धिविधायि । सामान्यविशेषसामान्यम् द्रव्यत्वादि । अन्ये तु व्याचक्षते—महासामान्यं द्रव्यत्वादि सामान्यविशेषाः पृथिवीत्वादि । विसेसो दुविहो । तं—अन्ने पठंति । सामन्नं दुविहं । परं अपरं च । विसेसो दुविहो अंत्यविसेसो अणंतविसेसो य ॥

§ See Ui • V is Phil. pp. 4 –64

¶ Fo summary of Ui's views, which I have accepted

For the date of the Nyāya Sūtras, th *locus classicus* is Jacobi's article on "The Dates of the Philosophical sūtras of the Brāhmans" published in the Journal of the American Oriental Society Vol. XXXI. Starting with an examination f certain Nyāya ūtras (N S. IV ii. 26-35) which criticise Buddhist doctrines, he arrives at the conclusion that they refer to the Śūnyavāda of the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna, and not to th Vijñānavāda f the Yogācāra school of Vasubandhu and Asanga, as is s pposed by the commentators. Consequently the N. Sūtras should be referred to the period following that of Nāgārjuna (3rd century) and preceding that of Vasubandhu and Asanga (middl of the 4th century). This deduction of Jacobi has long held the field, and it is only lately that the opinion is gaining ground that it is wrong to suppose that Indian Idealism was ina gurated by Vasu-

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with certain substantial modifications in the abo paragraphs, see "U1 Vaiśeṣika Philosophy p 65 It may be quoted here for ready reference. "Jacob searches into the dates of the sūtras of the six systems fix the date of V S. at bout 200-500 A. D and Suali, following Jacobi's proofs places the date in 250-300 A. D. Jacobi bases his proof mainly upon the relation of the Sūtras to the Buddhist schools, the Śūnyavāda and the Vijñanavāda. V S. does not directly relate to the Buddhist schools. Consequently he deduces the date from the date of N S. B t, as stated above, V S is quoted by the uthor of N S., and such quotations re found in the work of Nāgārjuna and Deva makes complement to Nāgārjuna' quotations Theref re V S. w uld appear to have been composed before Nāgārjuna. But the date of V.S cannot be earlier than Rahagutta and As'vaghosa. The conclusion is that V S. was composed about 50-150 A. D. If Nāgārjuna is not so early as 113-213 the date of V S. will be placed at time later than 50-150 A. D At any rate the date is earlier than Nāgārjuna, and the contents of V S. do not contradict this supposition "

bandhu, since the idealistic views had already been expounded in such works as Laṅkāvatāra sūtra,"* and "Saṁdhi vimocana" and already systematised by Maitreya etc.†

The different views held on this subject have been clearly summed up by Dr Tucci, who writes Jacobi maintained that N.S. and V.S. were composed between 200 and 450 A.D.‡ Suali proposed for V S. the date 250–300 and for N S. the date 300–350. Stcherbatsky had first maintained that N S. assumed its definite shape after the 5th century; then, he changed his view and held that no certain conclusion could be derived from the fact that there are in N S. references to Buddhist Idealism, since the Idealism is not that of Vasubandhu, but an older one. Ui§ proposed the date 150–250 Prof Dasgupta is rather sceptical as regards the possibility of fixing the exact date when the sūtras were codified. I think he is quite right, because we are still not in a position to determine the various strata that were superimposed in the actual redaction of the sūtras ¶

I am inclined to hold that among the different strata that are traceable in the composition of the Sûtras the one

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Keith discredits the evidence of "Lankāvatāra" on the ground that "the sūtra in its present f rm is not earlier than the sixth century A. D., as it prophesies the Hûṇa rule of that period."

† Tucci's Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic Introduction xxvi (G O S.). See for the early date of Indian Idealism my paper in the "Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference"

‡ J A.O S.V 1 XXXI.

§ Ui proposes the date *00–250 A D for systematisation of the doctrine and 300–3.0 f the redaction of N S.,—a view which is endorsed by T cci.

¶ "Pre-Dinnāga Texts of Logic, from Chinese Sources" Introduction p. xxiv

to which belongs the sūtra relating to the divisi Anumāna ("Trividham An mānam" I. I. 5) is the d The work as a whole, however may be referred to the l half of the second century B C., to some date abou B. C. in the age of the Āhnikas or D ily Lessons, so the Navāhnika of Patañjali' Vyākaraṇa Mahābh This general statement is s bject to the qualification some of the sūtras re demonstrably earlier and some than the ge to which the bulk of the sūtras belong this conclusion regarding the date of the sūtras I arrive the fact that the sūtra relati g to the division of Anumā obscure even to Vātsyāyana, the autho of the Nyāyabh and therefore considerable time must be supposed to elapsed between the ge f th sūtra and that of Vātsyā N w it is possible to a riv t the lower limit of the of Vātsyāyana with the help of the date of the "Anuy dvāra" work of the younger Jaina Canon, and th Māthara-Vṛtti, commentary on Īs varakṛṣṇa s "Sāṁk kārikā. Thus —If we compare Vātsyāyana accoun the three kinds f An māna referred to in the I त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टं च (I. I. 5) Māthara's exposition f the subject we cannot help conc ing that th Mātharavṛtti on the Sāṁkhyakārikā represen definite step forward in the history f Indian *Logic*. similarly if we compare th account of the same as gi in the "Anuyogadvāra with that found in Vātsyāya Bhāṣya, we cannot but be impressed by the great mas details which the former presents distinguished from latter This is as it hould be; for the Anuyogadvā is even later than Māthara, to whose work it refers† as important branch f learning stud ed in those d ys

With its 33 kinds f Fallacy 9 of पक्ष 14 of हेतु and of दृष्टान्त Of. the list of Fallacies in the Nyāyapra еса P (G O S)

† The passage is repeated with slight variations in Nandisūtra another work of the Jaina canon.

If we accept Weber's view that the Jaina Siddhānta was given its present shape between the third and fifth century A D the latest d te for the passage of the Anuyogadvāra will be the beginning of the fifth century A D The same passage occurs with slight alterations in the Nandisūtra, and supposing the Nandisūtra is a work of Devardhigaṇin (end of the fifth century A D) the passage in question from Anuyoga will have to be placed some time before it. Now if Vātsyā yana is later than Nāgārjuna (250 A. D —Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa), Vātsyāyana and Māṭhara have to be accommodated in the interval between 250 A. D (the date of Nāgārjuna) and 400 A. D (the date of the passage of the Anuyogadvāra) Allowing a margin of 50 years on either side the remaining period of 50 years is all too sho t to account for the great development of Logic, such as we have noted bove, between Vātsyāyana and Māṭhara. If, on the contrary we accept the Jaina Śvetāmbara traditio s it stands—and we cannot set it aside except for very cogent reasons—and assign the present edition of Anuyoga to Āryarakṣita who li ed in the second half of the first century A D., the dates of the Sāṃkhyakārikā (= Kaṇagasattari) nd the Māṭhara-Vṛtti will have to be shifted to the first century B C. and early part of the first century A D respectively Now one strong reason for assigning the passage in Anuy ga to the latter part of the first century A. D., rather than to some period between the third and the fifth century A D is that the passage refers to Buddhistic scriptures in an altogether general way—it calls them merely 'बुद्धवयण' † while the Sāmkhya w rks referred t ar no less tha three, which are mentioned specifically over and above the general 'कविलियं' (the philosophy of Kapila) Had the Anuyogadvāra been writte in the 3rd or 5th century

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The Jaina tradition ascribes not only the division of Anuyoga, but also th compilation or composition of An yogadvāra to Āryarakṣita (see Āv syaka I 74).

† बुद्धवयणं—Nandisūtra.

A. D., in the age of such eminent Buddhistic teachers as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga and Buddhaghoṣa, we would have found them o their works mentioned individually as has been done in the case of the Sāṁkhya authors. The list clearly reveals an atmosphere of flourishing Brahmanism which, as we know characterized the three or four centuries from the death of Aśok to the coronation of Kaniṣka. That the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa were popular works read at certain hours of the day among the peopl in th time of the Anuyogadvāra does not impair the conclusion we have arrived at. For we know that they were read in the remote Indian colony of Cambodia bo t 600 A.D and the custom of reading them as sacred literature may have been established in India several centuries before Land grants dated in the 6th century A D., and found in various parts of India, quote Mahābhārata as an thority possessed of the character of Smṛti or Dharmaśāstra—a status nd breadth of popularity which it cannot have acquired in coupl of centuries.

Having thus seen that the Māṭhara-Vṛtti may with a great deal of probability be referred t the first century A. D., we place Vātsyāyana a century or two earlier which will *account for th vast d elopment of th Science of Logic* which took place in th interval between Vātsyāyana nd Māṭhara.

The date here propose l for Vātsyāyana may ppear to be violent outrage upon the general opinion of Orientalists in regard to this matte who place him in the fourth or fifth century A D But I submit that the arguments by which their theory is supported are in the first place inconclusive; and, secondly they have not be co-o linated with the evidence of the works cited above point of iew which has been entirely overlooked by these scholars. Even if Dr Jacobi is right in holding that Vātsyāyana revised edition of the Nyāya-Sūtras discusses the Śūnyavāda or Nihilism of the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna (abo t 200–250 A. D.) but not the

opponent's position in his own words, and, besides, show little disposition to vary the dṛṣṭānta. Besides, the very fact that in the parallels which Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa has cited there is often a difference of words without difference of sense points to the conclusion that the author of the Sūtras had used some work of Mādhyamika philosophy other than the Mādhyamika Vṛtti of Nāgārjuna. Thus, for example, Nāgārjuna's 'यथै च गन्धर्व' etc. which Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa cites as the original of the Nyāya Sūtra 'स्वप्नविषय... ...' appears to me to be really not its original but only a parallel, the original being some other work earlier than both. Prof. Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya has rightly observed: "Certainly Nāgārjuna established the Mādhyamika school. But it does not follow from it that all the materials for building the new structure were his own. He chiefly collected them from the works previous to him such as the Prajñāpāramitā, Laṅkāvatāra, etc.

Now the Laṅkāvatāra itself clearly indicates that it is based upon older traditions of the Mādhyamika philosophy. The very mythological setting of the treatise in which Buddha teaches the doctrine of Śūnyatā to Rāvaṇa, shows that the author wants the reader to accept the doctrine as an old heritage. Besides, it is clearly declared to have been taught by 'former Buddhas,'† which need not be taken literally but which does point to a date long prior to the composition of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Besides one of the passages of the Laṅkāvatāra shows that the doctrine of *Kṣaṇikatā* had been criticised by earlier writers and the author had therefore to

Of this we have numerous instances in the commentaries on the Trividham A... which are cited by me in my paper on the subject. Moreover in the Laṅkāvatāra we read the illustration मृत्पिण्ड-दण्ड चक्र ... Is it contended that the Upaniṣad which contains the illustration of मृत्पिण्ड is posterior to Laṅkāvatāra ?

† "पूर्वबुद्धानुगतं ... पूर्वबुद्धैरधिष्ठितम् ।

stand on his defence and explain what it really meant and *what it did not mean.* Thus, we read :

निर्व्यापारं क्षणिकं विविक्तं क्षयवर्जितम् ।
अनुत्पत्तिं च धर्माणां क्षणिकार्थं वदाम्यहम् ।
उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं भङ्गं न वै देशेमि बालिशाः ।

All this is not surprising if we remember that the doctrine of Kṣaṇikatā, Nairātmya or Śūnyatā, is of the very essence of Buddhism and its logical representation must have been attempted centuries before the ge of Nāgārjuna and Laṅkā vatāra Sūtra. The controversy of Śāśvatavāda and Uccheda vāda is at least as old as Buddhism, perhaps even the Upaniṣads (see Bṛ Up.); moreover the very existence of a school of Buddhist thinkers who call themselves Sarvāstitvavādins (a sub-division of the Sthaviras and one of the primitive schools of Buddhism) implies that there existed a rival school which denied that "All exists." This may be either the school of Vijñānavādins who held that "not all, but only vijñānas exist or those who denied the existence of every thing, including even the *vijñānas* †

We may therefore claim that the Buddhistic doctrines which are noticed in the Nyāya-Sūtras do not compel us to believe that they belong to a period posterior to the Laṅkā vatāra Sūtra or the Mādhyamika Vṛtti.

After quoting Dr Keith who says "We need not, of course, take seriously the conception of Nāgārjuna as the creator of the Śūnyavāda philosophy" Dr. Randle rightly adds : 'Therefore references to the Ś ūnyavāda in the Nyāya Sūtra

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† The two doctrines were more or less inseparably bound up together and even as late as the Nyāya Sūtra it is difficult to decide whether particular adhikaraṇa contains a refutation of the one or the other So also in the quotation from Vṛttikāra which occurs in Ś ābara Bhāṣya of the P Mīmāṃsa Sūtras.

re not necessarily references to Nāgārjuna : unless the phrase (N S. which are parallel to phrases in Mk. (Mādhyamika Kārikā) first originated with Nāgārjuna. It is possible to regard these as 'tags' which are repeated by Nāgārjuna from earlier S'ūnyatāvāda writers : in which case Vidyābhūṣaṇa's argument for the priority of Nāgārjuna to the N S. passage in question and Jacobi's assumption that the date of Nāgārjuna gives the earliest limit for the composition of the Nyāya Sūtra fall to the ground."

(Indian Logic in the Early Schools p. 16 footnote)

The principal authors of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools up to the age of Malliṣeṇa are

1. Rāvaṇa—the author of a work known as "Rāvaṇa-Bhāṣya" † which is not extant but seems to have been known to Śaṃkarācārya.‡ He is earlier than the author of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra" Could it not be that the "सूत्रकृत् of the Kārikās quoted by Praśastapāda in the section on Inference and Fallacies ("......पूर्वं सूत्रकृतोक्तम्") was Rāvaṇa, 'son of Kasyapa'? A work consisting of kārikās or mnemonic lines would thus fall between Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda.

2. Pras'astapāda—the author of a Vaiś. work called Padārtha-Dharma-Saṃgraha, popularly known as "Praśastapāda Bhāṣya," which is not a regular Bhāṣya exposition of each Vaiśeṣika sūtra but an independent work running along the lines of the Vaiś. Sūtras. In his hands the Vaiś. system has undergone much development. Among his special contributions to the system, Keith notes his recognition in place of the seventeen qualities of Kaṇāda of twenty-four the development of the doctrine of generality and particularity and inherence, which assume

† See Keith I. L. A p. 27 and M. M. Kuppuswāmi Sastri's article in the Madras J. O. S. Vol. III Pt. I.

‡ See Śāmkara Bhāṣya B. Sūtra II. ii. 11 and Prakaṭārtha Vivaraṇa thereon.

new shapes in his hands; the occurrence of a complete theory of creation in which the Supreme Lord appears as creator; and the elaboration of logical doctrine, which is particularly evident in the case of the doctrine of fallacies." As regards his date, the general view is that he belonged to the fifth century A. D and was posterior to th Buddhist logician Dinnâga who should be referred to 400 A D ‡ After examining all the pros and cons of the problem however I come to think that the balance of probability is in favour of Praśastapâda s priority to Dinnâga—a view which Stcherbatsky has now urged against his own theory of an earlier date.¶

3. Vâtsyâyana—the autho of the N Bhâṣya. It is difficult to surmise which of the two viz., Vâtsyâyana nd Râvaṇa, was earlier For the work of Râvana is lost and consequently there is no internal evidence to help us. But there is no doubt that Vâtsyâyana was acquainted with the Vaiśeṣika system. For his date see supra.

4. Uddyotakara—He wrote his epoch-making work—the "Nyâya vârtika"—to answer the criticisms of the "bad (Buddhist) logicians who had attacked the system of Ak pâda (Gautama) His work has been very helpful in reconstructing the history of mediaeval Buddhist Logic (See Randle s "Fragments from Diñ âga"). Bâṇa contemporary and court poet of King Harṣa (A. D 620-644) mentions Subandhu's "Vâsavadattâ" and the latter refers to Uddyotakara, consequently Uddyotakara cannot be late than the first half of the seventh century and was probably a little earlier

5. Vâcaspati miśra—an thor of great versatility d depth of tho ght He has writt n works on Sâṃkhya, Yoga

‡ Keith's L. L. A p. 27

¶ See my Introduction to the Nyâya praveśa" Part I (G O. S.) pp. xv to xxi where the problem has been fully discussed

Vedānta and P Mīmāṃsā. These are: "Nyāyasūcī-nibandha" "Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā" a commentary on Uddyotakara's "Nyāya-Vārtika"; Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, a commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's "Sāṃkhyakārikā; Tattvavaiśāradī a commentary on "Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Patañjali's "Yogasūtras" Vidhiviveka and Nyāyakaṇikā" both works of P Mīmāṃsā. He flourished in the ninth century (about 850) A. D., as appears from the date given in his Nyāya-sūcīnibandha, 898—which has been understood to be the Vikrama Saṁvat year corresponding to 841 of the Christian era.

6. Bhāsarvajña—author of the "Nyāyasāra. This work is noteworthy because of its giving a distinct place to Śaivism within th framework of Logic. This association was hitherto an historical accident due to the writers on Nyāya nd Vaiśeṣika being Śaivites in religion. I the Nyāyasāra, Śaivism for the first time finds distinct place in the system. The work is further important for our purpose, as Malliṣeṇa quotes in one place the "Nyāyabhūṣaṇa" which is commentary on the Nyāyasāra and is referred to by Ratnakīrti, Buddhist writer of the tenth century

7 Udayana or Udayanācārya —He has written several works both on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, though separately. These are Lakṣaṇāvalī" book of logical definitions; Kiraṇāvalī" commentary on Praśastapāda s Vaiś. Bhāṣya; "Nyāyavārtika tātparya-pariśuddhi" commentary Vācaspati's N Vārt. Tātparya; Kusumāñjali" famous work o the proofs of the existence of God and allied q estions such as life before and hereafter being counterblast to the "Īśvarabhaṅga-kārikā of Kalyāṇarakṣita, a Buddhist writer of th 9th century; and Ātmatattva-viveka work on the nature of the soul in which the author criticises the B ddhist doctrines of Apoha, Kṣaṇabhaṅga and Ś ruti-aprāmāṇya. His date is definitely fixed at 984 A D on the evidence of his own statement in his "Lakṣaṇāvalī He brought fresh vigour to the Nyāya school and is very frequently quoted by later writers as a great

authority on the tenets of that school which was now being amalgamated with the Vaiśeṣika. Besides being a logician and a metaphysician he was a religious teacher of the S aivite school. It may be noted in passing that just as the Sāṁkhya was associated with Vaiṣṇavism Yoga partly with S'āktism so was Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with S aivism. The last fact—of the association of Nyāya-Vais. with S'aivism—has been duly noted by the Jaina author of the " Ṣaḍdarśana—Samuccaya (See Notes).

8 Śrīdhara, the author of the "Nyāyakandali, a very important work written as a commentary on Praśastapāda s Bhāṣya of the Vaiśeṣika system, and freely extracted in the Syādvādamañjarī He composed this work as he tells us, in A. D 991

9 Jayanta—the author of the " Nyāyamañjarī " —a full and free exposition of the important principles of the Nyāyadarśana along the lines of the Sūtras. Jayanta could not have lived earlier than the 9th century since he quotes Vācaspati (841 A. D.); neither could he be later than the 12th century as he is referred to in the "Syādvāda-ratnākara" by Devasūri (1086–1169 A D); and by Ratnaprabha (1181 A.D) in the "Ratnākarāvatārikā, who was an elde contem porary of Hemacandra. A few verses from Jayanta s " Nyāya mañjarī " have been extracted by Malliṣeṇa under Stanza VIII. Like Udayana, he too opposes Kalyāṇarakṣita and Dharmottara.

10. Gangeśa :—The uthor of the " Tattvacintāmaṇi " in which the logic I the Nyāya darśana attains its final shape He (A.D 1150–1200) was the founder of the Nadiya (Nava d īpa) school ("N vya-Nyāya," which in the subtleties of its logical definitions we t far beyond the founder of the school. But the development of the new school is later and therefore it is of littl interest to us as readers of the " Syādvādamañjarī.

(5) Pûrvamîmâmsâ :—As the Vaiśeṣika was engaged in determining the properties of things, and the Nyâya in formulati g the principles of Logic, the real function of the Pûrva-Mîmâmsâ school—which is demonstrably older than both—was to lay down the principles of Interpretation, originally that of Vedic texts relating to the Sacrifice. But its constant contact with rival systems which attacked the authority of the Veda drew it into the arena of pistemology and metaphysics. Thus, from the 'Vṛtti' of the Vṛttikâra of the Pûrva-Mîmâmsâ Whom Śabarasvâmin, the Bhâṣyakâra of the P Mîmâmsâ Sûtras, quotes we observe this new element in the darśana, which has been further developed by Prabhâkara and Kumârila and their later exponents Śâlikanâtha and Pârthasârathimiśra. While the epistemological and metaphysical problems were foreign to the original purpose of Mîmâmsâ, the system found its natural development in the direction of logic, with the result that the Mîmâmsâ came to be called also Nyâya, and was the parent of what is now known as the Nyâya-darśana.* But the great popularity of th darśana nd its importance as a philosophical system date from the time of its revival under Kumârila, who criticised many of the fa ourite doctrines of Buddhist philosophy with great vigour nd dialectic kill.

The principal writers f this school are —

1. The Vṛttikâra, to be identified with Upavarṣa or Bodhâyana.†

2. The Bhâṣyakâra Śabarasvâmin ‡ His q otation from

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* The ten-membered syllogism which Vâtsyâyana notes in his commentary on I i. 32 seems to be an early effort of the Mîmâmsâ school this line.

† After Jamalal,—the sûtrakâra of P Mîmâmsâ. T both of these is attributed commentary on the two (Pûrva nd Uttara or Karma and Brahma) Mîmâmsâs.

‡ See Keith s Karmamîmâmsâ p 9 Madras J O. R. Vol. I, Part III—"Vṛttikâragrantha" By Dr A. Sankaran,

"Vrttikāra" and the latter's reference to S'ūnyavāda and Nirālambanavāda of the Buddhists, Nāgārjuna etc. suggest "that 400 A.D is the earliest date to which he can be assigned" The force of this argument, however has much diminished since these schools are now dated before Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu.

3 Prabhākara and Kumārila. They belong to the 7th or 8th century A D Their relative chronology is a much debated problem which is still unsettled. The latter who wrote "Vārtikas" or supplementary commentaries called the "Ślokavārtika and Tantravārtika" on Śabarasvāmin's Bhāṣya is particularly famous for his strong criticism of Buddhist logic and philosophy He was generally supposed to belong to the latter half of the †8th century A.D., and was believed to be an elder contemporary of Śaṁkarācārya. This date, however has now been pushed back a few decades in the light of a recent publication in the G O S. For while his criticism of Dharmakīrti who flourished in the first half of the 7th century A. D furnishes the upper limit of his date, the lower limit is supplied by references made to his views by Śāntarakṣita, the author of the "Tattva-saṁgraha" who is

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A review of the arguments of both sides is impossible within the space at our disposal. See Das-Gupta's "Indian Philosophy p. 69 Keith's "Karmamimāṃsā" pp. 9–10; Dr Gangānath Jha's "Prabhākara school"; Prof. Kuppuswami Sāstri's paper in the Proceedings of the Second (Calcutta) Oriental Conference; "Introduction to Pūrvamimāṃsā" by Pasupatinath Sastri, "Introduction to Prabhākara–Vijaya by Pt. Ananta Kṛṣṇa Sastri; and "Kumārila and Prabhākara" by Pt. Chinnaswami Sastri; "Prabhākaras Old and new" by Prof. Hiriyanna, Madras J O R. Vol. IV Pt. II.

† See Dr. K. B. Pathak's article in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the R. A S. Vol. XVIII.

full of Kumārila and lived in the first half of the 8th century A. D.‡

Other important writers on Pūrvamīmāṁsā are later than Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa and consequently we need not note them here.

(6) The Philosophy of "Vedānta, like that of (Pūrva-) Mīmāṁsā, is at once old and new. As th name signifies the philosophy originates from th Upaniṣads, the end ('anta) o conclusion ('siddhānta) of the Veda. But its great popularity is due to its revival under Śaṁkarācārya in the 9th century A. D. It is called "Brahma-mīmāṁsā as opposed to "Karma-Mīmāṁsā, or "Uttara Mīmāṁsā as opposed to Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. This difference of nomenclature is founded upon the difference of view of the relation of the one system to th other. Śaṁkara considers Karma and Jñāna to be essentially inconsistent and therefore rejects the claim of the Karma-Mīmāṁsā' to be regarded as necessary antecedent to Brahma-Mīmāṁsā. It is probably that the two were treated at one time as parts of a single study. As Bodhāyana has remarked "संहितमेतच्छास्त्रम्" There can be no point, h wever in the remark that the two form one continuous whole, unless the two were really separate but were to be joined, or doubt had been cast on their continuity before the time of Bodhāyana. That the two must have originated separately admits of littl doubt. But later tendency to wards syncretism must have set in, which accounts for the above remark of Bodhāyana; and this is further corroborated by the fact that Upavarṣa commented on both of them and thus practically treated the two as parts of single whole. It should be noted, however that this does not make the two really one, since they have originated in fundamentally different types of thought, and are ascribed to different writers.

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‡ Dr B. Bhattacārya's foreword to the Tattva-saṁgraha Vol. I p. LXXXIII (G. O. S.).

The "Sūtras" of the Vedānta darśana which are ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa are presumably old, but the work as it stands at present would seem to be posterior to post-Christian Buddhist schools which it criticises.† Some attempt has been made§ to show that the sūtras relating to the criticism of Buddhism, like similar sūtras of the Nyāya-darśana, if correctly interpreted, would appear to refer to S'ūnyavāda and not to Vijñānavāda, and therefore their date must fall between that of Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu. But this argument has lost its point, since as already remarked evidence is growing to show that Vijñānavāda existed even before Vasubandhu, and probably Śūnyavāda also before Nāgārjuna. The underlying assumption that a particular 'Vāda began with its Ācārya may well be set aside; for an Ācārya is not an originator but only a promulgator of the doctrines of his school. But the bulk of the Sūtras since the Sāṃkhya which they criticise is atheistic, cannot be dated earlier than the later Mahābhārata period when the Sāṃkhya had began to gravitate towards atheism.

The only doctrine of "Vedānta" which Hemacandra and Haribhadra have noticed is that of Śaṁkara's school and there again that of "Māyā" only which S'aṁkara and his grand teacher—Gauḍapāda—are said to have borrowed from Buddhism. There can be no doubt that the language of Gauḍapāda's "Kārikās" in certain places savours of Buddhist influence, but there is a fundamental difference between the Vedāntin "Brahman" and the Buddhist's "Śūnya" which cannot be ignored. As regards S'aṁkarācārya also, a similar

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† A reference to "Brahma Sūtras" is to be found in the "Bhagavadgīta" ["ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैश्चैव हेतुमद्भिर्विनिश्चितैः"]. That this work could not have been the same as the "Brahmasūtras" which we have at present is beyond question. But it is difficult to decide whether it was the nucleus of the work which we now have or was entirely different.

§ By Jacobi in the article mentioned above.

charge has been made,* but it does not seem to be well founded. The doctrine of "Māyā" is only a description by analogy of "Nirupākhyatā," and the latter is implied in the antinomy which is said to surround the nature of Brahman in the Upaniṣads and is distinctly declared in the Bh. Gītā which says "न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते". Moreover in tracing the doctrine to the Buddhist source, the originality of the latter is taken for granted. It has never been investigated whether the word 'संवृति' of Mahāyāna Buddhism could carry any sense unless there was Reality which was 'संवृत' i. e. covered or obscured, and whether 'शून्य' could mean such a Reality at all. Is not the word 'संवृति' suggested by the "अपावृणु" of "हिरण्मयेन पात्रेण सत्यस्यापिहितं मुखम् । तत्त्वं पूषन्नपावृणु सत्यधर्माय दृष्टये ।" and "निगूढो" of "सर्वेषु भूतेषु गूढोत्मा न प्रकाशते ..."? Moreover is not 'कारक' of the Buddhist 'chain of causes' a reminiscence of the same word or words occurring in the Upaniṣad? Besides, in the "Kathāvatthu" (Points of Controversy — P. T. S.) where the question "whether Matter is subjective" is discussed, the word used is ārammaṇa (= skt. ārambhaṇa) and the commentator there notes the two meanings of the word ārammaṇa — a word which comes down from the famous text of the Upaniṣadic Idealism, viz., "वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्" (Chāndogya), which is the sheet-anchor of Saṁkara Vedānta.

It should be remembered in this connection that Mahāyāna Buddhism was a development of the original Buddhism under the influence of Brahmanism and local creeds; and that the dialectical method of the Mādhyamika school was anticipated in the earlier speculations relating to the nature of Brahman, in the Syādvāda of the Jains, and in such pre-Buddhistic thought as that of Saṁjaya recorded in the Buddhist canon.

That he has been called प्रच्छन्नबौद्ध is no proof of his being really so. It is after all an argument ad hominem which is not meant to be taken seriously.

The philosophical literature of Vedânta is immense. It can be classified, however under the following heads:

(1) Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

(2) The Vedânta of the post Upaniṣadic period of the Mahâbhârata and the Bhagavadgîtâ.

(3) The Vedânta of the Sûtrakâras—first, that of the predecessors of Bâdarâyana, such as Auḍuloml, Âśmarathya, Kâśakṛtsna etc., and afterwards that of Bâdarâyaṇa.

(4) The Vedânta of pre-Śaṁkara commentators of the Upaniṣads and the Sûtras—such as the Vṛttikâra etc.

(5) The Vedânta f S'aṁkara.

(6) Post-S aṁkara Vedânta of his followers.*

(7) The Vedânta of the other Âcâryas, such as Râmânuja, Vallabha and Madhva, nd of mi or teachers, such as Vijñânabhikṣu, which differed radically from that of S'aṁkara and flourished side by side with that of his followers.¶

It would be going too far beyond the scope of this section if we were to enter into the chronology and the teachings of these schools, especially because Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa had mainly concerned themselves with a single problem of Vedânta—viz., the Mâyâvâda—which is the characteristic feature of the Vedânta of S'aṁkara.

Among the post-Bâdarâyana and *pre-S'aṁkara Vedântins* we may note

1. Bodhâyana—the Vṛttikâra of the Brahmasûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. Some identifiy him with—

For a summary of the Vedânta of the followers of Saṁkara and their dates see Dr. Das-G pta's "History of Indian Philosophy" Vol. II.

¶ For the minor schools of Vedânta, before and after Śaṁkara, see Prof. Hiriyanna's articles in the Madras Journal of Oriental Research.

2 Upavarṣa—who is said to have written a commentary on the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsās. Sufficient evidence in favour of the identification of Bodhāyana with Upavarṣa is, however wanting Both of these must have flourished before the Christian era, if the nucleus of the Bādarāyana sūtras is distinguished from their present form.

3. Dramiḍācārya—an ācārya who belonged to the Dravida country

4. Taṅka—who is also supposed to be the same as Ātreya Brahma-nandin—and is known as "Vākyakāra"

5. Bhartṛprapañca—Like Auḍulomi he stood for the doctrines of Bhedābheda" and Brahma Pariṇāma His identity with Bhartṛhari is d ubtful.

Among the early exponents of the S'āṁkara school we have—

6. Maṇḍana—Different from Maṇḍana-miśra who, if we are to belie late tradition, was pupil of Kumārila and great Pūrva Mīmāṃsist whom S'aṃkara vanquished in debate and converted to Vedāntism. There was one Maṇḍana who was Vedāntin. He was probably contemporary (A.D 800) of Śaṁkara (who died i A. D 820), and advocated an extreme form of subjective Idealism or Solipsism, which was revived late by Saṃkara Vedāntin, the author of the Vedānta-Siddhānta-Muktāvali. He composed Brahmasiddhi and several other works of importance

7 Sureśvara—(circa 820 A. D) said to be the name of Maṇḍanamiśra after he becam saṁnyāsin and a disciple of Śaṁkarācārya, according to the tradition of the "Śāṅkara-Digvijaya" At any rate he is not to be identified with Maṇḍana, the solipsist, from whose view Sureśvara s is distinguished carefully by Sureśvara's pupil Sarvajñamuni, th author of the Saṁkṣepa S'ārīraka" and by his commentator He was the author of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya Vārtika and

Naiṣkarmyasiddhi—works of great importance in the history of Śāṁkara Vedānta.

8. Padmapāda—(circa 820 A. D) another disciple of Śaṁkarācārya who wrote a work called "Pancapādikā. On it Prakāśatman wrote "Pancapādikā-vivaraṇa" about 1200 A.D., and the latter received a commentary from Vidyāraṇya (1350 A. D) called "Vivaraṇa-Prameya Samgraha"

A little later but still ranking among the early Śaṃkarites are:—

9 Vācaspatimiśra—(about 840 A.D) the famous writer on Sāmkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. His great work of the last school is a lauable commentary on Śaṃkara's Śārīraka Bhāṣya of the Vedānta Sūtras, named Bhāmatī after his wife.

10 Sarvajñātma Muni (900 A. D)—a disciple of Sureśvarācārya and a younger contemporary of Vācaspatimiśra. His famous work "Saṃkṣepa-Śārīraka" is more than a mere abridgment of Śaṃkara's Śārīraka Bhāṣya as it modestly calls itself.

To the later Śāṃkara schools belong:—

11. Prakaṭārtha—a work of the 11th or 12th century A. D It is a commentary o Śāmkara Śārīraka Bhāṣya, and has been commented upon in a wo k of about 1 '00 A. D called "Prakaṭārtha ivaraṇa

12. Śrī H rṣa—(11.0 A. D) the author of the famous Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya" a work full of the subtle dialectics of Vedānta composed in the interests of "Anirvacanīyatākhyāti" Vāda.

13. Prakāś tman (1200 A. D.)—the author of P ñca pādikā-vivaraṇa.

14. Citsukhācārya—(1220 A. D)—the thor of the famous "Citsukh " a work which is much admired in the school of Śāṃkara Vedānta.

2 Upavarsa—who is said to have written a commentary on the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā. Sufficient evidence in favour of the identification of Bodhāyana with Upavarṣa is, however wanting Both of these must have flourished before the Christian era, if the nucleus of the Bādarāyaṇa sūtras is distinguished from their present form.

3. Dramiḍācārya—an ācārya who belonged to the Draviḍa country

4. Tamka—who is also supposed to be the same as Ātreya Brahma-nandin—and is known as "Vākyakāra"

5. Bhartṛprapañca—Like Auḍulomi he stood for the doctrines of Bhedābheda and Brahma Pariṇāma His identity with Bhartṛhari is doubtful.

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8. Padmapāda—(circa 820 A. D) another disciple of Śaṁkarācārya who wrote a work called Pañcapādikā" On it Prakāśatman wrote "Pañcapādikā vivaraṇa about 1200 A D., and the latter received a commentary from Vidy raṇya (1350 A. D) called "Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṁgraha"

A little later but still ranking among the early Śaṁkarites are:—

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12 Śrī Harṣa—(11.0 A. D) the author of the famous Khaṇḍ nakhaṇḍakhādya work full of the s btle dialectics of Vedānta composed in the interests of Anirvacanīyatākhyāti" Vāda.

13. Prakāśatman (1200 A. D.)—the author of Pañca pādikā-vivaraṇa.

14. Citsukhā rya—(12"0 A D)—th auth r of the f mous "C tsukh a w rk which is much dmired in the school of Śaṁkara Vedānta

15. Vidyāraṇya (1350 A. D.)—the greatest name in the history of later Śāṃkara Vedānta, and mediaeval Brāhmanism. He wrote a commentary called "Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha on the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa" of Prakāśātman, Pañcadaśī, a comprehensive work on Śāṃkara Vedānta written in verse in popular style, and "Jīvanmuktiviveka valuable work on Vedāntic life.

Among the latest representatives of Śāṃkara Vedānta we have to note—

16. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī—the author of the famous "Advaitasiddhi" and commentary on the Bhagavadgītā and some Bhakti w ks. He lived in the early part of the sixteenth century

17 Prakāśānanda—the autho of the famous Vedānta Siddhānta-Muktāvalī" lived in the latter half of the 16th century He is a powerful dvocate f "Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi āda —or panegoism an extreme form of idealism preached in Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha and by M ṇḍana. (See supra)

18. Appayadīkṣita—a great writer of the seventeenth cent ry on Alaṃkara Vedānta and of numerous Bhakti works the autho of the "Siddhāntaleśa digest of Śāṃkara Vedānta which is mon ment to his vast knowledge of Śaṃkara schools and his wonderful power of bridgment.

It will be remembered that in tracing the logical volution of da śanas we dealt with Brahmanical systems only W omitted B ddhist nd Jaina darśanas from the account not because they were in any way less important, but because they did not constitute links in the same logical chain. No historical account f Indian philosophy however can be complete without statement of th essential tenets of the Buddhist and Jaina darśanas and of the stages through which they ha passed. A short note on the Lokāyata or Cārvāka hould also be added since it has been noticed both by Hemacandra and Malli eṇa in our book.

(*) Buddhism—The teachings of Gautama Buddha the historical founder of Buddhism, are supposed to have been embodied in the "Tipitaka" or the three Baskets of the Pali canon, consisting of Sutta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma. The last is undoubtedly later than the other two, but even these in their present form belong linguistically to the age succeeding that of Asoka's Edicts and are thus divided by several centuries from the original source. Attempts have, therefore, been made to reconstruct Gautama's original teachings as distinguished from those attributed to him in the Pali canon. But like all reconstruction this is based upon certain assumptions†

* See "Sâkya or Buddhist origins" by Mrs. Rhys Davids.

† Stcherbatsky rejects this method. He writes "It is thus assumed that there has been primitive Buddhism, very much different, even, as it would seem, quite contrary to what later on finds its expression in the Pali canon. Pessimism Nihilism, Soul-denial, psychology without a Soul, annihilation as ultimate end, all those features that mark out Buddhism among other religions, Indian as well as non-Indian did not exist. It was the Buddhism of the Buddha himself which was so radically different from anything that appeared later in historical times as Buddhism. The consequence of this hypothesis of a simple creed preceding historical Buddhism is an attempt to interpret the latter in the light of the former." Dr Stcherbatsky thus rejects the hypothesis of "a simple creed" of Gautama preceding historical Buddhism and regards the founder as a speculative philosopher whose philosophic position he defines as follows:—

"As far as we can understand his [Gautama Buddha's] philosophical position, it seems that he was deeply impressed by the contradiction of assuming an eternal pure spiritual principle which, for incomprehensible reasons must have been polluted by all the filth of mundane existence in order later on, to revert to its original purity. He was thus led to a denial of every permanent principle. Matter and Mind

which we leave to far. This much, however can be safely asserted—that Gautama Buddha was primarily an ethical teacher and not a speculative philosopher whose ethical teaching was based not on system of theology or metaphysics but on psychology—or to be more definite, on the psychology of Pain with which all sentiency was bound up. In the interests of this particular type of ethics, he asserted certain propositions which, in th course of time, came to be understood too literally by his followers, who supported them by arguments which involved them in controversies with Brāhmaṇas and Jainas. For example, one great error which

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ppeared to him as split in an infinite process of evanescent elements (dharmas), the only ultimate realities, beside Space and Annihilation. The conception of an impersonal world-process was probably prepared by the idea of an impersonal unique substance of the w rld, as developed in the Upaniṣads. The analysis of the world into its elements of Matter and Mind was probably to certain extent, prepared by the work of the Sāṁkhya school. Th originality of Buddha's position consisted in denying substantiality altogether and converting the world-process in concerted ppearance of discrete evanescent elements. Forsaking the Monism of the Upaniṣads and the Dualism of the Sāṁkhyas, he established system of the most radical Pluralism. That the essence and the starting-point of Buddhism were speculative appears very clearly if we give credit to the records bout the other wandering teachers who were the contemporaries of Buddha and often engaged in controversies with him. The questions t issue between them w re of speculative nature. Ethical questions, the explanation of retribution, were predominant, but they always were narrowly linked together with some system of ontology and some doctrine of Final Release. —Stcherbatsky's "Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa pp. –5.

I do not think Dr Stcherbatsky is right in his view that Gautama Buddha was essentially a speculative philosopher

Gautama Buddha found to be the root of all evil was belief in an entity called *Âtman* which engendered selfishness both in this world and the world hereafter. Belief in *permanence* and *reality* of the world with its many supposed joys was another hallucination which gave rise to longings of all sorts, including thirst for life and its pleasures. Gautama declared that all was painful (दुःख), all was transitory (अनित्य) all was emptiness, that is to say nothing at all (शून्य), or nothing but ideas (ज्ञप्ति or विज्ञान) or a mere creation of mental habits (वासना), or imagination (विकल्प). All these doctrines which in their rudimentary form may well be supposed to be part of the original teaching of Gautama Buddha and which are clearly stated in the Pâli canon are elaborately treated in the third and last stage of the history of Buddhism—that known as "Mahâyâna" or "Sanskrit Buddhism" which is the only form of Buddhism known to most of the Brâhmaṇa and Jaina writers.

Of the three stages into which the history of Buddhism is divisible viz.—

(1) Original teaching of Gautama Buddha,

(2) Buddhism of the Pâli canon and

(3) Sanskrit Buddhism,

it is the last with which we as students of Syâdvâdamañjarî are concerned.

Its principal schools are those of—

(1) The *Vaibhâṣikas*—the followers of the Vibhâṣâ or commentaries, who declare that *all* is real;

(2) the *Sautrântikas*, or followers of the Sûtras or texts, who held that the external world is not directly perceived but only indirectly inferred from the images which it creates in the mind;

(3) the *Yogâcâras*—who assert that ideas are the only reals, there being no external reality either directly perceived or mediately inferred. They are so called because their leaders incidentally practised Yoga, and their idealism was naturally suggested by this practice which is mainly concerned with mental life.

(4) the *Mādhyamikas*—who deny reality of both the ends, being (bhāva) and non being (abhāva), and affirm it of the centre (मध्य) only which is neither being nor non-being but simply Śūnya = Emptiness.

✓ According to a tradition referred to by Mr Sogen, "the Vaibhāṣikas arose in the third century after Buddha's death; the Sautrāntikas in the fourth; th Mādhyamika school, as Aryadeva states, came into existence five hundred years after the Nirvāṇa of Buddha; and Asaṅga, the founder of the Yogācāras or the Vijñānavādins is at least, as late as the third century of the Christian era." This chronological order was till lately generally accepted; the Mādhyamikas nd the Yogācāras were supposed to be late than the first two, and as between them the Mādhyamika was considered earlier than the Yogācāra in accordance with the relative chronology of their respective ācāryas, viz., Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga r Vasubandhu. The fallacy of arguing from the date of the ācārya to the date of the originator f the school is obvious; for ācāryas are only propagators and not the founders of their schools. A I have already shown, Vijñānavāda existed long before th time of As ga and Vasubandhu, and so there is no reason to make it posterior to the Ś nyavāda of Nāgārjuna. From the position of the Sautrāntika who is half an idealist, the next step is naturally to that f the Yogācāra who is a complete idealist,† rather than to the Mādhyamika who is a Nihilist.¶

See Supra p. xxv

† Curiously this historical sequence of Buddhist darśanas grees with the mental evol tion of Vasubandhu, who began his career as a Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādin, but had strong Sautrāntika sympathies and was later converted by his eldest brother Asaṅga to the Y gācāra school

¶ For contrary pinion see Keith's Buddhist Philosophy p 238.

it a became a definite school of thought attributed to one Ajita Keśakambalin, which is duly noticed in the "Sāmañña Phala Sutta" of the Buddhist canon. This teacher is there reported to have taught his doctrine, which closely resembles that of the Cārvāka school, as follows There is no such thing, O King as alms or sacrifice o offering There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. A human being is built up of the four elements. ("नत्थि दिन्नं नत्थि हुतं......सुकटदुक्कटानं कम्मानं फलं विपाको अयं लोको परो लोको...चातुमहाभूतिको अयं पुरिसो"......) When he dies the earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to th water the heat to the fire, the windy to the air, and his faculties pass into space....*It is a doctrine of* fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk when men say ther is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body are cut off, annihilated, and after death they are not." At a later stage in Buddhist and Jaina works this school of the Lokāyatika or Cārvāka is condemned a the school of sophists (Vaitaṇḍikas). It seems that just as Science and Atheism-cum-Materialism are not essentially identical, and yet they have often coalesced in the history of Western thought, so the Lokāyata (N ture-lore and economics) and the Cārvāka (epicureanism) in India, though originally *different, became one at a later stage Bṛhaspati Sūtra* co-ordinates the Lokayatas or Laukayatikas with the Kāpālikas, and Guṇaratna, a comme tator of "Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya" refers to the Kāpālikas as one of the two schools of Nāstikas that is, Lokāyatas or Cārvākas; one of which, it is said recognises four elements and the other five.

The history of the system can be divided into the following *stages*—

Maitreyī is said to have look 1 aghast when Yājñavalkya remarked that at the tim of death ma was bsorbed in the elements nd nothing remained behind.

(1) The Upaniṣad period (Vide the Dialogue of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī).

(2) The early Buddhist period (Vide the account of the philosophy of Ajita Kośakambalin, the Materialist, in the Sāmañña Phala Sutta).

(a) Lokāyata—i. e. Nature Lore or Physical Science (Vide Dialogues of Buddha S. B. B. Vol. II p. 166).

(b) Bṛhaspati's and Kauṭilya's Artha-śāstra i. e. Science and art of producing wealth.

(3) Later Buddhist period—when the Lokāyatas were stigmatized as sophists indulging in irresponsible arguments and quibbles.

(4) Association with immoral and superstitious life e. g. that of the Kāpālikas. (Vide Gunaratna's commentary on the Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya).

(9) Jainism—Jainism is par excellence *the* doctrine of ahiṃsā—ahiṃsā not only of physical life but also of intellectual outlook (darśana). In the latter moreover it did not stop short at a mere negative attitude of toleration towards other schools, but took the positive step of investigating *how* each of those schools erred. As a result it came to the conclusion that the errors of those schools were only *partial truths* as seen from particular angles of vision—that none of them was wholly wrong and if each of them would see things from the point of view of the opponent as well as from their own, there would be perfect harmony all round. The principle of the relativity of knowledge which constitutes this doctrine is an important discovery; yet, in its general form, it is not such as might not occur to common sense. Consequently we are not surprised that in the "Udāna Sutta" of Pāli Buddhism there occurs a story—the "Parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant *—

* Pāli जच्चन्धवग्गो=Skt. जात्यन्धवर्गः—the Section of "The Born Blind.

where certain blind men are said to have come by an elephant and when asked to describe the shape of the animal, each of them gave a description according to the particular limb which he happened to have felt.‡

This general principle of Relativity and Consistency of Contradictories has been tacitly admitted in their systems both by Brâhmaṇa and Buddhist writers but they know not what they think says the Jaina. The original contribution, therefore, which Jainism may be said to have made to Philosophy as result of what I have called the attitude of "intellectual ahiṃsâ" *is its investigation of the different angles of vision* or Pathways to Reality (नय) and its formulation of the doctrine of the Possibility (स्यात्) of apparent contradictories in a real whole. According to Jainism while its own darśana visualises the *whole* truth (प्रमाणवाक्य) other darśanas possess only the gleams of the *broken* light (नयवाक्य). Both these doctrines, the Nayavâda and the Syâdvâda are varieties of Anekântavâda, i. e. the doctrine of the many-sided ness of Truth. But beyond this there is nothing common between them, and consequently they do not represent two stages in a single movement of thought, and must therefore be traced to separate origins united in a common standpoint. Of the two, it is difficult to decide which is earlier. That both of them are anterior to the rupture of Jainism into Śvetâmbara and Digambara about the first century of the Christian era admits of little doubt; for in spite of the differences of the two sects regarding the Jaina canon they both uphold the Nayavâda and the Syâdvâda. Of the two the Nayavâda would seem to be earlier by reason of its comparative simplicity and this view is in harmony with the fact that Umâsvâti, the author of the Tattvârthâdhigama Sûtra (First century A. D.), while he refers to the different

‡ इमेसु किर सज्जंति एके समण माहणा ।
विग्गय्ह नं विवदंति जना एकंगदस्सिनो ॥—Udâna.
—एकंगदस्सिनो those who see a single limb only

kinds of Nayas,* makes no mention of the Syâdvâda and its seven propositions.† And yet it is highly probable that the Syâdvâda existed long before his days. We find the doctrine in an earlier or possibly erroneous or misunderstood form, recorded in the Buddhist Suttas where however it is not attributed to the Nigganthas' or Jainas but to 'some recluses and Brâhmaṇas This would show that the doctrine had possibly non–Jaina beginnings There, referring to a class of thinkers whom the speaker characterises as 'amarâvikkhepikas' that is eel-wrigglers' or equivocators, Gautama Buddha says: "Thus fearing and abhorring the wrong in an expressed opinion ('मुसावादभया), he will neither declare anything to be good nor to be bad, but on question being put to him on this or that, he resorts to eel-wriggling to equivocation and says: I do not take it thus, I don't take it the other way But I advance no different opinion. And I don t deny your position. And I don't say it is neither the one nor the other

Thus does he equivocate and in like manner about each of such propositions as the following

( ) 1. There is not another world.
 2. There both is, and is not another world.
 3 There neither is nor is not another world.

(d) 1. A man who has penetrated to the truth continues to exist after death.
 2. He does not.
 3. He both does, and does not.
 4. He neither does, nor does not.

नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारर्जुसूत्रशब्दा नयाः। T. S. I. 34.

† The T. Sûtra which is supposed to refer to the subject is अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धेः (T S. V 31), which however refers only to the general principle of Relati ity or Anekânta. In the Bhâṣya, three of the seven propositions are mentioned viz. affirmation (सत्), denial (असत्) and indescribability (अवक्तव्य), yet not all the seven.

In the "Sāmañña-Phala Sutta" ("The Fruits of the life of a Recluse"),* another work of the Buddhist Pāli canon the same kind of prevarication is attributed to one Sañjaya of the Belaṭṭha clan who said: If you ask me whether there is another world—well if I thought there were, I would say so. And I don't think it is other-wise. And I don't deny it. And I don't say there neither is nor is not another world.

These passages at once put one in mind of the Jaina "Syādvāda" It is possible that the Buddhist here does injustice to the school which in answer to certain definite questions refused to commit itself to a definite proposition, because in its opinion the proposition would convey only a partial truth and would consequently be 'durnaya' It does not necessarily prov that the positive side to the doctrine was wanting. If, however in view of the fact that the doctrine is attributed to the 'recluses and Brāhmaṇas' we hold that it could not have been the "Syādvāda of the Jainas it must be understood as an early reference to the 'anirvacanīyatāvāda of the Vedāntin, which led to the 'Syādvāda of the Jaina as the next positive step.

The teaching of Mahāvīra Svāmin like that of Gautama Buddha was primarily ethical, and consequently logic and metaphysics may well be expected to occupy a subordinate place in the early Jaina canon. Accordingly there occur in it only few rare references to the principle of Syādvāda which are relied upon by later writers as providing the Scriptural authority for their doctrine; moreover these eferences occur in connection with concrete problems of spiritual philosophy which were debated in the schools and are not evolved as principles of bstract logic.

Hitherto only one or two passages have been traced in the Jaina canon which contain reference to the Syādvāda They occur in the Bhagavatīsūtra and are quoted by the

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* S. B. B. Dialogues of the Buddha, Vol. II

author of the "Nayacakra" who says: "सर्वस्यात्मा जिनप्रवचनस्यैव नियमवत्त्वात् नियमस्य नियमवमिति चेत्—उच्यते। नियम्यार्थं चास्य 'आया (Skt. आत्मा) मन्ने नाणे (=Skt. ज्ञानं) अन्नाणे (अज्ञानं)' इति स्वामी गौतमस्वामिना पृष्टो व्याकरोति 'गोयमा णाणे नियमा' अतो ज्ञानं नियमादात्मनि ज्ञानस्यात्मव्यतिरेकेण दुरवगमात् ॥ 'आया पुण सिय (=Skt. स्यात्) णाणे सिय अणाणे'

The Syādvāda as found in the Bhagavatīsūtra consists of three propositions¶ only—those of अस्ति (affirmation) नास्ति (negation) and अवक्तव्य (indescribability) Thus: "गोयमा अप्पणो आदिट्ठे आया (=आत्मा), परस्स आदिट्ठे नो आया (= न आत्मा), तदुभयस्स आदिट्ठे अवत्तव्वं (अवक्तव्यं) आया ति यणो आया ति य" इति Among other early references we have one in Bhadrabāhu's "Sūtra kṛtāṅga-niryukti" and another in "Tattvārtha-Bhāṣya — which has already been noted Later the doctrine is found in its fully developed form of 'Seven Propositions' in the "Pravacana-sāra and "Pañcāstikāya" of Kundakundācārya, in the "Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra, in the "Sammati-Tarka" and Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara, in the "Tattvārtha-Rājavārtika of Akalaṅka, in the "Tattvārtha Ślokavārtika" of Vidyānanda, in the "Pramāṇanaya-tattvā lokā-laṅkāra of Devasūri and several other independent works and commentaries both of the Digambara and Svetāmbara sects. But the most exhaustive treatise devoted entirely to the subject is the famous Saptabhaṃgī taraṃgiṇī of Vimala dās, a Digambara writer of a much later date. Except th formal difference in the rder of the third and fourth propositions of the 'Sapta Bhaṃgī' inter se,—which, again, does not coincide with the difference of J ina religious sects—there

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* I am indebted for this quotation to an article in the Jaina Sāhitya Saṃśodhaka" by Mr Rasiklal C Parikh whose attention was first drawn to it by M ni Śrī Jinav j yaji.

¶ These came to be known as "मूलभङ्ग"s when late they came to be developed into seven.

has been no change in the Saptabhaṅgī ever since it became a set of seven propositions instead of three. In regard to Nayas, their number has been variously given. The author of the "Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra" first mentions *five* nayas—नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारर्जुसूत्रशब्दा नयाः (I 34) and next adds "आद्यशब्दौ द्वित्रिभेदौ (I 35), but does not name these subdivisions. These are added, however, in the Bhāṣya, viz., देशपरिक्षेपी and सर्वपरिक्षेपी sub-divisions of नैगम and सांप्रत, समभिरूढ and एवंभूत sub-divisions of शब्द. These omitting the subdivisions of नैगम which are regarded as unimportant, make *seven*. Siddhasena Divākara mentions only *six* nayas, omitting नैगम from the earlier list. Some books, such as the Anekāntajayapatākā of Haribhadra, discuss only the more comprehensive proposition of "Anekānta" with special reference to the problems of द्रव्य and पर्याय, नित्य and अनित्य, सामान्य and विशेष etc.

As important as the Syādvāda and the Nayavāda but occupying a less spectacular place in Jainism, is its definition of Reality—"उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत्" which like the other two doctrines is a characteristic example of the Jaina's "अनेकान्तवाद".

The principal writers who have contributed to the philosophical literature of Jainism fall in two distinct lines, that of the Śvetāmbaras and that of the Digambaras. While the Digambaras insist upon nudity as essential in ascetic life, and question the authenticity of the canonical works recognised by the Śvetāmbaras, and while they are divided in the matter of certain miscellaneous dogmas such as the possibility of spiritual emancipation of women there is no important difference in their philosophical tenets. And yet the two traditions

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These according to the Śvetāmbara tradition were first collected at a Council held at Pāṭaliputra about 300 B. C. under the presidency of Sthūlabhadra, and were finally redacted and reduced to writing by Devardhigaṇi at Vallabhi about the beginning of the 6th century A. D.

run in separate lines, the writers of one sect rarely quoting or referring to those of the other Consequently all the authors whom Malliṣeṇa quotes belong to the Śvetāmbara tradition except one or two who command respect throughout the Jaina community

The history of the philosophical writings of Jainism may be divided into the following periods:

I. The period of the canonical works, many of which were composed before the Christian era, and some were added in the interval between the composition and the final redaction of the texts. To this early period belong speculations about the many-sidedness of Reality about the spirit and nature of matter and the affection of the former by the latter

II Next comes the age of the beginnings of systematic works of which the earliest writers are Umāsvāti and Kunda kundācārya.

(1) Umāsvāti is claimed as a Digambara by the Digambaras and as a S vetāmbara by the S vetāmbaras. He was either too high-souled to belong to either of the two warring sects, or what is more probable, by his time the sects had not ranged themselves in hostile or separate camps. He belo gs to the first century A. D His great work "Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra probably suggested by the 28th chapter of Uttarādhyayana, has had the honour of becoming a basis of numerous commentaries and subcommentaries both of the S vetāmbara and the Digambara sect. The Bhāṣya on the Sūtra is regarded as Umāsvāti's own composition by the S vetāmbaras while the Digambaras attribute to h m only the Sūtras. Among the numerous commentaries and s bcommentaries of the Sūtras the following may be noted as chief The Bhāṣ " by Umāsvāti himself or some other writer of the S'vetāmbara sect Sarvārthasiddhi" (Digambara) of Pūjyapāda Devanandi (5th century A D) Gandhahasti Bhāṣya" ttributed t Samantabhadra by Digambaras ol to Siddhasena Divākara

by S vetâmbaras, but considered to be work of Siddhasena gani, writer who lived some tim between the 7th and the 9th century of the Vikrama Samvat accordi g to Pandit Sukhlal; Râjavârtika" by Bhatta Akalanka (Digambara 8th century A D), and S lokavârtika by Vidyânandi (Digambara 9th century A D).

(2) Kundakundâcârya—a eminent Digambara writer also of the 1st century A D His most famous works are Pravacanasâra" and "Panchâstikâya The first like the "Tattvârthâdhigama " of Umâ[illegible] âti is comprehensive summary of Jainism.

III The third period which pens with Siddhasena Divâkara (S'vetâmbara) and Samantabhadra (Digambara) s the golden ge of Jain philosophy These two writers recognising th fact that the use f Sanskrit for Jaina works was as much sed of their times as that of Prâkrit was t the ag of Mahâvira, wrote in Sanskrit, and their example was followed widely by later writers on Jaina philosophy

Siddhasena—Divâkara, B ahman convert to the S'vetâmbara sect of Jainism, is assigned to the end f the 6th century A. D by Dr Satischandra, nd to the last quarter of the th century A.D by D Jacobi nd D P L Vaidya. This is done by all on somewhat inconclusi grounds, but the date can be taken as fixed within these broad limits. Besides the famous Dvâtrimsikâs "Sets of Thirty-tw Stanzas" he composed two standard works of Jaina Logic, the Nyâyâvatâra and the "Sammati—or Sanmati Tarka" The former was commented upo by Siddharsi in the beginning of the 10th century A. D., nd the latter by Abhayadevasûri bout the same time.

2. Samantabhadra, Digambara contemporary of Siddhasena-Divâkara, w te Âpta-Mîmâmsâ" said to be the introductory part of the Gandhahasti Bhâsya" which according to Digambaras, is a w k of Samantabhadra.

3 Haribhadra—There have been two Haribhadras, one of whom belongs to this age. He is a voluminous writer on Jaina religion and philosophy To the latter branch belongs the famous "Saddarśana-Samuccaya" which is a very careful and impartial though brief statement of the different systems of Indian philosophy

4. Bhatta Akalamka or Akalamka Deva—a famous Digambara writer of the latter part of the 8th century wrot the monumental Rāja-Vārtika" on the "Tattvārtha f Umāsvāti and Aṣṭaśati" a commentary on Samantabha dra "Āpta-Mimāmsā" He also wrote "Nyāyaviniścaya "Tattvārtha-Vārtika-Vyākhyānālamkāra" and numerous other works.

5. Vidyānand or -nandi —a Digambara writer of the early part of the 9th century A. D He wrote commentary called " Aṣṭasahasri " on the Aṣṭaśati of Akalamka nd "Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika —both polemical works of great value to advanced students of Jaina philosophy

6 Mānikyanandin—another Digambara author of the 9th century who wrote "Parikṣāmukhasūtra" a manual of Jaina Logic.

IV The next and for our p rpose the last, period of J ina philosophy xtends from Devasū i and Hemacand (12th century A D) to G naratna (15th century A. D)

1. Devasūri (1086-1169 A. D —Dr Satischandra) an elder contemporary of Hemacandra wrote Pramāṇa-nay - tattvālokālamkara" and its commentary Syādvā la-ratnā kara

2 Hemacandra (1088-1172 A D —D Satischandra) contemporary of D vasūri. A most vol minous writer who besides writing some Dvātriṁśikas on the mod l of Siddhasena-Divākara similar w ks, wrot a work on Jaina Logic called Pramā Mimāṁsā ; and further he provided

the Jaina readers with standard works o Vyâkaraṇa and Alaṁkâra to replace those composed by Brâhmaṇas. He is therefore, called "Kalikâla Sarvajña for his versatility

Ratnaprabhasûri (1181 A. D)—He wrote 'Syâdvâda ratnâkarâ vatârikâ shorter commentary the 'Syâdvâda-ratnâkara" on Pramâṇanayatattvalokâlaṁkara.

Malliṣeṇasûri—(1292 A. D) The author of our text—the Syâdvâdamañjarî which is mainly review of Brâhmaṇa, Bauddha and Cârvâka systems in the shape of comme tary on Hemacandra's Anyayoga-vyavaccheda-Dvâtriṁśikâ

Among later miscellaneous writers, Râjaśekhara (1349 A D) wrote "P ñjikâ on Ratnâkarâvatârikâ of Ratnaprabha, and Jñânacandra (1350) ṭippaṇa on the same. The ge may be said to have closed with Guṇaratna (1409) wh has written very lucid and exhaustiv commentary on the "Saddarśana-S muccaya of Haribhadra

IV A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE WORK.

Stanzas I-III.

The first three stanzas are introductory

St. I

This contains the characterisation of the last Tîrthaṅkara Śrî Vardhamâna otherwise known as Mahâvîra Svâmin, as an ideal teacher possessed f what re technically known in Jainism as the four 'अतिशय' or excellences: (1) ज्ञानातिशय—Excellence of wisdom, that is wis lom which is falling nd lost, expressed one word as 'केवलज्ञान' (2) अपायापगमाति शय—E cellence consisting in freedom from all evil, viz the passions (3) वचनातिशय—Excellence as teache since he has taught the doctrine of Syâdvâda which has stood invulnerable

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The word ha bout it Sâṅkhya tinge which, as we know from the history f Sâṅkhya nd J inism, is not accidental.

against all attacks of rival systems (4) पूजातिशय—Excellence consisting in the fact that he has deserved and received wo ship from all beings, gods as well as men. With regard to (२), note that it is a special feature of Jainism that it lea es no room for doubt that 'चारित्र' or moral life is as important as ज्ञान in an ideal man. Cf. सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः Tattvārtha I 1. As regards (4) it may be remembered that Vaiṣṇavism with its theory of human incarnations of God, Jainism and Buddhism have lifted the ideal man to a position above that of gods.

St. II.

Of the innumerable qualities of the Master the one which will engage the attention of the author is his "यथार्थवाद" i. e. his philosophy which is true to facts, that is to say the many sidedness of Truth or Reality—the fundamental doctrine of Jaina philosophy

St. III.

The author implores all readers, whether Jains or not, to ponder upon the truth of Jaina philosophy which emerges out of the examination of the partial truths of other systems. In other words, the bject of th author is not to revile other systems but to serve the cause of Truth—which is not absolutely confined to any single system. Compare the object of the "khaṇḍana khaṇḍa khādya, i the interests of Vedānta.

Stanzas IV-IX: *Criticism / the Vaiśeṣika System.*

St. IV

First, of its doctrines of सामान्य and विशेष:

Freely rendered the Stanza means: Things are of themselves—*sua moto*—capabl of co-ordination with things of their own class, and differentiation from things of a different class; their nature is not to be explained by assuming realities—(सामान्य and विशेष)—*other* than the things themselves. Those fools err who declare that the two, viz., सामान्य and विशेष are

distinct realities (distinct inter se and distinct from the things in which they are supposed to inhere) since they are not such.

The Jaina view on the point, like that of several other schools, is that things are *by themselves* co-ordinated with things of their own class and differentiated from things of other classes, and consequently there is no need to assume, as the Vaiśeṣikas do, the two hypothetical realities, सामान्य and विशेष. This, besides being a gratuitous assumption according to the Jaina view involves the absurdity of making two such *contradictory* things as सामान्य and विशेष reside in one and the same thing unless you reconcile them in the Jaina manner by regarding them as two relative aspects—and aspects only—of one and the same thing.

Although the later Vaiśeṣikas regarded सामान्य and विशेष as *two* distinct entities *over and above* द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म in which they were supposed to inhere they seem to have been originally meant as merely *logical categories* (बुद्ध्यपेक्ष i. e. relative to thought as the Vaiśeṣika Sūtrakāra calls them V. S. I. 2. 3) or at most, as *hypothetical* realities assumed to account for certain ideas which none can dispute viz. co-ordination (अनुवृत्ति) and differentiation (व्यावृत्ति). The Jaina position is very clearly formulated by Malliṣeṇa in the following words: "स्वभाव एव हि सर्वभावानां यदनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिप्रत्ययौ स्वत एव जनयन्ति। तथाहि घट एव तावत् पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारवान् प्रतीतिविषयीभवन् सन् अन्यानपि तदाकृतिभृतः पदार्थान् घटरूपतया घटैकशब्दवाच्यतया च प्रत्याययन् सामान्याख्यां लभते। स एव चेतरेभ्यः सजातीयविजातीयेभ्यो द्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैरात्मानं व्यावर्तयन् विशेषव्यपदेशमश्नुते। इति न सामान्यविशेषयोः पृथक् पदार्थान्तरत्वकल्पनं न्याय्यम्॥" Mark that सामान्य and विशेष are regarded by the Jainas as two relative *aspects of* a single reality not even two related realities, that is to say they are only *aspects* of Reality and these, again, are *relative* not absolutely opposed.

St. V

All things including दीप and आकाश (*generally believed to be* अनित्य and नित्य respectively) are subject to the law of

व्याप्य—that is to say a दीप which is regarded as an exemplar of अनित्य things is *also* नित्य, and आकाश which is regarded as a type of नित्य things is *also* अनित्य. All reality according to Jainas, is *both* नित्य and अनित्य; one might almost say *at once* नित्य and अनित्य although from different points of view so that there is no logical contradiction. The Jains characterises Reality or सत् as "उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तम्" (See Tattvârtha).

Light when extinguished has not passed into nothingness and ceased to be; it has only changed its form which is now darkness. Like light, darkness is also a द्रव्य (substance)§—and not a mere अभाव (Cf. तमश्चेतत्-सामान्याभावः—Tarkadîpikâ) as the Vaiśeṣikas think—which is possessed of a black colour and a cool feel. Similarly आकाश is both नित्य and अनित्य. The Jaina rejects the definition of नित्य which is generally given by other schools, viz., अप्रच्युतानुत्पन्नस्थिरैकरूपं नित्यम्, which means absolute changelessness. He defines it thus "तद्भावाव्ययं नित्यम्" (मोक्षसूत्र) i. e. नित्य is that which *continues to exist* inspite of उत्पाद and विनाश. To what would उत्पाद and विनाश belong, argues the Jaina if nothing continues? Therefore a continuous reality he says, must be posited for the very possibility of उत्पाद and विनाश. In fact, says the Jaina, modes and substance i. e. *change and permanence exist together*; neither is possible without the other (द्रव्यं पर्यायवियुतं पर्याया द्रव्यवर्जिताः। क्व कदा केन किंरूपा दृष्टा मानेन केन वा ?॥ दव्वं पज्जवविउयं दव्वविउत्ता य पज्जवा नत्थि—Sammatitarka). Malliṣeṇa observes that the tenet of the Yoga school agrees with that of the Jainas in this matter.

Note that the Jaina differs equally from (1) those who hold that all is eternal and (2) those who hold that all is evanescent, and also from (3) those who hold that some things are eternal and some evanescent. According to him all things

§ Mark that द्रव्य or substance is not to be confounded with matter. The former is anything that can stand under attributes, and need not be solid, liquid or gaseous, as matter is.

are *both* eternal and evanescent although from different points of view (See Brahmajāla Sutta of the Buddhists for the earlier exponents of these extreme doctrines.) In a way says the Jaina even the Vaiśeṣika absolutist admits—without being aware of it—that पृथ्वी is both नित्य and अनित्य *i. e.* not only are some cases of पृथ्वी नित्य and some अनित्य but पृथ्वीत्व co-exists simultaneously with both नित्यत्व and अनित्यत्व. In conclusion, Malliṣeṇa reproduces the criticism of absolute eternalism and absolute non-eternalism from Hemacandra's Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā (I. I. 33) almost verbatim, and winds up with the observation that the Vaiśeṣika admits the अनेकान्तवाद of the Jaina in some of his doctrines without being aware of it; *e. g.* the Vaiśeṣika holds that चित्ररूप is a conglomeration of several mutually exclusive रूप which belongs to a single whole substance; similarly many things in the Vaiśeṣika school are supposed to be क्षणान्तरस्थायि *i. e.* enduring for a certain limited length of time; this means that one and the same thing both endures and perishes, that is, it possesses two contradictory aspects (क्षणान्तरस्थायि वस्तु तदपि नित्यानित्यं).

St. VI.

The doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school which is next criticised is that of the existence and nature of God. God according to this school is—

(1) the maker of the world;

(2) one

(3) all-pervading by his presence and knowledge—*i. e.* ubiquitous and omniscient;

(4) independent; and

(5) eternal.

The prima facie case for this doctrine is made out as follows:—

(1) That He is the maker of the earth, the mountains etc. (that is to say of all these things in the case wherein we do not see the hand of man) can be inferred from the fact that all these

realities are *effects* and therefore require a *cause* (a maker); that they are effects may be easily deduced from another obvious fact that they are limited in their nature. The point of the argument is this: A *definite* nature implies a *conscious maker* a maker who has made this rather than that. It may be urged that the argument involves a paralogism or the fallacy of *arguing from a part to the whole* The Naiyāyika† guards against this attack by making his paksa *not the whole* of Reality—the totality of being—but confining it to such *particular* things as the earth, the mountains etc., (whether such a concept of God is right is a different question,) leaving as dṛṣṭānta all other things which are known to be of *our* making that is, made by sentient beings. The argument is thus from particulars to all parent particulars and not from *some* to *all* which includes the some and thus involves a fallacy In short, he argues for a power that is not we

No (1) is criticised by Malliṣeṇa, mainly on two grounds: First, that the *anumāna* is precluded by *pratyakṣa* which definitely bears witness to the fact that these things (earth, mountains etc.) have no maker., Secondly In the cases in which we have observed making the making belongs to persons *with a body* If to escape the difficulty you say that he can put on a body through his infinite power or that he may possess it owing to our own adṛṣṭa, it is a gratuitous assumption which amounts to begging the question.

No (2): He is *one* For the world is one consistent whole and not a congeries of several conflicting forces, since it is a cosmos and not a chaos. To this the Jaina replies: Not necessarily

† Here as elsewhere in many places the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika are to be understood [illegible] one

Through [illegible] there I have used the words make and 'maker' because create and creator or author may pro[illegible] while calling in the case of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika idea of God who is not supposed to have created the world out of nothing but has fashioned it out of atoms as a potter makes his pots.

sarily so. For many may co-operate to produce a singl result we often find many co-operating to produce a single result without any conflict of wills and consequent confusion e. g. the bees that make their hive.

No (3): Since His making takes place in all parts of the universe, he must be supposed to be *everywhere*, and he must be also *all-knowing*. It be is everywhere, he, says the Jaina, absorbs everything into his own self, leaving nothing to exist outside it. If he knows everything, he knows, we suppose, even hell and knowledge in his our being direct experience he is to be supposed to experience hell ! √[Mark that in the preceding argument the Vaiśeṣika had confined God's making to things which are not of our making and he cannot, therefore we argue that he is omnipresent and omniscient. Consistently he can only say God is present where we are not present, or God experiences what we do not experience.]

The Jaina continues. we may agree that certain souls are all-knowing, in which case God would be one of such souls, that is to say he would be on a par with emancipated souls. But mark says Malliṣeṇa revising his position, that knowledge does not actually travel from the knower to the known; and therefore, omniscience does not necessarily involve omnipresence. Moreover what is the proof of his omniscience ?—he asks. It cannot be *pratyakṣa*, for we cannot have pratyakṣa (direct perception) of his omniscience, unless we ourselves are omniscient, or become so in the process. It cannot be *anumāna*, for you cannot argue from the finite to the infinite. (See Caird "Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion"). It cannot be *arthāpatti*, that is, hypothesis or assumption necessary for explaining the wonderful variety and richness of the world. For the adṛṣṭa of living beings including the vegetable kingdom will explain one part of it, and the remaining part which belongs to the inanimate kingdom may well be existing eternally so, and eventually become the object of the joys and sorrows of

sentient beings. It cannot be *śabda* or the authoritative text of the sacred scriptures. For the scriptures on which you rely are full of contradictions and are therefore unreliable.

No (4): By the very nature of the case he is said to be independent. Then, why does he create a world so full of misery and inequalities unless he is wantonly cruel and unjust? If misery is a punishment for a foul deed and inequality is due to our varying karmans this hypothesis of *karman* will suffice to explain everything, and God will be superfluous.

No (5): He is said to be *eternal*. If so he should be eternally active, or eternally inactive. In the former case his work would at no point be finished, and so nothing could be ever accomplished. In the latter case nothing could even begin. Moreover, how could he have eternally conflicting natures viz., making and unmaking at the same time?

It is said that very likely "the (Vaiśeṣika) system was originally atheistic and some of the sūtras which the old Sanskrit commentators have interpreted as containing a reference to God, have been understood by modern scholars as possibly referring to dharma r prajāpati. But at no stage of its history has the Vaiśeṣika system been avowedly atheistic or even suspected of atheism. The silence of th Sūtras about the existence of God must be explained as due to the main problem f the system being the nature of Ātman and anātman and the investigation of the prope ties (विशेष) of things by first classifying them into categories. The Nyāya sūtras are also sparing in re erences to the problem of God. There is only one reference, occurring in three connected sūtras (Ny. Adh. IV ii. 19 21) which run as follows :—ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात् (19), न पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः (20), and तत्कारितत्वादहेतुः (21). In gard to this Section, as D Ganganath Jha d ly notes, " there is difference among commentators. According to the Bhāṣya, the Vārtika and Vis vanātha's Vṛtti it is

See Faddegon's Vaiś. System—p. 354.

meant to propound the Naiyāyika Siddhānta, that the universe has been created by God, and in accordance with his view Sū. 19 puts forward the final Siddhānta, Sū. 20 puts forward an objection against the Siddhānta, and Sū. 21 answers that objection from the standpoint of the Siddhānta. But in view of the fact that the interpretation of Sū. 19 as Siddhānta sūtra is inconsistent with the introductory assertion of the Bhāṣya that "अथातः प्रावादुकानां दृष्टयः प्रदर्श्यन्ते" i. e. "we now proceed to show up the doctrines of philosophers, tall-talkers or sophists the Tātparya, followed by the Pariśuddhi and Prakāśa, has taken it as representing the criticism of the Vedānta doctrine that God is the *constituent* cause of the Universe By this interpretation Sū. 19 represents the Vedānta view Sū. 20 shows the untenability of that view and Sū. 21 puts forward the references to the question of the existence of God. Thus, there is only one section of three Sūtras and that too occurs not in the constructive but in the destructive part of the work which deals with the doctrines of 'talkers This, again, is explained in two different ways, neither of which seems to be entirely satisfactory The difficulty of interpretation is inherent in the fact that the section consists of only three Sūtras an odd number of which the first is expected to be pūrvapakṣa and if the second is its answer—the Siddhānta—what about the next? Should not this as the last sūtra of the set be expected to be the Siddhānta? The difficulty however can be surmounted to some extent only by taking the third Sūtra as continuation of the second But this is not the only trouble. As Dr Ganganath Jha says:—

There is also a wider issue involved in this Section. The commentators are agreed that the Siddhānta view here put forward is that God is the Creator of the Universe. Now the question arises—How is it that this cardinal doctrine of the system has been inserted by Gautama as said above? He has put it forward only among certain philosophical doctrines and not as *the true doctrine*. Nor is it easy to reconcile the doctrine of God being the creator with the view that there is

no such thing as beginning of creation as is often found reiterated by the Vārtika (e. g on p. 445 and p. 460); if there is no beginning, God may be the *Controller* the *Ruler* He cannot be the *Creator* From the Bhāṣya also (p. 501 l. 3) it seems that God is held to be only the *Seer Knower Omniscient, All-powerful.** †

But, with all respect for Dr Ganganath Jhā, I think that in denying "creative power" to the God of the Nyāya Bhāṣya he has overlooked a sentence which has gone before, wherein the author says " यथा पिताऽपत्यानां तथा पितृभूत ईश्वरो भूतानाम्. This analogy however is somewhat different from that which occurs in later Nyāya books which compare him to a potter who makes his pots from clay

It should be noted that long before the time of Malliṣeṇa, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism had acquired the definite form in which it is formulated in all later manuals, and which was given to it in the " Nyāyasāra " of Bhāsarvajña, the "Nyāya-Kusumāñjali" of Udayana and the Nyāyakandali of Śrīdhara. It is the last mentioned book on which Malliṣeṇa has largely drawn for the statement of th pūrvapakṣa

It may be noted in passing that the theism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika differs from the theisms of Vedānta and Yoga which Malliṣeṇa does not note. ✓The theism of the Vedānta differs essentially from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in two respects First, it regards God as both the *nimitta* and the *upādāna* or *samavāyi kāraṇa* of the world; that is to say God according to it is not only the maker of the world, but also the stuff out of which it is made; in other words, He has created the world out of Himself and is not a mere architect as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds. Secondly He is not demonstrable, that is,

* Dr Ganganath Jha Translation of N S. etc. Vol. IV p. 77 footnote on or Bhāṣya on N S. 4-1-19

† आत्मान्तर ज्ञाता बोद्धा सर्वज्ञाता ईश्वर इति —N S. Bhāṣya.

proved by inference, but is revealed by his own voice that is, as the voice itself declares, 'In the creation, maintenance and destruction of the external world or Nature ('सप्रमाणम् का '), and 'In the commandments of right and wrong' ('कार्याकार्य')- With Yoga, God is neither creator nor an architect, but an Ideal, *the* Ideal Man not an ideal man or type generalised from ideal men as in Jainism, but an eternally existing and real Ideal Man.†

St. VII.

The doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas which is next criticised is that of 'समवाय' also called 'वृत्ति'—which is supposed to connect two absolutely distinct things viz. धर्म and धर्मिन्. It itself being distinct from both, that is, the third This, says the Jains, is contrary to all experience. W never perceive three things, one binding the other two like cement binding th stones. *Next* समवाय it is said, is one, eternal and all-pervasive. If so, the moment one thing perished, its समवाय would perish, and with it all things in the we ld to which it belonged! ['विनश्यदेकसमवायनाशे च समस्तवस्तुसमवायनाशः प्रसज्यते']. Just as you say here—in the तन्तु—exists this पट, and therefrom deduce समवाय in the same way since you say here is समवाय you will have to admit समवायान्तर and so ad infinitum—" इहेदं इत्यादिप्रत्ययस्य बाधकं" ! It may be noted, that on all the three points, the new school of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas have admitted the justice of these criticisms, so that according to the 'नवीन' समवाय is not प्रत्यक्ष but अनुमेय It is not एक but नाना It is not नित्य but अनित्य so that nothing remains of the old doctrine, except that the समवाय is peculiar type of relation.

St. VIII

I this stanza Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa attack three more doctrines of the Vaiśeṣikas. These rei

* Unlik the late Naiyāyikas the earlier Naiyāyikas seem to ha held the same views Cf. N Bh. "तुल्यनित्यान-पेक्षित्वविषयकत्वेन सम्बन्धावगमसम्बन्धिकानां वा तस्य समवायविवृत्ति"

† See Yoga Sūtra, Vyāsa-Bhāṣya.

1. 'सत्ता' (the highest सामान्य or Universal)—which is supposed to reside not in all that exists, that is in all reals but *on certain reals only* viz. द्रव्य गुण and कर्म, the remaining being denied the right. The latter are सामान्य विशेष and समवाय together with अभाव the last being added by commentators to Kaṇāda's list of categories. But Mallinātha does not care to notice this because it was a later addition, although it was made long before his time.

2. चैतन्य which one would expect to be regarded as the very essence of आत्मन् is treated by the Vaiśeṣikas as an *adventitious* (औपाधिक) quality (आत्मनः व्यतिरिक्तै ज्ञानाद्यै गुणवद्) which comes temporarily into आत्मन् as a result of the working of the machinery of cognition (ज्ञान) viz. अर्थ इन्द्रियेण संयुज्यते इन्द्रियं मनसा मन आत्मना ज्ञान is thus something different from आत्मन्. [This applies to प्रत्यक्ष. But in the case of the other varieties of ज्ञान, so far as the adventitious character of cognition is concerned, the position is the same viz., one ज्ञान through the working of मनस् causes another ज्ञान to come into आत्मन्.]

3. Liberation of आत्मन् is not a positive state of संवित् (consciousness) and आनन्द (joy), but a *negative* condition in which there is no consciousness and no joy ("आत्यन्तिक दुःखध्वंसो मोक्षः"–Tarka).

1 (a). The commentator begins by setting forth the principles of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy quoting Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika sūtras and Udayana's famous verse relating to the restrictions on the field of जाति (सामान्य par excellence). He makes a long extract from Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya on the first point, and quotes from Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī on the second and the third. According to the Vaiś. school there is a definite reality called 'सत्ता' or परसामान्य

Udayanācārya points out in his Kiraṇāvalī ("व्यक्तेरभेद: etc.) certain conditions in which an apparent सामान्य (°त्व) is not a *real* सामान्य (जाति). See Notes for the conditions and their reasons.

(i) It is not द्रव्य. For it is lacking in the characteristic nature of द्रव्य, which is to be either made up of many द्रव्यs as its constituents (e.g. a पट which is made of many तन्तुs) and not to be complete in a single द्रव्य (e.g. पट which is not complete in a single तन्तु unlike सत्ता or सामान्य which is complete in each single द्रव्य (e.g. पटत्व in each पट), or to be made up of no constituent द्रव्य at all (e.g. परमाणु which has no constituent as structural parts whatsoever).

(ii) It is not a गुण, because it exists in गुणs, which no गुण does. (गुणे गुणानङ्गीकारात्).

(iii) It is not कर्म for the same reason, mutatis mutandis.

1 (b). Similarly there exist विशेष as a special category. For just as सामान्य—of which सत्ता is the highest—is the principle of co-ordination (अनुवृत्ति) of individuals, so is विशेष the principle of differentiation or distinction (व्यावृत्ति). By its very nature विशेष belongs to each particular separately and therefore there should be as many विशेष as there are particulars in the Universe. Possession of different सामान्य and possession of different अवयवs are two other principles which serve to distinguish things. For example, घटत्व distinguishes घट from पट, and the possession of parts which are not identical with the parts of another घट distinguishes the first घट from the second. Hence it is not necessary to assume any विशेष in these two cases. But these methods of distinction will not do in the case of परमाणुs of the same substance, which are distinct from one another and yet alike, or in the case of आकाश which being a single whole does not possess either सामान्य or अवयव. (See Dinakari[*])

1 (c). समवाय is the *bond* of things which are inseparable, such as पट and its तन्तुs, घट and its गुणs, or घट and घटत्व etc. and it is therefore not one of the things themselves.

2 and 3. The ground of the Vaiśeṣikas for regarding गुण and कर्म as adventitious, and not essential is obvious. We are conscious of our ideas coming and going and so also of

pleasure and pain which belong to us and are positive in character. Passing states cannot be the essence of things: they belong to us, they are ours, they are not we.

Criticism—Mallisena criticises these three doctrines as follows:—

1. सत्ता is *being* and everything that *is* must possess सत्ता. Moreover its function is to co-ordinate, and therefore wherever things appear to be alike in one respect or another and are thus capable of co-ordination there is the field for सामान्य. We can co-ordinate all things that *exist*, and consequently सत्ता can reside in *all*. The difficulties raised by Udayana do not arise, because the Jaina is not prepared to admit सामान्य as a real apart from and over and above the particulars which it co-ordinates, nor does he regard particulars as simply particulars incapable of being referred to a universal. According to the Jaina, सामान्य is only an aspect and not a real per se and further सामान्य and विशेष are two aspects of the same real and are not mutually exclusive. Remember that the ancient Vaiśeṣikas who spoke of a सामान्य-विशेष —the two-in-one—were, according to the Jaina view wiser than their successors who made the categories so many water tight compartments. In the doctrine that सत्ता exists only in द्रव्य गुण and कर्म and not in the remaining categories one may see a sound distinction made between *real* categories and *conceptual* categories (see remarks under St. IV).

2. The distinction between ज्ञान and आत्मन्, it may be urged, is the distinction between करण and कर्तृ. But the distinction is false. The करण is not always external to कर्तृ. We speak of a serpent making a coil of himself by himself where कर्तृ कर्म and करण are all one. Again, it has been urged that we are conscious of *possessing* ज्ञान and not *being* ज्ञान itself and consequently ज्ञान must be regarded as distinct from आत्मन्. Answer: No. ज्ञान is not external to आत्मन्, it is not possession of something externally related to it. It is a production or drawing out of something from the आत्मन् itself and is there-

fore only an aspect or mode (परिणाम) of आत्मन् and nothing distinct.

2. As regards गुण the Jains would distinguish between [illegible] which is perishable and [illegible] which is everlasting.

All these weaknesses of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine would seem to arise from two fundamental errors: First, conceptual realities are hypostatised, and secondly he takes a mechanical view of the Universe where things are taken as essentially so many particulars which come together and separate like actors on a stage—and so carry on mutual intercourse as realities external to each other. The first of these opens up a much deeper question whether the logical or conceptual is not the real. This we cannot afford to discuss here. The second is to some extent the position of particularists and pluralists of modern European and American philosophy.

St. IX.

The doctrine next examined is that of the विभुत्व of आत्मन् —that आत्मन् is everywhere— a doctrine which on the face of it, say the Jains, is contrary to our experience. For all are agreed that a thing must be where its quality is found, e. g. घट exists where its form exists and not elsewhere. It may be argued: Don't we smell from a distance? Answer: No; the particles which possess the smell fly to our nose. But it may be asked: Does not magic work at a distance? Answer: No; the presiding deity of the magical formula or practice who resides elsewhere is working there. Having thus justified his position in a general way Malliṣeṇa lays down a syllogism for attacking the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the विभुत्व of आत्मन्—आत्मा सर्वगतो न भवति । सर्वत्र तद्गुणानुपलब्धेः । यो यः सर्वत्रानुपलभ्यमानगुणः स स सर्वगतो न भवति यथा घटः । तथा चायम् । तस्मात् तथा । व्यतिरेके व्योमादि and then proceeds to answer the objections of the opponent such as, the हेतु is असिद्ध etc. In the course of his answer he argues that the गुण of the आत्मन् is supposed to act even at a distance—and it cannot be there hanging in the air so to say without an underlying substratum; consequently our

आत्मन् must be supposed to be existing even there. And since अदृष्ट works everywhere, the underlying substance, viz., आत्मन् must also exist everywhere But the Jaina denies that अदृष्ट is acting there and everywhere. Things, he says, have their own nature—a fact which is ultimate and does not admit of question or explanation—and that nature is not caused by अदृष्ट To say that the natures of things are determined by अदृष्ट is to leave no room for your God. Next, since the Vaiśeṣika holds that आत्मानः are many if each of them is विभु also, as he believes, what a wonderful clash and interpenetration of आत्मानः would ensue ! Moreove each of them would enter the आत्मन् of God Himself and each would thereby become a creator ! It may be urged: Unless आत्मन् was विभु how could the आत्मन् draw to himself the particles for the body in which he has to dwell in the next life ? Or eve if he could, would not his body-sized आत्मन् as a consequence be सावयव and therefore a कार्य just like the body itself ? The Jaina, however is prepared to accept the logical consequence. [More accurately he says that आत्मन् has प्रदेश though not अवयव] The Jaina believes that आत्मन् is सावयव is परिणामिन् and does change from time to time. H is no believer in absolute changelessness of आत्मन्, or for the matter of that in absolute changelessness of anything whatsoever It may be asked in support of the विभुत्व theory: If आत्मन् were body-sized how could आत्मन् enter the body ? For two मूर्त things cannot occupy the same space t the same time. The Jaina answers the objection by denying मूर्तत्व (रूपादिमत्त्व etc.) in one sense (materiality) and affirming it in another (असर्वगतत्व). The Jaina expresses and explains his view that आत्मन् is subject to change and is yet terual, as follows: "पर्यायतस्तया विनश्यतोऽपि द्रव्यतो नित्यत्वात्. He forth points ut that fo some time after a body is cut, its parts continue to throb and retain the आत्मन् in them.

It may be noted that the Jaina is the only Inlian schoolman who holds that आत्मन् is middle-(body)sized. The only other philosopher who holds an analogous though

not the same doctrine in Rāmānujācārya, according to whom the ज्ञान of आत्मन् though not the आत्मन् himself, is देहपरिमाणविशिष्ट. In order to appreciate the Jaina position one has to reinterpret it and understand it in the only sense in which it is possible to defend it—viz., that the phenomenon of consciousness is limited to the body though the consciousness belongs to आत्मन् and is the essence of आत्मन्. Similarly when Śaṅkara speaks of the निर्गुण or निष्कल of आत्मन् what he means is आत्मन् is a reality which is not bounded by time or space. And the same is the case with the Sāṁkhya. Also it may be added, one must free आत्मन् from all material analogies, and must abandon the conception of आत्मन् as द्रव्य like घट, पट, शरीर etc. which is the fundamental error of what Kant calls Rational (i.e., 'uncritical' or 'dogmatic' in the Kantian sense of the word) Psychology. Let us remember in this connection, that when the Vaiśeṣika speaks of आत्मन् as a 'द्रव्य' or substance, he does not mean material substance but only a substance which possesses qualities (cf. DesCartes), not, however as mere logical subject possessing predicates, for such a view would deprive आत्मन् of all reality making him merely nominal.

Stanza X: *Criticism of Nyāya.*

St. X.

The system under criticism in this stanza and its commentary is that of the Naiyāyikas who are here called यौगs and so distinguished from the Vaiśeṣikas.

In a work of Logic, says the Jaina, what one should expect is an exposition of the laws of correct thinking, and perhaps of the fallacies which one is likely to commit unknowingly. But it is quite queer that "Nyāyasūtras"—a work which professes to deal with subjects which should be cared for studied in order to achieve the summum bonum—should treat such subjects as [illegible] etc. which are various forms of irresponsible, dishonest and sophistical reasoning. The Brāhmaṇa apologist may plead that Gautama has not in any way recommended these but that out of mercy for the

intellectually weak, he has only drawn their attention to such logical traps as the enemy is likely to devise for his ruin. Malliṣeṇa ridicules such an apologia. He next proceeds to deal with the definitions of certain terms which are contained in the fundamental sūtra of Nyāya: "प्रमाण-प्रमेय etc.

1. प्रमाण. Malliṣeṇa examines and rejects the definition given in the Nyāya Bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana, and in the Nyāyasāra" by Bhāsarvajña, viz—(1) 'अर्थोपलब्धिहेतु प्रमाणम्' and (2) 'सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम्' In neither of the two definitions, he says, the essential fact that प्रमाण is ज्ञान is brought out. On the contrary in the Nyāya system इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष and not th rudimentary ज्ञान which springs from it is regarded as a फल of प्रमाण Moreover in the case of the first definition, the word हेतु which occurs there is too wide and might include चक्षुः and कर्म as well as प्रमाता The correct definition of प्रमाण says Malliṣeṇa, is "स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्' (cf. Pramāṇa N ya-Tattvālokālaṁkāra).

2. प्रमेयम्—Criticism: शरीर etc. are included in आत्मन् and do not require to be separately mentioned प्रेत्यभाव and अपवर्ग are similarly states of आत्मन् A more fundamental objection is that आत्मन् is not a प्रमेय but प्रमातृ दोषs can be included in प्रवृत्ति, and re only activities of मनस् which has been separately mentioned दुःख and इन्द्रियार्थ are फल as one of the Brāhmaṇa logicians, Jayanta, admits. In conclusion Malliṣeṇa says that the right definition of प्रमेय is "प्रमाणविषयीभूतं वस्तु प्रमेयम् "

It may be pointed out that Malliṣeṇa forgets that there are two meanings of the word 'प्रमेय'—प्रमातुं योग्यम् and प्रमातुं शक्यम्—of which the former is intended in the Nyāyasūtra, and the latter in the Vaiśeṣika; in other words, the पदार्थs of the Nyāyasūtras are topics (प्रमातुं योग्याः), not categories, unlike the पदार्थs of the Vaiśeṣika which are categories (प्रमातुं शक्याः).

Malliṣeṇa next explains various kinds of छल, जाति and निग्रहस्थान as is done in the Nyāyasūtras and observes once more at the close that this subject is unworthy of the attention of

one who lays claim to वैदुष्य Let us remember however that Hemacandra has devoted a section of his Pramāṇa-Mīmāṁsā to the treatment of these very subjects.

Stanzas XI XII. *Criticism of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā.*

St. XI.

The author next criticises the defence of हिंसा as made by certain Vedists. After quoting texts from Brāhmaṇa scriptures which prescribe हिंसा Malliṣeṇa condemns it and pithily asks: "हिंसा चेद् धर्महेतुः कथम्? धर्महेतुश्चेद् हिंसा कथम्!" To say that हिंसा is वेदविहित and therefore धर्महेतु is to condemn the Veda, and is, moreover a contradiction in terms. He rejects the weak plea of the Vedists that हिंसा though ordinarily a sin is not a sin when it is prescribed by the Veda. Malliṣeṇa has no difficulty in rejecting this plea as an outrage upon our sense of right and wrong. It may be said that just as the Jainas make an exception in the case of the हिंसा of insects, worms and reptiles which are unavoidably killed in the process of building a Jaina temple, so the Vedist makes an exception of the Vedic यज्ञ which involves हिंसा Malliṣeṇa meets this plea by pointing out that the हिंसा which takes place while building a temple is unavoidable; moreover the service which a Jaina temple renders to the spiritual life of the community far outweighs the evil of the हिंसा. The हिंसा involved in a Vedic yajña is not necessary for obtaining स्वर्ग which, as the Brāhmaṇa scriptures admit, can be obtained by the practice of तप etc. The Vedists say: औत्सर्ग etc. If this be so hell will be a desert and

* The context of the Stanzas and the latter part of the com. on St. XI shew that the system criticised is principally that of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā which is primarily responsible for this doctrine. But as the Naiyāyikas have held the same view in regard to sacrificial slaughters of animals I have used the word Vedists as including both. Just as this may apply both to Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya, so the next Stanza also applies to both.

heaven an overpopulated city! Mallisena endorses the remark of "सारवी —the followers of 'सारवि' कपिल the Sāmkhyas —who says

"वृक्षं छित्वा पशून् हत्वा कृत्वा रुधिरकर्दमम्।
यद्यंव गम्यते स्वर्गे नरकं केन गम्यते ॥
—Quoted in Māthara Vrtti †

Besides Mallisena points out that the Vedic promise of स्वर्ग in such a case does not stand to reason and must be taken to be false like many another rites in connection with marriage etc. Mallisena then quotes other dicta of Brāhmaṇa philosophers such as those of the Vedantins who like the Sāmkhyas have condemned हिंसा even for a यज्ञ. Mallisena condemns also the Śrāddha ceremony which was a great occasion with the [illegible] Brāhmaṇas for slaughtering animals and eating animal food.

Lastly Mallisena takes up the scholastic problem whether the Veda is to be regarded as पौरुषेय or अपौरुषेय. He says that language and its utterance can never be अपौरुषेय and every sentence has a certain तात्पर्य which implies another and is thus पौरुषेय. Secondly the logic of Exception requires that exceptions should relate to the same matter to which the general rule is applied. Here on the other hand, exceptions are for the purpose of propitiating gods guests and manes, whereas the general rule (the prohibitory text "न हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि") is for avoiding sin and its consequences. Where is the necessity of propitiating them by हिंसा when other methods are available? The desire of स्वर्ग in such a case is as foolish as "तपुपतनात् गुप्तिरन्विष्यता".

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* [illegible] is well known [illegible] 'सारवि' (see S. [illegible] Sl. [illegible]) There is considerable similarity between Sāmkhyas and Jainism despite many important differences.

† See Māthara Vrtti, Sāmkhya Sūtras etc. [illegible] कपिल. Many of the quotations here made by Mallisena seem to have been taken from Māthara Vrtti.

A short historical note on this subject may be added: There is no doubt that animal slaughter both for food and propitiation of gods and manes was very common among ancient Aryans. At the same tim from the evidence of the sermons of Mahâvira Svâmi a d Gautama Buddha it is easy to see that अहिंसा was also an ancient practice which they tried to revive. There is famous passage in the Aitareya Brâhmaṇa which clearly hows that strong tendency in favour of अहिंसा must have set in long before its time. Had the passage been post-Buddhistic, अहिंसा even for Vedic sacrifice would ot have been complacently recommended in that Vedic work at tame when the preachi gs of Jainism and Buddhism were laying their axe t the root of Vedic practices. The Jñâna and Bhakti movements had large share in maki g the Vedic हिंसा beolete Of this w have ampl vidence in the Mahâ bhârata and the ruling philosophy of the day —the Sâmkhya,— which was already i the field when Jainism and Buddhism came to be preached. It sh uld be borne in mind in this connection that what th two reformers condemned was not the whole of the Vedic religious lif even in their day Apart from the couplet which has been cited by Mallisena as that of the Sâmkhyas, there is whol adhikaraṇa in the Sâmkhya Sûtras, which tho gh much late m y well be supposed to record old Sâmkhya traditions—devoted to repudiation of हिंसा altogether even from the Vedic sacrifice.

The history of हिंसा nd अहिंसा has passed thro gh the following stages.

1. First Stage: When हिंसा was practised by th people generally both for food and f worship of gods and manes.

2. Second Stage: When it was discarded from food but was retained in worship This is easy to understand. For while a secular practice can be easily changed, superstitions in which gods and ancestors are pposel to be involved die hard.

3. Third Stage. When the moral sense of the people was so far awakened by a deepe sense of religion—of Jñâna and

bhakti—that it revolted against all forms of हिंसा whether religious or secular

St. XII

Next, Hemacandra and his commentator examine the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā theory (that of the particular school of P Mīmāṃsā which was established by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) regarding the nature of ज्ञान The problems raised therein are: (1) How do we know that we know ?—i. e. how is knowledge itself known, that is, brought to consciousness ? (2) How do we know objects ?

The Jaina holds that ज्ञान or consciousness has this dual nature: (1) it reveals itself ('स्वावबोधक्षम) and (2) it reveals also the wo ld of objects ('अर्थावबोधक्षम') He thus rejects the view of Kumārila that ज्ञान itself is known by process of *implication* (अर्थापत्ति or आक्षेप), being implied in the fact of प्राकट्य of the object, which is its effect. With it he also rejects a similar theory of the "यौगाः' (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) who regard ज्ञान as अनुव्यवसायगम्य i. e. known by a *further act of knowing* (अनुव्यवसाय) directed upon the first fact of knowledge. The commentator could well have added that the Jaina view excludes also the idealistic position that knowledge does not disclose any external reality ideas being the only ultimate reality of objects (विज्ञानवाद). For this is the point of अर्थ in the dvandva compound 'स्वार्थ' (स्व+अर्थ) in the first line of the Stanza ('स्वार्थावबोधक्षम एव बोध). Hemacandra says that the doctrine of the self-revelation of ज्ञान is a perfectly sound proposition and yet some weak-kneed philosophers have succumbed to the criticism levelled against it by their opponents —which they need not have done.

As regards the main part of the substance of the Stanza—whether ज्ञान is self-revealed or alter revealed—the commentator states and examines Kumārila theory of प्राकट्य and the implication of ज्ञान in प्राकट्य Th rgument against the self-revelation theory is that "ज्ञानं स्वसंविदितं न भवति । स्वात्मनि

नियतिरोधात् । न हि प्रदीपविरोधोऽपि कुट दवलनमविरोधं प्रमा । न च प्रदीपाप्रकाशिता स्वं वेद्यमितिनयायात् ॥ The reply to that is based on the *analogy of* प्रदीप which reveals itself, while revealing other objects also nd does not require to be revealed by nother प्रदीप The argument of the opponent which was based pon such nalogies as those of घट and असि is met by an appeal t experience and its irresistible a thority (अनुभवसिद्धेऽर्थे विरोधासिद्धेः). Moreover how could Kumārila assume that ज्ञातता was an obvious fact on which he could base his argument of implication? What reason is there f assuming that ज्ञातता is self-revealed any more than th t ज्ञान is self-revealed? In fact we re conscious of the self-revelation of ज्ञान rathe than that of ज्ञातता. There is one more important objection to meet: If ज्ञान is वेद्य i. e. अनुभूति is अनुभाव्य it is no more अनुभूति ('अनुभूतेश्चानुभाव्यत्वे घटादिवदननु-भूतित्वप्रसङ्ग). The answer to that is made with the help of the Jaina theory f aspects r relativity of knowledge (अपेक्षिकत्व-प्रसुतित्वात् स्वापेक्षया अनुभाव्यत्वात् ; on the analogy 'स्वपितृपुत्रा-पेक्षयैकस्य पुत्रपितृत्ववत् विरोधाभावात्)

Mallisen winds p his examination of Bhatta complex theory f the knowledg by analysing it into three steps (त्रिपुटीप्रत्यक्षकल्पना)—

(1) Sensation (इन्द्रियवृत्ति) arising from contact with reality ('अर्थसंयोगे इन्द्रियवृत्तिरन्तरत्वं ज्ञानम्).

(2) Knowledge of the Reality ('अर्थप्राकट्य).

(3) Knowledge that the Reality was known deduction f th existence of knowledge (ज्ञान) from that of the fruit of that knowledge (फल) viz. th knownness (ज्ञातता) of the object (तथाप्यर्थापत्तिस्तया प्रमाणेन ज्ञातत्त्वोपलम्भ).

Mallisena next turns his ttack towards th Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who puts forward his ज्ञानान्तरसंवेद्य theory as follows. "ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरसंवेद्यं । ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वे सति प्रमेयत्वात् घटवत् ।" and meets the charge f अनवस्था by saying that as matter f fact there is no demand for any further act of knowledg (जिज्ञासा).—" न

वैयर्थ्यमर्थक्यात् । अर्थापत्तिविषयेषु स्मार्थेऽपेक्षितो प्रमाणः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ।"
In doing so he points out:

(1) That the हेतु is 'कालात्ययापदिष्ट' (This is a slip. It should be really सत्प्रतिपक्ष—otherwise known as प्रकरणसम—in the old Brāhmana logic) since the अनुमान above set forth can be met by a counter-अनुमान as follows "विवादास्पदीभूतं वाक्यं स्वार्थेऽविसंवादित्वम् । वाक्यत्वात् । ईश्वरवाक्यवत् ।" With reference to the example, Mallisena makes an interesting remark regarding the Jaina attitude towards the problem of the existence of God "युष्माभिरीश्वरस्याभ्युपगततया केवलं स्वीकृतत्वेन दृष्टान्ततया तेषां प्रसिद्धिः ।"—otherwise the example would we fictitious.

(2) That the हेतु is 'व्यर्थविशेषण' प्रमेयत्वात् in the हेतु serving no purpose.

(3) That it is 'अप्रयोजक' as the rgument 'स्वात्मव्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरज्ञानप्रत्यक्षे सति प्रमेयत्वात्' is applicable to thi gs are which are 'चक्षुरादीन्द्रिय' and not to ज्ञान—"ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वे प्रमेयत्वे च सत्यपि यथा घटं स्वान्यानि तथैव स्वात्मानं प्रकाशयति ।" As regards the denial of the possib lity of अनवस्था—on the ground that there is no demand for any further act of knowledge, Mallisena refuses to admit that it is possible to stop at any point after the regressus has begun

Stanzas XIII XIV *Criticism of Vedānta.*

St XIII

From the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, the critic next turns to Uttara-Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta and there to that particula school of Vedānta which in the time of the utho occupied the fore-ground nd here again to that particular tenet of the school which has made it famous—viz. मायावाद

Hemacandra s criticism of मायावाद is simple: (1) If माया is, there is no more अद्वैत; for ब्रह्म is one and माया would be another thus making two. (2) If माया is *not* how will there be this world, which it is sought to ccount for by assuming माया? Moreover to say that something is माया—false—and that it serves to account for the world is a contradiction

in terms. For unless something exists how can it do the duty of accounting for another thing?

Malliṣeṇa next proceeds to elaborate the criticism. The Vedāntin's argument, he says runs thus "अथ तु प्रपञ्चो मिथ्यारूपः । प्रतीयमानत्वात् । यदेवं तदेवं यथा शुक्ति" etc. the world is *unreal*, because it *appear* that is to say all phenomena, by the simple fact of their phenomenality are mere appearances. Malliṣeṇa now challenges the opponent to explain the meaning of मिथ्यारूपत्व

(1) If it means *absolute non-existence* it is accepting the position of असत्ख्याति—which the Vedāntin would not take up, lest it might expose him to the charge of being considered असत्ख्यातिक (Buddhist). (2) If it means *mis take* i. e. one thing appearing as another it is विपरीतख्याति which too the Advaitins cannot adopt as it involves two reals—the thing which is mis*taken* and the thing as it is *mis* taken. (3) If it means that it cannot be definitely characterised as either existent or non-existent (अनिर्वचनीय)—explanation may well be demanded as regards the meaning of this 'अनिर्वचनीयत्व' If 'अनिर्वचनीयत्वं मिथ्यारूपत्वं' it will involve असत्ख्याति or सत्ख्याति according as 'मिथ्यारूप' is निःस्वभावत्व is taken to be a भाव or अभाव Again, if निःस्वभावत्व = प्रतीयमानत्व how can such world (प्रपञ्च) be even talked about? Moreover it will be inconsistent with the hetu प्रतीयमानत्वात् as प्रतीयमानत्व means अप्रतीयमानत्व If मिथ्यारूपत्व only means that it does not really possess its own स्वरूप i. e. it is not what it appears to be this is again विपरीतख्याति (See supra).

Besides, the whole argument is असत्ख्यातिक The Vedāntin now becomes desperate and argues as follows The very fact of the world being दृश्य is the reason for regarding it as mere *phenomenon*, and therefore *unreal*. According to this school of

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The philosophy of Khyātis' is too intricate to be expounded in this short resume. The reader may therefore be referred to Randle's valuable account of the Khyātis in his Indian Logic in the Early Schools pp. 59–76

thought—a particular School of Śaṁkara Vedāntins—प्रत्यक्ष is only a sensation in which what is revealed is the thing-in-itself and not its predicate (निर्विषय मात्र), and it is afterwards transformed into perception (प्रत्यक्ष) by the addition of an element (which falls outside the province of प्रत्यक्ष) whereby a definite character as against all other characters is predicated of the subject. This is what we call the world (प्रपञ्च). This added element is not based on प्रत्यक्ष. Malliṣeṇa says that this is all wrong: प्रत्यक्ष is not merely sensation; it bears testimony to the existence of a certain character and exclusion of other characters; besides this, it reveals the fact that the world consists of many things every one of which possesses its own nature to the exclusion of every other nature. Moreover the argument is अनुमानबाधित. Thus: प्रपञ्चो मिथ्या न भवति असद्विलक्षणत्वात् आत्मवत्। But you will say when one अनुमान is confronted by another अनुमान there must be something to turn the balance. Very well here it is:—If प्रतिभासत्वम् is to be taken as a reason for मिथ्यात्व, ब्रह्म is मिथ्या too.

Adopting a somewhat different form of argument Malliṣeṇa makes out a prima facie case for the Vedāntin on the grounds of प्रत्यक्ष अनुमान and आगम and afterwards attacks each one of them. The Vedāntin's argument, he says, would be briefly this: प्रत्यक्ष only affirms, it does not deny ("आहुर्विधातृ प्रत्यक्षं न निषेद्धृ विपश्चितः") that is to say it affirms Reality and therefore whatever involves exclusion—the world of objects each one of which is supposed to possess a certain nature as against a certain other nature—falls outside the domain of प्रत्यक्ष. अनुमान also supports the same view and so does आगम (the Veda) which it is well known, affirms ब्रह्म as the sole Reality. Malliṣeṇa rejects all these arguments as "the out pourings of a drunken man." For no man in his senses, says M. would question that there is no affirmation which is not at the same time a negation (exclusion): the two are the *positive and negative aspects of a single Reality which are presented together.* Therefore the Vedāntin's argument which makes all *Being* one single reality with nothing by its side

to be excluded, is contrary to all experience. In fact, all our experience bears witness to definite characters of things. All सत् is determinate (सविकल्पक) and things are many

St. XIV

| The problem of the reality of *one* or *many* which is involved in the Vedāntin's position discussed under the preceding Stanza, presents itself in another form in this Stanza: What do words express—सामान्य or विशेष ?—universal or particulars, one or many ? Some P Mīmāṁsakas, the Advaita Vedāntins and the Sāṁkhyas are universalists, and some of them singularists also; the Buddhists are particularists and pluralists; and the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas are both. According to the Jains, they are all *partially right*. The first group of thinkers look to the unity of substance ('द्रव्यास्तिकनयानुसारिणः or 'संग्रहनयानुसारिणः'); the second confine their attention to its manifold modes or changes (पर्यायास्तिकनयानुसारिणः), the third considers both, but treats them as separate, self sufficient realities (नैगमनयानुयायिनः). Malliṣeṇa points out wherein each of them errs, what aspect each of them has ignored. The last school—that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika—comes nearest to th Jaina position; yet it fails to ppreciate the *relativity* of सामान्य and विशेष—the Universal and th Particular the One and the Many

Malliṣeṇa remarks after detailing the three partial truths तदेवं पक्षत्रयेऽपि न घटते योगः। प्रमाणबाधितत्वात्। सामान्यविशेषोभयात्मकस्यैव वस्तुनो निर्विवादमनुभूयमानत्वात् ... I" तदेवमत्रापि सामान्यविशेषोभयात्मकत्वमवसेयम्। यदि हि विशेषा एव स्युः, सामान्यं विशेषेभ्योऽत्यन्तभिन्नं स्यात्। विशेषा वा तद्भिन्नाः स्युः। ... not only d सामान्य nd विशेष both call fo recognition, b t they do so for *recognition as elation* i. e. as two aspects f single reality ("सामान्यस्य विशेषाणां च कथंचित् परस्परमविनाभावेनैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात्। निर्विशेषं हि सामान्यं भवेच्छशविषाणवत्। सामान्यरहितत्वेन विशेषास्तद्वदेव हि")

Stanza XV: *Criticism of the Sâṁkhya*

St. XV

In the Sâṁkhya system—

(1) चित् (चैतन्यशक्ति or पुरुष) has nothing to do with the knowledge of अर्थ, to know things being regarded as a function of बुद्धि बुद्धि is regarded as जड, being an evolute of प्रकृति and not a धर्म of चित् or पुरुष Here is a twofold offence against truth, says the critic. The function of पुरुष should be to know and बुद्धि should be धर्म f पुरुष and not a product of प्रकृति

(2) आकाश and other भूत are said to have sprung from the subtl तन्मात्र viz. शब्द etc.

This is quite contrary to what we observe, says Mallisena, regarding that relation शब्द etc. are the धर्म or गुण of the आकाशादिभूत and not the germs of the latter.

(3) बन्ध and मोक्ष say the Sâṁkhyas, do not really belong t पुरुष b being ever free.

Then why so much ado about मोक्ष and मोक्षोपाय? asks Mallisena.

Mallisena first gives a summary of the Sâṁkhya system by quoting from the Sâṁkhyakârikâs, and show that it has gone wrong in the matter of the points mentioned by Hemacandra.

(1) If चिच्छक्ति does not know things, it surrenders its very nature All talk about चिच्छक्ति or पुरुष being reflected in बुद्धि and thereby enabling th बुद्धि to know is absurd. For only material thing can be reflected. (Is this not taking the metaphor too literally?)

The Sâṁkhya is afraid that if he tt ibutes knowledge to पुरुष he would mak him as कर्तृ the principl of activity and therefore subject to परिणाम But he forgets, says the Jains, that without some sort of activity and consequent परिणाम he cannot so much as mak himself reflected and without parting with its original nat re he cannot have मुक्तामुक्त मोक्ष

and if he parts with it he cannot help being सविकार so far. The theory that पुरुष is really free from activity and therefore from भोग and yet appears to be subject to it on the analogy of a स्फटिक which receives its apparent colour from the जपाकुसुम which is lying near it is rejected by Mallişeṇa on the ground that here too the स्फटिक is subject to a real change of state, for it is only a स्फटिक—a transparent crystal—which takes the reflection and not an opaque stone (उपलखण्ड) Mallişeṇa thus disposes of the position of the Sāṁkhya declared in a text of Patañjali (or rather the commentary by Vyāsa from which the quotation is made), in that of आसुरिवचन in regard to the theory of भोग, as formulated by Āsuri in the same connection and as formulated by Vindhyavāsin also

Note that as between Āsuri and Vindhyavāsin, Āsuri speaks of the reflection of पुरुष in बुद्धि like that of the moon in a sheet of water the stirring of the water making the moon stir also, as it were. Vindhyavāsin on the other hand speaks of the colouring of पुरुष by बुद्धि like that of a pure white स्फटिक assuming the colour of the जपाकुसुम which is near it. Thus the two speak of two different reflections while one speaks of the reflection of पुरुष in बुद्धि the other that of बुद्धि in पुरुष. The Vāda-Mahārṇava accordingly speaks of reciprocal reflections, and so does also Vijñānabhikṣu, the last great exponent of Sāṁkhya philosophy

Mallişeṇa next deals with certain minor details of the Sāṁkhya system.

(2) धर्म ज्ञान वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य and their opposites really belong to आत्मन् and not to बुद्धि as the Sāṁkhya holds.

(3) Further अहंकार is not a product of बुद्धि; it is an attribute of आत्मन् which बुद्धि which is said to be अचेतन cannot produce.

(4) आकाश etc. are not a product of पञ्चतन्मात्र, and it is surprising, says Mallişeṇa, that the Sāṁkhya who claims to be the foremost of those who believe in the absolute eternality of

things (as an advocate of सत्कार्यवाद and consequent निरोधवाद) should speak of आकाश—apparently a type of eternal things—as product!

(5) वाक् etc. are regarded by the Sāṅkhyas as इन्द्रिय. But they are not. For an इन्द्रिय is that which does what nothing else can do—a condition not fulfilled by वाक् etc.

(6) It is vain to think that there is no बन्ध and no मोक्ष. For there is a *real* confusion of प्रकृति and पुरुष which makes our बन्ध.

Mallisena then deals with the three kinds of बन्ध mentioned in Sāṅkhya works: (1) प्राकृतिक, (2) वैकारिक and (3) दाक्षिण—that is, (1) that which consists in regarding प्रकृति as the highest ideal of worship like पुरुष, (2) that which consists in regarding the विकार of प्रकृति such as भूत, इन्द्रिय, अहंकार and बुद्धि as the objects of worship just lik पुरुष and (3) that which consists in practising the religion of ritualism. Mallisena points out they are all different kinds of causes which create what the Jains calls कर्मबन्ध. Unless बन्ध is real and not imaginary as the Sāṅkhya wants us to believe, there is no sense in speaking of मोक्ष.

(7) As regards the Sāṅkhya idea of मोक्ष that it consists of th cessation of the activity of प्रकृति Mallirena points out that th activity of प्रकृति can never cease inasmuch as activity is her very nature. If प्रकृति can choose to retire from th stage like an actress she may also choose to return there some day and so cause बन्ध once more! मोक्ष really consists of the real exhaustion of *all* Karman. Th Jaina conception of the nature of आत्मन् and his मोक्ष is essentially the same as that of the Sāṅkhya with this important difference, however that while the Sāṅkhya regards ज्ञान क्रिया बन्ध and मोक्ष as erroneously connected with आत्मन् the Jaina regards them as its real states.

Stanzas XVI—XVIII: *Criticism f Buddhism.*

The authors next criticise Buddhism, particularly Buddhist Idealism.

St XVI.

I The identity of प्रमाण and फल (प्रमिति), according to the Buddhist, does not bring an external object into touch with consciousness, as is generally supposed, or to be more accurate, it does not make (external) reality an object of (internal) knowledge; what it does is, it defines consciousness, that is to say it produces *conditioned* consciousness; thus, nothing enters into consciousness from without, the act of knowing being nothing but consciousness in every part.

This position is criticised on the following grounds:

The relation between प्रमाण and फल is a *causal* relation—which implies that the two cannot be simultaneous, nor can the two be successive, each enduring *for* a single kṣaṇa only and leaving no trace behind *for* causality is not possible under such conditions. Besides, the causal relation is a relation and as such it implies two correlates, consciousness and something other than consciousness. Malliṣeṇa takes a passage from Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu and its ṭīkā by Dharmottara as a representative text of this school of thought and criticises it on the ground that no such make-shift as the substitution of व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभाव for जन्यजनकभाव as between संवित्ति and सारूप्य can succeed in doing away with the necessity of recognising *two* instead of *one* factor in the act of knowledge (व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभावस्यापि च संबन्धत्वेन द्विष्ठत्वादेकस्मिन्नसंभवात्) The Jaina rejects at the same time the extreme dualism of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School—for the simple reason that प्रमाण and फल (प्रमिति) both belong to one and the same person, so that their unity in सारूप्य *somehow* cannot be denied altogether Note that this hardly differs from the Buddhist's "[illegible] स्वार्थ संवित् प्रमाणफलम्" except in that it would substitute स्वसंवित् for संवित् and reject absolute dualism even of the aspects which the Buddhist formula cannot wholly exclude.

II. Another favourite doctrine of the Buddhists is their 'क्षणभङ्गवाद'—the doctrine of Momentariness. The main ground on which it rests is that nothing can perish unless it is *in its*

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§4, XVI.

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II. Another favourite doctrine of the Buddhists is their 'क्षणभङ्गवाद'—the doctrine of Momentariness. The main ground on which it rests is that nothing can perish unless it is in its

nature to perish, which means that perishability is its nature and since the nature of a thing does not depend upon anything other than the thing itself perishability amounts to actual perishing As regards the pparent persistence of a thing (e. g. घट) in time, the Buddhists explanation is that here *similarity is mistaken fo identity* nothing (क्षण) being existent for more than single क्षण the seemingly persistent thing (घट) being nothing more than a series of perishing things (क्षण).

The doctrine of क्षणभङ्ग is rejected by the Jains o the ground that it is one-sided, the aspect of *permanence* (ध्रौव्य) being as necessary as that of *change*, that is production (उत्पाद) and destruction (व्यय). The former (permanence) belongs to द्रव्य and the latter (change) to its पर्याय which are aspects of the same द्रव्य This doctrine of *Permanence-cum-Evanescence* (i. e. persistence and change) has been criticised by the Buddhist as involving a contradiction, being as absurd as the statement that Devadatta is at once living and dying). But the Jains sees no absurdity in such a proposition. According to him, while we are l ing we are also dying, for the petals of lif are falling away from us all the while we are living

The argument advanced by the Buddhist philosopher Mokṣākaragupta against the doctrine of Permanence in order to establish that of Momentariness falls flat on the Jains, for it is welcome t him in so far as it proves one half of the whole truth in which h belie es.

III. Next is criticised Buddhist *Realism*, accordi g to which the विषय of ज्ञान is also a tenet of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school but the special trouble of the B ddhist is due to his क्षणभङ्गवाद which makes the realistic position as difficult to maintain as the idealistic position which was discussed above. Moreover says the Jains, it is not true that the अर्थ has to be real in order to be a कारण of ज्ञान, for there can be ज्ञान even when there is no eal अर्थ but only मृगतृष्णिका The Buddhist Realist may perhaps argue that the प्रकाशक (the revealer ज्ञान)

implies the प्रकाश्य (the revealed, अर्थ)—प्रकाश्य (अर्थ) which is also the *cause* of its प्रकाशक (ज्ञान). This argument is answered by citing the example of प्रदीप and घट between which no causal relation exists although one is प्रकाशक and the other प्रकाश्य. Further it is pointed out that the cause need not be real, it may be only ideal. For example स्मृति is not caused by अर्थ but by ज्ञान (अनुभव) and yet it is the very breath of अनुमानप्रमाण

Buddhist Realism is divided into two schools that of Presentationists and 'Representationists' (वैभाषिक and सौत्रान्तिक respectively), the latter being midway between Realism and Idealism. The former holds that ज्ञान is produced by अर्थ ('तदुत्पत्ति'), the latter that it bears the form ('तदाकारता') of अर्थ The point of the realistic argument consists in this that unless the reality of अर्थ were recognised as a cause of ज्ञान anything would be the object of that ज्ञान and that all distinction between right and wrong knowledge would vanish. The critic dispenses with the *causality* in the अर्थ and substitutes *capacity* in the ज्ञान by way of a rejoinder to the Realist. Moreover he sees no likeness (सारूप्य) between ज्ञान and अर्थ (e. g. the feeling of heat is not *like* heat in the fire). Likeness, again, cannot account for epistemological relations thus the reflection of the moon in the water does not apprehend the moon in the sky

Taking up the Second Half of the Stanza, Mallisena attacks the school of Buddhist Idealism (विज्ञानवाद of the योगाचार) which asserts that ideas (ज्ञान) are the only reals there being no causal (ज्ञानातिरिक्त अर्थ) or corresponding (ज्ञानाकार अर्थ) wo ld of external reality It attacks the reality of the external world, discarding the problem of epistemology i. e. of the theory of knowledge, as an imaginary bugbear by subjecting it to a number of dilemmas, such as, are the wholes identical with parts, that is, are the bodies nothing more than the constituting atoms, or are they something over and above them; are they permanent or transitory;

is the object in consciousness or outside it etc. None of the positions survives critical scrutiny with the result that the belief in external world cannot be regarded as due to its external reality but must be accounted for by the hypothesis of भ्रम due to अविद्या (nescience).

This is criticised as follows :

This idealistic position which makes our belief in external reality huge mis-take involves the reality of something that is mis-taken, that is taken amiss, which strikes at the root of this extreme Idealism.

All knowledge is of something which is other than the knowledge itself and is the विषय of that knowledge; it is a विषय which is directed towards something which is other than the विषय itself

(3) Atoms are real. That body is not separable from them is no reason why their reality should be questioned.

Moreover it possesses objective reality which is the same for all subjects.

(4) The object is not the subject The fact of self-consciousness implies that there is reality ther than the self from the consciousness of which the consciousness of the self is distinguished.

Moreover an object possesses objective reality which is the same for all subjects.

(5) The अनुमान by which the non-existence of external reality is so ght to be proved can have no value against the evidence of प्रत्यक्ष which decides the question in favour of its existence.

(6) That ज्ञान and its विषय re found *together* is an unwarranted assumption.

(7) The two have distinct nat res, e.g one I experienced as in me, the other outside me; one is already there, which the other notes afterwards.

The last stanza and its commentary having dealt with the बाह्यार्थवाद which was held by the Vaibhāṣika in common with all the other schools of Buddhism, and also the half-hearted and the extreme forms of Idealism (विज्ञानवाद) which were propounded by the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra schools, the critic next proceed to attack the शून्यवाद of the Mādhyamikas generally understood to mean the doctrine of absolute and universal emptiness or void. It may be noted here that the doctrine attributed to the Mādhyamiks in the stanza quoted by Malliṣeṇa towards the close of his commentary on St. XVII makes शून्यता a synonym of the Para-Brahman of the Śāmkara Vedāntins, and many Mahāyana hymn may be cited in which शून्यता is glorified in language which the Vedāntin employs with respect to his Para-Brahman. But this is really a confusion between शून्यता and पूर्णता

Malliṣeṇa like all other critics of the 'शून्यवाद' has understood it as the doctrine of the Universal Void or Emptiness.

An obvious objection which is taken to this doctrine is that it leaves no ground even for itself to stand upon, its only logical position being dead *silence* (" तत्त्वान्य पृच्छेव शुण्व न पुनः प्रत्यवस्थितत्वाय शुण्वतावस्थानलक्ष्यम् "). Yet it may be interesting to examine the rgument which is advanced in its favour. The argument is a sophistical demonstration of the logical impossibility of the supposed reals, viz., प्रमातृ प्रमेय प्रमाण and प्रमिति This, says Malliṣeṇa, the Buddhist tries to prove in extenso in " तत्त्वोपप्लवसिंह " a work which is not now vailable, but which was ccording to its author as the title implies, 'a lion that confounds the animals of Reality'

This position is met by showing that प्रमातृ etc. are by no means impossible; on the contrary they can be shown to be undeniably real I f et शून्यवाद If it is to be worthy of

ॐ पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात् पूर्णमुदच्यते ।
पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥—Upanisad.

credence, must be supported by प्रमाण which, however will mean negation of क्षणिकत्व.

St. XVIII

Next, we have a criticism of the Buddhist's क्षणभङ्गवाद in its application to the problem of आत्मन्. In the absence of an abiding आत्मन्, says the critic,—

(1) There can be no moral retribution in our life (कृत). The Buddhist no doubt substitutes for the single आत्मन् a *series* of विज्ञान of which each preceding one is supposed to be connected with each succeeding one, and vice versa. But who connects them? What is the synthesising principle?

(2) Similarly there is no room for Liberation (मोक्ष). For if there is no आत्मन्, who is to be liberated from the bondage *of life* (संसार)? *The heap of* क्लेश *which has to be* destroyed must belo g to some one to that very person who has been in bondage (बद्ध).

(3) Even such an ordinary psychological fact as स्मृति—memory—becomes impossible.

St. XIX.

The doctrine next criticised is that of वासना—a kind of makeshift which is intended to do duty for the principle of permanence which the Buddhist denies.

All Indian philosophers are firm believers in transmigra tion of the soul, and the Buddhist who denies the existence of the soul and yet believes in transmigration has somehow to mak t possible. This he does by adopting the theory of वासना. It is intended to acco nt for the pparent continuity of ur psychic experience not only in our present life but also of the past and the future. B t the problem which he has to face is that f reconciliation of वासना with क्षणक्षय. Hemacandra and with him Malliṣeṇa point out how the task is hopeless. They put forward this trilemma Are वासना and क्षणसन्तति (lit, series of moments, that is things conditioned

by moments) one (अभेद) or separate (भेद) or neither one nor the other (अनुभय)?—and they show how the Buddhist doctrine breaks on the spearheads of this trilüla. In the first case nothing is gained by the addition of वासना In the second case, it must either conform to the principle of क्षणक्षय or not—if it does, no gain; if it does not, the universality of the principle of क्षणक्षय is so far violated. In the third case, the position becomes impossible; for it must be either the one (अभेद) or the other (भेद). There is only one escape from all these troubles and that is by taking shelter underneath the shady tree of the Jaina doctrine of अनेकान्त i. e. भेद-cum-अभेद As Hemacandra graphically puts it, the birds that have flown away far across the wide sea without any hope of finding a resting place must return to their home (स्वागार) on the mast of the ship.

In connection with this hypothesis—भेदाभेद—Mallisena generously points out how in this case the difference is merely verbal. He says: "स्याद्वादवादिनामपि हि प्रतिक्षणं नवनवपर्याय परंपरोत्पत्तिरभिमतैव । तथा च क्षणिकत्वम् । अतीतानागतवर्तमानपर्याय परंपरानुयायकं चान्वयिद्रव्यम् तच्च वासनेति संज्ञान्तरमात्रेणाभिमतमेव । न च नाममात्रे वस्तु कोऽपि कोविदानाम्" Mallisena further shows how वासना is not possible without a permanent something on which it should rest (स्थिरस्य कस्यचित् च वासनाधारस्यासम्भवे वासना एव).

Stanza XX: *Criticism of the Cārvāka.*

St, XX.

The two principles of the Cārvāka which are criticised are:

(1) That प्रत्यक्ष is the only प्रमाण; not even अनुमान

(2) That there is no soul, beyond the physical body and consequently there is no moral responsibility and no life after death (भूतचैतन्य).

1 The first is impugned on the following grounds As a result of your doctrine, we cannot be ware of the mind

of other persons, as we have evidently no प्रत्यक्ष or direct experience of it. W cannot classify our cognitions as प्रमाण a d अप्रमाण (न च [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] प्रमाणाप्रमाण[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] शक्यते ।) Moreover we should not forget that we call even प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण on the strength of our experience and generalisation from observed cases—that is to say our belief in the credibility of our senses rests on Inference

2. The materialistic view of the soul is condemned by M with the help of a long passage quoted from "Dravyâlaṅkâra" where it is shown that *consciousness* is not the product of भूत (न भूतधर्मो [illegible]), nd even an ugly and a diseased body may hold a beautiful and healthy soul.

Stanzas XXI XXX : *The Jaina Doctrine.*

St XXI : *Nature of Reality: Permanence and Change.*

The authors assert here the Jaina doctrine of Reality as possessed of उत्पाद, व्यय and ध्रौव्य as against those who obsessed by the phenomena f the first two overlo k the third, viz. the Buddhists, and also those who contrariwise, notice only the third and forget the first two for example, the Sâṅkara Vedântins. Recall here the pre-B ddhistic schools noted in the Brahmajâlasutta, the Eternalists ([illegible]) and the non eternalists ([illegible]).

St. XXII *Reality, manysided.*

Th J ina insistence upon the entirety or wholeness of truth has found expression in vario forms. In the preceding stanza t was expressed as "उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत्. Now nothe proposition in which it is se forth is अनन्तधर्मात्मकमेव तत्त्वम्"—Truth has numberless aspects.

St XXIII : *Saptabhaṅgî.*

Next the uthor points t how ne and the same thing may be iewed synthetically or analytically as *one* or as *many* —as one substance or as many attributes or modes. This fact

has been expressed in the famous 'set of Seven Forms—the "सप्तभङ्गी" For a full statement of the se en forms see the text of the Syādvādamañjarī under St. XXII and the Notes thereon.

St. XXIV *No contradiction of the so called opposites.*

The authors now explain how the synthesis of opposites recommended in the previous Stanza does not involve any contradiction inasmuch as the opposites are conditioned by 'upādhis' and are relative to them.

St. XXV : *No contradiction—continued: application of the principle to certain problems of philosophy*

The सप्तभङ्गी be it remembered, gives only the *forms* of the propositions. The principle has to be applied to actual problems of philosophy on which various schoolmen stand divided owing to their viewpoints being partial. The problems are: (1) Permanence versus Change (2) Universal versus Particular; (3) Expressible versus Inexpressible i.e Positivism versus Transcendentalism; (4) Being versus Non-being, or Real versus Unreal.

St. XXVI : *Criticism of the absolutely eternal and the absolutely transitory*

Of these the author takes up the first, viz., Permanence versus Change or the Eternal versus the Transitory and shows how the arguments of the two sides destroy each other with the result that the doctrine of Syādvāda emerges from their mutual conflict. Compare here Kant's philosophy of antinomies.

St. XXVII : *Criticism f Absolutism continued.*

Absolutists cannot solve the problems of सुख-दुःख (भोग), पुण्य-पाप and बन्ध-मोक्ष

St. XXVIII : *Durnaya, Naya, and Pramāṇa.*

The athor next refers to the Jaina philosophy of दुर्नय, नय and प्रमाण. (1) दुर्नय is the mis-take of *partial* truth for the

whole truth to the exclusion of the latter; (2) नयाः are the statements of partial truths, without the recognition that they are only partial; and (3) प्रमाणं is the *whole* truth. The comme tator here sets forth the famous doctrine of the नयाः.

The doctrine of नय o Relativity of Knowledge is the most remarkable contribution of Jainism to Philosophy It means that Reality is conveyed (from √नी) to the mind differently from different points of view or to take it from the other end, the mind approaches Reality differently from different points of view A very useful and fundamental division of नयाः which is made is that i to (1) द्रव्यार्थि(थि)क नय and (2) पर्यायार्थि(थि)क नय, i. e. (1) that which regards द्रव्य o substance and (2) that which regards पर्याय or modes. The नयाः are also divided into five, six or seven kinds. Of these seven the first four are अर्थनयाः and the last three शब्दनयाः, or to adopt th fundamental divisions of द्रव्य and पर्याय the first three are द्रव्यार्थिक and the last four पर्यायार्थिक. These are:

(1) नैगम—(variously derived) which notes both the universal and the particular;

(2) संग्रह—which notes the universal only;

(3) व्यवहार—the point of view of daily life, which does not penetrate bel w the surface of things;

(4) ऋजुसूत्र—It confines itself to the present, and takes note of actual phenomena—the ttributes or changes occurring in substance and not the substance itself.

(5) शब्द—which pays ttention to the character of the world. Thus, while t distinguishes between the different connotations of words, does not do so in regard to their denotation.

(6) समभिरूढ—This नय goes further in the direction of ttaching much importance to the form of th word. It makes distinctions of things corresponding to the etymologies of the words. Thus no tw synonyms denote the same thing

(7) एवंभूत—This नय takes the word as signifying an object while it possesses the क्रिया connoted by the etymology

The Jaina observes that the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika systems are cases of नैगमनय so far as they recognize both the universal (सामान्य) and the particular (विशेष). The Vedānta and the Sāṁkhya are cases of संग्रहनय the former because it merges all particulars in the universal सत् and the latter in so far as it represents an attempt at marshalling particulars under certain general concepts, and regarding the former as forms of the latter the effect being contained in the cause The Cārvāka s way of looking at things is that of व्यवहारनय The Buddhists follow ऋजुसूत्रनय inasmuch as they accept phenomena and deny the noumenon; and the grammarians are by the very nature of their profession inclined towards शब्द etc.

It is obvious that the whole set of seven Nayas could not have come into existence all at once. As a matter of fact, they represent a gradual growth as is a apparent from the number of नय recognised at different times (see Notes) and also from their varying importance.

See the text of the Syādvādamañjarī on this Stanza and Notes for fuller account.

St XXIX *The number of Souls.*

The souls are divisible into six kinds but thei number is endless.

St XXX : *The doctrine of the Syādvāda, all comprehensive and impartial.*

The teaching of the Master is important and all-comprehensive. He has hardly to attack any of the other systems, as those systems quarrel inter se and destroy each other In other words, the Jaina philosophy emerges as the whole truth from the mutual conflicts of the several schools. For details see the Text, Notes and Supplementary Notes with Appendices.

This note presupposes the existence of the schools. If so, it only points to late date of the Jaina point of view

as compared with that of th other schools between which it mediates.

Stanzas XXXI–XXXII: *Conclusion.*

St. XXXI–XXXII: *Praise of the Lord Mahāvīra.*

Th Dvātriṃśikā closes as it began with the panegyric of the Tīrthaṅkara.

V AN ESTIMATE OF THE WORK.

From this short summary of the contents the reader ill see what a wide range of philosophical topics has been covered in this work. None of the rival sytems has been examined in its entirety but only those tenets have been selected for criticism from each of the schools in wh ch the J ina is really interested, and these are some f the greatest p oblems of religion and philosophy such as the problems of the universal and the particular the permanent and the changing, God the one, omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient maker of the world, the sanctity of all life, the state of the liberated so l, the theory of knowledge, the nature of Reality etc. The examination, moreover is not in the nature of irresponsible criticism (vitaṇḍā), but care has been taken to prese t the Jaina view on each of the points that has been considered; and, in conclusion, clear statement has been made of the Jaina doctrine of Naya and Syādvāda—in one phrase, of the Relativity of Knowledge which is determined by the point of iew from which Reality is approached. F this great ach eve ment t is difficult to apportion credit bet veen Hamacandra, the uthor of the Anyayogavyavaccheda Dvātriṃśikā, and Malliṣeṇa, the writer of the Syādvādamañjarī. The former is genuine devotional lyric, pulsating with reverence for the Master and is at the sam ti e a review of som f the tenets of the rival schools on which the Jaina sees reason to diffe Devotion and thought re here happily blended together in one whole, and are expressed in such noble and dignified language that it deserves to rank as piece of literature no less than that

of philosophy To Mallisena belongs the credit of constructing a systematic work out of the brief critical remarks which Hemacandra throws out at random His knowledge of the different systems, however is not equally deep. In some of the systems such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika he is evidently well read, while of others such as the Vedānta he has touched only the fringe. But on the whole he has conducted the examination of the different systems with knowledge and mastery of detail, and that too in a wonderfully lucid style which lifts his work from the position of mere parasitical commentary to that of an original work of independent val e

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इह हि विषमदुःषमारजनितिमिरतिरस्कारभास्करानुकारिणा
मद्भुतभावभावकीनगुणप्रसारिणीदेश्यदर्शनाविशानपरमार्हतश्री-
कुमारपालक्ष्मापालप्रवर्तिताभयदानाभिधानजीवातुसंजीवितनाना
20 जीवप्रदत्ताशीर्वादमाहात्म्यकल्पावधिस्थायिविशदयशःशरीरेण नि
रवद्यचातुर्विद्यनिर्माणैकब्रह्मणा श्रीहेमचन्द्रसूरिणा भगवत्सिद्धश्री
सिद्धसेनदिवाकरविरचितद्वात्रिंशद्द्वात्रिंशिकानुसारि श्रीवर्धमानजि
नस्तुतिरूपमयोगव्यवच्छेदान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदाभिधानं द्वात्रिंशि
काद्वितयं विद्वज्जनमनस्तत्त्वावबोधनिबन्धनं विदधे। तत्र च प्रथम-
25 द्वात्रिंशिकायाः सुखोन्नेयत्वाद्व्याख्यानमुपेक्ष्य द्वितीयस्यास्तस्याः
निःशेषदुर्वादिपरिषदधिक्षेपदक्षायाः कतिपयपदार्थविवरणकरणेन
स्वस्मृतिबीजप्रबोधविधिर्विधीयते । तस्याश्चेदमादिकाव्यम्–

अनन्तविज्ञानमतीतदोष-
मबाध्यसिद्धान्तममर्त्यपूज्यम् ।
श्रीवर्धमानं जिनमाप्तमुख्यं
स्वयंभुवं स्तोतुमहं यतिष्ये ॥ १ ॥

श्रीवर्धमानं जिनमहं स्तोतुं यतिष्य इति क्रियासंबन्धः । किं-
विशिष्टम् । अनन्तमप्रतिपाति विशिष्टं सर्वद्रव्यपर्यायविषयत्वे-
30 नोत्कृष्टं ज्ञानं केवलाख्यं विज्ञानं ततोऽनन्तं विज्ञानं यस्य सोऽनन्त-
विज्ञानस्तम् । तथातीता निःसत्ताकीभूतत्वेनातिक्रान्ता दोषा रा-
गादयो यस्मात्स तथा तम् । तथाबाध्यः परैर्बाधितुमशक्यः
सिद्धान्तः स्याद्वादश्रुतलक्षणो यस्य स तथा तम् । तथामर्त्या
देवास्तेषामपि पूज्यमाराध्यम् ॥

35 अत्र च श्रीवर्धमानस्वामिनो विशेषणद्वारेण चत्वारो मूलाति-
शयाः प्रतिपादिताः । तत्रानन्तविज्ञानमित्यनेन भगवतः केवल-
ज्ञानलक्षणविशिष्टज्ञानानन्त्यप्रतिपादनाज्ज्ञानातिशयः । अतीत-
दोषमित्यनेनाष्टादशदोषपरिक्षयाभिधानादपायापगमातिशयः । अ-
बाध्यसिद्धान्तमित्यनेन कुतीर्थिकोपन्यस्तकुहेतुसमूहाबाध्यत्वेन
40 स्याद्वादरूपसिद्धान्तप्रणयनभणनाद्वचनातिशयः । अमर्त्यपूज्यमि-
त्यनेनाकृत्रिमभक्तिभरनिर्भरसुरासुरनिकायनायकनिर्मितमहाप्राति-
हार्यसपर्यापरिज्ञापनात्पूजातिशयः ॥

अत्राह परः । अनन्तविज्ञानमित्येतावदेवास्तु नातीतदोषमिति ।
गतार्थत्वात् । दोषात्ययं विनानन्तविज्ञानत्वस्यानुपपत्तेः ॥ अत्रो-
45 च्यते । कुनयमतानुसारिपरिकल्पिताप्तव्यवच्छेदार्थमिदम् । तथा
चाहुराजीविकनयानुसारिणः—

ज्ञानिनो धर्मतीर्थस्य कर्तारः परमं पदम् ।
गत्वागच्छन्ति भूयोऽपि भवं तीर्थनिकारतः ॥

इति । तन्नूनं न तेऽतीतदोषाः । कथमन्यथा तेषां तीर्थनिकार-
50 दर्शनेऽपि भवावतारः ॥

आह । यद्येवमतीतदोषमित्येवास्तु अनन्तविज्ञानमित्यतिरिच्यते ।
दोषात्ययेऽवश्यंभावित्वादनन्तविज्ञानत्वस्य । न । कैश्चिद्दोषाभावे-
ऽपि तदनभ्युपगमात् । तथा च तद्वचनम्—

सर्वं पश्यतु वा मा वा तत्त्वमिष्टं तु पश्यतु ।
55 कीटसंख्यापरिज्ञानं तस्य नः क्वोपयुज्यते ॥

तथा—तस्मादनुष्ठानगतं ज्ञानमस्य विचार्यताम् ।
प्रमाणं दूरदर्शी चेदेते गृध्रानुपास्महे ॥

यस्तस्याप्येकार्थमनन्तविज्ञानमित्युक्तमेव । विज्ञानानन्त्यं विना एकस्याप्यर्थस्य यथावत्परिज्ञानाभावात् । तथा चार्षम्—

60 जे एगं जाणइ से सव्वं जाणइ ।
जे सव्वं जाणइ से एगं जाणइ ॥

तथा— एको भावः सर्वथा येन दृष्टः
सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टाः ।
सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा येन दृष्टा
65 एको भावः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टः ॥

इति ॥

ननु सर्वथाप्यसिद्धान्तमित्यपार्थकम् । यथोक्तगुणयुक्तस्याव्यभिचारिवचनत्वेन तदुक्तसिद्धान्तस्य बाधायोगात् ॥ न । अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात् । निर्दोषपुरुषप्रणीत एवागमोऽव्यसिद्धान्तो
70 नापरेऽपौरुषेयाद्या असंभवादिदोषाभावत्वात् इति ज्ञापनार्थम् । आप्तमाभवारम्भूकान्तकरेकमत्वादित्यपुण्यकेवलिनो यथोक्तसिद्धान्तमणयनासमर्थस्य व्यवच्छेदार्थं वा विशेषणमेतत् ॥

अजय्यत्वात् । असत्यपूज्यमिति न वाच्यम् । यावता यथोक्तिष्ठगुणगरिष्ठस्य त्रिभुवनविभोरपर्यपूज्यत्वं न कथंचन व्यभिचरती-
75ति ॥ सत्यम् । लौकिकानां तमस्या एव पूज्यतया प्रसिद्धास्तेषामपि भगवानेव पूज्य इति विशेषणेनानेन ज्ञापयत्याचार्यः परमेश्वरस्य देवाधिदेवत्वमावेदयति ॥

एवं पूर्वार्धे चत्वारोऽतिशया उक्ताः ॥

अनन्तविज्ञानत्वं च सामान्यकेवलिनामप्यवश्यं भावीत्यत
80स्तद्व्यवच्छेदाय श्रीवर्धमानमिति विशेष्यपदमपि विशेषणत्वतया

प्यामपायापगमातिशयश्रिया चतुस्त्रिंशदतिशयसमृद्ध्यनुभवात्मकयार्हन्त्य
रूपया वर्धमानं वर्धिष्णुम् ॥ नन्वतिशयानां परिमितत्वेनैव सिद्धान्ते
प्रसिद्धत्वात्कथं वर्धमानतोपपत्तिः ॥ इति चेत् । यथा निशीथ
चूर्णौ भगवतां श्रीमदर्हतामष्टोत्तरसहस्रसंख्यबाह्यलक्षणसंख्याया
85 उपलक्षणत्वेनान्तरङ्गलक्षणानां सत्त्वादीनामानन्त्यमुक्तम् । एवम
तिशयानामधिकृतपरिगणनायोगेऽप्यपरिमितत्वमविरुद्धम् । ततो
नातिशयश्रिया वर्धमानत्वं व्यापाद्यम् इति ॥

अतीतदोषता चोपशान्तमोहगुणस्थानवर्तिनामपि संभवतीत्यत
क्षीणमोहाद्यवस्थागुणस्थानप्राप्तिप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं जिनमिति विशे
90 षणम् । रागादिजेतृत्वाज्जिनः । सम्यक्क्षपितरागादिदोष
इति । अथाप्यसिद्धान्तता च श्रुतकेवल्यादिष्वपि दृश्यतेऽतस्तन्या
पोहायाप्तमुख्यमिति विशेषणम् । आप्तिर्हि रागद्वेषमोहानामैकान्तिक
आत्यन्तिकश्च क्षयः । सा येषामस्ति ते खल्वाप्ताः । अभ्रादित्वा
न्मत्वर्थीयोऽप्रत्ययः । तेषु मध्ये मुख्यमिव सर्वाङ्गानां प्रधानत्वेन
95 मुख्यम् । नासादय इति तुल्यः पाठः । अमरपूज्यता च
तथाविधानुपपन्नपरिचर्यापर्यायप्रियाचरणसंपन्नानां सामान्यमुनी
नामपि न दुष्टा । अतस्तन्निराकरणाय स्वयम्भुवमिति विशे
षणम् । स्वयमात्मनैव परोपदेशनिरपेक्षतयावगततत्त्वो भवतीति
स्वयम्भूस्तं स्वयम्भुवम् । एवंविधं परमजिनेन्द्रं स्वानु स्तुति
100 विषयीकृत्य यत्नं करिष्यामि ॥ अत्र चाचार्यो भविष्य
त्कालयोगेन यातिमामप्यन्यत्रयदनुष्ठानं भगवद्गुणस्तवनं मन्यमान
अदावध स्तुतिकरणव्यापारं कार्यं प्रारभ्यन्यत्र करणपर मदधीन
म पुनर्भगवद्गुणस्तवनमिति सूचितवान् । यद
पि च गणधरादयोऽपि परापदेशान्यानुरूपाभिनिरपेक्षतया निज
105 शक्त्यैव स्तुतिमारम्भ इति प्रारनायम् ॥

अथवा । श्रीवर्धमानादिविशेषणचतुष्टयमनन्तविज्ञानादिपद
चतुष्टयेन सह हेतुहेतुमद्भावेन व्याख्यायते । यत एव श्रीवर्ध
मानमत एवानन्तविज्ञानम् । श्रिया कृत्स्नकर्मक्षयाविर्भूतानन्त
चतुष्कसंपद्रूपया वर्धमानम् । यद्यपि श्रीवर्धमानस्य परमेश्वर
110 स्यानन्तचतुष्कसंपत्प्रतिपत्त्यनन्तरं सर्वकालं तुल्यत्वाच्चयापचयौ
न स्तस्तथापि निरपचयत्वेन शाश्वतिकावस्थानयोगाद्वर्धमानत्व
मुपपद्यते । यद्यपि च श्रीवर्धमानविशेषणेनानन्तचतुष्कान्तर्भा-
वित्वेनानन्तविज्ञानत्वमपि सिद्धं तथाप्यनन्तविज्ञानस्यैव परो
पकारसाधकतमत्वाद्भगवतश्चैव परोपकारैकनिबन्धनत्वाच्च
115 न्तविज्ञानत्वं शेषानन्तत्रयात्पृथङ्निर्धार्याचार्येणोक्तम् ॥

ननु यथा भगवतोऽनन्तविज्ञानं परार्थं तथानन्तदर्शनस्य
केवलदर्शनापरपर्यायस्य पारार्थ्यमभ्यासेऽन्वेव । केवलज्ञानकेवल
दर्शनाभ्यामेव हि स्वामी क्रमप्रवृत्तिभ्यामुपलब्धं सामान्यविशेषा
त्मकं पदार्थसार्थं परेभ्यः प्ररूपयति । तत्किमर्थं तन्नोपात्तम् ॥
120 इति चेदुच्यते । विज्ञानशब्देन तस्यापि संग्रहाददोषः । ज्ञान
मात्राया उभयत्रापि समानत्वात् । य एव ह्यभ्यन्तरीकृत
समतासामान्यधर्मो विषमताधर्मविशिष्टो ज्ञानेन गम्यन्तथात्व एव
ह्यभ्यन्तरीकृतविषमताधर्मः समताधर्मविशिष्टो दर्शनेन गम्यन्ते ।
जीवस्वाभाव्यात् । सामान्यप्रधानमुपसर्जनीकृतविशेषमर्थग्रहणं
125 दर्शनमुच्यते । तथा प्रधानविशेषमुपसर्जनीकृतसामान्यं च ज्ञानमिति ॥

तथा अत एव जिनम् एतावता वीतदोषम् । रागादिजेतृत्वाद्धि
जिनः । न चाजिनस्यापीतदोषता ॥ तथा यत एव वीतदोषमत
एवाबाध्यसिद्धान्तम् । आप्ता हि यस्यापि न दुष्यते । तत्र आप्तेषु
मुख्यं श्रेष्ठमाप्तमुख्यम् । आप्तमुख्यत्वं च अस्योरविसंवादिवचनतया

30 विश्वविश्वासभूमित्वात् । अत एवाबाध्यसिद्धान्तम् । नहि यथा परशासनानामबाध्यशास्त्रानुयायी सिद्धान्तः कुनयैर्बाधितुं शक्यते ॥ अत एव स्वयम् । अत एवामर्त्यपूज्यम् । पूज्यते हि देवदेवो भगवान् विलक्षणलक्षणेन स्वर्गसमुद्भवगुणेन सौधर्मेन्द्रादिभिरमर्त्यैरिति ॥

35　अत्र च श्रीवर्धमानमिति विशेषणतया यद्व्याख्यातं तद् योगव्यवच्छेदाभिधानप्रथमद्वात्रिंशिकाप्रथमकाव्यतृतीयपादवर्तमान श्रीवर्धमानाभिधमाप्तरूपम् इति विशेष्यमनुवर्तमान बुद्धौ संप्रधार्य विज्ञेयम् । तत्र आप्तरूपमिति विशेष्यपदम् । आद्यस्या वा विशेषणमपि विशेष्यतया व्याख्येयम् ॥

40　इति प्रथमवृत्तार्थः ॥ १ ॥

अस्यां च स्तुतावन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदोऽधिकृतः तस्य च तीर्थान्तरीयपरिकल्पिततत्त्वाभासनिरासेन तेषामाप्तत्वव्यवच्छेदः स्वरूपम् । तच्च भगवतो यथावस्थितवस्तुतत्त्ववादित्वस्वरूपापन्नेनैव साम्राज्यम-श्नुते । अतः स्तुतिकारो जगद्गुरोर्निःशेषगुणस्तुतिश्रद्धालुरपि 5 सद्भूतवस्तुवादित्वाख्यं गुणविशेषमेव वर्णयितुमात्मनोऽभिप्रायमाविष्कुर्वन्नाह—

अयं जनो नाथ तव स्तवाय
गुणान्तरेभ्यः स्पृहयालुरेव ।
विगाहतां किंतु यथार्थवाद-
मेकं परीक्षाविधिदुर्विदग्ध ॥ २ ॥

हे नाथ अयं मल्लक्षणो जनः तव गुणान्तरेभ्यो यथार्थवाद

व्यतिरिक्तेभ्योऽनन्यसाधारणशरीरलक्षणोऽनन्तविज्ञानादिरूप-
श्रद्धालुरेव । किमर्थम् । स्तवाय स्तुतिकरणाय । इत्थ एव श्रीवर्ध
10 पूर्वेष तु—स्तुतेर्योग्यं वा इतिलक्षणा । तत्र हि पूतामन्त
स्तोतुं स्तुतावनेवायं मम इति भावः ॥ ननु यदि गुणान्तरस्तुता-
वपि सद्भावास्तुता तत्किमर्थं तमोपेक्षा । इत्याशङ्क्योत्तरार्धमाह ।
किमित्यभ्युपगमविक्षेपयोर्वने निपातः । एकमेकमेव । यथार्थवादं
यथावस्थितवस्तुतत्त्वस्यापनाख्यं त्वदीयं गुणम् । अयं जनो
15 विभावतां स्तुतिक्रियया समन्ताद्व्याप्नोतु । तस्मिन्नेकस्मिन्नपि
हि गुणे वर्णिते तथान्तरीयदैवतेभ्यो वैशिष्ट्यस्थापनद्वारेण वस्तुतः
सर्वगुणस्तवनसिद्धेः ॥

अथ मस्तुतगुणस्तुतिः सम्यक्परीक्षासमाना स्थिरपक्षामेवो
पितीमवति नार्योगस्थो भवादृशामित्याशङ्कां विशेषणद्वारेण
20 निराकरोति । यतोऽयं जनः परीक्षाविधिदुर्विदग्धोऽपि त्वद्गुण-
विशेषपरीक्षणविधौ दुर्विदग्धः पण्डितंमन्य इति यावत् । अयमा-
शयः । यद्यपि जगद्गुरोर्यथार्थवादित्वगुणपरीक्षणं मादृशां मतेरगोचर
स्तथापि भक्तिश्रद्धातिशयात् तस्यामहमात्मानं विदग्धमिव मन्य
इति विशुद्धश्रद्धाभक्तिव्यक्तिमात्रमस्य स्तुतेः ॥
25 इति वृत्तार्थः ॥ २ ॥

अथ ये कुतीर्थ्याः कुशास्त्रवासनावासितस्वान्ततया विश्वम
स्वामिनं स्वामित्वेन न प्रतिपन्नाः तानपि तत्त्वविचारणां प्रति
शिक्षयन्नाह—

गुणेष्वसूयां दधत परेमी
मा शिश्रियन्नाम भवन्तमीशम् ।

तथापि सम्मील्य विलोचनानि
विचारयन्तां नयवर्त्म सत्यम् ॥ ३ ॥

परे अमी इति अदसस्तु विप्रकृष्टे इति वचनात्तत्त्वातत्त्वविमर्शबाह्यतया दूरीकरणार्हत्वाद्विप्रकृष्टाः परे कुतीर्थिकाः भवन्तं त्वाम् अनन्यसामान्यसकलगुणनिलयमपि मा ईशं शिश्रियन्मा स्वामित्वेन प्रतिपद्यन्ताम् । यतो गुणेष्वसूयां दधतः गुणेषु बद्धमत्सराः । गुणेषु दोषाविष्करणम् असूया । यो हि यत्र गुणे मत्सरीभवति स तद्वन्तं नानुरुध्यते । यथा माधुर्यमत्सरी करभः पुण्ड्रेक्षुकाण्डम् । गुणाश्रयश्च भवान् ॥ एवं परतीर्थिकानां भगवदाज्ञाप्रतिपत्तिं प्रतिषिध्य स्तुतिकारो माध्यस्थ्यमिवास्थाय तान्प्रति हितशिक्षां सूत्रार्थेनोपदिशति । तथापि त्वदाज्ञाप्रतिपत्तेरभावेऽपि । लोचनानि नेत्राणि । संमील्य मिलितपुटीकृत्य । सत्यं युक्तियुक्तम् । नयवर्त्म न्यायमार्गम् । विचारयन्तां विमर्शविषयीकुर्वन्तु ॥

अत्र च विचारयन्तामित्यात्मनेपदेन फलवत्कर्तृविषयेणैवं ज्ञापयत्याचार्यो यद्वितथनयपथविचारणया तेषामेव फलं वयं केवलमुपदेष्टारः । किं तत्फलम् इति चेन्मोक्ष एवेति ब्रूमः । संमील्य विलोचनानीति च यतः प्रायस्तत्त्वविचारणमेकाग्रता-हेतुनयननिमीलनपूर्वकं लोके प्रसिद्धमित्यभिप्रायः ॥ अथवा अयमुपदेशस्तेभ्योऽरोचमान एवाचार्येण वितीर्यते । ततोऽरोचमानोऽप्ययं कटुकौषधपानन्यायेनायतिसुखत्वान्नयने निमील्य पेय एवेत्याकूतम् ॥

ननु च यदि पारमेश्वरे वचसि तेषामविवेकातिरेकादरोचकता तत्किमर्थं तान् प्रत्युपदेशक्लेश इति ॥ नैवम् । परोपकारसार-

25 ऋषीणां महात्मनां मतिपाटवगर्वो हितमर्थं पानपेक्ष्य हितोप-देशप्रवर्तनात् । तेषां हि परार्थस्यैव स्वार्थत्वेनाभिमतत्वात् । न च हितोपदेशादपरः पारमार्थिकः परार्थः । तथा चार्षम् ।

> रूसउ वा परो मा वा विसं वा परियत्तउ ।
> भासियव्वा हिया भासा सपक्खगुणकारिया ॥

30 इति । तथा च वाचकमुख्यः—

> न भवति धर्मः श्रोतुः सर्वस्यैकान्ततो हितश्रवणात् ।
> ब्रुवतोऽनुग्रहबुद्ध्या वक्तुस्त्वेकान्ततो भवति ॥ १ ॥

इति वृत्तार्थः ॥ ३ ॥

अथ यथावस्थितवस्तुविचारमेव प्रपञ्चयितुं पराभिप्रेततत्त्वानां प्रामाण्यं निराकुर्वन्नादितस्तावत्काण्यपदर्शनोलूक्यमताभिमत तत्त्वानि दूषयितुकामस्तदन्तःपातिनौ प्रथमतरं सामान्यविशेषौ दूषयन्नाह—

> स्वतोऽनुवृत्तिव्यतिवृत्तिभाजो
> भावा न भावान्तरनेयरूपाः ।
> परात्मतत्त्वादतथात्मतत्त्वाद्
> द्वयं वदन्तोऽकुशलाः स्खलन्ति ॥ ४ ॥

5 अभवन् भवन्ति भविष्यन्ति चेति भावाः पदार्था आत्म-पुद्गलादयस्ते । स्वत इति सर्वं हि वाक्यं सावधारणमामनन्ति

स्वत एव आत्मीयस्वरूपादेव । अनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिविभागः ।
कारा प्रतीतिरेकशब्दवाच्यता चानुवृत्तिः । व्यावृत्तिः
वृत्ति । समानजातीयविजातीयेभ्य सर्वथा व्यवच्छेदः । ते उभे
पि संवलिते भवन्त आमयन्तीति अनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिविभाग' ।
सामान्यविशेषोभयात्मका इत्यर्थः ॥

अस्यैवार्थस्य व्यतिरेकमाह । न भावान्तरनेयरूपा इति । नेति
निषेधे । भावान्तराभ्यां पराभिमताभ्यां द्रव्यगुणकर्मसमवायेभ्य'
पदार्थान्तराभ्यां भावव्यतिरिक्तसामान्यविशेषाभ्यां नेयं प्रतीति-
15 विषयं प्रापणीयं रूपं यथासंख्यमनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिलक्षणं स्वरूपं
येषां ते तथोक्ताः । स्वभाव एव ह्ययं सर्वभावानां यदनुवृत्ति
व्यावृत्तिप्रत्ययौ स्वत एव जनयन्ति । तथाहि । घट एव तावत्पृथु
बुध्नोदराद्याकारवान्प्रतीतिविषयीभवन्सन्नन्यानपि तदाकृतिभृतः
पदार्थान्घटरूपतया घटैकशब्दवाच्यतया च प्रत्याय
20 यन्सामान्याख्यां लभते । स एव चेतरेभ्यः सजातीयविजा० न्यो
द्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैरात्मानं व्यावर्तयन्विशेषव्यपदेशमश्नुते । इति
न सामान्यविशेषयोः पृथक्पदार्थान्तरत्वकल्पनं न्याय्यम् । पदार्थ
धर्मत्वेनैव तयोः प्रतीयमानत्वात् । न च धर्मा धर्मिणः सकाशा
दत्यन्तं व्यतिरिक्ताः । एकान्तभेदे विशेषणविशेष्यभावानुपपत्तेः ।
25 करभरासभयोरिव धर्मधर्मिव्यपदेशाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च । धर्माणामपि
च पृथक्पदार्थान्तरत्वकल्पने एकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि पदार्थानन्त्य
प्रसङ्गः । अनन्तधर्मकत्वाद्वस्तुनः ॥

तदेवं सामान्यविशेषयोः स्वतत्त्वं यथावदनवबुध्यमाना अङ्ग
त्वत्स्वामिनिविष्टदृष्टयः तीर्थान्तरीयाः स्खलन्ति

30 व्यापकभावाद्व्याप्तिं निरूपयन्तीत्यर्थः । स्खलनेन च प्रामाणिकजनोपहसनीयता व्यज्यते । किं कुर्वाणाः इत्याह इचिन्त्याद्विलक्षणं सत्यपदद्वयं वदन्तः । कस्मादेवमेतत्पद्द्वयं वदन्तः इत्याह । परात्मतत्त्वात् । परौ पदार्थेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तता दन्यौ परस्परनिरपेक्षौ च यौ सामान्यविशेषौ तयोर्यदात्मतत्त्वं
35 स्वरूपमनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिलक्षणं तस्मात् तदाश्रित्येत्यर्थः गम्यमानः कर्माधारे इत्यनेन पञ्चमी । कथंभूतात् परात्मतत्त्वात् । इत्याह । अतथात्मतत्त्वात् । मा भूत्पराभिमतस्य परात्मतत्त्वस्य सम्यग्रूपतेति विशेषणमिदम् । यथा यनैकान्तभेदलक्षणेन प्रकारेण परैः प्रकल्पितं न तथा तेन प्रकारेणात्मतत्त्वं स्वरूपं यस्य तत्तथा ।
40 तस्मात् । यतः पदार्थेभ्यो विनिर्भागभावेन सामान्यविशेषौ वर्तेते ततो तयोः परत्वेन कल्पिता । परत्वं चान्यत्वम् । तयोरैकान्तभेदाविनाभावि ॥

किञ्च पदार्थेभ्यः सामान्यविशेषयोरत्यन्तभिन्नत्वे स्वीक्रियमाणे एकवस्तुविषयमनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिरूपं प्रत्यक्षद्वयं प्रत्ययेन ।
45 एकान्तभिन्ने चान्यत्रस्मात्सम्बन्धाभावे सामान्यविशेषव्यवहारानुपपत्तिः स्यात् । सामान्यविशेषव्यवहारयोरनयोः कालुष्यं समर्थयेन वर्तेते । परस्परनिरपेक्षतायां तु गगनारविन्दादिकल्पना । अत एव तयोर्यान्तिकः सामान्यविशेषभावस्तदुपहसनीयतामभिव्यनक्ति । यो वन्यपातिनं वस्तुतत्त्वं तथैव प्रतिपादयतः पौरुषेय-
50 नयेन प्रकाशयन्तस्य सद्भावाभावाद्यो न तत्तु तत्त्वस्य प्रकाशनाय ॥

इति वृत्तार्थः ॥ ४ ॥

अथ तदभिमतमेकान्तनित्यानित्यपक्षौ दूषयन्नाह—

आदीपमाव्योम समस्वभावं
स्याद्वादमुद्रानतिभेदि वस्तु ।
तन्नित्यमेवैकमनित्यमन्य
दिति त्वदाज्ञाद्विषतां प्रलापाः ॥ ५ ॥

आदीप दीपादारभ्य । आव्योम व्योम मर्यादीकृत्य । सर्वम् । वस्तु पदार्थस्वरूपम् । समस्वभावं समः तुल्यः स्वभावः स्वरूपं यस्य तत्तथा । किंच वस्तुनः स्वरूपं द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकत्वमिति
5 ब्रूमः । तथा च वाचकमुख्यः—"उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत्" इति । समस्वभावत्वं कुतः । इति विशेषणद्वारेण हेतुमाह—स्याद्वादमुद्रानतिभेदि । स्यादित्यव्ययमनेकान्तद्योतकम् । ततः स्याद्वादोऽनेकान्तवादः । नित्यानित्याद्यनेकधर्मशबलैकवस्त्वभ्युपगम इति यावत् । तस्य मुद्रा मर्यादा तां नातिभिनत्ति नातिक्रामतीति
10 स्याद्वादमुद्रानतिभेदि । यथा हि न्यायैकनिष्ठे राजनि राज्यश्रियं शासति सति सर्वाः प्रजास्तन्मुद्रां नातिवर्तितुमीशते तदतिक्रमे तासां सर्वार्थहानिभावात् एवं विजयिनि निष्कण्टके स्याद्वाद महानरेन्द्रे तदीयमुद्रां सर्वेऽपि पदार्था नातिक्रामन्ति तदुल्लङ्घने तेषां स्वरूपव्यवस्थाहानिप्रसक्तेः ॥

15 सर्ववस्तूनां समस्वभावत्वकथनेन च परामीष्टस्यैकं वस्तु व्योमादि नित्यमेवान्यच्च प्रदीपाद्यनित्यमेवेति वादस्य प्रतिक्षेपबीजम् । सर्वे हि भावा द्रव्यार्थिकनयापेक्षया नित्याः पर्यायार्थिकनयादेशात्पुनरनित्याः । तत्रैकान्तानित्यतया परैरङ्गीकृतस्य प्रदीपस्य तावन्नित्यानित्यत्वव्यवस्थापने दिङ्मात्रमुच्यते ॥ तथाहि । प्रदीप

20 पर्यायापन्नास्तैजसाः परमाणवः स्वरसतस्तैलक्षयाद्वाताभिघाताद्वा
ज्योतिष्पर्यायं परित्यज्य तमोरूपं पर्यायान्तरमासादयन्तोपि
नैकान्तेनानित्याः । पुद्गलद्रव्यरूपतयावस्थितत्वात्तेषाम् । न ह्ये
तावतैवानित्यत्वं यावता पूर्वपर्यायस्य विनाश उत्तरपर्यायस्य
चोत्पादः । न खलु मृद्द्रव्यं स्थासकोशकुशूलशिवकघटाद्यवस्था
25 न्तराण्यापद्यमानमप्येकान्ततो विनष्टम् । तेषु मृद्द्रव्यानुगमस्या
बालगोपालं प्रतीतत्वात् । न च तमसः पौद्गलिकत्वमसिद्धम् ।
चाक्षुषत्वान्यथानुपपत्तेः । प्रदीपालोकवत् । अथ यच्चाक्षुषं तत्सर्वं
स्वप्रतिभासे आलोकमपेक्षते । न चैवं तमः । तत्कथं चाक्षुषम् ॥
नैवम् । उलूकादीनामालोकमन्तरेणापि तत्प्रतिभासात् । यैस्तु
30 अस्मदादिभिरन्यच्चाक्षुषं घटादिकमालोकं विना नोपलभ्यते तैरपि
तिमिरमालोकयिष्यते । विचित्रत्वाद्भावानाम् । कथमन्यथा
पीतश्वेतादयोपि स्वर्णमुक्ताफलाद्या आलोकापेक्षदर्शनाः । प्र
दीपचन्द्रादयस्तु प्रकाशान्तरनिरपेक्षाः । इति सिद्धं तमश्चाक्षुषम् ॥
रूपवत्त्वाच्च स्पर्शवत्त्वमपि प्रतीयते । शीतस्पर्शप्रत्ययजनक
35 त्वात् । यानि त्वनिबिडावयवत्वमप्रतिघातित्वमनुद्भूतस्पर्श
विशेषत्वमप्रतीयमानखण्डावयविद्रव्यप्रविभागत्वमित्यादीनि तमसः
पौद्गलिकत्वनिषेधाय परैः साधनान्युपन्यस्तानि तानि प्रदीप
प्रभादृष्टान्तेनैव प्रतिषेध्यानि । तुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वात् । न च वाच्यं
तैजसाः परमाणवः कथं तमस्त्वेन परिणमन्त इति । पुद्गलानां
40 तत्तत्सामग्रीसहकृतानां विसदृशकार्योत्पादकत्वस्यापि दर्शनात् ।
दृष्टो ह्यार्द्रेन्धनसंयोगवशाद्भास्वररूपस्यापि वह्नेरभास्वररूपधूमरूप
कार्योत्पादः । इति सिद्धो नित्यानित्यः प्रदीपः । यदापि निर्वाणा
दर्वाग्देदीप्यमानो दीपस्तदापि नवनवपर्यायोत्पादविनाशभाक्त्वा
त्प्रदीपत्वान्वयाच्च नित्यानित्य एव ॥

45 एवं व्योमाप्युत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मकत्वान्नित्यानित्यमेव । तथा
ह्यवगाहकानां जीवपुद्गलानामवगाहदानोपग्रह एव तल्लक्षणम् ।
अवकाशदमाकाशम् इति वचनात् । यदा चावगाहका जीव-
पुद्गलाः प्रयोगतो विस्रसातो वैकस्मान्नभःप्रदेशात्प्रदेशान्तरमुप-
सर्पन्ति तदा तस्य व्योम्नस्तैरवगाहकैः सममेकस्मिन्प्रदेशे विभाग
50 उत्तरस्मिंश्च प्रदेशे संयोगः । संयोगविभागौ च परस्परं विरुद्धौ
धर्मौ । तद्भेदे चावश्यं धर्मिणो भेदः । तथा चाहुः—अयमेव हि
भेदो भेदहेतुर्वा यद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः कारणभेदश्चेति । ततश्च
तदाकाशं पूर्वसंयोगविनाशलक्षणपरिणामापत्त्या विनष्टमुत्तर-
संयोगोत्पादाख्यपरिणामानुभवाच्चोत्पन्नम् । उभयत्राकाशद्रव्यस्या-
55 नुगतत्वाच्चोत्पादव्यययोरेकाधिकरणत्वम् । तथा च यत्—अप्र
च्युतानुत्पन्नस्थिरैकरूपं नित्यम् इति नित्यलक्षणमाचक्षते तद
पास्तम् । एवंविधस्य कस्यचिद्वस्तुनोऽभावात् । तद्भावाव्ययं
नित्यम् इति तु सत्यं नित्यलक्षणम् । उत्पादविनाशयोः सद्भा-
वेऽपि तद्भावात् अन्वयिरूपाद्यन्न व्येति तन्नित्यमिति तदर्थस्य
60 घटमानत्वात् । यदि ह्यप्रच्युतादिलक्षणं नित्यमिष्यते तदोत्पाद
व्यययोर्निराधारत्वप्रसङ्गः । न च तयोर्योगे नित्यत्वहानिः ॥

द्रव्यं पर्यायवियुतं पर्याया द्रव्यवर्जिताः ।
क्व कदा केन किंरूपा दृष्टा मानेन केन वा ॥

इति वचनात् । न चाकाशं न द्रव्यम् । लौकिकानामपि घटा
65 काशं पटाकाशमिति व्यवहारप्रसिद्धेराकाशस्य नित्यानित्यत्वम् ।
घटाकाशमपि हि यदा घटापगमे पटेनाक्रान्तं तदा पटाका
शमिति व्यवहारः । न चायमौपचारिकत्वादप्रमाणमेव । उपचा
रस्यापि किंचित्साधर्म्यद्वारेण मुख्यार्थस्पर्शित्वात् । नभसो हि

यस्मिंश्च सर्वव्यापकत्वं मुख्यं परिमाणं तदाधेयघटपटादिसंबन्धि-
७० नियतपरिमाणवशात्कल्पितभेदं सत्प्रतिनियतदेशव्यापितया व्य-
वह्रियमाणं घटाकाशपटाकाशादि तत्तद्व्यपदेशनिबन्धनं भवति ।
तत्तद्घटादिसंबन्धे च व्यापकत्वेनावस्थितस्य व्योम्नोऽवस्थान्त-
रापत्तिः । ततश्चावस्थाभेदेऽवस्थावतोऽपि भेदः । तासां ततोऽ-
विष्वग्भावात् । इति सिद्धं नित्यानित्यत्वं व्योम्नः ॥

७५ स्वायंभुवा अपि हि नित्यानित्यमेव वस्तु मन्यन्ते । तथा
चाहुस्ते—त्रिविधः खल्वयं धर्मिणः परिणामो धर्मलक्षणावस्था-
रूपः । सुवर्णं धर्मि । तस्य धर्मपरिणामो वर्धमानरुचकादिः ।
धर्मस्य तु लक्षणपरिणामोऽनागतत्वादिः । यदा खल्वयं हेमकारो
वर्धमानकं भङ्क्त्वा रुचकमारचयति तदा वर्धमानको वर्तमानता-
८० लक्षणं हित्वातीततालक्षणमापद्यते । रुचकस्तु अनागततालक्षणं
हित्वा वर्तमानतालक्षणमापद्यते । वर्तमानतापन्न एव तु रुचको
नवपुराणभावमापद्यमानोऽवस्थापरिणामवान्भवति । सोऽयं त्रिविधः
परिणामो धर्मिणः । धर्मलक्षणावस्थाश्च धर्मिणो भिन्नाभिन्नाश्च ।
तथा च ते धर्म्यभेदाद्भिन्नत्वेन नित्याः । भेदाच्चोत्पत्तिवि-
८५ नाशविषयत्वम् । इत्युभयमुपपन्नमिति ॥

अथोत्तरार्धं विव्रियते ॥ एवं चोत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मकत्वे सर्व-
भावानां सिद्धेऽपि तद्वस्त्वेकमाकाशात्मादिकं नित्यमेव अन्यच्च
प्रदीपघटादिकमनित्यमेव इत्येवकारोऽपि संबध्यते । इत्थं हि
दुर्नयवादापत्तिः । अनन्तधर्मात्मके वस्तुनि स्वाभिप्रेतनित्यत्वादि-
९० धर्मसमर्थनप्रवणाः शेषधर्मतिरस्कारेण प्रवर्तमाना दुर्नया इति
तल्लक्षणात् । इत्यमेनोल्लेखेन त्वदाज्ञाद्विषतां भवत्प्रणीतशासन-
विरोधिनां प्रलापाः प्रलपितवचनान्यमीति यावत् ॥

अत्र च प्रथमपादीयमिति पक्षासिद्ध्या अनित्यपक्षोल्लेखेऽपि
यदुत्तरत्र यथासंख्यपरिहारेण पूर्वतर नित्यमेवैकमित्युक्तं तदेव
95 ज्ञापयति—यदनित्यं तदपि नित्यमेव कथंचित् यच्च नित्यं तदप्य
नित्यमेव कथंचित् । अनेकान्तवादिभिरप्येकस्यामेव पृथिव्यां
नित्यानित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । तथा च प्रशस्तकरः—सा तु द्विविधा
नित्यानित्या च । परमाणुलक्षणा नित्या कार्यलक्षणा त्वनित्या इति ।
न चात्र परमाणुकार्यद्रव्यलक्षणविषयद्वयभेदादेकाधिकरणं नित्या
100 नित्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् । पृथ्वीत्वस्योभयत्राप्यव्यभिचारात् ।
एवमबादिष्वपीति । आकाशेऽपि संयोगविभागाङ्गीकारात्तर
नित्यत्वं युक्त्या प्रतिपन्नमेव । तथा च स एवाह—शब्दकारणत्व
वचनात्संयोगविभागौ इति नित्यानित्यपक्षयोः संवलितत्वम् ।
एतच्च लक्षता भावितमस्ति ॥

105 अक्षणिकत्वं च परवचनानामित्थं समर्थनीयम् ॥ वस्तुन
स्तावदर्थक्रियाकारित्वं लक्षणम् । तच्चैकान्तनित्यानित्यपक्षयोर्न
घटते ॥ अप्रच्युतानुत्पन्नस्थिरैकरूपो हि नित्यः । स च क्रमेणार्थ-
क्रियां कुर्वीत अक्रमेण वा । अन्योन्यव्यवच्छेदरूपाणां
प्रकारान्तरासंभवात् ॥ तत्र न तावत्क्रमेण । स हि कालान्तर
110 भाविनीः क्रियाः प्रथमक्रियाकाल एव प्रसह्य कुर्यात् ।
समर्थस्य कालक्षेपायोगात् । कालक्षेपिणो वा असामर्थ्यप्राप्तेः ।
समर्थोऽपि तत्तत्सहकारिसमवधाने तं तमर्थं करोतीति चेत् न तर्हि
तस्य सामर्थ्यम् । अपरसहकारिसापेक्षवृत्तित्वात् । सापेक्षमसमर्थ-
मिति न्यायात् । न तेन सहकारिणोऽपेक्ष्यन्ते अपि तु कार्यमेव सह
115 कारिष्वसत्स्वभवत्तानपेक्षते इति चेत् तत्किं स भावोऽसमर्थः
समर्थो वा । समर्थश्चेत् किं सहकारिमुखप्रेक्षणदीनानि तान्यपेक्षते
न पुनर्झटिति घटयति । ननु समर्थमपि बीजमिला

असावासादितसहकारिसंनिधिरेवाङ्कुरं करोति नान्यथा । तर्हि तस्य सहकारिभिः किंचिदुपक्रियेत न वा । यदि
120 नोपक्रियेत तदा सहकारिसंनिधानात्प्रागिव किं न तदाप्यर्थक्रियायामुदास्ते । उपक्रियेत चेत्स तर्हि तैरुपकारोऽभिन्नो भिन्नो वा क्रियत इति वाच्यम् । अभेदे स एव क्रियते । इति लाभमिच्छतो मूलक्षतिरायाता । कृतकत्वेन तस्यानित्यत्वापत्तेः । भेदे तु स कथं तस्योपकारः । किं न
125 सह्यविन्ध्यादेरपि । तत्संबन्धात्तस्यायमिति चेत् उपकार्योपकारयोः कः संबन्धः । न तावत्संयोगः । द्रव्ययोरेव तस्य भावात् । अत्र तूपकार्यं द्रव्यमुपकारश्च क्रियेति न संयोगः । नापि समवायः । तस्यैकत्वाद्व्यापकत्वाच्च प्रत्यासत्तिविप्रकर्षाभावेन सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वान्न नियतैः संबन्धिभिः संबन्धो युक्तः । नियत
130 संबन्धिसंबन्धे चाङ्गीक्रियमाणे तत्कृत उपकारोऽस्य समवायस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यः । तथा च सत्युपकारस्य भेदाभेदकल्पना तदवस्थैव । उपकारस्य समवायादभेदे समवाय एव कृतः स्यात् । भेदे पुनरपि समवायस्य न नियतसंबन्धिसंबन्धत्वम् । तन्नैकान्तनित्यो भावः क्रमेणार्थक्रियां कुरुते ॥ नाप्यक्रमेण ।
135 न ह्येको भावः सकलकालकलाकलापभाविनीर्युगपत्सर्वाः क्रियाः करोतीति प्रातीतिकम् । कुरुतां वा । तथापि द्वितीयक्षणे किं कुर्यात् । करणे वा क्रमपक्षभावी दोषः । अकरणे त्वर्थक्रियाकारित्वाभावादवस्तुत्वप्रसङ्गः । इत्येकान्तनित्यात् क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां व्याप्तार्थक्रिया व्यापकानुपलब्धिबलाद्व्यापकनिवृत्त्या निवर्तमाना
140 स्वव्याप्यमर्थक्रियाकारित्वं निवर्तयति । अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं च निवर्तमानं स्वव्याप्यं सत्त्वं निवर्तयति । इति नैकान्तनित्यपक्षो युक्तिक्षमः ॥

एकान्तानित्यपक्षोऽपि न कक्षीकरणार्हः ॥ अनित्यो हि प्रतिक्षणविनाशी । स च न क्रमेणार्थक्रियासमर्थः । देशकृतस्य 145 कालकृतस्य च क्रमस्यैवाभावात् । क्रमो हि पौर्वापर्यम् । तच्च क्षणिकस्यासंभवि । अवस्थितस्यैव हि नानादेशकालव्याप्तिर्देशक्रमः कालक्रमश्चाभिधीयते । न चैकान्तविनाशिनि सास्ति । यदाहुः—

यो यत्रैव स तत्रैव यो यदैव तदैव सः ।
150 न देशकालयोर्व्याप्तिर्भावानामिह विद्यते ॥

न च संतानापेक्षया पूर्वोत्तरक्षणानां क्रमः संभवति । संतानस्यावस्तुत्वात् । वस्तुत्वेऽपि तस्य यदि क्षणिकत्वं न तर्हि क्षणेभ्यः कश्चिद्विशेषः । अथाक्षणिकत्वं तर्हि समाप्तः क्षणभङ्गवादः ॥

नाप्यक्रमेणार्थक्रिया क्षणिके संभवति । स ह्येको बीजपूरादि 155 रूपादिक्षणो युगपदनेकान् रसादिक्षणाञ्जनयन्नेकेन स्वभावेन जनयेन्नानास्वभावैर्वा । यद्येकेन तदा तेषां रसादिक्षणानामेकत्वं स्यादेकस्वभावजन्यत्वात् । अथ नानास्वभावैर्जनयति किंचिद्रूपादिकमुपादानभावेन किंचिद्रसादिकं सहकारित्वेनेति चेत्, ते स्वभावास्तस्यात्मभूता अनात्मभूता वा । अनात्मभूताश्चेत् स्वभा 160 वत्वहानिः । यद्यात्मभूतास्तर्हि तस्यानेकत्वमनेकस्वभावत्वात् । स्वभावानां वैकत्वं प्रसज्येत । तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात्तेषां तस्य चैकत्वात् । अथ य एव एकत्रोपादानभावः स एवान्यत्र सहकारिभाव इति न स्वभावभेद इष्यते । तर्हि नित्यस्यैकरूपस्यापि क्रमेण नानाकार्यकारिणः स्वभावभेदः कार्यसांकर्यं च कथमिष्यते 165 क्षणिकवादिना । अथ नित्यमेकरूपत्वादक्रमम् । अक्रमाच्च क्रमिणां नानाकार्याणां कथमुत्पत्तिरिति चेत् अहो स्वपक्षपाती देवानांप्रियो यः खलु स्वयमेकस्मान्निरंशाद्रूपादिक्षणलक्षणात्कारणाद्युगपदनेककारण-

साध्यान्यनेककार्याण्यङ्गीकुर्वाणोपि परपक्षे नित्येपि वस्तुनि क्रमेण नानाकार्यकरणेपि विरोधमुद्भावयति । तस्मात्क्षणिकस्यापि
170 भावस्याक्रमेणार्थक्रिया दुर्घटा ॥ इत्यनित्यैकान्तवादेपि क्रमाक्रमयो-र्व्यापकयोर्निवृत्त्यैव व्याप्यार्थक्रियापि व्यावर्तते । तद्व्यावृत्तौ च सत्त्वमपि व्यापकानुपलब्धिबलेनैव निवर्तते । इत्येकान्तानित्यवादोपि न रमणीयः ॥

स्याद्वादे तु पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारस्वीकारस्थितिलक्षणपरिणामेन
175 भावानामर्थक्रियोपपत्तिरविरुद्धा । न चैकत्र वस्तुनि परस्परविरुद्ध धर्माध्यासायोगादसन्स्याद्वाद इति वाच्यम् । नित्यानित्यपक्ष-विलक्षणस्य पक्षान्तरस्याङ्गीक्रियमाणत्वात् । तथैव च सर्वैरनुभवात् । तथा च पठन्ति—

भागे सिंहो नरो भागे योऽर्थो भागद्वयात्मकः ।
180 तमभागं विभागेन नरसिंहं प्रचक्षते ॥ इति ॥

वैशेषिकैरपि चित्ररूपस्यैकस्यावयविनोभ्युपगमादेकस्यैव पटादेश्चला-चलरक्तारक्तावृतानावृतत्वादिविरुद्धधर्माणामुपलम्भेः । सौगतैरप्ये-कत्र चित्रपटीज्ञाने नीलानीलयोर्विरोधानङ्गीकारात् ॥

अत्र च यद्यप्यधिकृतवादिनः प्रदीपादिकं कालान्तरावस्थायि-
185 त्वात्क्षणिकं न मन्यन्ते तन्मते पूर्वापरान्तावच्छिन्नायाः सत्ताया एवानित्यतालक्षणात् तथापि बुद्धिसुखादिकं तेपि क्षणिकतयैव प्रतिपन्नाः इति तदधिकारेपि क्षणिकवादचर्चा नानुपपन्ना । यदपि च कालान्तरावस्थायि वस्तु तदपि नित्या-नित्यमेव । सर्वोपि न खलु सोस्ति यत्र वस्तूत्पादव्यय-
190 ध्रौव्यात्मकं नास्ति ॥ इति काव्यार्थः ॥ ५ ॥

अथ तदभिमतमीश्वरस्य जगत्कर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमं मिथ्याभिनिवेशरूपं निरूपयन्नाह ।

फर्तास्ति कश्चिज्जगतः स चैकः
स सर्वगः स स्ववशः स नित्यः ।
इमाः कुहेवाकविडम्बनाः स्यु-
स्तेषां न येषामनुशासकस्त्वम् ॥६॥

जगतः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपलक्ष्यमाणचराचररूपस्य विश्वत्रयस्य कश्चिद् अनिर्वचनीयस्वरूपः पुरुषविशेषः कर्ता स्रष्टा अस्ति 5 विद्यते ॥ ते हीत्थं प्रमाणयन्ति । उर्वीपर्वततर्वादिकं सर्वं बुद्धिमत्कर्तृकम् । कार्यत्वात् । यद्यत्कार्यं तत्तत्सर्वं बुद्धिमत्कर्तृकम् यथा घटः । तथा चेदम् । तस्मात्तथा । व्यतिरेके व्योमादि । यश्च बुद्धिमांस्तत्कर्ता स भगवानीश्वर एवेति ॥

न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः । यतो भूभूधरादेः स्वस्वकारणकलाप-10 जन्यतयावयवितया वा कार्यत्वं सर्ववादिनां प्रतीतमेव । नाप्यनैकान्तिको विरुद्धो वा । विपक्षादत्यन्तव्यावृत्तत्वात् । नापि कालात्ययापदिष्टः । प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाबाधितधर्मधर्म्यनन्तरप्रतिपादितत्वात् ॥ नापि प्रकरणसमः । तत्प्रतिपन्थिधर्मोपपादनसमर्थप्रत्यनुमानाभावात् । न च वाच्यमीश्वरः पृथ्वीपृथ्वीधरादेर्विधाता न भवति 15 अशरीरत्वात् निर्वृतात्मवदिति प्रत्यनुमानं तद्बाधकमिति । यतोऽत्र ईश्वररूपो धर्मी प्रतीतोऽप्रतीतो वा प्रत्युपनीतः । न तावदप्रतीतः । हेतोराश्रयासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । प्रतीतश्चेत् येन प्रमाणेन स प्रतीतस्तेनैव किं स्वतनुकरणादिमत्त्वमप्युत्कृष्टं न प्रतीयते । इत्यतः कथमशरीरत्वम् । तस्मान्निरवद्य एवायं हेतुरिति ॥

२० स चैक इति। च पुनरर्थे। स पुनः पुरुषविशेष एकः अद्वितीयः। बहूनां हि विश्वविधातृत्वस्वीकारे परस्परविमतिसंभावनाया अनिवार्यत्वादेकैकस्य वस्तुनोऽन्यान्यरूपतया निर्माणे सर्वमसमञ्जसमापद्येतेति ॥

तथा स सर्वग इति। सर्वत्र गच्छतीति सर्वगः। सर्वव्यापी। २५ तस्य हि प्रतिनियतदेशवर्तित्वे नियतदेशवर्तीनां त्रिभुवनान्तर्वर्तिपदार्थसार्थानां यथावन्निर्माणानुपपत्तिः। कुम्भकारादिषु तथा दर्शनात् ॥ अथवा सर्वं गच्छति जानातीति सर्वगः सर्वज्ञः। सर्वे गत्यर्था ज्ञानार्थाः इति वचनात्। सर्वज्ञत्वाभावे हि यथोचितोपादानकारणाद्यनभिज्ञत्वादनुरूपकार्योत्पत्तिर्न स्यात् ॥

३० तथा स स्ववशः स्वतन्त्रः। सकलप्राणिनां स्वेच्छया सुखदुःखयोरनुभावनसमर्थत्वात्। तथा चाहुः—

ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत् स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा।
अन्यो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ॥

पारतन्त्र्ये तु तस्य परमुखप्रेक्षितया मुख्यकर्तृत्वव्याघातादनी- ३५ श्वरत्वापत्तिः ॥

तथा स नित्य इति। अप्रच्युतानुत्पन्नस्थिरैकरूपः। तस्य ह्यनित्यत्वे परोत्पाद्यतया कृतकत्वप्राप्तिः। अपेक्षितपरव्यापारो हि भावः स्वभावनिष्पत्तौ कृतक इत्युच्यते। यमपरस्तस्य कर्ता कल्प्यते स नित्योऽनित्यो वा स्यात्। नित्यश्चेदधिकृतेश्वरेण ४० किमपराद्धम्। अनित्यश्चेत्तस्याप्युत्पादकान्तरेण भाव्यम्। तस्यापि नित्यानित्यत्वकल्पनायामनवस्थादौस्थ्यमिति ॥

तदेवमेकत्वादिविशेषणविशिष्टो भगवानीशस्त्रिजगत्कर्तेति पराभ्युपगममुपदर्श्योत्तरार्धेन तस्य दुष्टत्वमाचष्टे ॥ इमा एवा

45 अनन्तरोक्ताः । कुहेवाकविडम्बनाः कुत्सिता हेवाका आग्रहविशेषाः
कुहेवाकाः कदाग्रहा इत्यर्थः त एव विडम्बनाः विचारचातुरी
चापलेन तिरस्काररूपत्वाद्विगोपकप्रकाराः । स्युः भवेयुः । तेषां प्राया
णिकापसदानाम् । येषां हे स्वामिन् त्वं नानुशासकः न शिक्षादाता ॥
तदभिनिवेशानां विडम्बनारूपत्वज्ञापनार्थमथ पराभिमततत्त्वपरिषि
50 वेषणेषु मत्येकं तच्छब्दप्रयोगमनुपागर्भमाविर्भावयांचकार स्तुति
कारः । तथा चैवमेव निन्दनीयं प्रति वक्तारो वदन्ति । स मूर्खः स
पापीयान् स दरिद्र इत्यादि । त्वमित्येकवचनसंयुक्तयुष्मच्छब्द
प्रयोगेण परमेष्ठिनः परमकारुणिकतयानपेक्षितस्वपरपक्षविभागम
द्वितीयं हितोपदेशकत्वं ध्वन्यते । अतोऽयमाशयः । यद्यपि
55 भगवानविशेषेण सकलजगज्जन्तुजातहितावहां सर्वेभ्य एव देश
नावाचमाचष्टे तथापि सैव केषांचिन्निविडनिकाचितपापकर्मकलु
षितात्मनां रुचिरूपतया न परिणमते । अपुनर्बन्धकादिव्यतिरि
क्तत्वेनायोग्यत्वात् । तथा च कादम्बर्यां बाणोऽपि बभाण—अपग
तमले हि मनसि स्फटिकमणाविव रजनिकरगभस्तयो विशन्ति
60 सुखमुपदेशगुणाः । गुरुवचनममलमपि सलिलमिव महदुपजनयति
श्रवणस्थितं शूलमभव्यस्य इति । अतो वस्तुवृत्त्या न तेषां भगवा
ननुशासक इति ॥ न चैतावता जगद्गुरोरसामर्थ्यसंभावना । न हि
कालदष्टमनुज्जीवयन् समुज्जीवितेतरदष्टको विषभिषगुपालम्भ
नीयः । अतिप्रसङ्गात् । स हि तेषामेव दोषः । न खलु निखि
65 लभुवनाभोगमवभासयन्तोऽपि भानवीया भानवः कौशिककोक-
स्यालोकहेतुतामभजमाना उपालम्भसंभावनास्पदम् । तथा च
श्रीसिद्धसेन —

> सद्धर्मबीजवपनानघकौशलस्य
> यल्लोकबान्धव तवापि खिलान्यभूवन् ।

70 तमाद्भुतं खगकुलेष्विह तामसेषु
सूर्यांशवो मधुकरीचरणावदाताः ॥

अथ कथमिव तत्कुहेवाकानां विडम्बनारूपत्वमिति । ब्रूमः । यत्तावदुक्तं परैः क्षित्यादयो बुद्धिमत्कर्तृकाः कार्यत्वाद्घटवदिति । तदयुक्तम् । व्याप्त्यग्रहणात् । साधनं हि सर्वत्र व्याप्तौ प्रमाणेन 75 सिद्धायां साध्यं गमयेदिति सर्ववादिसंवादः ॥ स चायं जगन्ति सृजन् सशरीरोऽशरीरो वा स्यात् ॥ सशरीरोपि किमस्मदादिवद्दृश्यशरीरविशिष्ट उत पिशाचादिवददृश्यशरीरविशिष्टः । प्रथमपक्षे प्रत्यक्षबाधः । तमन्तरेणापि च जायमाने तृणतरुपुरंदरधनुरभ्रादौ कार्यत्वस्य दर्शनात् प्रमेयत्वादिवत्साधारणानैकान्तिको हेतुः । 80 द्वितीयविकल्पे पुनरदृश्यशरीरत्वे तस्य माहात्म्यविशेषः कारणम् आहोस्विदस्मदाद्यदृष्टवैगुण्यम् । प्रथमप्रकारः कोशपानप्रत्यायनीयः । तत्सिद्धौ प्रमाणाभावात् । इतरेतराश्रयदोषापत्तेश्च । सिद्धे हि माहात्म्यविशेषे तस्यादृश्यशरीरत्वं प्रत्येतव्यम् । तत्सिद्धौ च माहात्म्यविशेषसिद्धिरिति । द्वैतीयिकस्तु प्रकारो न संचरत्येव 85 विचारगोचरे । संशयानिवृत्तेः । किं तस्यासत्त्वाददृश्यशरीरत्वं वान्ध्येयादिवत् किं वास्मदाद्यदृष्टवैगुण्यात्पिशाचादिवदिति निश्चयाभावात् ॥ अशरीरश्चेत्तदा दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोर्वैषम्यम् । घटादयो हि कार्यरूपाः सशरीरकर्तृका दृष्टाः । अशरीरस्य च सतस्तस्य कार्यप्रवृत्तौ कुतः सामर्थ्यम् आकाशादिवत् । तस्मात्सशरीराशरीर 90 लक्षणे पक्षद्वयेपि कार्यत्वहेतोर्व्याप्त्यसिद्धिः ॥ किं च त्वन्मतेन कालात्ययापदिष्टोप्ययं हेतुः । धर्म्येकदेशस्य तरुविद्युदभ्रादेरिदानीमप्युत्पद्यमानस्य विधातुरनुपलभ्यमानत्वेन प्रत्यक्षबाधित धर्म्यनन्तरं हेतुभणनात् । तदेवं न कश्चिज्जगतः कर्ता ॥

एकत्वादीनि तु जगत्कर्तृत्वव्यवस्थापनायानीयमानानि तद्

95 शेषणानि षण्ढं प्रति कामिन्या रूपसंपन्निरूपणमपार्थान्येव । तथापि तेषां विचारासहत्वख्यापनार्थं किंचिदुच्यते ॥ तत्रैकत्वचर्चे स्तावत् । बहूनामेककार्यकरणे वैमत्यसंभावनेति नायमेकान्तः । अनेककीटिकाशतनिष्पाद्यत्वेऽपि शक्रमूर्ध्नोऽनेकशिल्पिकल्पितत्वेऽपि प्रासादादीनां नैकसरघानिर्वर्तितत्वेऽपि मधुच्छत्रादीनां चैक-
100 रूपताया अविगानेनोपलम्भात् । अथैतेष्वप्येक एवेश्वरः कर्तेति ब्रूषे । एवं चेद्भवतो भवानीपतिं प्रति निष्प्रतिमा वासना तर्हि कुविन्दकुम्भकारादितिरस्कारेण पटघटादीनामपि कर्ता स एव किं न कल्प्यते । अथ तेषां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं कर्तृत्वं कथमपह्नोतुं शक्यम् । तर्हि कीटिकादिभिः किं तेषां विराद्धं यत्तेषामसदृ-
105 शारम्भप्रयाससाध्यं कर्तृत्वमेकहेलयैवापलप्यते । तस्माद्वैमत्यभया न्महेशितुरेकत्वकल्पना भोजनादिव्ययभयात्कृपणस्यात्यन्तवल्लभ पुत्रकलत्रादिपरित्यजनेन शून्यारण्यानीसेवनमिव ॥

तथा सर्वगतत्वमपि तस्य नोपपन्नम् । तद्धि शरीरात्मना ज्ञाना त्मना वा स्यात् । प्रथमपक्षे तदीयेनैव देहेन जगत्त्रयस्य व्याप्तत्वादि-
110 तरनिर्मेयपदार्थानामाश्रयानवकाशः । द्वितीयपक्षे तु सिद्धसाध्यता । अस्माभिरपि निरतिशयज्ञानात्मना परमपुरुषस्य जगत्त्रयक्रोडी करणाभ्युपगमात् । यदि परमेवं भवत्प्रमाणीकृतेन वेदेन विरोधः । तत्र हि शरीरात्मना सर्वगतत्वमुक्तम् । विश्वतश्चक्षु रुत विश्वतोमुखो विश्वतःपाणिरुत विश्वतःपात् इत्यादिश्रुतेः ॥
115 यच्चोक्तं तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशवर्तित्वे त्रिभुवनगतपदार्थानामनि यतदेशवृत्तीनां यथावन्निर्माणानुपपत्तिरिति । तत्रेदं पृच्छ्यते । स जगत्त्रयं निर्मिमाणस्तक्षादिवत्साक्षाद्देहव्यापारेण निर्मिमीते यदि वा संकल्पमात्रेण । आद्ये पक्ष एकस्यैव भूभूधरादेर्विधानेऽक्षोदी

यतः कार्यक्षेपस्य संभवाद्वरीयसाप्यनेहसा न परिसमाप्तिः।
120 द्वितीयपक्षे तु संकल्पमात्रेणैव कार्यकल्पनायां नियतदेशस्थायि-
त्वेऽपि न किंचिद्दूषणमुत्पश्यामः। नियतदेशस्थायिनां सामान्यदे-
वानामपि संकल्पमात्रेणैव तत्तत्कार्यसंपादनप्रतिपत्तेः॥ किं च
तस्य सर्वगतत्वेनाङ्गीक्रियमाणे ऽशुचिषु निरन्तरसन्तमसेषु
नरकादिस्थलेष्वपि तस्य वृत्तिः प्रसज्यते। तथा चानिष्टापत्तिः।
125 अथ युष्मत्पक्षेऽपि यदा ज्ञानात्मना सर्वजगत्त्रयं व्याप्नोतीत्युच्यते
तदाऽशुचिरसास्वादादीनामप्युपलम्भसंभावनानरकादिदुःखस्वरूप-
संवेदनात्मकतया दुःखानुभवप्रसङ्गाच्चानिष्टापत्तिस्तुल्यैवेति चेत्
तदेतदुपपत्तिभिः प्रतिकर्तुमशक्तस्य धूलिभिरिवावकरणम्। यतो-
ज्ञानमप्राप्यकारि स्वस्थानस्थमेव विषयं परिच्छिनत्ति न पुनस्तत्र
130 गत्वा। ततः कुतो भवदुपालम्भः समीचीनः। तर्हि भवतोऽप्यशुचि
ज्ञानमात्रेण तद्रसास्वादानुभूतिः। तद्भावे हि स्रक्चन्दनाङ्गना
रसवत्यादिचिन्तनमात्रेणैव तृप्तिसिद्धौ तत्प्राप्तिप्रयत्नवैफल्यप्रसक्ति-
रिति॥ यत्तु ज्ञानात्मना सर्वगतत्वे सिद्धसाधनं प्रागुक्तं तच्छक्ति-
मात्रमपेक्ष्य मन्तव्यम्। तथा च वक्तारो भवन्ति। अस्य मतिः
135 सर्वशास्त्रेषु प्रसरतीति। न च ज्ञानं प्राप्यकारि। तस्यात्मधर्मत्वेन
बहिर्निर्गमाभावात्। बहिर्निर्गमे चात्मनोऽचैतन्यापत्त्याऽजीवत्वप्र-
सङ्गः। न हि धर्मो धर्मिणमतिरिच्य क्वचन केवलो विलोकितः।
यच्च परे दृष्टान्तयन्ति यथा सूर्यस्य किरणा गुणरूपा अपि
सूर्यान्निष्क्रम्य भुवनं भासयन्त्येवं ज्ञानमप्यात्मनः सकाशाद्बहि-
140 र्निर्गत्य प्रमेयं परिच्छिनत्तीति तदेतदनुत्तरम्। किरणानां गुणत्वम-
सिद्धम्। तेषां तैजसपुद्गलमयत्वेन द्रव्यत्वात्। यश्च तेषां प्रकाशात्मा
गुणः स तेभ्यो न जातु पृथग्भवतीति। तथा च धर्मसंग्रहण्यां
श्रीहरिभद्राचार्यपादाः —

किरणा गुणा न दव्वं तेसिं पयासो गुणो न वा दव्वं ॥
145 जं नाणं आयगुणो कहमदव्वो स अन्नत्थ ॥ १ ॥
गन्तूण न परिछिंदइ नाणं णेयं तयम्मि देसम्मि ।
आयत्थं चिय नवरं अचिन्तसत्तीउ विण्णेयं ॥ २ ॥
लोहोवलस्स सत्ती आयत्था चेव भिन्नदेसंपि ।
लोहं आगरिसंती दीसइ इह कज्ज पच्चक्खा ॥ ३ ॥
150 एवमिह नाणसत्ती आयत्था चेव हंदि लोगंतं ।
जइ परिछिंदइ सम्मं को णु विरोहो भवे तस्स ॥ ४ ॥
इत्यादि ॥

अथ सर्वगः सर्वज्ञ इति व्याख्याने तत्रापि प्रतिविधीयते । ननु तस्य सार्वज्ञ्यं केन प्रमाणेन गृहीतम् । प्रत्यक्षेण परोक्षेण 155 वा । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षेण । तस्येन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नतयातीन्द्रियग्रहणासामर्थ्यात् । नापि परोक्षेण । तद्धनुमानं शाब्दं वा स्यात् । न तावदनुमानम् । तस्य लिङ्गग्रहणेन लिङ्गिलिङ्गसंबन्धस्मरणपूर्वकत्वात् । न च तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वेनुमेये किंचिदव्यभिचारि लिङ्गं पश्यामः।तस्यात्यन्तविप्रकृष्टत्वेन तत्प्रतिबद्धलिङ्गसंबन्धग्रहणा- 160 भावात्। अथ तस्य सर्वज्ञत्वं विना जगद्वैचित्र्यमनुपपद्यमानं सर्वज्ञत्वमर्यादापादयतीति चेन्न । अविनाभावाभावात् । न हि जगद्वैचित्री तत्सार्वज्ञ्यं विनान्यथा नोपपन्ना । द्विविधं हि जगत् । स्थावरजङ्गमभेदात् । तत्र जङ्गमानां वैचित्र्यं स्वोपात्तशुभाशुभकर्मपरिपाकवशेनैव । स्थावराणां तु सचेतनानामियमेव गतिरचेतनानां तु 165 तदुपभोगयोग्यतासाधनत्वेनानादिकालसिद्धमेव वैचित्र्यमिति ॥ नाप्यागमस्तत्साधकः । स हि तत्कृतोऽन्यकृतो वा स्यात् । तत्कृत एव चेत्तस्य सर्वज्ञतां साधयति तदा तस्य महत्त्वक्षतिः ।

स्वयमेव स्वगुणोत्कीर्तनस्य महत्तामनधिकृतत्वात्। अन्यच्च तस्य शास्त्रकर्तृत्वमपि न युज्यते। शास्त्रं हि वर्णात्मकम्। ते च ताल्वा-
170 दिव्यापारजन्याः। स च शरीर एव संभवी। शरीराभ्युपगमे च तस्य पूर्वोक्त एव दोषाः। अन्यच्चायं सोऽन्यः सर्वज्ञोऽसर्वज्ञो वा। सर्वज्ञत्वे तस्य द्वैतापत्त्या प्रागुक्तत्वदेकत्वाभ्युपगमबाधप्रसङ्गस्तस्याप्रमाणपर्यायमनवस्थापातश्च। असर्वज्ञश्चेत्कुतस्तस्य वचसि विश्वासः। अपरं च भवदीय आगमः भवतु तत्प्रणेतुरसर्वज्ञत्वमेव साधयति।
175 पूर्वापरविरुद्धार्थवचनोपेतत्वात्। तथाहि न हिंस्यात्सर्वभूतानीति प्रथममुक्त्वा पश्चात्तत्रैव पठितम्।

षट्शतानि नियुज्यन्ते पशूनां मध्यमेऽहनि।
अश्वमेधस्य वचनान्न्यूनानि पशुभिस्त्रिभिः॥

तथा अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत सप्तदश प्राजापत्यान्पशूनालभेत
180 इत्यादिवचनानि कथमिव न पूर्वापरविरोधमनुरुध्यन्ते॥
तथा नानृतं ब्रूयात् इत्यादिना अनृतभाषणं प्रथमं निषिध्य पश्चात् ब्राह्मणार्थेऽनृतं ब्रूयात् इत्यादि। तथा—

न नर्मयुक्तं वचनं हिनस्ति
न स्त्रीषु राजन्न विवाहकाले।
185 प्राणात्यये सर्वधनापहारे
पञ्चानृतान्याहुरपातकानि॥

तथा अदत्तादानमेकधा निरस्य पश्चादुक्तम्—यद्यपि ब्राह्मणो हठेन परकीयमादत्ते छद्मेन वा तथापि तस्य नादत्तादानम्। यतः सर्वमिदं ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दत्तं ब्राह्मणानां तु दौर्बल्याद् वृषलाः परिभुञ्जते।
190 तस्मादपहरन् ब्राह्मणः स्वमादत्ते स्वमेव ब्राह्मणो भुङ्क्ते स्वं वस्ते स्वं ददाति इति॥ तथा। अपुत्रस्य गतिर्नास्ति इति लपित्वा

अनेकानि सहस्राणि कुमारब्रह्मचारिणाम् ।
दिवं गतानि विप्राणामकृत्वा कुलसन्ततिम् ॥

इत्यादि ॥ कियन्तो वा दृष्टिमात्रप्रयोजनात्कृपणा विवेच्यन्ते ।
195 एवमागमोऽपि न तस्य सर्वज्ञतां वक्ति । किं च सर्वज्ञः सन्नसौ
चराचरं चेद्रचयति तदा जगदुपप्लवकरणवैरिणः पश्चादपि
कर्तव्यनिग्रहानसुरवैरिण एतदधिक्षेपकारिणश्चास्मदादीन्किमर्थं
सृजतीति । तन्नायं सर्वज्ञः ॥

तथा स्ववशत्वं स्वातन्त्र्यम् । तदपि तस्य न क्षोदक्षमम् ॥ स हि
200 यदि नाम स्वाधीनः सन् विश्वं विधत्ते परमकारुणिकश्च त्वया
वर्ण्यते तत्कथं सुखितदुःखिताद्यवस्थाभेदवृन्दस्थपुटितं घटयति भुवनम्
एकान्तशर्मसंपत्कान्तमेव तु किं न निर्मिमीते । अथ जन्मा
न्तरोपार्जिततत्तत्तदीयशुभाशुभकर्मप्रेरितः सन् तथा करोतीति ।
दधीषे तर्हि स्ववशत्वाय जलाञ्जलिः । कर्मजन्ये च त्रिभुवनवैचित्र्ये
205 शिपिविष्टहेतुकविशिष्टपरिकल्पनायाः कष्टैकफलत्वादस्मन्मतमेवा
ङ्गीकृतं प्रेक्षावता । तथा चायातोऽयं घट्टकुट्यां प्रभातमिति न्यायः ।
किं च प्राणिनां धर्माधर्मावपेक्षमाणश्चेदयं सृजति प्राप्तं तर्हि
यदयमपेक्षते तन्न करोतीति । न हि कुलालो दण्डादि करोति ।
एवं कर्मापेक्षश्चेदीश्वरो जगत्कारणं स्यात्तर्हि कर्मणीश्वरत्वमीश्वरोऽनी-
210 श्वरः स्यादिति ॥

तथा नित्यत्वमपि तस्य स्वगृह एव प्रतिपाद्यमानं हृद्यम् ॥ स
खलु नित्यत्वेनैकरूपः सन् त्रिभुवनसर्गस्वभावोऽतत्स्वभावो वा ।
प्रथमविधायां जगन्निर्माणात्कदाचिदपि नोपरमेत । तदुपरमे
तत्स्वभावत्वहानिः । एवं च सर्गक्रियाया अपर्यवसानादेकस्यापि

२१५ कार्यस्य न सृष्टिः । घटो हि स्वारम्भक्षणादारभ्य परिसमाप्ते-
रुपान्त्यक्षणं यावदभिमतनयाभिप्रायेण न घटव्यपदेशमासादयति ।
जलाहरणाद्यर्थक्रियायामसाधकतमत्वात् । अतत्स्वभावपक्षे तु न
जातु जगन्ति सृजेत्स्वभावायोगाद्गगनवत् । अपि च तस्यैकान्त-
नित्यस्वरूपत्वे सृष्टिवत्संहारोऽपि न घटते । नानारूपकार्यकरणे-
२२० ऽनित्यत्वापत्तेः । स हि येनैव स्वभावेन जगन्ति सृजेत्तेनैव तानि
संहरेत् स्वभावान्तरेण वा । तेनैव चेत् सृष्टिसंहारयोर्यौगपद्यप्रसङ्गः ।
स्वभावाभेदात् । एकस्वभावात्कारणादनेकस्वभावकार्योत्पत्ति-
विरोधात् । स्वभावान्तरेण चेत् नित्यत्वहानिः । स्वभावभेद एव
हि लक्षणमनित्यतायाः । यथा पार्थिवशरीरस्याहारपरमाणुसह-
२२५ कृतस्य प्रत्यहमपूर्वापूर्वोत्पादेन स्वभावभेदादनित्यत्वम् । इष्टश्च भवतां
सृष्टिसंहारयोः शम्भौ स्वभावभेदः । रजोगुणात्मकतया सृष्टौ
तमोगुणात्मकतया संहरणे सात्त्विकतया च स्थितौ तस्य व्यापार-
स्वीकारात् । एवं चावस्थाभेदस्तद्भेदे चावस्थावतोऽपि भेदान्नित्य-
त्वक्षतिः ॥ अथास्तु नित्यस्तथापि कथं सततमेव सृष्टौ न चेष्टते ।
२३० इच्छावशाच्चेन्ननु ता अपीच्छाः स्वसत्तामात्रनिबन्धनात्मलाभाः
सदैव किं न प्रवर्तयन्तीति स एवोपालम्भः । तथा शम्भोरष्टगुणा-
धिकरणत्वे कार्यभेदानुमेयानां तदिच्छानामपि विषमरूपत्वाद्धानिः
केन बाध्यते । किं च प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिः स्वार्थकारुण्याभ्यां व्याप्ता । तत-
श्चायं जगत्सर्गे व्याप्रियते स्वार्थात्कारुण्याद्वा । न तावत्स्वार्थात्त-
२३५ स्य कृतकृत्यत्वात् । न च कारुण्यात् । परदुःखप्रहाणेच्छा हि कारुण्यम् ।
ततः प्राक्सर्गाज्जीवानामिन्द्रियशरीरविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःखाभावेन
कस्य प्रहाणेच्छा कारुण्यम् । सर्गोत्तरकाले तु दुःखिनोऽवलोक्य
कारुण्याभ्युपगमे दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयम् । कारुण्येन सृष्टिः सृष्ट्या च
कारुण्यम् । इति नास्य जगत्कर्तृत्वं कथमपि सिद्ध्यति । तदेवमेव-

240 विपदापकस्यापि न पुरुषविशेषस्य यस्त्वया समाराधकः स खलु केवलं भवबन्धमोहविडम्बनापरिपाक इति । अत्र च यद्यपि मध्यवर्तिनो मकारस्य घण्टालालान्यायेन योजनादर्थान्तरमपि स्फुरति यथा इमाः कुहेवाकविडम्बनास्त्वया न स्युर्येषां त्वमनुशासक इति तथापि सोऽर्थः सहृदयैर्न हृदयधारणीयोऽन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदस्या
245 धिकृतत्वादिति काव्यार्थः ॥

अथ चैतन्यादयो रूपादयश्च धर्मा आत्मादेर्घटादेश्च धर्मिणोऽत्यन्तं व्यतिरिक्ता अपि समवायसंबन्धेन संबद्धाः सन्तो धर्मधर्मिव्यपदेशमश्नुवत इति मतं दूषयन्नाह ।

न धर्मधर्मित्वमतीवभेदे
वृत्त्यास्ति चेन्न त्रितयं चकास्ति ।
इहेदमित्यस्ति मतिश्च वृत्तौ
न गौणभेदोऽपि च लोकबाधः ॥ ७ ॥

धर्मधर्मिणोरतीवभेदे [अतीवेत्यत्ययनशब्दो वाक्यालङ्कारे तं
5 च प्रायोऽतिशब्दात्तिङन्तेभ्यश्च प्रयुञ्जते शाब्दिकाः यथा—आवर्जिता किंचिदिव स्तनाभ्याम् उद्वृत्तः क इव सुखावहः परेषामित्यादि] तत्र एकान्तभिन्नत्वेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे धर्मधर्मित्वं न स्यात् अस्य धर्मिण इमे धर्मा एषां च धर्माणामयमाश्रयभूतो धर्मीत्येवं सर्वप्रसिद्धो धर्मधर्मिव्यपदेशो न प्राप्नोति । तयोरत्यन्त-
10 भिन्नत्वेऽपि तत्कल्पनायां पदार्थान्तरधर्माणामपि विवक्षितधर्मिधर्मत्वापत्तेः ॥ एवमुक्ते मतिं परः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते । वृत्त्यास्तीति । अयुतसिद्धानामाधार्याधारभूतानामिहेदंप्रत्ययहेतुः संबन्धः समवायः । स च समवायनात्समवाय इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्य

विश्लेषेषु पञ्चसु पदार्थेषु वर्तनाद्वृत्तिरिति व्याख्यायते । तथा
15 वृत्त्या समवायसंबन्धेन तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोरितरेतरविनिर्लुण्ठितत्वेऽपि
धर्मधर्मिव्यपदेश इष्यते । इति नानन्तरोक्तो दोष इति ॥ अत्राचार्यः
समाधत्ते । नेदिति । यथार्थं तव मतिः सा नात्यन्तमविशिष्टा । यतो न
त्रितयं चकास्ति । अयं धर्मी इदं चास्य धर्मः अयं चैतत्संब-
न्धनिबन्धनं समवाय इत्येतत्त्रितयं वस्तुरूपं न चकास्ति ज्ञान-
20 विषयतया न प्रतिभासते । यथा किल शिलाशकलयुगलस्य मिथो-
ऽनुसन्धायकं राजादिद्रव्यं तस्मात्पृथक् तृतीयतया प्रतिभासते
नैवमत्र समवायस्यापि प्रतिभानं किं तु द्वयोरेव धर्मधर्मिणोरिति
व्यपदेश्यसंबन्धनीयोऽयं समवाय इति भावार्थः ॥ किं चायं तेन वादिना
एको नित्यः सर्वव्यापकोऽमूर्तश्च परिकल्प्यते । ततो यथा घटाश्रिताः
25 पाकजरूपादयो धर्माः समवायसंबन्धेन समवेतास्तथा किं न
पटेऽपि । तस्यैकत्वनित्यत्वव्यापकत्वैः सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वात् । यथाकाश
एको नित्यो व्यापकोऽमूर्तश्च सन् सर्वैः संबन्धिभिर्युगपदवि-
शेषेण संबध्यते तथा किं नायमपीति । विनश्यदेकवस्तुसमवायाभावे
च समस्तवस्तुसमवायाभावः प्रसज्यते । तदवच्छेदकभेदान्नायं
30 दोष इति चेदेवमनित्यत्वापत्तिः । प्रतिवस्तुस्वभावभेदादिति । अथ
कथं समवायस्य न ज्ञानं प्रतिभासनं यतस्तस्येहेतिप्रत्ययः साध-
कानं साधनम् । इहप्रत्ययप्रमाणसिद्ध एव । इह तन्तुषु पटः इहात्मनि
ज्ञानम् । इह घटे रूपादय इति प्रतीतेरुपलम्भात् । अस्य च प्रत्य-
यस्य कथमर्थधर्मसम्बन्धनामकत्वादस्ति समवायाख्यं पदार्थान्तरं
35 तद्धेतुरिति परमतमाशङ्क्याभिसन्धाय पुनराह । इहेदमित्यस्ति मतिश्च
वृत्ताविति । इहेदमिति इहेदमिति आश्रयाश्रयिभावहेतुक इहप्रत्यया
वृत्तावप्यस्ति समवायसंबन्धेऽपि विद्यते । यद्यस्मादपि वृत्त्यापि । तस्य

च व्यवच्छित्तये पश्चार्धं च व्याख्यातम्। इदमत्र हृदयम्। यथा
भवन्मते पृथिवीत्वाभिसंबन्धात्पृथिवी तत्र पृथिवीत्वं पृथिव्या एव
40 स्वरूपमस्तित्वाख्यं नापरं वस्त्वन्तरं तेन स्वरूपेणैव समं यो
ऽसावभिसंबन्धः पृथिव्याः स एव समवाय इत्युच्यते। प्राप्ता
नामेव प्राप्तिः समवायः इति वचनात्। एवं समवायस्याभिसंबन्धा
त्समवाय इत्यपि किं न कल्प्यते। यतस्तस्यापि यत्समवायत्वं
स्वस्वरूपं तेन सार्धं संबन्धोऽस्त्येव। अन्यथा निःस्वभावत्वा
45 च्छशविषाणवदवस्तुत्वमेव भवेत्। ततश्च इह समवाये समवायत्व
मित्युल्लेखेन इहप्रत्ययः समवायेऽपि युक्त्या घटत एव। ततो यथा
पृथिव्यां पृथिवीत्वं समवायेन समवेतं समवायेऽपि समवायत्वमेवं
समवायान्तरेण संबन्धनीयं तस्याप्यपरेणेत्येवं दुस्तरानवस्था
महानदी॥ एवं समवायस्यापि समवायत्वाभिसंबन्धे युक्त्या उप
50 पादिते साहसिक्यमालम्ब्य पुनः पूर्वपक्षवादी वदति। ननु पृथिव्या
दीनां पृथिवीत्वाभिसंबन्धनिबन्धनं समवायो मुख्यः। तत्र स्वतत्त्वा-
दिमत्त्वयाभिव्यङ्ग्यस्य सपूरीतसकलकायान्तरजातिलक्षणव्यक्ति
भेदस्य सामान्यस्योद्भवात्। इह तु समवायस्यैकत्वेन व्यक्तिभे
दाभावे भेदानुद्भूतत्वाद्गौणार्थं युष्मत्परिकल्पित इहेतिप्रत्यय
55 साध्यः समवायत्वाभिसंबन्धः यस्तत्साध्यश्च समवाय इति। तदेत
द[illegible]न परस्कारकारणम्। यत्रापि जातिलक्षणन्तो कथं निरू-
प्येत। व्यक्तेरभेदेनेति चेत्। तत्तदवच्छेदकवशात्तद्दोषोपपत्तौ
व्यक्तिभेदकल्पनाया दुर्निवारत्वात्। अन्यो हि घटसमवायोऽन्यश्च
पटसमवाय इति व्यक्त एव समवायस्यापि व्यक्तिभेद इति न
60 सिद्धो सिद्ध एव वास्तुत्वः। तस्मादन्यत्रापि मुख्य एव समवायः।
इहप्रत्ययस्यात्र समवायेऽप्यव्यभिचारात्॥

तदेतत्सकलं सपूर्वपक्षं यथाधानं मनसि निधाय

[illegible]

सिद्धान्तवादी आह । न गौणभेद इति । गौण इति योऽयं भेदः स नास्ति । गौणलक्षणाभावात् । तल्लक्षणं चेत्थमाचक्षते—

६५ अव्यभिचारी मुख्योऽविकलोऽसाधारणोऽन्तरङ्गश्च ।
विपरीतो गौणोऽर्थः सति मुख्ये धीः कथं गौणे ॥

तस्माद्धर्मधर्मिणोः संबन्धने मुख्यः समवायः समवाये च समवायत्वाभिसंबन्धे गौण इत्ययं भेदो नानात्वं नास्तीति भावार्थः। किं च योऽयमिह तन्तुषु पट इत्यादिप्रत्ययात्समवायसाधन ७० मनोरथः स खल्वनुहरते नपुंसकादपत्यप्रसवमनोरथम् । इह तन्तुषु पट इत्यादेर्व्यवहारस्याप्रामाणिकत्वात् । पांशुलपादानामपीह पटे तन्तव इत्येवं प्रतीतिदर्शनात् । इह भूतले घटाभाव इत्यत्रापि समवायप्रसङ्गात् । अत एवाह अपि च लोकबाध इति । अपि चेति दूषणाभ्युच्चये । लोकः प्रामाणिकलोकः सामान्यलोकश्च । तेन बाधो ७५ विरोधो लोकबाधः । तदप्रतीतव्यवहारसाधनात् । बाधकश्चास्य ईदृशाः प्रत्ययभेदे इति पुंस्त्रीलिङ्गता । तस्माद्धर्मधर्मिणोरविष्वग्भावलक्षण एव संबन्धः प्रतिपत्तव्यो नान्यः समवायादिरिति काव्यार्थः ॥ ७ ॥

अथ सत्ताभिधानं पदार्थान्तरमात्मनश्च व्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानाख्यं ८० गुणमात्मविशेषगुणोच्छेदस्वरूपां च मुक्तिमज्ञानादङ्गीकृतवतः परानुपहसन्नाह ।

सतामपि स्यात्क्वचिदेव सत्ता
चैतन्यमौपाधिकमात्मनोन्यत् ।
न संविदानन्दमयी च मुक्ति
सुसूत्रमासूत्रितमत्वदीये ॥ ८ ॥

वैशेषिकाणां द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाख्याः षट्-
पदार्थास्तत्त्वतयाभिप्रेताः ॥ तत्र पृथिव्यापस्तेजोवायुराकाशं
कालो दिग् आत्मा मन इति नव द्रव्याणि ॥ गुणाश्चतुर्विंशतिः ।
5 तद्यथा—रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगवि
भागौ परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धिः सुखदुःखे इच्छाद्वेषौ प्रयत्नश्चेति
सूत्रोक्ताः सप्तदश । चशब्दसमुच्चिताश्च सप्त—द्रवत्वं गुरुत्वं संस्कारः
स्नेहो धर्माधर्मौ शब्दश्च । इत्येवं चतुर्विंशतिर्गुणाः । संस्कारस्य वेग
भावनास्थितिस्थापकभेदात्त्रैविध्येऽपि संस्कारत्वजात्यपेक्षया
10 एकत्वाच्छौर्यौदार्यादीनां चात्रैवान्तर्भावान्नाधिक्यम् ॥ कर्माणि
पञ्च । तद्यथा-उत्क्षेपणमवक्षेपणमाकुञ्चनं प्रसारणं गमनमिति ।
गमनग्रहणाद् भ्रमणरेचनस्पन्दनाद्यविरोधः ॥ अत्यन्तव्यावृत्तानां
पिण्डानां यतः कारणादन्योन्यस्वरूपानुगमः प्रतीयते तदनुवृत्ति
प्रत्ययहेतुः सामान्यम् । तच्च द्विविधं परमपरं च । तत्र परं सत्ता
15 भावो महासामान्यमिति चोच्यते । द्रव्यत्वाद्यवान्तरसामान्यापेक्षया
महाविषयत्वात् । अपरसामान्यं च द्रव्यत्वादि । एतच्च सामान्य
विशेष इत्यपि व्यपदिश्यते । तथाहि द्रव्यत्वं नवसु द्रव्येषु वर्तमान
त्वात्सामान्यं गुणकर्मभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वाद्विशेषः । ततः कर्मधारये
सामान्यविशेष इति । एवं द्रव्यत्वापेक्षया पृथिवीत्वादिकमपरं
20 तदपेक्षया घटत्वादिकम् । एवं चतुर्विंशतौ गुणेषु वर्तमानं गुणत्वं सा
मान्यं द्रव्यकर्मभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वाच्च विशेषः । एवं गुणत्वापेक्षया रूपत्वा-
दिकं तदपेक्षया नीलत्वादिकम् । एवं पञ्चसु कर्मसु वर्तनात्कर्मत्वं
सामान्यं द्रव्यगुणेभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वाद्विशेषः । एवं कर्मत्वापेक्षया
उत्क्षेपणत्वादिकं ज्ञेयम् ॥ तत्र सत्ता द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरं
25 कथं युज्यते चेत् । उच्यते । न द्रव्यं सत्ता द्रव्यादन्येत्यर्थः ।
एकद्रव्यवत्त्वात् । एकैकस्मिन् द्रव्ये वर्तमानत्वादित्यर्थः । द्रव्यत्ववत् ।

यथा द्रव्यत्वं नवसु द्रव्येषु प्रत्येकं वर्तमानं द्रव्यं न भवति किं
तु सामान्यविशेषलक्षणं द्रव्यत्वमेव एवं तथापि । वैशेषिकाणां
हि अद्रव्यं वा द्रव्यम् अनेकद्रव्यं वा द्रव्यम् । तत्राद्रव्यमाकाश-
३० कालौ दिग् आत्मा मनः परमाणवः । अनेकद्रव्यं तु द्व्यणुकादि
स्कन्धः । एकद्रव्यं तु द्रव्यमेव न भवति । एकद्रव्यवती च सत्ता ।
इति द्रव्यलक्षणविलक्षणत्वान्न द्रव्यम् । एवं न गुणः सत्ता ।
गुणेषु भावात् । गुणत्ववत् । यदि हि सत्ता गुणः स्यान्न तर्हि गुणेषु
वर्तेत । निर्गुणत्वाद् गुणानाम् । वर्तते च गुणेषु सत्ता । सन् गुण
३५ इति प्रतीतेः । तथा न सत्ता कर्म । कर्मसु भावात् । कर्मत्ववत् । यदि च
सत्ता कर्म स्यान्न तर्हि कर्मसु वर्तेत । निष्कर्मत्वात् कर्मणाम् । वर्तते
च कर्मसु सत्ता । सत् कर्मेति प्रतीतेः । तस्मात् पदार्थान्तरं सत्ता ॥

तथा विशेषा नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयोऽन्त्या अत्यन्तव्यावृत्तिहेतवस्ते
द्रव्यादिवैलक्षण्यात् पदार्थान्तरम् । तथा च प्रशस्तकरः—अन्तेषु
४० भवा अन्त्याः । स्वाश्रयविशेषकत्वाद्विशेषाः । विनाशारम्भरहितेषु
नित्यद्रव्येष्वण्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनःसु प्रतिद्रव्यमेकैकशो वर्त-
माना अत्यन्तव्यावृत्तिबुद्धिहेतवः । यथास्मदादीनां गवादिष्वश्वा-
दिभ्यस्तुल्याकृतिगुणक्रियावयवोपचयावयवविशेषसंयोगनिमित्ता
प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिर्दृष्टा गौः शुक्लः शीघ्रगतिः पीनः ककुद्मान् महाघण्ट
४५ इति तथास्मद्विशिष्टानां योगिनां नित्येषु तुल्याकृतिगुणक्रियेषु
परमाणुषु मुक्तात्ममनःसु चान्यनिमित्तासंभवाद्येभ्यो निमित्तेभ्यः
प्रत्याधारं विलक्षणोऽयं विलक्षणोऽयमिति प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिर्देशकाल-
विप्रकर्षे च परमाणौ स एवायमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञानं च भवति तेऽन्त्या
विशेषा इति । अमी च विशेषरूपा एव न तु द्रव्यत्वादिवत्सामान्य
५० विशेषोभयरूपाः । व्यावृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् ॥

तथा अयुतसिद्धानामाधार्याधारभूतानामिहप्रत्ययहेतुः संबन्धः

समवाय इति। अयुतसिद्धयोः परस्परपरिहारेण पृथगाश्रयानाश्रितयोराधाराधेयभावः इह तन्तुषु पट इत्यादेः प्रत्ययस्यासाधारणं कारणं समवायः। यद्वशात् स्वकारणसामर्थ्यादुपजायमानं पटाद्याधार्यं तन्त्वाद्याधारे संबध्यते यथा छिदिक्रिया छेद्येनेति सोऽपि द्रव्यादिलक्षणवैधर्म्यात् पदार्थान्तरम्॥ इति षट् पदार्थाः॥

सांप्रतमक्षरार्थो व्याख्यायते। सतामपीत्यादि। सतामपि सद्बुद्धिवेद्यतया साधारणानामपि षण्णां पदार्थानां मध्ये कस्यचिदेव केषुचिदेव पदार्थेषु सत्ता सामान्ययोगः स्यात् भवेत् न सर्वेषु। तेषामेषा वाचोयुक्तिः सदिति। यतो द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु सा सत्ता इति वचनात् यत्रैव सत्प्रत्ययस्तत्रैव सत्ता। सत्प्रत्ययश्च द्रव्यगुणकर्मस्वेव अतस्तेष्वेव सत्तायोगः। सामान्यादिपदार्थत्रये तु न। तदभावात्। इदमुक्तं भवति। यद्यपि वस्तुस्वरूपमस्तित्वं सामान्यादित्रयेऽपि विद्यते तथापि तदनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुर्न भवति। य एव ह्यनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययः स एव सदितिप्रत्यय इति तदभावाच्च सत्तायोगः तत्र। द्रव्यादीनां पुनस्त्रयाणां षट्पदार्थसाधारणं वस्तुस्वरूपमस्तित्वमपि विद्यते। अनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुः सत्तासंबन्धोऽप्यस्ति। निःस्वरूपे अश्वविषाणादौ सत्तायाः समवायाभावात्। सामान्यादित्रिके कथं नानुवृत्तिप्रत्यय इति चेत् बाधकसद्भावादिति ब्रूमः। तथा हि सत्तायामपि सत्तायोगाङ्गीकारेऽनवस्था। विशेषेषु पुनस्तदभ्युपगमे व्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वलक्षणतत्स्वरूपहानिः। समवाये तत्कल्पनायां संबन्धाभावः। केन हि संबन्धेन तत्र सत्ता संबध्यते। समवायान्तराभावात्। तथा च प्रामाणिकप्रकाण्डमुदयनः—

व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं संकरोऽथानवस्थितिः।
रूपहानिरसंबन्धो जातिबाधकसंग्रहः॥

इति। ततः स्थितमेतत्सतामपि स्यात्कस्यचिदेव सत्तेति॥

तथा चैतन्यमित्यादि । चैतन्यं ज्ञानम् । आत्मनः क्षेत्रज्ञात् ।
अन्यत् अत्यन्तव्यतिरिक्तम् । असमासकरणादत्यन्तमिति लभ्यते ।
अत्यन्तभेदे सति कथमात्मनः संबन्धि ज्ञानमिति व्यपदेश इति
80 पराशङ्कापरिहारार्थम् औपाधिकमितिविशेषणद्वारेण हेत्व-
भिधानम् । उपाधेरागतम् औपाधिकम् । समवायसंबन्धलक्षणे-
नोपाधिना आत्मनि समवेतम् । आत्मनः स्वयं जडरूपत्वात् ।
समवायसंबन्धोपढौकितमिति यावत् । यथात्मनो ज्ञानादत्यन्तव्यति-
रिक्तत्वमिष्यते तदा दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरो-
85 त्तरापाये तदनन्तराभावाद् बुद्ध्यादीनां नवानामात्मविशेषगुणा-
नामुच्छेदावसर आत्मनोऽप्युच्छेदः स्यात् । तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् ।
अतो भिन्नमेवात्मनो ज्ञानं यौक्तिकमिति ॥ तथा न संविदित्यादि ।
मुक्तिर्मोक्षः । न संविदानन्दमयी न ज्ञानसुखरूपा । संविद् ज्ञानम् ।
आनन्दः सौख्यम् । ततो द्वन्द्वः । संविदानन्दौ प्रकृती यस्याः सा
90 संविदानन्दमयी । तादृशी न भवति । बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेष-
प्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्काररूपाणां नवानामात्मनो वैशेषिकगुणाना-
मत्यन्तोच्छेदो मोक्ष इति वचनात् । यतस्तु: पूर्वोक्तान्युप
ममद्युपसङ्क्षये । ज्ञानं हि क्षणिकत्वादनित्यं सुखं च सप्रक्षयतया
95 सातिशयतया च न विशिष्यते संसारावस्थातः । इति तदुच्छेदे
आत्मस्वरूपेणावस्थानं मोक्ष इति । प्रयोगश्चात्र—नवानामा-
त्मविशेषगुणानां संतानोऽत्यन्तमुच्छिद्यते । संतानत्वात् । यो यः
संतानः स सोऽत्यन्तमुच्छिद्यते यथा प्रदीपसंतानः । तथा चायं ।
तस्मादत्यन्तमुच्छिद्यते इति । तदुच्छेद एव महोदयो न कृत्स्नकर्म-
100 क्षयलक्षण इति । न हि वै सशरीरस्य प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति ।
अशरीरं वा वसन्तं प्रियाप्रिये न स्पृशतः इत्यादयोऽपि
वेदान्तास्तादृशीमेव मुक्तिमादिशन्ति । अत्र हि प्रिया

मिये सुखदुःखे ते चाशरीरं मुक्तं न स्पृशतः। अपि च

यावदात्मगुणाः सर्वे नोच्छिन्ना वासनादयः।
तावदात्यन्तिकी दुःखव्यावृत्तिर्न विकल्प्यते ॥ १ ॥
धर्माधर्मनिमित्तो हि संभवः सुखदुःखयोः।
मूलभूतौ च तावेव स्तम्भौ संसारसद्मनः ॥ २ ॥
तदुच्छेदे च तत्कार्यशरीराद्यनुपप्लवात्।
नात्मनः सुखदुःखे स्त इत्यसौ मुक्त उच्यते ॥ ३ ॥
इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नादि भोगायतनबन्धनम्।
उच्छिन्नभोगायतनो नात्मा तैरपि युज्यते ॥४॥
तदेवं धिषणादीनां नवानामपि मूलतः।
गुणानामात्मनो ध्वंसः सोऽपवर्गः प्रतिष्ठितः ॥५॥
ननु तस्यामवस्थायां कीदृगात्मावशिष्यते।
स्वरूपैकप्रतिष्ठानः परित्यक्तोऽखिलैर्गुणैः ॥६॥
ऊर्मिषट्कातिगं रूपं तदस्याहुर्मनीषिणः।
संसारबन्धनाधीनदुःखक्लेशाद्यदूषितम् ॥ ७ ॥

कामक्रोधलोभगर्वदम्भहर्षाः ऊर्मिषट्कमिति। तदेतदभ्युपगमम मित्थं समर्थयद्भिः भवदीयैस्त्वदाचार्यैर्मूर्खैः कणादमतानुगामिभिः सुसूत्रमासूत्रितम् सम्यगागमः प्रपञ्चितः। अथ वा सुसूत्रमिति क्रियाविशेषणम्। शोभनं सूत्रं वस्तुव्यवस्थाघटनाविज्ञानं यथैवमासूत्रितं तत्त्वव्यवस्थापनोपनिबन्धः कृत इति हृदयम्। सूत्रं तु व्यवस्थाकारि ग्रन्थे तन्तुव्यवस्थयोः इत्यनेकार्थवचनात्। अथ सुसूत्रमिति विपरीतलक्षणयोपहासगर्भं प्रशंसावचनम्। यथा—उपकृतं बहु तत्र किमुच्यते सुजनता प्रथिता भवता चिरम् इत्यादि। उपहसनीयता च युक्तिरिक्तत्वात् तदङ्गीकरणम्। तथा हि अविशेषेण सद्बुद्धिवेद्येष्वपि सर्वपदार्थेषु द्रव्यादिष्वेव त्रिषु सत्तासंबन्धः स्वीक्रियते न सामान्या-

त्रिष्वेव इति महतीयं पश्यतोहरता । यतः परिभाष्यतां सत्ताशब्दस्य
व्युत्पत्त्यर्थः । अस्तीति सन् । सतो भावः सत्ता अस्तित्वम् तद्वस्तुस्वरूपं
130 निर्विशेषमशेषेष्वपि पदार्थेषु त्वयाप्युक्तम् । तत्किमिदमर्धजरतीयं
यद्द्रव्यादित्रय एव सत्तायोगो नेतरत्र त्रये इति । अनुवृत्तिप्रत्यया
भावाच्च सामान्यादित्रये सत्तायोग इति चेत् न । तत्राप्यनुवृत्ति
प्रत्ययस्यानिवार्यत्वात् । पृथिवीत्वगोत्वघटत्वादिसामान्येषु
सामान्यं सामान्यमिति विशेषेष्वपि बहुत्वादयमपि विशेषोऽयमपि
135 विशेष इति समवाये च प्रागुक्तयुक्त्या तत्तदवच्छेदकभेदात्
एकाकारप्रतीतेरनुभवात् । स्वरूपसत्तासाधर्म्येण सत्ताध्यारोपात् ।
सामान्यादिष्वपि सत्सदित्यनुगम इति चेत् तर्हि मिथ्याप्रत्ययो-
यमापद्यते । अथ भिन्नस्वभावेष्वेकानुगमो मिथ्यैवेति चेत्
द्रव्यादिष्वपि सत्ताध्यारोपकृत एवास्तु प्रत्ययानुगमः । असति
140 मुख्येऽध्यारोपस्यासंभवात् । द्रव्यादिषु मुख्योऽयमनुगतः प्रत्ययः सा
मान्यादिषु तु गौण इति चेत् न । विपर्ययस्यापि शक्यकल्पनत्वात् ।
सामान्यादिषु बाधकसंभवान्न मुख्योऽनुगतः प्रत्ययः द्रव्यादिषु
तु तदभावान्मुख्य इति चेत् ननु किमिदं बाधकम् । अथ सामान्येऽपि
सत्ताभ्युपगमेऽनवस्था विशेषेषु पुनः सामान्यसद्भावे स्वरूपहानिः
145 समवायेऽपि सत्ताकल्पने तद्वृत्त्यर्थं संबन्धान्तराभाव इति बाधका
नीति चेत् न । सामान्येऽपि सत्ताकल्पने यद्यनवस्था तर्हि कथं न सा
द्रव्यादिषु । तेषामपि स्वरूपसत्तायाः प्रागेव विद्यमानत्वात् । विशेषेषु
पुनः सत्ताभ्युपगमेऽपि न रूपहानिः । स्वरूपस्य प्रत्युतोत्तेजनात् ।
निःसामान्यस्य विशेषस्य कचिदप्यनुपलम्भात् । समवायेऽपि सम
150 वायत्वलक्षणायाः स्वरूपसत्तायाः स्वीकारे यथायथं एकाविष्व
ग्भावात्मकः संबन्धः । अन्यथा तस्य स्वरूपाभावप्रसङ्गः । इति
बाधकाभावात् तेष्वपि द्रव्यवन्मुख्य एव सत्तासंबन्ध इति व्यर्थं

द्रव्यगुणकर्मस्वेव सत्ताकल्पनम् ॥ किं च तैर्वादिभिर्यो द्रव्यादित्रये
मुख्यः सत्तासंबन्धः कक्षीकृतः सोऽपि विचार्यमाणो विशीर्यते ।
155 तथा हि—यदि द्रव्यादिभ्योऽत्यन्तविलक्षणा सत्ता तदा द्रव्या-
दीन्यसद्रूपाण्येव स्युः । सत्तायोगात्सत्त्वमस्त्येवेति चेत् असतां
सत्तायोगेऽपि कुतः सत्त्वम् । सतां तु निष्फलः सत्तायोगः ।
स्वरूपसत्त्वं भावानामस्त्येवेति चेत् तर्हि किं शिखण्डिना सत्तायोगेन ।
सत्तायोगात्प्राग् भावो न सन् नाप्यसन् सत्तायोगाच्च सन्निति चेत्
160 वाङ्मात्रमेतत् । सदसद्विलक्षणस्य प्रकारान्तरस्यासंभवात् । तस्मात्
सतामपि स्यात्क्वचिदेव सत्तेति तेषां वचनं विदुषां परिषदि
कथमिव नोपहासाय जायते ॥ ज्ञानमपि यद्येकान्तेनात्मनः सका-
शाद्भिन्नमिष्यते तदा तेन चैत्रज्ञानेन मैत्रस्येव नैव विषयपरिच्छेदः
स्यादात्मनः । अथ यत्रैवात्मनि समवायसंबन्धेन समवेतं ज्ञानं
165 तत्रैव भावावभासं करोतीति चेन्न । समवायस्यैकत्वान्नित्यत्वा-
द्व्यापकत्वाच्च । सर्वत्र वृत्तेरविशेषात्समवायवदात्मनामपि व्याप-
कत्वादेकज्ञानेन सर्वेषां विषयावबोधप्रसङ्गः । यथा च घटे
रूपादयः समवायसंबन्धेन समवेतास्तद्विनाशे च तदाश्रयस्य
घटस्यापि विनाशः एवं ज्ञानमप्यात्मनि समवेतम् तच्च क्षणिकम्
170 ततस्तद्विनाशे आत्मनोऽपि विनाशापत्तेरनित्यत्वापत्तिः । अथास्तु
समवायेन ज्ञानात्मनोः संबन्धः । किं तु स एव समवायः
केन तयोः संबध्यते । समवायान्तरेण चेत् अनवस्था । स्वेनैव
चेत् किं न ज्ञानात्मनोरपि तथा । अथ यथा प्रदीपस्तथा
स्वात्मानं परं च प्रकाशयति तथा समवायस्येदृगेव स्वभावो
175 यदात्मानं ज्ञानात्मानौ च संबन्धयतीति चेत् ज्ञानात्मनो-
रपि किं न तथास्वभावता येन स्वयमेवैतौ संबध्येते । किं च
प्रदीपदृष्टान्तोऽपि भवत्पक्षे न जागर्तीति । यतः प्रदीपस्तावद्द्रव्यं

प्रकाशश्च तस्य धर्मो धर्मधर्मिणोश्च स्वभावात्यन्तं भेदोऽभ्युपगम्यते
तत्कथं प्रदीपस्य प्रकाशात्मकता। तदभावे च स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वस्वभाव
180 तामपि निर्निमित्तैव। यदि च प्रदीपात्प्रकाशस्यात्यन्तभेदेऽपि
प्रदीपस्य स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वमिष्यते तदा घटादीनामपि तदनुषज्यते।
भेदाविशेषात्। अपि च तौ स्वपरसंबन्धस्वभावौ समवायाद्भिन्नौ
स्यातामभिन्नौ वा। यदि भिन्नौ ततस्तस्यैतौ स्वभावाविति कथं
संबन्धः। संबन्धनिबन्धनस्य समवायान्तरस्यानवस्थाभयादन
185 भ्युपगमात्। अथाभिन्नौ ततः समवायमात्रमेव। न तौ। तदव्यतिरि
क्तत्वात्तत्स्वरूपवदिति। किं च यथा इह समवायिषु समवाय इति
मतिः समवायं विनाप्युपपन्ना तथा इहात्मनि ज्ञानमित्ययमपि
प्रत्ययस्तं विनैव चेदुच्यते तदा को दोषः। अथात्मा कर्ता ज्ञानं करणं
कर्तृकरणयोश्च वर्धकिवासीवद्भेद एव प्रतीतस्तत्कथं ज्ञानात्मनोरभेद
190 इति। तन्न। दृष्टान्तस्य वैषम्यात्। वासी हि बाह्यं करणं ज्ञानं
चाभ्यन्तरं तत्कथमनयोः साधर्म्यम्। न चैवं करणस्य द्वैविध्यम
प्रसिद्धम्। यदाहुर्लाक्षणिकाः।

करणं द्विविधं ज्ञेयं बाह्यमाभ्यन्तरं बुधः।
यथा लुनाति दात्रेण मेरुं गच्छति चेतसा॥

195 यदि हि किंचित्करणमान्तरमेकान्तेन भिन्नमुपदर्श्येत ततः
स्याद् दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः साधर्म्यम्। न च तथाविधमस्ति। न च
बाह्यकरणगतो धर्मः सर्वोऽप्यान्तरे योजयितुं शक्यते। अन्यथा
दीपेन चक्षुषा देवदत्तः पश्यतीत्यत्रापि दीपाच्चक्षुषोऽप्यत्यन्तं
देवदत्तस्य भेदः स्यात्। तथा च सति लोकप्रतीतिविरोध इति।
200 अपि च साध्यविकलोऽपि वासीवर्धकिदृष्टान्तः। तथा हि नायं वर्धकिः
काष्ठमिदमनया वास्या घटयिष्य इत्येवं वासीग्रहणपरिणामेना
परिणतः सन् वासीमगृहीत्वा घटयति किं तु तथा परिणतस्तां गृहीत्वा।

तथा परिणामनशक्तिरपि तस्य काष्ठस्य दहने व्याप्रियते पुरुषापि।
इत्येवं छेदनक्रियासाधकत्वाद्दात्रदेवदत्तयोरभेदोप्युपपद्यते । तत्क
205 थमनयोर्भेद एवेत्युच्यते । एवमात्मापि विवक्षितमर्थमनेन ज्ञानेन
ज्ञास्यामीति ज्ञानग्रहणपरिणामवान् ज्ञानं गृहीत्वार्थं व्यवस्यतीति तस्य
ज्ञानात्मनोरुभयोरपि संविदितसंवेदनकार्यसाधकत्वादभेद एव । एवं
कर्तृकरणयोरभेदे सिद्धे संवित्तिलक्षणं कार्यं किमात्मनि व्यवस्थितं
आहोस्विद्विषय इति वाच्यम् । आत्मनि चेत् सिद्धं नः समीहितम् ।
10 विषये चेत् कथमात्मनोऽनुभवः प्रतीयते । अथ विषयस्थितसंविदि
सद्भावादात्मनोऽनुभवस्तर्हि किं न पुरुषान्तरस्यापि । तद्भेदावि
शेषात् । अथ ज्ञानात्मनोरभेदपक्षे कथं कर्तृकरणभाव इति चेत् ननु
यथा सर्प आत्मानमात्मना वेष्टयतीत्यत्र अभेदे यथा कर्तृकरण
भावस्तथात्रापि । अथ परिकल्पितोऽयं कर्तृकरणभाव इति चेत्
215 वेष्टनावस्थायां प्रागवस्थाविलक्षणगतिनिरोधलक्षणार्थक्रियादर्श
नात् कथं परिकल्पितत्वम् । न हि परिकल्पनाशतैरपि शैलस्तम्भ
आत्मानमात्मना वेष्टयतीति वक्तुं शक्यम् । तस्मादभेदेऽपि
कर्तृकरणभावः सिद्ध एव ॥ किं च चैतन्यमितिशब्दस्य चिन्त्यता
मन्वर्थः । चेतनस्य भावश्चैतन्यम् । चेतनमात्मा त्वयापि
220 कीर्त्यते । तस्य भावः स्वरूपं चैतन्यम् । यच्च यस्य स्वरूपं न
तत्ततो भिन्नं भवितुमर्हति । यथा वृक्षाद्वृक्षस्वरूपम् । अथास्ति
चेतन आत्मा । परं चेतनासमवायसंबन्धात् न स्वतः तथारूप इति
चेत् तदयुक्तम् । यतः प्रतीतिप्रमाणाक्षिपत तर्हि निराबाधमुपयो
गात्मक एवात्मा प्रतिभाति । न हि जातुचित्स्वयमचेतनोऽहं चेत
225 नायोगाच्चेतनः अचेतनो वापि चेतनायाः समवाय इति प्रती
तिरस्ति । ज्ञाताहमिति समानाधिकरणतया प्रतीतेः । भेदे तथा
प्रतीतिरिति चेत् न । कथंचित्तादात्म्याभावे सामानाधिकरण्य

प्रतीतेरदर्शनात् । यष्टिः पुरुष इत्यादिप्रतीतिषु भेदे सत्युपचा
रात् सा न पुनस्तात्त्विकी । उपचारस्य तु बीजं पुरुषस्य यष्टि-
230 गतस्तब्धत्वादिगुणैरभेदः । उपचारस्य मुख्यार्थस्पर्शित्वात् । तथा
चात्मनि ज्ञाताहमिति प्रतीतिः कथंचिच्चेतनात्मतां गमयति ।
तामन्तरेण ज्ञाताहमितिप्रतीतेरनुपपद्यमानत्वात् । घटादिवत् । न हि
घटादिरचेतनात्मको ज्ञाताहमिति प्रत्येति । चैतन्ययोगाभावादसौ
न तथा प्रत्येतीति चेत् न । अचेतनस्यापि चैतन्ययोगाच्चेतनोऽहमि-
235 ति प्रतिपत्तेरनन्तरमेव निरस्तत्वात् । इत्यचेतनत्वं सिद्धमात्मनो
जडस्यार्थपरिच्छेदं पराकरोति । तं पुनरिच्छता चैतन्यस्वरूपतास्य
स्वीकरणीया ॥ ननु ज्ञानवानहमितिप्रत्ययादात्मज्ञानयोर्भेदः अन्य
था धनवानितिप्रत्ययादपि धनधनवतोर्भेदाभावानुषङ्गात् । तदसत् ।
यतो ज्ञानवानहमिति नात्मा भवन्मते प्रत्येति जडत्वैकान्तरूपत्वात् ।
240 घटवत् । सर्वथा जडश्च स्यादात्मा ज्ञानवानहमितिप्रत्ययश्च स्याद
स्य विरोधाभावात् इति मा निर्णैषीः । तस्य तथोत्पत्त्यसंभवात् । ज्ञा
नवानहमिति हि प्रत्ययो नागृहीतज्ञानाख्ये विशेषणे विशेष्ये चा
त्मनि जातूत्पद्यते । स्वमतविरोधात् । नागृहीतविशेषणा विशेष्ये
बुद्धिः इति वचनात् । गृहीतयोस्तयोरुत्पद्यत इति चेत्कुतस्तद्गृहीतिः ।
245 न तावत्स्वतः । स्वसंवेदनानभ्युपगमात् । स्वसंविदित एवात्मनि
ज्ञाने च स्वतः सा युज्यते नान्यथा । संतानान्तरवत् । परतश्चेत्
तदपि ज्ञानान्तरं विशेष्यं नागृहीतज्ञानत्वविशेषणं ग्रहीतुं शक्यम् ।
गृहीते हि यस्मिन् ज्ञानत्वमिति ज्ञानान्तराद्ग्रहणेन भाव्यमित्य
नवस्थानात् क्व नाम प्रत्ययः । तदयं नात्मनो जडरूपता
250 संगच्छते । तदसंगतौ च चैतन्यमौपाधिकमात्मनोऽन्यद् इति वृ
त्तार्थः ॥

तथा यदपि न संविदानन्दमयी च मुक्तिरिति व्यवस्थापनायानुमानमवादि संतानत्वादिति तत्राभिधीयते । ननु किमिदं संतानत्वं स्वतन्त्रमपरापरपदार्थोत्पत्तिमात्रं वा एकाश्रयापरापरोत्पत्तिर्वा । तत्राद्यः पक्षः सव्यभिचारः । अपरापरेषामुत्पादुकानां घटपटकटादीनां संतानत्वेऽप्यत्यन्तमनुच्छिद्यमानत्वात् । अथ द्वितीयपक्षः तर्हि तादृशं संतानत्वं प्रदीपे नास्तीति साधनविकलो दृष्टान्तः। परमाणुपाकजरूपादिभिश्च व्यभिचारी हेतुः।तथाविधसंतानत्वस्य तत्र सद्भावेऽप्यत्यन्तोच्छेदाभावात्। अपि च संतानत्वमपि भविष्यति अत्यन्तानुच्छेदश्च भविष्यति। विपर्ययबाधकप्रमाणाभावात् । इति संदिग्धविपक्षव्यावृत्तिकत्वादप्यनैकान्तिकोऽयम् । किं च स्याद्वादवादिनां नास्ति कश्चिदत्यन्तमुच्छेदो द्रव्यरूपतया स्थास्नूनामेव सतां भावानामुत्पादव्ययमुक्तत्वात् इति विरुद्धश्च। इति नाधिकृतानुमानाद्बुद्ध्यादिगुणोच्छेदरूपा सिद्धिः सिध्यति।नापि न ह वै सशरीरस्य इत्यागमात् । स हि शुभाशुभादृष्टपरिपाकजन्ये सांसारिकप्रियाप्रिये परस्परानुषक्ते अपेक्ष्य व्यवस्थितः । मुक्तिदशायां तु सकलादृष्टक्षयहेतुकमैकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकं च केवलं प्रियमेव तत्कथं प्रतिषेत्स्यते । आगमस्य चायमर्थः सशरीरस्य गतिचतुष्टयान्यतमस्थानवर्तिन आत्मनः प्रियाप्रिययोः परस्परानुषक्तयोः सुखदुःखयोरपहतिरभावो नास्तीति । अवश्यं हि तत्र सुखदुःखाभ्यां भाव्यम् । परस्परानुषक्तत्वं च समासकरणाल्लभ्यते। अशरीरं मुक्तात्मानम् । वाशब्दस्यैवकारार्थत्वादशरीरमेव सन्तं सिद्धिक्षेत्रमध्यासीनं प्रियाप्रिये परस्परानुषक्ते सुखदुःखे न स्पृशतः । इदमत्र हृदयम् । यथा किल संसारिणः सुखदुःखे परस्परानुषक्ते स्यातां न तथा मुक्तात्मनः किं तु केवलं सुखमेव । दुःखमूलस्य शरीरस्यैवाभावात् । सुखं त्वात्मस्वरूपत्वादवस्थितमेव ।

स्वस्वरूपावस्थानं हि मोक्षः । अत एवाशरीरमित्युक्तम् । आगमार्थमाप्तमित्ययमेव समर्थनीयः । यत एतदर्थानुपातिन्येव स्मृतिरपि दृश्यते ।

280　सुखमात्यन्तिकं यत्र बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम् ।
तं वै मोक्षं विजानीयाद्दुष्प्रापमकृतात्मभिः ॥

न चाय सुखशब्दो दुःखाभावमात्रे वर्तते । मुख्यसुखवाच्यतायां बाधकाभावात् । अयं रोगादिमुक्तः सुखी जात इत्यादिवाक्येषु च सुखीतिप्रयोगस्य पौनरुक्त्यप्रसङ्गाच्च ।
285 दुःखाभावमात्रस्य रागादिमुक्त इतीयतैव गतत्वात् । न च मम दुःखीरिवो मोक्षः पुंसामुपादेयतया संमत । को हि नाम शिलाकल्पमपगतसकलसुखसंवेदनमात्मानमुपपादयितुं यतेत । दुःखसंवेदनकत्वात्स्य सुखदुःखयोरेकस्याभावेऽपरस्यावश्यंभावात् । अत एव त्वदुपहासः श्रूयते ।

290　वरं वृन्दावने रम्ये क्रोष्टुत्वमभिवाञ्छितम् ।
न तु वैशेषिकीं मुक्तिं गौतमो गन्तुमिच्छति ॥

सांसारिकसुखावधिकपरिमितानन्दनिष्यन्दात् स्वर्गादप्यधिकं तद्विपरीतानन्दमम्लानज्ञानं च मोक्षमाचक्षते विचक्षणाः । यदि तु जडः पाषाणनिर्विशेष एव तस्यामवस्थायामात्मा भवेत् तद-
295 लमपवर्गेण । संसार एव वरमस्तु । यत्र तावदन्तरान्तरापि दुःखकलुषितमपि कियदपि सुखमनुभूयते । चिन्त्यतां तावत्किमल्पसुखानुभवो भव्य उत सर्वसुखोच्छेद एव । अथास्ति तथाभूते मोक्षे लाभातिरेकः प्रेक्षादक्षाणाम् । त एवं विवेचयन्ति । संसारे तावद् दुःखास्पृष्टं सुखं न संभवति । दुःखं चावश्यं हेयं विवेक-
300 हानं चानयोरेकभाजनपतितविषमधुनोरिव दुःशकमत एव द्वे अपि त्यज्यते । अतश्च संसारान्मोक्षः श्रेयान् । यतोऽत्र दुःखं

सर्वथा न स्यात् । वरमिषतो कादाचित्कसुखमात्रापि त्यक्ता
न तु तस्याः कृते दुःखभारः स्यात् स्मृत इति । तदेतदसत् । सांसा-
रिकसुखस्य मधुदिग्धधाराकरालमण्डलाग्रग्रासवत् दुःखरूपत्वादेव
305 युक्तैव मुमुक्षूणां तज्जिहासा । किंत्वात्यन्तिकसुखविशेषलिप्सया-
मेव । इहापि विषयनिवृत्तिजं सुखमनुभवसिद्धं तथापि मोक्षे विशिष्टं
नास्ति ततो मोक्षो दुःखरूप एवापद्यत इत्यर्थः । ये अपि विष-
मधुनी एकत्र संपृक्ते त्यज्येते ते अपि सुखविशेषलिप्सयैव ।
किंच यथा प्राणिनां संसारावस्थायां सुखमिष्टं दुःखं चानिष्टं तथा
310 मोक्षावस्थायां दुःखनिवृत्तिविशिष्टा सुखनिवृत्तिरप्यनिष्टैव । ततो यदि
त्वदभिमतो मोक्षः स्यात्तदा न प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् । भवति
चेयम् । ततः सिद्धो मोक्षः सुखसंवेदनस्वभावः । प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्ते-
रन्यथानुपपत्तेः । अथ यदि सुखसंवेदनैकस्वभावो मोक्षः स्यात्तदा
तद्रागेण प्रवर्तमानो मुमुक्षुर्न मोक्षमधिगच्छेत् । नहि रागिणां
315 मोक्षोऽस्ति रागस्य बन्धनात्मकत्वात् । नैवम् । सांसारिकसुखमेव रागो
बन्धनात्मको विषयादिप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वात् । मोक्षसुखे तु रागो न बन्धना-
त्मकः । परां कोटिमारूढस्य च स्पृहाभावरूपोऽप्यसौ निवर्तते । मोक्षे
भवे च सर्वत्र निःस्पृहो मुनिसत्तमः इति वचनात् । अन्यथा भवत्-
पक्षेऽपि दुःखनिवृत्त्यात्मकमोक्षाङ्गीकृतौ दुःखविषयकद्वेषकालुष्यं
320 केन निषिध्यते । इति सिद्धं कृत्स्नकर्मक्षयात्परमसुखसंवेदनात्मको
मोक्षो न बुद्ध्यादिविशेषगुणोच्छेदरूप इति ॥ अपि च भोः तप-
स्विन् कथं बुद्ध्युच्छेदोऽस्माकमप्यभिमत एवैषामिति मा विरूपं
मनः कृथाः । यतो हि बुद्धिशब्देन ज्ञानमुच्यते । तच्च मतिश्रुताव-
धिमनःपर्यायकेवलभेदात्पञ्चधा । तत्राद्यं ज्ञानचतुष्टयं क्षायोपश-
325 मिकत्वात् केवलज्ञानाविर्भावकाल एव प्रक्षीणम् । "नट्ठंमि उ छाउ-
मत्थिए नाणे" इत्यागमात् । केवलं तु सर्वद्रव्यपर्यायगतं क्षायिक-

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खेन निष्कलङ्कक्षायिकज्ञानरूपत्वाच्चास्त्येव मोक्षावस्थायां सुखं तु वैषयिकं तत्र नास्ति। तद्धेतोर्वेदनीयकर्मणोऽभावात्। यत्तु निरतिशयमक्षयमनपायमनन्तं च सुखं तदात्मनि विद्यत । दुःखस्य चाधर्ममूलत्वा
330 त्तदुच्छेदात्तदुच्छेदः । नन्वेवं सुखस्यापि धर्ममूलत्वाद्धर्मस्य चोच्छेदात्तदपि न युज्यते । पुण्यपापक्षयो मोक्ष इत्यागमवचनात् । नैवम् । वैषयिकसुखस्यैव धर्ममूलत्वात्तस्य तु तदुच्छेदा न पुनरनन्तस्यापि सुखस्योच्छेदः । इच्छाद्वेषयोः पुनर्मोहभेदत्वात् तस्य च समूलकाषंकषितत्वादभावः । प्रयत्नश्च क्रियाव्यापारगोचरो
335 नास्त्येव । कृतकृत्यत्वात् । वीर्यान्तरायक्षयोपनतस्त्वस्त्येव प्रयत्नो दानादिलब्धिवत् । न च क्वचिदुपयुज्यते कृतार्थत्वात् । धर्माधर्मयोस्तु पुण्यपापापरपर्याययोरुच्छेदोऽस्त्येव । तदभावे मोक्षस्यैवायोगात् । संस्कारश्च मतिज्ञानविशेष एव । तस्य च मोहक्षयानन्तरमेव क्षीणत्वादभाव इति । तदेवं न संविदानन्दमयी च मुक्तिरिति
340 युक्तिरिक्तेयमुक्तिरिति काव्यार्थः ॥ ८ ॥

अथ ते वादिनः कायप्रमाणत्वमात्मनः स्वयंसंवेद्यमानमप्यपमन्य तादृक्कुशास्त्रसम्पर्कविप्लावितदृष्टयस्तस्य विभुत्वं मन्यन्ते । अत स्तानुपालम्भमाह ।

> यत्रैव यो दृष्टगुणः स तत्र
> कुम्भादिवन्निष्प्रतिपक्षमेतत् ।
> तथापि देहाद्बहिरात्मतत्त्व
> मतत्त्ववादोपहताः पठन्ति ॥ ९ ॥

यत्रैव देशे यः पदार्थो दृष्टगुणो दृष्टाः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणतोऽनु-
5 भूता गुणा धर्मा यस्य स तथा स पदार्थस्तत्रैव विवक्षितदेश एवो पपद्यते । क्रियाव्यापारो गम्यः । पूर्वस्यैवकारस्यावधारणार्थस्याभि-

व्यभिचारात्। तत्रैव नान्यत्रेत्यन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदः। अमुमेवार्थं
दृष्टान्तेन द्रढयति। कुम्भादिवदिति। घटादिवत्। यथा कुम्भादे-
र्यत्रैव देशे रूपादयो गुणा उपलभ्यन्ते तत्रैव तस्यास्तित्वं प्रतीयते
नान्यत्र एवमात्मनापि गुणाश्चैतन्यादयो देह एव दृश्यन्ते न
बहिः तस्मात् तत्प्रमाण एवायमिति। यद्यपि पुष्पादीनामवस्थान-
देशादन्यत्रापि गन्धादिगुण उपलभ्यते तथापि तेन न व्यभि-
चारः। तदाश्रया हि गन्धादिपुद्गलास्तेषां च वैस्रसिक्या
प्रायोगिक्या वा गत्या गतिमत्त्वेन तदुपलम्भकघ्राणादिदेशं याव-
दागमनोपपत्तेरिति। अत एवाह। निष्प्रतिपक्षमेतदिति। एतदि-
प्रतिपक्ष बाधकरहितम्। न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नामेति न्यायात्।
ननु मन्त्रादीनां भिन्नदेशस्थानामप्याकर्षणोच्चाटनादिको गुणो
योजनशतादेः परतोऽपि दृश्यते इत्यस्ति बाधकमिति चेत् मैवं
वोचः। स हि न खलु मन्त्रादीनां गुणः किं तु तदधिष्ठातृदेवतानाम्।
तासां चाकर्षणीयोच्चाटनीयादिदेशगमने कौतस्कुतोऽयमुपालम्भः।
न नाम गुणा गुणिनमतिरिच्य वर्तन्त इति॥

अथोत्तरार्धं व्याख्यायते। तथापीत्यादि। तथाप्येवं निःसपत्ने
व्यवस्थितेऽपि तत्त्वे। भवत्सपत्नोपहताः। अनाचार इत्यत्र नञः
कुत्सार्थत्वात्। कुत्सिततत्त्ववादेन तदभिमताप्ताभासपुरुषविशेषप्रणीतेन
तत्त्वाभासप्ररूपणापरतया व्यामोहिताः। देहाद्बहिः शरीरव्यति-
रिक्तेऽपि देशे। आत्मतत्त्वमात्मरूपम्। पठन्ति शास्त्ररूपतया प्रणयन्ति॥
इत्यक्षरार्थः॥

भावार्थस्त्वयम्। आत्मा सर्वगतो न भवति। सर्वत्र तद्-
गुणानुपलब्धेः। यो यः सर्वत्रानुपलभ्यमानगुणः स सर्वगतो
न भवति यथा घटः। तथा चायम्। तस्मात् तथा। व्यतिरेके व्योमा-
दिः॥ न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः। कायव्यतिरिक्तदेशे तद्गुणानां बुद्ध्या

दीनां वादिना प्रतिवादिना चानभ्युपगमात् । तथा च श्री-
धरः । सर्वगतत्वेऽप्यात्मनो देहप्रदेशे ज्ञातृत्वं नान्यत्र शरी-
रस्योपभोगायतनत्वात् अन्यथा तस्य वैयर्थ्यात् इति । अथाद-
35 दृष्टमात्मनो विशेषगुणः । तच्च सर्वोत्पत्तिमतां निमित्तं सर्वव्यापकं
च । कथमन्यथा द्वीपान्तरादिष्वपि प्रतिनियतदेशवर्तिपुरुषोपभो-
ग्यानि कनकरत्नचन्दनाङ्गनादीनि तेनोत्पाद्यन्ते । गुणश्च गुणिनं
विहाय न वर्तते । अतोऽनुमीयते सर्वगत आत्मेति । नैवम् । अ-
दृष्टस्य सर्वगतत्वसाधने प्रमाणाभावात् । अथास्त्येव प्रमाणं वह्ने-
40 रूर्ध्वज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्यग्गमनं चादृष्टकारितमिति चेत् । तयो-
स्स्वस्वभावत्वादेव तत्सिद्धेर्दहनस्य दहनशक्तिवत् । साध्यदृष्टका-
रिता चेत् तर्हि जगत्त्रयवैचित्र्यभूभृतोऽपि तदेव सूत्रधारायतां
किमीश्वरकल्पनया । तथायमसिद्धो हेतुः ॥ न चानैकान्तिकः ।
साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिग्रहणेन व्यभिचाराभावात् ॥ नापि विरुद्धः ।
45 अत्यन्तं विपक्षव्यावृत्तत्वात् । आत्मगुणाश्च बुद्ध्यादयः शरीर
एवोपलभ्यन्ते ततो गुणिनापि तत्रैव भाव्यम् ॥ इति सिद्धः काय
प्रमाण आत्मा ॥ अन्यच्च । त्वया आत्मनां बहुत्वमिष्यते । नानात्मानो
व्यवस्थातः इति वचनात् । ते च व्यापकाः । ततस्तेषां प्रदीपप्रभा
मण्डलानामिव परस्परानुवेधे तदाश्रितशुभाशुभकर्मणामपि पर
50 स्परं संकरः स्यात् । तथा चैकस्य शुभकर्मणा अन्यः सुखी भवे
दितरस्याशुभकर्मणा अन्यो दुःखीत्यसमञ्जसमापद्येत । अन्यच्च
एकस्यैवात्मनः स्वोपात्तशुभकर्मविपाकेन सुखित्वं परोपार्जिता
शुभकर्मविपाकसंबन्धेन च दुःखित्वमिति युगपत्सुखदुःखसंवेदन-
प्रसङ्गः ॥ अथ स्यादात्मभोगायतनमाश्रित्यैव शुभाशुभयोर्भोगः तर्हि
55 स्वोपार्जितमप्यदृष्टं कथं भोगायतनाद्बहिर्निष्क्रम्य वह्नेरुद्गमन

नाग्निं करोतीति चिन्त्यमेतत् ॥ आत्मनां च सर्वगतत्वे एकस्य सृष्टिकर्तृत्वमसङ्गं । सर्वगतत्वेनेतरान्तरानुप्रवेशस्य संभावनीयत्वात् । ईश्वरस्य वा सर्वान्तरानुप्रवेशे तस्याप्यकर्तृत्वापत्तिः । न हि क्षीरनीरयोरन्योन्यसंबन्धे एकतरस्य पानादिक्रिया अन्यतरस्य न
60 भवतीति युक्तं वक्तुम् ॥ किंच आत्मनः सर्वगतत्वे नरनारकादिपर्यायाणां युगपदनुभवानुषङ्गः । अथ भोगायतनाभ्युपगमान्नायं दोष इति चेत् ननु स भोगायतनं सर्वात्मना अवष्टभ्नीयादेकदेशेन वा । सर्वात्मना चेदस्मदभिमतात्माङ्गीकारः । एकदेशेन चेत् सावयवत्वमसङ्गः । परिपूर्णभोगाभावश्च ॥ अथात्मनो व्यापकत्वाभावे
65 दिग्देशान्तरवर्तिपरमाणुभिर्युगपत्संयोगाभावादाद्यकर्माभावः तदभावादन्त्यसंयोगस्य तन्निमित्तशरीरस्य तेन तत्संबन्धस्य चाभावादनुपायसिद्धं सर्वदा सर्वेषां मोक्षः स्यात् । नैवम् । यद्येन संयुक्तं तदेव स तत्प्रत्युपसर्पतीति नियमासंभवात् । अयस्कान्तं प्रत्ययसस्तेनासंयुक्तस्याप्याकर्षणोपलम्भः । अथासंयुक्तस्याप्याकर्षणे
70 तच्छरीरारम्भं प्रत्यभिमुखीभूतानां त्रिभुवनोदरविवरवर्तिपरमाणूनामुपसर्पणप्रसङ्गान्न जाने तच्छरीरं कियत्प्रमाणं स्यादिति चेत् संयुक्तस्याप्याकर्षणे कथं स एव दोषो न भवेत् । आत्मनो व्यापकत्वेन सकलपरमाणूनां तेन संयोगात् । अथ तद्भावाविशेषेऽप्यदृष्टवशाद्विवक्षितशरीरोत्पादनानुगुणा नियता एव परमाणव उपसर्पन्ति ।
75 तदितरत्रापि तुल्यम् ॥ अथास्तु यथाकथंचिच्छरीरोत्पत्तिः तथापि सावयवं शरीरं व्याप्नुवन्नात्मा सावयवः स्यात् । तथा चास्य घटादिवत् कार्यत्वप्रसङ्गः । कार्यत्वे चासौ विजातीयैः सजातीयैर्वा कारणैरारभ्येत । न तावद्विजातीयैः तेषामनारम्भकत्वात् । न हि तन्तवो घटमारभन्ते । न च सजातीयैः । यत आत्मत्वाभिसंब

80 -भावे चैतेषां कारणानां सजातीयत्वम् । पार्थिवादिपरमाणूनां विजाती-
यत्वात् । तथा चात्मभिरात्मा आरभ्येत इत्यायातम् । तच्चायुक्तम् । एकत्र
शरीरेऽनेकात्मनामात्मारम्भकाणामसंभवात् । संभवे वा प्रतिसंधा-
नानुपपत्तिः । नान्येन दृष्टमन्यः प्रतिसंधातुमर्हति । अतिप्रसङ्गात् ।
तदारम्भकत्वे चास्य घटवदवयवक्रियातो विभागात्संयोगविनाशा-
85 द्विनाशः स्यात् । तस्माद्व्यापक एवात्मा युज्यते । कायप्रमाणता-
यामुक्तदोषसद्भावात् । इति चेन्न । सावयवत्वकार्यत्वयोः कथंचिदा-
त्मन्यभ्युपगमात् । तत्र सावयवत्वं तावदसंख्येयप्रदेशात्मकत्वम् ।
तथा च द्रव्यालङ्कारकारौ । आकाशोऽपि सदेशः सकृत्सर्वमूर्ता-
भिसंबन्धार्हत्वात् इति । यद्यप्यवयवप्रदेशयोर्गन्धहस्त्यादिषु
90 भेदोऽस्ति तथापि नात्र सूक्ष्मेक्षिका चिन्त्या । प्रदेशेष्वप्यवयवव्यव-
हारात् । कार्यत्वं तु ब्रूमः ॥ नन्वात्मनः कार्यत्वे घटादिवत्
प्राक्प्रसिद्धसमानजातीयावयवारभ्यत्वप्रसक्तिः । अवयवा ह्यव-
यविनमारभन्ते यथा तन्तवः पटमिति चेन्न वाच्यम् । न खलु
घटादावपि कार्यं प्राक्प्रसिद्धसमानजातीयकपालसंयोगारभ्यत्वं दृष्टम् ।
95 कुम्भकारादिव्यापारान्वितान्मृत्पिण्डादेव प्रथममेव पृथुबुध्नोदराद्या-
कारस्यास्योत्पत्तिप्रतीतेः । द्रव्यस्य हि पूर्वाकारपरित्यागेनोत्तरा-
कारपरिणामः कार्यत्वम् । तच्च बहिरिवान्तरप्यनुभूयत एव । ततश्चा-
त्मापि स्यात्कार्यः । न च घटादौ स्वावयवसंयोगपूर्वककार्यत्वा-
दर्शनात् सर्वत्र तथाभावो युक्तः । काष्ठे लोहलेख्यत्वोपलम्भाद्
100 वज्रेऽपि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात् । प्रमाणबाधनमुभयत्र तुल्यम् । न चात्मनः
कार्यत्वाभ्युपगमेऽप्यनित्यत्वानुषङ्गात्प्रतिसंधानाभावा-
नुपपत्तिः । कथंचिन्नित्यत्वस्य सम्यगस्योपपद्यमानत्वात् । प्रतिसं-
धानं हि यमहमद्राक्षं तमहं स्मरामीत्यादिरूपम् । तच्चैकान्तनित्यत्वे
कथमुपपद्यते । अवस्थाभेदात् । अन्या ह्यनुभवावस्था अन्या च

105 स्मरणाद्यवस्था । अवस्थाभेदे ह्यवस्थावतोऽपि भेदादेकरूपस्य स्थितेः कथंचिदनित्यत्वं युक्त्यायातं केन वार्यताम् ॥ अथात्मनः शरीरपरिमाणत्वे मूर्तत्वानुषङ्गात् शरीरेऽनुप्रवेशो न स्यात् । मूर्ते मूर्तस्यानुप्रवेशविरोधात् । ततो निरात्मकमेवाखिलं शरीरं प्राप्नोतीति चेत् किमिदं मूर्तत्वं नाम । असर्वगतद्रव्यपरिमाणत्वं रूपादिमत्त्वं

110 वा । तत्र नाद्यः पक्षो दोषाय । संमतत्वात् । द्वितीयस्त्वयुक्तः । व्याप्त्यभावात् । नहि यदसर्वगतं तन्नियमेन रूपादिमदित्यविनाभावोऽस्ति । मनसोऽसर्वगतत्वेऽपि भवन्मते तदसंभवात् । आकाशकालदिगात्मनां सर्वगतत्वं परममहत्त्वं सर्वसंयोगिसमानदेशत्वं चेत्युक्तत्वान्मनसो वैधर्म्यादसर्वगतत्वमभिप्रेतं तथापि नात्मनः शरीरे-

115 ऽनुप्रवेशानुपपत्तिर्येन निरात्मकं तत् स्यात् । असर्वगतद्रव्यपरिमाणलक्षणमूर्तत्वस्य मनोवत् प्रवेशाप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । रूपादिमत्त्वलक्षणमूर्तत्वोपेतस्यापि जलादेर्वालुकाद्यनुप्रवेशो न निषिध्यते आत्मनस्तु तद्रहितस्यापि तत्रासौ प्रतिषिध्यत इति महच्चित्रम् ॥ अथात्मनः कायप्रमाणत्वे बालशरीरपरिमाणस्य सतो युवशरीरपरि-

120 माणस्वीकारः कथं स्यात् । किं तत्परिमाणपरित्यागात् तदपरित्यागाद्वा । परित्यागाच्चेत् तदा शरीरवत्तस्यानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्परलोकाद्यभावानुषङ्गः । अथापरित्यागात् तन्न । पूर्वपरिमाणापरित्यागे शरीरवत्तस्योत्तरपरिमाणोत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । तदयुक्तम् । युवशरीरपरिमाणावस्थायामात्मनो बालशरीरपरिमाणपरित्यागे सर्वथा विनाशा-

125 संभवात् । विफणावस्थोत्पादे सर्पवत् । इति कथं परलोकाद्यभावानुषङ्गः । पर्यायतस्तस्यानित्यत्वेऽपि द्रव्यतो नित्यत्वात् ॥ अथात्मनः कायप्रमाणत्वे तत्खण्डने खण्डनप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् कः किमाह । शरीरस्य खण्डने कथंचित्तत्खण्डनस्येष्टत्वात् । शरीरसंबद्धात्मप्रदेशेभ्यो हि कतिपयात्मप्रदेशानां खण्डितशरीरप्रदेशेऽवस्थानादात्मनः

130 खण्डनम् । तथात्र स्थितमेव । अन्यथा शरीरात्पृथग्भूतस्यात्मनः कायापत्तिर्न स्यात् । न च खण्डितावयवानुप्रविष्टस्यात्मप्रदेशस्य पृथगात्मत्वप्रसङ्गः । तत्रैवानुप्रवेशात् । न चैकत्र संतानेऽनेके आत्मानः । अनेकार्थप्रतिभासिज्ञानानामेकप्रमात्राधारतया प्रतिभासाभावप्रसङ्गात् । शरीरान्तरव्यवस्थितानेकज्ञानावसेयार्थसंवित्ति-
135 वत् । कथं खण्डितावयवयोः संघट्टनं पश्चादिति चेत् एकान्तेन छेदानभ्युपगमात् । पद्मनालतन्तुवच्छेदस्यापि स्वीकारात् । तथाभूतादृष्टवशात्तत्संघट्टनमविरुद्धमेवेति तनुपरिमाण एवात्माङ्गीकर्तव्यो न व्यापकः । तथा चात्मा व्यापको न भवति । चेतनत्वात् । यत्तु व्यापकं न तच्चेतनं यथा व्योम । चेतनश्चात्मा । तस्मान्न व्यापकः ।
140 अव्यापकत्वे चास्य तत्रैवोपलभ्यमानगुणत्वेन सिद्धा कायप्रमाणता । यत्पुनरष्टमसमये साम्यकरणे समुद्घातदशायामार्हतानामपि चतुर्दशरज्ज्वात्मकलोकव्यापित्वेनात्मनः सर्वव्यापकत्वं तत्कादाचित्कमिति न तेन व्यभिचारः । स्याद्वादम्य नकषपाषाणगुष्ठितानां च मत्सरविमीलितदृश्या भवपिति काव्यार्थः ॥ ९ ॥

वैशेषिकनैयायिकयोः प्रायः समानतन्त्रत्वादौलूक्यमते क्षिप्ते यौगमतमपि क्षिप्तमवसेयम् । पदार्थेषु च तयोरपि न तुल्या प्रतिपत्तिरिति साम्प्रतमक्षपादप्रतिपादितपदार्थानां सर्वेषां चतुर्थपुरुषार्थं प्रत्यसाधकतमत्वे वाच्येऽपि तदन्तःपातिनां छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां परोपन्यासनिरासमात्रफलतया अत्यन्तमनुपादेयत्वात् तदुपदेष्टुर्वैराग्यमुपहसन्नाह ।

स्वयं विवादग्रहिले वितण्डा
पाण्डित्यकण्डूलमुखे जनेऽस्मिन् ।

मायोपदेशात्परमर्म भिन्दन्
अहो विरक्तो मुनिरन्यदीयः ॥ १० ॥

अन्ये अविज्ञाततत्त्वाः ... असारतयाऽनुपादेयनामानः परे। तेषामयं शास्तृत्वेन संबन्धी अन्यदीयः। मुनिः अक्षपादऋषिः। अहो विरक्तः अहो वैराग्यवान्। अहो इत्युपहाससगर्भमाश्चर्यं सूचयति। अन्यदीय इत्यत्र ईयकारके इति दोऽन्तः। किं कुर्वन्नित्याह परमर्म भिन्दन्। जात्याद्येकवचनप्रयोगात् परमर्माणि व्यथयन्। चतुर्भिरात्मप्रदेशैरधिष्ठिता देहावयवा मर्माणीति पारिभाषिकी संज्ञा। तत उपचारात्साध्यस्वतत्त्वसाधनाव्यभिचारितया प्राणभूतं साधनोपन्यासोऽपि मर्मेव मर्म। कस्माद्भिन्दन्। मायोपदेशात्। माया परवञ्चनम्। तस्या उपदेशश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानलक्षणपदार्थत्रयस्वरूपनिरूपणद्वारेण शिष्येभ्यः प्रतिपादनं तस्मात्। गुणादस्त्रियां न वा इत्यनेन हेतौ तृतीयाप्रसङ्गे पञ्चमी। कस्मिन्विषये मायामयमुपदिष्टवान् इत्याह। अस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षोपलक्ष्यमाणे जने तत्त्वविमर्शबहिर्मुखतया प्राकृतप्राये लोके। कथंभूते। स्वयमात्मना परोपदेशनिरपेक्षमेव। विवादग्रस्ते। विरुद्धः परस्परलक्षीकृतपक्षाधिक्षेपदक्षो वादो वचनोपन्यासो विवादः। तथा च भगवान् हरिभद्रसूरिः।

> लब्धख्यात्यर्थिना तु स्याद् दुःस्थितेनामहात्मना।
> छलजातिप्रधानो यः स विवाद इति स्मृतः ॥

तेन ग्रस्त इव ग्रस्तः कवलीकृत इव विवादग्रस्ते। अयं यथा ग्रहा-पस्मारपरवशः पुरुषो यत्किंचनप्रलापी स्यादेवमयमपि जन इति भावः। तथा वितण्डा प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनं वाक्यम्। वितण्ड्यते आहन्यतेऽनया प्रतिपक्षसाधनमिति व्युत्पत्तेः। अभ्युपेत्य

एवं यो न स्थापयति स वैतण्डिक इत्युच्यते इति न्यायवार्त्ति-
३० कम्। वस्तुतस्तु अपरामृष्टतत्त्वातत्त्वविचारं मौखर्यं वितण्डा।
तत्र यत्पाण्डित्यमविकलं कौशलं तेन कण्डूलमिव कण्डूलं मुखं
वदनं यस्य स तथा तस्मिन्। कण्डूः खर्जूः। कण्डूरस्यास्तीति
कण्डूलः। सिध्मादित्वान्मत्वर्थीयो लप्रत्ययः। यथा किलान्तर्गत-
कृमिकुलजनितां कण्डूतिं निरोद्धुमपारयन् पुरुषो व्याकुलतां
३५ कलयति एवं तन्मुखमपि वितण्डापाण्डित्यजनितासंबद्धप्रलापा-
पन्यासकरणकण्डूलमित्युपचर्यते। एवं च स्वरसत एव स्वस्वा-
भिमततत्त्वसंस्थापनाविमुखो वैतण्डिकलोकः। तत्र च तत्परमाप्त-
पुरुषविशेषपरिकल्पितपरवञ्चनमयवचनोपदेशमवसराय सम-
र्मणि यदा स्वेन एव ज्ञानलवमात्रमदे मन्यमाने कुशाग्रेण इव
४० कृतो घृताहुतिप्रक्षेप इति। अत्र यथाभिनन्दितमिवाक्षिभिरेवाक्तो
पदप्रदानमपि तस्य मुनेः कारुणिकत्वकोटिमारोपितम्। यथा
चाहुः।

दुःशिक्षितकुतर्कांशलेशवाचालिताननाः।
शक्याः किमन्यथा जेतुं वितण्डाटोपमण्डिताः॥
गतानुगतिको लोकः कुमार्गं तत्प्रतारितः।
मा गादिति छलादीनि प्राह कारुणिको मुनिः॥

कारुणिकत्वं च वैराग्यान्न भिद्यते। ततो युक्तमुक्तम् अहो
विरक्त इति स्तुतिकारस्योपहासवचनम्॥ अथ मायोपदेशादि-
तिपदानामर्थो विव्रियते। अक्षपादमते किल षोडश पदार्थाः।
५० प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्प-
वितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेय-
साधिगम इति वचनात्। न चैतेषां व्यस्तानां समस्तानां वा

अधिगमो निःश्रेयसावाप्तिहेतुः। न ह्येकेनैव क्रियाविरहितेन ज्ञानमात्रेण मुक्तिर्युक्तिमती। असमग्रसामग्रीकत्वात्। विपन्नैकचक्ररथेन मनीषितनगरप्राप्तिवत्। न च वाच्यं न खलु वयं क्रियां
5 प्रतिक्षिपामः किंतु तत्त्वज्ञानपूर्विकाया एव तस्या मुक्तिहेतुत्वमिति ज्ञापनाय तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगम इति ब्रूम इति। न ह्यमीषां संहते अपि ज्ञानक्रिये मुक्तिप्राप्तिहेतुभूते। वितथत्वात् सम्यग्ज्ञानक्रियया। न च वितथत्वमसिद्धम्। विचार्यमाणानां षोड-
10 शानामपि तत्त्वाभासत्वात्। तथा हि। तैः प्रमाणस्य तावल्लक्षणमित्थं सूत्रितम् अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणमिति। एतच्च न विचारसहम्। यतोऽर्थोपलब्धौ हेतुत्वं यदि निमित्तत्वमात्रं तत्सर्वकारकसाधारणमिति कर्तृकर्मादेरपि प्रमाणत्वप्रसङ्गः। अथ कर्तृकर्मादिविलक्षणं हेतुशब्देन करणमेव विवक्षितं तर्हि तज्ज्ञानमेव
15 युक्तं न चेन्द्रियसंनिकर्षादि। यस्मिन् हि सत्यर्थं उपलब्धो भवति स तत्करणम्। न चेन्द्रियसंनिकर्षसामग्र्यादौ सत्यपि ज्ञानाभावेऽर्थोपलम्भः। साधकतमं हि करणम्। अव्यवहितफलं तदिष्यते। व्यवहितफलस्यापि करणत्वे दुग्धभोजनादेरपि तथाप्रसङ्गः। तन्न ज्ञानादन्यत्र प्रमाणत्वम्। अन्यत्रोपचारात्। यदपि न्यायभूषणसूत्र-
20 कारेणोक्तं सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणमिति तत्रापि साधनग्रहणात्कर्तृकर्मनिरासेन करणस्यैव प्रमाणत्वं सिध्यति। तथाप्यव्यवहितफलत्वेन साधकतमत्वं ज्ञानस्यैवेति न तत्सम्यग्लक्षणम्। स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् इति तु तात्त्विकं लक्षणम्॥

प्रमेयमपि तैरात्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफल-
25 दुःखापवर्गभेदाद् द्वादशविधमुक्तम्। तच्च न सम्यक्॥ यतः शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषफलदुःखानामात्मन्येवान्तर्भावो युक्तः। संसारिण आत्मनः कथंचित्तदविष्वग्भूतत्वात्। आत्मा च

प्रवृत्तिरेव न भवति। तस्य प्रमातृत्वात् ॥ इन्द्रियबुद्धिमनसां तु कर
णस्यात्मप्रमेयत्वाभावः ॥ दोषास्तु रागद्वेषमोहास्ते च प्रवृत्तेर्न पृथग्भ
80 वितुमर्हन्ति । वाङ्मनःकायव्यापारस्य शुभाशुभफलस्य विचित्र
विधस्य तन्मते प्रवृत्तिशब्दवाच्यत्वात् । रागादिदोषाणां च मनो
व्यापारात्मकत्वात् ॥ दुःखस्य गन्धादीनामिन्द्रियार्थानां च फल
एवान्तर्भावः । मुख्यं पीडनात्मकं दुःखं दुःखात्मकं मुख्यं फलं तत्सा
धनं तु गौणम् इति जयन्तवचनात् ॥ प्रेत्यभावापवर्गयोः पुनरात्मन
85 एव परिणामान्तरापत्तिरूपत्वान्न पार्थक्यमात्मनः सकाशादुचितम् ॥
तदेवं द्वादशविधं प्रमेयमिति वाग्विस्तरमात्रम् । द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं
वस्तु प्रमेयम् इति तु समीचीनं लक्षणम् । सर्वसंग्राहकत्वात् ॥
एवं संशयादीनामपि तत्त्वाभासत्वं प्रेक्षावद्भिरनुप्रेक्षणीयम् । अत्र
तु प्रतीतत्वात् ग्रन्थगौरवभयाच्च न प्रपञ्चितम् । व्यक्षेण तत्र
90 न्यायशास्त्रमवतारणीयं तथावतार्यमाणं ग्रन्थान्तरतामवगाहत
इत्यास्ताम् ॥

तदेवं प्रमाणादिषोडशपदार्थानामविशेषेऽपि तत्त्वाभासत्वे
प्रकटकपटनाटकसूत्रधाराणां त्रयाणामेव छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां
मायोपदेशादितिपदेनोपक्षेपः कृतः ॥ तत्र परस्य वदतोऽर्थविकल्पो
100 पपादनेन वचनविघातश्छलम् । तत्त्रिधा । वाक्छलं सामान्य
च्छलमुपचारच्छलं चेति । तत्र साधारणे शब्दे प्रयुक्ते वक्तुरभिप्रे
तादर्थादर्थान्तरकल्पनया तन्निषेधो वाक्छलम् । यथा नवकम्ब
लोऽयं माणवक इति नूतनविवक्षया कथिते परः संख्यामारोप्य
निषेधति कुतोऽस्य नव कम्बला इति । संभावनयातिप्रसङ्गिनोऽपि
105 सामान्यस्योपन्यासे हेत्वारोपणेन तन्निषेधः सामान्यच्छलम् ।
यथा अहो नु खल्वसौ ब्राह्मणो विद्याचरणसंपन्न इति ब्राह्मण
स्तुतिप्रसङ्गे कश्चिद्वदति संभवति ब्राह्मणे विद्याचरणसंपदिति

तच्छलवादी ब्राह्मणत्वस्य हेतुतामारोप्य निराकुर्वन्नभियुङ्क्ते यदि
ब्राह्मणे विद्याचरणसंपद् भवति व्रात्येपि सा भवेद्व्रात्योपि ब्राह्मण
110 एवेति । औपचारिके प्रयोगे मुख्यप्रतिषेधेन प्रत्यवस्थानमुपचार
च्छलम् । यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीत्युक्ते परः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते कथमचे
तनाः मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति मञ्चस्थाः पुरुषाः क्रोशन्तीति ॥ तथा
सम्यग्हेतौ हेत्वाभासे वा वादिना प्रयुक्ते झटिति तद्दोषतत्त्वा
प्रतिभासे हेतुप्रतिबिम्बनप्रायं किमपि प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिर्दूषणा
115 भास इत्यर्थः । सा च चतुर्विंशतिभेदा । साधर्म्यादिप्रत्यवस्थान
भेदेन । यथा साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्य-
प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्तिसंशयप्रकरणाहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशे
षोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्यकार्यसमाः । तत्र साधर्म्येण
प्रत्यवस्थानं साधर्म्यसमा जातिर्भवति । अनित्यः शब्दः कृतक
120 त्वाद् घटवदिति प्रयोगे कृते साधर्म्यप्रयोगेणैव प्रत्यवस्थानं नित्यः
शब्दो निरवयवत्वादाकाशवत् । न चास्ति विशेषहेतुर्घटसाधर्म्यात्
कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्दो न पुनराकाशसाधर्म्यान्निरवयवत्वा
न्नित्य इति । वैधर्म्येण प्रत्यवस्थाने वैधर्म्यसमा जातिर्भवति ।
अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद् घटवदित्यत्रैव प्रयोगे स एव
125 प्रतिहेतुर्वैधर्म्येण प्रयुज्यते नित्यः शब्दो निरवयवत्वात्
अनित्यं हि सावयवं दृष्टं घटादीति । न चास्ति विशे
षहेतुर्घटसाधर्म्यात् कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्दो न पुनस्त
द्वैधर्म्यान्निरवयवत्वान्नित्य इति । उत्कर्षापकर्षाभ्यां प्रत्यव
स्थानमुत्कर्षापकर्षसमे जाती भवतः । तत्रैव प्रयोगे दृष्टान्तधर्मं
130 कंचित्साध्यधर्मिण्यापादयन्नुत्कर्षसमां जातिं प्रयुङ्क्ते । यदि घट
वत् कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्दो घटवदेव मूर्तोपि भवतु न चेन्मूर्तो
घटवदनित्योपि माभूदिति शब्दे धर्मान्तरोत्कर्षमापादयति ।

अपकर्षस्तु घटः कृतकः सन्नश्रावणो दृष्ट एवं शब्दोऽप्यस्तु नो
चेद् घटवदनित्योऽपि माभूदिति शब्दे श्रावणत्वधर्मापकर्षणमिति ।
135 इत्येवमादयो दिग्मात्रदर्शनार्थं जातय उक्ता । एवं शेषा अपि
विंशतिरसाधर्म्यसमादयः । अत्र तु अनुपयोगित्वान्न लिखि
ताः ॥ तथा विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम् । तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिः
साधनाभासे साधनबुद्धिर्दूषणाभासे च दूषणबुद्धिरिति । अप्रति
पत्तिः साधनस्यादूषणं दूषणस्य चानुद्धरणम् । तच्च निग्रहस्थानं
140 द्वाविंशतिविधम् । तद्यथा । प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञा
विरोधः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः हेत्वन्तरम् अर्थान्तरम् निरर्थकम् अविज्ञा
तार्थम् अपार्थकम् अप्राप्तकालम् न्यूनम् अधिकम् पुनरुक्तम् अननु
भाषणम् अज्ञानम् अप्रतिभा विक्षेपः मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं
निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः अपसिद्धान्तः हेत्वाभासाश्च । तत्र हेत्वनैका
145 न्तिकीकृते प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्मं स्वदृष्टान्तेऽभ्युपगच्छतः प्रतिज्ञाहानि
र्नाम निग्रहस्थानम् । यथा अनित्यः शब्द ऐन्द्रियकत्वाद् घटवदिति
प्रतिज्ञासाधनाय वादी वदन् परेण सामान्यमैन्द्रियकमपि नित्यं
दृष्टमिति हेतावनैकान्तिकीकृते यद्येवं ब्रूयात् सामान्यवद् घटोऽपि
नित्यो भवत्विति स एवं ब्रुवाणः शब्दानित्यत्वप्रतिज्ञां जह्यात् ।
150 प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे परेण कृते तत्रैव धर्मिणि धर्मान्तरं साधनी
यमभिदधतः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भवति । अनित्यः
शब्द ऐन्द्रियकत्वादित्युक्ते तथैव सामान्येन व्यभिचारे चोदिते
यदि ब्रूयात् युक्तं सामान्यमैन्द्रियकं नित्यं तद्धि सर्वगतम् असर्व
गतस्तु शब्दः इति तदिदं शब्द अनित्यत्वलक्षणपूर्वप्रतिज्ञातः प्रति
155 ज्ञान्तरमसर्वगतः शब्द इति निग्रहस्थानम् । अनया दिशा शेषा
ण्यपि विज्ञेयानि । ग्र तु न लिखितानि । पूर्वहत्वादेव ॥ इत्येवं
मायाश्रयेणात्र छलादिमयं सूचितम् । तत्रैव परवञ्चनात्मकान्यपि

छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानि तत्त्वरूपतयोपदिशतोऽक्षपादर्षेर्वैराग्यव्यावर्णनं तमसः प्रकाशात्मकत्वप्रख्यापनमिव कथमिव नोपहसनीयमिति काव्यार्थः ॥ १० ॥

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अधुना मीमांसकमतमभिमतं वेदविहितहिंसाया धर्महेतुत्वमुपपत्तिपुरस्सरं निरस्यन्नाह ।

> न धर्महेतुर्विहितापि हिंसा
> नोत्सृष्टमन्यार्थमपोद्यते च ।
> स्वपुत्रघातान्नृपतित्वलिप्सा
> सब्रह्मचारि स्फुरितं परेषाम् ॥ ११ ॥

इह खल्वर्चिमार्गप्रतिपक्षधूममार्गाश्रिता जैमिनीया इत्थमाचक्षते । या हिंसा गार्ध्याद् व्यसनितया वा क्रियते सैवाधर्मानुबन्धहेतुः प्रमादसंपादितत्वात् शौनिकलुब्धकादीनामिव । वेदविहिता तु हिंसा प्रत्युत धर्महेतुः देवतातिथिपितॄणां प्रीतिसंपादकत्वात् तथाविधपूजोपचारवत् । न च तत्प्रीतिसंपादकत्वमसिद्धम् । कारीरीप्रभृतियज्ञानां स्वसाध्ये वृष्ट्यादिफले यः खल्वव्यभिचारः स तत्प्रीणितदेवताविशेषानुग्रहहेतुकः । एवं 10 त्रिपुरार्णववर्णितच्छगलजाङ्गलहोमात्परराष्ट्रवशीकृतिरपि तदनुकूलितदेवताप्रसादसंपाद्या । अतिथिप्रीतिस्तु मधुपर्कसंस्कारादिसमास्वादजा प्रत्यक्षोपलक्ष्यैव । पितॄणामपि तथोपयाचितश्राद्धादिविधानेन प्रीणितानां स्वसंतानवृद्धिविधानं साक्षादेव वीक्ष्यते । आगमश्चात्र प्रमाणम् । स च देवप्रीत्यर्थमश्वमेधगोमेधनरमेधा15 दिविधानाभिधायकः प्रतीत एव । अतिथिविषयस्तु "महोक्षं वा महाजं वा श्रोत्रियाय प्रकल्पयेत्" इत्यादिः । पितृप्रीत्यर्थस्तु—

द्वौ मासौ मत्स्यमांसेन त्रीन्मासान् हारिणेन तु ।
औरभ्रेणाथ चतुरः शाकुनेनेह पञ्च तु ॥

इत्यादि। एवं पराभिप्रायं हृदि संप्रधार्याचार्यः प्रतिविधत्ते न
20 धर्मेत्यादि ॥ विहितापि वेदप्रतिपादितापि । आस्तां तावदविहिता
हिंसा प्राणिप्राणव्यपरोपणरूपा । न धर्महेतुः न धर्मानुबन्धनिबन्ध
नम् । यतोऽत्र प्रकट एव स्ववचनविरोधः । तथाहि । हिंसा चेद्धर्महेतुः
कथम् धर्महेतुश्चेद्धिंसा कथम् । श्रूयतां धर्मसर्वस्वं श्रुत्वा चैवा
वधार्यतामित्यादि । न हि भवति माता च वन्ध्या चेति । हिंसा
25 कारणं धर्मस्तु तत्कार्यमिति पराभिप्रायः । न चायं निरपायः ।
यतो यद्यस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकावनुविधत्ते तत्तस्य कार्यम् । यथा
मृत्पिण्डादेर्घटादिः । न च धर्मो हिंसात एव भवतीति प्रातीति
कम् । तपोविधानदानध्यानादीनां तदकारणत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अथ
न ब्रूमः सामान्येन हिंसा धर्महेतुः किं तु विशिष्टैव ।
30 विशिष्टा च सैव या वेदविहितेति चेत् ननु तस्या धर्महेतुत्वं किं
वध्यजीवानां मरणाभावेन मरणेऽपि तेषामार्तध्यानाभावात्सुगति
लाभेन वा । नाद्यः पक्षः । प्राणत्यागस्य तेषां साक्षादुपलभ्यमा
नत्वात् । न द्वितीयः । परचेतोवृत्तीनां दुर्लक्षतयार्तध्यानाभावस्य
वाङ्मात्रत्वात् । प्रत्युत हा कष्टम् अस्ति न कोऽपि कारुणिकः
35 शरणमिति स्वभाषया विरसमारसत्सु तेषु वदनदैन्यनयनतरलता
दीनां लिङ्गानां दर्शनात् । दुर्ध्यानस्य स्पष्टमेव निष्टङ्क्यमानत्वात् ॥
अथेत्थमाचक्षीथाः यथा अयःपिण्डो गुरुतया मज्जनात्मकोऽपि
तनुतरपत्रादिकरणेन संस्कृतः सन् जलोपरि प्लवते यथा च
मारणात्मकमपि विषं मन्त्रादिसंस्कारविशिष्टं सद् गुणाय जायते
40 यथा वा दहनस्वभावोऽप्यग्निः सत्यादिप्रभावप्रतिहतशक्तिः
सन् न हि दहति एवं मन्त्रादिविधिसंस्कारात् खलु

वेदविहिता हिंसा दोषपोषाय । न च तस्याः कुत्सि
तत्वं शङ्कनीयं तत्कारिणां याज्ञिकानां लोके पूज्यत्वदर्शनादिति ।
तदेतन्न दक्षाणां क्षमते क्षोदम् । वैधर्म्येण दृष्टान्तानामसाधकतमत्वा
45 त् । अयःपिण्डादयो हि पत्रादिभावान्तरापन्नाः सन्तः सलिलतरणा
दिक्रियासमर्थाः । न च वैदिकमन्त्रसंस्कारविधिनापि विशस्यमानानां
पशूनां काचिद्वेदनानुत्पादादिरूपा भावान्तरापत्तिः प्रतीयते । अथ
तेषां वधानन्तरं देवत्वापत्तिर्भावान्तरमस्त्येवेति चेत्किमत्र प्रमाणम् ।
न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम् । तस्य संबद्धवर्तमानार्थग्राहकत्वात् । संबद्धं
50 वर्तमानं च गृह्यते चक्षुरादिना इति वचनात् । नाप्यनुमानम् ।
तत्प्रतिबद्धलिङ्गानुपलब्धेः । नाप्यागमः । तस्याद्यापि विवादास्पद
त्वात् । अर्थापत्त्युपमानयोस्त्वनुमानान्तर्गततया तद्दूषणेनैव गता
र्थत्वम् । अथ भवतामपि जिनायतनादिविधाने परिणामविशेषा
त्पृथिव्यादिजन्तुजातघातनमपि यथा पुण्याय कल्पत इति कल्पना
55 तथास्माकमपि किं नेष्यते । वेदोक्तविधिविधानरूपस्य परि
णामविशेषस्य निर्विकल्पं तत्रापि भावात् । नैवम् । परिणामविशे
षोऽपि स एव शुभफलो यत्रानन्योपायत्वेन यतनयापकृष्ट
चैतन्यानां पृथिव्यादिजीवानां वधेऽपि स्वल्पपुण्यव्ययेनापरिमित
सुकृतसंप्राप्तिः न पुनरितरः । भवत्पक्षे तु सत्स्वपि तत्तच्छ्रुतिस्मृति
60 पुराणेतिहासप्रतिपादितेषु यमनियमादिषु स्वर्गावाप्त्युपायेषु तांस्ता
[illegible] मतिमतीकं कदनकदर्थनया कान्दिशीकान्कृपण-
पञ्चेन्द्रियान् शौनिकाधिकं मारयतां [illegible]येन दुर्गति
पथानुकूलयतां दुर्लभः शुभपरिणामविशेषः । एवं च यं कंचन
पदार्थं किंचित्साधर्म्यद्वारेणैव दृष्टान्तीकुर्वतां भवतामतिप्रसङ्गः
65 संगच्छते । न च जिनायतनविधापनादौ पृथिव्यादिजीववधेऽपि न
गुणः । तथाहि तद्दर्शनाद्गुणानुरागितया भव्यानां बोधिलाभः पूजा

विषयविमोचनादिना च मनःप्रसादः ततः समाधिः ततश्च क्रमेण निःश्रेयससमाप्तिरिति । तथा च भगवान्पञ्चलिङ्गीकारः ।

> पुढवाइयाण जइ वि हु होइ विणासो जिणालयाहिंतो ।
> तव्विसया वि सुदिट्ठिस्स णियमओ अत्थि अणुकंपा ॥ १ ॥
> एयाहिंतो बुद्धा विरया रक्खंति जेण पुढवाई ।
> इत्तो निव्वाणगया अबाहिया आभवमिमाणं ॥२॥
> रोगिसिरावेहो इव सुविज्जकिरिया व सुप्पउत्ताओ ।
> परिणामसुंदरच्चिय चिट्ठा से बाहजोगे वि ॥ ३ ॥

इति । वैदिकवधविधाने तु न कश्चित्पुण्योपार्जनानुगुणं गुणं पश्यामः । अथ विप्रेभ्यः पुरोडाशादिप्रदानेन पुण्यानुबन्धी गुणोऽस्त्येवेति चेत् न । पवित्रसुवर्णादिप्रदानमात्रेणैव पुण्योपार्जनसंभवात् । कृपणपशुगणप्राणव्यपरोपणसमुत्थमांसदानं केवलं निर्घृणत्वमेव व्यनक्ति । अथ न प्रदानमात्रं पशुवधक्रियायाः फलं किं तु भूत्यादिकम् । यदाह श्रुतिः श्वेतं वायव्यमजमालभेत भूतिकामः इत्यादि । एतदपि व्यभिचारपिशाचग्रस्तत्वादप्रमाणमेव । भूतेरुपायान्तरैरपि साध्यत्वात् । अथ तत्र यज्ञे हन्यमानानां छागादीनां प्रेत्य स्वर्गप्राप्तिरूपोऽस्त्येवोपकार इति चेत् वाङ्मात्रमेतत् । प्रमाणाभावात् । न हि ते निहताः पशवः स्वर्गविलासप्रमुदितमनसः कस्मैचिदागत्य तथाभूतमात्मानं कथयन्ति । अथास्त्यागमाख्यं प्रमाणम् । यथा

> औषध्यः पशवो वृक्षास्तिर्यञ्चः पक्षिणस्तथा ।
> यज्ञार्थं निधनं प्राप्ताः प्राप्नुवन्त्युच्छ्रितं पुनः ॥

इत्यादि । नैवम् । तस्य पौरुषेयापौरुषेयविकल्पाभ्यां निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात् । न च भावत्केन विधिना पशुविशसनविधायिना स्वर्गावाप्तिरुपकार इति वाच्यम् । यदि हि हिंसयापि स्वर्गप्राप्तिः

स्वार्थं हि पार्थं पिहिता नरकपुरप्रतोल्यः । शौनिकादीनामपि
स्वर्गप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गात् । तथा च पठन्ति पारमर्षाः ।

> यूपं छित्त्वा पशून् हत्वा कृत्वा रुधिरकर्दमम् ।
> 95 यद्येवं गम्यते स्वर्गे नरके केन गम्यते ॥

किंच अपरिचितास्पष्टचैतन्यानुपकारिपशुविशसनेनापि त्रिदिव
पदवीप्राप्तिस्तदा परिचितस्पष्टचैतन्यपरमोपकारिमातापित्रादिव्या
पादनेन यज्ञकारिणामधिकतरपदप्राप्तिः प्रसज्यते । अथ अचिन्त्यो
हि मणिमन्त्रौषधीनां प्रभावः इति वचनाद्वैदिकमन्त्राणामचिन्त्य
100 प्रभावत्वात् तत्संस्कृतपशुवधसंभवस्त्वेव स्वर्गप्राप्तिरिति चेद् न ।
इह लोके विवाहगर्भाधानजातकर्मादिषु तन्मन्त्राणां व्यभिचारो
पलम्भाददृष्टे स्वर्गादावपि तद्व्यभिचारोऽनुमीयते । दृश्यन्ते हि
वेदोक्तमन्त्रसंस्कारविशिष्टेभ्योऽपि विवाहादिभ्योऽनन्तरं वैधव्या
ल्पायुष्कतादारिद्र्याद्युपद्रवविधुराः पराशताः । अपरे च मन्त्रसंस्कारं
105 विना कृतेभ्योऽपि तेभ्योऽनन्तरं तद्विपरीताः । अथ तत्र क्रियावैगुण्यं
विसंवादहेतुरिति चेत् न । संशयानिवृत्तेः । किं तत्र क्रियावैगु
ण्यात्फलविसंवादः किं वा मन्त्राणामसामर्थ्यादिति न निश्चयः ।
तेषां फलेनाविनाभावासिद्धेः । अथ यथा युष्मन्मते आरोग्यबोहि
लाभं समाहिवरमुत्तमं दिंतु इत्यादीनां वाक्यानां लोकान्तर
110 एव फलमिष्यते एवमस्मदभिमतवेदवाक्यानामपि नेह जन्मनि
फलमिति किं न प्रतिपद्यते । तत्र विवाहादौ नोपलम्भावकाश
इति चेत् अहो वचनवैचित्री । यथा वर्तमानजन्मनि विवाहादिषु
प्रयुक्तमन्त्रसंस्कारैरागामिनि जन्मनि तत्फलमर्थं द्वितीयादिजन्मा
न्तरेष्वपि विवाहादीनामेव प्रवृत्तिपरम्परा पुण्यहेतुत्वाङ्गीकारेऽनन्त
115 भवानुसन्धानं प्रसज्यते । एवं च न कदाचन संसारस्य परिसमाप्तिः ।
तथा च न कस्यचिदपवर्गप्राप्तिः इति प्राप्तं भवदभिमतवेदस्यापौरुषेय

9 [स्वगार]

सितसंसारवल्लरीमूलकन्दत्वम्। आरोग्यादिप्रार्थना तु असत्यामृषा-
भाषापरिणामविशुद्धिकारणत्वान्न दोषाय। तत्र हि भावारोग्या-
दिकमेव विवक्षितम्। तच्च चातुर्गतिकसंसारलक्षणभावरोगपरिक्षय-
120 रूपत्वादुत्तमफलम्। तद्विषया च प्रार्थना कथमिव विवेकिना-
मनादरणीया। न च तत्रान्यपरिणामविशुद्धेस्तत्फलं न प्राप्यते।
सर्ववादिनां भावशुद्धेरपवर्गफलसंपादनेऽविप्रतिपत्तिरिति। न च
वेदनिवेदिता हिंसा न कुत्सिता। सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानसंपन्नैरार्ष-
मार्गमपन्नैर्वेदान्तवादिभिश्च गर्हितत्वात्। तथा च तत्त्वदर्शिनः
125 पठन्ति।

देवोपहारव्याजेन यज्ञव्याजेन येऽथवा।
घ्नन्ति जन्तून् गतघृणा घोरां ते यान्ति दुर्गतिम्॥

वेदान्तिका अप्याहुः।

अन्धे तमसि मज्जामः पशुभिर्ये यजामहे।
130 हिंसा नाम भवेद्धर्मो न भूतो न भविष्यति॥

तथा अग्निर्मामेतस्माद्धिंसाकृतादेनसो मुञ्चतु। छान्दसत्वान्मो-
चयत्वित्यर्थः। इति। व्यासेनाप्युक्तम्।

ज्ञानपालिपरिक्षिप्ते ब्रह्मचर्यदयाम्भसि।
स्नात्वातिविमले तीर्थे पापपङ्कापहारिणि॥ १॥
135 ध्यानाग्नौ जीवकुण्डस्थे दममारुतदीपिते।
असत्कर्मसमित्क्षेपैरग्निहोत्रं कुरूत्तमम्॥२॥
कषायपशुभिर्दुष्टैर्धर्मकामार्थनाशकैः।
शममन्त्रहुतैर्यज्ञं विधेहि विहितं बुधैः॥३॥
प्राणिघातात्तु यो धर्ममीहते मूढमानसः।
140 स वाञ्छति सुधावृष्टिं कृष्णाहिमुखकोटरात्॥४॥

इत्यादि ॥ यच्च याज्ञिकानां लोकपूज्यत्वोपलम्भादित्युक्तं तद-
प्यसारम् । अबुधा एव हि पूजयन्ति तान् न तु विवेकबुद्धयः ।
अबुधपूज्यता तु न प्रमाणम् । तस्याः सारमेयादिष्वप्युपलम्भात् ॥
यदप्यभिहितं देवतातिथिपितृप्रीतिसंपादकत्वाद्वेदविहिता हिंसा
145 न दोषायेति तदपि वितथम् । यतो देवानां संकल्पमात्रोपनता-
भिमताहारपुद्गलरसास्वादसुहितानां वैक्रियशरीरत्वात् युष्मदा-
वर्जितजुगुप्सितपशुमांसाद्याहुतिग्रहीताविच्छैव दुःसंभवा । औदा-
रिकशरीरिणामेव तदुपादानयोग्यत्वात् । प्रक्षेपाहारस्वीकारे च
देवानां मन्त्रमयदेहत्वाभ्युपगमबाधः । न च तेषां मन्त्रमयदेहत्वं
150 भवत्पक्षे न सिद्धम् । चतुर्थ्यन्तं पदमेव देवता इति जैमिनिवचन-
प्रामाण्यात् । तथा च मृगेन्द्रः ।

शब्देतरत्वे युगपद्भिन्नदेशेषु यष्टृषु ।
न सा प्रयाति सांनिध्यं मूर्तत्वादस्मदादिवत् ॥

इति । सेति देवता । हूयमानस्य च वस्तुनो भस्मीभावमात्रोपल-
155 म्भात्तदुपयोगजनिता देवानां प्रीतिः प्रलापमात्रम् । अपि च
योऽयं त्रेताग्निः स त्रयस्त्रिंशत्कोटिदेवतानां मुखम् । अग्निमुखा
वै देवा इति श्रुतेः । ततश्चोत्तममध्यमाधमदेवानामेकेनैव मुखेन
भुञ्जानानामन्योन्योच्छिष्टभुक्तिप्रसङ्गः । तथा च ते तुरुष्केभ्योऽप्य-
तिरिच्यन्ते । तेऽपि तावदेकत्रामत्रे भुञ्जते न पुनरेकेनैव
160 वदनेन । किं च । एकस्मिन् वपुषि वदनबाहुल्यं क्वचन श्रूयते
यत्पुनरनेकशरीरेष्वेकं मुखमिति महदाश्चर्यम् । सर्वेषां च देवा-
नामेकस्मिन्नेव मुखेऽङ्गीकृते यदा केनचिदेको देवः पूजादिना-
राद्धोऽन्यश्च निन्दादिना विराद्धस्ततश्चैकेनैव मुखेन युगपदनुग्रह-
निग्रहवाक्योच्चारणसंकरः प्रसज्यते । अन्यच्च । मुखं देहस्य
165 नवमो भागस्तदपि येषां दाहात्मकं तेषामेकैकशः सकलदेहदाहा

स्वकर्म निधुवनभस्मीकरणपर्यवसितमत्र संभाव्यत इत्यलमति-
चर्चया ॥ यच्च कारीरीयज्ञात् वृष्ट्यादिफलव्यभिचारस्तत्प्री-
णितदेवतानुग्रहहेतुक उक्तः साप्यनैकान्तिकः । क्वचिद् व्यभि-
चारस्यापि दर्शनात् । यत्रापि न व्यभिचारस्तत्रापि न सदा
170 हिताद्युचितप्राशनजन्मा तदनुग्रहः । किं तु स स्वयाविनिपातिचय-
ज्ञानी स्वात्मनिवर्तितं पूजाप्रकारं यच्च व्यवस्थानावस्थितः सम्-
मानीत तदा तत्कर्तारं प्रति प्रसभप्रवृत्तादभिमतकार्यार्पणेच्छाव-
शात्तत्साधयति । मन्त्रप्रयोगादिना पुनरजानाना जानानापि वा
पूजाव्युत्क्रमोपसंहृतः स न साधयति । द्रव्यक्षेत्रकालमासादि-
175 सहकारिसाकल्यापेक्षस्य कार्योत्पादस्योपलम्भात् । स च पूजा-
प्रकारः पशुविशसनव्यतिरिक्तैः प्रकारान्तरैरपि शुद्धसात्त्विकतया
पापैकफलया मौनिकल्पया । यच्च छगलमांसमहामांसपरशु-
बलीकृतिसिद्धया देव्याः परितोषानुमानं तत्र कः क्रमः । कापालि-
कानामुद्धतभावानां वर्धनं मत्पुरीकारात् । कथं तथापि तदस्तु
180 दर्शनज्ञानाग्निव परितापा न पुनस्तद्वत्यया । निम्बपत्रकटुक-
तैलधूमादीनां हृद्यमाद्यद्रव्यादीनामपि तद्योग्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।
परमार्थतस्तु तपस्सहकारिसमवधानसचिवागमज्ञानां यत्किंच
तत्फलं भवति मनसैव चिन्तामणयोऽपि तथादर्शनात् । भक्ति-
मतां तु प्रीतिः संस्कारसेवमपकापादिनापि साध्या । तदर्थं
185 महोत्सवमहामांसादिकल्पनं निर्विवेकतामेव ख्यापयति । पितॄणां
पुनः प्रीतिरैकान्तिकी श्राद्धादिविधानेनापि भूयसां सवानपुष्ट-
रुपलभ्येः । तदविधानेऽपि च केषांचिदधमगृहाणामिव
धुवरां तद्दर्शनात् । ततश्च श्राद्धादिविधाने शुभजननियतारम्भ-
मात्रफलमेव । ये हि लोकान्तरं प्राप्तास्ते तामस्वकुलक्रमानुसारेण
190 सुरनारकादिगतिषु सुखमसुखं वा भुञ्जाना यथासत ते कथमिव

तनयादिभिरावर्जितं पिण्डमुपभोक्तुं स्पृहयालवोऽपि स्युः । तथा
च युष्मद्यूथिनः पठन्ति ।

मृतानामपि जन्तूनां श्राद्धं चेत्तृप्तिकारणम् ।
तन्निर्वाणप्रदीपस्य स्नेहः संवर्धयेच्छिखाम् ॥

195 इति कथं श्राद्धविधानार्जितं पुण्यं तेषां समीपमुपैतु । तदन्य
कृतत्वात् तस्य जडत्वात् निश्चरणत्वाच्च । अथ तेषामुद्देशेन श्राद्धा
दिविधानेऽपि पुण्यं दातुरेव तनयादेः स्यादिति चेत् । तेन तज्जन्य
पुण्यस्य स्वाध्यवसायादुपार्जितत्वात् । एवं च तत्पुण्यं तेषामेव
स्यादपि इति विवाद एव विलीनं भिक्षुकज्ञातेन । किं तु पापानु
200 बन्धिपुण्यत्वात् वस्तुतः पापमेव । अथ विमानमुक्तं तस्य उपतिष्ठत
इति चेत् क एतत्प्रत्येतु । विमानानामेव मेदुरादरसादर्शनात् । तद्वदपि
च तेषां संक्रमः श्रद्धातुमपि न शक्यते । आगमनावसरे तत्संक्रम
लिङ्गस्य कस्याप्यनवलोकनात् । विमानानामेव च मृतः साक्षात्कर
णात् । यदि परं त एव स्थूलकर्मैराकुल्यतरमतिगाढदर्पोद्धतपन्थ
205 मेतमाया इति मुग्धैन श्राद्धादिविधानम् । यदपि गयाश्राद्धादियाचन
मुपलभ्यते तदपि तथाविधविप्रलम्भकविप्रलब्धानिष्पन्नतादिकृतमेव
निश्चयम् ॥ यदप्युदितम् आगम एव प्रमाणमिति तदप्यप्रमाणम् ।
स हि पौरुषेयो वा स्यादपौरुषेयो वा । पौरुषेयश्चेत् सर्वज्ञकृत इतर
कृतो वा । आद्यपक्षे युष्मन्मतव्याहतिः । तथा च भवत्सिद्धान्तः ।

210 अतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां साक्षाद्द्रष्टा न विद्यते ।
नित्येभ्यो वेदवाक्येभ्यो यथार्थत्वविनिश्चयः ॥

द्वितीयपक्षे तु तत्र दोषवत्कर्तृकत्वेनानाश्वासप्रसङ्गः । अपौरुषेय
श्चेत् । संभवस्यैव स्वरूपनिराकरणात् खरविषाणवत् । तथा
हि उक्तिर्वचनमुच्यते इति च पुरुषक्रियानुगतं रूपमस्य एतत्क्रिया
215 भावे कथं भवितुमर्हति । न चैतत्समर्थं कचिदप्यनदुपलभ्यते ।

उपलभ्यमानस्य शब्दप्रयत्नव्यापारसमयात् । तस्मादध्ययने तत्पौरुषेयमेव वर्णात्मकत्वात् कुमारसंभवादिवचनवत् । वचनात्मकश्च वेदः । तथा चाहुः ।

ताल्वादिजन्मा ननु वर्णवर्गो
220 वर्णात्मको वेद इति स्फुटं च ।
पुंसश्च ताल्वादि ततः कथं स्या-
दपौरुषेयोऽयमिति प्रतीतिः ॥

इति सुतरामपौरुषेयत्वमुररीकृत्यापि तावद्भवद्भिरपि वर्णस्यास्थानं पौरुषेयमेवाङ्गीक्रियते । अन्यथाभिहितं कुर्यात्स्वर्गकाम इत्यत्र
225 स्वमांसं भक्षयेदिति किं नाभेः । नियामकाभावात् । तथा चैवं सूत्रमपि पौरुषेयमभ्युपगतम् । अस्तु वा अपौरुषेयः तथापि तस्य न प्रामाण्यम् । आप्तपुरुषाधीना हि वाचां प्रमाणतेति । एवं च तस्याप्रामाण्ये तदुक्तसकलानुपपत्तिप्रतिपादितम् हिंसात्मका यागश्राद्धादिविधयः प्रामाण्यविधुरा एवेति ॥ अथ यागे
230 न हिंस्यात् सर्वभूतानि इत्यादिना हिंसानिषेधः स औत्सर्गिको मार्गः। सामान्येन विधिरित्यर्थः। तदपवादेनोत्सर्गस्य बाधितत्वाच्च श्रौता हिंसाविधिर्दोषाय। उत्सर्गापवादयोरपवादो विधिर्बलीयानिति न्यायात् । भवतामपि हि न सर्वकालमेव हिंसानिषेधः। तपस्कारकमात्र पृथिव्यादिप्रतिवचनानामनुष्ठानात्। ग्लाना
235 यत्संस्तर आचाराकर्मादिग्रहणवर्णनात् । अपवादपदं च याज्ञिकी हिंसा दृश्यतामितीतः पुराणमन्वन्तरादिति परमार्हत स्तुतिकार आह । नास्पृश्यमित्यादि । अन्यार्थमिति प्रवर्ति यत्र रमणक-प्रतिन्यायमनोभयथापि संबन्धनीयम् । अन्यार्थमस्पृश्यम् अन्यस्मै कार्याय प्रयुक्तम् । उत्सर्गवाक्यमन्यार्थप्रयुक्तेन वाक्येन नापोद्यते
240 नाशयतामर्थगतिस्स्यात् । यमुद्दिश्यभासितस्य वाक्य उत्सर्गः प्रवर्तते

तमेवाश्रित्यापवादोऽपि प्रवर्तते । तयोर्निम्नोन्नतादिव्यवहारवत्पर
स्परसापेक्षत्वेनैकार्थसाधनविषयत्वात् । यथा जैनानां संयमपरि
पालनार्थं नवकोटिविशुद्धाहारग्रहणमुत्सर्गः तथाविधद्रव्यक्षेत्रकाल-
भावापत्सु च निपतितस्य गत्यन्तराभावे पञ्चकादियतनयाऽने
245 षणीयादिग्रहणमपवादः सोऽपि च संयमपरिपालनार्थमेव । न च
मरणैकशरणस्य गत्यन्तराभावोऽसिद्ध इति वाच्यम् ।

सव्वत्थसंजमं संजमाओ अप्पाणमेव रक्खिज्जा ।

मुच्चइ अइवायाओ पुणो विसोही नयाऽविरई ॥

इत्यागमात् । तथा आयुर्वेदेऽपि यमेवैकं रोगमधिकृत्य कस्यांचिद
250 वस्थायां किंचिद्वस्त्वपथ्यं तदेवावस्थान्तरे तत्रैव रोगे पथ्यम् ।

उत्पद्यते हि सावस्था देशकालामयान् प्रति ।
यस्यामकार्यं कार्यं स्यात्कर्म कार्यं तु वर्जयेत् ॥

इति वचनात् । यथा बलवदादेर्ज्वरिणो लङ्घनं क्षीणधातोस्तु
तद्विपर्ययः । एवं देशाद्यपेक्षया ज्वरिणोऽपि दधिपानादि योज्यम् ।
255 तथा च वैद्याः ।

कालाविरोधि निर्दिष्टं ज्वरादौ लङ्घनं हितम् ।
ऋतेऽनिलश्रमक्रोधशोककामकृतज्वरान् ॥

एवं च यः पूर्वमपथ्यपरिहारो यश्च तत्रैवावस्थान्तरे तस्यैव परिभोगः
स खल्वुभयोरपि तस्यैव रोगस्य शमनार्थः । इति सिद्धमेकविषय
260 त्वमुत्सर्गापवादयोरिति ॥ भवतां चोत्सर्गोऽन्यार्थोऽपवादश्चान्यार्थः ।
न हिंस्यात्सर्वभूतानि इत्युत्सर्गो हि दुर्गतिनिषेधार्थः अपवादस्तु
वैदिकहिंसाविधिर्देवतातिथिपितृप्रीतिसंपादनार्थः । अतश्च परस्पर
निरपेक्षत्वे कथमुत्सर्गोऽपवादेन बाध्यते । तुल्यबलयोर्विरोध इति
न्यायात् । भिन्नार्थत्वेऽपि यत्र तद्बाधनेऽतिप्रसङ्गात् । न च वाच्यं

२६५ वैदिकहिंसाविधिरपि स्वर्गहेतुतया दुर्गतिनिषेधार्थं प्रवति तस्यो-
त्कृत्या स्वर्गहेतुत्वनिर्लोठनात्। तदन्तरेणापि च प्रकारान्तरैरपि
तत्सिद्धिभावात्तस्यान्तरामाप अपवादपक्षस्वीकारः ॥ न च वयमेव
यागविधेः सुगतिहेतुत्वं नाङ्गीकुर्मः किं तु भवदाप्ता अपि। यदाह
व्यासमहर्षिः।

२७०   पूजया विपुलं राज्यमग्निकार्येण संपदः।
   तपः पापविशुद्ध्यर्थं ज्ञानं ध्यानं च मुक्तिदम् ॥

अत्राग्निकार्यशब्दवाच्यस्य यागादिविधेर्यथापायान्तरैरपि अभ्यर्णां
संपदामेव हेतुत्वं वदभाषापस्तस्य सुगतिहेतुत्वमर्थात्कदर्थितवानेव। तथा च स एव भावाग्निहोत्रं ज्ञानपालीत्यादिश्लोकैः
२७५ स्थापितवान्। तदर्थं स्थित तर्हि वादिनां चेष्टामुपमया दूषयति
स्वपुत्रेत्यादि। परेषां भवत्प्रणीतवचनपराङ्मुखानाम्। स्फुरितं
चेष्टितम् स्वपुत्रघातान्नृपतित्वलिप्सासब्रह्मचारि निजसुतनिपातनेन
राज्यप्राप्तिमनोरथसदृक्षम्। यथा किल कश्चिदविपश्चित्पुरुषः परमा-
प्रियतया निजमङ्गजं व्यापाद्य राज्यश्रियं प्राप्तुमीहेत न च तस्य
२८० तत्प्राप्तावपि पुत्रघातपातककलङ्कपङ्कः कथंचिदपयाति एवं वेदवि-
हितहिंसया देवतादिप्रीतिसिद्धावपि हिंसासमुत्थं दुष्कृतं न खलु
पराहन्यते। अत्र च लिप्साशब्दं प्रयुञ्जानः स्तुतिकारो ज्ञापयति यथा
तस्य दुर्नयस्यासत्प्रवृत्त्यात्मना निर्लूनिततत्कर्मणो राज्यप्राप्ती
कदर्थं समीहामात्रमेव न पुनस्तत्सिद्धिः एवं तेषां दुर्वादिनां
२८५ वेदविहितहिंसामनुतिष्ठतामपि देवतादिपरितोषण मनोराज्यमेव।
न पुनस्तेषामुपयाजनपूज्यत्वमिन्द्रादिभिर्विलोक्यतो च दृष्टिः।
प्रासङ्गुत्या निराकृतत्वात् ॥ इति काव्यार्थः ॥ ११ ॥

सांप्रतं नित्यपरोक्षज्ञानवादिनां मीमांसकभेदभट्टानामेकात्मसमवायिज्ञानान्तरवेद्यज्ञानवादिनां च यौगानां मतं विकुट्टयन्नाह ।

स्वार्थावबोधक्षम एव बोधः
प्रकाशते नार्थकथान्यथा तु ॥
परे परेभ्यो भयतस्तथापि
प्रपेदिरे ज्ञानमनात्मनिष्ठम् ॥ १२ ॥

बोधो ज्ञानम् । स च स्वार्थावबोधक्षम एव प्रकाशते । स्वस्यात्मस्वरूपस्यार्थस्य च पदार्थस्य योऽवबोधः परिच्छेदः तत्र क्षम एव समर्थ एव प्रतिभासत इत्ययोगव्यवच्छेदः । प्रकाशत इति क्रियया बोधस्य प्रकाशरूपत्वसिद्धेः सर्वप्रकाशानां स्वार्थप्रकाशकत्वेन बोधस्यापि तत्सिद्धिः । विपर्यये दूषणमाह । नार्थकथान्यथा तु इति । अन्यथेति अर्थप्रकाशनेऽविवादात् ज्ञानस्य स्वसंविदितत्वानभ्युपगमेऽर्थकथैव न स्यात् । अर्थकथा पदार्थसंबन्धिनी वार्ता । सदसद्रूपात्मकं स्वरूपमिति यावत् । तुशब्दोऽवधारणे । भिन्नक्रमश्च । स चार्थकथया सह योजित एव । यदि हि ज्ञानं स्वसंविदितं नेष्यते तदा तेनात्मज्ञानाय ज्ञानान्तरमपेक्षणीयं तेनाप्यपरमित्यनवस्था । ततो ज्ञानं तावत्स्वावबोधव्यग्रतामग्नम् । अर्थस्तु जडतया स्वरूपज्ञापनासमर्थ इति को नामार्थस्य कथामपि कथयेत् । तथापि एवं ज्ञानस्य स्वसंविदितत्वे युक्त्या घटमानेऽपि । परे तीर्थान्तरीयाः । ज्ञानं कर्मतापन्नम् । अनात्मनिष्ठम् न विद्यते आत्मनः स्वस्य निष्ठा निश्चयो यस्य तदनात्मनिष्ठम् । अस्वसंविदितमित्यर्थः । प्रपेदिरे प्रपन्नाः । कुत इत्याह । परेभ्यो भयतः । परे पूर्वपक्षवादिनस्तेभ्यः सकाशात् ज्ञानस्य स्वसंविदितत्वं नोपपद्यते स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधादित्युपालम्भसंभावनासंभवं यद्भयं तस्मात् तदाश्रित्येत्यर्थः ॥

इत्यमुमर्थमनिच्छन् विधाय भावार्थः प्रपञ्च्यते ॥ भट्टास्त्वाहुः
यदुत ज्ञानं स्वसंविदितं न भवति । स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् ।
न हि सुशिक्षितोऽपि नटबटुः स्वस्कन्धमधिरोढुं पटुः । न च सुतीक्ष्णा
25 प्यसिधारा स्वं छेत्तुमाहितव्यापारा । ततश्च परोक्षमेव ज्ञान
मिति ॥ तदसम्यक् । यतः किमुत्पत्तिः स्वात्मनि विरुध्यते
ज्ञप्तिर्वा । यद्युत्पत्तिः सा विरुध्यताम् । न हि वयमपि ज्ञानमात्मान
मुत्पादयतीति मन्यामहे । अथ ज्ञप्तिः । नैषमात्मनि विरुद्धा । तदात्म
नैव ज्ञानस्य स्वहेतुभ्य उत्पादात् प्रकाशात्मनैव प्रदीपालोकस्य ।
30 अथ प्रकाशात्मैव प्रदीपालोक उत्पन्न इति परप्रकाशकोऽस्तु
आत्मानमप्येतावन्मात्रेणैव प्रकाशयतीति कोऽयं न्याय इति चेत्
तत्किं तेन वराकेणाप्रकाशितेनैव स्थातव्यम् आलोकान्तराद्वास्य
प्रकाशेन भवितव्यम् । प्रथमे प्रत्यक्षबाधः । द्वितीयेऽपि सैवानव
स्थापत्तिः ॥ अथ नासौ स्वमपेक्ष्य कर्मतया प्रकाशत इत्यस्वप्रका
35 शकः स्वीक्रियते । आत्मानं न प्रकाशयतीत्यर्थः । प्रकाशरूपतयो
त्पन्नत्वात्स्वयं प्रकाशत एव इति चेत् चिरं जीव । न हि वयमपि ज्ञानं
कर्मतयैव प्रतिभासमानं स्वसंवेद्यं ब्रूमः । ज्ञानं स्वयं प्रतिभासत
इत्यादावकर्मकस्य तस्य प्रकाशनात् । यथा तु ज्ञानं स्वं जाना
मीति कर्मतयापि तद्भाति तथा प्रदीपः स्वं प्रकाशयतीत्ययमपि
40 कर्मतया भाति एव । यस्तु स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधो दोष
उद्भावितः सोऽप्ययुक्तः । अनुभवसिद्धेऽर्थे विरोधासिद्धेः । घटमहं
जानामीत्यादौ कर्तृकर्मवज्ज्ञप्तेरप्यवभासमानत्वात् । न चाप्रत्य
क्षोपलम्भस्यार्थदृष्टिः प्रसिध्यति । न च ज्ञानान्तरात्तदुपलम्भसंभा
वना । तस्याप्यनुपलब्धस्य प्रस्तुतोपलम्भप्रत्यक्षीकाराभावात् ।
45 उपलम्भान्तरसंभावने चानवस्था । अर्थोपलम्भात्तस्योपलम्भे
ऽन्योन्याश्रयदोषः ॥ अथार्थप्राकट्यमन्यथा नोपपद्यते यदि ज्ञानं

न स्यादित्यर्थापत्त्या तदुपलम्भ इति चेन्न । तस्या अपि ज्ञापकत्वेना ज्ञाताया ज्ञापकत्वायोगात् । अर्थापत्त्यन्तरात् तज्ज्ञानेऽनवस्थेतरेतराश्रय दोषापत्तेस्तदवस्थः परिभवः । तस्मादर्थोन्मुखतयेव स्वोन्मुखतयापि
80 ज्ञानस्य प्रतिभासात्स्वसंविदितत्वम् ॥ नन्वनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वे घट विदनुभूतिस्त्वमसङ्गः । प्रयोगस्तु ज्ञानमनुभवरूपमप्यनुभूतिर्न भवति अनुभाव्यत्वात् । घटवत् अनुभाव्य च भवद्भिरिष्यते ज्ञानम् । स्वसंवेद्यत्वात् । नैवम् । ज्ञातृज्ञातृत्वेनेवानुभूतेरनुभूतित्वेनैवानु भवात् । न चानुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वे दोषः । अर्थापेक्षयानुभूतित्वात् स्वापे-
85 क्षया चानुभाव्यत्वात् । स्वपितृपुत्रापेक्षयैकस्य पुत्रत्वपितृत्ववद्विरोधा भावात् ॥ अनुमानाच्च स्वसंवेदनसिद्धिः । तथाहि । ज्ञानं स्वयं प्रकाशमानमेवार्थं प्रकाशयति प्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवत् । संवेदनस्य प्रकाश्यत्वात्प्रकाशकत्वमसिद्धमिति चेन्न । अज्ञाननिरासादिद्वारेण प्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तेः । ननु नेत्रादयः प्रकाशका अपि स्वं न
90 प्रकाशयन्तीति प्रकाशकत्वहेतोरनैकान्तिकतेति चेत् नाम नेत्रादि भिरनैकान्तिकता । तेषां लब्ध्युपयोगलक्षणभावेन्द्रियरूपाणामेव प्रकाशकत्वात् ॥ भावेन्द्रियाणां च स्वसंवेदनरूपतयैव न व्यभि चारः । तथा संवित् स्वप्रकाशा । अर्थप्रतीतित्वात् । यः स्वप्रकाशो न भवति नासावर्थप्रतीतिर्यथा घटः ॥ तदेवं सिद्धेऽपि प्रत्यक्षानु
95 मानाभ्यां ज्ञानस्य स्वसंविदितत्वे तत्संप्रयोगे इन्द्रियबुद्धिरन्यलक्षण ज्ञानं ततोऽर्थप्राकट्यं तस्मादर्थापत्तिः तया प्रवर्तकज्ञानस्योपलम्भ इत्येवंरूपा त्रिपुटीप्रत्यक्षकल्पना भट्टानां प्रयासफलैव ॥

योगास्त्वाहुः । ज्ञानं स्वान्यप्रकाश्यम् । ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वे सति प्रमे यत्वात् । घटवत् । समुत्पन्नं हि ज्ञानमेकात्मसमवेतानन्तरोत्पन्नविष्णु
100 मानसप्रत्यक्षेणैव प्रकाश्यते न पुनः स्वेन । न चैवमनवस्था । अर्थावसायि विज्ञानोत्पादमात्रेणैवार्थसिद्धौ प्रमातुः कृतार्थत्वात् । अर्थज्ञान

जिज्ञासायां तु तथापि ज्ञानमुत्पद्यत एवेति ॥ तदयुक्तम् । पक्षस्य
प्रत्यनुमानबाधितत्वेन हेतोः कालात्ययापदिष्टत्वात् । तथा हि ।
विवादास्पदं ज्ञानं स्वसंविदितं ज्ञानत्वात् ईश्वरज्ञानवत् । न चायं
75 बाधप्रतीतो दृष्टान्तः। पुरुषस्येश्वरतया जैनैरपि स्वीकृतत्वेन तज्ज्ञा
नस्य तेषां प्रसिद्धेः । व्यर्थविशेष्यश्चायं तव हेतुः । समर्थविशेष-
णोपादानेनैव साध्यसिद्धेः। अग्निसिद्धौ धूमवत्त्वे सति द्रव्यत्वादिति-
वत् ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वादित्येतावतैव गतत्वात् । न हीश्वरज्ञानादन्य
त्स्वसंविदितमप्रमेयं वा ज्ञानमस्ति यद्व्यवच्छेदाय प्रमेयत्वादिति
80 क्रियेत । अस्मन्मते तदन्यज्ञानस्य सर्वस्य प्रमेयत्वात् । अप्रयोजकश्चायं
हेतुः । सोपाधित्वात् । साधनाव्यापकः साध्येन समव्याप्तिश्च
खलूपाधिरभिधीयते । तत्पुत्रत्वादिना श्यामत्वे साध्ये शाकाद्या
हारपरिणामवत् । उपाधिश्चात्र जडत्वम् । तथा हि ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वे
प्रमेयत्वे च सत्यपि यदेव जडं स्तम्भादि तदेव स्वस्मादन्येन प्रका
85 श्यते । स्वप्रकाशे परमुखप्रेक्षित्वं हि जडस्य लक्षणम् । न च ज्ञानं
जडस्वरूपम् । अतः साधनाव्यापकत्वं जडत्वस्य । साध्येन समव्या
प्तिकत्वं चास्य स्पष्टमेव । जाड्यं विहाय स्वप्रकाशाभावस्य तं च
त्यक्त्वा जाड्यस्य कचिदप्यदर्शनादिति ॥ यच्चोक्तं समुत्पन्नं हि
ज्ञानमेकात्मसमवेतेत्यादि तदप्यसत्यम् । इत्थमर्थज्ञानतज्ज्ञानयो
90 रुत्पद्यमानयोः क्रमानुपलक्षणात् । आशूत्पादात्क्रमानुपलक्षण-
मुत्पलपत्रशतव्यतिभेदवदिति चेत् तन्न। जिज्ञासाव्यवहितस्यार्थज्ञान
स्योत्पादप्रतिपादनात् । न च ज्ञानानां जिज्ञासासमुत्पाद्यत्वं घटते ।
अजिज्ञासितेष्वपि योग्यदेशेषु विषयेषु तदुत्पादप्रतीतेः । न चार्थ-
ज्ञानमयोग्यदेशम् । आत्मसमवेतत्वात् । अस्य समुत्पादादपि जिज्ञासाम
95 न्तरेणैवार्थज्ञाने ज्ञानोत्पादप्रसङ्गः । अयोग्यदेशत्वं नामेदं क्वे
दाप इति चेत् तन्न । अन्यच्चैवं तज्ज्ञानज्ञानेऽप्यपरज्ञानोत्पादप्रसङ्गः

तथापि चैवमेवायमित्यपरापरज्ञानोत्पादपरंपरायामेवात्मनो व्यापा
राम विषयान्तरसंचारः स्यादिति ॥ तस्मादर्थज्ञानं तदात्म
बोधं प्रत्यनपेक्षितज्ञानान्तरव्यापारम् । यथा गोचरान्तरग्राहि
100 ज्ञानात्प्राग्भाविगोचरान्तरग्राहिधारावाहिज्ञानमन्त्यस्यान्त्यज्ञानम्।
ज्ञानं च विवादाध्यासितं रूपादिज्ञानमिति न ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानान्तर
ज्ञेयता युक्तिं सहत इति काव्यार्थः ॥ १२ ॥

अथ ये ब्रह्माद्वैतवादिनोऽविद्याऽपरपर्यायमायावशात्प्रतिभास
मानत्वेन विश्ववर्त्तिवस्तुप्रपञ्चमपारमार्थिकं समर्थयन्ते तन्मत
मुपहसन्नाह ।

माया सती चेद्द्वयतत्त्वसिद्धि
रथासती हन्त कुतः प्रपञ्चः ।
मायैव चेदर्थसहा च तत्किं
माता च वन्ध्या च भवत्परेषाम् ॥ १३ ॥

तैर्वादिभिस्तात्त्विकात्मप्रब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्ता या माया अविद्या
प्रपञ्चहेतुः परिकल्पिता सा सद्रूपाऽसद्रूपा वा द्वयी गतिः । सती
सद्रूपा चेत्तदा द्वयतत्त्वसिद्धिः । द्वाववयवौ यस्य तद्द्वयं तथाविधं
यत्तत्त्वं परमार्थस्तस्य सिद्धिः । अयमर्थः । एकं तावत्त्वदभिमतं ता
त्त्विकमात्मब्रह्म द्वितीया च माया तत्त्वरूपा सद्रूपतयाङ्गीक्रियमा
णत्वात् । तथा चाद्वैतवादस्य मूले निहितः कुठारः । अथेति
10 पक्षान्तरद्योतने । यदि असती गगनाम्भोजवदवस्तुरूपा सा माया
ततः । हन्तेत्युपदर्शने खेदे वा । कुतः प्रपञ्चः । अयं त्रिभुवनोदर
विवरवर्तिपदार्थसार्थरूपप्रपञ्चः कुतः । न कुतोऽपि संभवतीत्यर्थः ।
मायाया अवस्तुत्वेनाभ्युपगमात् अवस्तुनश्च तुरङ्गशृङ्गस्येव सर्वोपा

स्यापिरहितस्य साक्षात्क्रियमाणेऽनभिवर्तमननेऽसमर्थत्वात् ।
15 किलेन्द्रजालादौ मृगतृष्णादौ वा मायोपदर्शितार्थानामर्थक्रियाया-
मसामर्थ्यं दृष्टम् । अत्र तु तदुपलम्भारूपं मायाव्यपदेशः मदीय
ताम् । अथ मायापि भविष्यति अर्थक्रियासमर्थपदार्थोपदर्शन
क्षमा च भविष्यति इति चेत्तर्हि स्ववचनविरोधः । न हि भवति
माता च वन्ध्या चेति । एनमेवार्थं हृदि निधायोत्तरार्धमाह ।
20 मायैव चेदित्यादि । अथैवकारोऽप्यर्थः । अपिश्च समुच्चयार्थः । अग्रेतन
चकारश्च तथा । उभयोश्च समुच्चयार्थयोर्यौगपद्यद्योतकत्वं प्रतीतमेव ।
यथा रघुवंशे ते च प्रापुरुदन्वन्तं बुबुधे चादिपूरुषः इति । तदयं
वाक्यार्थो माया च भविष्यति अर्थसहा च भविष्यति । अर्थसहा
अर्थक्रियासमर्थपदार्थोपदर्शनक्षमा । चेच्छब्दोऽत्र यद्यर्थे इति पद ।
25 एवं परमाशङ्क्य तस्य स्ववचनविरोधमुद्भावयति । तत्किं भवत्येव
माता च वन्ध्या च । किमिति संभावने । संभाव्यते एतत् भवतो
ये परे प्रतिपक्षास्तेषां भवत्परेषां भवद्व्यतिरिक्तानां भवदाज्ञाबहि
र्भूतत्वेन तेषां वादिनां यन्माता च भविष्यति वन्ध्या च भवि
ष्यतीत्युपहासः । माता हि प्रसवधर्मिणी वनिताभिधीयते । वन्ध्या च
30 तद्विपरीता । ततश्च वन्ध्या चेत्कथं माता माता चेत्कथं वन्ध्या ।
तदेवं मायायाः अपारमार्थ्या अप्यर्थसहत्वेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे प्रस्तुतवाक्य-
वस्त्यात्र एव स्ववचनविरोधः । इति समासार्थः ॥

व्यासार्थस्त्वयम् । ते वादिन इदमभिदधन्ति । वास्तिकमात्मसमवेतं
चास्ति ।

35 सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किंचन ।
आरामं तस्य पश्यन्ति न तत्पश्यति कश्चन ॥

इति समयात् । अयं तु प्रपञ्चो मिथ्यारूपः प्रतीयमानत्वात् यदेवं
तदेवं यथा शुक्तिशकले कलधौतं तथा चायं तस्मात्तथा । तत्त्वाद्वा
दैवम् । तथाहि । मिथ्यारूपत्वं तेः कीदृगभिमतमिति किमसत्त्वा

40 सत्त्वम् उतान्यस्यान्याकारतया प्रतीतत्वम् आहोस्विदनिर्वाच्यत्वम्।
प्रथमपक्षेऽसत्ख्यातिप्रसङ्गः । द्वितीये विपरीतख्यातिस्वीकृतिः ।
तृतीये तु किमिदमनिर्वाच्यत्वम् । निःस्वभावत्वं चेत्प्रसिद्धः प्रति
षेधार्थत्वे स्वभावशब्दस्यापि भावाभावयोरन्यतरार्थत्वेऽसत्ख्यातिस
त्ख्यात्यभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गः । भावप्रतिषेधेऽसत्ख्यातिरभावप्रतिषेधे
45 सत्ख्यातिरिति । प्रतीत्यगोचरत्वं निःस्वभावत्वमिति चेदत्र विरोधः ।
स प्रपञ्चो हि न प्रतीयते चेत्कथं धर्मितयोपात्तः कथं च प्रतीयमा
नत्वं हेतुतयोपात्तं तथोपादाने वा कथं न प्रतीयते । यथा प्रती
यते न तथेति चेत् तर्हि विपरीतख्यातिरियमभ्युपगता स्यात् । किं
चेयमनिर्वाच्यता प्रपञ्चस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधिता घटोऽयमित्याद्याकारं हि
50 प्रत्यक्षं प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यतामेव व्यवस्यति । घटादिप्रतिनियतपदार्थ
परिच्छेदात्मनस्तस्योत्पादात् । इतरेतरविविक्तवस्तूनामेव च प्रपञ्च
शब्दवाच्यत्वात् । अथ प्रत्यक्षस्य विधायकत्वात्कथं प्रतिषेधे सामर्थ्यम्।
प्रत्यक्षं हि इदमिति वस्तुस्वरूपं गृह्णाति नान्यत्स्वरूपं प्रतिषेधति ।

आहुर्विधातृ प्रत्यक्षं न निषेद्धृ विपश्चितः ।
55 नैकत्व आगमस्तेन प्रत्यक्षेण प्रबाध्यते ॥

इति वचनात् इति चेत् । अन्यरूपनिषेधमन्तरेण तत्स्वरूपपरि
च्छेदस्याप्यसंपत्तेः । पीतादिव्यवच्छिन्नं हि नीलं नीलमिति गृहीतं
भवति नान्यथा । केवलवस्तुस्वरूपप्रतिपत्तेरेवान्यप्रतिषेधप्रतिपत्ति
रूपत्वात् । मुण्डभूतलग्रहणे घटाभावग्रहणवत् । तस्माद्यथा प्रत्यक्षं
60 विधायकं प्रतिपन्नं तथा निषेधकमपि प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । अपि च
विधायकमेव प्रत्यक्षमित्यङ्गीकृते यथा प्रत्यक्षेण विद्या विधीयते
तथा किं नाविद्यापीति । तथा च द्वैतापत्तिः । ततश्च सुव्यवस्थित
प्रपञ्चः । तदमी वादिनोऽविद्याविरहेन सन्मात्रं प्रत्यक्षात्प्रतियन्तो
ऽपि न निषेधकं तदिति ब्रुवाणाः कथं नोन्मत्ताः इति सिद्धं प्रत्यक्ष

65 बाधितः पक्ष इति ॥ अनुमानबाधितश्च । प्रपञ्चो मिथ्या न
भवति असद्विलक्षणत्वात् आत्मवत् । प्रतीयमानत्वं च हेतुर्ब्रह्मात्मना
व्यभिचारी । स हि प्रतीयते न च मिथ्या । अप्रतीयमानत्वे त्वस्य
तद्विषयवचसामप्रवृत्तेर्मूकतैव तेषां श्रेयसी । साध्यविकलश्च दृष्टान्तः ।
शुक्तिशकलकलधौतेऽपि प्रपञ्चान्तर्गतत्वेन अनिर्वचनीयतायाः
70 साध्यमानत्वात् । किं चेदमनुमानं प्रपञ्चाद्भिन्नमभिन्नं वा । यदि भिन्नं
तर्हि सत्यमसत्यं वा । यदि सत्यं तद्वदेव प्रपञ्चस्यापि सत्यत्वं
स्यात् । अद्वैतवादप्राकारे खण्डिपातात् । अथासत्यं तर्हि न किंचिदनेन
साधयितुं शक्यम् । अवस्तुत्वात् । अभिन्नं चेत् प्रपञ्चस्वभावतया
तस्यापि मिथ्यारूपत्वापत्तिः । मिथ्यारूपं च तत्कथं स्वसाध्य
75 साधनायालम् ॥ एवं च प्रपञ्चस्यापि मिथ्यारूपत्वासिद्धेः
कथं परमब्रह्मणस्तात्त्विकत्वं स्याद्यतो बाह्यार्थाभावो भवेदिति ॥

अथवा प्रकारान्तरेण सन्मात्रलक्षणस्य परमब्रह्मणः
साधनं दूषणं चोपन्यस्यते । ननु परमब्रह्मण एवैकस्य परमार्थसतो
विधिरूपस्य विद्यमानत्वात्प्रमाणविषयत्वम् । अपरस्य द्वितीयस्य
80 कस्यचिदप्यभावात् । तथा हि । प्रत्यक्षं तदावेदकमस्ति । प्रत्यक्षं द्विधा
भिद्यते । निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदात् । ततश्च निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षात्
सन्मात्रविषयात्तस्यैकस्यैव सिद्धिः । तथा चोक्तम् ।

अस्ति ह्यालोचनाज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ।

85 न च विधिवत्परस्परव्यावृत्तिरप्यध्यक्षत एव प्रतीयत इति
द्वैतसिद्धिः । तस्य निषेधाविषयत्वात् । आहुर्विधातृ प्रत्यक्षं न निषेद्धृ
इत्यादिवचनात् । यच्च सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्षं घटपटादिभेदसाधकं तद
पि सत्तारूपेणान्वितानामेव तेषां प्रकाशकत्वात् सत्ताद्वैतस्यैव साधकम् ।
सत्तायाश्च परमब्रह्मरूपत्वात् । तदुक्तं यदद्वैतं तद्ब्रह्मणो रूपमिति ॥

90 अनुमानादपि तत्सद्भावो विभाव्यत एव । तथा हि विधिरेव तत्त्वम् । प्रमेयत्वात् । यत् प्रमाणविषयभूतोऽर्थः प्रमेयः । प्रमाणानां च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानार्थापत्तिसंज्ञकानां भावविषयत्वेनैव प्रवृत्तेः । तथा चोक्तम् ।

प्रत्यक्षाद्यवतारः स्याद्भावांशो गृह्यते यदा ।
95 व्यापारस्तदनुत्पत्तिरभावांशे जिघृक्षिते ॥

यच्चाभावाख्यं प्रमाणं तस्य प्रामाण्याभावान्न तत्प्रमाणम् । तद्विषयस्य कस्यचिदप्यभावात् । यस्तु प्रमाणपञ्चकविषयः स तु विधिरेव । तेनैव च प्रमेयत्वस्य व्याप्तत्वात् । सिद्धं प्रमेयत्वेन विधिरेव तत्त्वम् । यत्तु न विधिरूपं तन्न प्रमेयम् यथा खरविषाणम् । प्रमेयं चेदं
100 निखिलं वस्तुतत्त्वम् । तस्माद्विधिरूपमेव । अतो वा तत्सिद्धिः । ग्रामारामादयः पदार्थाः प्रतिभासान्तःप्रविष्टाः । प्रतिभासमानत्वात् । यत्प्रतिभासते तत्प्रतिभासान्तःप्रविष्टं यथा प्रतिभासस्वरूपम् । प्रतिभासन्ते च ग्रामारामादयः पदार्थाः । तस्मात्प्रतिभासान्तःप्रविष्टाः ॥ आगमोऽपि परमब्रह्मण एव प्रतिपादकः समुपलभ्यते । पुरुष एवेदं
105 सर्वं यद्भूतं यच्च भाव्यम् उतामृतत्वस्येशानो यदन्नेनातिरोहति । यदेजति यन्नैजति । यद्दूरे यदन्तिके । यदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य यदु सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः । इत्यादि । श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्य अनुमन्तव्य इत्यादिवेदवाक्यैरपि तत्सिद्धेः । कृत्रिमेणाप्यागमेन तस्यैव प्रतिपादनात् । उक्तं च ।

110 सर्वं वै खल्विदं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किंचन ।
आरामं तस्य पश्यन्ति न तत्पश्यति कश्चन ॥

इति प्रमाणतस्तस्यैव सिद्धेः ॥ परमपुरुष एक एव तत्त्वम् । सकलभेदानां तद्विवर्तत्वात् । तथा हि सर्वे भावा ब्रह्मविवर्ताः । सर्वैकरूपेणान्वितत्वात् । यद्यद्रूपेणान्वितं तत्तदात्मकमेव यथा घटघटीशरावो-

115 दञ्चनाद्यया मृद्रूपत्वेनान्विता मृद्विवर्ताः। सत्त्वैकरूपेणान्वितं च
सकलं वस्तु। इति सिद्धं ब्रह्मविवर्तत्वं निखिलभेदानामिति॥

तदेतत्सर्वं मदिरारसास्वादगद्गदोद्गदितमिवाभासते। विचारासह-
त्वात्। तथाहि वस्तु प्रमाणसिद्धं न तु वाङ्मात्रेण। अद्वैतमते च प्रमाण-
मेव नास्ति। तत्सद्भावे द्वैतप्रसङ्गात्। अद्वैतसाधकस्य प्रमाणस्य द्विती-
120 यस्य सद्भावात्। अथ मतं लोकप्रत्यायनाय तदपेक्षया प्रमाणमप्य-
भ्युपगम्यते। तदसत्। त्वन्मते लोकस्यैवासंभवात्। एकस्यैव नित्य
निरंशस्य परब्रह्मण एव सत्त्वात्॥ अथास्तु यथाकथंचित्प्रमाणमपि।
तत्किं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागमो वा तत्साधकं प्रमाणमुररीक्रियते।
न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम्। तस्य समस्तवस्तुजातगतभेदस्यैव प्रकाशकत्वात्।
125 आबालगोपालं तथैव प्रतिभासनात्। यच्च निर्विकल्पकं प्रत्यक्षं
तद्ग्राहकमित्युक्तं तदपि न सम्यक्। तस्य प्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमात्।
सर्वस्यापि प्रमाणतत्त्वस्य व्यवसायात्मकस्यैव अविसंवादकत्वेन प्रामा-
ण्योपपत्तेः। सविकल्पकेन तु प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणभूतेनैकस्यैव विधिरूप-
स्य परब्रह्मणः स्वप्नेऽप्यप्रतिभासनात्। यदप्युक्तम् आहुर्विधातृ प्रत्यक्ष
130 मित्यादि तदपि न पेशलम्। प्रत्यक्षेण ह्यनुवृत्तव्यावृत्ताकारात्मक
वस्तुन एव प्रकाशनात्। एतच्च प्रागेव क्षुण्णम्। न ह्यनुस्यूतमेकम
खण्डं सत्तामात्रं विशेषनिरपेक्षं सामान्यं प्रतिभासते येन यदद्वैतं
ब्रह्मणो रूपमित्याद्युक्तं शोभेत। विशेषनिरपेक्षस्य खरविषाण
वदप्रतिभासमानत्वात्। तदुक्तम्।

135 निर्विशेषं हि सामान्यं भवेत्खरविषाणवत्।
सामान्यरहितत्वेन विशेषास्तद्वदेव हि॥

ततः सिद्धं सामान्यविशेषात्मन्यर्थे प्रमाणविषये कुत एकस्य
परब्रह्मणः प्रमाणविषयत्वम्॥ यच्च प्रमेयत्वादित्यादिरनुमानमुक्तं
तदप्येतेनैवापास्तं बोद्धव्यम्। पक्षस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधितत्वेन हेतोः काला

140 व्यपदिष्टत्वात्। यच्च तत्सिद्धौ प्रतिभासमानत्वं साधनमुक्तं तदपि साधनाभासत्वेन न प्रकृतसाध्यसाधनायालम्। प्रतिभासमानत्वं हि निखिलभावानां स्वतः परतो वा। न तावत्स्वतः। घटपटमुकुटशकटादीनां स्वतः प्रतिभासमानत्वेनासिद्धेः। परतः प्रतिभासमानत्वं च परं विना नोपपद्यत इति। यच्च परमब्रह्मविवर्तवर्तित्वमखि-
145 लभेदानामित्युक्तं तदप्यन्यथाप्रतीयमानद्वयाविनाभावित्वेन पुरुषाद्वैतं प्रतिपक्षयत्येव। न च घटादीनां चैतन्यान्वयोऽप्यस्ति। मृदाद्यन्वयस्यैव तत्र दर्शनात्। ततो न किंचिदेतदपि। अतोऽनुमानादपि न तत्सिद्धिः। किं च पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्ता अनुमानोपायभूताः परस्परं भिन्ना अभिन्ना वा। भेदे द्वैतसिद्धिः। अभेदे त्वेकरूपतापत्तिः। तत्कथमे-
150 तेभ्योऽनुमानमात्मानमासादयति। यदि च हेतुमन्तरेणापि साध्यसिद्धिः स्यात्तर्हि द्वैतस्यापि वाङ्मात्रतः कथं न सिद्धिः। तदुक्तम्।

हेतोरद्वैतसिद्धिश्चेद् द्वैतं स्याद्धेतुसाध्ययोः।
हेतुना चेद्विना सिद्धिर्द्वैतं वाङ्मात्रतो न किम्॥

पुरुष एवेदं सर्वमित्यादेः सर्वं वै खल्विदं ब्रह्मेत्यादेश्चागमा-
155 दपि न तत्सिद्धिः। तस्यापि द्वैताविनाभावित्वेनाद्वैतं प्रति प्रामाण्यासंभवात्। वाच्यवाचकभावलक्षणस्य द्वैतस्यैव तत्रापि दर्शनात्। तदुक्तम्।

कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं लोकद्वैतं विरुध्यते।
विद्याऽविद्याद्वयं न स्याद्बन्धमोक्षद्वयं तथा॥

160 ततः कथमागमादपि तत्सिद्धिः॥ ततो न पुरुषाद्वैतलक्षणमेकमेव प्रमाणस्य विषयः। इति सुव्यवस्थितः प्रपञ्चः। इति काव्यार्थः॥ १३॥

अथ स्वाभिमतसामान्यविशेषोभयात्मकवाच्यवाचकभावसमर्थनपुरःसरं तीर्थान्तरीयप्रकल्पिततदेकान्तगोचरवाच्यवाचकभावनिरासद्वारेण तेषां प्रतिभावैभवाभावमाह ।

अनेकमेकात्मकमेव वाच्यं 5
द्वयात्मकं वाचकमप्यवश्यम् ।
अतोऽन्यथा वाचकवाच्यक्लृप्ता–
वतावकानां प्रतिभाप्रमादः ॥ १४ ॥

वाच्यमभिधेयं चेतनमचेतनं वस्तु । एवकारस्याप्यर्थत्वात् । सा5मान्यरूपतया एकात्मकमपि व्यक्तिभेदेनानेकम् अनेकरूपम् । यद्वाऽनेकरूपमप्येकात्मकमन्योन्यसंवलितत्वात् इत्थमपि व्याख्याने न दोषः । तथा वाचकमभिधायकं शब्दरूपं तदप्यवश्यं निश्चितं द्वयात्मकम् सामान्यविशेषोभयात्मकत्वात् एकानेकात्मकमित्यर्थः । उभयत्र वाच्यलिङ्गत्वेऽप्यव्यक्तत्वान्नपुंसकत्वम् । अवश्यमितिपदं 10 वाच्यवाचकयोरुभयोरप्येकानेकात्मकत्वं निश्चिन्वत् तदेकान्तं व्यवच्छिनत्ति । अत उपदर्शितप्रकारादन्यथा सामान्यविशेषैकान्तरूपेण प्रकारेण । वाचकवाच्यक्लृप्तौ वाच्यवाचकभावकल्पनायाम् । अतावकानाम् अत्वदीयानाम् अन्ययूथ्यानाम् । प्रतिभाप्रमादः प्रज्ञास्खलितम् । इत्यक्षरार्थः ॥ अत्र वाच्यस्य प्रधानत्वेन वाच्यपदस्य प्राग्निपाते 15 प्राप्तेऽपि यदादौ वाचकग्रहणं तत्प्रायोऽर्थप्रतिपादनस्य शब्दाधीनत्वेन वाचकस्याभ्यर्हितत्वज्ञापनार्थम् । तथा च शाब्दिकाः ।

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥

इति ॥

20 भावार्थस्त्वेवम् । एके तीर्थिकाः सामान्यरूपमेव वाच्यतया अभ्युपग-

च्छन्ति । ते च द्रव्यास्तिकनयानुपातिनो मीमांसकभेदा अद्वैतवादिनः
सांख्याश्च । केचिच्च विशेषरूपमेव वाच्यं निर्वचन्ति । ते च पर्यायास्ति
कनयानुसारिणः सौगताः । अपरे च परस्परनिरपेक्षपदार्थपृथग्भूत
सामान्यविशेषयुक्तं वस्तु वाच्यत्वेन निश्चिन्वते । ते च नैगमनयानुगा
25 मिनः काणादा आक्षपादाश्च । एतच्च पक्षत्रयमपि किंचिच्चर्च्यते ॥ तथा
हि संग्रहनयावलम्बिनो वादिनः प्रतिपादयन्ति सामान्यमेव तत्त्वम् ।
ततः पृथग्भूतानां विशेषाणामदर्शनात् । तथा सर्वमेकम् । अविशेषेण
सदिति ज्ञानाभिधानानुवृत्तिलिङ्गानुमितसत्ताकत्वात् । तथा द्रव्य
त्वमेव तत्त्वम् । ततोऽर्थान्तरभूतानां धर्माधर्माकाशकालपुद्गलजीवद्र
30 व्याणामनुपलम्भात् । किं च ये सामान्यात्पृथग्भूता अन्योन्यव्यावृ
त्त्यात्मका विशेषाः कल्प्यन्ते तेषु विशेषत्वं विद्यते न वा । ना चेन्नि:
स्वभावताप्रसङ्गः । स्वरूपस्यैवाभावात् । अस्ति चेत्तर्हि तदेव सामा
न्यम् । यतः समानानां भावः सामान्यम् । विशेषरूपतया च सर्वेषां
तेषामविशेषेण प्रतीतिः सिद्धैव । अपि च विशेषाणां व्यावृत्तिप्रत्यय
35 हेतुत्वं लक्षणम् । व्यावृत्तिप्रत्यय एव विचार्यमाणो न घटते । व्यावृत्ति-
र्हि विवक्षितपदार्थे इतरपदार्थप्रतिषेधः । विवक्षितपदार्थश्च स्वस्वरूप-
व्यवस्थापनमात्रपर्यवसायी कथं पदार्थान्तरप्रतिषेधे प्रगल्भते । न च
स्वरूपसत्त्वादन्यत्र किमपि यन्न तत्प्रतिषेधे प्रवर्तेत । तत्र च व्यावृ
त्तौ क्रियमाणायां स्वात्मव्यतिरिक्तविश्वत्रयवर्तिनोऽतीतवर्तमाना
40 नागताः पदार्थास्तस्माद्व्यावर्तनीयाः । ते च नाज्ञातस्वरूपा व्याव
र्तयितुं शक्याः । ततश्चैकस्यापि विशेषस्य परिज्ञाने प्रमातुः सर्वज्ञत्वं
स्यात् । न चैतत्प्रातीतिकं यौक्तिकं वा । व्यावृत्तिश्च निषेधः । स
चाभावरूपत्वात्तुच्छः कथं प्रतीतिगोचरमञ्चति । खपुष्पवत् । तथा
येभ्यो व्यावृत्तिस्ते असद्रूपा सद्रूपा वा । असद्रूपाश्चेत्तर्हि खरविषाणा
45 त्किं न व्यावृत्तिः । सद्रूपाश्चेत्सामान्यमेव । या चेयं व्यावृत्तिर्विशेषैः

क्रियेत सा सर्वासु विशेषव्यक्तिष्वेका अनेका वा । अनेका चेत्तस्या
अपि विशेषत्वापत्तिः । अनेकरूपत्वकर्णीभिन्नत्वाद्विशेषाणाम् । ततश्च
तस्या अपि विशेषत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्यान्यया भाव्यम् । व्यावृत्तेरपि
च व्यावृत्तौ विशेषाणामभाव एव स्यात् । तत्स्वरूपभूताया व्यावृत्ते
५० प्रतिषिद्धत्वात् । अनवस्थापाताच्च । एका चेत्सामान्यमेव संज्ञान्त
रेण प्रतिपन्नं स्यात् । अनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययलक्षणाव्यभिचारात् । किं चामी
विशेषाः सामान्याद्भिन्ना अभिन्ना वा । भिन्नाश्चेन्मण्डूकजटाभारानु
काराः । अभिन्नाश्चेत्तदेव तत्स्वरूपवत् । इति सामान्यैकान्तवादः ॥
यथायथन्यायविनस्तु मापते । विविक्ताः क्षणक्षयिणो विशेषा एव
५५ परमार्थः । ततो विष्वग्भूतस्य सामान्यस्याप्रतीयमानत्वात् । न हि
गवादिव्यक्त्यनुभवकाले वर्णसंस्थानात्मकव्यक्तिरूपमपहायान्य
त्किञ्चिदेकमनुयायि प्रतिभासते । तादृशस्यानुभवाभावात् । तथा च
पठन्ति ।

एतासु पञ्चस्ववभासिनीषु प्रत्यक्षबोधे स्फुटमङ्गुलीषु ।
६० साधारणं रूपमवेक्षते यः शृङ्गं शिरस्यात्मन ईक्षते सः ॥

एकाकारपरामर्शप्रत्ययस्तु स्वहेतुदत्तशक्तिभ्य एवोत्पद्यत इति न
तेन सामान्यसाधनं न्याय्यम् । किं च यदिदं सामान्यं परिकल्प्यते
तदेकमनेकं वा । एकमपि सर्वगतमसर्वगतं वा । सर्वगतं चेत्किं न
व्यक्त्यन्तरालेऽप्युपलभ्यते । सर्वगतैकत्वाभ्युपगमे च तस्य यथा
६५ गोत्वं सामान्यं गोव्यक्तीः क्रोडीकरोति एवं किं न घटपटादिव्य
क्तीरपि । अविशेषात् । असर्वगतं चेद्विशेषरूपापत्तिरभ्युपगमबाधश्च ।
अथानेकम् गोत्वाश्वत्वघटत्वपटत्वादिभेदभिन्नत्वात् तर्हि विशेषा
एव स्वीकृताः । अन्योन्यव्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वात् । न हि यद्गोत्वं तदश्वत्वा
त्मकमिति । अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं च वस्तुनो लक्षणम् । तच्च विशेषेष्वेव

70 स्फुटं प्रतीयते । न हि सामान्येन काचिदर्थक्रिया क्रियते । तस्य निष्क्रियत्वात् । वाहदोहादिकास्वर्थक्रियासु विशेषाणामेवोपयोगात् । तथेदं सामान्यं विशेषेभ्यो भिन्नमभिन्नं वा । भिन्नं चेदवस्तु । विशेषविश्लेषेणार्थक्रियाकारित्वाभावात् । अभिन्नं चेद्विशेषा एव तत्स्वरूपवत् । इति विशेषैकान्तवादः ॥ नैगमनयानुगामिनस्त्वाहुः ।
75 स्वतन्त्रौ सामान्यविशेषौ । तथैव प्रमाणेन प्रतीतत्वात् । तथा हि सामान्यविशेषावत्यन्तं भिन्नौ । विरुद्धधर्माध्यासितत्वात् । यावेवं तावेवं यथा पाथःपावकौ । तथा चैतौ । तस्मात्तथा । सामान्यं हि गोत्वादि सर्वगतं तद्विपरीताश्च शबलशाबलेयादयो विशेषाः । ततः कथमेषामैक्यं युक्तम् । न सामान्यात्पृथग्विशेषस्योपलम्भ इति चेत्
80 कथं तर्हि तस्योपलम्भ इति वाच्यम् । सामान्यव्याप्तस्येति चेत् न तर्हि स विशेषोपलम्भः । सामान्यस्यापि तेन ग्रहणात् । ततश्च तेन बोधेन विविक्तविशेषग्रहणाभावात् तद्वाचकं ध्वनिं तत्साध्यं च व्यवहारं न प्रवर्तयेत्प्रमाता । न चैतदस्ति । विशेषाभिधानव्यवहारयोः प्रवृत्ति दर्शनात् । तस्माद्विशेषमभिलषता तत्र च व्यवहारं प्रवर्तयता तद्ग्रा-
85 हको बोधो विविक्तोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । एवं सामान्यस्यान विशेषसम्पर्कं विशेषस्यान च सामान्यसम्पर्कं प्रयुञ्जानेन सामान्येऽपि तद्ग्राहके बोधो विविक्तोऽङ्गीकर्तव्यः । तस्मात्स्वस्वग्राहिणि ज्ञाने पृथक्प्रतिभासमानत्वा[illegible] । ततो न सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वं वस्तुनो घटते । इति स्वतन्त्रसामान्यविशेषवादः ॥

90 तदेतत्पक्षत्रयमपि न क्षमते क्षोदम् । प्रमाणबाधितत्वात् । सामान्यविशेषोभयात्मकस्यैव वस्तुनो निर्विगानमनुभूयमानत्वात् । वस्तुना हि लक्षणमर्थक्रियाकारित्वम् । तच्चानेकान्तवाद एवाविकलं कलयन्ति परीक्षकाः । तथा हि यथा गौरित्युक्ते खुरककुत्सास्नालाङ्गूलविषाणाद्यवयवसंपन्नं वस्तुस्वरूपं सर्वव्यक्त्यनुयायि प्रतीयते तथा महि

95 व्यादिव्यावृत्तिरपि प्रतीयते। यद्यपि च शबला गौरित्युक्ते तथापि यथा विशेषप्रतिभासस्तथा गोत्वप्रतिभासोऽपि स्फुट एव। शबलेति केवलविशेषणोच्चारणेऽपि अर्थात्प्रकरणाद्वा गोत्वमनुगम्यते । अपि च शबलत्वमपि नानारूपम्। तथा दर्शनात्। ततो वक्त्रा शबलत्वमुर- रीकुर्वता सकलशबलसामान्यं विवक्षितगोव्यक्तिगतमेव शबलत्वं व्यव-
100 स्थाप्यते । तदेवमाबालगोपालं प्रतीतिप्रसिद्धेऽपि वस्तुनः सामान्य विशेषात्मकत्वे तदुभयैकान्तवादः प्रलापमात्रम् । न हि कश्चित्कदा- चित्केनचित्सामान्यं विशेषविनाकृतमनुभूयते विशेषा वा तद्विना- कृताः। केवलं दुर्नयप्रभावितमतिव्यामोहवशादेकपक्षपातेनान्यतरद्व्य- वस्थापयन्ति बालिशाः। सोऽयमन्धगजन्यायः ॥ अपि च तदेकान्त-
105 पक्षोपनिपातिनः प्रागुक्ता दोषास्तेऽपि अनेकान्तवादप्रचण्डमुद्गरजर्ज- रितत्वान्नोन्मज्जितुमपि क्षमाः ॥ स्वतन्त्रसामान्यविशेषवादिनस्त्वेवं प्रतिक्षेप्याः। सामान्यं प्रतिव्यक्ति कथंचिद्भिन्नम् । कथंचिदभिन्नम् । कथंचित्तदात्मकत्वात्। विसदृशपरिणामवत्। यथैव हि काचिद्व्य- क्तिरुपलभ्यमाना व्यक्त्यन्तराद्विशिष्टा विसदृशपरिणामदर्शनादव-
110 तिष्ठते तथा सदृशपरिणामात्मकसामान्यदर्शनात्समानेति। तेन समा नो गौरयम्। सोऽनेन समान इति प्रतीतिः। न चास्य व्यक्तिस्वरूपाद- भिन्नत्वात्सामान्यरूपताव्याघातः। यतो रूपादीनामपि व्यक्तिस्वरू- पादभिन्नत्वमस्ति न चैतेषां गुणरूपताव्याघातः। कथंचिद्व्यतिरेकस्तु रूपादीनामिव सदृशपरिणामस्याप्यस्त्येव। पृथग्व्यपदेशादिभाक्त्वात्।
115 विशेषा अपि नैकान्तेन सामान्यात्पृथग्भवितुमर्हन्ति। यतो यदि सा मान्यं सर्वगतं सिद्धं भवेत् तदा तेषामसर्वगतत्वेन ततो विरुद्धधर्मा ध्यासः स्यात्। न च तस्य तत्सिद्धम्। प्रागुक्तयुक्त्या निराकृतत्वात्। सामान्यस्य विशेषाणां च कथंचित्परस्पराव्यतिरेकेणैकानेकरूप तया व्यवस्थितत्वात्।। सामान्यमप्य

120 नेकमिष्यते सामान्यात्तु विशेषाणामव्यतिरेकात्तेऽप्येकस्मा इति ॥
एकत्वं च सामान्यस्य संग्रहनयार्पणात्सर्वत्र विज्ञेयम् । प्रमाणार्पणा
च्चास्य कथंचिद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासितत्वम् । सदृशपरिणामरूपस्य विसदृ
शपरिणामवत् कथंचित्प्रतिव्यक्ति भेदात् । एवं चासिद्धं सामान्यवि-
शेषयोः सर्वथाविरुद्धधर्माध्यासितत्वम् । कथंचिद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासित
125 त्वं चेद्विवक्षितं तदास्मत्कक्षाप्रवेशः । कथंचिद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासस्य कथं-
चिद्भेदाविनाभूतत्वात् । पाथःपावकदृष्टान्तोऽपि साध्यसाधनविकलः ।
तयोरपि कथंचिदेव विरुद्धधर्माध्यासितत्वेन भिन्नत्वेन च स्वीकर-
णात् । पयस्त्वपावकत्वादिना हि तयोर्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासो भेदश्च । द्रव्य
त्वादिना पुनस्तद्वैपरीत्यमिति । तथा च कथं न सामान्यविशेषात्म
130 कत्वं वस्तुनो घटत इति ॥ ततः सूक्तं वाच्यमेकमनेकरूपमिति ॥

एवं वाचकमपि शब्दाख्यं द्वयात्मकम् सामान्यविशेषात्मकम् ।
सर्वशब्दव्यक्तिष्वनुयायि शब्दत्वमेकं शाङ्खशार्ङ्गतीव्रमन्दोदात्तानु-
दात्तस्वरितादिविशेषभेदादनेकम् । शब्दस्य हि सामान्यविशेषात्म
कत्वं पौद्गलिकत्वाद्व्यक्तमेव । तथाहि पौद्गलिकः शब्दः । इन्द्रियार्थ
135 त्वात् । रूपादिवत् । यच्चास्य पौद्गलिकत्वनिषेधाय स्पर्शशून्याश्रयत्वात्
अतिनिबिडप्रदेशे प्रवेशनिर्गमयोरप्रतिघातात् पूर्वं पश्चाच्चावयवानुप-
लब्धेः सूक्ष्ममूर्तद्रव्यान्तराप्रेरकत्वात् गगनगुणत्वाच्चेति पञ्चहेतवो
यौगैरुपन्यस्तास्ते हेत्वाभासाः । तथा हि शब्दपर्यायस्याश्रयो भाषा
वर्गणा न पुनराकाशम् । तत्र च स्पर्शो निर्णीयत एव । यथा शब्दा-
140 श्रयः स्पर्शवान् । अनुवातप्रतिवातयोर्विप्रकृष्टनिकटशरीरिणोपलभ्य
मानानुपलभ्यमानेन्द्रियार्थत्वात् । तथाविधगन्धाधारद्रव्यपरमाणु
वत् । इत्यसिद्धः प्रथमः । द्वितीयस्तु गन्धद्रव्येण व्यभिचारादनैका
न्तिकः । वर्तमानजात्यकस्तूरिकादिगन्धद्रव्यं हि पिहितद्वारापवरक
स्यान्तर्विशति बहिश्च निर्याति न चापौद्गलिकम् । अथ तत्र सूक्ष्मरन्ध्र-

145 संभवाकाशविनिविडत्वमतस्तत्र तत्प्रवेशनिष्क्रमौ । कथमन्यथोद्घा-
टितद्वारापवरकस्यापामिव न तदेकार्णवत्वम् । सर्वथा नीरन्ध्रे तु प्रदेशे
न तयोः संभव इति चेत् तर्हि शब्देऽप्येतत्समानमित्यसिद्धो हेतुः ।
तृतीयस्तु तडिदुल्कादिभिरनैकान्तिकः । चतुर्थोऽपि तथैव । गन्ध
द्रव्यविशेषसूक्ष्मरजोधूमादिभिर्व्यभिचारात् । न हि गन्धद्रव्यादिक
150 मपि नासायां निविशमानं तद्विवरद्वारदेशोद्भिन्नश्मश्रुप्रेरकं दृश्यते।
पञ्चमः पुनरसिद्धः । तथाहि न गगनगुणः शब्दः । अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्ष
त्वात् । रूपादिवत् । इति सिद्धः पौद्गलिकत्वात्सामान्यविशेषात्मकः
शब्द इति ॥ न च वाच्यम् आत्मन्यपौद्गलिकेऽपि कथं सामान्यविशेषा-
त्मकत्वं निर्विवादमनुभूयत इति । यतः संसार्यात्मनः प्रतिप्रदेशम-
155 नन्तानन्तकर्मपरमाणुभिः सह वह्नितापितघनकुट्टितनिर्विभाग
पिण्डीभूतसूचीकलापवत् लोलीभावमापन्नस्य कथंचित्पौद्गलिकत्वा-
भ्युपगमादिति । यद्यपि स्याद्वादवादिनां पौद्गलिकमपौद्गलिकं
च सर्वं वस्तु सामान्यविशेषात्मकं तथाप्यपौद्गलिकेषु धर्माधर्मा-
काशकालेषु तदात्मकत्वमर्वाग्दृशां न तथाप्रतीतिविषयमायातीति
160 पौद्गलिकेषु पुनस्तत्साध्यमानं तैः सुश्रद्धानमित्यप्रस्तुतमपि
शब्दस्य पौद्गलिकत्वमत्र सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वसाधनायोपन्य
स्तमिति । अत्रापि नित्यशब्दवादिसंमतः शब्दैकत्वैकान्तोऽनित्य
शब्दवादिसंमतः शब्दानेकत्वैकान्तश्च प्राग्दर्शितदिशा प्रतिक्षेप्यः ।
अथवा वाच्यस्य घटादेरर्थस्य सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वे तद्वाचकस्य
165 ध्वनेरपि तत्त्वम् । शब्दार्थयोः कथंचित्तादात्म्याभ्युपगमात् । यदाहु
र्भद्रबाहुस्वामिपादाः ।

अभिहाणं अभिहेयाउ होइ भिन्नं अभिन्नं च ।
खुरअग्गिमोयगुच्चारणम्मि जम्हा उ वयणसवणाणं ॥
नवि छेओ नवि दाहो न पूरणं तेण भिन्नं तु ।

170 जम्हा य मोयगुच्चारणम्मि तत्थेव पच्चओ होइ ॥
न य होइ स अन्नत्थे तेण अभिन्नं तदत्थाओ ।

एतेन

विकल्पयोनयः शब्दा विकल्पाः शब्दयोनयः ।
कार्यकारणता तेषां नार्थं शब्दाः स्पृशन्त्यपि ॥

175 इति प्रत्युक्तम् । अर्थाभिधानप्रत्ययास्तुल्यनामधेया इति वच नात् । शब्दस्य ह्ययमेव तत्त्वं यदभिधेयं याथात्म्येनासौ प्रति पादयति । स च तथा प्रतिपादयन् वाच्यस्वरूपपरिणामपरिणत एव वक्तुं शक्तो नान्यथा । अतिप्रसङ्गात् । घटाभिधानकाले पटाद्य भिधानस्य प्राप्तेरिति ॥

180 अथवा प्रकारान्तरेण सकलं काव्यमिदं व्याख्यायते । वाच्यं वस्तु घटादिकम् । एकात्मकमेव एकरूपमेव सत् अनेकम् अने कस्वरूपम् । अयमर्थः । प्रमाता तावत्प्रमेयं लक्षणेन निश्चिनोति । तच्च सजातीयविजातीयव्यवच्छेदादात्मलाभं लभते । यथा घटस्य सजातीया मृन्मयपदार्था विजातीयाश्च पटादयः । तेषां व्यवच्छेद
185 स्तल्लक्षणम् । पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारः कम्बुग्रीवो जलधारणादिक्रिया समर्थः पदार्थविशेषो घट इत्युच्यते । तेषां च सजातीयानां स्वरूपं तत्र बुद्ध्यारोप्य व्यवच्छिद्यते । अन्यथा प्रतिनियततत्स्वरूप परिच्छेदानुपपत्तेः । सर्वभावानां हि भावाभावात्मकं स्वरूपम् । एकान्तभावात्मकत्वे वस्तुनो वैश्वरूप्यं स्यात् । एकान्ताभावात्म
190 कत्वे च निःस्वभावता स्यात् । तस्मात्स्वरूपेण सत्त्वात्पररूपेण चासत्त्वाद्भावाभावात्मकं वस्तु । यदाह ।

सर्वमस्ति स्वरूपेण पररूपेण नास्ति च ।
अन्यथा सर्वसत्त्वं स्यात्स्वरूपस्याप्यसंभवः ॥

ततश्चैकस्मिन् घटे सर्वेषां घटव्यतिरिक्तपदार्थानामभावरूपेण वृत्तेर

195 नकात्मकत्वं घटस्य सूपपादम्। एवं चैकस्मिन्नर्थे ज्ञाते सर्वेषाम-
र्थानां ज्ञानम्। सर्वपदार्थपरिच्छेदमन्तरेण तदभिन्नस्यैकस्य
वस्तुनो विविक्ततया परिच्छेदासंभवात्। आगमोऽप्येवमेव व्यवस्थितः।

जे एगं जाणइ से सव्वं जाणइ। जे सव्वं जाणइ स एगं जाणइ।

तथा

200 एको भावः सर्वथा येन दृष्टः सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टाः।
सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा येन दृष्टा एको भावः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टः॥

ये तु सौगताः परासत्त्वं नाङ्गीकुर्वते तेषां घटस्य सर्वात्मकत्व-
प्रसङ्गः। तथा हि यथा घटस्य स्वरूपादिनापि सत्त्वं तथा यदि पररू-
पादिनापि स्यात् तथा च सति स्वरूपादिसत्त्ववत्पररूपादिसत्त्वप्र-
205 सक्तेः कथं न सर्वात्मकत्वं भवेत्। परासत्त्वेन तु प्रतिनियतोऽसौ
सिध्यति। अथ न नाम नास्ति परासत्त्वं किं तु स्वसत्त्वमेव तदि-
ति चेत् अहो वैदग्धी। न खलु यदेव सत्त्वं तदेवासत्त्वं भवितुमर्हति।
विधिप्रतिषेधरूपतया विरुद्धधर्माध्यासेनानयोरैक्यायोगात्। अथ
युष्मत्पक्षेऽप्येवं विरोधस्तदवस्थ एवेति चेत् अहो वाचाटता देवानां-
210 प्रियस्य। न हि वयं येनैव प्रकारेण सत्त्वं तेनैवासत्त्वं येनैवासत्त्वं
तेनैव सत्त्वमभ्युपगमः किं तु स्वरूपद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैः सत्त्वं पर-
रूपद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैस्त्वसत्त्वम् तदा क्व विरोधावकाशः। यौगास्तु
प्रगल्भन्ते सर्वथा पृथग्भूतपरस्पराभावाभ्युपगमेनैव पदार्थ-
प्रतिनियमसिद्धेः किं तेषामसत्त्वात्मकत्वकल्पनयेति। तदसत्। यदा
215 हि पटाद्यभावरूपो घटो न भवति तदा घटो पटादिरेव स्यात् यथा
च घटाभावाद्भिन्नत्वाद् घटस्य घटरूपता तथा पटादेरपि स्यात्।
पटाभावाद्भिन्नत्वादेव। इत्यलं विस्तरेण॥ एवं वाचकमपि शब्दरूपं
द्व्यात्मकम्। एकानेकात्मकमपि सप्तभङ्गिन्यर्थः। [illegible]न्यायेन शब्द-
स्यापि भावाभावात्मकत्वात्। अथ वा एकविषयस्यापि वाचक-

220 स्यानेकविषयत्वोपपत्तेः । यथा किल घटशब्दः संकेतवशात् पृथु
बुध्नोदराद्याकारवति पदार्थे प्रवर्तते वाचकतया तथा देशकाला
द्यपेक्षया तद्वशादेव पदार्थान्तरेष्वपि च तथा प्रवर्तमानः केन
वार्यते । भवन्ति हि वक्तारो योगिनः शरीरं प्रति घट इति । संके
तानां पुरुषेच्छाधीनतयाऽनियतत्वात् । तथा चौरशब्दोऽन्यत्र तस्करे
225 रूढोऽपि दाक्षिणात्यानामोदने प्रसिद्धः । यथा च कुमारशब्दः पूर्व
देशे आश्विनमासे रूढः । एवं कर्कटीशब्दादयोऽपि तत्तद्देशापेक्षया
योन्यादिवाचका ज्ञेयाः । कालापेक्षया पुनर्यथा जैनानां प्राय
श्चित्तविधौ धृतिश्रद्धासंहननादिमति प्राचीनकाले षड्गुरुशब्देन
शतमशीत्यधिकमुपवासानामुच्यते स्म सांप्रतकाले तु तद्विपरीते
230 तेनैव षड्गुरुशब्देनोपवासत्रयमेव संकेत्यते जीतकल्पव्यवहारा
नुसारात् । शास्त्रापेक्षया तु यथा पुराणेषु द्वादशीशब्देनैकादशी
त्रिपुरार्णवे चालिशब्देन मदिराभिपर्कं मैथुनशब्देन मधुस
र्पिषोर्ग्रहणमित्यादि । न चैवं संकेतस्यैवार्थप्रत्यायने प्राधान्यम् ।
✓ स्वाभाविकसामर्थ्यसाचिव्यादेव तस्य तत्र प्रवृत्तेः । सर्वशब्दानां
235 सर्वार्थप्रत्यायनशक्तियुक्तत्वात्तत्र च देशकालादौ पदार्थप्रतिपादन
शक्तिसहकारी संकेतस्तत्र तमर्थं प्रतिपादयति । तथा च निर्णीतं
दुर्णयपरप्रवादाः श्रीदेवसूरिपादैः । स्वाभाविकसामर्थ्यसमया-
भ्यामर्थबोधनिबन्धनं शब्दः । अत्र शक्तिपदार्थसमर्थनं ग्रन्थान्तरा
दवसेयम् ॥ प्रतोऽन्यथेत्यादि उत्तरार्धं पूर्ववत् । प्रतिभासमात्रस्तु तयोः
240 सदसदेकान्ते वाच्यस्य प्रतिनियतार्थविषयत्वे च वाचकस्योक्त
युक्त्या दोषसद्भावात् व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः ॥ तदयं समुदायार्थः ।
सामान्यविशेषात्मकस्य भावाभावात्मकस्य च वस्तुनः सामान्यविशे
षात्मको भावाभावात्मकश्च ध्वनिर्वाचक इति । अन्यथा प्रकारान्तरैः
पुनर्वाच्यवाचकभावव्यवस्थामातिष्ठमानानां प्रतिभैव प्रमाद्यति प्र

मीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकानां लाघवोपष्टम्भगौरवधर्माणां परस्प
रोपकारिणां त्रयाणां गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था
प्रकृतिः । प्रधानमव्यक्तमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । तच्चानादिमध्यान्तमनवयवं
साधारणमशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमरसमगन्धमव्ययम् । प्रधानाद्बुद्धिर्महदि
त्यपरपर्यायोत्पद्यते । योऽयमध्यवसायो गवादिषु प्रतिपत्तिः एवमेतद्
नान्यथा गौरेवायं नाश्वः स्थाणुरेष नायं पुरुष इत्येषा बुद्धिः । त
स्यास्त्वष्टौ रूपाणि धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यरूपाणि चत्वारि सात्त्विकानि
अधर्मादीनि तु तत्प्रतिपक्षभूतानि चत्वारि तामसानि । बुद्धेर
हंकारः । स चाभिमानात्मकः । अहं शब्देऽहं स्पर्शेऽहं रूपेऽहं गन्धेऽ-
हं रसेऽहं स्वामी अहमीश्वरः असौ मया हतः ससत्त्वोऽहममुं हनि
ष्यामि इत्यादिप्रत्ययरूपः । तस्मात्पञ्चतन्मात्राणि शब्दतन्मात्रादी
न्यविशेषरूपाणि सूक्ष्मपर्यायवाच्यानि । शब्दतन्मात्रादि शब्द
एवोपलभ्यते न पुनरुदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितकम्पितषड्जादिभेदाः । ष
ड्जादयः शब्दविशेषास्तूपलभ्यन्ते । एवं स्पर्शरूपरसगन्धतन्मात्रे
ष्वपि योजनीयमिति । तत एव चाहङ्कारादेकादशेन्द्रियाणि च । तत्र
चक्षुः श्रोत्रं घ्राणं रसनं त्वगिति पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि वाक्पाणिपाद
पायूपस्थाः पञ्च कर्मेन्द्रियाणि एकादशं मन इति । पञ्चतन्मात्रे-
भ्यश्च पञ्च महाभूतानि उत्पद्यन्ते । तद्यथा शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशं
शब्दगुणं शब्दतन्मात्रसहितात्स्पर्शतन्मात्राद्वायुः शब्दस्पर्शगुणः
शब्दस्पर्शतन्मात्रसहिताद्रूपतन्मात्रात्तेजः शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणं शब्द
स्पर्शरूपतन्मात्रसहिताद्रसतन्मात्रादापः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः । शब्द
स्पर्शरूपरसतन्मात्रसहिताद्गन्धतन्मात्रात् शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धगुणा
पृथ्वी जायत इति । पुरुषस्तु—

अमूर्तश्चेतनो भोगी नित्यः सर्वगतोऽक्रियः ।
अकर्ता निर्गुणः सूक्ष्म आत्मा कापिलदर्शने ॥

इति । अन्धपङ्गुवत् प्रकृतिपुरुषयोः संयोगः । चिच्छक्तिश्च
विषयपरिच्छेदशून्या । यत इन्द्रियद्वारेण सुखदुःखादयो विषया
बुद्धौ प्रतिसंक्रामन्ति बुद्धिश्चोभयमुखदर्पणाकारा ततस्तस्यां चैत
60 न्यशक्तिः प्रतिबिम्बते । ततः सुख्यहं दुःख्यहम् इत्युपचारः । आत्मा
हि स्वं बुद्धेरव्यतिरिक्तमभिमन्यते । आह च पतञ्जलिः । शुद्धोपि
पुरुषः प्रत्ययं बौद्धमनुपश्यति तमनुपश्यन्नतदात्मापि तदात्मक
इव प्रतिभासते इति । मुख्यतस्तु बुद्धेरेव विषयपरिच्छेदः । तथा
च वाचस्पतिः । सर्वो व्यवहर्ता आलोच्य नन्वहमत्राधिकृत इत्य
65 भिमत्य कर्तव्यमेतन्मयेति अध्यवस्यति ततश्च प्रवर्तत इति लोकतः
सिद्धम् । तत्र कर्तव्यमिति योऽयं निश्चयश्चितिसंनिधानापन्न
चैतन्याया बुद्धेः सोऽध्यवसायो बुद्धेरसाधारणो व्यापार इति ।
चिच्छक्तिसंनिधानाच्चाचेतनापि बुद्धिश्चेतनावतीवाभासते । वाद
महार्णवस्त्वाह । बुद्धिदर्पणसंक्रान्तमर्थप्रतिबिम्बकं द्वितीयदर्पणकल्पे
70 पुंस्यध्यारोहति तदेव भोक्तृत्वमस्य न त्वात्मनो विकारापत्तिः
इति । तथा चासुरिः ।

विविक्ते दृक्परिणतौ बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते ।
प्रतिबिम्बोदयः स्वच्छे यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्भसि ॥

विन्ध्यवासी त्वेवं भोगमाचष्टे ।

75 पुरुषोऽविकृतात्मैव स्वनिर्भासमचेतनम् ।
मनः करोति सांनिध्यादुपाधिः स्फटिकं यथा ॥

न च वक्तव्यं पुरुषश्चेदगुणोऽपरिणामी कथमस्य मोक्षः । मुचे-
र्बन्धनविश्लेषार्थत्वात्सवासनक्लेशकर्माशयानां च बन्धनसमाम्ना
तानां पुरुषेऽपरिणामिन्यसंभवात् । अत एव नास्य प्रेत्यभावा
80 परनामा संसारोऽस्ति निष्क्रियत्वादिति । यतः प्रकृतिरेव नाना
पुरुषाश्रया सती बध्यते संसरति मुच्यते च न पुरुष इति बन्ध

मोक्षसंसारौ पुरुषे उपचर्येते। यथा जयपराजयौ भृत्यगतावपि स्वामिन्युपचर्येते तत्फलस्य कोशलाभादेः स्वामिनि संबन्धात् तथा भोगापवर्गयोः प्रकृतिगतयोरपि विवेकाग्रहात्पुरुषे संबन्ध
85 इति॥

तदेतदखिलमालजालम्। चिच्छक्तिश्च विषयपरिच्छेदशून्या चेति परस्परविरुद्धं वचः। चिती संज्ञाने। चेतनं चित्या वा चेतयतीति चित्। सा चेत्स्वपरपरिच्छेदात्मिका नेष्यते तदा चिच्छक्तिरेव सा न स्यात्। घटवत्। न चामूर्तायाश्चिच्छक्तेर्बुद्धौ प्रतिबि-
90 म्बोदयो युक्तः। तस्य मूर्तधर्मत्वात्। न च तथा परिणाममन्तरेण प्रतिसंक्रमोऽपि युक्तः। कथंचित्सक्रियाकत्वाभ्यां व्यतिरेकेण प्रकृत्युपधानेऽप्यन्यथात्वानुपपत्तेः। अप्रच्युतप्राचीनरूपस्य च सुखदुःखादिभोगव्यपदेशानर्हत्वात्। तत्प्रच्युतौ च प्राक्तनरूपत्यागेनोत्तररूपाध्यासिततया सक्रियत्वापत्तिः। स्फटिकादावपि तथा परिणामेनैव
95 प्रतिबिम्बोदयसमर्थनात्। अन्यथा कथमन्धोपलादौ न प्रतिबिम्बः। तथा परिणामाभ्युपगमे च बलादायातं चिच्छक्तेः कर्तृत्वं साक्षाद्भोक्तृत्वं च। अथ अपरिणामिनी भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुभवतीति पतञ्जलिवचना दौपचारिक एवायं प्रतिसंक्रम इति चेत् तर्हि उपचारस्य तत्त्वचिन्ता-
100 यामनुपयोगीति प्रेक्षावतामनुपादेय एवायम्। तथा च प्रतिप्राणिप्रतीतं सुखदुःखादिसंवेदनं निराश्रयमेव स्यात्। न चेदं बुद्धेरुपपन्नम्। तस्या जडत्वेनाभ्युपगमात्। अत एव जडा च बुद्धिरित्यपि विरुद्धम्। न हि जडस्वरूपायां बुद्धौ विषयाध्यवसायः साध्यमानः साधीयस्तां दधाति। ननूक्तमचेतनापि बुद्धिश्चिच्छक्तिसांनिध्याच्चेतनावती-
105 वावभासत इति। सत्यमुक्तमयुक्तं तूक्तम्। न हि चैतन्यवति पुरुषादौ प्रतिसंक्रान्ते दर्पणस्य चैतन्यापत्तिश्चैतन्याचैतन्ययोरपरावर्तिस्वभाव

त्वेन शक्रेणाप्यन्यथाकर्तुमशक्यत्वात् । किं चाचेतनापि चेतनाव
तीव प्रतिभासत इति स्वच्छन्दनारोपो ध्वन्यते । न चारोपार्थ
क्रियासमर्थः । न खल्वतिकोपनत्वादिना समारोपिताग्नित्वो माण
110 वकः कदाचिदपि मुख्याग्निसाध्यां दाहपाकाद्यर्थक्रियां कर्तुमीश्वरः ।
इति चिच्छक्तेरेव विषयाध्यवसायो घटते न जडरूपाया बुद्धेरिति ॥
अत एव धर्माद्यष्टरूपतापि तस्या वाङ्मात्रमेव । धर्मादीनामात्मध
र्मत्वात् । अत एव चाहंकारोऽपि न बुद्धिजन्यो युज्यते । तस्याभि
मानात्मकत्वेनात्मधर्मस्याचेतनादुत्पादायोगात् ॥ अम्बरादीनां च
115 शब्दादितन्मात्रजत्वं प्रतीतिपराहतत्वेनैव विहितोत्तरम् । अपि च
सर्ववादिभिस्तावदविगानेन गगनस्य नित्यत्वमङ्गीक्रियते । अयं च
शब्दतन्मात्रात्तस्याविर्भावमुद्भावयन्नित्यैकान्तवादिनां च धुरि आ
सनं न्यासयन्नसंगतप्रलापीव प्रतिभाति । न च परिणामिकारणं स्व
कार्यस्य गुणो भवितुमर्हतीति शब्दगुणमाकाशमित्यादि वाङ्मात्रम् ॥
120 वागादीनां चेन्द्रियत्वमेव न युज्यते । इतरासाध्यकार्यकारित्वाभावा
त् । परप्रतिपादनग्रहणविहरणमलोत्सर्गादिकार्याणामितरावयवैरपि
साध्यत्वोपलम्भे । तथापि तत्त्वकल्पने इन्द्रियसंख्या न व्यवतिष्ठते ।
अन्याङ्गोपाङ्गादीनामपीन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥ यच्चोक्तं नानाश्रयायाः
प्रकृतेरेव च बन्धमोक्षौ संसारश्च न पुरुषस्येति तदप्यसारम् । अना
125 दिभवपरंपरानुबद्धया प्रकृत्या सह यः पुरुषस्य विवेकाग्रहणलक्ष
णोऽविष्वग्भावः स एव चेद् बन्धस्तदा को नामान्यो बन्धः स्यात् ।
प्रकृतिः सर्वोत्पत्तिमतां निमित्तमिति च प्रतिपद्यमानेनायुष्मता
संज्ञान्तरेण कर्मैव प्रतिपन्नम् । तस्यैवैवंस्वरूपत्वात् अचेतनत्वाच्च ॥
यस्तु प्राकृतिकवैकारिकदाक्षिणभेदात्त्रिविधो बन्धः । तद्यथा प्रकृ
130 तावात्मज्ञानाद्ये प्रकृतिमुपासते तेषां प्राकृतिको बन्धः । ये विकारा
नेव भूतेन्द्रियाहंकारबुद्धीः पुरुषबुद्ध्योपासते तेषां वैकारिकः । इष्टा

पूर्तेर्दाक्षिणः । पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञो इष्टापूर्तकारी कामोपहतमना बध्यत इति ।

इष्टापूर्तं मन्यमाना वरिष्ठं नान्यच्छ्रेयो येऽभिनन्दन्ति मूढाः ।
135 नाकस्य पृष्ठे ते सुकृतेन भूत्वा इमं लोकं हीनतरं वा विशन्ति ॥

इति वचनात् । स त्रिविधोऽपि कल्पनामात्रम् । कथंचिन्मिथ्यादर्श-नाविरतिप्रमादकषाययोगेभ्योऽभिन्नस्वरूपत्वेन कर्मबन्धहेतुष्वेवा-न्तर्भावात् । बन्धसिद्धौ च सिद्धस्तस्यैव निर्बाधः संसारः । बन्धमो-क्षयोश्चैकाधिकरणत्वाद् य एव बद्धः स एव मुच्यत इति पुरुष-
140 स्यैव मोक्षः । आबालगोपालं तथाप्रतीतेः । प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकदर्शना-त्प्रवृत्तेरुपरतायां प्रकृतौ पुरुषस्य स्वरूपेणावस्थानं मोक्ष इति चेत् न । प्रवृत्तिस्वभावायाः प्रकृतेरौदासीन्यायोगात् । अथ पुरुषार्थनिबन्धना तस्याः प्रवृत्तिः । विवेकख्यातिश्च पुरुषार्थः । तस्यां जातायां निव-र्तते । कृतकार्यत्वात् ।

145 रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥

इति वचनात् । इति चेत् नैवम् । तस्या अचेतनाया विमृश्यकारि-त्वाभावात् । यथेयं कृतेऽपि शब्दाद्युपलम्भे पुनस्तदर्थं प्रवर्तते तथा विवेकख्यातौ कृतायामपि पुनस्तदर्थं प्रवर्तिष्यते । प्रवृत्ति-
150 लक्षणस्य स्वभावस्यानपेतत्वात् । नर्तकीदृष्टान्तस्तु स्वेष्टविघातकारी । यथा हि नर्तकी नृत्यं पारिषद्येभ्यो दर्शयित्वा निवृत्तापि पुन-स्तत्कुतूहलात् प्रवर्तते तथा प्रकृतिरपि पुरुषायात्मानं दर्शयित्वा निवृत्तापि पुनः कथं न प्रवर्ततामिति । तस्मात्कृत्स्नकर्मक्षये पुरुष-स्यैव मोक्ष इति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ॥ एवमन्यासामपि तत्कल्पनानां
155 तमोमोहमहामोहतामिस्रान्धतामिस्रभेदात्पञ्चधाविपर्ययाभिधानाद्रागद्वेषा-भिनिवेशरूपा विपर्ययः । ब्राह्मप्राजापत्यसौम्यैन्द्रगान्धर्वयक्षराक्ष

मपैशाचभेदादष्टविधो दैव सर्गः । पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपस्थावरभे
दात्पञ्चविधस्तैर्यग्योनः । ब्राह्मणत्वाद्यवान्तरभेदाविवक्षया चैक
विधो मानुष इति चतुर्दशधा भूतसर्गः । बाधिर्यकुण्ठितान्धत्वज
160 ताऽजिघ्रतामूकताकौण्यपङ्गुत्वक्लैब्योदावर्तमत्तताख्यैकादशेन्द्रियव
धतुष्टिनवकविपर्ययसिद्ध्यष्टकविपर्ययलक्षणसप्तदशबुद्धिवधभेदाद
ष्टाविंशतिधा शक्तिः । प्रकृत्युपादानकालभागाख्याः अम्भःसलिलौ
घवृष्ट्यपरपर्यायनामान्याध्यात्मिकस्तस्र आध्यात्मिक्यः । शब्दादिविषयोपर
तयर्जनरक्षणक्षयभोगहिंसादोषदर्शनहेतुजन्मानः पञ्च बाह्यास्तु
165 ष्टयःताश्च पारसुपारपारापारानुत्तमाम्भउत्तमाम्भःशब्दव्यपदेश्याः ।
इति नवधा तुष्टिः । त्रयो दुःखविघाता इति मुख्यास्तिस्रः सिद्धयः
प्रमोदमुदितमोदमानाख्याः । तथाध्ययनं शब्द ऊहः सुहृत्प्राप्ति
र्दानमिति दुःखविघातोपायतया गौण्यः पञ्च तारसुतारतार
तारम्यकसदामुदिताख्याः । इत्यष्टधा सिद्धिः । धृतिश्रद्धासुख
170 विविदिषाविज्ञप्तिभेदात्पञ्च कर्मयोनयः । इत्यादीनां संवरप्रति
संवरादीनां च शब्दार्थमूलग्रंथेभ्योऽन्यभाष्यादिप्रसिद्धानां विस्तरस्त्वमू
लभावनीयमिति काव्यार्थः ॥ १५ ॥

इदानीं च प्रमाणात्फलमभिन्नमभिन्नं प्रमाणफलमाहुः ये च बाह्यार्थ
प्रतिक्षेपेण ज्ञानाद्वैतमेवास्तीति ब्रुवते तन्मतस्य विचार्यमाणत्व
विशरारुतामाह ।

> न तुल्यकालः फलहेतुभावो
> हेतौ विलीने न फलस्य भावः ।
> न संविदद्वैतपथेऽर्थसंवि
> द्विलूनशीर्णं सुगतेन्द्रजालम् ॥ १६ ॥

बौद्धाः किल प्रमाणात्फलमेकान्तेनाभिन्नं मन्यन्ते । तथा च
5 तत्सिद्धान्तः । उभयत्र तदेव ज्ञानं प्रमाणं फलम् । अधिगमरूपत्वात् ।
उभयत्रेति प्रत्यक्षेऽनुमाने च तदेव ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षानुमानलक्षणं फलं
कार्यम् । कुतः । अधिगमरूपत्वात् इति परिच्छेदरूपत्वात् । तथा
हि परिच्छेदरूपमेव ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । न च परिच्छेदादृतेऽन्यज्ज्ञानफ-
लम् । अभिन्नाधिकरणत्वात् । इति सर्वथा न प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां
10 भिन्नं फलमस्तीति ॥ एतच्च न समीचीनं यतो यद्यस्मादेकान्तेनाभिन्नं
तत्तेन सहैवोत्पद्यते यथा घटेन घटत्वम् । तैश्च प्रमाणफलयोः कार्य-
कारणभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते । प्रमाणं कारणं फलं कार्यमिति । स
चैकान्ताभेदे न घटते । न हि युगपदुत्पद्यमानयोस्तयोः सव्येतर-
गोविषाणयोरिव कार्यकारणभावो युक्तः । नियतप्राक्कालभावित्वा-
15 त्कारणस्य । नियतोत्तरकालभावित्वात्कार्यस्य । एतदेवाह न
तुल्यकालः फलहेतुभाव इति । फलं कार्यं हेतुः कारणं तयोर्भावः
स्वरूपं कार्यकारणभावः । स तुल्यकालः समानकालो न युज्यत
इत्यर्थः । अथ क्षणान्तरितत्वात्तयोः क्रमभावित्वं भविष्यतीत्या-
शङ्क्याह । हेतौ विलीने न फलस्य भाव इति । हेतौ कारणे
20 प्रमाणलक्षणे विलीने क्षणिकत्वादुत्पत्त्यनन्तरमेव निरन्वयं विनष्टे
फलस्य प्रमाणकार्यस्य न भावः सत्ता । निर्मूलत्वात् । विद्यमाने
हि फलहेतावस्येदं फलमिति प्रतीयते नान्यथा । अतिप्रसङ्गात् । किं
च हेतुफलभावः संबन्धः स च द्विष्ठ एव स्यात् । न चानयोः क्षण-
क्षयैकदीक्षितो भवान्संबन्धं क्षमते । ततः कथमयं हेतुरिदं फलमिति
25 प्रतिनियता प्रतीतिः । एकस्य ग्रहणेऽप्यन्यस्याग्रहणे तदसंभवात् ।

द्विष्ठसंबन्धसंवित्तिर्नैकरूपप्रवेदनात् ।
द्वयोः स्वरूपग्रहणे सति संबन्धवेदनम् ॥

इति वचनात् । यदपि धर्मोत्तरोऽप्यसारूप्यमस्य प्रमाणं तद्वशा

द्येयं प्रतीतिसिद्धिरिति न्यायबिन्दुसूत्रे विवृण्वता भणितं नील
30 निर्भासं हि विज्ञानं यतस्तस्मान्नीलस्य प्रतीतिरवसीयते येभ्यो
हि चक्षुरादिभ्यो ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते न तद्वशात्तज्ज्ञानं नीलस्य संवे
दनं शक्यतेऽवस्थापयितुम् नीलसदृशं त्वनुभूयमानं नीलस्य संवे
दनमवस्थाप्यते न च जन्यजनकभावनिबन्धनः साध्यसाधन
भावो येनैकस्मिन्वस्तुनि विरोधः स्यात् अपि तु व्यवस्थाप्य
35 व्यवस्थापकभावेन तत एकस्य वस्तुनः किंचिद्रूपं प्रमाणं किंचि
त्प्रमाणफलं न विरुध्यते व्यवस्थापनहेतुर्हि सारूप्यं तस्य ज्ञान
स्य व्यवस्थाप्यं च नीलसंवेदनरूपमित्यादि तदप्यसारम्। एकस्य
निरंशस्य ज्ञानलक्षणस्य व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकत्वलक्षणस्वभाव
द्वयायोगात्। व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभावस्यापि च संबन्धत्वेन
40 द्विष्ठत्वात् एकस्मिन्नसंभवात्। किं चार्थसारूप्यमर्थाकारता तच्च
निश्चयरूपमनिश्चयरूपं वा। निश्चयरूपं चेत्तदेव व्यवस्थापकमस्तु।
किमुभयकल्पनया। अनिश्चितं चेत् स्वयमव्यवस्थितं कथं नीला
दिसंवेदनव्यवस्थापने समर्थम्। अपि च कोऽयमर्थाकारता। किमर्थ
ग्रहणपरिणामः आहोस्विदर्थाकारधारित्वम्। नाद्यः। सिद्धसा-
45 धनात्। द्वितीयस्तु ज्ञानस्य प्रमेयाकारानुकरणाज्जडत्वापत्त्यादि
दोषाघ्रातः। तथा प्रमाणादेकान्तेन फलस्याभेदः सापीयान्।
सर्वथा तादात्म्ये हि प्रमाणफलयोर्न व्यवस्था। तद्भावविरोधात्।
न हि सारूप्यमस्य प्रमाणमधिगतिः फलमिति सर्वथा तादात्म्ये
सिध्यति। अतिप्रसङ्गात्। ननु प्रमाणस्यासारूप्यव्यावृत्तिः
50 सारूप्यम् अनधिगतिव्यावृत्तिरधिगतिरिति व्यावृत्तिभेदादेकस्या
पि प्रमाणफलव्यवस्थेति चेत् नैवम्। स्वभावभेदमन्तरेणान्य
व्यावृत्तिभेदस्याप्यनुपपत्तेः। कथं च प्रमाणस्य फलस्य चाप्रमा
णाफलव्यावृत्त्या प्रमाणफलव्यवस्थावत्प्रमाणान्तरफलान्तरव्या

तथाप्यप्रमाणत्वस्यापि प्रसक्तेः च व्यवस्था न स्यात्। विजाती
55 यादिव सजातीयादपि व्यावृत्तत्वाद्वस्तुनः। तस्मात्प्रमाणात्फलं
कथंचिद्भिन्नमेष्टव्यम्। साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रतीयमानत्वात्। ये हि
साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रतीयेते ते परस्परं भिद्येते। यथा कुठारच्छिदि
क्रिये इति॥ एवं योगाभिमतः प्रमाणात्फलस्यैकान्तभेदोऽपि निरा
कर्तव्यः। तस्यैकप्रमातृतादात्म्येन प्रमाणात्कथंचिदभेदव्यवस्थितेः।
60 प्रमाणतया परिणतस्यैवात्मनः फलतया परिणतिप्रतीतेः। यः प्रमि
मीते स एवोपादत्ते परित्यजत्युपेक्षते चेति सर्वव्यवहारिभिरस्ख
लितमनुभवात्। इतरथा स्वपरयोः प्रमाणफलव्यवस्थाविप्लवः प्रस
ज्यत इत्यलम्॥

अथवा पूर्वार्धमिदमन्यथा व्याख्येयम्। सौगताः किलेत्थं
65 प्रमाणयन्ति। सर्वं सत् क्षणिकम्। यतः सर्वं तावद् घटादिकं वस्तु
मुद्गरादिसंनिधौ नाशं गच्छद् दृश्यते तत्र येन स्वभावेनान्त्याव
स्थायां घटादिकं विनश्यति तथाभूतस्वभावोत्पन्नस्य विपत्ते
तदानीमुत्पादानन्तरमेव तेन नष्टव्यमिति व्यक्तमस्य क्षणिकत्वम्।
अथेदृश एव स्वभावस्तस्य हेतुतो जातो यत्कियन्तमपि काल
70 स्थित्वा विनश्यति। एवं तर्हि मुद्गरादिसंनिधानेऽपि एष एव
तस्य स्वभाव इति पुनरप्यनेन तावन्तमेव कालं स्थातव्यम् इति
नैव विनश्येदिति। सोऽयमदित्सोर्वणिजः प्रतिदिनं पत्रलिखितश्व
स्तनदिनप्रार्थनन्यायः। तस्मात्क्षणद्वयस्थायित्वेनाप्युत्पत्तौ प्रथम-
क्षणवद् द्वितीयेऽपि क्षणे क्षणद्वयस्थायित्वात्पुनरपरक्षणद्वयमवतिष्ठे
75 त। एवं तृतीयेऽपि क्षणे तत्स्वभावत्वान्नैव विनश्येदिति। स्यादेतत्।
स्थावरमेव तत्स्वहेतोर्जातं परं बलेन विरोधकेन मुद्गरादिना
विनाश्यत इति। तदसत्। कथं पुनरसौ विनश्यते। न च तद्विनश्य
ति स्थावरत्वात् विनाशश्च तस्य विरोधिना बलेन क्रियत इति।

न पुनर्नष्टं भवति । जीवति च स्वदृशा मरणं चास्य भव-
६० तीति । अथ विनश्यति यदि कथमविनश्वरं तद्वस्तु
स्वरूपेणोत्पन्नमिति । न हि म्रियते चामरणधर्मा चेति युज्यते वक्तुम् ।
तस्मादविनश्वरस्य कस्यचिदपि नाशायोगात् दृष्टश्च नाशस्य
नन्तरमेव वस्तु स्वरूपोपजातमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तस्मादुत्पत्त्यनन्तर-
मेव विनश्यति । तथा च क्षणक्षयित्वं सिद्धं भवति । प्रयोगस्त्वेवम् ।
६५ यद्विनश्वरस्वरूपं तदुत्पत्तेरनन्तरानवस्थायि यथान्त्यक्षणवर्तिघटस्य
स्वरूपम् विनश्वरस्वरूपं च रूपादिकमुदयकाले इति स्वभावहेतुः ।
यदि क्षणक्षयिणो भावाः कथं तर्हि स एवायमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञा स्यात् ।
उच्यते । निरन्तरसदृशापरापरोत्पादादविद्यानुबन्धाच्च पूर्वक्षण-
विनाशकाल एव तत्सदृशं क्षणान्तरमुत्पन्नं तेनाकारविलक्षणत्वा-
७० भावादव्यवधानाच्चोत्पन्नत्वेऽपि स एवायमित्यभेदाध्यवसायी
प्रत्ययः प्रसूयते । अत्यन्तभिन्नेष्वपि लूनपुनर्जातकुशकाशकेशादिषु
दृष्ट एवायं स एवायमिति प्रत्ययस्तद्वदत्रापि किं न सम्भाव्यते ।
तस्मात्सर्वं सत् क्षणिकमिति सिद्धम् ॥ अत्र च पूर्वक्षण उपादानकारणं
उत्तरक्षण उपादेयमिति पराभिप्रायमङ्गीकृत्याह न तुल्यकाल
७५ इत्यादि । स [illegible]मुक्तावलीकल्पा निरन्वयविनाशिनः पूर्व-
क्षणा उत्तरक्षणान् जनयन्तः किं स्वोत्पत्तिकाले एव जनयन्ति
उत क्षणान्तरे । न तावत्प्रथमः । समकालभाविनोर्युवतिकुचयोरिवो-
पादानोपादेयभावाभावात् । अत साधूक्तम् न तुल्यकालः फल-
हेतुभाव इति । न च द्वितीयः । तदानीं निरन्वयविनष्टत्वेन पूर्वक्षणस्य न
८० दुत्तरक्षणजनने कुतः सामर्थ्यमपि । न चानुपादानस्योत्पत्तिर्दृष्टा ।
अतिप्रसङ्गात् । इति सुष्ठु व्याहृतं हेतौ विलीने न फलस्य भाव इति ॥
[illegible] । [illegible] इतु
पादान तद्वार उपादानोपादेयभाव न्याय ॥ यत्र क्षणिकत्वा

पनाय मोक्षाकरगुप्तेनानन्तरमेव समर्थितं तद् स्याद्वादवादे निरव-
काशमेव। निरन्वयनाशपक्षे कर्पविस्सिद्धसाधनात्। प्रतिक्षणं पर्याय-
नाशस्यानेकान्तवादिभिरभ्युपगमात्। यदप्यभिहितं न ह्येवं सं-
भवति जीवति च देवदत्तो मरणं चास्य भवतीति तदपि संभाव्यमेव न
स्याद्वादवादिनां प्रतिभासत इति। यतो जीवनं प्राणधारणं मरणं चा-
युर्दलिकक्षयस्ततो जीवतोऽपि देवदत्तस्य प्रतिसमयमायुर्दलिकानाम्
उदीर्णानां क्षयादुपपन्नमेव मरणम्। न चायमन्त्यावस्थायामेव [illegible]
स्नायुर्दलिकक्षयात् तत्रैव मरणव्यपदेशो युक्त इति। तस्यामप्येक-
स्यापि न्यक्षेण तत्क्षयाभावात्। तथापि यथाभिहितानामेव तेषां क्षया-
न पुनस्तत्क्षण एव युगपत्सर्वेषाम्। इति सिद्धं गर्भादारभ्य प्रतिसमयं
मरणम्। इत्यर्थः समाप्तः॥

अथवाऽपरथा व्याख्या। सौगतानां क्षणिकत्वेन ज्ञानं जनक-
तया ज्ञानं गमक स्वसामर्थ्यं गृह्णातीति। नाकारं विना विषय इति
वचनात्। तदाकारं ज्ञानं च घटनेति। एतच्च न चारु।
यतो यस्मिन् क्षणेऽस्य स्वरूपमसौ गम्यमाने ज्ञाने भासते।
तस्य सदा [illegible]त्वात्। तत्र च [illegible] ज्ञानं [illegible]

यत आह तैर्विना इत्यादि । तैर्विना अर्थरूपे ज्ञानकारणे विलीने क्षणिक-
त्वाभिरन्वयं विनष्टे न फलस्य ज्ञानलक्षणकार्यस्य नाम आत्म-
130 लाभः स्यात् । जनकस्यार्थक्षणस्यातीतत्वान्निर्मूलमेव ज्ञानोत्पादः
स्यात् । जनकस्यैव च ग्राह्यत्वे इन्द्रियाणामपि ग्राह्यत्वापत्तिः । तेषाम-
पि ज्ञानजनकत्वात् । न चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामर्थस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वं
दृष्टम् । मृगतृष्णादौ जलाभावेऽपि जलज्ञानोत्पादात् । अन्यथा तद्भ्रा-
न्तत्वासंभवात् । भ्रान्तं तज्ज्ञानमिति चेत् ननु भ्रान्ताभ्रान्तविचारः
135 स्थिरीभूय क्रियतां त्वया । सांप्रतं प्रतिपद्यस्व तावदनर्थजमपि
ज्ञानम् । अन्वयेनार्थस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वं दृष्टमेवेति चेत् न । न हि तद्भाव-
भावलक्षणोऽन्वय एव हेतुफलभावनिश्चयनिमित्तम् । अपि तु तदभा-
वेऽभावलक्षणो व्यतिरेकोऽपि । स चोक्तयुक्त्या नास्त्येव । योगिनां
चातीतानागतार्थग्रहणे किमर्थस्य निमित्तत्वम् । तयोरसत्त्वात् ।

140 ण णिव्वाणगया भग्गा पुंजो णत्थि अणागए ।
णिब्भुया णेव चिट्ठन्ति आरग्गे सरिसोवमा ॥

इति वचनात् । निमित्तस्य चार्थक्रियाकारित्वेन सत्त्वात्तीता-
नागतत्वक्षतिः । न च प्रकाश्यादात्मलाभ एव प्रकाशकस्य प्रकाश-
कत्वम् । प्रदीपाद्घटादिभ्योऽनुत्पन्नस्यापि तत्प्रकाशकत्वात् । जनक-
145 स्यैव च ग्राह्यत्वाभ्युपगमे स्मृत्यादेः प्रमाणस्याप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः । त-
स्यार्थाजन्यत्वात् । न च स्मृतिर्न प्रमाणम् । अनुमानप्राणभूतत्वात्
साध्यसाधनसंबन्धस्मरणपूर्वकत्वात्तस्य । जनकमेव चेद्ग्राह्यं तर्हि
स्वसंवेदनस्य कथं ग्राहकत्वम् । तस्य हि ग्राह्यं स्वरूपमेव न च तत्
तज्जन्यं स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् । तस्मात्स्वसामग्रीप्रभवयोर्घट-
150 दीपयोरिवार्थज्ञानयोः प्रकाश्यप्रकाशकभावसंभवान्न ज्ञाननिमित्त-
त्वमर्थस्य । नन्वर्थाजन्यत्वे ज्ञानस्य कथं प्रतिनियतकर्मव्यवस्था ।
तदुत्पत्तितदाकारताभ्यां हि सोपपद्यते । तस्मादनुत्पन्नस्यातदाका-

रस्य च ज्ञानस्य सर्वार्थान्प्रत्यविशेषात्सर्वग्रहणं प्रसज्येत । नैवम् ।
तदुत्पत्तिमन्तरेणाप्यावरणक्षयोपशमलक्षणया योग्यतयैव प्रतिनिय
155 तार्थप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तेः । तदुत्पत्तावपि च योग्यतावश्यमेषितव्या ।
अन्यथाऽक्षपात्रसान्निध्ये तद्वदालोकसान्निध्येऽपि तुल्ये कुतश्चिदर्थात् कस्य
चिदेव ज्ञानस्य जन्मेति कौतस्कुतोऽयं विभागः । तदाकारता
त्वर्थाकारसंक्रान्त्या तावदनुपपन्ना । अर्थस्य निराकारत्वमसद्भावात् ।
ज्ञानस्य साकारत्वमसद्भावाच्च । अर्थेन च मूर्तेनामूर्तस्य ज्ञानस्य
160 कीदृशं सारूप्यमित्यर्थविशेषग्रहणपरिणाम एव सारूप्यमुपेयम् । यतः

अर्थेन घटयत्येनां न हि मुक्त्वार्थरूपताम् ।
तस्मात्प्रमेयाधिगतेः प्रमाणं मेयरूपता ॥

इति यत्किंचिदेतत् । अपि च व्यस्ते समस्ते चैते ग्रहणकारणं
स्याताम् । यदि व्यस्ते तदा कपालान्त्यक्षणो घटान्त्यक्षणस्य जल
165 चन्द्रो वा नभश्चन्द्रस्य ग्राहकः प्राप्नोति । यथासंख्यं तदुत्पत्ति-
तदाकारत्वात् । अथ समस्ते तर्हि घटोत्तरक्षणः पूर्वघटक्षणस्य
ग्राहकः प्रसजति । तयोरुभयोरपि सद्भावात् । ज्ञानरूपत्वे सत्येते
ग्रहणकारणमिति चेत् तर्हि समानजातीयज्ञानस्य समनन्तरज्ञान
ग्राहकत्वं प्रसज्येत । तयोर्जन्यजनकभावसद्भावात् । तस्मात् योग्यता
170 मन्तरेणान्यद् ग्रहणकारणं पश्याम इति ॥

अथापरार्धं व्याख्यातुमुपक्रम्यते । तत्र च बाह्यार्थनिरपेक्ष
ज्ञानाद्वैतमेव ये बौद्धविशेषा मन्यन्ते तेषां प्रतिक्षेप[illegible] एवम् ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकादिकलङ्कानङ्कितं निष्प्रपञ्चं ज्ञानमात्रं परमार्थसत् ।
बाह्यार्थस्तु विचारपदं न क्षमते । तथाहि । कोऽयं बाह्यार्थः ।
175 किं परमाणुरूपः स्थूलावयविरूपो वा । न तावत्परमाणुरूपः ।
प्रमाणाभावात् । प्रमाणं हि प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा । न तावत्प्रत्यक्ष
तत्साधनपटुकक्षम् । तद्धि योगिनां स्यात् अस्मदादीनां वा ।

नाद्यम् । अत्यन्तविप्रकृष्टतया प्रत्यक्षागम्यत्वात् । न द्वितीयम् ।
अनुभवबाधितत्वात् । न हि घटादिकं परमाणुरयं परमाणुरयमिति
10 स्तम्भोऽयं कुम्भोऽयमित्यवमत्र न सन्देहः मवदना
दयात् । नाप्यनुमानेन तत्सिद्धिः । अणूनामतीन्द्रियत्वेन सं
मह अविनाभावस्य क्वापि सिद्ध ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् । किं चामी
नित्या अनित्या वा स्युः । नित्याश्चेत् क्रमेणार्थक्रियाकारिणो युग
पद्वा । न क्रमेण । स्वभावभेदेनानित्यत्वापत्तेः । न युगपद् । एकक्षण एव
15 कृत्स्नार्थक्रियाकरणात् क्षणान्तरे तदभावादसत्त्वापत्तिः । अनित्या
श्चेत् क्षणिकाः कालान्तरस्थायिनो वा । क्षणिकाश्चेत् सहेतुका निर्हे
तुका वा । निर्हेतुकाश्चेत् नित्यं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वा स्यात् । निरपेक्षत्वात् ।
अपेक्षातो हि कादाचित्कत्वम् । सहेतुकाश्चेत् किं सर्वो स्थूलं किंचि
त्कार्यं परमाणवो वा । न स्थूलम् । परमाणुरूपस्यैव प्रागसत्त्वा
20 दीशनत्वात् । न च परमाणवः । ते हि सन्तोऽसन्तः सन्तोऽसन्तो वा
स्वकार्याणि कुर्युः । सन्तश्चेत् किमुत्पत्तिक्षण एव क्षणान्तरे वा ।
नोत्पत्तिक्षणे । तदानीमुत्पत्तिमात्रव्यग्रत्वात्तेषाम् । अथ

भूतिर्येषां क्रिया सैव कारणं सैव चोच्यते ।

इति वचनात् भवनमेव तेषामपरापरकार्यं कारणमिति चेत् एवं
25 तर्हि रूपाणवो रसाणूनां ते च तेषामुपादानं स्युः । उभयत्र भवना
विशेषात् । न च क्षणान्तरे । नष्टत्वात् । असन्तश्चेत् तदुत्पादने ।
तर्हि एकं स्वसत्ताक्षणमपहाय सदा तद्रूपतिप्रसङ्गः । तदसत्त्वस्य
सर्वदाऽविशेषात् । सन्त्वसत्पक्षस्तु

न सर्व वा भवत्यसद् रूपामात्र एव न सः ।

30 इति वचनादिभयाघात एव । तस्मान्न क्षणिकाः । नापि
कालान्तरस्थायिनः । क्षणिकपक्षोक्तदोषानतिवृत्तत्वात् । किं चामी
स्थितरा(?)स्थायिनोऽपि विषयक्रियाप्रगुणाः स्वकार्यकारिणो वा ।

आद्ये खपुष्पवदसत्त्वापत्तिः । यदभिकल्प्य विमतसद्रूपं सदसद्रूपं वा न कार्यं कुर्युः । असद्रूपं चेत् खरविषाणादेरपि किं न
205 कारणम् । सद्रूपं चेत् तत्रापि कारणान्तरस्या । तृतीयपक्षस्तु मान्द्विरापदुर्गमः । उभयदोषस्याप्य समया पतत् ॥

नापि स्थूलावयविरूपः । एकपरमाण्वसिद्धौ कथमनेकतत्सिद्धिः । तदभावे च तत्प्रचयरूपः स्थूलावयवी वाञ्छामात्रम् । किं चायमनेकावयवाधार इष्यते । ते चावयवा यदि विरोधिनः तर्हि नैकः
210 स्थूलावयवी । विरुद्धधर्माध्यासात् । अविरोधिनश्चेत्प्रतीतिविरोधः । एकस्मिन्नेव स्थूलावयविनि चलाचलरक्तारक्तावृतानावृतादिविरुद्धावयवानामुपलम्भः । अपि चासौ तेषु वर्तमानः कार्त्स्न्येनैकदेशेन वा वर्तेत । कार्त्स्न्येन प्रत्येकस्मिन्नवयवे परिसमाप्तत्वादनेकावयववृत्तित्वं न स्यात् । प्रत्यवयवं कार्त्स्न्येन वृत्तौ चावयविबहुत्वापत्तिः ।
215 एकदेशेन वृत्तौ च तस्य निरंशत्वाभ्युपगमबाधः । सांशत्वे वा तेंऽशास्तस्माद् भिन्ना अभिन्ना वा । भिन्नत्वे पुनरप्यनेकांशवृत्तेरेकस्य कार्त्स्न्यैकदेशविकल्पानतिक्रमादनवस्था । अभिन्नत्वे न केचिदंशाः स्युः । इति नास्ति बाह्योऽर्थः कश्चित् । किन्तु ज्ञानमेवेदं सर्वं नीलाद्याकारेण प्रतिभाति । बाह्यार्थस्य जडत्वेन प्रतिभासायोगात् । यथाह्‌ ।

220 स्वाकारबुद्धिजनका दृश्या नेन्द्रियगोचराः ।

अलङ्कारकारेणाप्युक्तम् ।

> यदि संवेद्यते नीलं कथं बाह्यं तदुच्यते ।
> न चेत्संवेद्यते नीलं कथं बाह्यं तदुच्यते ॥

यदि बाह्योऽर्थो नास्ति ॥ किंविषयस्तर्ह्ययं घटपटादिप्रतिभास इति
225 चेत् ननु निरालम्बन एवायमनादिवितथवासनाप्रवर्तितः । निर्विषयत्वात् । आकाशकेशज्ञानवत् स्वप्नज्ञानवद्वेति । अत्र प्रयोगः

नान्योऽनुभाव्यो बुद्ध्यास्ति तस्या नानुभवोऽपरः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकवैधुर्यात् स्वयं सैव प्रकाशते ॥
बाह्यो न विद्यते ह्यर्थो यथा बालैर्विकल्प्यते ।
वासनालुठितं चित्तमर्थाभासं प्रवर्तते ॥

इति ॥

तदेतत्सर्वमवद्यम्। ज्ञानमिति हि क्रियाशब्दः। ततो ज्ञायतेऽनेनेति ज्ञानं ज्ञप्तिर्वा ज्ञानमिति। अस्य च कर्मणा भाव्यम्। निर्विषयाया ज्ञप्तेरघटमानत्वात्। न चाकाशकेशादौ निर्विषयमपि दृष्टं ज्ञानमिति वाच्यम्। तस्याप्येकान्तेन निर्विषयत्वाभावात्। न हि सर्वथाऽगृहीतसत्यकेशज्ञानस्य तत्प्रतीतिः। स्वप्नज्ञानमप्यनुभूतदृष्टाद्यर्थविषयत्वान्न निरालम्बनम्। तथा च महाभाष्यकारः।

अणुहूयदिट्ठचिंतिय सुयपयइवियारदेवयाणूवा ।
सुमिणस्स निमित्ताइं पुण्णं पावं च णाभावो ॥

यच्च ज्ञानविषयः स बाह्योऽर्थः। भ्रान्तिरियमिति चेत् चिरं जीव। भ्रान्तिर्हि मुख्येऽर्थे क्वचिद् दृष्टे सति करणापाटवादिनाऽन्यत्र विपर्यस्तग्रहणे प्रसिद्धा। यथा शुक्तौ रजतभ्रान्तिः। अर्थक्रियासमर्थेऽपि वस्तुनि यदि भ्रान्तिरुच्यते तर्हि मनीना भ्रान्ताभ्रान्तव्यवस्था। तथा च सत्यमतद्वच ।

भासामात्रकना ये च वास्वादितमादृकाः ।
रमणीपथिपाकादि तुल्यं तेषां प्रसज्यते ॥

न चामून्यध्यक्षप्रमाणानि स्याद्वादिनां बाधां विदधते। परमाणुरूपस्य स्थूलावयविरूपस्य बाह्यस्यार्थस्याङ्गीकृतत्वात्। यच्च परमाणुपक्षखण्डने अभिहितं प्रमाणाभावादिति तन्न। तत्कार्याणां घटादीनां प्रत्यक्षत्वे तेषामपि कथंचित् प्रत्यक्षत्वं योगिप्रत्यक्षेण च साक्षात् प्रत्यक्षत्वमवसेयम्। अनुपलब्धिरपि न साकल्यात्। अनुमानादपि तत्सि

द्धिः। यथा सन्ति परमाणवः स्थूलावयविनिष्पत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तेरि
त्यन्तव्याप्तिः। न चाणुभ्यः स्थूलोत्पाद इत्युक्तं ततः। स्थूलादपि
२५५ समवयव्यप्रमाणः स्थूलस्य घटादेः प्रादुर्भावविभावनात्। आगमकारा
दयस्तु तत्स्फुटीकाराय। यच्च पुनरणुभ्यः स्थूलस्यापि तत्र तत्का
लादिसामग्रीसव्यपेक्षक्रियाव्यापारात् स्थूलं संयोगाविभागपर्यन्तम
पितव्य। यदपि किं चायमनवयवव्यापार इत्यादि न्यगादि तथापि
कथंचिद्विरोध्यनवयवव्यापिव्यग्मूलहस्तिरमयवन्यमिधीयत। तत्र च
२६० यद्विरोध्यनवयवव्यापारस्यां विरुद्धधर्माध्यासनमभिहितं तत्कथं
चिदुपपन्न एव तावत्। अवयवारम्भकस्य तस्यापि कथंचिदनेकरूपत्वात्।
यच्चोपन्यस्तम् अपि चासौ तेषु वर्तमानः कार्त्स्न्येनैकदेशेन वा वर्तेत
इत्यादि तथापि विकल्पद्वयानभ्युपगम एवोत्तरम्। अविष्वग्भावेना
वयविनोऽवयवेषु वृत्तेः स्वीकारात्। किं च यदि बाह्योऽर्थो नास्ति
२६५ किमिदानीं नियताकारं प्रतीयते। नीलमेतदिति विज्ञानाकारोऽय
मिति चेत् न। ज्ञानाद्बहिर्भूतस्य संवेदनात्। ज्ञानाकारत्वे त्वहं नील-
मिति प्रतीतिः स्यात् न त्विदं नीलमिति। ज्ञानानां प्रत्येकमाकार
भेदात् कस्यचिदहमिति प्रतिभासः कस्यचिन्नीलमेतदिति चेत् न।
नीलाद्याकारवदहमित्याकारस्य व्यवस्थितत्वाभावात्। तथा च यदे
२७० वाहमिति प्रतीयते तदेवापरेण त्वमिति प्रतीयते। नीलाद्याकार
स्तु व्यवस्थितः सर्वैरप्येकरूपतया ग्रहणात्। मसितहस्तूरादिभिस्तु
यद्यपि नीलादिर्पीतादितया गृह्यते तथापि तत्र न व्यभिचारः।
तस्य भ्रान्तत्वात्। स्वयं स्वस्य संवेदनेऽहमिति प्रतिभासन
इति चेत् ननु किं परस्यापि संवेदनमस्ति। कथमन्यथा स्वसन्तानस्य
२७५ प्रयोगः। प्रतियोगिनश्च सर्वं परमपेक्षमाण एव प्रवर्तते।
स्वरूपस्यापि भ्रान्त्या प्रत्यक्षत्वादिति चेत् हन्त प्रत्यक्षेण
प्रतीता सन्तः कथं न बाह्याः। भ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्षमिति चेत् ननु कुत

280 एतत् । अनुमानेन ज्ञानार्थयोरभेदसिद्धेरिति चेत् किं तदनुमा
नमिति पृच्छाम' । यद्येन सह नियमेनोपलभ्यते ततो न भिद्य
ते यथा सचन्द्रादसचन्द्रः । नियमेनोपलभ्यते च ज्ञानेन सहार्थः
इति व्यापकानुपलब्धिः । प्रतिषेध्यस्य ज्ञानार्थयोर्भेदस्य व्यापकः
सहोपलम्भानियमस्तस्यानुपलब्धि' । भिन्नयोर्नीलपीतयोर्युगपदुपल
285 म्भनियमाभावात् । इत्यनुमानेन तयोरभेदसिद्धिरिति चेत् न । संदि-
ग्धानैकान्तिकत्वेनास्यानुमानाभासत्वात् । ज्ञानं हि स्वपरसंवेदनम् ।
तत् परसंवेदनतामात्रेणैव नीलं गृह्णाति स्वसंवेदनतामात्रेणैव च
नीलबुद्धिम् । तदेवमनयोर्युगपद्ग्रहणात्सहोपलम्भनियमोऽस्ति अ
भेदश्च नास्ति इति सहोपलम्भनियमरूपस्य हेतोर्विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तेः
290 संदिग्धत्वात् संदिग्धानैकान्तिकत्वम् । असिद्धश्च सहोपलम्भनि
यम' । नीलमेतदिति बहिर्मुखतयाऽर्थेऽनुभूयमाने तदानीमेवान्त-
रस्य नीलानुभवस्याननुभवात् इति कथं प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानेन ज्ञाना
र्थयोरभेदसिद्ध्या भ्रान्तत्वम् । अपि च प्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रान्तत्वेनाबा
धितविषयत्वादनुमानस्यात्मलाभः तल्लाभे चानुमाने प्रत्यक्षस्य
295 भ्रान्तत्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयदोषोऽपि दुर्निवारः । अर्थाभावे च नियत
देशाधिकरणा प्रतीतिः कुतः । न हि तत्र विवक्षितदेशेऽप्यारोपयि-
तव्यो नान्यत्रेत्यस्ति नियमे हेतुः । वासनानियमात्तदारोपनियम
इति चेत् न । तस्या अपि तद्देशनियमकारणाभावात् । सति ह्यर्थसंज्ञाने
यद्देशोऽर्थस्तद्देशोऽनुभवस्तद्देशा च तत्पूर्विका वासना । बाह्यार्था
300 भावे तु तस्याः कुतो देशनियमः । अथास्ति तावदारोपनियमः ।
न च कारणविशेषमन्तरेण कार्यविशेषो घटते बाह्यार्थो नास्ति
येन वासनानामेव वैचित्र्यं तत्र हेतुः । इति चेत् तद्वासनावैचित्र्यं बो-
धाकारादन्यदनन्यद्वा । अनन्यच्चेत् बोधाकारस्यैकत्वात्कुतस्तासां पर
स्परतो विशेषः । अन्यच्चेत् अर्थे कः प्रद्वेष' येन सर्वलोकप्रतीतिरपह्नू

किञ्च सेवकस्य विरुद्धतया कुपितो नृपतिः सर्वस्वमपहरति एवं
तत्सिद्धान्तोऽपि शून्यवादविरुद्धं प्रमाणप्रमेयाङ्गीकरणोद्यतस्य तस्य
सर्वस्वभूतं सम्यग्वादित्वमपहरति । किं च स्वाभ्युपगतेनैव
20 तेन वादिना शून्यवादः प्ररूप्यते इति स्वीकृतप्रमाणस्य प्रामाण्य-
मिति कुतस्तस्य स्वपक्षसिद्धिः । प्रमाणाङ्गीकरणात् । किं च प्रमाणं
प्रमेयं विना न भवतीति प्रमाणानङ्गीकरणे प्रमेयमपि विशीर्णम् ।
ततश्चास्य मूकतैव युक्ता न पुनः शून्यवादोपन्यासाय तुण्डताण्डव-
डम्बरम् । शून्यवादस्यापि प्रमेयत्वात् । अत्र च स्तुतिकर्तुः कृता
25 न्तवर्णं च प्रभुज्ञानस्य सूरेरयमभिप्रायः । यदसौ शून्यवादी दूरे
प्रमाणस्य सर्वथाङ्गीकारः यावत्प्रमाणस्पर्शमात्रमपि विषहते तदा तस्मै
कृतान्तो यमराजः कुप्येत् । तत्कोपो हि मरणफलः । ततश्च स्वसि
द्धान्तविरुद्धमसौ प्रमाणग्रहणग्रहस्यापायमवश्यमेव यातेति । एवं
सति अहो इत्युपहासगर्भसायाम् दुष्षमवत्यपि गुणेषु दोषानारो-
30 पयन्तीत्येवंशीलास्त्वदसूयिनः तन्त्रान्तरीयाः तैरिदं मत्यज्ञानच-
क्षुषा निरीक्षितम् अहो सुदृष्टं साधुदृष्टम् । विपरीतलक्षणयोपहासात्
सम्यग्दृष्टिभिरित्यर्थः । असूयावादोस्ताच्छीलिकणिन्प्रत्ययेनापि वा
गुणमाहात्म्यम् । असूयाऽस्त्येषामित्यसूयिनः त्वय्यसूयिनः त्वदसू-
यिनः इति मत्वर्थीयान्तं वा । त्वदसूयुदृष्टमिति पाठेऽपि न किंचि
35 द्दुष्यति । असूयुशब्दस्योदन्तस्योपनायैर्न्यायवार्तपरिशुद्धपादो
मत्सरिणि प्रयोगादिति ॥

इह शून्यवादिनामयमभिसंधिः । प्रमाता प्रमेयं प्रमाणं प्रमि
तिरिति तत्त्वचतुष्टयं परपरिकल्पितमवस्त्वेव । विचारासहत्वात् ।
तुरङ्गशृङ्गवत् । तत्र प्रमाता तावदात्मा तस्य च प्रमाणग्राह्यत्वा-
40 भावादभावः । तथा हि न प्रत्यक्षेण तत्सिद्धिः । इन्द्रियगोचरा
तिक्रान्तत्वात् । यत्तु अहंकारप्रत्ययेन तस्य मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वसाधनं

तदप्यनैकान्तिकम् । तस्याहं गौरः श्यामो वेत्यादौ शरीराश्रय-
तयाप्युपपत्तेः । किं च यद्ययमहंकारप्रत्यय आत्मगोचरः स्यात्तदा न
कादाचित्कः स्यात् । आत्मनः सदा सन्निहितत्वात् । कादाचित्कं हि
45 ज्ञानं कदाचित्कारणपूर्वकं दृष्टं यथा सौदामनीज्ञानमिति । नाप्य-
नुमानेन । अव्यभिचारिलिङ्गाग्रहणात् । आगमानां च परस्परवि-
रुद्धार्थवादिनां नास्त्येव प्रामाण्यम् । तथा हि एकेन कथमपि कश्चि-
दर्थो व्यवस्थापितोऽभियुक्ततरेणापरेण स एवान्यथा व्यवस्थाप्यते।
स्वयमव्यवस्थितप्रामाण्यानां च तेषां कथमन्यव्यवस्थापने साम-
50 र्थ्यम् । इति नास्ति प्रमाता ॥ प्रमेयं च बाह्योऽर्थः स चानन्तरमेव
बाह्यार्थप्रतिक्षेपक्षणे निर्लोठितः ॥ प्रमाणं च स्वपरावभासिज्ञानम् ।
तच्च प्रमेयाभावे कस्य ग्राहकमस्तु । निर्विषयत्वात् । किं चैतदर्थसम-
कालं तद्भिन्नकालं वा तद्ग्राहकं कल्प्येत । आद्यपक्षे त्रिभुवनवर्ति-
नोऽपि पदार्थास्तत्रावभासेरन् । समकालत्वाविशेषात् । द्वितीये तु
55 निराकारं साकारं वा तत्स्यात् । प्रथमे प्रतिनियतपदार्थपरिच्छेदा-
नुपपत्तिः । द्वितीये तु किमयमाकारो व्यतिरिक्तोऽव्यतिरिक्तो वा
ज्ञानात् । अव्यतिरेके ज्ञानमेवायं तथा च निराकारपक्षदोषः । व्यति-
रेके चायं चिद्रूपः तदानीमाकारोऽपि वेदकः स्यात् । तथा चायम-
पि निराकारः साकारो वा तद्वेदको भवेत् । इत्यावर्तनेनानवस्था ।
60 अथाचिद्रूपः किमज्ञातो ज्ञाता वा तज्ज्ञापकः स्यात् । प्राचीने विकल्पे
चैत्रस्येव मैत्रस्यापि तज्ज्ञापकोऽसौ स्यात् । तदुत्तरे तु निराकारेण
साकारेण वा ज्ञानेन तस्यापि ज्ञानं स्यात् । इत्याद्यावृत्तावनवस्थै-
वेति ॥ इत्थं प्रमाणाभावे तत्फलरूपा प्रमितिः कुतस्तनी । इति
सर्वशून्यतैव परं तत्त्वमिति । तथा च पठन्ति ।

65 यथा यथा विचार्यन्ते विशीर्यन्ते तथा तथा ।
यदेतत्स्वयमर्थेभ्यो रोचते तत्र के वयम् ॥

रूपवत् । रसादिगतेन रसनादिना व्यभिचार इति चेद् न ।
तेषामपि एकेन्द्रियजन्तुत्वेन सात्मकत्वात् । यश्चैषां कर्ता स
आत्मा । गृहपतिवत् । रसादीनां च सात्मकत्वमाधाराङ्गीकारेण
120 चेयम् । किञ्चिद्रसत्वे च । तथा भेर्यं मनः । अभिमतविषय
संबन्धनिमित्तक्रियाश्रयत्वात् । दारकहस्तगतगोलकवत् । यश्चास्य
प्रेरकः स आत्मा इति । तथा आत्मचेतनक्षेत्रज्ञजीवपुरुषादयः
पर्याया न निर्विषयाः । पर्यायत्वात् । घटकुटकलशादिपर्यायवत् ।
व्यतिरेके पशुभूतादि । यश्चैषां विषयः स आत्मा । तथा अस्त्यात्मा ।
125 असमस्तपर्यायवाच्यत्वात् । यो यः सांकेतिकशुद्धपर्यायवाच्यः
स सोऽस्तित्वं न व्यभिचरति । यथा घटादि । व्यतिरेके खरवि
षाणनभोम्भोरुहादयः । तथा सुखादीनि द्रव्याश्रितानि
गुणत्वात् रूपवत् । योऽसौ गुणी स आत्मा । इत्यादिलिङ्गानि ।
तस्मादनुमानतोऽप्यात्मा सिद्धः ॥ आगमानां च येषां पूर्वापर
130 विरुद्धार्थत्वं तेषामप्रामाण्यमेव । यस्त्वाप्तप्रणीत आगमः स
प्रमाणमेव । कषच्छेदतापलक्षणोपाधित्रयविशुद्धत्वात् । कषादीनां
च स्वरूपं पुरस्ताद्वक्ष्यामः । न च वाच्यमाप्तः क्षीणसर्वदो
षः तथाविधं चाप्तत्वं कस्यापि नास्तीति । यतो रागादयः
कस्यचिदत्यन्तमुच्छिद्यन्ते । अस्मदादिषु तदुच्छेदप्रकर्षोप
135 लम्भात् । सूर्याद्यावरकजलदपटलवत् । तथा चाहुः ।

देशतो नाशिनो भावा दृष्टा निखिलनश्वराः ।
मेघपङ्क्त्यादयो यद्वदेवं रागादयो मताः ॥

इति । यस्य च निरवयवतयैते विलीनाः स एवाप्तो भगवान्
सर्वज्ञः । अथानादित्वाद्रागादीनां कथं प्रलय इति चेत् । उपायतस्त-
40 न्नाशात् । अनादेरपि सुवर्णमलस्य क्षारमृत्पुटपाकादिना विलयोप
लम्भात् । तद्वदुपायानादीनामपि रागादिदोषाणां प्रतिपक्षभूतरत्नत्रया

भ्यासेन विलयोपपत्तेः। क्षीणदोषस्य च केवलज्ञानाव्यभिचारा-
त्सर्वज्ञत्वम्। तत्सिद्धिस्तु ज्ञानतारतम्यं क्वचिद्विश्रान्तं तारतम्यत्वात्
आकाशपरिमाणतारतम्यवत्। तथा सूक्ष्मान्तरितदूरार्थाः कस्य
145 चित्प्रत्यक्षा अनुमेयत्वात् क्षितिधरकन्धराधिकरणधूमध्वजवत्। एवं
चन्द्रसूर्योपरागादिसूचकज्योतिर्ज्ञानाविसंवादान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रभृत-
योऽपि हेतवो वाच्याः। तद्वचनात्मकेन सर्वविदा प्रणीत आगमः
प्रमाणमेव। तदप्रामाण्यं हि प्रणायकदोषनिबन्धनम्।

रागाद्वा द्वेषाद्वा मोहाद्वा वाक्यमुच्यते ह्यनृतम्।
150 यस्य तु नैते दोषास्तस्यानृतकारणं किं स्यात्॥

इति वचनात्। प्रणेतुश्च निर्दोषत्वमुपपादितमेवेति सिद्ध आग
मादप्यात्मा। एगे आया इत्यादिवचनात्॥ तदेवं प्रत्यक्षानु
मानागमैः सिद्धः प्रमाता॥

प्रमेयं चानन्तरमेव बाह्यार्थसाधने साधितम्। तत्सिद्धौ च
155 प्रमाणं ज्ञानं प्रमेयाभावे कस्य ग्राहकमस्तु निर्विषयत्वादिति
प्रलापमात्रम्। करणमन्तरेण क्रियासिद्धेरयोगात्। लवनादिषु
तथादर्शनात्। यच्चात्र समकालमित्याद्युक्तं तत्र विकल्पद्वयमपि
स्वीक्रियत एव। अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षं हि समकालार्थकलनकुशलम्।
स्मरणमतीतार्थस्य ग्राहकम्। शब्दानुमाने च त्रैकालिकस्याप्यर्थस्य
160 परिच्छेदके। निराकारं चैतद्द्वयमपि। न चातिप्रसङ्गः। स्वज्ञानावरण
वीर्यान्तरायक्षयोपशमविशेषवशादेवास्य नैयत्येन प्रवृत्तेः। शेषवि
कल्पानामस्वीकार एव तिरस्कारः॥

प्रमितिस्तु प्रमाणस्य फलं स्वसंवेदनसिद्धैव। न चानुमेयेष्वप्युप
देशापेक्षा। फलं च द्विधा। आनन्तर्यपारम्पर्यभेदात्। तत्रानन्तर्येण
165 सर्वप्रमाणानामज्ञाननिवृत्तिः फलम्। पारम्पर्येण केवलज्ञानस्य
तावत् फलमौदासीन्यम्। शेषप्रमाणानां तु हानोपादानोपेक्षा

बुद्ध्या ॥ इति शून्यवादिमतं प्रमाणादिपक्षक्षेपम् ॥

तथा च

नासन्न सन्न सदसन्न चाप्यनुभयात्मकम् ।
170 चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं तत्त्वं माध्यमिका विदुः ॥

इत्युन्मत्तभाषितम् ॥ किं चेदं प्रमाणादीनामवास्तवत्वं शून्यवादिना वस्तुवृत्त्या तावदेष्टव्यम् । तच्चासौ प्रमाणादभिमन्यते न प्रमाणाद्वा । न तावदप्रमाणात् तस्याकिंचित्करत्वात् । अथ प्रमाणात् तन्न । प्रमाणावास्तवत्वग्राहकं प्रमाणं सांवृतमसांवृतं वा स्यात् । यदि
175 सांवृतं कथं तस्मादवास्तवाद्वास्तवस्य शून्यवादस्य सिद्धिः । तदसिद्धौ च वास्तव एव समस्तोऽपि प्रमाणादिव्यवहारः प्राप्तः । अथ तद्ग्राहकं प्रमाणं स्वयमसांवृतम् । तर्हि क्षीणा प्रमाणादिव्यवहारावास्तवत्वप्रतिज्ञा । तेनैव व्यभिचारात् । तदेवं पक्षद्वयेपि इतो व्याघ्र इतस्तटीति न्यायेन व्यक्त एव परमार्थतः स्वाभिमतसिद्धिविरोधः ॥
180 इति काव्यार्थः ॥ १७ ॥

अधुना क्षणिकवादिन ऐहिकामुष्मिकव्यवहारानुपपमार्थ समर्थनमविमृश्यकारित्वं दर्शयन्नाह ।

कृतप्रणाशाकृतकर्मभोग-
भवप्रमोक्षस्मृतिभङ्गदोषान् ।
उपेक्ष्य साक्षात् क्षणभङ्गमिच्छ-
न्नहो महासाहसिक परस्ते ॥ १८ ॥

कृतप्रणाशदोषमकृतकर्मभोगदोषं भवभङ्गदोषं प्रमोक्षभङ्गदोषं स्मृतिभङ्गदोषमित्येतान्साक्षादित्यनुभवसिद्धानुपेक्ष्य अनादृत्य ।
5 साक्षात्कुर्वन्नपि गजनिमीलिकामवलम्बमानः । क्षणभङ्गम् यदा

नन्तरविनाशस्वभावक्षणक्षयिणाम्। इत्युक्तं भवति पथमानः। स एव। परः
प्रतिपक्षः येनाक्षिप्तः सोऽगत इत्यर्थः। अथवा महासाहसिकः। सहसा
अविमृश्यात्मकेन पक्षेन वर्तते साहसिकः। भाविनमनर्थमविभाव्य
यः प्रवर्तते स एवमुच्यते। महांश्चासौ साहसिकश्च महासाहसिकः
10 अत्यन्तमविमृश्य प्रवृत्तिकारी। इति समुच्चितार्थः॥

विवृतार्थस्त्वयम्। यदा बुद्धिक्षणपरंपरामात्रमेवात्मानमामनन्ति
न पुनर्मौक्तिकमणिनिकरानुस्यूतैकसूत्रवदन्वयिनमेकमात्मानं तन्मते यत
ज्ञानक्षणेन सदनुष्ठानमसदनुष्ठानं वा कृतं तस्य निरन्वयविनाशाच्च
तत्फलोपभोगः यस्य च फलोपभोगस्तेन तत्कर्म न कृतमिति या
15 स्याज्ज्ञानक्षणस्य कृतप्रणाशः स्वकृतकर्मफलस्यानुपभोगात् उत्तरज्ञानक्ष
णस्य चाकृतकर्मभोगः स्वयमकृतस्य कर्मणः फलोपभोगादिति। अत्र
कर्मशब्दः उभयत्रापि योज्यः। तेन कृतप्रणाशस्याकृतकर्मणश्च
इत्यनयोः दोषयोः प्रत्यासत्त्युपन्यासः।। तथा भवभङ्गदोषः। भव
आजवंजवीभावलक्षणः संसारः तस्य भङ्गो विनाशः स एव दोषः क्षणिक
20 वादे प्रसज्यते। परलोकाभावप्रसङ्गश्चायमर्थः। परलोकिनः कस्य
चिदभावात्। परलोको हि पूर्वजन्मकृतकर्मानुभागेण भवति। तत्र
प्राचीनज्ञानक्षणानां निरन्वयनाशात् केन नामोपभुज्यतां जन्मान्तरे।
यत्र योऽसावुत्सूत्रेण यदिदं तथैवान्तरं प्रतिसंधत्ते यद्यज्ञानीन्तनं
चित्तं चित्तं च मरणकालभावि इति भवपरंपरासिद्धये प्रमाणमुक्तं
25 तदयुक्तम्। चित्तक्षणानां निरन्वयविनाशिनां चित्तान्तरप्रतिसंधाना
योगात्। द्वयोरत्यन्तभिन्नयोरपि प्रतिसंधानमुभयानुगामिना केन
चित्क्रियते। यतोऽन्यः प्रतिसंधाता न तेन नाभ्युपगम्यते। स
चात्मान्वयी। न च प्रतिसंधत्त इत्यस्य जनयतीत्यर्थः। कार्यहेतु-
प्रसङ्गात्। तेन चाग्निनास्य दृष्टः स्वभावहेतुत्वेनोक्तत्वात्।
30 स्वभावहेतुश्च तादात्म्ये सति भवति। भिन्नकालभाविनोश्च

चित्तचित्तान्तरयोः कुतस्त्यान्तरम् । युगपद्भाविनोश्च प्रतिसंधेय-
प्रतिसंधायकत्वाभावापत्तिः । युगपदुत्पत्तिप्रतिनियमेऽपि किमत्र
नियामकं यदेकं प्रतिसंधायकमपरं च प्रतिसंधेयम् इति । अस्तु वा
प्रतिसंधानस्य ज्ञानमयः । सोऽप्यनुपपन्नः । तुल्यकालत्वे हेतुफल-
35 भावस्याभावात् । भिन्नकालत्वे च पूर्वचित्तक्षणस्य विनष्टत्वाद्
उत्तरचित्तक्षणः कथमुपादानमन्तरेणोत्पद्यताम् । इति यत्किंचिदेतत् ॥
तथा प्रमोक्षभङ्गदोषः । अरूपेणापुनर्भावेन कर्मबन्धनान्मुक्तिः प्रमो-
क्षः तस्यापि भङ्गः प्राप्नोति । तन्मते तावदात्मैव नास्ति कः प्रेत्य
सुखीभवनार्थं यतिष्यते । ज्ञानक्षणोऽपि संसारी कथमपरज्ञान-
40 क्षणसुखीभवनाय घटिष्यते । न हि दुःखी देवदत्तो यज्ञदत्तसुखाय
चेष्टमानो दृष्टः । क्षणस्य तु दुःखं स्वरसनाशित्वात्तेनैव सार्धं ध्वस्तम् ।
संतानस्तु न वास्तवः कश्चित् । वास्तवत्वे तु आत्माभ्युपगम-
प्रसङ्गः । अपि च बौद्धा निखिलवासनोच्छेदे विगतविषयाकारोप-
प्लवविशुद्धज्ञानोत्पादो मोक्ष इत्याहुः तच्च न घटते । कारणाभावादेव
45 तदनुपपत्तेः । भावनाप्रचयो हि तस्य कारणमिष्यते । स च स्थिरैका-
श्रयाभावाद्विशेषानाधायकः प्रतिक्षणमपूर्ववदुपजायमानो निरन्वय-
विनाशी गगनलङ्घनाभ्यासवदनासादितप्रकर्षो न स्फुटाभिज्ञान-
जननाय प्रभवतीत्यनुपपत्तिरेव तस्य । समस्तचित्तक्षणानां स्वाभावि-
क्याः सदृशारम्भणशक्तेरसदृशारम्भं प्रत्यक्षमत्वादकस्मादनुच्छे-
50 दात् । किं च समस्तचित्तक्षणाः पूर्वं स्वरसपरिनिर्वाणाः, अयम
पूर्वो जातः संतानश्चैको न विद्यते यन्मोक्षो यत्नाभिरम्भो
न विषयभेदेन यदैव तत्कस्यायं मुक्त्यै एतदर्थं प्रयतते । अयं
हि मोक्षशब्दो बन्धनविच्छेदपर्यायः । मोक्षश्च तस्यैव घटते
यो बद्धः । क्षणक्षयपक्षे त्वन्यः क्षणो बद्धः क्षणान्तरस्य
55 मुक्तिरिति मोक्षाभावः प्राप्नोति ॥ तथा स्मृतिभङ्गदोषः । तथा

हि पूर्वबुद्ध्यानुभूतेऽर्थे नोत्तरबुद्धीनां स्मृतिः संभवति । ततोऽन्य-
त्वात् । संतानान्तरबुद्धिवत् । न ह्यन्यदृष्टोऽर्थोऽन्येन स्मर्यते ।
अन्यथा एकेन दृष्टोऽर्थः सर्वैः स्मर्येत । स्मरणाभावे च कुत
स्तरां प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रसूतिः । तस्याः स्मरणानुभवोभयसंभवत्वात् ।
60 पदार्थप्रेक्षणप्रबुद्धसात्कृतसंस्कारस्य हि प्रमातुः स एवायमित्या
कारणयमुत्पद्यते । अथ स्यादयं दोषो यद्यविशेषेणान्यदृष्टमन्य
स्मरतीत्युच्यते । किंत्वन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणभावादेव च
स्मृतिः । भिन्नसंतानबुद्धीनां तु कार्यकारणभावो नास्ति तेन
संतानान्तराणां स्मृतिर्न भवति । न चैकसांतानिकीनामपि
65 बुद्धीनां कार्यकारणभावो नास्ति येन पूर्वबुद्ध्यनुभूतेऽर्थे
तदुत्तरबुद्धीनां स्मृतिर्न स्यात् । तदप्यनवदातम् । एवमपि अन्य
त्वस्य तदवस्थत्वात् । न हि कार्यकारणभावाभिधानेऽपि
तदपगतम् । क्षणिकत्वेन सर्वासां भिन्नत्वात् । न हि कार्यकारण-
भावात्स्मृतिरित्युभयप्रसिद्धोऽस्ति दृष्टान्तः । अथ

70 यस्मिन्नेव हि संताने आहिता कर्मवासना ।
फलं तत्रैव संधत्ते कर्पासे रक्तता यथा ॥

इति कर्पासरक्ततादृष्टान्तोऽस्तीति चेत् तदसाधीयः । साधन
दूषणयोरसंभवात् । तथा हि अन्वयाद्यसंभवान्न साधनम् । न हि
कार्यकारणभावो यत्र तत्र स्मृतिः कर्पासे रक्ततावदित्यन्वयः
75 संभवति । नापि यत्र न स्मृतिस्तत्र न कार्यकारणभाव इति व्यति
रेकोऽस्ति । असिद्धत्वाद्युद्भावनाच्च न दूषणम् । न हि ततोऽन्यत्वा
दित्यस्य हेतोः कर्पासे रक्ततावदित्यनेन कश्चिद्दोषः प्रतिपाद्यते ।
किंच यद्यन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणभावेन स्मृतिरिष्यते तदा
शिष्याचार्यादिबुद्धीनामपि कार्यकारणभावसद्भावेन स्मृत्यादि
80 स्यात् । अथ नायं प्रसङ्गः एकसंतानत्वे सतीति विशेषणादिति चेत्

तदप्ययुक्तम्। भेदाभेदपक्षाभ्यां तस्योपक्षीणत्वात्। क्षणपरंपरातस्तस्याभेदे हि क्षणपरंपरैव सा। तथा च संतान इति न किंचिदतिरिक्तमुक्तं स्यात्। भेदे त्वपारमार्थिकः पारमार्थिको वाऽसौ स्यात्। अपारमार्थिकत्वेऽस्य तदेव दूषणम्। अकिंचित्करत्वात्। पारमार्थिक-
८५ त्वे स्थिरो वा स्यात् क्षणिको वा। क्षणिकत्वे संतानिनिर्विशेष एवायमिति किमनेन स्तेनभीतस्य स्तेनान्तरशरणस्वीकरणानुकारिणा। स्थिरश्चेद् आत्मैव संज्ञाभेदतिरोहितः प्रतिपन्नः। इति न स्मृतिर्घटते क्षणक्षयवादिनाम्। तदभावे चानुमानस्यानुत्थानमित्युक्तं प्रागेव। अपि च स्मृतेरभावे निहितप्रत्युन्मार्गणप्रत्यर्पणादि-
९० व्यवहारा विशीर्येरन्।

इत एकनवते कल्पे शक्त्या मे पुरुषो हतः।
तेन कर्मविपाकेन पादे विद्धोऽस्मि भिक्षवः॥

इति वचनस्य च का गतिः। एवमुत्पत्तिरुत्पादयति स्थितिः स्थापयति जरा जर्जरयति विनाशो नाशयति इति चतुःक्षणिकं
९५ वस्तु प्रतिजानाना अपि प्रतिक्षेप्याः। क्षणचतुष्कानन्तरमपि निहितप्रत्युन्मार्गणादिव्यवहाराणां दर्शनात्। तदेवमनेकदोषाघातेऽपि यः क्षणभङ्गमभिप्रैति तस्य महत् साहसमिति काव्यार्थः॥१८॥

अथ तथागताः क्षणक्षयपक्षे सर्वव्यवहारानुपपत्तिं परैः सद्भाविताम् आकर्ण्येत्थं प्रतिपादयिष्यन्ति। यत्सर्वपदार्थानां क्षणिकत्वेऽपि वासनाबलसम्पन्नमन्मना ऐक्याध्यवसायेन ऐहिकामुष्मिकव्यवहारप्रवृत्तेः कृतप्रणाशादिदोषा निरवकाशा एवेति। तदाकूतं
५ परिहर्तुकामस्तत्कल्पितवासनायाः क्षणपरंपरातो भेदाभेदानुभयलक्षणे पक्षत्रयेऽप्यघटमानत्वं दर्शयन् स्वाभिमतभेदाभेदस्याद्वादमकामयमानानपि तानङ्गीकारयितुमाह।

सा वासना सा क्षणसंततिश्च
नाभेदभेदानुभयैर्घटेते ।
ततस्तटादर्शिशकुन्तपोत-
न्यायात्त्वदुक्तानि परे श्रयन्तु ॥ १९ ॥

सा शाक्यपरिकल्पिता त्रुटितमुक्तावलीकल्पानां परस्परविशकलितानां क्षणानामन्योन्यानुस्यूतत्वप्रत्ययजनिका एकसूत्रस्थानीया संतानापरपर्याया वासना । वासनेति पूर्वज्ञानजनितामुत्तरज्ञाने शक्तिमाहुः । सा च क्षणसंततिस्तद्दर्शनप्रसिद्धा प्रदीपकलिकावन्नवनवोत्पद्यमानाऽपरापरसदृशक्षणपरंपरा । एते द्वे अपि अभेदभेदानुभयैर्न घटेते ॥ न तावदभेदेन तादात्म्येन ते घटेते । तथाहि अभेदे वासना वा स्यात् क्षणपरंपरा वा । न द्वयम् । यदि यस्माद् भिन्नं न तत् पृथगुपलभ्यते यथा घटात् घटस्वरूपम् । केवलायां वासनायामन्वयिस्वीकारः। वास्याभावे च किं तया वासनीयमस्तु । इति तस्या अपि न स्वरूपमवतिष्ठते । क्षणपरंपरामात्राङ्गीकरणे च प्राच एव दोषाः ॥ न च भेदेन ते युज्येते । सा हि भिन्ना वासना क्षणिका स्यादक्षणिका वा । क्षणिका चेत् तर्हि क्षणेभ्यस्तस्याः पृथक्कल्पनं व्यर्थम् । अक्षणिका चेदन्वयिपदार्थाभ्युपगमेनागमबाधः । तथा च पदार्थान्तराणां क्षणिकत्वकल्पनाप्रयासो व्यसनमात्रम् ॥ अनुभयपक्षेऽपि न घटेते । स हि कदाचिदेवं ब्रूयात् नाहं वासनायाः क्षणश्रेणितोऽभेदं प्रतिपद्ये न च भेदं किं त्वनुभयमिति । तदप्यनुचितम्। भेदाभेदयोर्विधिनिषेधरूपयोरेकतरप्रतिषेधेऽन्यतरस्यावश्यं विधिभावादन्यतरपक्षाभ्युपगमः । तत्र च प्रागुक्त एव दोषः । अथवाऽनुभयरूपत्वेऽवस्तुत्वप्रसङ्गः । भेदाभेदलक्षणपक्षद्वयव्यतिरिक्तस्य मार्गान्तरस्यानस्तित्वात् । अनार्हतानां हि

प्यद्रोपः ॥ अत्र च समुद्रस्थानीयः संसारः । पोतसमानं त्वच्छासनम् । कूपस्तम्भसंनिभः स्याद्वादः । पक्षिपातोपमा 5 वादिनः । ते च स्वामिमतपक्षप्ररूपणोद्यमेन मुक्तिलक्षणतटप्राप्तये कृतप्रयत्ना अपि तस्मादिष्टार्थसिद्धिमपश्यन्तो व्याघुट्य स्याद्वादरूपकूपस्तम्भाश्रयत्वापन्नजिनशासनप्रवहणोपसर्पणमेव यदि शरणीकुर्वते तदा तेषां प्रमाणवादिरिनिष्क्रमणमनोरथः सफलतां कलयति नापरथेति काव्यार्थः ॥ १९ ॥

एवं क्रियावादिनां मायादुष्टानां कतिपयकुग्रहनिग्रहं विधाय सांप्रतमक्रियावादिनां लौकायतिकानां मतं सर्वाधमत्वादन्ते उपन्यस्यन् तन्मतमूलस्य प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणस्यानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरानङ्गीकारेऽकिंचित्करत्वप्रदर्शनेन तेषां प्रज्ञायाः प्रमादमादर्शयति ।

विनानुमानेन पराभिसंधि
मसंविदानस्य तु नास्तिकस्य ।
न साम्प्रतं वक्तुमपि क्व चेष्टा
क्व दृष्टमात्रं च हहा प्रमादः ॥ २० ॥

5 प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमिति मन्यते चार्वाकः । तन्न संगच्छते ॥ अनु पश्चात् लिङ्गसंबन्धग्रहणस्मरणानन्तरं मीयते परिच्छिद्यते देशकालस्वभावविप्रकृष्टोऽर्थोऽनेन ज्ञानविशेषेणेत्यनुमानम् । अस्वात् स्वार्थानुमानम् । तेनानुमानेन लैङ्गिकप्रमाणेन विना पराभिसंधिं पराभिप्रायम् असंविदानस्य सम्यगजानानस्य तुशब्दः पूर्ववादिभ्यो 10 भेदद्योतनार्थः । पूर्वेषां वादिनामास्तिकतया विप्रतिपत्तिस्थानेषु सावकाशाः नास्तिकस्य तु वक्तुमपि नोचिती कुत एव तेन सह साद इति तुशब्दार्थः । नास्ति परलोकः पुण्यं पापमिति वा मतिरस्य ।

नास्तिकास्तिकदैष्टिकम् इति निपातनान्नास्तिकः। तस्य नास्तिकस्य लौकायतिकस्य। वक्तुमपि न सांप्रतम् वचनमप्युच्चारयितुं नोचितम्। ततस्तूष्णींभाव एवास्य श्रेयान्। दूरे प्रामाणिकपरिषदि प्रविश्य प्रमाणोपन्यासगोष्ठी। वचनं हि परप्रत्यायनाय प्रतिपाद्यते। परेण चाप्रतिपित्सितमर्थं प्रतिपादयन्नसौ सतामवधेयवचनो न भवत्युन्मत्तवत्। ननु कथमिव तूष्णींकतैवास्य श्रेयसी यावता चेष्टाविशेषादिना प्रतिपाद्यस्याभिप्रायमनुमाय सुकरमेवानेन वचनोच्चारणम् इत्याशङ्क्याह क्व चेष्टा क्व दृष्टमात्रं च इति। क्वेति बृहदन्तरे। चेष्टा इङ्गितम्। पराभिप्रायरूपस्यानुमेयस्य लिङ्गम्। क्व च दृष्टमात्रम्। दर्शनं दृष्टम्। भावे क्तः। दृष्टमेव दृष्टमात्रम् प्रत्यक्षमात्रम्। तस्य लिङ्गनिरपेक्षप्रवृत्तित्वात्। अत एव दूरमन्तरमेतयोः। न हि प्रत्यक्षेणातीन्द्रियाः परचेतोवृत्तयः परिज्ञातुं शक्याः। तस्यैन्द्रियकत्वात्। मुखप्रसादादिचेष्टया तु लिङ्गभूतया पराभिप्रायस्य निश्चये अनुमानप्रमाणमनिच्छतोपि तस्य बलादापतितम्। तथा हि। मद्वचनश्रवणाभिप्रायवानयं पुरुषः। तादृग्मुखप्रसादादिचेष्टान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति। अतश्च हहा प्रमादः। हहा इति खेदे। अहो तस्य प्रमादः प्रमत्तता यदनुभूयमानमप्यनुमानं प्रत्यक्षमात्राङ्गीकारेणापह्नुते। अत्र संपूर्वस्य चेतेरकर्मकत्व एवात्मनेपदम् अत्र तु कर्मास्ति तत्कथमत्रात्मनेपदम्। अत्रोच्यते। अत्र सैनदिदं शक्तः संचिदान इति कार्यम्। यथाशक्तिज्ञीसे इति वक्तौ ज्ञानविधानात्। तत्प्रायमर्थं। अनुमानेन विना पराभिसंहितं सम्यग्विदितुमशक्तस्येति। एवं परबुद्धिज्ञानान्यथानुपपत्त्यायमनुमानं हठादङ्गीकारितः। तथा प्रकारान्तरेणाप्ययमङ्गीकारयितव्यः। तथा हि। चार्वाकः काश्चिज्ज्ञानव्यक्तीः संवादित्वेनाव्यभिचारिणीरुपलभ्यान्याश्च विसंवादित्वेन व्यभिचारिणीः पुनः

वस्तुना भिन्नेन वा भाव्यमभिन्नेन वा। तदुभयातीतस्य वस्त्वन्तरस्या-
नन्वयमापत्तात्। एवं विकल्पद्वयेपि क्षणपरंपरावासनयोरनुपपत्तौ
30 पारिशेष्याद्भेदाभेदपक्ष एव कक्षीकरणीयः। न च मन्तव्यं
यो भवेद्दोषो द्वयोर्भावे कथं न सः इति वचनाद्भयापि
दोषवातद्वयस्पर्शमिति वाच्यम् कुक्कुटसर्पनरसिंहादिवज्जात्यन्तरत्वाद
नेकान्तपक्षस्य। नन्वार्हतानां वासनाक्षणपरंपरयोरङ्गीकार एव
नास्ति तत्कथं तदाश्रयभेदाभेदचिन्त्या चरितार्था इति चेन्मैवम्।
35 स्याद्वादवादिनामपि हि प्रतिक्षणं नवनवपर्यायपरंपरोत्पत्तिरभि
मतैव। तथा च क्षणिकत्वम्। अतीतानागतवर्तमानपर्यायपरंपरानु
संधायकं चान्वयि द्रव्यम् तच्च वासनेति संज्ञान्तरभागपि अभिमतमेव।
न खलु नामभेदाद्भेदः कोपि कोविदानाम्। सा च प्रतिक्षणोत्पाद
ष्णुपर्यायपरंपरा अन्वयिद्रव्यात् कथंचिद्भिन्ना कथंचिदभिन्ना। तथा
40 तदपि तस्याः स्याद्भिन्नं स्यादभिन्नम्। इति पृथक्त्वमस्यव्यपदेशादपि
पर्यायाद्भेदः। द्रव्यस्यैव च तथा तथा परिणमनादभेदः। एतच्च सक
लादेशविकलादेशव्याख्याने पुरस्तात्प्रपञ्चयिष्यामः॥

अपि च बौद्धमते वासनापि तावन्न घटते इति निर्विषया तत्र
भेदादिविकल्पचिन्ता। तल्लक्षणं हि पूर्वक्षणेनोत्तरक्षणस्य वास्यता।
45 न चास्थिराणां भिन्नकालत्वादन्योन्यासंबद्धानां च तेषां वास्य
वासकभावो युज्यते। स्थिरस्य संबद्धस्य च पटादेर्मृगमदादिना
वास्यत्वं दृष्टमिति। अथ पूर्वचित्तसहजातचेतनाविशेषात्स्वसंतति
विशिष्टचित्तोत्पत्तौ सोऽस्य शक्तिविशेषविशिष्टचित्तोत्पादो वासना। तथा
हि पूर्वचित्तं रूपादिविषयं यदपि विज्ञानं यत् तत् पञ्चविधम्। पञ्च
50 रूपादिविज्ञानान्यविकल्पकानि षष्ठं च विकल्पविज्ञानम्। तत्र
सह जातः समानकालभवनाविशेषाङ्गाकारात्मकमालयविज्ञानम्।
तस्मात्पूर्वशक्तिविशिष्टचित्तोत्पादो वासनेति। तदपि न। अस्य

रत्वाद्वासकेनासंबन्धाच्च । यथासौ चेतनाविशेषः पूर्वचित्तसहभावी
स न वर्तमाने चेतस्युपकारं करोति । वर्तमानस्याश्रयस्थापनेयो-
55 पनेयस्तेनाविकार्यत्वात् । तद्धि यथाभूतं जायते तथाभूतं विन-
श्यतीति । नाप्यनागते उपकारं करोति । तेन सहासंबद्धत्वात् ।
असंबद्धं च न भावयतीत्युक्तम् । तस्मात् सौगतमते वासनापि
न घटते । अत्र च स्तुतिकारेणाभ्युपेत्यापि सामान्यविद्वन्य-
स्थापनाय भेदाभेदादिचर्चा विरचितेति भावनीयम् ॥

60 अथोत्तरार्धव्याख्या । तत इति ॥ पक्षत्रयेऽपि दोषसद्भावात् त्वदु-
क्तानि मद्वचनानि भेदाभेदस्याद्वादसंवादपूतानि परे कुतीर्थ्याः
प्रकरणान्मायापातनीया श्रयन्तु आश्रयन्ताम् । अत्रोपमानमाह
तटादर्शीत्यादि । तटं न पश्यतीति तटादर्शी यः शकुन्तपोतः
पक्षिशावकः तस्य न्यायः उदाहरणं तस्मात् । यथा किल
65 कश्चिदपारपारावारान्तःपातितः काकादिशकुनिशावको यदि
निर्जिगमिषया प्रवहणकूपस्तम्भादेरुत्थाय मुग्धतयोड्डीनः
समन्ताज्जलप्लावनमयमवलोकयंस्तन्मध्ये निर्वेदादपावृत्य तदेव
कूपस्तम्भादिस्थानमाश्रयते गत्यन्तराभावात् तेऽपि कुतीर्थ्याः
प्रागुक्तपक्षत्रयेऽपि वस्तुसिद्धिमनासादयन्तस्त्वदुक्तमेव चतुर्थं भेदा-
70 भेदपक्षमनिच्छयापि कक्षीकुर्वाणास्त्वच्छासनमत्र प्रतिपद्यन्ताम् ।
न हि स्वस्य वसनिकृन्ततामापन्नस्य बलीयसः अमोघः शरण्या-
श्रयणं दोषपोषाय नीतिशालिनाम् । त्वदुक्तानीति बहुवचन
सर्वेषामपि तन्त्रान्तरीयाणां परे पदेऽनेकान्तवादप्रतिपत्तिरेव
यथावस्थितपदार्थप्रतिपादनोपयिकी नान्यदिति ज्ञापनार्थम् ।
75 अनन्तधर्मात्मकस्य सर्वस्य वस्तुनः सर्वनयात्मकेन स्याद्वादेन
विना यथावदुपलब्धुमशक्यत्वात् । इतरथान्धगजन्यायेन पल्लव-
ग्राहिताप्रसङ्गात् ॥ अथयन्तीति वर्तमानान्तं केचित्पठन्ति तथा

प्यदोषः ॥ अत्र च समुद्रस्थानीयः संसारः । पोतसमानं त्वच्छासनम् । कूपस्तम्भसंनिभः स्याद्वादः । पक्षिपोतोपमा
10 वादिनः । ते च स्वामिमतपक्षप्रक्षपणोड्डयनेन मुक्तिलक्षणतटमाप्तये कृतप्रयत्ना अपि तस्यातिष्ठार्थसिद्धिमपश्यन्तो भगवत्स्याद्वादकूपस्तम्भास्कन्दवत्तावकीनशासनप्रवहणोपसर्पणमेव यदि शरणीकुर्वते तदा तेषां भवाणवादुत्तिर्निष्क्रमणमनोरथः सफलतां कलयति नापरथेति काव्यार्थः ॥ १९ ॥

एवं क्रियावादिनां मतावादुकानां कतिपयकुग्रहनिग्रहं विधाय सांप्रतमक्रियावादिनां लौकायतिकानां मतं सर्वाधमत्वादन्ते उपन्यस्यन् तन्मतमूलस्य प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणस्यानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरानङ्गीकारेऽकिंचित्करत्वप्रदर्शनेन तेषां प्रज्ञायाः प्रमादमादर्शयति ।

विनानुमानेन पराभिसंधि
मसंविदानस्य तु नास्तिकस्य ।
न साम्प्रतं वक्तुमपि क्व चेष्टा
क्व दृष्टमात्रं च हहा प्रमादः ॥ २० ॥

5 प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमिति मन्यते चार्वाकः । तत्र संलपते ॥ अनु पश्चात् लिङ्गग्रहणसंबन्धस्मरणानन्तरं मीयते परिच्छिद्यते देशकालस्वभावविप्रकृष्टोऽर्थोऽनेन ज्ञानविशेषेणेत्यनुमानम् । मस्ताचात् स्वार्थानुमानम् । तेनानुमानेन लैङ्गिकप्रमाणेन विना पराभिसंधिं पराभिप्रायम् असंविदानस्य सम्यगजानानस्यानुभवन्त्यः पूर्ववादिभ्यो
10 भेदद्योतनार्थः । पूर्वेषां वादिनामास्तिकत्वया विप्रतिपत्तिस्थानेषु सावः कृतः नास्तिकस्य तु वक्तुमपि नौचिती कुत एव तेन सह सोद इति तुशब्दार्थः । नास्ति परलोकः पुण्यं पापमिति वा मतिरस्य ।

नास्तिकास्तिकदैष्टिकम् इति निपातनान्नास्तिकः। तस्य नास्तिकस्य लौकायतिकस्य। वक्तुमपि न सांप्रतम् वचनमप्युच्चारयितुं नो 15 चितम्। ततस्तूष्णींभाव एवास्य श्रेयान्। दूरे प्रामाणिकपरिषदि प्रविश्य प्रमाणोपन्यासगोष्ठी। वचनं हि परप्रत्यायनाय प्रतिपाद्यते। परेण चाप्रतिपित्सितमर्थं प्रतिपादयन्नसौ सतामनवधेयवचनो भव त्युन्मत्तवत्। ननु कथमिव तूष्णींकतास्य श्रेयसी यावता चेष्टाविशे षादिना प्रतिपाद्यस्याभिप्रायमनुमाय सुकरमेवानेन वचनोच्चारण 20 मित्याशङ्क्याह क्व चेष्टा क्व दृष्टमात्रं च इति। क्वेति दूरमन्तरे। चेष्टा इङ्गितम्। पराभिप्रायरूपस्यानुमेयस्य लिङ्गम्। क्व च दृष्ट-मात्रम्। दर्शनं दृष्टम्। भावे क्तः। दृष्टमेव दृष्टमात्रम् प्रत्यक्षमात्रम्। तस्य लिङ्गनिरपेक्षप्रवृत्तित्वात्। अत एव दूरमन्तरमेतयोः। न हि प्रत्यक्षेणातीन्द्रियाः परचेतोवृत्तयः परिज्ञातुं शक्याः। तस्यैन्द्रिय 25 कत्वात्। मुखप्रसादादिचेष्टया तु लिङ्गभूतया पराभिप्रायस्य निश्चये अनुमानप्रमाणमनिच्छतोऽपि तस्य बलादापतितम्। तथा हि। मद्वचनश्रवणाभिप्रायवानयं पुरुषः। तादृग्मुखप्रसादादिचेष्टा न्यथानुपपत्तेरिति। अतश्च हहा प्रमादः। हहा इति खेदे। अहो तस्य प्रमादः प्रमत्तता यदनुभूयमानमप्यनुमानं प्रत्यक्ष- 30 मात्राङ्गीकारेणापह्नुते। अत्र संपूर्वस्य चेतेरकर्मकत्व एवात्मने पदम् अत्र तु कर्मास्ति तत्कथमत्रात्मनेपदम्। अत्रोच्यते। अत्र संचेतितुं शक्तः संचिन्वान इति कार्यम्। वयःशक्तिशीले इति शक्तौ शानविधानात्। ततश्चायमर्थः। अनुमानेन विना पराभि संहितं सम्यगविदुमशक्तस्येति। एवं परबुद्धिज्ञानान्यथानुपपत्त्याऽ 35 यमनुमानं हठादङ्गीकारितः। तथा प्रकारान्तरेणाप्ययमङ्गीकार यितव्यः। तथा हि। चार्वाकः काश्चिज्ज्ञानव्यक्तीः संवादित्वेना व्यभिचारिणीरुपलभ्यान्याश्च विसंवादित्वेन व्यभिचारिणीः पुनः

कालान्तरे चात्मप्रतीतिराणां ज्ञानव्यक्तीनामप्रामाण्यं प्रमाणतेतरते
व्यवस्थापयेत् । न च संनिहितार्थबलेनोत्पद्यमानं पूर्वापरपरामर्श-
40 शून्यं प्रत्यक्षं पूर्वापरकालभाविनीनां ज्ञानव्यक्तीनां प्रामाण्या-
प्रामाण्यव्यवस्थापकं निमित्तमुपलक्षयितुं क्षमते । न चायं स्वप्रती-
तिगोचराणामपि ज्ञानव्यक्तीनां परं प्रति प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं वा
व्यवस्थापयितुं प्रभवति । तस्माद्यथादृष्टज्ञानव्यक्तिसाधर्म्यद्वारेणे-
दानीन्तनज्ञानव्यक्तीनां प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यव्यवस्थापकं परप्रति-
45 पादकं च प्रमाणान्तरमनुमानरूपमुपासीत । परलोकादिनिषेधश्च
न प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण शक्यः कर्तुम् । संनिहितमात्रविषयत्वात्तस्य ।
परलोकादिकं चाप्रतिषिध्य नायं सुखमास्ते प्रमाणान्तरं च
नेच्छतीति डिम्भहेवाकः ॥ किंच प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यर्थाव्यभिचारादेव
प्रामाण्यम् । कथमितरथा स्नानपानावगाहनाद्यर्थक्रियाऽसमर्थे
50 मरुमरीचिकानिचयचुम्बिनि प्रत्यक्षे न प्रामाण्यम् । तच्च अर्थ-
प्रतिबन्धलिङ्गशब्दद्वारा समुन्मज्जतोरनुमानागमयोरप्यर्थाव्यभिचा-
रादेव किं नेष्यते । व्यभिचारिणोरप्यनयोर्दर्शनादप्रामाण्यमिति
चेत् । प्रत्यक्षस्यापि तिमिरादिदोषान्निशीथिनीनाथयुगलावलम्बि-
नोऽप्रमाणस्य दर्शनात्सर्वत्राप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः । प्रत्यक्षाभासं तदिति
55 चेत् इतरत्रापि तुल्यमेतदन्यत्र पक्षपातात् । एवं च प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण
वस्तुव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः । अमूला जीवपुण्यापुण्यपरलोकनिषेधादि
वार्ता अप्रमाणमेव ॥ एवं नास्तिकाभिमतो भूतचिद्वादोऽपि निरा
कार्यः । तथा च द्रव्यालङ्कारकार उपयोगवर्णने । न चायं
भूतधर्मः । सत्त्वकठिनत्वादिवत् मद्याङ्गेषु भ्रम्यादिमदशक्तिवच्च
60 प्रत्येकमनुपलम्भात् । अनभिव्यक्तावस्थासिद्धेः । कायाकारपरि
णतेभ्यस्तेभ्यः स प्रत्ययः इति चेत् कायपरिणामोऽपि तन्मात्रभावी
न कादाचित्कः । अन्यस्यात्मन स्यात् । मद्गरे च देहादि

नियमः । मृतादपि च स्यात् । शोणितादुपाधिः सुप्तादावप्यस्ति ।
न च सततस्योत्पत्तिः । भूयोभूयः प्रसङ्गात् । अभ्यासमनभ
65 प्रसिद्धमर्थक्रियाकारित्वं विरुध्येत । अमतः सकम्पशक्तिविकल्पस्य
स्वयमुत्पत्तौ कर्तृत्वम् । अन्यस्यापि प्रसङ्गात् । तत्र भूतकाय
मुपयोगः । कुतस्तर्हि सुप्तोत्थितस्य तदुत्थः । स्वसंवेदनेन चैतन्य
स्याभावात् । न । जाग्रदवस्थानुभूतस्य स्मरणात् । असंवेदनं तु
निद्रोपघातात् । कथं तर्हि कायविकृतौ चैतन्यविकृतिः । नैकान्तः ।
70 चित्रादिना कश्मलमयुपयोपि बुद्धिशुद्धेः । अविकारे च भावनाविशेषतः
प्रीत्यादिभेददर्शनात् । शोकादिना बुद्धिविकृतौ कायविकारदर्शनाच्च ।
परिणामिना विना च न कार्योत्पत्तिः । न च भूतान्येव तथा
परिणमन्ति । विजातीयत्वात् । काठिन्यादेरनुपलम्भात् । अथव एवे
न्द्रियग्राह्यत्वरूपां स्थूलतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते तज्जातास्यादि चोपलभ्यत ।
75 तत्र भूतानां धर्मः कर्म वा उपयोगः । तथा मनोम प्रदाक्षिपनि
तदस्य स्मरणम् । स चात्मा स्वसंविदितः । भूतानां तथाभावे
परिमुर्गं स्यात् । गौरोऽहमित्यादि तु नान्यमुग्यम् । पावकरणजन्य
त्वात् ॥ अनभ्युपगतानुमानप्रामाण्यस्य चात्मनिषधोपि दुर्लभः ।

धर्मे कर्मे च भूतानामुपयोगो भवेद्यदि ।
80 प्रत्यक्षमुपलम्भः स्यादुत्पादो वा विलक्षणात् ॥

इति कन्यायः ।

एवमुक्तयुक्तिभिरेकान्तवादप्रतिक्षेपमाख्याय साम्प्रतमनादिवि
द्यावासनाप्रवासितसन्ततयः प्रत्यक्षोपलक्ष्यमाणमप्यनेकान्तवादं
यदनभ्युपगच्छन्त तत्पामुन्मत्ततामाविर्भावयन्नाह ।

प्रतिक्षणोत्पादविनाशयोगि
स्थिरैकमध्यक्षमपीक्षमाणः ।

जिन त्वदाज्ञामवमन्यते यः
स वातकी नाथ पिशाचकी वा ॥२१॥

अविच्युतं अविसमयम्। उत्पादं उत्तराकारस्वीकाररूपं विना-
5 शं च पूर्वाकारपरिहारलक्षणं युञ्जत इत्यर्थसंबन्धः अविसमात्पाद-
विनाशयोगि। किं तत्। स्थिरैकं कर्मतापन्नम्। स्थिरमुत्पादविनाशयो-
रनुयायित्वात् त्रिकालवर्ति यदेकं द्रव्यं स्थिरैकम्। एकशब्दोऽत्र साधा-
रणवाची। उत्पादे विनाशे च तस्य साधारणम्। अन्वयिद्रव्यत्वात्। यथा
चैत्रमैत्रयोरेका जननी साधारणेत्यर्थः। इत्थमेव हि तयोरेकाधिक-
10 रणता। पर्यायाणां कथंचिद्भिन्नत्वेऽपि तस्य कथंचिदेकत्वात्।
एवं यथार्थवस्तुतत्त्वव्यवस्थापकसमाजः मत्स्यसमवलोकनमपि। हे
जिन रागादिजेतः। त्वदाज्ञाम् आ सामस्त्येनानन्तधर्मविशिष्टतया
ज्ञायन्ते अवबुध्यन्ते जीवाजीवादयः पदार्था यया सा आज्ञा आगमः
शासनम्। तवाज्ञा त्वदाज्ञा तां त्वदाज्ञां भवत्प्रणीतस्याद्वादमुद्राम्।
15 यः कश्चिदविवेकी अवमन्यते अवमानयति। जात्यपेक्षमेकवचनम् अव-
ज्ञया वा। स पुरुषपशुः वातकी पिशाचकी वा। वातो रोगविशेषः
अस्यास्तीति वातकी वातकीव वातकी वातूल इत्यर्थः। एवं पिशा-
चकीव पिशाचकी भूताविष्ट इत्यर्थः। अत्र वाशब्दः समुच्चयार्थ
उपमानार्थो वा। स पुरुषापसदो वातकिपिशाचकिभ्यामधिरो
20 इति सुखामित्यर्थः। वातकीसारपिशाचाक्रान्तः इत्यनेन
मत्वर्थीयः क्रमान्तः। एवं पिशाचकीत्यपि। यथा किल वातेन
पिशाचेन वाक्रान्तवपुः सत्त्वसारमपि तत्त्वमभाव-
न्यथा मतिपथ एवमयमप्येकान्तवादापस्मारपरवश इति ॥

अत्र च जिनेति साभिप्रायम्। रागादिजेतृत्वाद्धि जिनः। ततश्च
यः किल विगलितदोषकालुष्यतया वचनस्यापि ततमपद

30 शासनमनभ्यसते तस्य कथं नोन्मत्ततेति भावः । नाथ हे स्वामिन् !
अलब्धस्य सम्यग्दर्शनादेर्लम्भकतया लब्धस्य च तस्यैव निर-
तिचारपरिपालनोपदेशदायितया च योगक्षेमकरत्वोपपत्तेर्नाथ ।
तस्यामन्त्रणम् ।

वस्तुतत्त्वं चोत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मकम् । तथा हि । सर्वं वस्तु
35 द्रव्यात्मना नोत्पद्यते विपद्यते वा । परिस्फुटमन्वयदर्शनात् । लून
पुनर्जातनखादिष्वन्वयदर्शनेन व्यभिचार इति न वाच्यम् । प्रमाणेन
बाध्यमानस्यान्वयस्यापरिस्फुटत्वात् । न च प्रस्तुतोऽन्वयः प्रमाण
विरुद्धः । सत्यप्रत्यभिज्ञानसिद्धत्वात् ।

सर्वव्यक्तिषु नियतं क्षणे क्षणेऽन्यत्वमथ च न विशेषः ।
40 सत्याश्चित्यपचित्योराकृतिजातिव्यवस्थानात् ॥

इति वचनात् । ततो द्रव्यात्मना स्थितिरेव सर्वस्य वस्तुनः ।
पर्यायात्मना तु सर्वं वस्तूत्पद्यते विपद्यते च । अस्खलितपर्यायानुभ
वसद्भावात् । न चैवं शुक्ले शङ्खे पीतादिपर्यायानुभवेन व्यभिचारः ।
तस्य स्खलद्रूपत्वात् । न खलु सोऽस्खलद्रूपो येन पूर्वाकारविनाशा
45 जहद्वृत्तोत्तराकारोत्पादाविनाभावी भवेत् । न च जीवादौ वस्तुनि
हर्षामर्षौदासीन्यादिपर्यायपरम्परानुभवः स्खलद्रूपः । कस्यचिद्
बाधकस्याभावात् । ननूत्पादादयः परस्परं भिद्यन्ते न वा । यदि
भिद्यन्ते कथमेकं वस्तु त्र्यात्मकम् । न भिद्यन्ते चेत् तथापि कथ-
मेकं त्रयात्मकम् । तथा च ।

50 यद्युत्पादादयो भिन्नाः कथमेकं त्रयात्मकम् ।
अथोत्पादादयोऽभिन्नाः कथमेकं त्रयात्मकम् ॥

इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । कथंचिद्भिन्नलक्षणत्वेन तेषां कथंचि
द्भेदाभ्युपगमात् । तथा हि । उत्पादविनाशध्रौव्याणि स्याद्भि
न्नानि भिन्नलक्षणत्वाद् रूपादिवदिति । न च भिन्नलक्षणत्वम

55 सिद्धम् । असतश्च आत्मलाभः सतः सत्तावियोगो द्रव्यरूपतयानुवर्तनं च तदुत्पादादीनां परस्परमसङ्कीर्णानि लक्षणानि सकललोकसाक्षिकाण्येव ॥ न चामी भिन्नलक्षणा अपि परस्परानपेक्षाः खपुष्पवदसत्त्वापत्तेः । तथाहि । उत्पादः केवलो नास्ति । स्थितिविगमरहितत्वात् कूर्मरोमवत् । तथा विनाशः केवलो नास्ति ।
60 स्थित्युत्पत्तिरहितत्वात् तद्वत् । एवं स्थितिः केवला नास्ति । विनाशोत्पादशून्यत्वात् तद्वदेव । इत्यन्योन्यापेक्षाणामुत्पादादीनां वस्तुनि सत्त्वं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । तथा चोक्तम् ।

> घटमौलिसुवर्णार्थी नाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम् ।
> शोकप्रमोदमाध्यस्थ्यं जनो याति सहेतुकम् ॥
> 5 पयोव्रतो न दध्यत्ति न पयोऽत्ति दधिव्रतः ।
> अगोरसव्रतो नोभे तस्माद्वस्तु त्रयात्मकम् ॥

इति काव्यार्थः ॥

अथान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदस्य प्रस्तुतत्वादास्तां तावत्साक्षाद्भगवान् भवदीयवचनापेक्षया अपि परतीर्थिकतिरस्कारबद्धकक्षा इत्याशयवान् स्तुतिकारः स्याद्वादव्यवस्थापनाय प्रयोगमुपन्यस्यन् स्तुतिमाह ।

> अनन्तधर्मात्मकमेव तत्त्व
> मतोन्यथा सत्त्वमसूपपादम् ।
> इति प्रमाणान्यपि ते कुवादि
> कुरङ्गसंत्रासनसिंहनादाः ॥ २२ ॥

5 तत्त्वं परमार्थभूतं वस्तु जीवाजीवलक्षणमनन्तधर्मात्मकमेव । अनन्तास्त्रिकालविषयत्वादपरिमिता ये धर्माः सहभाविनः क्रमभाविनश्च पर्यायास्त एवात्मा स्वरूपं यस्य तदनन्त-

धर्मात्मकम्। एवकारः प्रकारान्तरव्यवच्छेदार्थः। अत एवाह अतोऽन्यथा इत्यादि। अतोऽन्यथा उक्तप्रकारवैपरीत्येन। सत्त्वं वस्तुतत्त्वम्। असूपपादम् सुखेनोपपाद्यत घटनाकोटिसंटङ्कमारोप्यत इति सूपपादम् न तथा असूपपादं दुर्घटमित्यर्थः। अनेन साधनं दर्शितम्। तथाहि। वस्त्विति धर्मि। अनन्तधर्मात्मकत्वं साध्यो धर्मः। सत्त्वान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति हेतुः। अन्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणत्वाद्धेतोः। अन्तर्व्याप्त्यैव साध्यस्य सिद्धत्वाद्दृष्टान्तादिभिर्न प्रयोजनम्। यदनन्तधर्मात्मकं न भवति तत्सदपि न भवति यथा वियदिन्दीवरमिति केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुः। साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तानां पक्षकुक्षिनिक्षिप्तत्वेनान्वयायोगात्। अनन्तधर्मात्मकत्वं चात्मनि तावत्साकारानाकारोपयोगिता कर्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वं प्रदेशाष्टकनिश्चलता अमूर्तत्वमसंख्यातप्रदेशात्मकता जीवत्वमित्यादयः सहभाविनो धर्माः। हर्षविषादशोकसुखदुःखदेवनरनारकतिर्यक्त्वादयस्तु क्रमभाविनः। धर्मास्तिकायादिष्वप्यसंख्येयप्रदेशात्मकत्वं गत्याद्युपग्रहकारित्वं मत्यादिज्ञानविषयत्वं तत्तदवच्छेदकावच्छेद्यत्वमवस्थितत्वमरूपित्वमेकद्रव्यत्वं निष्क्रियत्वमित्यादयः। घटे पुनरामत्वं पाकजरूपादिमत्त्वं पृथुबुध्नोदरत्वं कम्बुग्रीवत्वं जलादिधारणाहरणसामर्थ्यं मत्यादिज्ञानज्ञेयत्वं नवत्वं पुराणत्वमित्यादयः। एवं सर्वपदार्थेष्वपि नानानयमताभिज्ञेन शाब्दानार्थांश्च पर्यायान्प्रतीत्य वाच्यम्॥

अत्र आत्मशब्देनानन्त्येऽपि धर्मेष्वनुवृत्तिरूपमन्वयि द्रव्यं ध्वनितम्। तच्च उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत् इति व्यवस्थितम्। एवं तावदर्थेषु। शब्देष्वपि उदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितविवृतसंवृतघोष–वद्घोषताल्पप्राणमहाप्राणतान्यान्यतदर्थप्रत्यायनशक्त्यादयोऽव–सेयाः। अस्य हेतोरसिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकत्वादिकण्टकोद्धारः

स्वयमभ्यूह्यः । इत्येवमुक्तस्वमेतराणि ते तव प्रमाणान्यपि न्यायोपपन्नसाधनवाक्यान्यपि । आस्तां तावत्साक्षात्कृतद्रव्यपर्याय निकायो भवान् । तावकेतान्यपि कुवादिकुरङ्गसंत्रासनसिंहनादाः कुवादिनः कुत्सितवादिनः । एकान्तप्राकृतनयानुयायिनोऽन्यतीर्थिकाः त एव संसारवनगहनवसनव्यसनितया कुरङ्गा मृगास्तेषां सम्यक्त्रासने सिंहनादा इव सिंहनादाः । यथा सिंहस्य नादमात्रमप्याकर्ण्य कुरङ्गास्त्रासमाश्रयन्ति तथा भवत्प्रणीतप्रकारप्रमाणवचनान्यपि श्रुत्वा कुवादिनस्त्रस्नुतामन्वभूवन् । प्रतिवचनप्रदानकातरतां बिभ्रतीति यावत् । एकैकं स्वयुक्तं प्रमाणमन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदकमित्यर्थः ॥

अत्र प्रमाणानीति बहुवचनमेवंजातीयानां प्रमाणानां भगवच्छासने आनन्त्यज्ञापनार्थम् । एकैकस्य सूत्रस्य सर्वोदधिसलिलसर्वसरिद्वालुकानन्तगुणार्थत्वात् । तेषां च सर्वेषामपि सव-विन्दुस्थया प्रमाणत्वात् । अथवा द्व्यादिबहुवचनान्ता गणस्य संख्यका भवन्तीति न्यायात् इतिशब्देन प्रमाणवाक्यस्य सूचनात् सूत्रार्थे एकस्मिन्नपि प्रमाणे उपन्यस्ते उचितमेव बहुवचनम् ॥ इति काव्यार्थः ॥

अनन्तरमनन्तधर्मात्मकत्वं वस्तुनि साध्यं मुक्तकण्ठमुक्तम् । तदेव सप्तभङ्गीप्ररूपणद्वारेण प्रपञ्चयन् भगवतो निरतिशयं वचनातिशयं च स्तुवन्नाह ।

अपर्ययं वस्तु समस्यमान-
मद्रव्यमेतच्च विविच्यमानम् ।
आदेशभेदोदितसप्तभङ्ग-
मदीदृशस्त्वं बुधरूपवेद्यम् ॥२३॥

समस्यमानं संक्षेपेणोच्यमानं वस्तु अपर्ययम् अविवक्षितपर्यायम्।
5 वसन्ति गुणपर्याया अस्मिन्निति वस्तु धर्माधर्माकाशपुद्गल-
कालजीवलक्षणं द्रव्यषट्कम् । अयमभिप्रायः । यदैकमेव वस्त्वात्म
घटादिकं चेतनाचेतनं सतामपि पर्यायाणामविवक्षया द्रव्यरूपमेव
वक्तुमिष्यते तदा संक्षेपेणाभ्यन्तरीकृतसकलपर्यायनिकायलक्ष
णेनाभिधीयमानत्वादपर्ययमित्युपदिश्यते । केवलद्रव्यरूपमेवेत्यर्थः ।
10 यथात्मायं घटोऽयमित्यादि । पर्यायाणां द्रव्यानतिरेकात् । अत एव
द्रव्यास्तिकनया शुद्धसंग्रहाख्यो द्रव्यमात्रमेवेच्छन्ति । पर्यायाणां
तदविष्वग्भूतत्वात् । पर्ययः पर्यवः पर्यायः इत्यनर्थान्तरम् ।
अद्रव्यमित्यादि । चः पुनरर्थे । स च पूर्वस्माद्विशेषद्योतने भिन्नक्रमश्च।
विविच्यमानं चेति विभक्तेन पृथक्पृथगुच्यमानम् । पुनस्तद्वस्तु
15 अद्रव्यमेव । अविवक्षितान्वयिद्रव्यं केवलपर्यायरूपमित्यर्थः ॥

यदा ह्यात्मा ज्ञानदर्शनादीन्पर्यायानधिकृत्य प्रतिपर्यायं विवि
च्यते तदा पर्याया एव प्रतिभासन्ते न पुनरात्माख्यं किमपि
द्रव्यम् । एवं घटोऽपि कुण्डलौष्ठपृथुबुध्नोदरपूर्वापरादिभागाव
यवापेक्षया विविच्यमानः पर्याया एव न पुनर्घटाख्यं तदतिरिक्तं
20 वस्तु । अत एव पर्यायास्तिकनयानुपातिनः पठन्ति ।

> भागा एव हि भासन्ते संनिविष्टास्तथा तथा ।
> तद्वान्नैव पुनः कश्चिन्निर्भागः संप्रतीयते ॥

इति । ततश्च द्रव्यपर्यायोभयात्मकत्वेऽपि वस्तुनो द्रव्यनयार्पणया
पर्यायनयानर्पणया च द्रव्यरूपता पर्यायनयार्पणया द्रव्यनया
25 नर्पणया च पर्यायरूपता उभयनयार्पणया च तदुभयरूपता । अत
एवाह वाचकमुख्यः अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धेः इति । एवंविधं द्रव्यपर्या
यात्मकं वस्तु त्वमेव अदीदृशः त्वमेव दर्शितवान् । नान्य इति
काक्वावधारणावगतिः ॥

नन्वन्याभिधानप्रत्यययोग्यं द्रव्यमन्याभिधानप्रत्ययविषयाश्च
30 पर्यायाः तत्कथमेकमेव वस्तूभयात्मकमित्याशङ्क्य विशेषण-
द्वारेण परिहरन्ति आदेशभेदेत्यादि । आदेशभेदेन सकलादेश
विकलादेशलक्षणेनादेशद्वयेनोदिताः प्रतिपादिताः सप्तसंख्या
भङ्गा वचनप्रकारा यस्मिन् वस्तुनि तत्तथा । ननु यदि भगवता त्रिभु
वनबन्धुना निर्विशेषतया सर्वेभ्य एवंविधं वस्तुतत्त्वमुपदर्शितं तर्हि
35 किमर्थं तीर्थान्तरीयाः तत्र विप्रतिपद्यन्त इत्याह बुध
रूप्यमेयमिति । बुध्यन्ते यथावस्थितं वस्तुतत्त्वं सारेतरविभागवि
भागविचारणया इति बुधाः । प्रकृष्टा बुधा बुधरूपाः नैसर्गिका
धिगमिकान्यतरसम्यग्दर्शनविशदीकृतज्ञानशालिनः प्राणिनः । तैरेव
वेदितुं शक्यं वेद्यं परिच्छेद्यम् । न पुनः स्वस्वशास्त्रवासनाभ्यास
40 परिपाकप्रमाणानिश्चितबुद्धिभिरप्यन्यैः । तेषामनादिमिथ्यादर्शन
वासनादूषितमतितया यथास्थितवस्तुतत्त्वावबोधेन बुधरूपत्वा
भावात् । तथा चागमः ।

सदसदविसेसणाउ, भवहेउजदिच्छिओवलंभाउ ।
णाणफलाभावाउ मिच्छादिट्ठिस्स अण्णाणं ॥ १ ॥

45 अत एव तत्परिगृहीतं द्वादशाङ्गमपि मिथ्याश्रुतमामनन्ति ।
तेषामुपपत्तिनिरपेक्षं यदृच्छया वस्तुतत्त्वोपलम्भसंरम्भात् । सम्य-
ग्दृष्टिपरिगृहीतं तु मिथ्याश्रुतमपि सम्यक्श्रुततया परिणमति
सम्यग्दृशाम् । सर्वविदुपदेशानुसारिप्रवृत्तितया मिथ्याश्रुतोक्तस्या
प्यर्थस्य यथावस्थितविधिनिषेधविषयतयोन्नयनात् । तथा हि
50 किल वेदे अजैर्यष्टव्यम् इत्यादिवाक्येषु मिथ्यादृशोऽजशब्दं
पशुवाचकतया व्याचक्षते सम्यग्दृशस्तु जन्माप्रायोग्यं त्रिवार्षिकं
यवव्रीह्यादि पञ्चवार्षिकं तिलमसूरादि सप्तवार्षिकं कङ्गुसर्षपादि
धान्यपर्यायतया पर्यवसाययन्ति । अत एव च भगवता श्रीवर्ध

मानस्वामिना विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु
55 विनश्यति न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति इत्यादिश्रुतयः श्रीमदिन्द्रभूत्यादीनां
स्वयंगणधरदेवानां जीवादिनिषेधकतया प्रतिभासमाना अपि
तद्व्यवस्थापकतया व्याख्याताः । तथा स्मार्ता अपि

न मांसभक्षणे दोषो न मद्ये न च मैथुने ।
प्रवृत्तिरेषा भूतानां निवृत्तिस्तु महाफला ॥

60 इति श्लोकं पठन्ति । अस्य च यथाश्रुतार्थव्याख्यानेऽसंबद्ध-
प्रलाप एव । यस्मिन् अनुष्ठीयमाने दोषो नास्त्येव तस्मान्निवृत्तिः
कथमिव महाफला भविष्यति । इज्याध्ययनदानादेरपि निवृत्ति-
प्रसङ्गात् । तस्मादन्यदैदंपर्यमस्य श्लोकस्य । तथाहि न मांसभक्षणे
कृते अदोषः अपि तु दोष एव । एवं मद्यमैथुनयोरपि । कथं
65 नादोष इत्याह यतः प्रवृत्तिरेषा भूतानाम् । प्रवर्तन्ते उत्पद्यन्तेऽ-
स्यामिति प्रवृत्तिः उत्पत्तिस्थानम् । भूतानां जीवानां तत्तज्जीवसंस-
क्तिहेतुरित्यर्थः । प्रसिद्धं च मांसमद्यमैथुनानां जीवसंसक्तिमूलकार-
णत्वमागमे ।

आमासु य पक्कासु य विपच्चमाणासु मंसपेसीसु ।
70 आयंतियमुववाओ भणिओ उ निगोयजीवाणं ॥ १ ॥
मज्जे महुम्मि मंसम्मि नवणीयम्मि चउत्थए ।
उप्पज्जंति अणंता तव्वण्णा तत्थ जंतुणो ॥ २ ॥
मेहुणसण्णारूढो नवलक्ख हणेइ सुहुमजीवाणं ।
केवलिणा पण्णत्ता सद्दहियव्वा सया कालं ॥ ३ ॥
75 तथाहि

इत्थीजोणीए संभवंति बेइंदिया उ जे जीवा ।
इक्को व दो व तिण्णि व लक्खपुहुत्तं च उक्कोसं ॥ ४ ॥

न प्रयुज्यते तथाप्यन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदफलत्वेनैवकारवद् बुद्धिमद्भिः प्रतीयत एव। यदुक्तम्

> सोऽप्रयुक्तोऽपि वा तज्ज्ञैः सर्वत्रार्थात्प्रतीयते।
> 130 यथैवकारोऽयोगादिव्यवच्छेदप्रयोजनः॥ १॥

इति प्रथमो भङ्गः॥

स्यात्कथंचिन्नास्त्येव कुम्भादिः स्वद्रव्यादिभिरिव परद्रव्यादिभिरपि वस्तुनोऽसत्त्वानिष्टौ हि प्रतिनियतस्वरूपाभावाद् वस्तुप्रतिनियतिर्न स्यात्। न चास्तित्वैकान्तवादिभिरत्र 135 नास्तित्वमसिद्धमिति वक्तव्यम्। कथंचित्तस्य वस्तुनि युक्तिसिद्धत्वात् साधनवत्। नहि क्वचिदनित्यत्वादौ साध्ये सत्त्वादिसाधनस्यास्तित्वं विपक्षे नास्तित्वमन्तरेणोपपन्नम्। तस्य साधनत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात्। तस्माद् वस्तुनोऽस्तित्वं नास्तित्वेनाविनाभूतं नास्तित्वं च तेनेति। विवक्षावशाच्चानयोः प्रधानोपसर्जनभावः। 140 एवमुत्तरभङ्गेष्वपि ज्ञेयम्। अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धेः इति वाचकवचनात्। इति द्वितीयः॥

तृतीयः स्पष्ट एव॥

द्वाभ्यामस्तित्वनास्तित्वधर्माभ्यां युगपत्प्रधानतयार्पिताभ्यामेकस्य वस्तुनोऽभिधित्सायां तादृशस्य शब्दस्यासंभवाद् 145 अवक्तव्यं जीवादिवस्तु। तथाहि सदसत्त्वगुणद्वयं युगपदेकत्र सदित्यनेन वक्तुमशक्यम्। तस्यासत्त्वप्रतिपादनासमर्थत्वात्। तथाऽसदित्यनेनापि। तस्य सत्त्वप्रत्यायनसामर्थ्याभावात्। न च पुष्पदन्तादिवत्साङ्केतिकमेकं पदं तद्वक्तुं समर्थम्। तस्यापि क्रमेणार्थद्वयप्रत्यायने सामर्थ्योपपत्तेः। शतृशानचोः संकेतितसच्छब्दवत्। 150 अत एव द्वन्द्वकर्मधारयवृत्त्योर्वाक्यस्य च न तद्वाचकत्वम्। इति सकलवाचकरहितत्वादवक्तव्यं वस्तु युगपत्सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां प्रधान-

भावाभावाभ्यामाक्रान्तं व्यपदिश्यते । न च सर्वथाऽवक्तव्यम् । अवक्तव्यशब्देनाप्यनभिधेयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । इति चतुर्थः ॥

शेषास्त्रयः सुगमाभिप्रायाः ॥

155 न च वाच्यमेकत्र वस्तुनि विधीयमाननिषिध्यमानानन्तधर्माभ्युपगमेनानन्तभङ्गीप्रसङ्गादसंगतैव सप्तभङ्गीति । विधिनिषेधप्रकारापेक्षया प्रतिपर्यायं वस्तुन्यनन्तानामपि सप्तभङ्गीनामेव संभवात् । यथा हि सदसत्त्वाभ्यामेवं सामान्यविशेषाभ्यामपि सप्तभङ्ग्येव स्यात् । तथाहि । स्यात्सामान्यं स्याद्विशेषः 160 स्यादुभयं स्यादवक्तव्यं स्यात्सामान्यावक्तव्यं स्याद्विशेषावक्तव्यं स्यात्सामान्यविशेषावक्तव्यमिति । न चात्र विधिनिषेधप्रकारौ न स्त इति वाच्यम् । सामान्यस्य विधिरूपत्वाद्विशेषस्य च व्यावृत्तिरूपतया निषेधात्मकत्वात् । अथवा प्रतिपक्षशब्दत्वाद्यदा सामान्यस्य प्राधान्यं तदा तस्य विधिरूपता विशेषस्य च निषेधरूपता 165 यदा विशेषस्य पुरस्कारस्तदा तस्य विधिरूपता इतरस्य च निषेधरूपता । एवं सर्वत्र योज्यम् । ननु युक्तम् अनन्ता अपि सप्तभङ्ग्य एव भवेयुः इति । प्रतिपर्यायं प्रतिपाद्यपर्यनुयोगानां सप्तानामेव संभवात् । तेषामपि सप्तत्वं सप्तविधतज्जिज्ञासानियमात् । तस्या अपि सप्तविधत्वं सप्तधैव तत्संदेहसमुत्पादात् । तस्यापि सप्तविधत्व- 170 नियमः स्वगोचरवस्तुधर्माणां सप्तविधत्वस्यैवोपपत्तेरिति । इयं च सप्तभङ्गी प्रतिभङ्गं सकलादेशस्वभावा विकलादेशस्वभावा च । तत्र सकलादेशः प्रमाणवाक्यम् । तल्लक्षणं चेदम् । प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नानन्तधर्मात्मकवस्तुनः कालादिभिरभेदवृत्तिप्राधान्यादभेदोपचाराद्वा यौगपद्येन प्रतिपादकं वचः सकलादेशः । अस्यार्थः । 175 कालादिभिरष्टभिः कृत्वा यदभेदवृत्तेर्धर्मधर्मिणोरपृथग्भावस्य प्राधान्यं तस्मात्कालादिभिर्भिन्नात्मनामपि धर्मधर्मिणामभेदा

पुरिसेण सह गयाए तेसिं जीवाण होइ उद्दवणं ।
वेणुगदिट्ठंतेणं तत्तायसलागणाएणं ॥ ५ ॥

80 संसक्तायां योनौ द्वीन्द्रिया एते । शुक्रशोणितसंभवास्तु गर्भजपञ्चेन्द्रिया इमे ।

पंचिंदिया मणुस्सा एगणरभुत्तणारिगब्भम्मि ।
उक्कोसं णवलक्खा जायंति एगवेलाए ॥ ६ ॥
णवलक्खाणं मज्झे जायइ इक्कस्स दुण्ह व समत्ती ।
85 सेसा पुण एमेव य विलयं वच्चंति तत्थेव ॥ ७ ॥

तदेवं जीवोपमर्दहेतुत्वान्न मांसभक्षणादिकमदुष्टमिति अयोगः। अथवा भूतानां पिशाचप्रायाणामेषा प्रवृत्तिः। त एव च मांसभक्षणादौ प्रवर्तन्ते न पुनर्विवेकिन इति भावः। तदेवं मांसभक्षणादेर्दुष्टत्वं स्पष्टीकृत्य यदुपदेष्टव्यं तदाह । निवृत्तिस्तु महाफला । तुरेव-
90 कारार्थः। तुः स्याद्भेदेऽवधारणे इति वचनात् । ततश्चैतेभ्यो मांसभक्षणादिभ्यो निवृत्तिरेव महाफला स्वर्गापवर्गफलप्रदा न पुनः प्रवृत्तिरपीत्यर्थः । अत एव स्थानान्तरे पठितम्

वर्षे वर्षेऽश्वमेधेन यो यजेत शतं समाः ।
मांसानि च न खादेद्यस्तयोस्तुल्यं भवेत्फलम् ॥
95 एकरात्रोषितस्यापि या गतिर्ब्रह्मचारिणः ।
न सा क्रतुसहस्रेण प्राप्तुं शक्या युधिष्ठिर ॥

मद्यपाने तु कृतं घ्यानुवादैः । तस्य सर्वविगर्हितत्वात् । तानेवं-प्रकारानर्थानपरूपमिव युष्मामांसास्वादलिप्सवः वदितुमर्हन्तीति कृतमति-प्रसङ्गेन ॥

100 अथ केऽमी सप्तभङ्गाः कश्चायमादेशभेद इत्युच्यते । एकत्र जीवादौ वस्तुन्येकैकसत्त्वादिधर्मविषयप्रश्नवशादविरोधेन व्यस्तया

दिबाधापरिहारेण पृथग्भूतयोः समुदितयोश्च विधिनिषेधयोः पर्या-
लोचनया कृत्वा स्याच्छब्दलाञ्छितो वक्ष्यमाणैः सप्तभिः प्रकारैर्व-
चनविन्यासः सप्तभङ्गीति गीयते । तद्यथा । स्यादस्त्येव सर्वमिति
100 विधिकल्पनया प्रथमो भङ्गः १ । स्यान्नास्त्येव सर्वमिति निषेध
कल्पनया द्वितीयः २ । स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येवेति क्रमतो विधि-
निषेधकल्पनया तृतीयः ३ । स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति युगपद्विधि-
निषेधकल्पनया चतुर्थः४ । स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति विधिक
ल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च पञ्चमः ५ । स्यान्नास्त्येव
110 स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति निषेधकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च
षष्ठः ६ । स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति क्रमतो
विधिनिषेधकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च सप्तमः ७॥
तत्र स्यात्कथंचित् स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावरूपेणास्त्येव सर्वं कु-
म्भादि न पुनः परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावरूपेण । तथाहि कुम्भो द्रव्यतः
115 पार्थिवत्वेनास्ति नाप्यादित्वेन । क्षेत्रतः पाटलिपुत्रकत्वेन न
कान्यकुब्जादित्वेन । कालतः शैशिरत्वेन न वासन्तिकादित्वेन ।
भावतः श्यामत्वेन न रक्तादित्वेन । अन्यथेतररूपापत्त्या स्वरूप
हानिप्रसङ्ग इति । अवधारणं चात्र भङ्गेऽनभिमतार्थव्यावृत्त्यर्थ
मुपात्तम् । इतरथानभिहिततुल्यतैवास्य वाक्यस्य प्रसज्येत ।
120 प्रतिनियतस्वार्थानभिधानात् । यदुक्तम्

वाक्येऽवधारणं तावदनिष्टार्थनिवृत्तये ।
कर्तव्यमन्यथानुक्तसमत्वात्तस्य कुत्रचित् ॥

तथाप्यस्त्येव कुम्भ इत्येतावन्मात्रोपादाने कुम्भस्य स्तम्भाद्य
स्तित्वेनापि सर्वप्रकारेणास्तित्वप्राप्तेः प्रतिनियतस्वरूपानुपपत्तिः
125 स्यात् । तत्प्रतिपत्तये स्यादिति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते । स्यात्कथंचित्स्वद्र
व्यादिभिरेवायमस्ति न परद्रव्यादिभिरपीत्यर्थः । यथापि चासौ

न प्रयुज्यते तथापि व्यवच्छेदफलत्वाद्वाक्यानामेवकारवद् बुद्धिमद्भिः प्रतीयत एव। यदुक्तम्

सोऽप्रयुक्तोऽपि वा तज्ज्ञैः सर्वत्रार्थात्प्रतीयते।
130 यथैवकारोऽयोगादिव्यवच्छेदप्रयोजनः॥ १ ॥

इति प्रथमो भङ्गः॥

स्यान्नास्त्येव कुम्भादिः स्वद्रव्यादिभिरिव परद्रव्यादिभिरपि वस्तुनोऽसत्त्वानिष्टौ हि प्रतिनियतस्वरूपाभावाद् वस्तुप्रतिनियतिर्न स्यात्। न चास्तित्वैकान्तवादिभिरत्र
135 नास्तित्वमसिद्धमिति वक्तव्यम्। कथंचित्तस्य वस्तुनि युक्तिसिद्धत्वात् साधनवत्। न हि क्वचिदनित्यत्वादौ साध्ये सत्त्वादिसाधनस्यास्तित्वं विपक्षे नास्तित्वमन्तरेणोपपन्नम्। तस्य साधनत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात्। तस्माद् वस्तुनोऽस्तित्वं नास्तित्वेनाविनाभूतं नास्तित्वं च तेनेति। विवक्षावशाच्चानयोः प्रधानोपसर्जनभावः।
140 एवमुत्तरभङ्गेष्वपि ज्ञेयम्। अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धेः इति वाचकवचनात्। इति द्वितीयः॥

तृतीयः स्पष्ट एव॥

द्वाभ्यामस्तित्वनास्तित्वधर्माभ्यां युगपत्प्रधानतयाऽर्पिताभ्यामेकस्य वस्तुनोऽभिधित्सायां तादृशस्य शब्दस्यासंभवाद्
145 अवक्तव्यं जीवादिवस्तु। तथा हि सदसत्त्वगुणद्वयं युगपदेकत्र सदित्यनेन वक्तुमशक्यम्। तस्यासत्त्वप्रतिपादनासमर्थत्वात्। तथाऽसदित्यनेनापि। तस्य सत्त्वप्रत्यायनसामर्थ्याभावात्। न च पुष्पदन्तादिवत्साङ्केतिकमेकं पदं तद्वक्तुं समर्थम्। तस्यापि क्रमेणार्थद्वयप्रत्यायने सामर्थ्योपपत्तेः। शतृशानचोः संकेतितसच्छब्दवत्।
150 अत एव द्वन्द्वकर्मधारयवृत्त्योर्वाक्यस्य च न तद्वाचकत्वम्। इति सकलवाचकरहितत्वादवक्तव्यं वस्तु युगपत्सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां प्रधान-

मातापितृभ्यामाक्रान्तं व्यवतिष्ठते । न च सर्वथाऽवक्तव्यम् । अवक्तव्यशब्देनाप्यनभिधेयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । इति चतुर्थः ॥

शेषास्त्रयः सुगमाभिप्रायाः ॥

155 न चात्रैकत्र वस्तुनि विधीयमाननिषिध्यमानानन्तधर्माभ्युपगमेनानन्तभङ्गीप्रसङ्गादसंगतैव सप्तभङ्गीति । विधिनिषेधप्रकारापेक्षया प्रतिपर्यायं वस्तुन्यनन्तानामपि सप्तभङ्गीनामेव संभवात् । यथा हि सदसत्त्वाभ्यामेवं सामान्यविशेषाभ्यामपि सप्तभङ्ग्येव स्यात् । तथाहि । स्यात्सामान्यं स्याद्विशेषः 160 स्यादुभयं स्यादवक्तव्यं स्यात्सामान्यावक्तव्यं स्याद्विशेषावक्तव्यं स्यात्सामान्यविशेषावक्तव्यमिति । न चात्र विधिनिषेधप्रकारौ न स्त इति वाच्यम् । सामान्यस्य विधिरूपत्वाद्विशेषस्य च व्यावृत्तिरूपतया निषेधात्मकत्वात् । अथवा प्रतिपक्षशब्दत्वाद्यदा सामान्यस्य प्राधान्यं तदा तस्य विधिरूपता विशेषस्य च निषेधरूपता 165 यदा विशेषस्य पुरस्कारस्तदा तस्य विधिरूपता इतरस्य च निषेधरूपता । एवं सर्वत्र योज्यम् । अतः सुष्ठूक्तम् अनन्ता अपि सप्तभङ्ग्य एव भवेयुः इति । प्रतिपर्यायं प्रतिपाद्यपर्यनुयोगानां सप्तानामेव संभवात् । तेषामपि सप्तत्वं सप्तविधतज्जिज्ञासानियमात् । तस्या अपि सप्तविधत्वं सप्तधैव तत्संदेहसमुत्पादात् । तस्यापि सप्तविधत्व 170 नियमः स्वगोचरवस्तुधर्माणां सप्तविधत्वस्यैवोपपत्तेरिति । इयं च सप्तभङ्गी प्रतिभङ्गं सकलादेशस्वभावा विकलादेशस्वभावा च । तत्र सकलादेशः प्रमाणवाक्यम् । तल्लक्षणं चेदम् । प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नानन्तधर्मात्मकवस्तुनः कालादिभिरभेदवृत्तिप्राधान्याद भेदोपचाराद्वा यौगपद्येन प्रतिपादकं वचः सकलादेशः । अस्यार्थः । 175 कालादिभिरष्टभिः कृत्वा यदभेदवृत्तं धर्मधर्मिणोरपृथग्भावस्य प्राधान्यं तस्मात्कालादिभिर्भिन्नात्मनामपि धर्मधर्मिणामभेदा

ध्यारोपाद्वा समकालमभिधायकं वाक्यं सकलादेशः । तद्विपरीतस्तु विकलादेशो नयवाक्यमित्यर्थः । अयमाशयः । यौगपद्येनाशेषधर्मात्मकं वस्तु कालादिभिरभेदप्राधान्यवृत्त्याऽभेदोपचारेण
180 वा प्रतिपादयति सकलादेशः। तस्य प्रमाणाधीनत्वात् । विकलादेशस्तु क्रमेण भेदोपचाराद्भेदप्राधान्याद्वा तदभिधत्ते । तस्य नयात्मकत्वात् ॥

कः पुनः क्रमः किं च यौगपद्यम् । यदास्तित्वादिधर्माणां कालादिभिर्भेदविवक्षा तदैकस्य शब्दस्यानेकार्थप्रत्यायने शक्त्य-
185 भावात् क्रमः । यदा तु तेषामेव धर्माणां कालादिभिरभेदेन वृत्तमात्मरूपमुच्यते तदैकेनापि शब्देनैकधर्मप्रत्यायनमुखेन तदात्मकतामापन्नस्यानेकाशेषधर्मरूपस्य वस्तुनः प्रतिपादनसंभवाद्यौगपद्यम् ॥

के पुनः कालादयः । कालः आत्मरूपम् अर्थः संबन्ध
190 उपकारः गुणिदेशः संसर्गः शब्दः । तत्र स्याज्जीवादि वस्त्वस्त्येवेत्यत्र यत्कालमस्तित्वं तत्कालाः शेषानन्तधर्मा वस्तुन्येकत्रेति तेषां कालेनाभेदवृत्तिः (१) । यदेव चास्तित्वस्य तद्गुणत्वमात्मरूपं तदेवान्यानन्तगुणानामपीत्यात्मरूपेणाभेदवृत्तिः (२) । य एव चाधारोऽर्थो द्रव्याख्योऽस्तित्वस्य स एवान्यपर्यायाणा-
195 मित्यर्थेनाभेदवृत्तिः (३) । य एव चाविष्वग्भावः कथंचित्तादात्म्यलक्षणः संबन्धोऽस्तित्वस्य स एव शेषविशेषाणामिति संबन्धेनाभेदवृत्तिः (४) । य एव चोपकारोऽस्तित्वेन स्वानुरक्तत्वकरणं स एव शेषैरपि गुणैरित्युपकारेणाभेदवृत्तिः (५) । य एव गुणिनः संबन्धी देशः क्षेत्रलक्षणोऽस्तित्वस्य स एवान्यगुणाना-
200 मिति गुणिदेशेनाभेदवृत्तिः (६) । य एव चैकवस्त्वात्मनास्तित्वस्य संसर्गः स एव शेषधर्माणामिति संसर्गेणाभेदवृत्तिः (७) । अपि

सम्बन्धेऽभेदः प्रधानं भेदो गौणः संसर्गे तु भेदः प्रधानम्
अभेदो गौण इति विशेषः । य एव चास्तीति शब्दोऽस्तित्वधर्मा-
त्मकस्य वस्तुनो वाचकः स एव शेषानन्तधर्मात्मकस्यापीति शब्दे-
205 नाभेदवृत्तिः (८) पर्यायार्थिकनयगुणभावे द्रव्यार्थिकनयप्राधान्या-
दुपपद्यते द्रव्यार्थिकगुणभावे पर्यायार्थिकप्राधान्ये तु न गुणा-
नामभेदवृत्तिः संभवति । समकालमेकत्र नानागुणानामसंभवात् ।
संभवे वा तदाश्रयस्य तावद्धा भेदप्रसङ्गात् । नानागुणानां संब-
न्धिन आत्मरूपस्य च भिन्नत्वात् । आत्मरूपाभेदे तेषां भेदस्य
210 विरोधात् । स्वाश्रयस्यार्थस्यापि नानात्वात् अन्यथा नानागुणा-
श्रयत्वस्य विरोधात् । संबन्धस्य च संबन्धिभेदेन भेददर्शनात्
नानासंबन्धिभिरेकत्रैकसंबन्धाघटनात् । तैः क्रियमाणस्योप-
कारस्य च प्रतिनियतरूपस्यानेकत्वात् अनेकैरुपकारिभिः क्रिय-
माणस्योपकारस्य विरोधात् । गुणिदेशस्य च प्रतिगुणं भेदात् तद-
215 भेदे भिन्नार्थगुणानामपि गुणिदेशाभेदप्रसङ्गात् । संसर्गस्य च
प्रतिसंसर्गिभेदात् तदभेदे संसर्गिभेदविरोधात् । शब्दस्य प्रति-
विषयं नानात्वात् सर्वगुणानामेकशब्दवाच्यतायां सर्वार्थानामेक-
शब्दवाच्यतापत्तेः शब्दान्तरवैफल्यापत्तेः । तत्त्वतोऽस्तित्वादी-
नामेकत्र वस्तुन्येवमभेदवृत्तेरसंभवे कालादिभिर्भिन्नात्मनाम-
220 भेदोपचारः क्रियते । तदेताभ्यामभेदवृत्त्यभेदोपचाराभ्यां कृत्वा
प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नानन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुनः समकालं यदभिधायकं
वाक्यं स सकलादेशः प्रमाणवाक्यापरपर्यायः । नयविषयीकृतस्य
वस्तुधर्मस्य भेदवृत्तिप्राधान्याद्भेदोपचाराद्वा क्रमेण यदभिधायकं
वाक्यं स विकलादेशो नयवाक्यापरपर्यायः । इति स्थितम् । ततः
225 साधूक्तम्, आदेशभेदोदितसप्तभङ्गम् ॥ इति काव्यार्थः ॥

अनन्तरं भगवद्दर्शितस्यानेकान्तात्मनो वस्तुनो बुधरूपवेद्यत्वमुक्तम्। अनेकान्तात्मकत्वं च सप्तभङ्गीप्ररूपणेन सुबोधं स्यादिति सापि निरूपिता। तस्यां च विरुद्धधर्माध्यासितं वस्तु पश्यन्त एकान्तवादिनोऽबुधरूपा विरोधमुद्भावयन्ति तेषां प्रमाणमार्गाच्च्यवनमाह।

उपाधिभेदोपहितं विरुद्धं
नार्थेष्वसत्त्वं सदवाच्यते च।
इत्यप्रबुध्यैव विरोधभीता
जडास्तदेकान्तहताः पतन्ति ॥ २४ ॥

अर्थेषु पदार्थेषु चेतनाचेतनेष्वसत्त्वं नास्तित्वं न विरुद्धं न विरोधावरुद्धम्। अस्तित्वेन सह विरोधं नानुभवतीत्यर्थः। न केवलमसत्त्वं न विरुद्धं किंतु सदवाच्यते च। सच्चावाच्यं च सदवाच्ये तयोर्भावौ सदवाच्यते। अस्तित्वावक्तव्यत्वे इत्यर्थः। ते अपि न विरुद्धे॥ तथा हि। अस्तित्वं नास्तित्वेन सह न विरुध्यते। अवक्तव्यत्वमपि विधिनिषेधात्मकमन्योन्यं न विरुध्यते। अथवा अवक्तव्यत्वं वक्तव्यत्वेन सार्धं न विरोधमुद्वहति। अनेन च नास्तित्वास्तित्वावक्तव्यत्वलक्षणभङ्गत्रयेण सकलसप्तभङ्ग्या निर्विरोधतोपलक्षिता। अमीषामेव त्रयाणां मुख्यत्वाच्छेषभङ्गानां च संयोगजत्वेनामीष्वेवान्तर्भावादिति॥ नन्वेते धर्माः परस्परं विरुद्धास्तत्कथमेकत्र वस्तुन्येषां समावेशः संभवतीति विशेषणद्वारेण हेतुमाह उपाधिभेदोपहितम् इति। उपाधयोऽवच्छेदका अंशप्रकाराः तेषां भेदो नानात्वम् तेनोपहितम् अर्पितम्। असत्त्वस्य विशेषणमेतत्। उपाधिभेदोपहितं सदर्थेष्वसत्त्वं न

३० विरुद्धम् । सदसत्त्वयोश्च वचनभेदं कृत्वा योजनीयम् । उपाधिभेदोपहिते सती सदसत्त्वे अपि न विरुद्धे । अयमभिप्रायः । परस्परपरिहारेण ये वर्तेते तयोः शीतोष्णवत् सहानवस्थानलक्षणो विरोधः । न चात्रैवम् । सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरितरेतरमविष्वग्भावेन वर्तनात् । नहि घटादौ सत्त्वमसत्त्वं परि-
३५ हृत्य वर्तते । पररूपेणापि सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । तथा च तद्व्यतिरिक्तार्थान्तराणां नैरर्थक्यम् । तेनैव त्रिभुवनार्थसाध्यार्थक्रियाणां सिद्धेः । न चासत्त्वं सत्त्वं परिहृत्य वर्तते । स्वरूपेणाप्यसत्त्वप्राप्तेः । तथा च निरुपाख्यत्वात्सर्वशून्यतेति । तदा हि विरोधः स्यात् यद्येकोपाधिकं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं च स्यात् । न चैवम् । यतो न हि येनै-
४० वांशेन सत्त्वं तेनैवासत्त्वमपि । किंत्वन्योपाधिकं सत्त्वमन्योपाधिकं पुनरसत्त्वम् । स्वरूपेण हि सत्त्वं पररूपेण चासत्त्वम् । दृष्टं ह्येकस्मिन्नेव चित्रपटावयविन्यन्योपाधिकं तु नीलत्वमन्योपाधिकाश्चेतरे वर्णाः । नीलत्वं हि नीलीरागाद्युपाधिकं वर्णान्तराणि च तत्तद्रञ्जनद्रव्योपाधिकानि । एवं मेचकरत्नेऽपि तत्त-
४५ द्वर्णपुद्गलोपाधिकं वैचित्र्यमवसेयम् । न चैभिर्दृष्टान्तैः सत्त्वासत्त्वयोर्भिन्नदेशत्वप्राप्तिः । चित्रपटाद्यवयविन एकत्वात् । तथापि भिन्नदेशत्वासिद्धेः । कथंचित्पक्षस्तु दृष्टान्ते दार्ष्टान्तिके च स्याद्वादिनां न दुर्लभः ॥

एवमन्यपरिहारभेदादायुष्मतस्त्वयैकस्यैव पुंसस्तत्तदुपाधिभेदात्पि-
५० तृत्वपुत्रत्वमातुलत्वभागिनेयत्वपितृव्यत्वभ्रातृव्यत्वादिधर्माणां परस्परविरुद्धानामपि प्रसिद्धिदर्शनात्किं वाच्यम् । एवमवक्तव्यत्वादयोऽपि वाच्या इति । उत्पत्तिकारणोपाधिभेदेन चासत्त्वं विरोधाभासमनभ्युपेयमत्रासंग । एवकारोऽवधारणे । स च तथा सम्यग्ज्ञानस्याभाव एव न पुनर्मैवताऽपि भाव इति व्यनक्ति । ततश्च विरोध

45 भीताः सत्त्वासत्त्वादिधर्माणां बहिर्मुखत्वेऽप्युक्त्या संभावितो यो विरोधः सहानवस्थानादिस्तस्माद्भीताः त्रस्तमानसाः। अत एव जडाः तात्त्विकभयहेतोरभावेऽपि तथाविधपशुवद्भीरुत्वान्मूर्खाः परवादिनः। तदेकान्तहताः तेषां सत्त्वादिधर्माणां य एकान्त इतरधर्मनिषेधेन स्वाभिमतधर्मव्यवस्थापननिश्चयस्तेन हता इव हताः 50 पतन्ति स्खलन्ति पतिताश्च सन्तस्ते न्यायमार्गाक्रमणे न समर्था न्यायमार्गाध्वनीनानां च सर्वेषामप्याक्रमणीयतां यान्तीति भावः। यद्वा पतन्तीति प्रमाणमार्गतश्च्यवन्ते। लोके हि सन्मार्गच्युतः पतित इति परिभाष्यते। अथवा यथा वज्रादिप्रहारेण हताः पतिताः मूर्च्छामतुच्छामासाद्य निःसंज्ञाः भवन्त्येवं तेऽपि 55 वादिनः स्वाभिमतैकान्तवादेन युक्तिसरणिमननुसरता वज्राशनिप्रायेण निहताः सन्तः स्याद्वादिनां पुरतोऽकिंचित्करा वाङ्मात्रमपि नोच्चारयितुमीशत इति॥

अत्र च विरोधस्योपलक्षणत्वाद् वैयधिकरण्यम् अनवस्था संकरः व्यतिकरः संशयः अप्रतिपत्तिः विषयव्यवस्थाहानिः इत्येतेऽपि 60 परोद्भाविता दोषा अभ्यूह्याः॥ तथाहि। सामान्यविशेषात्मकं वस्त्वित्युपन्यस्ते परे उपालम्भाः भवन्ति। यथा सामान्यविशेषयोर्विधिप्रतिषेधरूपयोर्विरुद्धधर्मयोरेकाधिकरणे वस्तुन्यसंभवाच्छीतोष्णवदिति विरोधः। न हि यदेव विधेरधिकरणं तदेव प्रतिषेधस्याधिकरणं भवितुमर्हत्येकरूपतापत्तेः ततो वैय- 65 धिकरण्यमपि भवति॥ अपरं येनात्मना सामान्यस्याधिकरणं येन च विशेषस्य तावप्यात्मानौ एकेनैव स्वभावेनाधिकरोति द्वाभ्यां वा स्वभावाभ्याम्। एकेनैव चेत् तत्र पूर्ववद्विरोधः। द्वाभ्यां वा स्वभावाभ्यां सामान्यविशेषाख्यं स्वभावद्वयमधिकरोति तदानवस्था तावपि स्वभावान्तराभ्यां तावपि स्वभावान्त

70 शम्यामिति ॥ येनात्मना सामान्यस्याधिकरणं तेन सामान्यस्य
विशेषस्य च येन च विशेषस्याधिकरणं तेन विशेषस्य सामा
न्यस्य चेति संकरदोषः ॥ येन स्वभावेन सामान्यं तेन विशेषो
येन विशेषस्तेन सामान्यमिति व्यतिकरः ॥ ततश्च वस्तुनोऽसाधा
रणाकारेण निश्चेतुमशक्तेः संशयः ॥ ततश्चाप्रतिपत्तिः ॥ ततश्च
75 प्रमाणविषयव्यवस्थाहानिः इति ॥ एते च दोषाः स्याद्वादस्य
जात्यन्तरत्वादिरवकाशा एव । अतः स्याद्वादमर्मवेदिभिरुद्धरणी
यास्तत्तदुपपत्तिभिरिति । स्वतन्त्रतया निरपेक्षयोरेव सामान्य-
विशेषयोर्विधिप्रतिषेधरूपयोस्तेषामवकाशात् ॥

अथवा विरोधशब्दोऽत्र दोषवाची । यथा विरुद्धमाचरतीति ।
80 दुष्टमित्यर्थः । ततश्च विरोधेभ्यो विरोधवैयधिकरण्यादिदोषेभ्यो
भीता इति व्याख्येयम् । एवं च सामान्यशब्देन सर्वा अपि दोष
व्यक्तयः संगृहीता भवन्ति ॥ इति काव्यार्थः ॥

अथानेकान्तवादस्य सर्वद्रव्यसर्वपर्यायव्यापित्वेऽपि मूलभेदा
पेक्षया चातुर्विध्याभिधानद्वारेण भगवतस्तत्त्वामृतरसास्वादसौहि
त्यमुपवर्णयन्नाह ।

स्यान्नाशि नित्यं सदृशं विरूपं
वाच्यं न वाच्यं सदसत्तदेव ।
विपश्चितां नाथ निपीततत्त्व
सुधोद्गतोद्गारपरंपरेयम् ॥ २५ ॥

स्यादित्यव्ययमनेकान्तद्योतकमष्टास्वपि पदेषु योज्यम् । तदे
5 वाधिकृतमेकं वस्तु स्यान्नाशि विनशनधर्मीं अनित्यमि
त्यर्थः । स्यान्नित्यमविनाशधर्मीत्यर्थः । एतावता नित्यानित्यल
क्षणमेकं विधानम् ॥ तथा स्यात्सदृशम् अनुवृत्तिहेतुसामान्यरूपम् ॥

स्याद्विरूप्यम् विविधरूपं विसदृशपरिणामारब्धं व्यावृत्तिहेतुविशेष-
रूपमित्यर्थः। अनेन सामान्यविशेषरूपो द्वितीयः प्रकारः॥ तथा
10 स्याद्वाच्यं वक्तव्यम्॥ स्यान्न वाच्यम् अवक्तव्यमित्यर्थः। अत्र
च समासे अवाच्यमिति युक्तं तथाप्यवाच्यपदं योन्यादौ रूढ-
मित्यसभ्यतापरिहारार्थं न वाच्यमित्यसमस्तं चकार स्तुतिकारः।
एतेनाभिलाप्यानभिलाप्यस्वरूपस्तृतीयो भेदः॥ तथा स्यात्सद्
विद्यमानमस्तिरूपमित्यर्थः। स्यादसत् तद्विलक्षणमिति। अनेन
15 सदसदाख्या चतुर्थी विधा॥

हे विपश्चितां नाथ संख्यावतां मुख्य इयम् अनन्तरोक्ता निपीत-
तत्त्वसुधोद्गतोद्गारपरंपरा। तवेति प्रकरणात्सामर्थ्याद्वा गम्यते। तत्र
यथावस्थितवस्तुस्वरूपपरिच्छेदः तदेव जरामरणापहारित्वादिगुणो-
पमाम्यत्वाभिव्याप्तविषोर्मिभिराकरिष्णुत्वादन्तराह्लादकारित्वा-
20 च्च सुधा पीयूषं तत्त्वसुधा। नितरामनन्यसामान्यतया पीता
आस्वादिता या तत्त्वसुधा तस्या उद्गता प्रादुर्भूता तत्कारणिका
उद्गारपरंपरा उद्गारश्रेणिरित्यर्थः। यथा हि कश्चिदाकण्ठं पीयूष-
रसमापीय तदनुविधायिनीमुद्गारपरंपरां मुञ्चति तथा भग-
वानपि जरामरणापहारि तत्त्वामृतं स्वैरमास्वाद्य तद्रसानुविधा-
25 यिनीं स्याद्वादानेकान्तवादभेदचतुष्टयीरूपामुद्गारपरम्परां देशना-
मुखेनोद्गीर्णवानित्याशयः॥

अथवा यैरेकान्तवादिभिर्मिथ्यात्वगरलभोजनमाकुक्षि भक्षितं
तेषां तज्जन्यविकारप्रकाराः प्राक् प्रदर्शिताः। यैस्तु पचेलिम-
प्राचीनपुण्यप्राग्भारानुगृहीतैर्भगवद्वदनेन्दुनिःस्यन्दि तत्त्वामृतं
30 मनोहत्य पीतं तेषां विपश्चितां यथार्थवादविदुषां हे नाथ इयं
पूर्वदर्शितोल्लेखशेखरोद्गारपरंपरेति व्याख्येयम्। एते च चत्वा-
रोऽपि वादास्तेषु तेषु स्थानेषु प्रागेव चर्चिताः। तथा हि। आद्यौ-

यथा व्योम समस्तभावानाम् इति वृत्ते नित्यानित्यवादः प्रदर्शितः । अनेकमेकात्मकमेव वाच्यम् इति काव्ये सामान्यविशेषवादः संसू-
15 चितः। सप्तभङ्गनामभिलाप्यानभिलाप्यवादः सदसद्वादश्च चर्चितः। इति न भूयः प्रयासः ॥ इति काव्यार्थः ॥

इदानीं नित्यानित्यपक्षयोः परस्परदूषणप्रकाशनबद्धकक्षतया वैरायमाणयोरितरेतरोदीरितविविधहेतुहेतिसंनिपातसंभावितविनि-पातयोरयत्नसिद्धप्रतिपक्षप्रतिक्षेपस्य भगवच्छासनसाम्राज्यस्य सर्वोत्कर्षमाह ।

य एव दोषा किल नित्यवादे
विनाशवादेऽपि समास्त एव ।
परस्परध्वंसिषु कण्टकेषु
जयत्यधृष्यं जिनशासनं ते ॥ २६ ॥

5 किलेति निश्चये । य एव नित्यवादे नित्यैकान्तवादे दोषा अनित्यैकान्तवादिभिः प्रसञ्जिताः क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रियानु-पपत्त्यादयस्त एव विनाशवादेऽपि क्षणिकैकान्तवादेऽपि समाः तुल्याः नित्यैकान्तवादिभिः प्रसज्यमाना अन्यूनाधिकाः । तथाहि नित्य-वादी प्रमाणयति । सर्वं नित्यं सत्त्वात् । क्षणिके सदसत्कालयोरर्थक्रि-
10 याविरोधात् तल्लक्षणं सत्त्वं नावस्थां बध्नातीति ततो निवर्तमान-मनन्यशरणतया नित्यत्वमवतिष्ठते । तथाहि क्षणिकोऽर्थः सन् वा कार्यं कुर्यात् असन् वा । गत्यन्तराभावात् । न तावदाद्यः पक्षः। सम-समयवर्तिनि व्यापारायोगात् । सकलभावानां परस्परं कार्यकारण-भावप्राप्त्यातिप्रसङ्गाच्च । नापि द्वितीयः पक्षः क्षोदं क्षमते । असतः
15 कार्यकरणशक्तिविकलत्वात् । अन्यथा शशविषाणादयोऽपि कार्यकरणायोत्सहेरन् । विशेषाभावात् । इति ॥ अनित्यवादी

नित्यवादिनं प्रति पुनरेवं प्रमाणयति । सर्वं क्षणिकं सत्त्वात् ।
अक्षणिके क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रियाविरोधात् अर्थक्रियाकारित्वस्य
च भावलक्षणत्वात् ततोऽर्थक्रिया व्यावर्तमाना स्वक्रोडीकृतां
20 सत्तां व्यावर्तयदिति क्षणिकसिद्धिः । नहि नित्योऽर्थक्रियां
क्रमेण प्रवर्तयितुमुत्सहते । पूर्वार्थक्रियाकरणस्वभावोपमर्दद्वारेणोत्तर
क्रियायां क्रमेण प्रवृत्तेः । अन्यथा पूर्वक्रियाकरणाविरामप्रसङ्गात् ।
तत्स्वभावप्रच्यवे च नित्यता प्रयाति । अतादवस्थ्यस्यानित्यतालक्ष
णत्वात् । अथ नित्योऽपि क्रमवर्तिनं सहकारिकारणमर्थमुदीक्षमाण
25 स्तावदासीत् पश्चात्तमासाद्य क्रमेण कार्यं कुर्यादिति चेत् न । सह
कारिकारणस्य नित्येऽकिंचित्करत्वादकिंचित्करस्यापि प्रतीक्षणेऽ
नवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । नापि यौगपद्येन नित्योऽर्थक्रियां कुरुते । अ
ध्यक्षविरोधात् । न ह्येककाले सकलाः क्रियाः प्रारभमाणः कश्चिदुप
लभ्यते । करोतु वा । तथाप्याद्यक्षण एव सकलक्रियापरिसमाप्ते
30 र्द्वितीयादिक्षणेष्वकुर्वाणस्यानित्यता बलादापद्येत । करणाकरण
योरेकस्मिन्विरोधात् । इति ॥ तदेवमेकान्तद्वयेऽपि ये हेतवस्ते युक्ति
साम्याद्विरुद्धं न व्यभिचरन्तीत्यविचारितरमणीयतया सुगतमतस्य
व्यामर्थं चास्यादयन्तीति विरुद्धा व्यभिचारिणोऽनैकान्तिकाः ।
इति ॥ अत्र च नित्यानित्यैकान्तपक्षप्रतिक्षेप एवोक्तः । उपलक्षण
35 त्वाच्च सामान्यविशेषाद्येकान्तवादा अपि मिथःप्रत्यनीकतया
विरुद्धा व्यभिचारिणश्च हेतूनुपस्थापयन्तीति परिभावनीयम् ॥
अथोत्तरार्धं व्याख्यायते । परस्परेत्यादि । एवं च कण्टकेषु
क्षुद्रशत्रुकल्पैकान्तवादिषु परस्परध्वंसिषु सत्सु परस्परस्माद् ध्वंसम्
विनाशमुपयान्तीत्येवंशीलाः सुन्दोपसुन्दवदिति परस्परध्वंसिनः ।
40 ननु हे जिन न तव शासनं स्याद्वादलक्षणनिपुणं द्वादशाङ्गीरूपं
प्रवचनं पराभिभावुकानां कण्टकानां व्यपमुच्छिन्नप्रसरत्वाभावात्

धृष्यम् अपराभवनीयम्। शक्तार्हे कृत्याश्च इति कृत्यविधानात् धर्षितुमशक्यं धर्षितुमनर्हं वा। जयति सर्वोत्कर्षेण वर्तते। यथा कश्चिन्महाराजः पीवरपुण्यपरीपाकः परस्परं विगृह्य स्वयमेव क्षयमुपेयिवत्सु द्विषत्स्वयत्नसिद्धनिष्कण्टकत्वं समृद्धं राज्यमुपभुञ्जानः सर्वोत्कृष्टो भवत्येवं त्वच्छासनमपि। इति काव्यार्थः॥

अनन्तरकाव्ये नित्यानित्याद्येकान्तवादे दोषसामान्यमभिहितम्। इदानीं कतिपयतद्विशेषान्नामग्राहं दर्शयंस्तत्प्ररूपकाणामसद्भूतोद्भावकतयोद्धततामि विपरिणमनमनिर्वापमिव परिभाव्य परिश्रीपतेर्जिनमतस्य पुरतो भुवनत्रयं मत्सुपकारकारितामाविष्करोति—

> नैकान्तवादे सुखदुःखभोगौ
> न पुण्यपापे न च बन्धमोक्षौ।
> दुर्नीतिवादव्यसनासिनैवं
> परैर्विलुप्तं जगदप्यशेषम्॥ २७॥

एकान्तवादे नित्यानित्यैकान्तपक्षाभ्युपगमे न सुखदुःखभोगौ घटेते। न च पुण्यपापे घटेते। न च बन्धमोक्षौ घटेते। पुनःपुनर्नञः प्रयोगोऽत्यन्ताघटमानतादर्शनार्थः॥ तथाहि एकान्तनित्ये आत्मनि तावत् सुखदुःखभोगौ नोपपद्येते। नित्यस्य हि लक्षणम् अप्रच्युतानुत्पन्नस्थिरैकरूपत्वम्। ततो यदा आत्मा सुखमनुभूय स्वकारणकलापसामग्रीवशात् दुःखमुपभुङ्क्ते तदा स्वभावभेदादनित्यत्वापत्त्या स्थिरैकरूपताहानिप्रसङ्गः। एवं दुःखमनुभूय सुखमुपभुञ्जानस्यापि वाच्यम्। अथ अवस्थाभेदादयं व्यवहारः। न चावस्थासु भिद्यमानास्वपि तद्वतो भेदः सर्पस्येव कुण्डलार्जवावस्थासु इति चेत् न।

तास्ततो व्यतिरिक्ताः अव्यतिरिक्ता वा । व्यतिरेके तास्तस्येति संबन्धाभावः । अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अव्यतिरेके तु तद्ग्रहणेनैव तद्वत्स्थितत्वात् स्थिरैकरूपताहानिः । कथं च तदेकान्तैकरूपत्वेऽवस्थाभेदोऽपि भवेत् । इति ॥ किं च सुखदुःखभोगौ पुण्यपापनिर्वर्त्यौ । तन्निर्वर्तनं चार्थक्रिया सा च कूटस्थनित्यस्य क्रमेण अक्रमेण वा नोपपद्यत इत्युक्तप्रायम् । अत एवोक्तं न पुण्यपापे इति । पुण्यं दानादिक्रियोपार्जनीयं शुभं कर्म पापं हिंसादिक्रियासाध्यमशुभं कर्म । ते अपि न घटेते । प्रागुक्तनीतेः ॥ तथा न बन्धमोक्षौ । बन्धः कर्मपुद्गलैः सह अविष्वग्भावमात्मनो वह्न्ययःपिण्डवद् अन्योन्यसंश्लेषः । मोक्षः कृत्स्नकर्मक्षयः । तावप्येकान्तनित्ये न स्याताम् । बन्धो हि संयोगविशेषः । स च अप्राप्तानां प्राप्तिः इतिलक्षणः । प्राक्कालभाविनी अप्राप्तिरन्यावस्था उत्तरकालभाविनी प्राप्तिरन्या । तदनयोरप्यवस्थाभेददोषो दुस्तरः । कथं चैकरूपत्वे सति तस्याकस्मिको बन्धनसंयोगः । बन्धनसंयोगाच्च प्राक् किं नायं मुक्तोऽभवत् । किं च तेन बन्धनेनासौ विकृतिमनुभवति न वा । अनुभवति चेत् चर्मादिवद् अनित्यः । नानुभवति चेत् निर्विकारत्वे सता असता वा तेन गगनस्येव न कोऽप्यस्य विशेषः इति बन्धवैफल्यान्नित्यमुक्त एव स्यात् । ततश्च विशीर्णा जगति बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्था । तथा च पठन्ति ।

वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नश्चर्मण्यस्ति तयोः फलम् ।
चर्मोपमश्चेत्सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्फलः ॥

बन्धस्यानुपपत्तौ मोक्षस्याप्यनुपपत्तिः । बन्धनविच्छेदपर्यायत्वान्मुक्तिशब्दस्य । इति ॥

40 एवमनित्यैकान्तवादेऽपि सुखदुःखाद्यनुपपत्तिः। अनित्यं हि अत्यन्तोच्छेदधर्मकम्। तथाभूते चात्मनि पुण्योपादानक्रियाकारिणो निरन्वयं विनष्टत्वात् कस्य नाम तत्फलभूतसुखानुभवः। एवं पापोपादानक्रियाकारिणोऽपि निरन्वयनाशे कस्य दुःखसंवेदनमस्तु। एवं चान्यः क्रियाकारी अन्यश्च तत्फलभोक्ता
45 इत्यसमञ्जसमापद्यते। अथ

यस्मिन्नेव हि संताने आहिता कर्मवासना।
फलं तत्रैव संधत्ते कर्पासे रक्तता यथा॥

इति वचनादसमञ्जसमित्यपि वाङ्मात्रम्। संतानवासनयोरवास्तवत्वेन प्रागेव निर्लोठितत्वात्। तथा पुण्यपापेऽपि न घटेते।
50 तयोर्हि अर्थक्रिया सुखदुःखोपभोगः। तदनुपपत्तिश्चानन्तरमेवोक्ता। ततोऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वाभावात् तयोरप्यघटमानत्वम्। किंचानित्यः क्षणमात्रस्थायी तस्मिंश्च क्षणे उत्पत्तिमात्रव्यग्रत्वात् तस्य कुतः पुण्यपापोपादानक्रियार्जनम्। द्वितीयादिक्षणेषु चावस्थातुमेव न लभते। पुण्यपापोपादानक्रियाभावे च
55 पुण्यपापे कुतः। निर्मूलत्वात्। तदसत्त्वे च कुतस्तनः सुखदुःखभोगः। आस्तां वा कथंचिदेतत्। तथापि पूर्वक्षणसदृशेनोत्तरक्षणेन भवितव्यम्। उपादानानुरूपत्वादुपादेयस्य। ततः पूर्वक्षणाद् दुःखितादुत्तरक्षणः कथं सुखित उत्पद्यते। कथं च सुखितात्ततः स दुःखितः स्यात्। विसदृशभागतापत्तेः। एवं
60 पुण्यपापादावपि। तस्मादपरिचिन्तितमेतत्॥ एवं बन्धमोक्षयोरप्यसंभवः। लोकेऽपि हि य एव बद्धः स एव मुच्यते। निरन्वयनाशाभ्युपगमे चैकाधिकरणत्वाभावात् संतानस्य चावास्तवत्वात् कुतस्तयोः संभावनामात्रमपि। इति परिणामिनि चात्मनि स्वीक्रियमाणं सर्वं निराबाधमुपपन्नम्।

65 परिणामोऽर्थान्तरगमनं न च सर्वथा व्यवस्थानम् ।
न च सर्वथा विनाशः परिणामस्तद्विदामिष्टः ॥

इतिवचनात् । पातञ्जलटीकाकारोऽप्याह । अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणामः इति ॥ एवं सामान्यविशेषसदसदभिलाप्यानभिलाप्यैकान्तवादेष्वपि सुखदुःखाद्य-
70 भावः स्वयमभियुक्तैरभ्यूह्यः ॥

अथाक्षरार्थव्याख्या । एवमनुपपद्यमानेऽपि सुखदुःखभोगादिव्यवहारे परैः परतीर्थिकैः अथ च परमार्थतः शत्रुभिः । परशब्दो हि शत्रुपर्यायोऽप्यस्ति । दुर्नीतिवादव्यसनासिना । नीयते एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थः प्रतीतिविषयमाभिरिति नीतयो नयाः । दुष्टा नीतयो
75 दुर्नीतयो दुर्नयाः । तेषां वदनं परेभ्यः प्रतिपादनं दुर्नीतिवादः । तत्र यद् व्यसनम् अत्यासक्तिः औचित्यनिरपेक्षा प्रवृत्तिरिति यावत् दुर्नीतिवादव्यसनम् । तदेव सकलोपघातशरीरोच्छेदनशक्तियुक्तत्वात् असिरिव असिः कृपाणः दुर्नीतिवादव्यसनासिः । तेन दुर्नीतिवादव्यसनासिना करणभूतेन दुर्नयप्ररूपणहेवाकरसेन ।
80 एवम् इत्यनुभवसिद्धं प्रकारमाह । अपिशब्दस्य भिन्नक्रमत्वात् अशेषमपि जगत् निखिलमपि त्रैलोक्यम् । तात्स्थ्यात् तद्व्यपदेश इति त्रैलोक्यगतजन्तुजातम् । विलुप्तम् सम्यग्ज्ञानादिभावप्राणव्यपरोपणेन व्यापादितम् । तत् भावश्च इत्याशयः । सम्यग्ज्ञानादयो हि । भावप्राणाः प्रावचनिकैर्गीयन्ते । अत एव सिद्धेष्वपि
85 जीवव्यपदेशः । अन्यथा हि जीवधातुः प्राणधारणार्थेऽभिधीयते तेषां च दशविधद्रव्यप्राणधारणाभावादजीवत्वप्रसक्तिः । सा च विरुद्धा । तस्मात्संसारिणो दशविधद्रव्यप्राणधारणाज्जीवाः । सिद्धाश्च ज्ञानादिभावप्राणधारणात् । इति सिद्धम् ॥ दुर्नयस्वरूपं चोत्तरकाव्ये व्याख्यास्यामः । इति काव्यार्थः ॥

सांप्रतं दुर्नयनयप्रमाणप्ररूपणद्वारेण प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः इति वचनाज्जीवाजीवादितत्त्वाधिगमनिबन्धनानां तेषां प्रमाणनयानां प्रतिपादयितुः स्वामिनः स्याद्वादविरोधिदुर्नयमार्गनिराकरिष्णुमनन्यसामान्यं वचनातिशयं स्तुवन्नाह ।

सदेव सत्स्यात्सदिति त्रिधार्थो
मीयेत दुर्नीतिनयप्रमाणैः ।
यथार्थदर्शी तु नयप्रमाण-
पथेन दुर्नीतिपथं त्वमास्थः ॥ २८ ॥

अर्यते परिच्छिद्यत इत्यर्थः पदार्थः । त्रिधा त्रिभिः प्रकारैः । मीयेत परिच्छिद्येत । विधौ सप्तमी । कैस्त्रिभिः प्रकारैरित्याह । दुर्नीतिनयप्रमाणैः । नीयते परिच्छिद्यते एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थ आभिरिति नीतयो नयाः । दुष्टा नीतयो दुर्नीतयो दुर्नया इत्यर्थः । नया नैगमादयः । प्रमीयते परिच्छिद्यतेऽर्थोऽनेकान्तविशिष्टोऽनेनेति प्रमाणं स्याद्वादात्मकं प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षलक्षणम् । दुर्नीतयश्च नयाश्च प्रमाणे च दुर्नीतिनयप्रमाणानि तैः । कथं मीयते इत्याह सदेव सत्स्यात्सदिति । सदिति अव्यक्तत्वान्नपुंसकत्वं यथा किं तस्या गर्भे जातमिति । सदेवेति दुर्नयः । सदिति नयः । स्यात्सदिति प्रमाणम् । तथा हि । दुर्नयस्तावत्सदेवेति ब्रवीति । अस्त्येव घट इति । अयं वस्तुन्येकान्तास्तित्वमेवाभ्युपगच्छन्नितरधर्माणां तिरस्कारेण स्वाभिप्रेतमेव धर्मं व्यवस्थापयति । दुर्नयत्वं चास्य मिथ्यारूपत्वात् । मिथ्यारूपत्वं च तत्र धर्मान्तराणां सतामपि निह्नवात् । तथा सदित्युल्लेखवान्नयः । स ह्यस्ति घटः इति घटे स्वाभिमतमस्तित्वधर्मं प्रसाधयन् शेषधर्मेषु गजनिमीलिकामालम्बते । न चास्य दुर्नयत्वम् । धर्मान्तरा

तिरस्कारात्। स च प्रमाणनयैः। स्यात्कथंचित्स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैः सदिति स्यात्सदेव सदस्तु इति प्रमाणम्। प्रमाणं चास्य दृष्टेष्टाबाधितत्वादिपरमार्थत्वाच्च। सर्वं हि वस्तु स्वरूपेण सत् पररूपेण चासदित्यसकृदुक्तम्। सदिति दिङ्मात्र
25 दर्शनार्थम्॥ अनया दिशा असत्त्वनित्यत्वानित्यत्ववक्तव्यत्वावक्तव्यत्वसामान्यविशेषाद्यपि वाच्यम्॥

इत्थं वस्तुस्वरूपमाख्याय स्तुतिकार यथार्थदर्शी इत्यादि। दुर्नीतिपथं दुर्नयमार्गम्। दुर्नयस्य स्वाभिप्रायत्वात् स्वम च। आस्थः क्षेपेण निराकृतवान्। न तीर्थान्तरदेवतानि। केन
30 कृत्वा। नयप्रमाणपथेन। नयप्रमाणे उक्तस्वरूपे। तयोर्मार्गेण प्रचारेण। यतस्त्वं यथार्थदर्शी। यथार्थोऽस्ति तथैव पश्यतीत्येवं शीलो यथार्थदर्शी। विमलकेवलज्योतिषा यथावस्थितवस्तुदर्शी। तीर्थान्तरशास्तारस्तु रागादिदोषकालुष्यकलङ्कितत्वेन तथाविधज्ञानाभावाच्च यथार्थदर्शिनः। ततः कथं नाम दुर्नयपथप्रमथन
35 मलंभवन्तु ते तपस्विनः। नहि स्वयमनयपङ्कमग्नः परेषामनयं निषेद्धुमुद्धर्ता च। इदमुक्तं भवति। यथा कश्चित्सन्मार्गवेदी परोपकारदुर्ललितः पुरुषस्तस्करश्वापदकण्टकाद्याकीर्णं मार्गं परित्याज्य पथिकानां गुणदोषोभयविकलं सोपानमृष्टं गुणयुक्तं च मार्गमुपदर्शयति एवं जगन्नाथोऽपि दुर्नयतिरस्करणेन भव्येभ्यो नयप्रमा
40 णमार्गं प्ररूपयतीति। आस्थ इत्यस्यतेरद्यतन्यां पञ्चमीभूते 'अस्यतेस्थक्' इत्यनेन थगागमे 'श्वयत्यसूवचपतः श्वास्थवोचपप्तम्' इति अस्थादेशे स्वरादेस्तासु इति वृद्धौ रूपम्॥ तुल्यसंख्यया च प्रमाणस्येव प्राधान्यम्। यच्चात्र नयानां प्रमाणतुल्यकक्षतयाख्यापनं तत्तेषामनुयोगद्वारभूततया प्रज्ञापनाङ्गत्वख्यापनार्थम्। चत्वारि हि
45 प्रवचनानुयोगमहानगरस्य द्वाराण्युपक्रमो निक्षेपोऽनुगमो नयश्चेति।

एतेषां च स्वरूपमावश्यकभाष्यादेर्निरूपणीयम् । इह तु नोच्य
ग्रन्थगौरवभयात् । अत्र चैकत्र कृतसमासान्त पथिन्शब्द
अन्यत्र चाभ्युच्चयः पथश्चोऽन्त इति पथशब्दस्य द्विप्रय
न दुष्यति ॥

50 अथ दुर्नयनयप्रमाणस्वरूपं किंचिन्निरूप्यते । तत्रापि प्रथमं
स्वरूपम् । तदनधिगमे दुर्नयस्वरूपस्य दुष्परिज्ञानत्वात् ।
चाचार्येण प्रथमं दुर्नयनिर्देशो यथोत्तरं प्राधान्यापेक्षा
कृतः । तत्र प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नार्थैकदेशपरामर्शो नयः । अनन्त
प्यासितं वस्तु स्वाभिप्रेतैकधर्मविशिष्टं नयति प्राप
55 संविदंकोटिमारोहयतीति नयः । प्रमाणप्रवृत्तेरुत्तरकाल
परामर्श इत्यर्थः । नयाश्चानन्ताः । अनन्तधर्मत्वाद्वस्तुनस्तदेक
पर्यवसितानां वक्तुरभिप्रायाणां च नयत्वात् । तथा च वृद्धाः
जावइया वयणपहा तावइआ चेव हुंति नयवाया ।
इति । तथापि चिरंतनाचार्यैः सर्वसंग्राहिसप्ताभिप्रायपरिक
60 द्वारेण सप्त नयाः प्रतिपादिताः । तद्यथा । नैगमसंग्रहव्य
ऋजुसूत्रशब्दसमभिरूढैवंभूता इति । कथमेषां सर्वसंग्राहकत्व
चेदुच्यते । अभिप्रायस्तावदर्थद्वारेण शब्दद्वारेण वा प्रवर्तते ।
न्तराभावात् । तत्र ये केचनार्थनिरूपणप्रवणाः प्रमात्रभिप्रा
सर्वेऽप्याद्ये नयचतुष्टयेऽन्तर्भवन्ति । ये च शब्दविचारच
65 शब्दादिनयत्रय इति ॥

तत्र नैगमः सत्तालक्षणं महासामान्यम् अवान्तरसामा
च द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वादीनि तथान्त्यान् विशेषान् स
साधारणरूपलक्षणानवान्तर विशेषांश्चापेक्षया पररूपव्या
समाम् सामान्यादत्यन्तविनिर्लुठितस्वरूपानभिमैति । इ
70 स्वतन्त्रसामान्यविशेषवादे क्षुण्णमिति न पृथक्प्रयत्नः । प्र

प्रसिद्धनिरूपणमस्याप्यभ्युपगम्यमानायम् ॥

संग्रहस्तु अशेषविशेषतिरोधानद्वारेण सामान्यरूपतया
विश्वमुपादत्ते । एतच्च सामान्यैकान्तवादे प्राक् प्रपञ्चितम् ॥
व्यवहारस्त्वेवमाह । यथालोकग्राहमेव वस्त्वस्तु किमनया
75 अदृष्टाव्यवह्रियमाणवस्तुपरिकल्पनकष्टपिष्टिकया । यदेव च
लोकव्यवहारपथमवतरति तस्यैवानुग्राहकं प्रमाणमुपलभ्यते नेत-
रस्य । न हि सामान्यमनादिनिधनमेकं संग्रहाभिमतं प्रमाण-
भूमिः । तथानुभवाभावात् । सर्वस्य सर्वदर्शित्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । नापि
विशेषाः परमाणुलक्षणाः क्षणक्षयिणः प्रमाणगोचराः । तथा-
80 प्रवृत्तेरभावात् । तस्मादिदमेव निखिललोकाबाधितं प्रमाणप्रसिद्धं
किंचित्कालभाविस्थूलतामाबिभ्राणमुदकाद्याहरणाद्यर्थक्रियानिर्वर्तन
क्षमं घटादिकं वस्तुरूपं पारमार्थिकम् । पूर्वोत्तरकालभावि
तत्पर्यायपर्यालोचना पुनरज्यायसी । तत्र प्रमाणप्रसराभावात् ।
प्रमाणमन्तरेण च विचारस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् । अवस्तुत्वाच्च
85 तेषां किं तद्गोचरपर्यालोचनेन । तथाहि पूर्वोत्तरकालभा-
विनो द्रव्यविवर्ताः क्षणक्षयिपरमाणुलक्षणा वा विशेषा न
कथंचन लोकव्यवहारमुपरचयन्ति । तन्न ते वस्तुरूपाः ।
लोकव्यवहारोपयोगिनामेव वस्तुत्वात् । अत एव पन्था
गच्छति कुण्डिका स्रवति गिरिर्दह्यते मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीत्या-
90 दिव्यवहाराणां प्रामाण्यम् । तथा च वाचकमुख्यः ।
लौकिकसम उपचारप्रायो विस्तृतार्थो व्यवहारः इति ॥

ऋजुसूत्रः पुनरिदं मन्यते । वर्तमानक्षणविवर्त्येव वस्तुरूपम् ।
नातीतमनागतं च । अतीतस्य विनष्टत्वादनागतस्यालब्धात्म-
लाभत्वात्खरविषाणादिभ्योऽविशिष्यमाणतया सकलशक्तिविरह-
95 रूपत्वान्नार्थक्रियानिर्वर्तनक्षमत्वं तदभावाच्च न वस्तुत्वम् । यदे

वार्थक्रियाकारि तदेव परमार्थसत् इति वचनात् । वर्तमानक्षणा
स्थितं पुनर्वस्तुरूपं समस्तार्थक्रियासु व्याप्रियत इति तदेव पार
मार्थिकम् । तदपि च निरंशमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । अंशव्याप्तेर्युक्तिरिक्त
त्वात् । एकस्यानेकस्वभावतामन्तरेणानेकस्वावयवव्यापनायोगात् ।
100 अनेकस्वभावता एवास्तु इति चेत् न । विरोधव्याघ्राघ्रातत्वात् ।
तथाहि यद्येकः स्वभावः कथमनेकः अनेकश्चेत्कथमेकः । एकानेकयोः
परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात् । तस्मात्स्वरूपनिमग्नाः परमाणव एव
परस्परोपसर्पणद्वारेण कथंचिन्निचयरूपतामापन्ना निखिलकार्येषु
व्यापारभाज इति त एव स्वलक्षणं न स्थूलतां धारयत्पारमा
105 र्थिकमिति । एवमस्याभिप्रायेण यदेव स्वकीयं तदेव वस्तु न
परकीयम् । अनुपयोगित्वात् । इति ॥

शब्दस्तु रूढितो यावन्तो ध्वनयः कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे प्रवर्तन्ते यथे
न्द्रशक्रपुरंदरादयः सुरपतौ तेषां सर्वेषामप्येकमर्थमभिप्रैति किल ।
प्रतीतिवशात् । यथा शब्दाव्यतिरेकार्थस्य प्रतिपाद्यते तथैव तस्यैक-
110 मनेकत्वं वा प्रतिपादनीयम् । न चेन्द्रशक्रपुरन्दरादयः पर्याय
शब्दा विभिन्नार्थवाचितया कदाचन प्रतीयन्ते । तेभ्यः सर्वदा
एकाकारपरामर्शोत्पत्तेरस्खलितवृत्तितया तथैव व्यवहारदर्शनात् ।
तस्मादेक एव पर्यायशब्दानामर्थ इति । शब्द्यते आहूयतेऽनेनाभि
प्रायेणार्थ इति निरुक्तात् एकार्थप्रतिपादनाभिप्रायेणैव पर्यायध्वनीनां
115 प्रयोगात् । यथा चायं पर्यायशब्दानामेकमर्थमभिप्रैति तथा तट
स्तटी तटमिति विरुद्धलिङ्गलक्षणधर्माभिसंबन्धाद्वस्तुनो भेदं
चाभिधत्त । न हि विरुद्धधर्मकृतं भेदमनुभवतो वस्तुनो विरुद्ध
धर्मायोगो युक्तः । एवं संख्याकालकारकपुरुषादिभेदादपि
भेदोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । तत्र संख्या एकत्वादि कालोऽतीतादिः
120 कारकं कर्मादि पुरुषः प्रथमपुरुषादिः ॥ समभिरूढस्तु

पर्यायशब्दानां प्रविभक्तमेवार्थमभिमन्यते । तद्यथा इन्दनादिन्द्रः ।
परमैश्वर्यमिन्द्रशब्दवाच्यं परमार्थतस्तद्वत्यर्थे । अतद्वत्यर्थे
पुनरुपचारतो वर्तते । न वा कश्चित्तद्वान् । सर्वशब्दानां परस्पर
विभक्तार्थप्रतिपादितया आश्रयाश्रयिभावेन प्रादुर्भावासिद्धेः । एवं
125 शकनाच्छक्रः पूर्दारणात्पुरन्दर इत्यादिभिन्नार्थत्वं सर्वशब्दानां
दर्शयति । प्रमाणयति च । पर्यायशब्दा अपि भिन्नार्थाः । प्रवि
भक्तव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तकत्वात् । इह ये ये प्रविभक्तव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्त
कास्ते ते भिन्नार्थका यथेन्द्रपशुपुरुषशब्दाः । विभिन्नव्युत्पत्तिनि
मित्तकाश्च पर्यायशब्दा अपि । अतो भिन्नार्था इति ॥

130 एवंभूतः पुनरेवं भाषते । यस्मिन्नर्थे शब्दो व्युत्पाद्यते स
व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमर्थो यदैव प्रवर्तते तदैव तं शब्दं प्रवर्तमानमभि
प्रैति न सामान्येन । यथोदकाद्याहरणवेलायां योषिदादिमस्तका
रूढो विशिष्टचेष्टावानेव घटोऽभिधीयते न शेषः । घटशब्दव्युत्पत्ति
निमित्तशून्यत्वात् पटादिवदिति । अतीतां भाविनीं वा चेष्टा
135 मङ्गीकृत्य सामान्येनैवोच्यत इति चेत् न । तयोर्विनष्टानुत्पन्नतया
शशविषाणकल्पत्वात् । तथापि तद्द्वारेण शब्दप्रवर्तने सर्वत्र प्रव
र्तयितव्यः । विशेषाभावात् । किंच यद्यतीतवर्त्स्यच्चेष्टापेक्षया
घटशब्दोऽचेष्टावत्यपि प्रयुज्यते तदा कपालमृत्पिण्डादावपि तत्प्र
वर्तनं दुर्निवारं स्यात् । विशेषाभावात् । तस्माद्यत्र क्षणे व्युत्पत्तिनि
140 मित्तमविकलमस्ति तस्मिन्नेव सोऽर्थस्तच्छब्दवाच्य इति ॥

अत्र संग्रहश्लोकाः ।

अन्यदेव हि सामान्यमभिन्नज्ञानकारणम् ।
विशेषोऽप्यन्य एवेति मन्यते नैगमो नयः ॥ १ ॥
सद्रूपतानतिक्रान्तं स्वस्वभावमिदं जगत् ।
145 सत्तारूपतया सर्वं संगृह्णन् संग्रहो मतः ॥ २ ॥

व्यवहारस्तु तामेव प्रतिवस्तु व्यवस्थिताम् ।
तथैव दृश्यमानत्वाद्व्यापारयति देहिनः ॥ ३ ॥
तत्रर्जुसूत्रनीतिः स्याच्छुद्धपर्यायसंश्रिता ।
नश्वरस्यैव भावस्य भावात्स्थितिवियोगतः ॥ ४ ॥
150 विरोधिलिङ्गसंख्यादिभेदाद्भिन्नस्वभावताम् ।
तस्यैव मन्यमानोऽयं शब्दः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥ ५ ॥
तथाविधस्य तस्यापि वस्तुनः क्षणवर्तिनः ।
ब्रूते समभिरूढस्तु संज्ञाभेदेन भिन्नताम् ॥ ६ ॥
एकस्यापि ध्वनेर्वाच्यं सदा तन्नोपपद्यते ।
155 क्रियाभेदेन भिन्नत्वादेवंभूतोऽभिमन्यते ॥ ७ ॥

एत एव च परामर्शा अभिप्रेतधर्मावधारणात्मकतया शेष-
धर्मतिरस्कारेण प्रवर्तमाना दुर्नयसंज्ञामश्नुवते । तद्बलप्रभावित-
सत्ताका हि खल्वेते परप्रवादाः । तथा हि । नैगमनयदर्शनानुसा-
रिणौ नैयायिकवैशेषिकौ । संग्रहाभिप्रायप्रवृत्ताः सर्वेऽप्यद्वैतवादाः
160 सांख्यदर्शनं च । व्यवहारनयानुपातिप्रायश्चार्वाकदर्शनम् ।
ऋजुसूत्राकूतप्रवृत्तबुद्धयस्ताथागताः । शब्दादिनयावलम्बिनो वैया-
करणादयः । उक्तं च सोदाहरणं नयदुर्नयस्वरूपं श्रीदेवसूरिपादैः ।
तथा च तद्ग्रन्थः । नीयते येन श्रुताख्यप्रमाणविषयीकृतस्यार्थ-
स्यांशस्तदितरांशौदासीन्यतः स प्रतिपत्तुरभिप्रायविशेषो नयः
165 इति । स्वाभिप्रेतादंशादितरांशापलापी पुनर्नयाभासः । स
व्याससमासाभ्यां द्विप्रकारः । व्यासतोऽनेकविकल्पः । समास-
स्तु द्विभेदो द्रव्यार्थिकः पर्यायार्थिकश्च । आद्यो नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहा-
रभेदात्त्रेधा । धर्मयोर्धर्मिणोर्धर्मधर्मिणोश्च । प्रधानोपसर्जनभावेन
यद्विवक्षणं स नैकगमो नैगमः । सच्चैतन्यमात्मनीति धर्मयोः । वस्तु
170 पर्यायवद्द्रव्यमिति धर्मिणोः । क्षणमेकं सुखी विषयासक्तजीव इति

धर्मधर्मिणोः । धर्मद्वयादीनामैकान्तिकपार्थक्याभिसंधिर्नैगमाभा
सः ॥ यथा आत्मनि सत्त्वचैतन्ये परस्परमत्यन्तं पृथग्भूते इत्यादि ॥
सामान्यमात्रग्राही परामर्शः संग्रहः । अयमुभयविकल्पः परोऽ
परश्च । अशेषविशेषेष्वौदासीन्यं भजमानः शुद्धद्रव्यं सन्मात्रमभिम
175 न्यमानः परः संग्रहः । विश्वमेकं सद् अविशेषादिति यथा । सत्ताद्वैतं
स्वीकुर्वाणः सकलविशेषान्निराचक्षाणस्तदाभासः । यथा सत्तैव तत्त्वं
ततः पृथग्भूतानां विशेषाणामदर्शनात् । द्रव्यत्वादीन्यवान्तरसा
मान्यानि मन्वानस्तद्भेदेषु गजनिमीलिकामवलम्बमानः पुनरपर
संग्रहः ॥ धर्माधर्माकाशकालपुद्गलजीवद्रव्याणामैक्यं द्रव्यत्वाभे
180 दादित्यादिर्यथा । द्रव्यत्वादिकं प्रतिजानानस्तद्विशेषान्निह्नुवान
स्तदाभासः । यथा द्रव्यत्वमेव तत्त्वं ततोऽर्थान्तरभूतानां द्रव्याणाम-
नुपलब्धेरित्यादि ॥ संग्रहेण गोचरीकृतानामर्थानां विधिपूर्वकमव
हरणं येनाभिसंधिना क्रियते स व्यवहारः । यथा यत्सत् तद् द्रव्यं
पर्यायो वेत्यादिः । यः पुनरपारमार्थिकद्रव्यपर्यायप्रविभागमभिप्रैति
185 स व्यवहाराभासः । यथा चार्वाकदर्शनम् ॥ पर्यायार्थिकश्चतुर्धा
ऋजुसूत्रः शब्दः समभिरूढ एवंभूतश्च ॥ ऋजु वर्तमानक्षणस्थायि
पर्यायमात्रं प्राधान्यतः सूचयन्नभिप्राय ऋजुसूत्रः । यथा सुखविवर्तः
संप्रत्यस्तीत्यादिः । सर्वथा द्रव्यापलापी तदाभासः । यथा तथाग
तमतम् ॥ कालादिभेदेन ध्वनेरर्थभेदं प्रतिपद्यमानः शब्दः । यथा
190 बभूव भवति भविष्यति सुमेरुरित्यादिः । तद्भेदेन तस्य तमेव
समर्थयमानस्तदाभासः । यथा बभूव भवति भविष्यति सुमेरुरित्या
दयो भिन्नकालाः शब्दा भिन्नमेवार्थमभिदधति भिन्नकालशब्दत्वा-
त् तादृक्सिद्धान्यशब्दवदित्यादिः ॥ पर्यायशब्देषु निरुक्तिभेदेन
भिन्नमर्थं समभिरोहन् समभिरूढः । इन्दनादिन्द्रः शकनाच्छक्रः
195 पूर्दारणात्पुरन्दर इत्यादिषु यथा । पर्यायध्वनीनामभिधेयनानात्वमेव

कक्षीकुर्वाणस्तदाभासः' यथेन्द्रः शक्रः पुरन्दर इत्यादयः शब्दा
भिन्नाभिधेया एव भिन्नशब्दत्वात्करिकुरङ्गतुरङ्गशब्दवदित्यादिः ॥
शब्दानां स्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाविष्टमर्थं वाच्यत्वेनाभ्युपग
च्छन्नेवंभूतः । यथेन्दनमनुभवन्निन्द्रः शकनक्रियापरिणतः शक्रः
205 पूर्दारणप्रवृत्तः पुरन्दर इत्युच्यते । क्रियानाविष्टं वस्तु शब्दवाच्यतया
प्रतिक्षिपंस्तु तदाभासः । यथा विशिष्टचेष्टाशून्यं घटाख्यं वस्तु न घ
टशब्दवाच्यं घटशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाशून्यत्वात् पटवदित्या
दिः ॥ एतेषु चत्वारः प्रथमेऽर्थनिरूपणप्रवणत्वादर्थनयाः । शेषास्तु
त्रयः शब्दवाच्यार्थगोचरतया शब्दनयाः ॥ पूर्वः पूर्वो नयः प्रचु
210 रगोचरः परः परस्तु परिमितविषयः । सन्मात्रगोचरात्संग्रहान्नैगमो
भावाभावभूमिकत्वाद्भूमविषयः । सद्विशेषप्रकाशकाद्व्यवहारतः संग्रहः
समस्तसत्समूहोपदर्शकत्वाद्बहुविषयः । वर्तमानविषयादृजुसूत्राद्व्यव
हारस्त्रिकालविषयावलम्बित्वादनल्पार्थः । कालादिभेदेन भिन्नार्थो
पदर्शिनः शब्दादृजुसूत्रस्तद्विपरीतवेदकत्वान्महार्थः प्रतिपर्यायशब्द
215 मर्थभेदमभीप्सतः समभिरूढाच्छब्दस्तद्विपर्ययानुयायित्वात्प्रभूत
विषयः । प्रतिक्रियं विभिन्नमर्थं प्रतिजानानादेवंभूतात्समभिरू
ढस्तदन्यथार्थस्थापकत्वान्महागोचरः ।नयवाक्यमपि स्वविषये प्रव
र्तमानं विधिप्रतिषेधाभ्यां सप्तभङ्गीमनुव्रजति । इति ॥ विशेषार्थिना
नयानां नामान्वर्थविशेषलक्षणाक्षेपपरिहारादिचर्चस्तु भाष्यमहो-
220 दधिगन्धहस्तिटीकान्यायावतारादिग्रन्थेभ्यो निरीक्षणीयः ॥

प्रमाणं तु सम्यगर्थनिर्णयलक्षणं सर्वनयात्मकम् ॥ स्याच्छ
ब्दलाञ्छितानां नयानामेव प्रमाणव्यपदेशभाक्त्वात् । तथा च
श्रीविमलनाथस्तवे श्रीसमन्तभद्रः ।

नयास्तव स्यात्पदलाञ्छना इमे रसोपविद्धा इव लोहधातवः ।
225 भवन्त्यभिप्रेतफला यतस्ततो भवन्तमार्याः प्रणता हितैषिणः ॥

इति । तच्च द्विविधं प्रत्यक्षं परोक्षं च । तत्र प्रत्यक्षं द्विधा सांव्यव
हारिकं पारमार्थिकं च । सांव्यवहारिकं द्विविधम् इन्द्रियानिन्द्रिय-
निमित्तभेदात् । तद् द्वितयमवग्रहेहावायधारणाभेदादेकैकशश्चतु
र्विकल्पम् । अवग्रहादीनां स्वरूपं सुप्रतीतत्वान्न प्रतन्यते ।
225 पारमार्थिकं पुनरुत्पत्तावात्ममात्रापेक्षम् । तद्द्विविधं क्षायो-
पशमिकं क्षायिकं च । आद्यमवधिमनःपर्यायभेदाद्द्विधा । क्षायिकं
तु केवलज्ञानमिति । परोक्षं च स्मृतिप्रत्यभिज्ञानोहानुमानागम
भेदात्पञ्चप्रकारम् । तत्र संस्कारप्रबोधसंभूतमनुभूतार्थविषयं
तदित्याकारं वेदनं स्मृतिः । तत्तीर्थकरबिम्बमिति यथा । अनु
230 भवस्मृतिहेतुकं तिर्यगूर्ध्वतासामान्यादिगोचरं संकलनात्मकं ज्ञानं
प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् । यथा तज्जातीय एवायं गोपिण्डो गोसदृशो
गवयः स एवायं जिनदत्त इत्यादि । उपलम्भानुपलम्भसंभ
वं त्रिकालीकलितसाध्यसाधनसंबन्धाद्यालम्बनमिदमस्मिन्सत्येव
भवतीत्याद्याकारं संवेदनमूहाऽपरनामा तर्कः । यथा यावान्
235 कश्चिद्धूमः स सर्वो वह्नौ सत्येव भवतीति तस्मिन्नसत्यसौ
न भवत्येवेति वा । अनुमानं द्विधा स्वार्थं परार्थं च । तत्रान्यथा
ऽनुपपत्त्येकलक्षणहेतुग्रहणसंबन्धस्मरणकारणकं साध्यविज्ञानं
स्वार्थम् । पक्षहेतुवचनात्मकं परार्थम् अनुमानमुपचारात् । आप्त
वचनादाविर्भूतमर्थसंवेदनमागमः । उपचारादाप्तवचनं च । इति
240 स्मृत्यादीनां च विशेषस्वरूपं स्याद्वादरत्नाकरात्साक्षेपपरिहारं ज्ञेय
मिति । प्रमाणान्तराणां पुनरर्थापत्त्युपमानसंभवप्रातिभैतिह्यादीना
मत्रैवान्तर्भावः ॥ संनिकर्षादीनां तु जडत्वादेव न प्रामाण्यम् ।
इति ॥ तदेवंविधेन नयप्रमाणोपन्यासेन दुर्नयमार्गस्त्वया खिली
कृतः । इति काव्यार्थः ॥

इदानीं सप्तद्वीपसमुद्रमात्रो लोक इति वावदूकानां तन्मात्रलोके परिमितानामेव सत्त्वानां संभवात् परिमितात्मवादिनां दोष-दर्शनमुखेन भगवत्प्रणीतं जीवानन्त्यवादं निर्दोषतयाभिष्टुवन्नाह ।

मुक्तोपि वाभ्येतु भवं भवो वा
भवस्थशून्योस्तु मितात्मवादे ।
षड्जीवकायं त्वमनन्तसंख्य
माख्यस्तथा नाथ यथा न दोष ॥२९॥

मितात्मवादे संख्यातानामात्मनामभ्युपगमे दूषणद्वयमुपतिष्ठते ।
5 तत्क्रमेण दर्शयति । मुक्तोपि वाभ्येतु भवमिति । मुक्तः निर्वृति-प्राप्तः । सोपि वा । अपि विस्मये । वाशब्द उत्तरदोषापेक्षया समुच्चयार्थः यथा देवो वा दानवो वेति । भवमभ्येतु संसार मभ्यागच्छतु । इत्येको दोषप्रसङ्गः ॥ भवो वा भवस्थशून्योस्तु । भवः संसारः स वा भवस्थशून्यः संसारिजीवैर्विरहितः अस्तु
10 भवतु । इति द्वितीयो दोषप्रसङ्गः ॥

इदमाकूतम् । यदि परिमिता एवात्मानो मन्यन्ते तदा तत्त्वज्ञानाभ्यासप्रकर्षादिक्रमेणापवर्गं गच्छत्सु तेषु संभाव्यते खलु स कश्चित्कालो यत्र तेषां सर्वेषां निर्वृतिः । कालस्यानादिनिधनत्वादात्मनां च परिमितत्वात्संसारस्य रिक्तता भवन्ती केन
15 वार्यताम् । समुपलभ्यते हि प्रतिनियतसलिलपटलपरिपूरिते सरसि पवनतपनातपनप्रनोदञ्चनादिना कालान्तरे रिक्तता । न चायमर्थो प्रामाणिकस्य कस्यचिदसिद्धः । संसारस्य स्वरूपहानिप्रसङ्गात् । तत्स्वरूपं ह्येतदेव कर्मवशवर्तिनः प्राणिनः संसरन्ति समसार्षुः संसरिष्यन्ति चेति । सर्वेषां च निर्वृतत्वे संसारस्य वा
20 रिक्तत्वं हठादभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । मुक्तैर्वा पुनर्भवमागन्तव्यम् । न च क्षीणकर्मणां भवाधिकारः ।

22 स्यात्

दग्धे बीजे यथात्यन्तं प्रादुर्भवति नाङ्कुरः ।
कर्मबीजे तथा दग्धे न रोहति भवाङ्कुरः ॥

इति वचनात् । आह च पतञ्जलिः । सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायु
25 र्भोगा इति । एतट्टीका च । सत्सु क्लेशेषु कर्माशयो विपाकारम्भी भवति
नोच्छिन्नक्लेशमूलः । यथा तुषावनद्धाः शालितण्डुला अदग्धबीज
भावाः प्ररोहणसमर्था भवन्ति नापनीततुषा दग्धबीजभावा वा
तथा क्लेशावनद्धः कर्माशयो विपाकप्ररोही भवति । नापनीत
क्लेशो न प्रसंख्यानदग्धक्लेशबीजभावो वेति । स च विपाकस्त्रि
30 विधो जातिरायुर्भोग इति । अक्षपादोऽप्याह । न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसं
धानाय हीनक्लेशस्य इति ॥

एवं विभङ्गज्ञानिशिवराजर्षिमतानुसारिणो दूषयित्वा तच्चरा
येन भगवदुपज्ञमपरिमितात्मवादं निर्दोषतया स्तौति । षड्जीवे
त्यादि । त्वं तु हे नाथ तथा तेन प्रकारेण अनन्तसंख्यम् अन
35 न्त्यात्मसंख्याविशेषयुक्तम् षड्जीवकायम् । अजीवन् जीवन्ति जीवि
ष्यन्ति चेति जीवाः इन्द्रियादिद्रव्यभावप्राणधारणयुक्ताः
चय संघेयानूर्ध्वे इति चिनोतेर्घञि आदेश्च कत्वे कायः
समूहो जीवकायाः पृथिव्यादिः । षण्णां जीवकायानां समाहारः
षड्जीवकायम् । पात्रादिदर्शनान्नपुंसकत्वम् । अथ वा षण्णां
40 जीवानां कायाः प्रत्येकं संघाताः षड्जीवकायाः तं षड्जीवकायम् ।
पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवनस्पतित्रसलक्षणषड्जीवनिकायम् । तथा तेन
प्रकारेण । आख्यः मर्यादया अभ्यधितवान् । यथा येन प्रकारेण । न
दोषाः दूषणमिति । आस्यपेक्षमेकवचनम् । आस्तां दोषपक्षवार्तीया
अन्येऽपि दोषा यथा न प्राप्नुवन्ति तथा त्वं जीवानन्त्यमुप
45 दिष्टवानित्यर्थः । आख्य इति आङ्पूर्वस्य ख्यातेरङि सिद्धिः ।
त्वमित्येकवचनं चेदं ज्ञापयति यज्जगद्गुरोरेकस्यैवेदृक् प्ररूपण
सामर्थ्यं न तीर्थान्तरशास्तॄणामिति ॥

पृथिव्यादीनां पुनर्जीवत्वमित्थं साधनीयम् । यथा सात्मिका विद्रुमशिलादिरूपा पृथिवी छेदे समानधातूत्थानात् अर्शोऽङ्कुरवत् ।
50 भौममम्भोपि सात्मकं क्षतभूसजातीयस्य स्वभावस्य संभवात् शालूरवत् । आन्तरिक्षमपि सात्मकम् अभ्रादिविकारे स्वतः संभूय पातात् मत्स्यादिवत् । तेजोपि सात्मकम् आहारोपादानेन वृद्ध्यादिविकारोपलम्भात् पुरुषाङ्गवत् । वायुरपि सात्मकः अपरप्रेरितत्वे तिर्यग्गतिमत्त्वात् गोवत् । वनस्पतिरपि सात्मकः छेदादिभि-
55 र्म्लान्यादिदर्शनात् पुरुषाङ्गवत् । केषांचित्स्वापाङ्गनोपश्लेषादिविकाराच्च । अपकर्षतरतमभावाद्वा सर्वेषां सात्मकत्वसिद्धिः । आप्तवचनाच्च । त्रसेषु च कृमिपिपीलिकाभ्रमरमनुष्यादिषु न केषांचित्सात्मकत्वे विगानमिति ॥

यथा च भवत्पक्षे जीवानन्त्ये न दोषस्तथा दिङ्मात्रं भाव्यते ।
60 भगवन्मते हि षण्णां जीवनिकायानामयमल्पबहुत्वम् । सर्वस्तोकास्त्रसकायिकाः । तेभ्योऽसंख्यातगुणास्तेजस्कायिकाः । तेभ्यो विशेषाधिकाः पृथिवीकायिकाः । तेभ्यो विशेषाधिका अप्कायिकाः । तेभ्योपि विशेषाधिका वायुकायिकाः । तेभ्योनन्तगुणा वनस्पतिकायिकाः । ते च व्यावहारिका अव्यावहारिकाश्च ।

65 गोला य असंखिज्जा असंखणिगोअ गोलओ भणिओ ।
इक्किक्कम्मि णिगोए अणन्तजीवा मुणेयव्वा ॥
सिज्झन्ति जत्तिया खलु इह संववहारजीवरासीओ ।
इंति अणाइवणस्सइ रासीओ तत्तिया तम्मि ॥

इति वचनात् । यावन्तश्च यतो मुक्तिं गच्छन्ति जीवास्ताव-
70 न्तोऽनादिनिगोदवनस्पतिराशेस्तत्रागच्छन्ति । न च तावता तस्य काचित्परिहाणिः । निगोदजीवानन्त्यस्याक्षयत्वात् । निगोदस्वरूपं च समयसागरादवगन्तव्यम् । अनाद्यनन्तेपि काले ये केचिन्निर्वृता

दग्धे बीजे यथात्यन्तं प्रादुर्भवति नाङ्कुरः ।
कर्मबीजे तथा दग्धे न रोहति भवाङ्कुरः ॥

इति वचनात् । आह च पतञ्जलिः । सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगा इति। एतट्टीका च सत्सु क्लेशेषु कर्माशयो विपाकारम्भी भवति नोच्छिन्नक्लेशमूलः । यथा तुषावनद्धाः शालितण्डुला अदग्धबीजभावाः प्ररोहसमर्था भवन्ति नापनीततुषा दग्धबीजभावा वा तथा क्लेशावनद्धः कर्माशयो विपाकप्ररोही भवति । नापनीतक्लेशो न प्रसंख्यानदग्धक्लेशबीजभावो वेति । स च विपाकस्त्रिविधो जातिरायुर्भोग इति । अक्षपादोऽप्याह । न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसंधानाय हीनक्लेशस्य इति ॥

एवं विभ्रमज्ञानिक्षिप्तपरानपिमतानुसारिणो दूषयित्वा प्रवरं येन भगवदुपज्ञमपरिमितात्मवादं निर्दोषतया स्तौति । षड्जीवे त्यादि । त्वं तु हे नाथ तथा तेन प्रकारेण अनन्तसंख्यम् अनन्ताख्यसंख्याविशेषयुक्तम् षड्जीवकायम् । अजीवन् जीवन्ति जीविष्यन्ति चेति जीवाः इन्द्रियादिप्राणादिद्रव्यभावप्राणधारणयुक्ताः तेषां संघातानूर्ध्वे इति चिनोतेर्घञि आदेश्च कत्वे कायः समूहो जीवकायः पृथिव्यादिः । षण्णां जीवकायानां समाहारः षड्जीवकायम् । पात्रादिदर्शनान्नपुंसकत्वम् । अथ वा षण्णां जीवानां कायः यस्मिन् संघातः षड्जीवकायः तं षड्जीवकायम् । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवनस्पतित्रसलक्षणषड्जीवनिकायम् । तथा तेन प्रकारेण । आख्यः मर्यादया प्ररूपितवान् । यथा येन प्रकारेण । न दोषः दूषणमिति । आख्यपेक्षमेतद्वचनम् । आद्यछद्मापदद्वयजातीया अन्येपि दोषा यथा न प्रादुःष्यन्ति तथा त्वं जीवानन्त्यमुपदिष्टवानित्यर्थः । आख्य इति आङ्पूर्वस्य ख्यातेरद्यतनि सिद्धिः । त्वमित्येकवचनं चेदं ज्ञापयति यज्जगद्गुरोरेवैकस्येदृक् प्ररूपणसामर्थ्यं न तीर्थान्तरशास्तॄणामिति ॥

पृथिव्यादीनां पुनर्जीवमिदं साधनीयम् । यथा सात्मिका विद्रुमशिलादिरूपा पृथिवी छेदे समानधातूत्थानात् अर्शोऽङ्कुरवत् । 10 भौममम्भोपि सात्मकं क्षतभूसजातीयस्य स्वभावस्य संभवात् भाकेरवत् । आन्तरिक्षमपि सात्मकम् अभ्रादिविकारे स्वतः संभूय पातात् मत्स्यादिवत् । तेजापि सात्मकम् आहारोपादानेन तद्वृद्ध्यादिविकारोपलम्भात् पुरुषाङ्गवत् । वायुरपि सात्मकः अपरप्रेरितत्वे तिर्यग्गतिमत्त्वात् गोवत् । वनस्पतिरपि सात्मकः छेदादिभि 15 र्म्लान्यादिदर्शनात् पुरुषाङ्गवत् । केषांचित्स्वापाङ्गनोपश्लेषादि विकाराच्च । अपकर्षतमेतन्यादा सर्वेषां सात्मकत्वसिद्धिः । आप्तवचनाच्च । त्रसेषु च कृमिपिपीलिकाभ्रमरमनुष्यादिषु न केषांचित्सात्मकत्वे विगानमिति ॥

यथा च भगवदुपज्ञे जीवानन्त्ये न दोषस्तथा दिङ्मात्रं भाव्यते । 20 भगवन्मते हि षण्णां जीवनिकायानामयदल्पबहुत्वम् । सर्वस्तोकास्त्रसकायिकाः । तेभ्योऽसंख्यातगुणास्तेजस्कायिकाः । तेभ्यो विशेषाधिकाः पृथिवीकायिकाः । तेभ्यो विशेषाधिका अप्कायिकाः । तेभ्योपि विशेषाधिका वायुकायिकाः । तेभ्यानन्तगुणा वनस्पतिकायिकाः । ते च व्यावहारिका अव्यावहारिकाश्च ।

25 गोला य असंखिज्जा असंखनिगोअ गोलओ भणिओ ।
इक्किक्कम्मि निगोए अणन्तजीवा मुणेअव्वा ॥
सिज्झंति जत्तिया खलु इह संववहारजीवरासिमो ।
एंति अणाइवणस्सइ रासिओ तत्तिया तम्मि ॥

इति वचनात् । यावन्तश्च यतो मुक्तिं गच्छन्ति जीवास्तावन्तो 30 ऽनादिनिगोदवनस्पतिराशेस्तमागच्छन्ति । न च तावता तस्य काचित्परिहाणिः।निगोदजीवानन्त्यस्याक्षयत्वात्। निगोदस्वरूपं च समयसागरादवगन्तव्यम् । अनाद्यनन्तेपि काले ये केचिन्निर्वृता

राख्यव्यपदेशं एवं पृथगभिसन्धीनां नयानां स्याद्वादलक्षणैकसूत्र-प्रोतानां श्रुताख्यप्रमाणव्यपदेश इति । ननु प्रत्येकं नयानां विरुद्धत्वे कथं समुदितानां निर्विरोधिता । उच्यते । यथा हि समी-४०चीनं मध्यस्थं न्यायनिर्णेतारमासाद्य परस्परं विवदमाना अपि वादिनो विवादाद्विरमन्ति एवं नया अन्योन्यं वैरायमाणा अपि सार्वज्ञशासनमुपेत्य स्याच्छब्दप्रयोगोपशमितविप्रतिपत्तयः सन्तः परस्परमत्यन्तं सुहृद्भूयावतिष्ठन्ते । एवं च सर्वनयात्मकत्वे भग-वच्छासनस्य सर्वदर्शनमयत्वमविरुद्धमेव । नयरूपत्वाद्दर्शनानाम् । ४५न च वाच्यं तर्हि भगवच्छासनस्य तेषु कथं नोपलम्भ इति । समु-द्रस्य सर्वसरिन्मयत्वेऽपि विभक्तासु तास्वनुपलम्भात् । तथा च वक्तृवचनयोरैक्यमध्यवस्य श्रीसिद्धसेनदिवाकरपादाः ।

उदधाविव सर्वसिन्धवः
समुदीर्णास्त्वयि नाथ दृष्टयः ।
५० न च तासु भवान्प्रदृश्यते
प्रविभक्तासु सरित्स्विवोदधिः ॥

अन्ये त्वेवं व्याचक्षते । यथान्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावात्परे प्रवादा मत्सरिणस्तथा तव समयः सर्वनयान्मध्यस्थतयाङ्गी-कुर्वाणो न मत्सरी । यतः कथंभूतः । पक्षपाती पक्षमेकमभि-५५निवेशं पातयति तिरस्करोतीति पक्षपाती । पातस्य गमनार्थ-त्वात् । अत्र च व्याख्याने मत्सरीति विधेयपदं पूर्वस्मिंश्च पक्षपातीति विधेयः । अत्र च क्रियाक्रियाव्याख्यानविवेको विच-क्षणैः स्वयं कार्यः । इति काव्यार्थः ॥

इत्थंकारं कतिपयपदार्थविवेचनद्वारेण स्वामिनो यथार्थवादाख्य-गुणमभिष्टुत्य समग्रवचनातिशयव्यावर्णनं स्वस्यासामर्थ्यं दृष्टा

न्यपूर्वकमुपदर्शयन् औद्धत्यपरिहाराय भङ्ग्यन्तरतिरोहितं स्वाभिमानं च प्रकाशयन् निगमनमाह—

वाग्वैभवं ते निखिलं विवेक्तु-
माशास्महे चेन्महनीयमुख्य ।
लङ्घेम जङ्घालतया समुद्रं
वहेम चन्द्रद्युतिपानतृष्णाम् ॥ ३१ ॥

विभव एव वैभवम् । प्रज्ञादित्वात्स्वार्थेऽण् । विभोर्भावः कर्म वेति वा वैभवम् । वाचां वैभवं वाग्वैभवं वचनसंपत्कर्षम् । विभोर्भाव इति पक्षे तु सर्वनयव्यापकत्वम् । विभुशब्दस्य व्यापकपर्यायतया रूढत्वात् । ते तव सम्बन्धि निखिलं कृत्स्नं विवेक्तुं विचारयितुं चेत् यदि वयमाशास्महे इच्छामः । हे महनीयमुख्य महनीयाः पूज्याः पञ्च परमेष्ठिनस्तेषु मुख्यः प्रधानभूत आद्यत्वात् तस्य संबोधनम् । ननु सिद्धेभ्यो हीनगुणत्वादर्हतां कथं वागतिशयशालिनामपि तेषां मुख्यत्वम् । न च हीनगुणत्वमसिद्धम् । मन्त्र्यावसरे सिद्धेभ्यस्तेषां नमस्कारकरणश्रवणात् । काऊण नमुक्कारं सिद्धाणमभिग्गहं तु सो गिण्हे इति श्रुतकेवलिवचनात् । नैवम् । अर्हदुपदेशेनैव सिद्धानामपि परिज्ञानात् । तथा चार्षम् । अरहन्तुवएसेण सिद्धा णज्जंति तेण अरिहाई इति । ततः सिद्धं भगवत एव मुख्यत्वम् । यदि तव वाग्वैभवं निखिलं विवेक्तुमाशास्महे ततः किमित्याह । लङ्घेम इत्यादि । तदा इत्यध्याहार्यम् । तदा जङ्घालतया जाङ्घिकतया वेगवत्तया समुद्रं लङ्घेम किल समुद्रमिव अतिक्रामामः । तथा वहेम धारयेम । चन्द्रद्युतीनां चन्द्रमरीचीनां पानं चन्द्रद्युतिपानम् । तत्र तृष्णा तर्षोऽभिलाष इति यावत् चन्द्रद्युतिपानतृष्णा ताम् ।

निर्यान्ति निर्यास्यन्ति च ते निगोदानामनन्तभागोऽपि न वर्तन्ते नातिपतन्न पतिष्यन्ति। ततश्च कथं मुक्तानां भवागमनप्रसङ्गः
15 कथं च संसारस्य रिक्ततापत्तिरिति। अभिमतं चैतदन्ययूथ्यानामपि। यथा चोक्तं वार्त्तिककारेण।

अत एव विद्वत्सु मुच्यमानेषु संततम्।
ब्रह्माण्डलोकजीवानामनन्तत्वादशून्यता॥
अन्यूनातिरिक्तत्वैर्युज्यते परिमाणवत्।
20 वस्तुन्यपरिमेये तु नूनं तेषामसंभवः॥

इति काव्यार्थः॥

अधुना परदर्शनानां परस्परविरुद्धार्थसमर्थकतया मत्सरित्वं प्रकाशयन् सर्वज्ञोपज्ञसिद्धान्तस्यान्योन्यानुगतसर्वनयमयतया मात्सर्याभावमाविर्भावयति।

अन्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावा
यथा परे मत्सरिणः प्रवादाः।
नयानशेषानविशेषमिच्छन्
न पक्षपाती समयस्तथा ते॥ ३०॥

प्रकर्षेणोपद्यन्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्ते स्वाभ्युपगतार्था यैरिति प्रवादाः।
5 यथा येन प्रकारेण। परे भवच्छासनादन्ये। प्रवादा दर्शनानि। मत्सरिणः अतिशायिना मत्सरेणाभिमानेन सातिशयासहनता-शालिनः कोपरूपापकृष्टचित्तवृत्तिरूपाः सन्तः पक्षपातिन इतरपक्ष-तिरस्कारेण स्वकक्षीकृतपक्षस्थापनप्रवणा वर्तन्ते। कस्मात् हेतोर्मत्सरिण इत्याह। अन्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावात्। पक्ष्यते
10 व्यक्तीक्रियते साध्यधर्मवैशिष्ट्येन हेत्वादिभिरिति पक्षः। कक्षी-कृतधर्मप्रतिष्ठापनाय साधनोपन्यासः। तस्य प्रतिकूलः पक्षः प्रति

पक्षः। पक्षस्य प्रतिपक्षो विरोधी पक्षः प्रतिपक्षः। तस्य भावः पक्ष
प्रतिपक्षभावः। अन्योन्यं परस्परं यः पक्षप्रतिपक्षभावः पक्षप्रतिपक्षत्व
मन्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावः तस्मात्। तथाहि। य एव मीमांसकानां
15 नित्यः शब्द इति पक्षः स एव सौगतानां प्रतिपक्षः। तन्मते शब्द-
स्यानित्यत्वात्। य एव सौगतानामनित्यः शब्द इति पक्षः स
एव मीमांसकानां प्रतिपक्षः। एवं सर्वप्रयोगेषु योज्यम्। तथा
तेन प्रकारेण। ते तव। सम्यगेति गच्छति शब्दोऽर्थमनेनेति पुंसाम्नि
घः समयः संकेतः। यद्वा सम्यग् अवैपरीत्येन ईयन्ते ज्ञायन्ते
20 जीवाजीवादयोऽर्था अनेन इति समयः सिद्धान्तः। अथवा सम्य
गयन्ते गच्छन्ति जीवादयः पदार्थाः स्वस्मिन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठां
प्राप्नुवन्त्यस्मिन्निति समय आगमः। न पक्षपाती नैकपक्षानुरागी।
पक्षपातित्वस्य हि कारणं मत्सरित्वं परप्रवादेषूक्तम्। त्वत्सम-
यस्य च मत्सरित्वाभावान्न पक्षपातित्वम्। पक्षपातित्वं हि मत्स
25 रित्वेन व्याप्तं व्यापकं च निवर्तमानं व्याप्यमपि निवर्तयतीति
मत्सरित्वे निवर्तमाने पक्षपातित्वमपि निवर्तत इति भावः।
तव समय इति वाच्यवाचकभावलक्षणे संबन्धे षष्ठी। सूत्रापेक्षया
गणधरकर्तृकत्वेपि समयस्यार्थापेक्षया भगवत्कर्तृकत्वाद्वाच्य
वाचकभावो न विरुध्यते। अत्थं भासइ अरहा सुत्तं गंथंति गणहरा
30 णिउणं इति वचनात्। अथवा उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यप्रपञ्चः समयः।
तेषां च भगवता साक्षान्मातृकापदरूपतयाभिधानात्। तथा
चार्षम्। उप्पन्नेइवा विगमेइवा धुवेइवा इत्यदोषः॥ मत्सरि
त्वाभावमेव विशेषणद्वारेण समर्थयति। नयानशेषानविशेष
मिच्छन् इति। अशेषान् समस्तान्नैगमादीनविशेषं निर्वि
35 शेषं यथा भवत्येवम् इच्छन् आकाङ्क्षन्। सर्वनयात्मकत्वादनेकान्त
वादस्य। यथा विशकलितानां मुक्तामणीनामेकसूत्रानुस्यूतानां

द्वारव्यपदेश एवं पृथगभिसन्धीनां नयानां स्याद्वादलक्षणैकसूत्र-
प्रोतानां श्रुताख्यप्रमाणव्यपदेश इति । ननु प्रत्येकं नयानां विरु-
द्धत्वे कथं समुदितानां निर्विरोधिता । उच्यते । यथा हि समी-
40 चीनं मध्यस्थं न्यायनिर्णेतारमासाद्य परस्परं विवदमाना अपि
वादिनो विवादाद्विरमन्ति एवं नया अन्योन्यं वैरायमाणा अपि
सर्वज्ञशासनमुपेत्य स्याच्छब्दप्रयोगोपशमितविप्रतिपत्तयः सन्तः
परस्परमत्यन्तं सुहृद्भूयावतिष्ठन्ते । एवं च सर्वनयात्मकत्वे भग-
वत्समयस्य सर्वदर्शनमयत्वमविरुद्धमेव । नयरूपत्वाद्दर्शनानाम् ।
45 न च वाच्यं तर्हि भगवत्समयस्तेषु कथं नोपलभ्यत इति । समु-
द्रस्य सर्वसरिन्मयत्वेऽपि विभक्तासु तास्वनुपलम्भात् । तथा च
वक्तृवचनयोरैक्यमध्यवस्य श्रीसिद्धसेनदिवाकरपादाः ।

उदधाविव सर्वसिन्धवः
समुदीर्णास्त्वयि नाथ दृष्टयः ।
50 न च तासु भवान्प्रदृश्यते
प्रविभक्तासु सरित्स्विवोदधिः ॥

अन्ये त्वेवं व्याचक्षते । यथान्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावात्परे
प्रवादा मत्सरिणस्तथा तव समयः सर्वनयान्मध्यस्थतयाङ्गी-
कुर्वाणो न मत्सरी । यतः कथंभूतः । पक्षपाती पक्षमेकपक्षाभि-
55 निवेशं पातयति तिरस्करोतीति पक्षपाती । रागस्य जीवनाशं
नष्टत्वात् । अत्र च व्याख्याने मत्सरीति विधेयपदं पूर्वस्मिंश्च
पक्षपातीति विशेष्यम् । अत्र च क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टव्याख्यानविवेको विवे-
किभिः स्वयं कार्यः । इति काव्यार्थः ॥

इत्थंकारं कतिपयपदार्थविवेचनद्वारेण स्वामिनो यथार्थवादाख्यं
गुणमभिष्टुत्य समग्रवचनातिशयव्याख्याने स्वस्यासामर्थ्यं दर्श-

न्वपूर्वकमुपदर्शयन् औद्धत्यपरिहाराय भङ्ग्यन्तरतिरोहितं स्वामि
पार्न च प्रकाशयन् निगमनमाह—

> वाग्वैभवं ते निखिलं विवेक्तु
> माशास्महे चेन्महनीयमुख्य ।
> लङ्घेम जङ्घालतया समुद्रं
> वहेम चन्द्रद्युतिपानतृष्णाम् ॥ ३१ ॥

5 विभव एव वैभवम् । प्रज्ञादित्वात्स्वार्थेऽण् । विभोर्भावः
कर्म चेति वा वैभवम् । वाचां वैभवं वाग्वैभवं वचनसंप-
त्कर्षम् । विभोर्भाव इति पक्षे तु सर्वनयव्यापकत्वम् । विभुशब्दस्य
व्यापकपर्यायतया रूढत्वात् । ते तव संबन्धिनं निखिलं कृत्स्नं
विवेक्तुं विचारयितुं यत् यदि वयमाशास्महे इच्छामः । हे महनीय
10 मुख्य महनीयाः पूज्याः पञ्च परमेष्ठिनस्तेषु मुख्यः प्रधानभूतः
आद्यत्वात् तस्य संबोधनम् । ननु सिद्धेभ्यो हीनगुणत्वादर्हतां कथं
वागतिशयशालिनामपि तेषां मुख्यत्वम् । न च हीनगुणत्वम-
सिद्धम् । प्रव्रज्यावसरे सिद्धेभ्यस्तेषां नमस्कारकरणश्रवणात् ।
काऊण नमुक्कारं सिद्धाणमभिग्गहं तु सो गिण्हे इति श्रुतकेव
15 लिवचनात् । नैवम् । अर्हदुपदेशेनैव सिद्धानामपि परिज्ञानात् ।
तथा चार्षम् । अरहन्तुवएसेण सिद्धा णज्जंति तेण अरिहाइ
इति । ततः सिद्धं भगवत एव मुख्यत्वम् । यदि तव वाग्वैभवं
निखिलं विवक्तुमाशास्महे तत् किमित्याह । लङ्घेम इत्यादि ।
तदा इत्यध्याहार्यम् । तदा जङ्घालतया प्राद्भिकतया वेगव
20 त्तया समुद्रं महोदधिं लङ्घेम समुद्रमपि अतिक्रामामः । तथा वहेम
धारयेम । चन्द्रद्युतीनां चन्द्रमरीचीनां पानं चन्द्रद्युतिपानम् ।
तत्र तृष्णा तर्षोऽभिलाष इति यावत् चन्द्रद्युतिपानतृष्णा ताम् ।

उभयथापि संभावने सप्तमी । यथा कश्चिच्चरणचङ्क्रमणवेगवत्तया यानपात्राद्यन्तरेणापि समुद्रं लङ्घयितुमीहते यथा च 25 कश्चिच्चन्द्रमरीचीरमृतमयीः श्रुत्वा चुलुकादिना पातुमिच्छति न चैतद्द्वयमपि शक्यसाधनम् तथा न्यक्षेण भवदीयवाग्वैभववर्णनाकाङ्क्षापि असम्भवारम्भसाधितुल्या । आस्तां तावत्तावकीनवचनविषयाणां सामस्त्येन विवेचनविधानं तद्विषयाकाङ्क्षापि महत्साहसमिति भावार्थः । अथवा क्षपि क्षेपणे इति धातोर्हेम 30 क्षेपयेम समुद्रं जङ्घास्वया अतिरंहसा । अतिक्रमणार्थसद्भेस्य प्रयोगे दुर्लभं परस्मैपदमनित्यं चात्मनेपदमिति । अत्र च औद्धत्यपरिहारेऽभिकृतोऽपि यतामास्महे इत्यात्मनि बहुवचनमाचार्यैः प्रयुक्तमास्तादिति सूचयति यद्विपश्चितो जगति मादृशा मन्दमेधसो भूयांसः स्तोतारः इति बहुवचनमात्रेण न सत्त्वहङ्कारः स्तोतरि 35 मयौ पङ्कनीयः प्रत्युत निरभिमानतामात्सादोपरि पताकारोप एवावधारणीयः । इति काव्यार्थः ॥

एषु एकत्रिंशद्वृत्तेषु उपजातिश्छन्दः ॥

एवं विप्रतारकैः परतीर्थिकैर्व्यामोहमये तमसि निमज्जितस्य जगतोऽभ्युद्धरणेऽव्यभिचारिवचनतासाम्येनान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदेन भगवत एव सामर्थ्यं दर्शयन् तदुपास्तिविन्यस्तमानसानां पुरुषाणामौचितीचतुरतां प्रतिपादयति ।

इदं तत्त्वातत्त्वव्यतिकरकरालेऽन्धतमसे
जगन्मायाकारैरिव हतपरैर्हा विनिहतम् ।
तदुद्धर्तुं शक्तो नियतमविसंवादिवचन
स्त्वमेवातस्त्रातस्त्वयि कृतसपर्याः कृतधियः ॥३२॥

इदं मत्पक्षोपलभ्यमान जगत् विश्वम् उपमाराज्ञगद्वी जन । इतपरै इता अपमा ये परे तीर्थान्तरीया इतपर तैः । मायाकारै इन्द्रजालिकैरिव शाम्बरीयप्रयोगनिपुणैरिवेति यावत् । अन्ध तमसे निबिडान्धकारे । हा इति खेदे । विनिहतं विक्षेपण निहित स्थापितं पातितमित्यर्थः । अर्थं करालीत्य पयति मन्यपती
10 त्यर्थं तत्र तपमधेत्य पतमसम् समना पापतमस इत्यलत्पर्य तस्मिमन्धतमस । कर्यभूते पतमस इति द्रष्ट्या अकारान्धतमस दार्थमाह । तस्मात्तत्त्व्यतिकरकरासे । तत्त्वं भावत्वं च तस्या तत्त्वे तयोर्व्यतिकरो व्यतिकीर्णता व्यामिश्रता स्वभावमिति मपस्तत्त्वावस्थ्यपतिकरः तेन करासे भयङ्करे । यथा पतमस
15 तत्त्व भतत्त्वाभिनिपद्योमतत्त्वे च तत्त्वाभिनिमिश इत्यनत्यो व्यति करः संजायत इत्यर्थः । अनेन च विशेषणेन परमार्थतो मिथ्यात्वमोहनीयमेवान्धतमसम् । तस्यैवेदृग्लक्षणत्वात् । तथा च ग्रन्थान्तरे मन्दुतरस्तुतिकारपादाः ।

अदेवे देवबुद्धिर्या गुरुधीरगुरौ च या ।
20 अधर्मे धर्मबुद्धिश्च मिथ्यात्वं तद्विपर्ययात् ॥

नवोयनयः । यथा किल ऐन्द्रजालिकाः स्वप्रयोगनिपुणमिश्रितपरव्यामोहनरूपामपत्नासमापिपर्मोपपीय महस्तमापत्नादिमायं दिक्षिप्तपुष्प परिपक्ष्म मायामय तमसि मज्जयन्ति तथा परतीर्थिकैरपि तादृग्मकारदुरपीनकुतर्कयुक्तीन्पदर्श्य जगदिदं व्यामो
25 हमहान्धकारे निक्षिप्तमिति । सम्यगदृष्टं मोहमहान्धकारापन्न माद् कर्तुं नियतं निभित्तं समर्थं नाम्य प्रक्तः सपव । निपः धर्मिरधर्मिकस्वैरं भगवतः सामर्थ्यमुपवर्ण्यत इति विशेषणद्वारेण कारणमाह । असंसपादिवचनः । कषच्छेदतापलक्षणपरीक्षात्रय विशुद्ध वचन कममासौ न विसंवदतीत्यर्थस्थीत्यविसंवादि । तथा
30 भूतं वचनमुपदृशो यन्त्रासादविसंवादिवचन । अव्यभिचारि

१२ [स्याद्वा]

श्रीजिनप्रभसूरीणां साहाय्योद्भिन्नसौरभा ।
श्रुतावुत्तंसतु सतां वृत्तिः स्याद्वादमञ्जरी ॥ ८ ॥
मित्राणे कलिनिर्मलाम्बिनतुला श्रीहेमचन्द्रप्रभौ
80 वृत्त्यस्तुतिविहितिनिर्मितिमिपात्रक्तिर्मया विस्तृता ।
निर्मेतुं गुणदूपणे निजगिरां तमार्थये सज्जना
स्वस्यास्त्वस्वमकुधियं बहुमतिः सास्त्वत्र सम्यग् परः ॥ ९ ॥

इति श्रीटीकाकारस्य प्रशस्तिः समाप्ता ॥

NOTES

The Maṅgalācaraṇa (Page 1)

The Syādvādamañjarī opens with a *maṅgalācaraṇa* in four verses. The Jainas, like the Brāhmaṇas believe in the efficacy of prayer to Higher Powers for successful execution of literary undertakings. cf. श्रेयांसि बहुविघ्नानि भवन्ति महतामपि। अश्रेयसि प्रवृत्तानां क्वापि यान्ति विनायकाः॥ तस्मात्सेश्वरमङ्गलोपादानाय मङ्गलमभिधेयम्। .. । सर्वमेव वा शास्त्रं मङ्गलं ज्ञानरूपत्वात्।......। मङ्गलमध्यनिर्दिष्टं च मां गतव्यसनमवति समाप्तिरिति मङ्गलम्। मा भूद्विघ्नो विनो गलो वा शास्त्रस्येति मङ्गलम्॥ —Śīlāṅkācārya's Commentary on the Ācārāṅga Sūtras.

Much intellectual energy has been spent in Brahmanical books of Logic (Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya) on demonstrating the necessity of maṅgalācaraṇa and on determining the manner in which it acts towards fulfilling its purpose. The duty of performing a maṅgalācaraṇa is based upon śiṣṭācāra (practice of the good and respectable) which itself presupposes, say the Brāhmaṇas a vedic commandment. As regards its *modus operandi*, while some hold that it brings an undertaking to a successful completion removing obstacles if any (समाप्ति o निर्विघ्नसमाप्ति) others think that its function is simply to counteract the bad luck which causes obstacles (विघ्नध्वंस), the completion itself depending upon other natural or supernatural causes. Then again while some connect the maṅgala with the completion (समाप्ति) through the removal of obstacles (विघ्नध्वंसस्य मङ्गलस्य द्वारम्), others believe that kind of religious merit (अपूर्व) is created by the maṅgala which removes the obstacles and produces the completion (अपूर्वद्वारेण मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिहेतुत्वम्). The scholiasts were not unaware of such incomplete works in Indian literature as Bāṇa's Kādambarī despite a maṅgalācaraṇa, and complete works even without a maṅgalācaraṇa. Consequently they have endeavoured to explain the breach in the causal law by

the hypothesis of mangalâcaran done in previous life (जन्मान्तरीय मङ्गल), and also of comparative quantities and qualities of the mangalâcaram and the evil karma. ("समाप्त्यभावस्तु क्वचित् प्राचीनविघ्नबहुत्वात् क्वचिन्मङ्गलजन्यादृष्टस्याल्पत्वात् क्वचित्प्रबलप्रत्यवायसद्भावात् "अन्ये तु मङ्गलं समाप्ति कारणतावच्छेदकं समाप्ति फलम् इत्यादि प्रकाशम् कर्मादिवैलक्षण्यात् स्वीकुर्वन्ति" Tattva-Ci.) Yet, the trend of their belief in the efficacy of mangalâcaran would seem to be in the direction f rationalism. For the whole subject, see mangala 1di in Tatt-Ci. N Kaustubha N Mañjari, M ktâvali and its commentaries [तच्च न मङ्गलं विघ्नध्वंसं प्रति न वा समाप्तिं प्रति कारणं विनापि मङ्गलं नास्तिकादीनां ग्रन्थे निर्विघ्नसमाप्तिदर्शनात् इति वाच्य अविगीतशिष्टाचारविषयत्वेन मङ्गलस्य सफलत्वे सिद्धे तत्र फलजिज्ञासायां सम्भवति दृष्टफलत्वे अदृष्टफलकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् समाप्तिफलत्वस्य लाघवेन कल्पयितुं शक्यते । यत्र च सत्यपि मङ्गले न दृश्यते तत्र जन्मान्तरीयं तत्कल्प्यते यत्र च सत्यपि मङ्गले समाप्तिर्न दृश्यते तत्र वक्तव्यो विघ्नो विघ्नप्राचुर्यं वा बोध्यम्— विघ्नध्वंसस्तु मङ्गलस्य द्वारमित्याहु प्राञ्च । नव्यास्तु मङ्गलस्य विघ्नध्वंस एव फलं समाप्तिस्तु बुद्धिप्रतिभादिकारणकलापात् ।—नास्तिकादीनां ग्रन्थेषु जन्मान्तरीयमङ्गलजन्यादृष्टविघ्नध्वंस एव सिद्धमित्यानन्तर्यमसौ नाप्नोतीति न व्यभिचार इत्याहु ॥ मुक्ता०]

The religious belief in th necessity of propitiating gods before commencing any serious piece f work—even the day's routine—is natural and so we find that in the vedic ritual, th main sacrifice was often preceded by small introductory offering made to the gods (cf. "आग्नेयमष्टाकपालं निर्वपेत् ... "). Similarly as recorded i the Bharata-Nâtyaśâstra, tediously long religious ceremony was performed on the stage, before commencing dramatic representation. The ceremony which was originally mixed doing (आङ्गिक) and speaking (वाचिक) came, in course of time, to be cut down to the latter thus, the recitation of Nândi remained the sole urvivo of the old elaborate ceremonies of the Pûrva ranga. Thus, th mangalâcaran is all literary w ks is mostly verbal.

"समाप्तिसत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्याम् मङ्गलस्य व्यभिचार विघ्नसाद्—यत्र तत्र दुरितनाशकमपि मङ्गलमपि न मङ्गलम् Tatt-Ci. Such mangalâcaran generally

takes one of the three following forms: (I) आशीः Benediction or Prayer (II) नमस्क्रिया Salutation, and (III) वस्तुनिर्देश Description the last being supposed to be accomplished even by a bare reference to the name of a god, or the use of a word which means a god as, for example, the word देवता in 'अस्त्युत्तरस्यां दिशि देवतात्मा हिमालयो नाम नगाधिराजः' the first line of Kālidāsa's Kumārasambhava.

The old practice was probably the performance of mangalācarana *outside the work*, in the shape of the recitation of Vedic mantras, of the syllable Om, or of the names of ācāryas and gurus (*vide infra*), and hence its apparent absence from early works. But the duty of performing a mangalācarana is so liberally construed by the later scholiasts, that it is supposed to have been sufficiently done to god by the use of a word like अथ—which is said to be auspicious, but which really means nothing more than 'now'—at the commencement of work e.g. अथातो धर्मं व्याख्यास्यामः 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' ["ओंकारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा । कण्ठं भित्त्वा विनिर्यातौ तेन माङ्गलिकावुभौ"—इति स्मृतेः —Tatt.-Ch.]

Some manuscripts of the Syādvādamañjarī open with नमः सर्वज्ञाय —the usual mangalācarana of namaskāra to be found in Jaina and Bauddha works the 'सर्वज्ञ' being of course the Perfect Man i.e., the Jina or the Buddha. This may be part of the author's mangala or it may be the copyist's.

St. 1 (Page 1 ll. 1–4)

अनन्तवस्तुविषयम्—knowledge of innumerable things, substances and modes rather than of one endless Reality of the Vedantins; for the Jaina is a pluralist. This ज्ञान is technically known as केवलज्ञान (see below) स्वयं देवैरपि सेवित—man, in his spiritual perfection, is higher than gods—a doctrine contributed to the history of world's religious thought by Jainism, Buddhism and Vaishnavism. कुतीर्थ—false doctrines or systems. कोलाहल—the jargon

arising from their mutual contradictions. रागद्वेषद्विषन्मुखीन्‌ परिषद्‌—the crowd of enemies consisting of or full of passions such as राग and द्वेष Here रागद्वेषमुखाः द्विषः may mean (i) enemies beginning with राग and द्वेष i.e. all the passions; or (ii) enemies whose mouths are full of राग and द्वेष i.e. the heretical schools. (cf. तीर्थ). वीरजिन —The Lord Mahāvīra. For the name see Kalpasūtra 108 परीसहोवसग्गाणं खंतिखमे पडिमाणं पालए धीमं अरइरइसहे दविए वीरियसंपन्ने देवेहिं से नामं कयं समणे भगवं महावीरे —" because he stands fast in the midst of dangers and fears, patiently bears hardships and calamities, adheres to the chosen rules of penance, is wise, indifferent to pleasure and pain, rich in control, and gifted with fortitude, the name Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra has been given him by the gods." [Tr S. B. E.]; also vide Hemacandra's note on Haribhadra's आवश्यकवृत्ति वीरं विक्रान्तम्‌ कर्मवैरिजयात्‌ वीरः ...
विराजति इत्येवं वा वीरयति कर्मविदारणमिति विराजते इति वीरः। तदुक्तम्‌
विदारयति यत्कर्म तपसा च विराजते। तपोवीर्येण युक्तश्च तस्माद्वीर इति स्मृतः ॥

St. 2 (P 90 r ll 5-8)

निःसीमप्रतिभैकजीवितधरौ r °धरे—whose very life or being consists of an unbounded play of genius. प्रतिभा—intuition or quick perception It goes with दैवभूः or सरस्वतीसुरगुरू (Sarasvatī and Bṛhaspati) according as we read धरौ (r) or °धरे. निःशेषपृथ्वीभुजां पुण्यौघेन—Owing to the mass of punya of all those who are born on this earth the mortals; that is to say it is our good fortune that Hemacandra was born in this world. The variant °स्पृशां पुण्यौघेन would give the sense—By the mass of punya which in its magnitude covers the whole earth. सरस्वतीसुरगुरू स्वाङ्गैकरूपौ दधत्‌—Hemacandra representing in his person both Sarasvatī and Bṛhaspati—the former the goddess of learning, and the latter the teacher of gods. स्याद्वादम्‌ (L)—loo sing or acc dual in apposition to सरस्वतीसुरगुरू. The former appears to be preferable. य स्याद्वादनयविचारणैकनिपुणः who, in virtue of his being both सरस्वती and सुरगुरु, may be said to have demonstrated the Syādvāda doctrine of All-in-One or

-One-in Many by his own personal example. सदृशमामिति॰ चन्द्र-The sea is roused into activity by the moon (चन्द्र); so is good thought by हेमचन्द्र. आसस्तुते-of the Dvātriṁśikā which is a panegyric of Mahāvīra—the आप्त आप्त-originally a kinsman (cf. न आपिर्विदो अस्य रिषण्यन् Rg S.) or a friend; and, hence he who declares the Truth— आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता. or is competent to declare the Truth. तस्यार्थवक्तव्यस्यवक्ता... वस्तु ...

St 4 (Page 1 ll 13-16)

विवृति—th present work of Malliṣeṇa—that is the Syādvādamañjarī प्रतिपत्ति-proves successful. आरम्भसमारम्भ-undertaking of the wo k, or the work which is respectfully undertaken (= संभाविता आरम्भा) पक्षा विस्तृतम्—an instance of आक्षेपालङ्कार—cf. निषेधो वक्तुमिष्टस्य यो विशेषाभिधित्सया। वक्ष्यमाणोक्तविषयः स आक्षेपो द्विधा मतः॥ K. Pr

From the original stock of the Indian Religion Jainism and Buddhism branched off as separate religions many years after the time of the great reformers Mahāvīra and Gautama Buddha; and ven when eventually Brahmanism, Jainism and Buddhism stood ut as rival religions in the country they influenced e ch other much more profoundly than their follow ers cared to admit. Owing t their common rigin, they possess mainly th same religious traditions including the Pantheon. The prayer to भारती here is n instance to the point. The pray r howe er is withdrawn (वक्षा विस्तृतम्) in favou f the author Jaina master—Udayaprabha—as quickly as the reverence which the J ins at one time paid to the ancient Indian religion. सारस्वतः ...—The ternal mystic formula of Sarasvatī; here, th name f the athor s guru—उदयप्रभ which is to take the place of the formula. उदयप्रभ wrote आरम्भसिद्धि, धर्माभ्युदय महाकाव्य and उपदेशमालाकर्णिकावृत्ति, etc.

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l. 17 कालचक्र—Th wheel of Tim with its spokes (Sk. अरक, Guj. आरा) is di ided by the Jains into two parts-अवसर्पिणी

and उत्सर्पिणी—i. e. the half with the *downward* move, and that with the *upward* move. The former is subdivided into six अरs i. e. spokes, sectors, or arcs in the descending order of happiness 1 सुषम-सुषमा (the period of extreme happiness,) 2 सुषमा (the period of happiness), 3 सुषम-दुःषमा (the period of mixed happiness and misery the former preponderating) 4 दुःषमसुषमा (the period of mixed misery and happiness, the former preponderating), 5 दुःषमा (the period of misery) and 6 दुःषमदुःषमा (the period of extreme misery). The first Tirthankara—Rsabhadeva—was born during the 3rd and the remaining twenty-three during the 4th period. Ours is the 5th. The same divisions in the reverse order belong to the other half viz., उत्सर्पिणी. For detailed account of their characteristics see Mrs. Stevenson "The Heart of Jainism pp. 272 278 "The main features of the chronological system of the Gainas equally differ from those of the Buddhists as from those of the Brâhmanas. For it is impossible to derive the Utsarpinî and Avasarpinî eras with their six Aras, from the Buddhistical four great and eighty smaller Kalpas, which are as it were the acts and scenes in the drama of the successive creations and dissolutions of the universe so from the Yugas and Kalpas of the Brâhmanas. I am of opinion that the Buddhists have improved on the Brahmanic system of the Yugas, while the Gainas inverted their Utsarpinî and Avasarpinî eras after the model of the day and night of Brahmâ. —Jacobi, S. B. E. Gaina Sûtras, Pt. I p. xxxi.

" स च कालो द्विविधः । उत्सर्पिणी अवसर्पिणी चेति । तत्रोत्सर्पयति भावान् क्रमेणेति अनुभवादिभिरिति उत्सर्पिणी । तैरेवावसर्पयतीति अवसर्पिणी । तत्रावसर्पिणी षड्विधा । सुषमसुषमा, सुषमा, सुषमदुःषमा, दुःषमसुषमा, दुःषमा अतिदुःषमा । उत्सर्पिण्यपि अतिदुःषमादा सुषमसुषमान्ता षड्विधैव भवति । "–Âv Tîkâ.

इत्थंकार कालचक्रं द्वेधा ...स्यपरिवर्त्ते । कालो द्विविधोऽवसर्पिण्युत्सर्पिणी विभेदतः । ... सुषमसुषमा ... सुषमा ... सुषमदुःषमा ... दुःषमसुषमा ... दुःषमा ...

क्षमा पुनः। सैका सहस्रर्वोतो द्विचत्वारिंशतो मिता। एकविंशतिरप्तानां सहस्राणि तु कृत्स्नशः । एवमप्युत्तमापि स्यात्पञ्चपंचप्रमाणिका । मरकत भक्तपर्णिम्यां च एवं समुदीरिता । मस्तर्पिन्यां तु एव स्यु प्रतिलोमक्रमेण तु । तदेवमसर्पिण्युत्सर्पिण्यां च मीलिता । सागरोपमकोटीनां कोटयः स्युः विंशतिः ।" Hem. चार्वीचरचित Sarga II, Verses 111, etc.

l. 16 अमृतसारसरणीर्व etc.—सुधासारणी–a canal or stream of nectar A canal near Māngrol in Kāthiāvād is known by the proper name of Sāran. सुधासारिणी (s. v. l.) streaming with nectar causing nectar to flow देशनोपासनाविस्तार–Spreading of the gospel of J inism among his pupils or those who are prepared or fit to hear it.

सत्त्वार्थिषुरत–For Kumārapāla's conversion to Jainism and th stories of his enthusiasm fo the new faith, see Dvyāśraya Kumārapālacarita of Hemacandra Prabandha cintāmani, Pt iv pp. 132 133 Tawney s Edition, A. S. B. Rāsmālā of I pp. 187–192 & 194–197 the Bombay Gazetteer Gujarat pp. 190–193 "The King and the monk [Hemāchārya] et rned to Unhilpoor There Hemāchārya instructed Kumāra Pāl in the purity which proceeded from th mouth of Jin Dev and caused him to become great among the followers of Urhant. Under the Āchārya directions, the King forbad the destruction of life fo a period f fourteen years in the eighteen countries of Goozerat, in which his order was obeyed." (Rāsmālā vol. I pp. 187–188.) The order is known by the name of अमारिघोषणा or proclamation prohibiting slaught r

l. 21 चातुर्विद्य—Explained in marginal note in some of the manuscripts as व्याकरणसाहित्यतर्कचातुर्विद्य i. e Grammar Sacred Canon (Jaina), Literature and Logic. This nea ly accords with the f ur subjects in which Mahalabhatta (ix century A D.), the teacher f महीदासोत्पल (9th century) is said to hav been versed, viz., मीमांसा, व्याकरण तर्क and साहित्य In several Gujarat inscriptions, however the word चातुर्विद्य occurs in the sense of the four Vedas. (see Fleet's Inscriptions.)

L 21. .... etc.–Siddhasena Divākara (for his date and other account see H.J pp. 76–77) composed 32 sets of 32 stanzas each. Similarly Hemacandra composed two such sets called अयोगव्यवच्छेद and अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेद—द्वात्रिंशिका the *former* being a *defense* of the Jaina system, and the latter an *attack* on other systems. (cf. similarly Pādas I and II of the Adhyāya II of the Brahmasūtras. The words are of common occurrence in these senses and the method the common method of scholastic treatment. cf. "..... —Sāyana com. on Aitareya Brāhmaṇa).

L 23 (1) अयोगव्यवच्छेद lit. exclusion of non-possession, *i. e* demonstration that truth does not fail to belong to the Jaina system, *that it certainly belongs to it* the *constructive* or *positive* part of Hemacandra work (स्वपक्षसाधन)-(2) अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेद—lit. exclusion of the position that truth might belong to other rival systems, *i. e.* demonstration that truth does not belong to other systems the *destructive* or *negative* part of the undertaking (परपक्षदूषण). *Thirty two* seems to have been a favo rite number with Hemacandra. He got thirty-two Vihāras or Jaina monasteries built by Kumārapāla in expiation of the sin the latter had committed by eating a certain dish which reminded him of flesh. The reason given for the number was that man had thirty-two teeth, see Prabandha-cintāmaṇi ch. I ..... ।

L 26. ..... (*i. e.* परिषद्)—An assembly or assemblage of all the heretical *i. e.* non-Jaina philosophers. पर्षद्–evidently contraction of परिषद्–is as old as the Sūtras and the Smṛtis and even older (cf. supra .....).

Stanza I

ll. 29-30 ..... unlimited, unfailing; ..... that extraordinary kind

श्रुतज्ञानको ऽत्र प्रतिविशेष इति । अतोऽवसीयते । अस्मादिस्याद्यर्थ मागमादन्यत् मिथ्यं मतिज्ञानम् । श्रुतज्ञानं तु विवक्षितविषयग्राहि ...— T Bh) I illustrating th difference thus drawn Mr Jaini says— An eclipse to-d y may be known by Matijñāna, b t one in the time of Alexander or one to happen next ye r can now only be known by S rutajñāna All true history is thus श्रुतज्ञान in the same way as हेतुविद is included in श्रुतज्ञान in Brahmanical Logic. This is, how er extending the scope of श्रुतज्ञान beyond its intended limits, it being originally oppose l t मतिज्ञान in the sense of Authority Revelation as distinguished from Experience and Reason.

(3) अवधिज्ञान—Knowledge of the distant n tim space (अवधि-limit or boundary) It is innate (भवप्र) in th case of the celestial (देव) and the infernal (नारक) s als o acquired by the precipitation or annihilation of ka mic matter (क्षयोपशमनिमित्त), in the case f other souls such men l low animals (मनुष्य and तिर्यञ्चोति). This variety of ज्ञान is concerned with only रूपिद्रव्य (material bjects possessing रूप रस etc.)

(4) मन पर्य(l यो)ज्ञान—knowledg f what passes in other minds मन प्रतीत्य प्रतिसन्धाय वा ज्ञानं मनःपर्यय (T. R) reaching and reading the mind It has tw varieties—ऋजुमति and विपुलमति i. e. simple and complex. The latte is finer (विशुद्धतर) than the former and, unlik it, is not exposed to the risk of destruction (अप्रतिपाति)

(5) केवलज्ञान—pure or perfect knowledge-which is cha racteristic of the soul entirely liberate l from th bondage of matter The word is thus explained (1)बाह्याभ्यन्तरतपोविशेषाद् यदर्थ केवलं तत्केवलम् (तत्-कियाविशेषात् ...अर्थिनः केवलं सेवन्ते तत् केवलम्); (2) असहायमिति केवलम् (केवलम्‌ शुद्धे वैरस्य इति । अतज्ज्ञानं ... ... केवलं ज्ञानं) i. e. (1) that which is sought and practised, from th root केवृ-सेवने; or (2) pure, unmixed, free from other shades of ज्ञान such as क्षायोपशमिक The second is evidently better explanation than the first. But, in reality the word as well

as the idea seems to be a legacy from the Sāmkhyas and the Vedāntins; or what is more pr bable, it is a common heritage of the Jainas, the Sāṁkhyas and the Vedāntins from the Upanisad thinkers, according to whom the highest knowledge consisted in realising the purity or absoluteness of Ātmā, that is, its freedom from the bondage f anātmā o Prakrti For a brief account of these different kinds of ज्ञान see Appendix III pp. 143–144 of Barnett Antagadadasāo

Mahāvīra, say the Jainas, was born with the first three kinds of ज्ञान viz मति श्रुत and अवधि मनःपर्य(र्यं)ज्ञान he gained immediately on entering the state of houselessness, according to Svetāmbaras; afte several months of wandering penance and meditation according to Digambaras. केवलज्ञान cam to him according to all authorities, at the end of his tw lve years of ascetic life. (see H. J p. 33)

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l. 85 अत्र च श्रीवर्धमानस्वामिनो विशेषणद्वारेण etc.—The four adjectives in the Stan a, viz., (1) अनन्तविज्ञानम् (2) अतीतदोषम् (3) अबाध्यसिद्धान्तम् and (4) अमर्त्यपूज्यम् connote respectively the four 'मूलातिशयाः 'fundamental excellences of Tīrthankara. These are (1) ज्ञानातिशय (2) अपायापगमातिशय, (3) वचनातिशय and (4) पूजातिशय Their number is extended to thirty-four by some thus we read in Kundakundācārya s Niyama āra gāthā घणघाइकम्मरहिया केवलणाणाइ परमगुणसहिया। चोत्तिस-अतिसयजुत्ता अरिहंता एरिसा होंति ॥

l. 86 अनन्तविज्ञानम् .... him who possesses unbounded knowledge, pure and perfect—(केवलज्ञान). See also a.

ll. 87–88 अतीतदोषम्—him who has transcended the *eighteen* kinds of evil. These are enumerated as follows — "अन्त रायदानलाभवीर्यभोगोपभोगगाः । हासो रत्यरती भीतिर्जुगुप्सा शोक एव च ॥ कामो मिथ्यात्वमज्ञानं निद्रा चाविरतिस्तथा । रागो द्वेषश्च नो दोषास्तेषामष्टादशाप्यमी । "प्राणातिपात-मृषावाद-अदत्तादान-मैथुन-परिग्रह-क्रोध मान-माया-लोभ-प्रेम-द्वेष-कलह-अभ्याख्यान-पैशुन्य-परपरिवाद-रति-अरति-माया-मृषा-मिथ्यादर्शन-शल्याख्यम् (अष्टादशं कर्म)"–Sīlāṅka s Com. on आचाराङ्ग p. 79

L 39 अबाध्यसिद्धान्तम् etc —him who has taught the doctrine of स्याद्वाद which successfully resists the attacks of heretical teachers.

L 40 अमर्त्यपूज्यम्-him who has received the highest homage ([illegible]) f om the chiefs of gods and demons. An account f how Indra and others waited upon Vardhamāna may be read in Kalpasūtra and Acārāṅga.

L 43 ननु च etc —The uthor now proceeds to consider certain possible (I do not think anyone actually raised them) objections, with view to showing the need of each of the adjecti es in the Stanza. These are :—

First, it may be objected :—अनन्तविज्ञान necessarily implies [illegible] and so the word अतीतदोषम् in the stanza is superfluous. This is nswered by referring to the iew of the Ājīvikas according to whom even the emancipated sages—the founders of the Law-are reborn as Saviours, when they find the Law in danger. Compare in this connection, the distinction between Arhat and Bodhisat in Rhys Davids' American Lectures on Buddhism and Kern s Indian Buddhism.

The Jains regards this as weakness, and so deems it necessary to state explicitly that th Tirthankara is not only all wise, but is also free from all evil, i. is liable to re-birth on no account whatsoever

Ājīvikas were sometimes confounded with Buddhists. Compare "मन्यते हि गोशालमतानुसारिणो मोक्षप्राप्तावपि तीर्थनिकारदर्शनाद्भूयो भूयो भवमवतरन्ति । यदाहुः—ज्ञानिनो धर्मतीर्थस्य कर्तारः परमं पदम् । गत्वा गच्छन्ति भूयोऽपि भवं तीर्थनिकारतः इति । न ते परमार्थतो मोक्षप्राप्ताः [illegible] । न हि सकल [illegible] । यदुक्तम्—दग्धे बीजे यथात्यन्तं प्रादुर्भवति नाङ्कुरः कर्मबीजे तथा दग्धे न रोहति भवाङ्कुर इति" Manibhadra Laghuvritti on Haribhadra s Ṣaḍ-dars.

For Ājīvikas see Hoernle article on the subject in th Enc of Religion and Ethics Vol. I Rockhill Life of Buddha, Append: II, and Bhandarkar nd Pathak articles in the Indian Antiquary Vol. XL (1912).

The founder of this community according to Jaina scriptures was one Gos'āla Maṅkhaliputra (see Uvāsagadasāo and Bhagavatīsūtra. The latter gives an account of his life.) The teachings of Gos'āla were condemned by the Buddhists and the Jainas as unmoral and immoral. King As'oka, however in the 13th year of his reign (B. C. 251) bestowed a cave on the Ājīvikas, whom in a later Pillar Edict he co-ordinates with the Brāhmanas and Niggaṇthas. In the 6th century Varāhamihira in his astrol gical works, the Bṛhajjātaka and the Laghujātaka, names them as one of the seven classes of religious mendicants. They were also known as Ekadandins according to his commentator Bhattotpala and were sometimes identified with Digambaras, (of course, wrongly) as for exampl by S'īlāṅka (9th century) in his commentary on Sūtrakṛtāṅga, and in the inscriptions of the Chola King Rājarāja. The origin of th word is obscure Hoernle, surmises that Ājīvikas = Professionals n account of their leader s peculi views on the ājīva or profession f religious mendicant. There is nothing, however very peculiar about the views to justify the conjecture.

II 51–65 on P 4. (2) Second objection — सर्वज्ञत्व necessarily implies सर्वदर्शित्व and therefore 'सर्वदर्शित्व' is superfluous. To it the uthor replies that according to some heretical thinkers सर्वज्ञत्व is quite compatible with limitation in knowledge. Thus, they say it is immaterial whether one knows everything or not ; what matters is whether he knows the essential thing, that is what he o ght to know or not It does not matter at all if one does not know the number of bacteria in a thing ; the ज्ञान that matters is the अनुष्ठानगतं ज्ञानं i. the ज्ञान that has a bearing on life or practice ; if ज्ञान 'long sight, i.e. the mere range of knowledge were valuable in itself without its bearing on lif why not worship vultures who are tall birds with long range of sight ? Thus, then, bsolute purity of life and not unlimited knowledge is the essential characteristic f a Teacher Th Jaina rejects this view of the comparative unimportance of the extent of ज्ञान in a Teacher

You cannot know a single thing in its entirety says the Jaina, unless you know all: thus one and all are organically related, and so is the knowledge of one and the knowledge of all. (Here one is reminded of Tennyson's "Flower in the Crannied Wall") Hence अवश्यमितरं is as much required as "अवश्यमेव" cf. "न च सर्वथासमस्तवस्तूनि अनाकलय्य निर्णेतुं कोऽपि विज्ञानाति सुपरतर्क्षेण (?) केवलमेव विज्ञानमनुमानाद् । ज्ञातुं तस्य न सर्वं सर्वैर्वै इत्यमेकं वा ॥" Pramanamimamsa st. 48;

एको भावः सर्वथा येन दृष्टः ।
सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टाः ।
सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा येन दृष्टा
एको भावः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टः ॥

P Sira Tatparyavritti on st. 49

cf. also "सर्वं वस्त्वभिप्रायेण ज्ञानं सर्वेषामवभासनात् सर्वेषामतीतादिरूपेणान्यथेत अविरोधानामेकस्य वस्तुनो निश्चितत्वा परिच्छेदानुपपत्तेः । आगमोऽप्येवमेव व्यवस्थित । जे एगं जाणइ से सव्वं जाणइ जे सव्वं जाणइ से एगं जाणइ । तथा—

एगो भावो सव्वहा जेण दिट्ठो
सव्वे भावा सव्वहा तेण दिट्ठा ।
सव्वे भावा सव्वहा जेण दिट्ठा
एगो भावो सव्वहा तेण दिट्ठो ॥

(Manibhadra Laghuvritti on the Ṣaḍ Sam. of Haribhadra p. 48 Ben Edition.)

"तथा अनेकैर इत्यस्यापि महार्थस्य निश्चितत्वादिस्थानविशिष्टम् । यस्मात्स्थितिस्थिरता । सर्वं पश्यतु वा मा वा इष्टमर्थं तु पश्यतु । कीटसंख्यापरिज्ञानं तस्य न (or च) क्वोपयुज्यते । किं च निश्चितत्वमपि तस्य न घटते । एकस्यापि सर्वस्य तथास्वरूपानवगमेन सर्वप्रमाणसम्भावात् । यत आह । एको भावः सर्वथा येन दृष्टः सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टाः । सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा येन दृष्टा एको भावः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टः"—मलयगिरिसूरि Com. on नन्दीसूत्र of हरिभद्रसूरि These quotations occur in numerous Jaina works.

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L 6 (3) Third objection —Does not अवश्यमितरत्वम् necessarily follow from the first two adjectives? One answer is— It does But, then, ye miss one point. According to Jainism,

the Siddhânta is propounded by a *person or persons* (who possess the two former qualifications) as distinguished from the Vedas which are supposed by some (the Mîmâmsakas, for example) to be अपौरुषेय i. e not manating from a personal author—which is impossible H ote the word [illegible] in the text for directi g our attention to the personality of the founder of the सिद्धान्त who deserves to be revered not only by mortals, but e en by immortals. Another answer : [illegible] [illegible]° [P 4 l 71] certai k valins who simply rave them, selves, and are not authors of any true सिद्धान्त of " [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] —Haribhadra s [illegible] २९ Com.

l. 3 (4) F urth objection:—[illegible] is superfluous since it f llows as a matter of course from the qu lities bove mentioned Answe : Tr e. But people worship only gods, and do not know that the Jaina arhat is greater than gods and therel re worthy of greater worship.

l 79 [illegible] च etc.–Next, it is suggested that the word [illegible] in the stanza may be taken as a विशेषण also—in which case it will mean जिन ([illegible] [illegible]) [illegible] = infinitely possessed of the glory of [illegible] consisting of the personal experience of the wealth of thirty-four e cellences.[1] [illegible]—not th ppear nce but the reality not the external possession but the inward being of A hathood. Th thirty-fou excellences ha e been referred to above (see Notes p. 11) These consist of 19 [illegible] 4 [illegible] and 11 [illegible] [illegible]-cf. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible]-BH. ha med But [illegible] च (7 1 46 Hem. S'abd) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]-Hem

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l. 82 [illegible]—ever increasing, i finite. How is this consistent with the limit of [illegible] mentione l in the Jaina Siddhânta, such as the number thirty-f ur te. ? Ans.-In the Nis'îtha Cûrni (Nis'îtha-one of the Anga-bâhya) are enume-

You cannot know
Jaina less you l
related, nd so is t
all. (Here one is re
Well) Hence a
cf. "जय सोमिमास्वेर
मैतासिवाय् सिद्धमस्य
Pravacanasara st.

cf. also "एवं
तमिवेषाराम स्वस्य
अवरतिपत. । के ए
आयाह्। तथा—

(Haribhadra
dra p. 48 Ben E

"तथा मनेकैर द
विकल्पना । सर्वे पसत्
ना (or न) होपयुज्यते ।
व्ययस्वस्तवसर्वविशेषित
भावः सर्वथा वेन दृष्ट सर्वे
एको भाव सर्वथा येन दृष्ट
of हरिभद्रसूरि These quot

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L 67 (3) Third bject
cessarily foll w from the
It does But, then, you m

"The six (? five: Viṣṇu-nandin Nandi mitra, Aparājita, Govardhana, and Bhadrabāhu.) spiritual leaders who followed Jambusvāmin are called *S'rutakevalin*, because, though the complete omniscience which Jambusvāmin and his predecessors attained was denied to them, they possessed complete knowledge of the scriptures (श्रुत)" (H J pp 72 80).

l. 93 अनादिनिधन etc —See Panini 6-2 127 अनादिनिधन Hemacandra's S'abdānuśāsana 7 2 40 where अनन्त is included in अनादिनिधन

l. 95 प्रणम्य—See Hem.'s S abd. 7-1-114.

l. 95 अमन्दमुनय च etc —अमन्दमुनय may conceivably exist even in such sages as have equipped themselves with wisdom and character by sitting at the feet of great masters and serving them. But their wisdom and characte are, after all, acquired not innate. स्वयंबुद्ध etc.-(l. 99) स्वयंबुद्ध n-self-enlightened. वक्ष्ये (l. 100). Mark the word which only means I will endeavour or strive, thus suggesting the difficulty of doing full justice to the subject The future tense of the root has also point in it, *viz.*, that of suggesting faith in the task. अहम्— Though already implied in the first person form वक्ष्ये अहम् is explicitly mentioned in orde to suggest that the author proceeds on his own initiative and is not led to his task by either the advice or the example of others.

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l. 106 etc. अथवा श्रीवर्धमानं ... ...It is ingeniously pointed out that the four adjectives (1) श्रीवर्धमानं (2) जिनं (3) आप्तमुख्यं and (4) स्वयंभुवं in the last two lines may be connected with the four words (1) अनन्तविज्ञानं (2) अतीतदोषं (3) अबाध्यसिद्धान्तं and (4) अमर्त्यपूज्यम् respectively i the first two lines, as cause and effect. Thus, श्रीवर्धमानं *i. e.* 'infinitely possessed of glory necessarily implies infinite knowledge 'अनन्तविज्ञानं the glory consisting in the possession of the four infinites as consequence of the destruction of all karmas. वर्धमान-The word वर्धमान primarily signifies growth, but there is no occasion for growth in this case where excellences are possessed in infinite measure from

rated 1008 'external marks' of an Arhat and the umber is taken at the same time to be suggestive of n infinite number of internal marks; in the same way the special mention of 34, does not exclude the possibility of the number being really infinite.

L 88 अनितृष्णा etc.—Next, the word तृष् in the stanza is justified. The term implies more than 'अनितृष्' f the first line On the fourteen Steps to Liberation from Karma known as Gunasthâna see II, J pp. 185-192. उपशान्तगुणस्थान is the leventh and क्षीणगुणस्थान the twelfth step of the ladder O their difference, see Ibid p. 190. Whe a man has ttained to the eleventh tage, *Upasântamoha gunasthâna* he has reached a really critical point, where everythi g depend on how h deals with the sin of greed If he destroys it, and it becomes quite extinct, he is sAf ; but if it only remains quiescent, be is in a perilous state, for like a flood, it may at any moment burst its dam and th force of its current may carry the soul far dow the slope he has been climbing, depositing him on either the sixth or the seventh step (*Pramatta* or *Apramatta gunasthâna*), or even o the lowest (*Mithyâtva*). On the other hand, if he deal successfully with greed, he becomes an anuttara 1st Deva and knows that he will become a Siddha after h has undergone one mo e rebirth as a man.

If man be on the twelfth step, *Kshînamoha gunasthâna*, he has won freedom for ever not only from greed but from all the ghatin karma and the gh the aghatin karma may still persist, they have little power to bind the soul; in fact, so l mited is their power that at death a soul passes t once through th two remaining tages and enters moksa without delay Th D gambara believe that at this stage the first two parts of pur contemplation (S ukla-dhyâna) are developed

L 91 अनन्तविज्ञान etc.—Next is justified the word 'अनन्त गुणक' in the stanza. M hâ ira was f course perfect Kevalin so er the next three propagators of the siddhânta, viz., Gautama Sudharman and Jambusvâmin (—B. C. 453).

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l 135 यत् च श्रीवर्धमानमिति— To take श्रीवर्धमानम् as an adjective may appear unusual but it has a precedent in the अयोगव्यवच्छेदद्वात्रिंशिका stanza 1 line 3 which runs as 'श्रीवर्धमानाभिधमात्मरूपम्' where आत्मरूपम् (आत्म + रूपप् a termination in the sense of प्रशंसा of Panini प्रशंसायां रूपप् 5-3-66) = परमात्मानम् is the विशेष्य and श्रीवर्धमानाभिधम् one of its विशेषणs. With due deference to the author one may question how श्रीवर्धमानाभिधम् could be equated with श्रीवर्धमानम् on the contrary one would seem justified in holding that श्रीवर्धमान is a singular term and therefore a substantive in श्रीवर्धमानाभिधम् Against this it will perhaps be contended that श्रीवर्धमान in अभिधम् is a singular term and a substantive, but it is at the same time a विशेषण inasmuch as it characterizes the आत्मरूप or परमात्मा Yet this does not put श्रीवर्धमानाभिधम् on all fours with श्रीवर्धमानम्

L. 138 सान्वर्था वा etc.—The author perceives the weakness of the position he has taken up, and so proposes to treat the word श्रीवर्धमानं as at once विशेषण and विशेष्य the quality (विशेषण) justifying the name (विशेष्य)

Stanza II

L. 1 सन्ति च गुणा etc.—Introduction to the next stanza This explains why from amongst all the excellent qualities that belong to Mahāvīra, this particular one, viz. यथार्थवाद has been selected for specific mention in the next stanza.

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l 9 तुभ्यं स्पृहये etc.—स्पृह governs the dative of the noun.

l 10 पुरेत etc. Hem. 8-2 "0-" सुहस्पीच्च वा । स्तुवतश्चैतोप्यादे वा वैतालिकां भवति । पुरतोऽपि पुरातनं वा स्तुवति । स्वात्मनिति विम् ? । पुरतोऽपि स्तुवति स्वे ।"

L. 13 एतमेवैतं......To praise this one quality is to praise all, since it is the distinguishing trait of Mahāvīra and places him above all other teachers, be they even celestial beings.

the very birth, therefore the word should be understood in the secondary sense of infin te and eternal possession. अनन्तचतुष्क (l. 110). The 'four infinites' are infinite ज्ञान (knowledge), दर्शन (faith), चारित्र (character or conduct) and वीर्य (spiritual energy) Some substitute सुख for चारित्र in the list of the four anantas or infinites, the first three of which are the well-known रत्नत्रय or the Three J wels" of Jainism. (see O. J p. xli) Some, again, put दर्शन first and ज्ञान second in the list of the three Jewels For a discussion of the relative positions of दर्शन and ज्ञान and the particula position of ज्ञान between दर्शन and चारित्र see T Rv 20 35 on T. S. 1 See also O J pp 52-58. Dr Bhandarkar's Report Bom. Mss etc. Some athorities mention ज्ञान before दर्शन

l 112 etc [illegible] etc.—Since '[illegible]' connotes the possession of the 'f ur infinites' including 'infinit knowledge the word [illegible] in the first line would seem superfl ous So it is in w y yet it has been *specifically* mentioned in order to suggest that infinite knowledge ([illegible]) is the great instrument for beneficence possesse l by the Master.

l 116–125 ननु यथा [illegible] etc.—A query Just as [illegible] is the great instrument of beneficence, so is [illegible]; why then is the latter not mentioned specifically lik the former? Answer The word [illegible] in the stanza not only stands for ज्ञान but includes दर्शन also—the difference between ज्ञान and दर्शन being only the difference between the particular nd the general. Every object has particula and general aspect, of which the general is subordinated to the particular in ज्ञान, and the pr ticular to th general in दर्शन ([illegible] [illegible] l. 124-25). Mark, how e that this is different kind of distinction from that drawn T S. and T Rv., where दर्शन and ज्ञान stand for fa th ('[illegible]') and knowledge ('[illegible]') respectively

l 126 तथा [illegible]—Next (2) [illegible] (3) '[illegible] & (4) '[illegible] re show to be connected ith (2) [illegible] (3) [illegible] and (4) [illegible] as cause nd effect.

cf. "न्यग्रोधिकाप्रसूतेन विहरता पुरवरे कुसुमनाम्नि। कौभीषणिना स्वाति-तनयेन वात्सीसुतेनार्घ्यम्। अर्हद्वचनं सम्यग्गुरुक्रमेणागतं समुपधार्य दुःखार्तं च दुरागमविहतमतिं लोकमवलोक्य। इदमुच्चैर्नागरवाचकेन सत्त्वानुकम्पया दृब्धम्। तत्त्वार्थाधिगमाख्यं स्पष्टमुमास्वातिना शास्त्रम्" from which it appears that his father's name was Svâti and his mother's Vâtsî (Umâ of the Vatsa gotra.) A Similar account is found in the commentary on the T tt Sûtra by Siddhasenagaṇi. Dr Satishchandra is evidently wrong in understanding the word नागरवाचक as probably containing a reference to his S âkhâ (spiritual geneology); the word नगर means Kusumapura or Pâtaliputra (as they call London "the Town") and नागरवाचक is the celebrated teacher who belonged to Pataliputra–the scene of Ûmâsvâti's literary and missionary activities. He lived according to the tradition, for 84 years, 8 months and 6 days and attained Nirvâṇa in Samvat 142 i. e. 85 A. D For further particulars see Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit MSS. p xvi, Dr Hoernle's article in the Ind. Ant. Vol XX p. 351, and D Satishchandra's H. I L. p. 169

Stanza IV

The system first examined i the Vaiseṣika system of Kaṇâda, औलूक्यदर्शन-from st IV to IX, both inclusive.

l. 2 परात्मतत्त्वादतथात्मतत्त्वात्—The categories laid down in the system of Kaṇâda the Vai e ka system, one of the six great systems of Brahmanical philosophy

As to the origin of the words कणाद and काणाद, उलूक and औलूक्य vide the following — वैशेषिकशास्त्रप्रणेता कणादः स च [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] उलूक इति नाम [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Aulûkya given by Mâdhava as a name for the tenets of Kaṇâda rests on pl y upon the word Kaṇâda, crow-eater=Ulûka. W ber' H. I. L. p. 246 footnote 261. This wretched derivation has been rightly dismissed by Prof. Keith as 'an idle fiction

l. 20 श्रोतुं etc.—This writer presumes to scan Mahāvīra's intellectual greatness, not because he is really competent to do so but because he possesses Faith and Love (श्रद्धा and भक्ति), of which an eulogium like the present is but one expression.

Stanza III

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ll. 4-5 अमी –विप्रलम्भ–अमी Those, from अदस्–a pronoun suggesting distance or remoteness. The commentator sees in this word a sly hint that those heretical writers deserve to be avoided.

ll. 9-10 करभः इक्षुदण्डम्—as a camel dislikes a white sugar-cane.

l. 13 ध्यायेयुः—The author wishes they closed their eyes in meditation and pondered over these philosophical problems dispassionately.

l. 15 शम न निमीलयन्ति —For the point which the commentator sees in the Ātmanepada, see Pān. 1.3.72 स्वरितञितः कर्त्रभिप्राये क्रियाफले.

l. 19 etc. अथवा अवबुध्यस्वेत्यादि etc.—O closing the eyes while the great physician, Mahāvīra, administers and thrusts down their throats the bitter yet wholesome medicine of Jaina Siddhāntas. Let us recall that Gautama Buddha is similarly characterised as 'भिषक्' in Buddhist works.

Page

l. 25 प्रतिपाद्य–One to whom Truth is imparted ; a pupil,—whether willing or otherwise to sit at the Master's feet.

l. 28 परस्य वा ..Note the philanthropic missionary zeal expressed in this old stanza.

l. 30 उमास्वाति :—Umāsvāti or Umāsvāmin, the great exponent of Jaina scriptures, respected alike by the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras, probably because the split between the two sects had not yet established itself in his life-time. For an account of the man and his parentage, see his Tat.Sūtra Ch. x p. 233 B b. Ind. Ed.

cf. " न्यग्रोधिकाप्रसूतेन विहरता पुरवरे कुसुमनाम्नि। कौभीषणिना स्वातितनयेन वात्सीसुतेनार्घ्यम्। अर्हद्वचनं सम्यग्गुरुक्रमेणागतं समुपधार्य दुःखार्तं च दुरागमविहतमतिं लोकमवलोक्य। इदमुच्चैर्नागरवाचकेन सत्त्वानुकम्पया दृब्धम्। तत्त्वार्थाधिगमाख्यं स्पष्टमुमास्वातिना शास्त्रम्।" from which it appears that his father's name was Svâti and his mother's Vâtsî (Umâ of the Vatsa gotra.) A Similar account is found in the commentary on the Tatt Sûtra by Siddhasenagaṇi. Dr Satishchandra is evidently wrong in understanding the word उच्चैर्नागरवाचक as probably containing a reference to his Śâkhâ (spiritual geneology) ; the word नगर means Kusumapura or Pâṭaliputra (as they call London "the Town"), and नागरवाचक is the celebrated teacher who belonged to Pataliputra-the scene of Umâsvâti's literary and missionary activities. He lived according to the tradition, for 84 years, 8 months and 6 days and attained Nirvâṇa in Samvat 142 i. e. 85 A. D For further particulars see Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit MSS. p xvi, Dr Hoernle's article in the Ind. Ant. Vol XX p. 351, and Dr Satishchandra's H. I. L. p. 168.

Stanza IV

The system first examined is the Vaiśeṣika system of Kaṇâda. कणादसूत्रेण-from st IV to IX, both inclusive

l. 2 औलूक्यशासनाभिमततत्त्वानि—The categories laid down in the system of Kaṇâda the Vaiśeṣika system, one of the six great systems of Brahmanical philosophy

As to the derivation of the words कणाद and काणाद कणभक्ष and औलूक्य vide the following — वैशेषिकशास्त्रप्रणेता कणादः स च [illegible] योगमहर्षिः। शिवप्रसादोपलब्धविशेषपदार्थमभ्यासात् [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] कणभक्ष इति नाम [illegible] कणादस्य महर्षेर्नाम

Aulûkya given by Mâdhava as name for th tenets of Kaṇâda rests on play upon the word Kaṇâda, crow-eater=Ulûka Weber's H. I. L. p. 246, footnote 284. This wretched derivation has been rightly dismissed by Prof. Keith as an idle fiction

प्रतल कणाद इति यस्मिन् कणभक्षं कस्मिंश्चिल्लोके कणभक्षणं बहु शाक्यात्मभक्षीति निर्धारितवान् [जैन ?] । तदयुक्तम् । वस्तुतस्तु कणाद शास्त्र समापितिं विज्ञानवेपरीत्यात् "शास्त्रपो भक्षीति मतस्तत्समाप्य कणभक्ष मार्गे गुरुः कणाद इति । कणाद इति तत्र कापोतीं वृत्तिमनुतिष्ठतो रथ्यानिपतितांस्तण्डुलकणानादाय प्रत्यहं कृताहारनिमित्ता संज्ञा । "तस्मैश्वर महाकरूपकारी प्रत्यक्षीभूय द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायलक्षणं पदार्थषट्कमुपदिदेश इत्यादि पौराणिकी कथामवगन्तव्या—

　　मौर्यापत्यानिपुत्रा कस्तोपयित्वा महेश्वरम् ।
　　चक्रे वैशेषिकं शास्त्रं तस्मै कणभुजे नमः ॥

इति प्रशस्तपादभाष्यमङ्गलश्लोक व्याख्यायामिष्याख्यातिमिथितया प्रज्ञात-शिखान्तपूर्वपक्षास्ते व्यामोहयन्ति भोगिनाद्विमालकाण । (Vindhyes' r prasada व्यासवार्तिकवृत्तिरा Ben Ed. pp. 58-55.) While some Jaina writer may have bee responsible for the derivation criticised i the above passage, it by no means represents th Jaina tradition, which is perfectly respectful and is in harmony with the Brahmanical account. Thus, Rājasekhara Jaina writer, says in his Suddarsanasa m ccaya विशेषोत्कर्षेण कणादस्य मुने गुरुः । मतमेतत् प्रवर्तितं तत औलूक्यमुच्यते ॥ Similarly in his commentary on the Nyāyakandali, h says "इह किल पूर्वमतिपु-महात्मा तपश्चरितरुमारात कणाद कणादस्य तस्मैश्वर महाकरूपकारी प्रत्यक्षीभूय द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायलक्षणं पदार्थषट्कमुपदिदेश । तदनु च महर्षिभिरतस्त्वया षट्पदार्थतत्त्वमवगम्य कणादस्य कथामिव स्वशास्त्रकार ॥" Gunaratna, another distinguished Jaina writer writes i his commentary on the Saddarsanasamuccaya of Haribhadra मुनिविशेषस्य कापोतीं वृत्तिमनुतिष्ठतो रथ्यानिपतितांस्तण्डुलकणानादाय कृताहारस्याहारनिमित्तत् कणाद इति संज्ञाजनि । तस्य कणादस्य मुने गुरुः विशेषोत्कर्षेण मतमेतत् प्रवर्तितम् । तत औलूक्यं प्रोच्यते । कणादस्य शिष्येण वैशेषिका कणादा कथ्यन्ते ।" thus end rsing the Brahm nical explanation of th nam कणाद् as stated S ridhara Nyāyakandali "कणाद इति तस्य कापोतीं वृत्तिमनुतिष्ठतो रथ्यानि पतितांस्तण्डुलकणानादाय प्रत्यहं कृताहारनिमित्ता संज्ञा अत एव निरवद्य कणाद् या महर्षिविस्तरात्मक । (The last rema k f S idhara refers to the sarcasm on the Atomism of Kanāda.)

It will be interesti g to turn next to the Buddhist tradition relating to this bject, for which see Prof. Ui's

Introduction to the Daśapadārthī. "Ch'ekhi (540-623 A D.), a Chinese Buddhist, relates the following traditions with regard to the Vaiśeṣika and its founder :—"(The founder's name) Ulūka means an owl'... The time when he lived was 800 years before the Buddha. By day he composed a work and by night he wandered about for alms......The sūtra composed by *him is called the Vaiśeṣika (-sūtra) and consists of 100,000* ślokas. The main tenets are the doctrines of the six categories, of the asatkāryavāda, and that self (ātman) is something different from cognition (buddhi)." In another passage he states —"According to the life of Harivarman there lived a follower of Ulūka (t the time of Harivarman, c. 260 A. D). He said that the sūtra composed by our teacher Ulūka, is named the Vaiśeṣika (-sūtra), and is subtle or scholastic. Its general tenet is the doctrine of the six categories, and the speciality is that cognition is something different from self.... Vaiśeṣika, the name of the Sūtra means superior or excellent and distinguished (o different). The origin of the name is in the fact that the system is distinguished from, and superior to, the Sāmkhya. hwhai-ci states :—"About the end of the time of the creation (s·ṛṣṭi) when the ge of creatures was immeasurable a teacher (T rthaka) came to the world. He was named Ulūka. Ulūk means an 'owl' In the day time he meditated in a dense forest secluding himself from worldly affairs nd at n ght wh n people went to rest, h wandered about for food This mode of living was very similar to that of n owl so that he got the name *Ulūka. He was also called* Kaṇabhaj or Kaṇ bhakṣa *Kaṇa* means 'a grain (or a piece) of (rice-) corn and *bhuj* r *bhakṣa* means to eat The origin of the name was that he was usually wandering about at night, but as young women were frightened by the sight of him he afterwards went in secr t into mills, picked up pieces of corn from rice-bran, and at them. H was consequently nick named the 'corn-piece eat r He was further called (the teacher of) the V iśeṣika. V i eṣika means 'superior or 'excellent (literally 'conquering) H composed work

explaining the six categories. The work was named the Vaiśeṣika (– śāstra), since it excelled other works in all respects, or because it was composed by a man of superior intelligence." Kwhēi-ci also calls the founder Kaṇāda; but to the Chinese tradition it is not known that Kaṇāda or Kaṇabhuj means, "atom-eater" and the meaning of the term Vaiśeṣika is 'superior' o 'excellent' Atom-eate " as the nickname of the founder might not be probable, because a atomic theory is not special to the system, nd the Vaiśeṣika is not the first pioneer of the theory 'Superior' or 'excellent' is secondary meaning of the term, and the term is not used in this sense in V S. The explanation f the name Vaiśeṣika that it was derived from the fifth category particularity (Viśeṣa), or the characteristic of the system that an object is precisely analysed nd classified, is more probable......Rāja sekhara, in th Nyāyakandalitīkā explains that Kaṇāda was favoured by Iśvara on account f the merit of his ardent ascetic practice. Iśvara appeared to him as *Ulūka-rūpa-dhārī* (bearing the form of an owl.)..... But Iśvara is not mentioned in V S., although late commentators strain the meaning of some passages. Praśastapāda acknowledged Īśvara for the first time in the history of the Vaiśeṣika. Consequently the tradition must have originated l time later than Praśastapāda who lived in the fifth or sixth century A. D. Th Chinese traditional explanation of Ulūka seems to have been derived from an etymological meaning of the term, but it represents an older tradition. Even Aśvaghoṣa all des to the meaning

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Summary :

I औलूक्य from उलूक ; so called,

(1) because Śiva appeared to the ṛṣi in the form of an owl ([illegible]) and taught the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras ;

or (2) because the ṛṣi went about like an owl in the night and collected grains of corn for his food

or (3) because his system was all-powerful like an owl in the night, *i. e.* before the appearance of the Buddha, but worthless in the day *i. e.* after his appearance.

II वैशेषिक so called,

(1) because superior to the Sāṃkhya which was the older philosophy ;

or (2) because of its peculiar category called विशेष ;

or (3) because of its favourite method of investigating truth by determining the Viśeṣas or distinguishing properties of things

III कणाद—

(1) = [illegible]—a crow-eater or owl (? see Weber's H. I. L.)

(2) so called, because of his ascetic practice of maintaining himself by eating grains of corn collected in the night

(3) so called sarcastically because of his Atomic Theory

13 [illegible]—The characteristic method of investigating Truth adopted in the Vaiśeṣika system is to find out the Viśeṣas *i. e.* the differentia or distinguishing properties of things. This gives the name to the system, and is therefore rightly selected first for attack. The Chinese account of the origin of the word Vaiśeṣika meaning superior *i. e.* superior to the Sāṃkhya may be set aside as less likely

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as those things; in other words, अनुवृत्ति means a common concept (एकाकार प्रतीतिः) and a common name (एकशब्दवाच्यता च). व्यतिवृत्तिव्यावृत्ति etc. The points of वि and अति are brought out in the explanation attached to the word: thus, व्यतिवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिः (the latter is more intelligible being more commonly employed)=विजातीयेभ्य (वि) सर्वथा (= अति) व्यावृत्तेः।

ll. 9-10 तमे अपि संवित्ते etc.—object to समासे the subject being भावाः।

अर्थान्तरेण व्यतिरेकमाह—The negative side of the same fact: भावs or things are not presented to the mind through anything other than the भावs themselves('भावा न भावान्तरनेयरूपाः st. I. 2) i. e. through सामान्य and विशेष categories which the Vaiśeṣika recognises in addition to द्रव्य गुण and कर्म and समवाय. According to this explanation भावान्तर in the compound 'भावान्तरनेयरूपा (in l. 2 of the st.) means द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-समवायेभ्यः पदार्थान्तरेण प्रतीतिविषयं प्रापणीयम्-whose character (रूप) of अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति is brought to the mind (नेय) by the additional categories (भावान्तर) of सामान्य and विशेष respectively.

ll. 16 etc. स्वभाव एव etc.—It is the very nature of things to produce ideas of अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति. Thus घटसामान्य (घटत्व) is nothing but the घट itself; a घट possessing a certain form and presenting itself before the mind thereby causes other objects possessing the same form to come before the mind as घट and be denotable by th term 'घट' (घट एव तावत् पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारवान् प्रतीतिविषयतां यन् अन्यानपि तदाकारविषयान् पदार्थान् घटरूपतया प्रत्याययन्। तथा च प्रत्याययत् सामान्यात्मना वर्तते (ll. 17-20) in other words, things by their ery nature, and not thro gh any imaginary category like the सामान्य bring about their co-ordination with other individuals f their class, and give rise to common terms. The same घट moreover becomes विशेष in so far as it distinguishes itself from ther individuals f the same (सजातीय) or different (विजातीय) class by virtue of its peculiar द्रव्य (substance), क्षेत्र (place), काल (time), and भाव (nature or quality). Therefore सामान्य and विशेष need not be recognised as separate categories ('न सामान्यविशेषौ पृथक्पदार्थतया कल्प्यौ स्याताम् l. 23), they being

St. स्वतोऽनुवृत्तिव्यतिवृत्तिभाजो—

The Jaina view on the question of सामान्य and विशेष is (1) that they are not required to be recognized as special पदार्थs to account for अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति (= व्यतिवृत्ति of the Stanza); for अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति can very well be explained as arising from the nature of the objects themselves, without the hypothesis of separate categories called सामान्य and विशेष; (2) that they are neither absolutely the same as the objects in which they are supposed to inhere (एकान्त अभेद), nor absolutely distinct from those objects (एकान्त भेद); in fact, they are *both*.

l. 5 अभवन् भवन्ति भविष्यन्ति चेति भावाः—भावाः are things past, present or future i.e. a भाव does not necessarily connote *present* existence; thus a ध्वंस or प्रागभाव which the Vaiseshika regards as the अ-भाव of a thing is as much a भाव as the thing itself; moreover the so-called अभाव is not तुच्छ or निरुपाख्य i.e., unsubstantial nothing, as some Vedantins would have it, but is an aspect of भाव and therefore the भाव itself.

l. 5 6 आत्मपुद्गलादय—Spirit, matter etc.

सर्वं हि वाक्यं etc.—Every proposition is determining and therefore, exclusive of something i.e. it implies 'only' even when the word is not expressly employed. Hence स्वतः in the stanza = स्वत एव न परतः। स्वत एव = आत्मीयस्वरूपात्—Things conform to themselves and distinguish themselves *suo forte*; they do not require such mediators as सामान्य and विशेष to enable them to accomplish the task.

Page 1

ll. 8-9 एकाकारा प्रतीतिरेकशब्दवाच्यता चानुवृत्तिः—सामान्य and विशेष are assumed by the Vaiśeṣikas to account for अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति (or व्यतिवृत्ति as it is called in the stanza). Of these अनुवृत्ति is defined as 'एकाकारा प्रतीतिरेकशब्दवाच्यता च' i.e. it consists of the fact that a thing (a) appears to possess the same form as certain other things, and (b) is expressible by the same word

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ll. 16 etc. स्वभाव एव etc.—It is the very nature of things to produce ideas of अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति. Thus घटसामान्य (घटत्व) is nothing but the घट itself. घट possessing a certain form and presenting itself before the mind thereby causes other objects possessing the same form to come before the mind as घट and be denotable by the term 'घट' (घट एव तावत् पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारवान् प्रतीति विषयीभवन् तद् अन्यानपि तदाकारवतः पदार्थान् घटरूपतया प्रत्याययन् घटशब्दवाच्यतां च प्रत्याययन् सामान्यात्मना वर्तते (ll. 17-20) in other words, things by their very nature, and not through any imaginary category like the सामान्य bring about their co-ordination with other individuals of their class, and give rise to common terms. The same घट moreover becomes विशेष in so far as it distinguishes itself from other individuals of the same (सजातीय) or different (विजातीय) class by virtue of its peculiar द्रव्य (substance), क्षेत्र (place), काल (time), and भाव (nature or quality). Therefore, सामान्य and विशेष need not be recognised as separate categories (न सामान्यविशेषौ पृथक्पदार्थान्तरं स्याताम् l. 3), they being

nothing more than certain aspects (अनुवृत्ति aspect and व्यावृत्ति aspect, respectively) of the things of which they are predicated (पदार्थधर्मत्वेनैव तयोः प्रतीयमानत्वात् l. 23). For द्रव्य क्षेत्र काल and भाव see Syādvāda-mañjarī on St. XXIII. "यत्र स्यात् कथंचित् [illegible] [illegible] सर्वं द्रव्यादि । न पुनः [illegible] [illegible] तदपि । द्रव्यतो [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] इति ॥"

Mark that upto this point Malliṣeṇa has taken the word 'भावान्तर' of the second line of the stanza as referring to सामान्य and विशेष recognised as categories other than the well-known भाव or पदार्थ *viz.* द्रव्य गुण कर्म and समवाय (भावान्तरभावौ पदार्थान्तरभावौ द्रव्यगुणकर्मसमवायेभ्यः पदार्थान्तरभूतौ भावव्यतिरिक्तसामान्यविशेषाख्यौ etc.). The explanation involves the use of the word 'भाव' in two different senses in one and the same verse, nay in one and the same line 'भाव' in भावाः means things in general, while 'भाव' in 'भावान्तर'" means the पदार्थ or categories, *viz.*, द्रव्य गुण कर्म and समवाय. This is obviously unsatisfactory and one would, therefore, prefer to take भावान्तर in the sense of 'other than the *things themselves*' and, this is the sense in which the author understands the word in the passage that follows, *viz.*, "पदार्थधर्मत्वेनैव तयोः प्रतीयमानत्वात् । न च धर्मा धर्मिणः सर्वथा [illegible] व्यतिरिक्ताः (ll. 23-24). The transition, however from one explanation to the other is almost unconscious, the argument being continuous, and the words पदार्थान्तर (in सामान्यविशेषयो [illegible] [illegible]) and व्यतिरिक्त (in भावव्यतिरिक्तसामान्यविशेषाख्याः) lending themselves to a double interpretation, *viz.* (1) other than the categories द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-समवाय or (2) other than the things themselves.

L. 23 न च धर्मा धर्मिणः सर्वथा etc.—सामान्य and विशेष are but the धर्म (not real independent entities, but mere aspects) of the पदार्थ of which they are predicated. Thus —Are not धर्म other than the धर्मिन् of which they are predicated? Is not predicate different from its subject? To this the author replies No. If धर्म were absolutely *other* than the धर्मिन् there could be no such relation between them as विशेष्य and विशेषण

or subject and predicate any more than between a camel and a donkey two absolutely distinct entities which could never be related as subject and predicate, (धर्मधर्मिभेदे विशेषणविशेष्यभावानुपपत्तेः । करभरासभयोरिव धर्मधर्मिभावस्याप्यसङ्गात् (ll. 34-35) Moreover if धर्मs were held to be distinct from the धर्मिन् i.e. the substratum in which they are supposed to inhere, there would be as many distinct entities in a धर्मिन् as there are धर्मs, that is to say an infinite number of पदार्थs would have to be admitted on the proposed hypothesis (धर्माणामपि पृथक्पदार्थत्वे एकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि पदार्थानन्त्यप्रसङ्गः । अनन्तधर्मकत्वाद्वस्तुनः—ll. 36-37)

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l. 33 पदार्थव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् etc. St. iv ll. 3-4 – Construe thus :—एतौ (पदार्थेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तत्वात् अन्यौ परस्परनिरपेक्षौ च) यौ सामान्यविशेषौ तयोर्यद् भावान्तरं (स्वरूपम्—अनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिरूपम्) तस्मात् (तदपेक्ष्य) (ll. 33-34). अन्यौ = 1. Other than (अन्यौ) 2. strangers to each other (परस्परनिरपेक्षौ). सामान्य and विशेष which are supposed to be other than the पदार्थs of which they are predicated or other than the categories द्रव्य गुण कर्म and समवाय (For the two explanations see here), and which, moreover are regarded as two distinct पदार्थs inter se (पदार्थेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तत्वात्परस्परनिरपेक्षौ च). Their भावान्तर=their स्वरूप consisting of अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति respectively अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तिरूप [illegible] reference to that. For the meaning of the पञ्चमी the author cites ल्यब्लोपे कर्मण्यधिकरणे (H S. 2- 74) [illegible]—a bahuvrihi adjective qualifying the tatpurusha noun भावान्तरम्. It means —Since the alleged otherness is not fact, is not what it is said to be literally [illegible] it does not possess the [illegible] the स्वरूप or character which has been ascribed to it by the Vaiseshikas [illegible] that (1) सामान्य and विशेष are absolutely other than the पदार्थs of which they are predicated, and (2) are distinct inter se अविश्वग्भाव—not as separate entities (from वि not, and श्वञ्ज्—सञ्ज् to adhere hence विष्वक् separate). यत्त्वं अन्यत्वं etc —To say that some thing is पर i.e. अन्य is to assert अत्यन्तभेद (absolute distinction) as its necessary implicate

ll. 43 f. ते च पदार्थेभ्य सामान्यविशेषयोरत्यन्तविभक्तौ स्वीक्रियमाणे etc.—Now if there were अत्यन्तभेद between सामान्य and विशेष on

the one hand and the पदार्थ on the other it would be impossible to connect the tw cognitions of अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति with the पदार्थ. For if the t sides fall absolutely asu d सामान्य and विशेष could have othing to do with the पदार्थ If on the other hand w ad pt th alternative of सामान्य अभेद—absolute identity—one m mber of the pair f सामान्य and विशेष would vanish leaving only the ther in th fiel l. (एकत्वादेवै कस्यापरस्यानवस्थानात् L 46). For both bei g mutually contradictory they could not be identified with the same पदार्थ. Moreover if सामान्य and विशेष were merged in the पदार्थ there would be no explanation of two uch evi lent facts as सामान्य and विशेष (= अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति) which ppear in every experience.

L 47 परस्परविविक्तरूपात् etc.—The word पर in the stanza was interpreted in the sense of (1) ther than th पदार्थ, and (2) distinct inter se The प्रत्यय f सामान्य and विशेष i the latter sense will be discussed later on. See व्या स on St. VIII

I was tempted to interpret the passage in somewhat different way that is, as referring to the प्रत्यय or अध्यवसाय of सामान्य and विशेष *inter se* Thus the argument in सामान्यविशेषयोरेवान्य विभाते सौकिकमार्गे etc., would be that if सामान्य nd विशेष were regarded as absolutely distinct from *each other* they could not give rise to the ideas of अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति i reference to one and the same object—as in fact they did—being contradictory If, on the other hand, सामान्य and विशेष were regarded as bsolutely *one*, one would be merge l in the other leaving only the ther in the field, which would be contrary to our everyday experience of *both* सामान्य and विशेष ppea ing together in one and the same bject (सामान्यविशेषप्रत्ययप्रत्योरेव वस्तु प्रत्यक्षेण प्रतीते L 47). But this interpretation while it possesses the advantage of giving point to पर and इव in परस्परविविक्त and प्रत्ययात् and also to प्रत्ययप्रत्योरेव in the last quoted line, is precluded by the fact that the author t lso speaks of the प्रत्यय or अध्यवसाय as 'परार्थम्' and not *inter se* in his passage; *vide* पदार्थेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तात्मनौ and 'परार्थम्' सामान्यविभागे सौकिकमार्गे

Stanza V

Divide the Commentary thus :—

I आदीपे -- सर्वं हि वस्तु द्रव्यार्थिकनयापेक्षया नित्यम् पर्यायार्थिकनयापेक्षया पुनरनित्यम् । Introductory

II तथैवप्रदीपस्यापि--नित्यानित्य एव । तमः is but a form of तेजस् and so the latter is both नित्य and अनित्य

III एवं व्योमापि-- इति सिद्धं नित्यानित्यत्वं व्योम्नः ।
आकाश is similarly both नित्य and अनित्य

IV स्याद्वादिनां अपि---अप्रच्युतमिति । The doctrine of the Yogins on the nature of नित्य and अनित्य.

V ( ) अपरार्धं -- कदाचित्. The second half of the Stanza explained.

(b) The doctrine of the Vaiseşikas unwittingly in favour of नित्यानित्य

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ll. 2-5 आदीपं etc. —All things, दीप (a flame of light) and व्योम (âkâsa) alike, possess the common nature of permanence and change. For all Reality is *substance-cum-mode* (वस्तुन स्वरूपं द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकम्). This is stated by Umâsvâti i the T Sûtra "उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत्"—of which the terms उत्पाद व्यय and ध्रौव्य re thus explained in the T R. Vârtika स्वजात्यपरित्यागेन भावान्तरावाप्तिरुत्पादः, तथा पूर्वभावविगमो व्ययः ध्रुवेः स्थैर्यकर्मणो ध्रुवतीति ध्रुवः Note that द्रव्य is not merely द्रव्य but also पर्याय and hence, उत्पाद and व्यय in addition t ध्रौव्य moreover, द्रव्य is not simply पर्याय but is also द्रव्य and therefore ध्रौव्य in addition to उत्पाद and विनाश। Thus, everything that exists (सत्) is द्रव्यपर्यायात्मक and उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्त. As to the point of 'द्रव्य and its implication in regard to the relation of द्रव्य and पर्याय see the Com. on the T. R.-Vârtik on the T Sutra V 29— which thus sums up th whole position: पर्यायेषु पर्यायाणां च स्यादन्यत्वं स्यादनन्यत्वम् । यथा घटस्य मृद्द्रव्यस्य आदिपुरुषकादिभिः अविशिष्टस्य अनेकसंस्थानान्तरा- विर्भूतपिण्डघटकपालादिपर्याया धर्मा परस्परतो विविक्त लक्षणत्वे । न तेषां भेदात्मन भेदः नापि तत्स्वभावातेषामभेदः । तत् नित्यानित्यत्वापेक्षया नाना

the one hand and the पदार्थ on the other it would be impossible to connect the two cognitions of अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति with the पदार्थ. For if the two sides fall absolutely asunder सामान्य and विशेष could have nothing to do with the पदार्थ. If on the other hand we adopt the alternative of एकान्त अभेद—absolute identity—one member of the pair of सामान्य and विशेष would vanish leaving only the other in the field. (अन्यतरस्य [illegible] L 45). For both being mutually contradictory they could not be identified with the same पदार्थ. Moreover if सामान्य and विशेष were merged in the पदार्थ there would be no explanation of two such evident facts as सामान्य and विशेष (= अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति) which appear in every experience.

L 47 [illegible] etc.—The word पर in the stanza was interpreted in the sense of (1) other than the पदार्थ, and (2) distinct inter se. The पक्ष of सामान्य and विशेष in the latter sense will be discussed later on. See व्या on St. VIII.

I was tempted to interpret the passage in a somewhat different way that is, as referring to the भेद or अभेद of सामान्य and विशेष inter se. Thus the argument सामान्यविशेषयोरेकान्त-भिन्नत्वे [illegible] etc., would be that if सामान्य and विशेष were regarded as absolutely distinct from each other they could not give rise to the ideas of अनुवृत्ति and व्यावृत्ति in reference to one and the same object—as in fact they did—being contradictory. If, on the other hand, सामान्य and विशेष were regarded as absolutely one, one would be merged in the other leaving only the other in the field, which would be contrary to our everyday experience (both सामान्य and विशेष appearing together in one and the same object (सामान्यविशेषयोरेकान्ताभेदे [illegible] L 47). But this interpretation, while it possesses the advantage of giving point to पर and इव in [illegible] and [illegible] also to [illegible] in the last quoted line is precluded by the fact that the author there speaks of the भेद or अभेद as 'पदार्थेभ्य' and not inter se in this passage; vide पदार्थेभ्यो [illegible] and 'पदार्थेभ्य [illegible]

introduced here with a view to showing that the Vaiśeṣika distinction of नित्य and अनित्य things—e. g that between व्योम and दीप—is false. Every वस्तु is at once नित्य and अनित्य—it is नित्य from the standpoint of द्रव्यार्थिकनय and अनित्य from the standpoint of पर्यायार्थिकनय that is to say considered as the underlying substance it is नित्य, and as the changing manifestation it is अनित्य The doctrine of नय or standpoints follows as a necessary corollary from that of स्याद्वाद "*Naya* is the method by which things are comprehended from particular standpoints," says Dr. Satischandra. Having defined it, he proceeds to explain the nature of the five *nayas* mentioned in the T Sūtra नैगम-संग्रह-व्यवहार-ऋजुसूत्र-शब्दाः The last viz, शब्द he subdivides, on the authority of Umāsvāti's Bhāṣya into साम्प्रत समभिरूढ and एवम्भूत But the same Sūtra is quoted in the T R. Vārtika thus: "नैगम-संग्रह-व्यवहार-ऋजुसूत्र-शब्द-समभिरूढ-एवंभूता नयाः and these are the सप्तनयाः—the seven modes of stating truth from different standpoints—according to its commentator For the explanation of the different नयs in English see Dr Satischandra's "Indian Logic: Mediæval School," pp. 11 12 and "History of Indian Logic," pp. 170-71. But more important than this classification, for the purpose of the text, is the fundamental one of नयs into द्रव्यार्थिकनय and पर्यायार्थिकनय also called द्रव्यास्तिक॰ and पर्यायास्तिक॰

The following extract from the T R. Vārtika and its commentary will be found useful— प्रमाणप्रकाशितार्थविशेष-प्ररूपको नयः (T. R. V.)—प्रकर्षेण मानं प्रमाणं सकलादेश इत्यर्थः, तेन प्रकाशितानां न प्रमाणाभासपरिगृहीतानामित्यर्थः, तेषामर्थानामस्तित्व-नास्तित्व-नित्यत्वा-नित्यत्वाद्यनन्तात्मनां जीवादीनां ये विशेषाः पर्यायास्तेषां प्रकर्षेण रूपकः प्ररूपकः निरवद्यप्रयोगहेतुरित्यर्थः। स द्वेधो नयस्तत्र द्वौ मूलभेदौ द्रव्यास्तिकः पर्यायास्तिक इति। द्रव्यमस्तीति मतिरस्य द्रव्यभवनमेव नातोऽन्ये भावविकाराः भावव्यतिरेकेणानुपलब्धेरिति द्रव्यास्तिकः। पर्याय एवास्ति इति मतिरस्य जन्मादिभावविकारमात्रमेव भवनं न ततोऽन्यद् द्रव्यमस्ति तद्व्यतिरेकेणानुपलब्धेरिति पर्यायास्तिकः। अथवा द्रव्यमेवार्थोऽस्य न गुणकर्मणी तदवस्थारूपत्वादिति द्रव्यार्थिकः। पर्याय एवार्थोऽस्य रूपाद्युत्क्षेपणादिलक्षणो न तत

[illegible]पेक्षया न द्रव्यम् । तथा द्रव्यस्यापि [illegible] पर्यायाः कथंचिद्भिन्ना द्रव्यापेक्षया कथंचिदभिन्नाः इति तात्पर्यं न [illegible] । [illegible] तथा, तदुक्तं [illegible] ।
Note, again, how ध्रौव्य is reconciled with उत्पाद and व्यय Thus "[illegible] ।—— [illegible] ध्रौव्यमपिरिति [illegible] । यदि च [illegible] ध्रौव्यमपिरिति स्यात् [illegible] भवेत् । यदि वा [illegible] एवं [illegible] ध्रौव्यं प्रसज्येत । etc.

l. 6. स्याद्वादमुद्रानतिभेदि—Nothing can break through the seal of स्याद्वाद, i. e., the conditions imposed by the Universal Law of स्याद्वाद—the doctrine of the "May-be" – which denies all absolute propositions, such as, something is absolutely नित्य or अनित्य every proposition according to the Jain doctrine, being only *relatively* true, i. e., true from certain point of view and untrue from a different point of view It is thus doctrine of Relativity of Truth, of fluid as opposed to rigid Truth, and should *not* be *confounded* with any form of Scepticism or Agnosticism, ancient or modern.

l. 7 स्यादित्यव्ययम् etc. स्यात् (originally Pot. 3rd pers. sing of अस् to be) is generally treated by commentators as an indeclinable noun or adjective connoting indefinite possibility

l. 8. स्याद्वादोऽनेकान्तवाद etc. The doctrine of the "*May-be*" means the doctrine of *Indefinite* aspects of Truth, involving co-existence of such apparently inconsistent dharmas as नित्यत्व and अनित्यत्व

l. 10. यथा हि [illegible] राजनि etc The word मुद्रा suggests the idea of the royal seal, and through it, the analogy of sovereign whose law all must obey Nothing can transgress the law of स्याद्वाद says the author without committing suicide or throwing itself out of the world-order (स्वरूपे [illegible] [illegible] It is possible to take [illegible] as [illegible], but I prefer to take it as द्वन्द्व, thus drawing from it two ideas instead of one)

l. 15 सर्ववस्तु समस्वभावम् The स्याद्वाद — that all things partake of the common nature of [illegible] or स्याद्वाद is

the form (पर्याय) of light and assume that (पर्यायान्तर) of darkness. Thus, the particles persist as the original matter (मूलद्रव्य), that which changes being only their form (पर्याय). A mere change of form does not mean अभिव्यक्ति—मृत्तिका for example may take numberless forms such as those of a jar a storehouse, etc.; yet the मृत्तिका is recognised as the identical substance persisting through all the changes. This, says the author, is patent to the dullest man (आबालगोपालं प्रतीतत्वात्) The case of प्रदीप and तमः is not so patent; yet it is the same That transformatio is not cessation (अभिव्यक्ति) is shown here in the same way as in the theory of the सत्कार्यवादिन् (Sāṁkhya and Vedānta) which goes as far back as the Upaniṣads, fo which see inter alia Sāṁkhya Kārikā IX and Com., Sāṁkhya Sūtras I. 115–123 and Com., Brahma-Sūtras-II-1-14-18 and Śaṅkara's commentaries thereon:—

"असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसम्भवाभावात्। शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम्॥ S. Kār IX.

"यथा हि कूर्मस्याङ्गानि कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति निःसरन्ति चाविर्भवन्ति न तु कूर्मतस्तदङ्गान्युत्पद्यन्ते प्रध्वंसन्ते वा एवमेकस्या मृदः सुवर्णस्य वा घटमुकुटादयो विशेषा निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त इत्युच्यन्ते निविशमाना तिरोभवन्तो विनश्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते न पुनरसतामुत्पादः सतां वा निरोधः —S. T Kaumudī (Com on S. K.) IX

"तस्मादिदमेव कार्यस्यातीतानागतावस्थामात्रा एव वक्तव्या। घटोऽतीतो घटो वर्तमानो घटो भविष्यतीति प्रत्ययानां गुणत्वमेवेत्याद्। न चैतस्य प्राग्भावप्रध्वंसाभावविषयत्वमिति। ते ह्यतीतानागतत्वे अवस्थे घटस्य गुणस्वभावं भवत ॥ S. Pr Bh. on S. Sūtra 113.

"अयमेव हि सत्कार्यवादिनामसत्कार्यवादिभ्यो विशेषो यत् वैशेषिकादयो प्राग्भावध्वंसौ तत्त्वान्तरमिति कार्यस्यानागतातीते मन्यन्ते मोक्षेऽपि। वर्तमानत्वस्य चाभिव्यक्तत्वस्य ध्वंसप्रागभावावित्युच्यते। घटादेरस्यानागतत्वाद्यभावादिति" S. Pr Bh. on S. Sūtra 82.

Let us note here the views of the different Indian Schools regarding the relation of Cause ('material' cause in the Aristotelian sense) and Effect;

[illegible]स्तीति पर्यायार्थिकः । अपराण्यपि समस्ते विस्तरतः [illegible] । अर्थ इति पन्था- [illegible] द्रव्यमेवार्थोऽस्य [illegible] पर्यायार्थिकः [illegible] द्रव्यार्थिकः । परि [illegible] पर्यायार्थिकः । पर्याय एवार्थः [illegible] पर्यायार्थिकः । [illegible] अर्थ द्रव्यमेवार्थोऽस्य [illegible] द्रव्यार्थिकः । पर्यायोऽर्थः प्रयोजनमस्य [illegible] रिति पर्यायार्थिकः । [illegible] ॥

(1) द्रव्यास्तिक and (2) पर्यायास्तिक are slight variations of द्रव्यार्थिक and पर्यायार्थिक and they mean respectively (1) the view that द्रव्य is the fundamental reality the पर्यायविशेष being nothing apart from it, and (2) the view that पर्याय, i.e., पर्यायविशेष are the only reality the द्रव्य being nothing apart from them. In explaining द्रव्यार्थिक and पर्यायार्थिक, the writer refers to three different meanings f the word अर्थ viz., (1) Truth or Reality (2) Effect, and (3) Object or Purpose—so that the tw terms would respectively mean (1) अर्थ = तत्त्व—Reality th view that द्रव्य is the only reality गुण and कर्म (comprised under the common head of पर्याय) being mere states of द्रव्य, and the view tha पर्याय (i.e., गुण such as रूप etc. and कर्म such as उत्क्षेपण) is th only reality द्रव्य being nothing part from पर्याय. (2) अर्थ = कार्य i.e., Effect the view that द्रव्य, i.e. कारण is the अर्थ, [illegible], कार्य and the view that पर्याय is the अर्थ i.e., कार्य. (3) अर्थ = प्रयोजन object the view that द्रव्य is the object f our tho ght, language, &c. and the view that the same are directed to पर्याय

ll. 18—26 प्रदीपपर्यायापन्नास्तु etc.—Next f llows the proof that प्रदीप is t once नित्य and अनित्य. Th obvious difficulty in th way of regarding प्रदीप or तैजस as नित्य is our experience of तमः as the negation of प्रदीप or तेज The difficulty is met by the Jains by treating तमः as positive substance, kind of matter—पुद्गल—into which तैजस is t times transformed Th particles of तैजस, according to the Jaina theory assume the particula form (पर्याय) of प्रदीप, but when the oil is exhausted the o a blast of wind the particles abandon

the form (पर्याय) of light and assume that (पर्यायान्तर) of darkness. Thus, the particles persist as the original matter (पुद्गलद्रव्य), that which changes being only their form (पर्याय). A mere change of form does not mean अभिनव—मृत्तिका, for example, may take numberless forms such as those of a jar a storehouse etc.; yet the मृत्तिका is recognised as the identical substance persisting through all the changes. This, says the author is patent to the dullest man (आबालगोपालं प्रतीतत्वात्) The case of शरीर and तमः is not so patent, yet it is the same That transformation is not creation (अभिनवत्व) is shown here in the same way as in the theory of the सत्कार्यवादिन् (Sāṁkhya and Vedānta) which goes as far back as the Upaniṣads, for which see inter alia Sāṁkhya Kārikā IX and Com., Sāṁkhya Sūtra I 113–123 and Com. Brahma-Sūtras-II-1-14-18 and Sankara s commentaries thereon:—

"असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् । शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् ॥" S Kār IX.

"यथा हि कूर्मस्याङ्गानि कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति निःसरन्ति चाविर्भवन्ति न तु कूर्मतस्तदङ्गान्युत्पद्यन्ते प्रध्वंसन्ते वा एवमेकस्या मृदः सुवर्णस्य वा घटमुकुटादयो विशेषा निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त इत्युच्यन्ते निविशमानास्तिरोभवन्तो विनश्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते न पुनरसतामुत्पादः सतां वा निरोधः"—S. T Kaumudi (Com. on S. K.) IX.

तस्मादभिव्यक्त्यैव कार्यस्यातीतानागतवर्तमानावस्थाभेदा एव वक्तव्याः । घटोऽतीतो घटो वर्तमानो घटो भविष्यतीति प्रत्ययानां [illegible] । न चैवमपि [illegible] । ते [illegible] भावस्य [illegible] ॥ S. Pr Bh. on S. Sūtra 113.

"अनयैव हि सत्कार्यवादिनामसत्कार्यवादिभ्यो विशेषो यद् वैशेषिकाः [illegible] कार्यस्य [illegible] मन्यन्ते । वर्तमानताऽप्य [illegible] ॥" S. Pr Bh. on S. Sūtra 83.

Let us note here the views of the different Indian Schools regarding the relation of Cause ('material' cause in the Aristotelian sense) and Effect:

(1) According to the Sāṁkhya and the School of Vedā is which agrees with the Sāṁkhya, the Cause and the Effect are but one entity in two different states ; the Effect is not created, but is only pro-duced, that is, drawn out of the Cause. This doctrine is known as सत्कार्यवाद of. the following—

"अवस्थैव मृद्धिरण्यादेर्द्रव्यस्य संस्थानान्तरयोगमात्रेण बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादय उपपद्यन्ते यथैकस्यैव देवदत्तस्यावस्थाभेदैः बालो युवा स्थविर इति बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादयः कार्यविशेषाश्च दृश्यन्ते। [illegible] इति [illegible] परिहृतम्। [illegible] न कार्यान्तरमिति युक्तम्। [illegible] परिहृतमिति। [illegible] न विरुध्यते। [illegible] पूर्वमेव सत् उत्पद्यत इति। [illegible] न विरुध्यते। [illegible] इति चेत् [illegible] । [illegible] इति निरवद्यम् ॥" Rām. Srī Bhāṣya II. 1–15.

(2) According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Cause and the Effect are two distinct entities held together by a relation called 'समवाय'; so that, घट was non-existent before its manufacture, and will be non existent fter its destruction, enjoying existence only during the interval. This doctrine is known as असत्कार्यवाद (For the Sāṁkhya case set forth in the Kārikā bove quoted and the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and criticism thereof see Nyāyakandali,Viz. Ed. pp. 143-144.)

(3) According t the School of Vedānta led by Śaṅkara, the Effect is neithe the same as, nor distinct from the Cause; moreover it cannot be both the same as and distinct from the Cause, the two judgments being contradictory ; hence, it is concluded, the Effect is such as cannot be described adequately either as that which is the same as or distinct from the Cause—

it is अनिर्वचनीय. It is neither सत् nor असत्, either before or after its birth, it is मिथ्या. This doctrine which may be called अनिर्वचनीय-कार्यवाद is sometimes confused with or placed under सत्कार्यवाद. But in truth it is सत्कारणवाद rather than सत्कार्यवाद.

"ये हि स्वमहस्वरूपा न ते मनुष्यसत्वे यथा खपुष्पादिशेषकारकः । तथा च सर्वे विकारजातं स्वमात्मस्तु सत् । तथा हि यदस्ति तदस्त्येव यथा चिदात्मा । न सतो कदाचित् कश्चित् कथंचिदस्ति किंतु सर्वदा सर्वत्र सर्वथास्त्येव न कारि । न चैवं विकारजातम् । तस्य कदाचित् कथंचित् कुत्रचित्सत्त्वाभावात् । तथापि सत्त्वमानं चेद्विकारजातं कथं कदाचिदसत् । असत्त्वमानं चेत्कथं कदाचित् सत् । तद् तयोरेकत्वविरोधात् । न हि सर्वं कदाचित् कश्चित् कथंचित्सत्त्वो भवति । अथ तस्य तत्तत्वे यत्रों ते च त्वकारणाधीनजन्मतया कदाचिदेव भवतः तर्हि विकार जातं स्वरूपमानं सत्त्वमिति न विचार कस्यचित् । अथासत्त्वसमये तयास्ति कस्य तर्हि धर्मोऽस्त्विति । न हि धर्मिण्यसत्त्वे तद्धर्मोऽयुक्तं प्रत्युत्पद्मपपत्तेः । अथास्य च धर्म किंधर्मान्तरमसत्त्वम् । किमात्ते मायस्य । न हि घटे जाते पटस्य किंचिद्भवति । असत्त्वं भावविरोधीति चेत् । न । अनिर्वचनीयस्य तत्त्वोपपत्तेः । किंचित्कारत्वे वा तथान्यतरेण तद्रूपोपमर्दसम्भवात् । अभावस्वत्वं नाम किंचित भवते किं तु स एव न भवति । यथाहुः 'न तस्य किंचिद्भवति न भवत्येव केवलम्' इति । अनेन प्रसङ्गप्रतिषेधो विरुध्यताम् । किं तत्त्वभावो भाव एव भाव स्वभावः स इति । तत्र पूर्वस्मिन् पक्षे भावानां तत्त्वभावतया तुच्छतया अप-स्थूलत्वं प्रसज्येत । तथा च भावाभावाभाव । तदपेक्षितत्त्व सर्वभावविलक्षणा भावाभावव्यवहारः स्यात् । कारणमात्रमिदमित्यपेक्षेऽपि विवेकस्य भावविलक्षणत्वात्तस्य स्वीय । तस्मान्निर्वचनीयं कारणमिदं कार्यजातं न वस्तु सत् । अतो विकारजात-मनिर्वचनीयम् । Bhāmati on Br. S. II. 1. 14.

(4) According to the Jains, as with the S'āṅkara Vedāntin, there is partial truth in both the conflicting theories mentioned

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Das-Gupta rightly observes "Both the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya theories of causation are sometimes called *Satkārya-vāda*. But correctly speaking as some discerning commentators have pointed out, the Vedānta theory of causation should be called *Sat-kāraṇa-vāda*, for according to it the *Kāraṇa* (cause) alone exists (sat) and all *Kāryas* (effects) are illusory appearances of the Kāraṇa; but according to Sāṅkhya the Kārya exists in potential state in the Kāraṇa and is hence always existing and real.—Das-Gupta H. I. Phil. vol. I. p. 258.

in (1) and (2); but, while the Sânkara Vedântin deduces his favourite doctrine of अनिर्वचनीयत्व or मिथ्यात्व from the contradiction of being (सत्) and non-being (असत्) the Jaina records the view as partial statements of single truth, both of which he regards as equally true from different points of view. He sees no irrationality (अनिर्वचनीयत्व and मिथ्यात्व) in the so-called contradiction, and would, moreover urge that logic should be ruled by facts and not facts by logic. (So also school of Vedânta criticised by Sankara. cf. similarly "ऐकात्म्यतत्त्वं यथा घटाघटाभ्यां ... इति ...") To borrow the words of a literary critic in a different context, "the ingredients of a pudding are no more true or essential than the pudding itself when it is cooked."

On the problem of सत्कार्य or असत्कार्य consider the following passage from Prof Ward's "The Realm of Ends":—

But widely as the term 'evolution' is used, it is rarely defined; hence it is often without misgiving applied to processes that are diametrically opposed to the differentiation of unity and to the integration of plurality. The history of this term is worth a moment's consideration. We begin with the literal sense, the unrolling of a scroll or volume, whereby what lies written inside it is no longer latent but laid bare—becomes patent and evident. This as figure is then transferred to the processes of thought; and we talk of evolving or explicating whatever may be implied or involved in a concept, an argument or theory. We find it later applied with similar meaning to the supposed unfolding of an organism regarded as completely pre-existing in miniature within the germ. Such was the theory of biological evolution or preformation advocated by Leibnitz. And throughout the 18th century this was the prevalent view among biologists and philosophers alike but now it is all but superseded by the very different theory of epigenesis or new formation; for which, nevertheless, the term evolution is still retained. So different are the

two theories in fact that the earlier strictly evolutional view would—unless essentially modified—render the Darwinian doctrine of the origin of species impossible. For according to that earlier theory the germ was more than a marvellous bud-like miniature of the adult, it necessarily included in its turn the next generation and this the next—in short all future generations. Germ within germ in ever smaller miniature, after the fashion of an infinite juggler's box was the corollary logically appended to this theory of preformation. The successive unfolding of such a system of emboitement or involution, though the plus ultra of evolution, literally understood, is thus the direct negative of an evolution, as we understand it to-day. According to this latter theory each new organism is not an educt but a product to use Kantian phrases; its parts are in no sense present in the embryo but are gradually organised one after another in due order as the term epigenesis implies and as Harvey who first used the term, prophetically maintained. It is now known too that in this progressive differentiation the individual retraces the main stages through which the species has advanced as Haeckel in technical language concisely puts it: Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.

ll. 20-34. III तम [illegible]:—The author next shows how तमः may well be regarded a material substance (द्रव्य). His reasoning is that तमः being quite as visible (चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात्) as light (आलोकवत्), it is as much a material substance as the latter the only difference between the two being that one is dark and the other bright. But it may be objected that तमः is not really visible (चाक्षुष for whatever is really visible (चाक्षुष) requires light to make it so; whereas, तमः does not require it; therefore its visibility (चाक्षुषत्व) must be deemed to be only apparent. The answer made to this objection is: तमः is seen by owls without the help of light, which shows that the व्याप्ति relied upon by the Vaiśeṣika (viz., whatever is visible requires light to make it so) breaks down. No doubt we do require light to enable us to see

घट पट etc., but this is no reason why we should require it in order to see तमः. So different are the natures of things in this world that you must take the differences as they are, and have no right to obliterate them by adopting a fictitious uniformity For example, gold, pearls, etc., although all तैजस are not visible without external light; whereas lamp, the moon, etc., are visible even without the aid of other light.

l. 34. रूपवत्त्वात् etc.—Moreover तमः possesses not only a colour (dark) which makes it visible, but also tangibility (स्पर्श), viz., cool touch.

ll. 35-38. यदि अतिरिक्त etc.—The following are the grounds relied upon by the Vaiśeṣika, says the autho for holding that तमः cannot be material substance—(a) want of density (अतिनिबिडत्वात्); (b) want of resistance (अप्रतिघातित्वात्)' (c) absence of developed—distinct—tangibility(उद्भूतस्पर्शवत्त्वाभावात्); (d) absence of its being a fragment cut off like chip from a block ([illegible]). T all these, he says, he could make a simple reply: None of these conditions, viz., density resistance, tangibility and divisibility is fulfilled by light—प्रभारूप—and yet light is undeniably a material substance.

ll.38-42. न च सत्यं तैजस etc.—The dissimilarity between the तैजस particles and their product—the तमः—may be paralleled by that of वह्नि and धूम the one refulgent (भास्वरम्) and the other dark.

On the question of the nature of तमः, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, see Vaiś. Sūtras II 19-20 with Śaṅkaramiśra Upaskāra, th section on Dravya" in Tarkadīpikā with Nīlakaṇṭhī and other commentaries, similarly Nyāya-Siddhāntamuktāvalī and its commentaries, Nyāyakandalī, Viz. Ed. pp. 9 10, and Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha O. S. Ed. pp. 228-230 where the Vaiśeṣika view is discussed and established.

[illegible]री भास्वरं गिरिमन्दे इति [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible]। तथापि [illegible] तत्र इति [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] इति [illegible] । [illegible] इति

नैयायिकानां । इति चेत् तत्र द्रव्यान्तरत्वं न घटते । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । द्रव्यं चालोका-भावात्मकं पृथिव्याद्यन्यतमस्वरूपं वा । नाद्यः । पृथिव्यादीनामन्यतमस्य तस्य भावत्वे-ऽप्यभावानुभवत्वानुपपत्तेः । न द्वितीयः । निर्गुणस्य तस्य द्रव्यत्वासंभवेन द्रव्या-न्तरत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वासंभवात् । ननु तमसः स्वावयवैरारब्धत्वमस्त्येव तम कथं निर्गुण-त्वमिति चेत् तदसारम् । गन्धादिस्पर्शस्य नीलरूपस्य तस्मिन्नभावे निराधारत्वे । कथं नीलं तम इति प्रतीतिः कथमिति चेत् नीलं तम इति भ्रान्तिरेवेत्यर्थं एव नीलता । अत एव आरोपितरूपं तमः । अविद्यमानमपि रूपमन्यत्रारोप्यते इत्यारोपसंभवात् । आलोकाभावस्य तथाविधस्य कथं रूपारोपे सामर्थ्यं संभवति । न चासमवायि-प्रत्ययः । ताद्रूप्येण सामान्यप्रतीतिसंभवात् । अत एव नालोकाद्यभावस्य । अभावस्य प्रतियोगिग्राहकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वनियमेन मानसत्वानुपपत्तेः । तस्मादालोकाभाव एव तमः । न च निमित्तं प्रत्येकमालोकाभावयोग इति सांप्रतम् । प्रत्यभिज्ञानादि-सामग्र्यादिप्रत्ययनियमात् । न चाभावे भावधर्माध्यारोपो दुरुपपादः । दुःखाभावे सुखत्वारोपस्य संयोगाभावे विभागत्वाभिमानस्य च दर्शनात् । न चालोकाभावस्य प्रतियोगिग्रहणसापेक्षत्वेनालोकसापेक्षचक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । यद्यपि तदपेक्षं चक्षुस्तद्भावप्रत्ययेऽपि तदपेक्षत इति न्यायेनालोकापेक्षाया आलोकसंसर्गा-भावस्य तद्ग्रहणादपि तदपेक्षाया अभावात् । न चाधिकरणग्रहणसंभवः । अभाव-प्रतीतावधिकरणग्रहणस्यानुपयोगात् । अन्यथा निशि न कोऽत्र इति कथं प्रत्ययः स्यादिति अप्रमाणमिदं परवचनम् । तत्सर्वमभिप्रेत्य भगवान् कणादः प्रणिनाय सूत्रं—द्रव्यगुणकर्मनिष्पत्तिवैधर्म्यादभावस्तमः (क. सू. ५२।१९) इति"

Contra, Srî-Bhâsya Chatus-Sûtrî Mad. Ed. p 77 "आलोकाभावमात्रं वा रूपदर्शनाभावमात्रं वा तमो न द्रव्यान्तरम् । मन्दर्श चाल-क्षणासत्ताचे निरूपणतोऽप्यत इति चेत् उच्यते । बहुलत्वविरलत्वादवस्थायोगेन रूपवत्तया चोपलब्धेर्द्रव्यान्तरमेव तम इति निरवद्यम् । cf. "तमः खलु चलं नीलं परापरविभागवत् । प्रसिद्धद्रव्यवैधर्म्यान्नवभ्यो भेत्तुमर्हति" and for a brief statement of the whole controversy the following interesting stanza

"तमो द्रव्यं नैयायिकमतमिति भाट्टे प्रभाकरे प्रदीपे रूपि स्यात् तिमिरं न भवेत् स्वार्थकगुणः । इतीमं सन्धं किमपि निजमन्यन्मतमिदं तयोर्द्रव्यं यदि कथमपि विपरीततया ॥"

143 यद्यपि निर्वाणात् प्राक् &c.—This is another sense in which दीप is both नित्य and अनित्य and it does not militate against our common belief as does the former: a दीप (i. e., the flame) is undergoing numberless changes and yet it retains its identity thus proving itself both नित्य and अनित्य.

IV ll. 46–55. एवं व्योमापि । तस्मात्सर्वमप्येतस्मात् नित्यानित्यमेव—Having shown that दीप is both नित्य and अनित्य the author next proceeds to show the same in the case of व्योम—with this difference that in the former case the difficulty to be met was about नित्यत्व in the latter it is about अनित्यत्व. उत्पाद and व्यय account for अनित्यत्व ध्रौव्य for नित्यत्व

अवगाहलक्षणं etc.—Compare आकाशस्यावगाहः [उपकारः]. T Sūtra Adh. V Sū. 18. अवगाहो [illegible] हेतुरित्यवगाहलक्षणम् cf. the com. of भावविजयगणि　Uttarā-Sūtra xxviii, 9

"अवगाहिनां धर्मास्तिकायादीनां [illegible] । [illegible] । न [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] व तत्र न [illegible] [illegible]? । [illegible] । न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] । ततो [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible]. Gunaratna Com. on Haribhadra's Ṣaḍdarśana p. 172.

When souls and material objects (जीवपुद्गल) which occupy space travel from one point of space to another they become separated from one portion of आकाश and get united with another portion of आकाश. These separation and union being contradictory dharmas must belong to two different dharmins, according to the rule "अयमेव हि भेदो etc.—" What constitutes or causes भेद (difference) is the possession of two contradictory predicates or difference of causes, volitionally or spontaneously (to स्वीयमतो नि(स्र)सा वा—I would prefer to read प्रयोगतो विस्रसातो वा, स्वीयमतो being wrongly substituted for प्रयोग owing to the former word occurring several times in the same passage. प्रयोग and विस्रसा are technical terms of Jaina psychology for which see Bāj. Vā on T Sūtra, 225

"द्रव्यस्य [illegible] प्रयोगविस्रसालक्षणो विकारः परिणामः"—तत्र प्रयोग [illegible] विस्रसा—[illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] ।

i. e., those things must be regarded as distinct which possess contradictory predicates (विरुद्धधर्माध्यास) or spring from different causes (कारणभेद). आत्मा comes under the first part of the rule, and is thus shown to be two—one that is destroyed and the other that is produced the former being the one from which the previous कुशल is destroyed, and the latter being the one with which a new कुशल is produced; and yet, in another way both the आत्माs are one. Thus आत्मा may be shown to be both नित्य and अनित्य

ll. 55-60. तथा च तत्त्वार्थसूत्र etc.—It will be observed that the नित्यत्व above set forth is नित्यत्व *in the midst of change* a conception of नित्यत्व which requires t be justified against that *false conception of नित्यत्व which makes it consist in changelessness.* The Jaina accordingly defines नित्यत्व as तद्भावाव्ययं नित्यम् (T Sûtra V 30) which is thus explained in the Râj V a d its commentary: प्रत्यभिज्ञानहेतुता तद्भावः । तदेवेदमिति स्मरणं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं तदकस्मान्न भवति इति योऽस्य हेतुः स तद्भावः । भवनं भावः । येनात्मना प्राग्दृष्टं वस्तु तेनैवात्मना पुनरपि भावात् तदेवेदमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायते । यद्यत्यन्त-निरोधोऽभिनवप्रादुर्भावमात्रमेव स्यात् ततः स्मरणानुपपत्तेः तदधीनो लोकसंव्यवहारो विरुध्यते । ततस्तद्भावेनाव्ययं नित्यमिति निश्चीयते । In the same manner our author says here: "...स्वपक्षव्याप्त्यासत्त्वानुगमस्वावीनात्म्यपरयोरैकात्म्यादि करणत्वम् ।—तत्राविनाशो तद्भावेऽपि तद्भावात्मविरूपाश्रयेति अनित्यमिति तदेव तत्त्वम्" and his reason for the rejection of नित्यत्व as changelessness is that it will leave उत्पाद and व्यय without a basis (that to which they should cling, in which they should rest, as predicates) od thus make them impossible (इति हि अप्रच्युतानुत्पन्नस्थिरैकरूपं नित्यमित्यस्मिन् पक्षे उत्पादव्ययावसम्भवौ). On the general line of argument which deduces नित्यत्व from प्रत्यभिज्ञा or अर्थक्रिया compare S'ankara s Com. on Br Sûtra II ii-?6 Thus there would seem to be three different vi ws on the subject. *1st*, that of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, according to whom nothing is नित्य which is not absolut ly changeless, and such re according to them आकाश परमाणु &c. *2nd*, that of the *Vedântins* who distinguish between two kinds of नित्यत्व—one relative, which they call अपरिणामि or परिणामि o नित्यत्व such as belongs to आत्मा in all its changes (e. g. मृत्तिका in घट शराव etc.) and which they base on

IV ll 45–55. एवं व्योमापि । उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मकत्वात् नित्यानित्यमेव—Having shown that दीप is both नित्य and अनित्य the author next proceeds to show the same in the case of व्योम—with this difference that in the former case the difficulty to be met was about नित्यत्व in the latter it is about अनित्यत्व उत्पाद and व्यय account for अनित्यत्व ध्रौव्य for नित्यत्व

अवगाहकानां etc.—Compar आकाशस्यावगाहः [उपकारः]. T Sūtra Adh. V Sū. 18. उपग्रहो निमित्तमपेक्षाकारणं हेतुरित्यनर्थान्तरम् cf. the com. of भावविजयगणि on Uttarā-Sūtra xxviii, 9

" अवगाहिनां धर्मास्तिकायादीनामवकाशदानेनोपकारित्वादाकाशमुच्यते । अव-काशदानमिदं चोपग्रहोऽनुग्रहः । स चावगाहोऽन्यत्राप्युपलभ्यते । अवगाहिनाम् अवगाहपरिणामसंनिधानेन ... । ... ... ? । ... ...

kim ... ... । तत्समेतम् । ततो ... ...

rather characteristic ... ... । ...

not only consistent with ध्रौव्य ... ... Com. on Haribhadra s

on and thus become impossibl in the ...

alleged inconsistency of उत्पाद and व्यय on the one hand and ध्रौव्य on the other is thus dealt with in the RAJ.V and its Com. which takes up the specific question f the नित्यत्व or otherwise f विरुद्ध nd answers it in the spirit of स्याद्वाद —

विरोध इति चेन्नाभिन्नरूपत्वात् (RAJ.V)। ... विरोध न ... ... इति विरोध ... । किं कारणम् ? । ... । यदि ... ... नित्यता ... ... । ... । न तु ... ...

एवं पर्यायविमुक्तं etc. cf "दव्वं पज्जवविउयं दव्वविउत्ता य पज्जवा नत्थि —सम्मति० I 12.

ll 64–74. यौगिकवाक्येऽपि घटाकाशपटाकाश etc—Another way in which आकाश may be shown to be नित्यानित्य is this When घट is gone and पट takes its place, घटाकाश is replaced by पटाकाश; thus, one आकाश is destroyed and nothe is produced. It may be bjected that this is mere 'व्यवहार' that is to say आकाश is not lly produced or destroyed, but by transference of predicates it is said to be produced or destroyed according to the production or destruction of घट, पट etc., which condition

i. e., those things must be regarded as distinct which possess contradictory predicates (विरुद्धधर्माध्यास:) or spring from different causes (कारणभेद:). आत्मा comes under the first part of the rule, and is thus shown to be two—one th t is destroyed and the other that is produced the former being the one from which the previous दैवेश is destroyed and the latter being the one with which a new दैवेश is produced; and yet, in another way both the आत्मा are one. Thus आत्मा may be shown to be both नित्य and अनित्य

ll. 55-60. तथा च तत्त्वार्थसूत्र etc.—It will be observed that the नित्यत्व above set forth is नित्यत्व *in the midst of change* a conception of नित्यत्व which requires to be justified against that false conception of नित्यत्व which makes it consist in *changelessness*. The Jains accordingly defines नित्यत्व as तद्भावाव्ययं नित्यम (T Sûtra V 30) which is thus explained in th भा V —ll, for commentary "यत्सतोभावान्नव्येति न व्येष्यति तन्नित्यम्" particulars of आत्मा तदभावास्मयति इति योजना etc. न न्यायेन

[illegible] etc.—The author proceeds to show how even amongst the Brahmanical schools the Yogins hold the doctrine of नित्यानित्य

सार्वतुका—The followers of सर्वतु or हिरण्यगर्भ one of the ancient teachers of Yoga philosophy mentioned in the Mahâbhârata, and according to a certain interpretation of the passage, in the S'vetâsvatara Upanişad also. The other names of the same group are कपिल आसुरि, and पञ्चशिख Whether हिरण्यगर्भ was a historical o a mythical teacher must remain doubtful. हिरण्यगर्भ of the Ṛgveda Saṃhitâ is beyond doubt the God f mon theism from which has sprung this luminous universe; and probably the कपिल and हिरण्यगर्भ of the S'vetâsvatara Upanişad are used in the same sense, although the word ऋषि used in connection with them gives plausibility to their historical character But long before the time of Gautama Buddha कपिल had become historical, that is, some teacher had come to be invested with the ancient name And simila must have been the case with हिरण्यगर्भ

ll. 76-85. त्रिविध उच्यते धर्मिणः परिणामो etc.—According to the Yogins (See Pāt. Yoga Sūtras and Vyāsa Bhāṣya -III 13), says the author a धर्मिन् (substance possessed of धर्म, as every substance is) undergoes परिणाम or modification of three kinds (1) धर्म (2) लक्षण and (3) अवस्था—which he thus illustrates: (1) When th substance—gold—is made into ornaments, the ornaments are the धर्मपरिणाम of gold. (2) The धर्म, again, of gold viz., the ornaments may be changed from one shape to another when present shape becomes past and future shape becomes present. This is called 'लक्षण परिणाम (अनागतोऽध्वेति लक्षणं कालभेदः । तेन हि लक्षितं वस्तु वर्तमानादेः कालान्तरयुक्तेभ्यो व्यवच्छिद्यते—Vācaspati Miśra.) (3) Or a certain shape may become old by sheer lapse of time. This is called अवस्थापरिणाम All the three kinds of परिणाम belong to one and the same धर्मिन् (सोऽयं त्रिविधः परिणामो धर्मिणः). [But how would yo reconcil this remark with another just few lines here viz., 'धर्मस्य तु लक्षणपरिणामोऽप्यस्ति' ? I suppose by referring the लक्षणपरिणाम through the धर्म to the धर्मिन्]. And they are supposed to be at once distinct from and identical with the धर्मिन् (धर्मलक्षणावस्थाः धर्मिणो भिन्नाभिन्नाः) Now f they are identical with the धर्मिन् the धर्मिन् being नित्य (persistent or biding reality) the परिणामs too are नित्य; and if they are distinct from the धर्मिन् they are subject to उत्पाद and विनाश and are therefo अनित्य Thus they are both नित्य and अनित्य

cf तथेदमुदाहरणम् । मृद्धर्मी पिण्डाकाराद्धर्माद्धर्मान्तरमुपसम्पद्यमानो धर्मतः परिणमते घटाकार इति । घटाकारोऽनागतं लक्षणं हित्वा वर्तमानलक्षणं प्रतिपद्यत इति लक्षणतः परिणमते । घटो नवपुराणतां प्रतिक्षणमनुभवन्नवस्थापरिणामं प्रतिपद्यत इति । धर्मिणोऽपि धर्मान्तरमवस्था धर्मस्यापि लक्षणान्तरमवस्थेत्येक एव द्रव्यपरिणामो भेदेनोपदर्शित इति ।... त एते धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा धर्मिस्वरूपमनतिक्रान्ता इत्येक एव परिणामः सर्वानमून् विशेषानभिप्लवते । cf also न धर्मी त्र्यध्वा । धर्मास्तु त्र्यध्वानः । ते लक्षिता अलक्षिताः । तत्र लक्षितास्तां तामवस्थां प्राप्नुवन्तोऽन्यत्वेन प्रतिनिर्दिश्यन्तेऽवस्थान्तरतो न द्रव्यान्तरतः । यथैका रेखा शतस्थाने शतं दशस्थाने दशैका चैकस्थाने यथा चैकत्वेऽपि स्त्री माता चोच्यते दुहिता च स्वसा चेति (Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Pāt. Sūtra III 13.)

ll. 86–92. सर्वात्पायें निश्चित्ते etc.—All पदार्थ are equally characterised by उत्पाद, व्यय and ध्रौव्य; and, therefore, it is wrong to draw a line of distinction between things and things and say that certain things are absolutely नित्य and नित्य only e g., आकाश आत्मा etc., while certain others are absolutely अनित्य and अनित्य only e.g घट पट etc.

l 89 अवस्तथ्यवस्तु etc.—Compare—दीपोत्पाद्यमीप्सुकं ...... । ...... वस्तु ...... स येन .... । ...... । Laghu-Vrtti on the Ṣad.

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ll. 93–96. अत्र च प्रथमार्धे etc.—This is too ingenious. Mallis'eṇa says that in the first line we had दीप and व्योम—the first supposed to be अनित्य and the latter नित्य; but in the second half the order is reversed, नित्य being mentioned first and अनित्य afterwards. This यथासंख्यपरिहार—abandonment of the order—is suggestive of the view that after all there is no such thing as fixed or absolute नित्य and अनित्य and so they may very well change places!

ll. 96– प्रशस्तपादोऽपि etc.—The author has shown above that the Yoga doctrine of परिणाम and their relation to the अनित्य is a virtual admission of the नित्यानित्य doctrine, that is, of the अनेकान्तवाद of the Jainas. Next he proceeds to show how the 'प्रशस्त पादेन s'—the Vais'eṣikas whose system is being discussed—— hold a doctrine which is a virtual admission of the नित्यानित्यवाद. Thus 'प्रशस्तपाद'—Pras'astapâda, the Bhâṣyakâra of the Vais'eṣika Sûtras, says, पृथ्वी is of two kinds, नित्य and अनित्य; that consisting of atoms is नित्य that consisting of effects is अनित्य. Obviously it may be argued this is not an admission that पृथ्वी—the identical पृथ्वी—is at once नित्य and अनित्य but all that is said is that some varieties of पृथ्वी (पार्थिव atoms) are नित्य while others (कार्य) are अनित्य. The statements of नित्यत्व and अनित्यत्व thus refer to two separate अधिकरणs (भिन्नाधिकरणं नित्यानित्यत्वम्). That is to say नित्यत्व and अनित्यत्व are here predicated of two separate

subjects. But this defence is futile. For पृथक्त्व belongs to all the varieties, to नित्य as well as to अनित्य पृथ्वी and is 'एकाधिकरण' both with नित्यत्व and अनित्यत्व; in other words, नित्यत्व and अनित्यत्व are both predicated of पृथ्वी. So also are they predicated of जल. Then again, there is a tacit admission of अनित्यत्व about आकाश inasmuch as संयोग and विभाग are predicated of it.

ll. 102–105. तथा च स एवाह । etc.—शब्दकारणत्ववचनात् संयोगविभागाविति—Pra. Bhāṣya in the section on आकाश p. 58. Viz. Edn. The passage is thus explained in the Nyāyakandalī "संयोगाद्विभागात् शब्दाच्च शब्दस्य निष्पत्तिरिति सुप्रतीतम् ... संयोगविभागौ ... (ibid p. 58). Of the three ways in which शब्द is produced two re by means of संयोग and विभाग. संयोग and विभाग being the the असमवायिकारणत्व of शब्द, they hav the same अधिकरण as शब्द, and that is आकाश. आकाश being thus bown to possess संयोग and विभाग it becomes subject to उत्पाद and व्यय; in other words, it is अनित्य (see above). Now from its पदार्थधर्मसंग्रह it is already known to be नित्य. Therefore it is नित्यानित्य. The नित्यानित्यत्व of आकाश had already been shown here. But the same is shown once more here as a doctrine which is denied and yet virtually admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas in some of their tenets—thus betraying incoherent talk. (l. 105)

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ll. 105–142. [illegible] च to —The author now takes up the question of नित्यानित्यत्व—in its gene al form—i. e., without any such particular application as that to दीप or व्योम as was done here, and points out the innumerable contradictions and impossible positions to which the doctrine of absolute नित्यत्व or अनित्यत्व leads us.

For example, real thing is defined as that which does something. N w let us see how the doctrine of absolute नित्यत्व or अनित्यत्व will fit in with this. A नित्य thing is one which has

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The whole paragraph of the text is taken almost verbatim from Hemacandra's commentary on his own प्रमाणमीमांसा— 1-1. 31.

neither beginning nor end but only persistent existence (अप्रच्युतानुत्पन्नस्थिरैकरूप). Now if it is a reality it must *do* something, as required by the definition of reality; and that either *at once* or *gradually* for no third alternative is possible according to the law of the excluded middle (अन्योन्यव्यवच्छेदरूपाणां प्रकारान्तरासंभवात्). Of the two, the latter that is, *gradual* activity is impossible in the present case, for there is nothing to delay the action of the स्थिर thing and prevent its doing its work *at once* (समर्थस्य क्षेपायोगात्) unless the thing is lacking in the required energy or competency It may be argued that the thing possesses the *capacity* to do a certain work but it needs an auxiliary agent to turn that capacity into actuality But that is virtually admitting that the thing is so far l cking in the required competency (सापेक्षमसमर्थम्-इति न्यायात्); for what depends upon others is pro tanto lacking in its own strength. It may be answered that it is not the स्थिर thing that needs an auxiliary in order to produce an effect, but it is the effect itself which needs it in order to come into being (न तेन सहकारिणोऽपेक्ष्यन्ते अपि तु कार्यमेव सहकारिष्वसत्सु अभवत् तानपेक्षते). But this is only trying to evade the difficulty we want a straight answer to this question—Is the thing competent or incompetent? If it is competent, why should it weakly and imploringly look at the face of the auxiliary and not produce the effect *at once*? You will perhaps say that a seed though perfectly competent to put forth a sprout does so actually only when accompanied by earth, water etc., and not otherwise. This statement, however will not stand the test of the following dilemma: Do those companions render any assistance to the principal cause or not? If they do not, the cause (the स्थिर thing of our hypothesis) has no more reason to be active after than it had before the advent of those companions. If they do, we ask the question: Is the assistance (उपकार) thus rendered by the companions to the स्थिर thing identical with the स्थिर thing or is it different? If it (उपकार) is identical with the स्थिर thing, it vitiates the very स्थिरत्व of the thing and turns it into something क्षणिक it being itself something produced by those auxiliaries. (भवेत् स

एव क्रियते इति नामयिभ्यो बृहस्पतितत्ता । इत्यक्तेव तत्समितिवातवो) If, on the other hand, it (उपकार) is different from the स्थिर thing itself, how can it affect the स्थिर thing at all, any more than the Sahya mountain can affect the Vindhya mountain? (This is only an example to illustrate two disconnected things which have no influence upon each other) It may be argued that the assistance (उपकार) is neither identical with the thing to which it is rendered, nor is it separate from it, but it *belongs* to it (तदीयत्वात् तस्य). To this argument we reply by a question What is the relation between the thing assisted (उपकार्य—the स्थिर thing f our hypothesis) and the assistance itself (उपकार)? It cannot be संयोग for संयोग exists only between two द्रव्य, whereas in the present case the thing assisted (उपकार्य) is द्रव्य nd the assistance itself (उपकार) is क्रिया Nor can the relation be समवाय for समवाय is one nd all-pervading and therefore it cannot be connected with any particular correlates (i.e., these, rather than those), all the correlates being equally far from or equally near to the समवाय (समवायस्ति-नियम्यं प्रत्येव तत्र सम्बन्धात् नियते संनिधिर् संबन्धो युक्तः). If you hold that the समवाय is connected with particula correlates, it means that those correlates influence (उपकार) the समवाय i a certain manner—in which case the old difficulties (see bove) about the influence (उपकार), whether regarded as identical with or different from the समवाय recur thus, if the उपकार is ne with the समवाय it is nothing more tha the समवाय if it is distinct from the समवाय, the समवाय fails to be the relation of any particular correlate. Therefore nothing that is absol tely स्थिर can *gradually do* something and th fulfil the d finition of Reality Now to tak the ther alternative, viz the alternati e f the स्थिर thing doing t work all *at once* The bjection to it is that nothing is ever know to be doing all its work at ingle stroke S ppos g it does, what will remai for it to d in th next moment? Supposing gain, that there does remain some wo k to do then the position is the same as the one abo considered, viz., that of grad l action, of which it is only an alias. Supposing, however that it has no work to do

in the succeeding moment, it fails to fulfil the definition of Reality and is therefore nothing Thus, both the alternative hypotheses of gradual or successive action and simultaneous action failing in the case of an absolutely स्थिर thing, the activity with which they are concomitant also fails, and with the fall re of activity comes non-existence or nothingness. Thus collapses the alternative of absolute स्थिरत्व

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ll. 143-173. Turn we now to the other alternative, viz., that of absolute क्षणिकत्व An क्षणिक-thing is one which perishes every moment. Such a thing cannot do any kind of work *successively* (क्रमेण); for in its case no succession either of time or of space is possible Thus—Succession means the relation of before and after which is impossible in the case of that which has absolutely momentary existence. Only a thing that abides can cover several points of space nd time. But the thing which perishes every moment cannot do so. How things fare under the absolute-क्षणिकत्व-hypothesis is thus described in a verse "यो यत्रैव स तत्रैव यो यदैव तदैव सः । न देशकालयोर्व्याप्तिर्भावानामिह विद्यते" —i. e., Things occupy only a certain point of space or time, they do not cove ny length of space or time. It may be urged that things no doubt perish in a moment and so do not admit of succession (क्रम), but they *form* a संतान, i. e., a continuous series which does not so perish nd which consequently makes succession possibl B t this assumption will not mend matters. For there is no such real ty as continuous series Supposing there is such a real series, if the series is momentary the position is th same as before, that is, the objection in the case of the single members mentioned above applies to the series as well. If, on the other hand, the series be supposed to be capable of persistence in time the doctrine of momentariness (क्षणभङ्गवाद) vanishes. Nor can an absolutely क्षणिक thing (as supposed by the hypothesis) i. e. that which is only momentary(क्षणिक), do all ts work *at once* (युगपद्). The dilemma with which the advocate of absolute क्षणिकत्व—the

Buddhist—is confronted is this: When a single स्वभाव [the Buddhist is so obsessed by the idea of क्षणिकत्व that he calls things 'क्षण'] when fruit, for example, simultaneously gives rise to numerous effects such as रसरूप etc., does it do so by virtue of single nature or of many natures (एकेन स्वभावेन अनेकस्वभावैर्वा)? In the former case, there could be no diversity of effects among रस etc since they all arise from a single—uniform—nature. In the latter case i. e., if it produced रस etc., as उपादान (the stuff of whi h the effect is made), and रस etc., as सहकारि (auxiliaries), we would ask whether the many natures (which, by hypothesis, belong to the thing) were the thing itself or otherwise? In the latter case, they could not be *natures* (अस्वभावभूतत्वात् स्वभावत्वहानिः). In th former case, the thing itself would have to be regarded as many (स्वभावभूतत्वात्तेषां भावानेकत्वम्), or the natures would have to be regarded as one (स्वभावानां वा एकत्वं प्रसज्येत—तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् तेषां तत्त्व वैकल्यात्). It may be argued that there is no plurality of natures in thing, the thing acting as उपादान in one place and सहकारि in another But this will mean that the thing which is नित्य and एकरूप (persistent and possessed of singl nature, uniform), successively produces many effects—an admission of plurality f natures and variety of effects (स्वभावभेदः कार्यभेदश्च) If you bject. How can that which is नित्य and एकरूप (unif rm) and therefore अक्रम (acting at once and not by successive steps) give rise to effects which are नाना (various) and क्रमिक (arising in successio) W retort. If from one singl partless क्षणिकरूप acti g cause th re can spring—as yo hold—at singl flash without succession, numerous effects requiring umerous causes, why can not a नित्य thing produce successively variety of effects? That is to say th novelty if any und one supposition is the same as under the other Therefore, thing which is absolutely अनित्य i. e., क्षणिक, fails to show itself to be reality by doing something *at once* without succession of steps (तस्मात् क्षणिकस्यापि भावस्याक्रमेणार्थक्रिया दुर्घटा) Thus, both the alternatives of क्रम and अक्रम failing, the अर्थक्रिया

which they cover also fails, and with the failure of अर्थक्रिया goes the failure of existence. Thus collapses the doctrine of absolute अनित्यत्व of which the Buddhist is a special advocate.

cf. "अर्थक्रिया न युज्येत नित्यक्षणिकपक्षयोः। क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां भावानां सा लक्षणतया मता॥" Quoted in Hem.'s Com. on मीमांसा ११११

It is interesting to read, however the following remark made by a Jaina writer "अनेन च लक्षणेन वैशेषिकादिपरिकल्पिता प्रमाणेन सत्त्वं योगसिद्धमिति अर्थक्रियालक्षणं सत्त्वं हि अपि प्रतिक्षिप्ते वेदितव्यम्" (Guna. Com on Ṣaḍ. St. 5) where the अर्थक्रिया is mentioned as the Buddhistic definition of Reality

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ll. 174-180 स्यादेतत् तु पूर्वोत्तराकार etc.—Now the author shows how things, under the Syād āda hypothesis, can act, while they possess the threefold characteristics of the bandonment of previous form acceptance of a new form and retention of its own identity The only possible objection to it is that it involves the attribution of contradictory characteristics to one and the same thing B t the objection can be easily met by an appeal to experience—which f vours the view that things are multiform in characte and so the only doctrine which tallies with experience and therefore with truth is that things are neither exclusively नित्य nor अनित्य but are in reality both—like the Nara-S mha (Man-Lion) of mythology "न नरः सिंहरूपत्वात् न सिंहो नररूपतः (भागे सिंहो नरो भागे योऽर्थो भागद्वयात्मकः तमभागं विभागेन नरसिंहं प्रचक्षते).

ll. 181 183. वैशेषिकैरपि etc.—The Vaiseṣikas too, hold doctrines which can be easily shown to savour of Syādvāda—though they would not like to admit it. Thus for exampl they recognise चित्ररूप (which really amounts to contradictory रूप) in a single body or substance, one and the same substance is described as moving or stationary; one and the same object—a घट for example is supposed to be both red and not-red (the former when it is hot, the latter when it is not so), covered and open etc.

cf. एकमेव चित्रपटोत्पत्तिमिते वर्णे [illegible] न च विरोध-मायाहते । तदुक्तं धर्मकीर्तिना । [illegible] चेत् । तथा च भावानुभवात् । एक चेत्कथं चित्रं [illegible] स्यात् । इति को विरोध इत्यादि । Gom Com on Sad. 57

बौद्धैरपि etc.—The Buddhists, similarly find no contradiction in seeing नील and अ-नील in one and the same विषय Note that they d not attribute qualities to substances, for they recognise no external reality but only see certain elements in particular lies—नील and अनील, for example, in the idea or concept of पट

ll. 164–168. अत्र च सत्यत्विरुद्धत्वापिता etc.—The author finds it necess y to hav ve that so far as सृष्टि is concerned the Vaiśeṣika unlike the B ddhist does not regard it as क्षणिक (momentary) but only अनित्य (that which has beginning and an end, not necessarily the short duration of single moment of time) but even he regards वृद्धि, सुख etc as क्षणिक just like the Buddhist and so th questio of क्षणिकत्व is not irrelevantly introduced whil dealing with the tenets f the Vaiśeṣikas. Remember that S'ankara has called the Vaiśeṣikas on this account, अर्धवैनाशिकाः i. e., semi B ddhists. For the क्षणिकत्व of बुद्धि, सुख etc in th Vaiśeṣika system, see Nyāya Muktāvali nd Com. thereon, Bh. P Stanza 27

l. 158. क्षणिकं च कालान्तरस्थायि etc.—The V iśeṣika confines क्षणिकत्व t बुद्धि सुख etc—but many thing he regards as having certain *duration* in time which is *limited*. Now if yo put the less of duration, i e., persistence i time, and limited ness in time together t will mean the same thing as नित्यानित्यत्व

l 169 क्षणोऽपि न तत्र कोऽपि etc.—There is not moment of tim when thing does not partak of the three-fold character of उत्पाद, व्यय nd ध्रौव्य (see bove).

Stanza VI

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The doctrine next criticised is :—

Stanza VI—(1) There is some maker of the world; (2) He is one; (3) He is everywhere [(3a) He knows everything] (4) He is self-dependent; (5) He is eternal.

Criticism —

L ll. 5-6 जगतः सत्कर्तृकं etc.—क्षितिः = [illegible] [illegible] etc.—A syll gism to prove the existence of God. The major premiss on which it rests is यत् यत् तत्सर्वं बुद्धिमत्कर्तृकं यथा घटः—

Everything that is *made* requires an intelligent m ker—e.g a jar etc; the Earth etc. are things made; therefore (कार्यत्वात्) they have an intelligent maker whom we call Is vara or God.

ll 9 न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः etc.—Here the minor premiss is not "unproven." For it can be easily shown to be true by *mean* of the following rgument:—The Earth etc. are thi gs made because they spri g from defi ite causes ([illegible]), *also because, they are bodies possessed of parts* (अवयवित्वात्).

ll. 10-11. नाप्यनैकान्तिको विरुद्धो वा—No is the *hetu* (कार्यत्वात्) i the theistic syllogism either "inconclusive" or "hostile" For it fully satisfies the condition नियतान्वयव्यतिरेकि the violation of which nvolves the fallacies of inconclusive and "hostile" *hetus*. If there be a ingle case in which the हेतु exists without the साध्य the हेतु is inconclusive (अनैकान्तिक) if the हेतु exists lways without the साध्य it is distinctly hostile ('विरुद्ध'). But in the present case, the हेतु is one which is *never* fo nd where the साध्य i not f und (नियतान्वयव्यतिरेकि) and is, there ore, goo l हेतु ([illegible]).

ll. 11 12 नापि कालात्ययापदिष्टः etc.—Nor is the हेतु "precluded" (बाधित) by प्रत्यक्ष आगम o [illegible] having closed the question t the contrary [illegible]—*i.e.* stated as a हेतु after the statement of the पक्ष (धर्मिन्) and the साध्य (धर्म).

ll. 13. यदि प्रवन्दस्य etc. There is no rival हेतु or अनुमान to prove the apposition. The foll wing may be plausibly dvanced as such an अनुमान but it will fail

God could not be the maker of the W ld—the Earth, etc., because he would be wanting in physical body to accomplish the task he being like emancipated souls (मिर्मुक्तात्मवत्) whom no ne supposes to be world-makers.

This syllogism may be subjected to the following criticism.

Is God—the subject f the proposition to be proved—*known* or *unknown*? If *unknown* the argument involves the fallacy of आश्रयासिद्ध (हेतु affirmed of subject—पक्ष—which is fictitious). If *known*, there is no reason to think that he is lacking in body and is therefore, incapable of making the world If a body is required f the task, h may be s pposed to have got it, by what is called धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाण, that is to say the प्रमाण which proves धर्मिन् may be supposed to prove also the धर्म that are equired in th धर्मिन् [Example: If you assume the existence of substance called eith to explain the phenomen of light, that substance may be supposed, by the sam hypothesis, to possess all those properties that are required to make the phenomeno possible]

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ll 20 (2) न चैक इति to.—*God is one.* If there were many gods, e., many masters f the world, the world would be throw into confusion by the conflict of discordant wills a d the ve y purpose for which we had resorted to the hypothesis of divine maker viz to explain the harmony and ord of the Univers would thereby be defeated.

ll 24-29. (3a) तथा न सर्वग इति etc — सर्वग = *Omnipresent*; bec use his activit is wanted ev ywhere. Or (3b) सर्वज्ञ = *omniscient* because intelligent making requires thought o wisdom.

ll. 30 35 (4) तथा स्ववशः—G d is *self*-dependent. ईश्वरप्रेरितो etc.—Originally found in the Mahābhārata, *Vana-parva* It has has been subsequently reproduced in many wo ks both of Jaina and Brāhmaṇa literature. It means Impelled by

God a soul moves to heaven or to hell. No other person is master of his सुख and दुःख. *Self*-dependence is implied in the very notion of one who is the Lord of all.

ll. 36 (5) तथा स नित्य etc.—He is eternal. A created God is a contradiction in terms. This may be shown by a simple question: Is the Creater of God eternal or not? If he is, why not so God himself? If not, he will have to be supposed to be a creature created by another and he by another and so on *ad infinitum*.

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l. 45. इमाः एताः etc.—कुहेवाकविडम्बनाः :—ridiculous and false doctrines.

ll. 64. सत्येऽपि etc.—The master preaches his doctrine to all, yet all do not benefit by it, because there are some whose minds are so bedimmed by passions that they cannot receive the light of his teaching. It is their fault, not his. कारणवत्ति कार्योत्पत्ति—See Kād. Nir ed. p. 196. कौशिक-owl.

ll. 67—सदा कौशिककुलेन etc.—Oh friend of the World! Despite your possessing faultless skill in sowing seeds of the right Dharma, even you have had your barren lands. It is not surprising. To birds of darkness (owls) the rays of the sun are as white (ironical black) as the feet of bees!

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ll. 73 ff. अत्र वयमिदं etc.—Here begins detailed criticism of the theistic syllogism—क्षित्यादयो बुद्धिमत्कर्तृकाः कार्यत्वात् घटवत्.

I. The first objection is that here the व्याप्ति (major premise) is not known to be sound (व्याप्तेरग्रहणात्). All are agreed that a साधन (हेतु) leads to the inference of साध्य when the व्याप्ति (i. e. its invariable concomitance with the साध्य) is established by प्रमाण. But we are going to show that such व्याप्ति is impossible in the present case.

ll. 5—स सर्वं शरीरी सृजन् etc.—Here is a dilemma. Is God (1) possessed of a body or (2) not—when making these worlds? If he is possessed of a body we should like to know

whether the body is (1,a) *visible* like ours, or (1,b) *invisible* like that of a ghost? The *former* alternative (No. 1,a) is ruled out by प्रत्यक्ष. We do not see any such body working in the production of grass, trees, rain-bows, clouds, etc. Hence the alleged व्याप्ति—यत्र यत्र कार्यत्वं तत्र तत्र सकर्तृकत्वम् falls to the ground. The हेतु here is साधारण अनैकान्तिक *i. e.* inconclusive, on account of its being common to things possessed of शरीर and those possessed of अशरीर like the hetu प्रमेयत्व which is inconclusive as to नित्यत्व or अनित्यत्व, being found in thing which are नित्य (*e. g.* आकाश) and also in things which are अनित्य (*e. g.* घट). The latter alternative (N 1,b) requires to be made clearer as to whether the invisibility of his body is due to his unique greatness or to any fault of our adrsta *i. e.* misfortune, caused by the law of Karma—*i.e.* dharma and adharma.—The first of these alternatives is not supported by any proof; moreover it involves argument in circle (इतरेतराश्रय) in that his invisible body will be proved when his unique greatness is proved, and his unique greatness will be proved when his invisible body is proved. The second alternative (No. 2) is not free from certain doubts. Thus, a doubt will arise in our mind whether our failure to see his body is due to the fact of his not existing at all (*e. g.* we do not see the body of a son f a barren woman) or to any defect in our adrsta which incapacitates us for the sight (*e.g.* owing to the same reason we do not see the body of ghost). Moreover if God works without a body it is contrary to all our experience of other drstāntas or examples. For all the examples of कार्य which we have bserved (such as घट etc) show maker possessed of body (such as potter) Without body maker can do nothing he would be as inactive as आत्मा. So the व्याप्ति of the hetu (कार्यत्व) with the sādhya (सकर्तृकत्व) breaks down when placed on the horns f the dilemma of सशरीरत्व and अशरीरत्व. For the Nyāya-Vaiś arguments, see स्या. म. Vis. Ed. pp. 55–57 टिप्पणी on स्या. म. on का ६ St. I

II. 90-93-2. Moreover the hetu is कालात्ययापदिष्ट or बाधित as it is otherwise called. For we see by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण that certain

कार्ये do spring into existence even without an intelligent maker *e g* a tree, a lightning, a cloud etc., in fact all natural phenomena which we do not see created by man or any other living being

So we conclude: "न कश्चिज्जगत् कर्ता."

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Mallisena next proceeds to examine the so called attributes of God viz. एकत्व सर्वगत्व etc.

II, 96. न्केतस्यकवेत्वाद् etc.—God is supposed to be *one* because it is said multiplicity of gods would mean multiplicity of wills, with its necessary corollary,—a conflict of wills and the consequent confusion in the making and management of the world. But the Jaina denies the necessity of the corollary and in support of his position he cites the examples of (1) an anthill made by many ants, (2) that of a palace made by many artisans and (3) that of a beehive made by many bees—all working harmoniously together to a common end.

अथ तेष्वप्येक etc.—Some might see one Supreme Maker behind each of these makers viz. the ants, the bees etc. But they may well be asked: Why not say then that God is the maker of घट पट etc. instead of the potter the weaver etc.? * If you say their agency is too visible to be denied we should like to know how the agency of the ants and the bees is any the less visible. cf. Sil.'s Com. on the Sûtrak p. 79 "यदपि च—स्वर्गीयेवाहस्य कुम्भकारः स्व निर्मिते कर्तृत्वेनाध्यवसीयते नेश्वरः । यदि पुनरीश्वरः स्यात् किं कुम्भकारेणेति ।। नैतदस्ति । तथापीश्वर एव सर्वस्यापि निमित्तकारणत्वेन व्याप्रियते । सर्वेषं कुम्भकारस्वाप्यन्यथा स्यात् । तथा चोक्तम्—[illegible] अपरोक्षे । [illegible] किं त्वाचरो कारणत्वं न युज्यते ? । [illegible] न व्याप्नोति । अपि च—[illegible] कर्ता स [illegible] एव [illegible] सर्वगत एव प्राप्नोति । [illegible]" Sil. Com. on [illegible]

[They do say however that God is according to them the primary cause, and the potter etc. the secondary causes. See Bh G Br Sûtras etc cf Martineau's Study of Rel. Vol. I.]

ll. 105-107.—समानीयत्व etc.—To hold that God is one in order to avoid conflict of wills is like getting rid of a family to void quarrelling about food !

l. 108.—यथा सर्वगतत्वमपि etc.—If, as you say he is omnipresent, it must be either through the body (शरीरत्वम्) or through the mind (ज्ञानत्वम्). In the former case, his body would fill all space, leaving no room fo other objects. The latter alternative is all right, for we too hold that the Supreme Person (पुरुषपुरुष) pervades the whole Universe with his boundless ज्ञान But it is not a position which you can take up since your Veda asserts the malpresence of God in the physical sense. For y ur texts such as विश्वतश्चक्षु etc. declare his physical ubiquity

l. 115.—कुर्वीत etc.—A possible reason for regarding God as physically all-pervasive is this If God occupied only particular spot he could not well deal with objects at a distance. But this is bad reasoning Is the Divine Architect, who is the supposed maker of the three worlds, working like carpenter through the instrumentality of his body r through that of his mind ? The first would be long and tedious process if his body is to be supposed to be l mited in size to void the difficulties of th hypothesis of an infinite body The second process viz. that of working by the mind will not necessitate physical omnipresence of the deity Minor gods, all are agreed, dwell in limited wo lds of their wn and yet work by their mind at great distances. Moreover the physical mnipresence of God would mean his contamination through contact with all sorts of impurities including residence in hell. It may be urged from the other side that this bjection will pply equally to the doctrine which w ha accepted viz. that f mental omnipresence of the Supreme Person (th Perfect Man). But this is wrong It is mistaking the very nature of *mental process, in which ज्ञान has ot to leave the ātman and travel to* the bject from distance. Besides, the argument of contamination absurd: thought of d rty thing does not fill the mouth with dirt, or the thought of luxuries provid you with the luxuries themselves.

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l. 133.—वस्तु प्रकाशयता etc.—This is withdrawing a point which was conceded in a foregoing passage (see supra)

l. 138.—यत्र वे रश्मयश्चि etc.—The case of ज्ञान is sometimes illustrated by the analogy of the light (किरण–rays) of the sun, which, though a guṇa (attribute) of the sun travels from the sun to the world which it illumines. But the analogy will not bear scrutiny. The rays are not a guṇa of the sun, but a dravya made of luminous matter (pudgala), and the luminosity (light–प्रकाश) which belongs to them as a guṇa never travels out of them.

l. 143—तथा च चर्मचक्षुरित्थं etc.—See vv 370-73. The passage occurs in a discussion about the nature of Jiva. The position of the opponent and the Jaina criticism of the same are very clearly brought out in the text and the Com. of the verses quoted here. These have been explained in the Commentary as follows :—

किरणा गुणा न —

[illegible]

[illegible] —

[illegible]

[illegible] —

[illegible] vv 370-73 etc., Com.

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ll. 144.—विप्रकृष्ट—This formulates the objection. The rays of the sun are not guṇas but dravya; and so little wonder that they travel out of the Sun; luminosity is their guṇa, which cannot go out of the dravya. Similarly ज्ञान is a guṇa of ātman and it cannot travel out of ātman.

तं तु वं etc.—Wonderful is the nature of ज्ञान it has not to go out to the spot of its object—it remains in ātman and works at a distance. If an analogy is wanted it is afforded in a magnet—which is wellknown for its actio in distans.

ll. 163-194.—अथ सर्वज्ञ सर्वज्ञ etc.—Taking सर्वज्ञ=omniscient. The doctrine of the omniscience of God can be easily disproved by means of the following dilemma: Is the omniscience of God proved by प्रत्यक्ष or परोक्ष (i. e. अनुमान or शब्द)? Not the former. For प्रत्यक्ष springs from the contact of इन्द्रिय and अर्थ which is not possible in the case of omniscience which transcends the employment of इन्द्रिय. Not the latter—in the shape of अनुमान. For अनुमान is based upon the recollection of an invariable concomitance between लिङ्ग (हेतु) and लिङ्गिन् (साध्य) and we do not know of any लिङ्ग which can prove omniscience—the latter being too far away from the field of our observation.

It may be argued that the अनुमान in the present case is of the nature of अर्थापत्ति, that is to say omniscience is inferred as necessarily implied in the wonderful variety of the cosmos. But the argument is wrong. There is no necessary implication of omniscience contained in the variety of the Cosmos which can be easily explained by th law of karma in the case of l ving beings and by an uncaused natural state of things in the case of inanimate matter. Nor is there any testimony of शब्द or आगम to prove th omniscience. Is the आगम (1) made by God or (2) made by any other person? (1) If it is made by God it is wonderful self-laudatory document—hardly worthy f true greatness. Moreover it is impossible that he could ha e given out the āgamas without physical body the ery utterance of the sounds of their letters requiring a throat,

palate etc., (cf. Br. Sû. II. ii. 38–40) And if he has a body it is a position which has been already disposed of (see above). (2) If it is made by any other person, is that person (2a) omniscient or (2b) not? (2a) If he is omniscient, God is one such person and here is another—a position which militates against the unity and singularity of God. Besides, the omniscience of the other person will require to be demonstrated by the word of a third person, who must be also omniscient, and so on *ad infinitum*. (2b) If he is not omniscient, what faith can we put in his word?

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ll. 174.–सर्वं च सर्वज्ञ etc.—The author next proceeds to show that if God is the source of the Brahmanical scriptures, he is anything but omniscient. For, the Brahmanical scriptures, says the writer are full of contradictions.

ll. 175-178.–श्रुति etc.—The passage that follows is taken verbatim from Gunaratna's T. R. D p. 261-63 The conflicting texts quoted therein are selected with reference to the vratas or moral precepts of the Jainas viz. अहिंसा, सत्य अदत्तादान (अस्तेय) ब्रह्मचर्य together with अपरिग्रह

ll. 199.–तथा स्ववशत्वे etc.—If God is self-dependent and at the same time all-merciful, why should he create a world full of misery? There is nothing to prevent him from creating a perfect world. Not even his independent will? No. For the will is linked to an all-merciful nature. cf S'ankara on Br. Sû. II ii. 37

l. 201-02.–शर्मपूर्णां—Full of ; शर्म–happiness.

ll. 203.–अथ कर्मापेक्षो etc.—If you propose to reconcile the misery in the world with God's mercy by the hypothesis of *karma*, it will amount to surrender of the principle of his independence (cf. S'ankara on Br Sû II. ii. 37).

ll. 204.–जलाञ्जलि—Funeral libation of water; equivalent to sounding the death-knell.

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ll. 144.–किरणाद्य—This formulates the objection: The rays of the sun are not guṇas but dravya; and so little wonder that they travel out of the Sun; luminosity is their guṇa, which cannot go out of the dravya. Similarly ज्ञान is a guṇa of ātman and it *cannot travel out of ātman.*

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ll. 153-194.–अथ सर्वज्ञ सर्वज्ञः etc.—Taking सर्वज्ञ=omniscient. The doctrine of the omniscience of God can be easily disproved by means of the following dilemma: Is the omniscience of God proved by प्रत्यक्ष or परोक्ष (i. e. अनुमान or शब्द)? Not the former. For प्रत्यक्ष springs from the contact of इन्द्रिय and अर्थ which is not possible in the case of omniscience which transcends the employment of इन्द्रिय। Not the latter—in the shape of अनुमान. For अनुमान is based upon the recollection of an invariable concomittance between लिङ्ग (हेतु) and लिङ्गिन् (साध्य) and we do not know of any लिङ्ग which can prove omniscience—the latter being too far away from the field of our observation.

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ll. 225-229.—इत्थं भवन्ति etc.—A plurality of natures is attributed to God in the Brahmanical scriptures. Thus, the nature of रजोगुण is active at the time of creation, of तमोगुण at the time of destruction, and of सत्त्वगुण at the time of its existence: ब्रह्म, रुद्र and विष्णु

एवं चावस्थाभेदे etc.—A change of states in God would mean a changing God.

ll. 229.—अथास्तु नित्यः etc.—Granting that God is eternal how is it that he is not evercreating? A possible answer is that it depends upon his free and independent will when to be engaged in the act of creation and when not, and hence the creation is occasional. But the answer is futile. On what should his will depend? On him and him only? If so, it should be eternally there, and the creative activity should be eternal and not occasional and spasmodic.

ll. 231.—तथा बुद्ध्यादिगुणवान् etc.—God is said to have the following attributes: बुद्धि etc. (For this and small differences on the point see Tarkasamgraha and Com., Kārikāvalī with Com. Muktāvalī and Dinakarī, and Nyāyakandalī p. 57). If these have to be inferred from their effects, they will be of a very unsatisfactory kind, unworthy of God. For the world we see is by no means perfect. From our imperfect or finite world we can only argue to a finite or imperfect God: See E. Caird's Com. on Kant: Rational Theology; John Caird's "Introduction to the Phil. of Religion," and Flint's "Theism."

ll. 233.—किं च प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्ति etc.—The famous dilemma raised by Mill and Saṅkara. Creative activity on the part of God may be supposed to spring either from self-interest or pity for his creatures. The former is impossible in the case of God. The latter is not possible without the presupposition of misery of his creatures which he strives to remove. The misery however is impossible without a body and organs to suffer it, and these are not existing prior to creation. Thus

शिपिविष्ट-Vishnu, God. विष्टप-a world. घट्टकुटी प्रभातम्— Arriving in the morning at a toll-bar. You drove your cart all night in the hope that you would thereby pass the toll-bar unnoticed in the darkness of the night. But unfortunately you reached the toll-bar just when there was daybreak and the officer at the station had got up to do his duty! Hence घट्टकुटी प्रभातम् is an idiomatic expression to state that you have arrived at the very position you wanted to avoid all along.

ll. 207.—किं च तदपि etc.—He is not only *dependent* upon the law of *karma* of his creatures for the allotment of happiness and misery in this world, but a further question arises as to who is the maker of the law of karma (कर्मणां)? If he has not made it, he is not Iśvara or Lord in regard to it.

ll. 211.—तत्र नित्यसिसृक्षायां etc.—If he is eternal, his nature should be eternal, his creativeness should be eternal—he should be ever creating and creating—a process which would never end, and not a single act of creation would ever be complete. And, since an incomplete act is no act (a घट is not a घट befor the last moment of completion is reached and it is fit to perform the work for which it was intended for अर्थक्रियाकारित्व) God would be the maker of nothing If on the other hand creativeness were not part of his nature, he could not create the world any more than ākāśa which never creates any world

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ll 218.—सृष्टि च संहार etc.—If he has an absolutely eternal nature, and creativeness is part of that nature, he would be ever creating and creating without any possibility of संहार or destruction. If creation and destruction sprang from a single nature—the two would be simultaneous; moreover it would mean difference of effects (creation and destruction) without difference in the cause (single nature). If you adopt the hypothesis of two natures, one of which (सृष्टि) is put forth at one time and the other (संहार) at the other time, that is tantamount to confession that his nature is not eternal, but only occasional.

ll. 225-229.—तत्र परतो etc.—A plurality of natures is attributed to God in the Brahmanical scriptures. Thus, the nature of रजोगुण is active at the time of creation, of तमोगुण at the time of destruction, and of सत्त्वगुण at the time of its existence: ब्रह्म, हर and विष्णु

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the theist finds himself lost in vicious circle—pity and misery necessary to account for God's creative activity and the creative activity necessary for the possibility of misery!

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ll. 242.– [illegible]—Going both ways like the pendulum of bell. For the Jaina argument see Ṣad Darśana-Samuccaya, Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā pp. 52-63, 115-24 S.ll. Com. on the Sūtrakritāṅga pp. 42-47).

For the Theistic argument examined in the Stanza and the Com. see [illegible] p. 54–56.

For the difficulties of the Theistic position consult Śaṅkara's Com. on the B Su. II. i.i, 37-41 Rāmānuja Com. on the same and on I. i. 3. For an attempt at a solution of some of the difficulties see B Su. II. i. 30 36 The point of [illegible] will be found suggested by a corresponding passage in [illegible] pp. 55–56: cf. "Meanwhile th practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him ther exists larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary It might conceivably even be only larger and more godlike self, of which the present self would then be but th mutilated expression and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at all. Thus would sort of polytheism return upon us......"

Upholders of the monistic iew will say to such polytheism (which by the way has lways been the real religion of common people and is so still to-day) that unless there be one all-inclusive God, our guarantee of security is left imperfect. In the Absolute, and in the Absol te only *all* is saved. If there be different Gods, each caring for his part, some

portion of some of us might not be covered with divine protection, and our religious consolation would thus fail to be complete... ..... Common sense is less sweeping in its demand than philosophy ....I think, in fact, that a final philosophy of religion will have to consider the pluralistic hypothesis more seriously than it has hitherto been willing to consider it —James's Varieties of Religious Experience p. 526.

"This [a belief in more gods than one] of itself is what reason cannot rest in—what reason is constantly finding out more clearly to be false. The more the universe is examined and understood, the more apparent does it become that it is a single, self-consistent whole—a vast unity in which nothing is isolated or independent. The very notion, therefore, of separate and independent deities and still more of course, of discordant or hostile deities ruling over different departments of nature, is opposed to the strivings and findings of reason Flint's Theism pp. 40–41.

For the Design Argument in its old form see Paley's Natural Theology" and for its defence against later criticism see Flint's "Theism," and for a history of the Teleological Argument, Flint's Theism pp. 387–90.

For the whole subject of Theistic proofs, see Ibid, Lectures IX to end. Among modern writings on the subject in addition to Flint's "Theism and Anti-Theistic Theories the reader may consult Kant's criticism of Cartesian *proofs* and Rational Theology and the statement of difficulties in the design argument in the old orthodox f rm and a reinterpretation of the argument in John Caird's Philosophy of Religion," and Edward Caird's Com. on Kant. Consult also M rtineau's "Study of Religion" Vol I, Fraser's Theism" (Kantian presentation of the subject), Lindsay's "Recent Advances in Theism Pringle-Pattison's "Idea of God," W rd's "Realm of Ends" and Alexander's "Space, Time and Deity"

Appendices.

1.

किं पुनरीश्वरसद्भावे प्रमाणम्?। अनुमानमागमश्च। [illegible]

[illegible]

चिकीर्षामीति । ततः प्रयतते । ततश्च शरीरं व्यापारयति । ततः करोति । अत्रान्तरा
स्वव्यतिरिक्तप्रयत्नस्य शरीरव्यापारस्य च शरीरेतीन्द्रियव्यतिरेकान्वयं दृष्टिवक्तुम-
शक्ये कार्योत्पत्त्युपायभूतं निमित्तमेतावदिष्टके व्यतिरिक्तस्याभावेनावधारितं
न शक्यते ग्रहीतुम् । चक्षुरादिवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्सामर्थ्यं भूयाद्यभावे । तत्परित्यागो न
बुद्धिरपि परित्यज्यताम् । प्रथमातिरिक्तस्य शरीरस्य बुद्धिमत्त्वेनासम्भावित्वं करिष्यति ।
व्यापारोऽयमस्मात्तिरिक्तस्यात्मविशेषो न कल्पोतीति चेत् कुत एतत् ? । तत्पुनरुत्पन्न-
मिति चेत् कथितं ममापि मनोरथानुमेयम् । न तथा कार्यदृष्टा प्रयत्नमतीतात्
कार्योत्पत्त्युपायप्रसङ्गे मनोऽनन्तरीतस्यापारं शरीरम् । एवं तर्हि का गतिरत्र
बुद्धिमत्कर्तृपूर्वकत्वाभावस्य ? । अत्रोच्यते । उभयोरपि शरीरशरीरव्यतिरेक-
योरनुपलब्धेः । निर्विषयस्य सामान्यस्य सिद्धत्वाभावात् । विशेषमात्रस्य दूषणम् ? । न
किंचित् । दूरत एव विशेषमात्रमुक्तमविनाभावगमने सामर्थ्यं सामान्ये
कार्यं प्रयुञ्जानो निपुणस्य यथा कथिञ्चिदिति दृष्टान्तमध्येऽप्युपमानाभावं प्रति व्यापा
रात् । कर्तृमात्रपूर्वकत्वं विना न युज्यते यतः तदिदमशरीरिकर्तृकत्वमात्रं व्याप्ति
ग्राहकप्रमाणबाधितत्वात् प्रमाणान्तराणि प्रतीयमानेन चाभिप्रेतमशरीरिकर्तृविशेषं
विरुद्धविशेषसाधनं ततश्च विरुद्धाव्यभिचार्येव हेतुरिति पूर्वपक्षसंक्षेपः ॥ अत्र
प्रतिसमाधिः । किं शरीरत्वमेव कर्तृत्वमुत परिदृष्टसामर्थ्यकारकप्रयोजकत्वम् ? ।
न तावच्छरीरित्वमेव कर्तृत्वम् । सुषुप्तस्योदासीनस्य च कर्तृत्वप्रसङ्गात् । किंतु परि-
दृष्टसामर्थ्यकारकप्रयोजकत्वम् । तस्मिन् सति कार्योत्पत्तेः । तच्चाशरीरस्यापि
निर्वहति यथा स्वशरीरप्रेरणायामात्मनः । अस्ति तत्रान्यस्य स्वकर्मोपार्जितं तदेव
शरीरमिति चेत् सत्यमस्ति । परं प्रेरणोपाये न भवति । स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरो
धात् । प्रेरणेनप्रयत्नेनेति चेत् ईश्वरस्यापि प्रेरणं प्रयत्नादस्ति तत्र स्वशरीरे प्रेरणाया
इच्छाप्रयत्नाभ्यामुत्पत्तेरिच्छाप्रयत्नयोश्च सति शरीरे भावाभावाभावात् अस्ति
तस्य स्वप्रेरणायामिच्छाप्रयत्नमात्रापेक्षेपायत्वमिति चेत् । तस्येच्छाप्रयत्न-
योरपकर्षे प्रत्येक कारकत्वात् इच्छाप्रयत्नयोरिच्छाप्रयत्नयोः प्रेरकाकारकत्वे तु
तदुत्पादमूलमेव शरीरं कर्मत्वादिभि व्यभिचारः । अनपेक्षितशरीरव्यापारस्येच्छा
प्रयत्नमात्रसहितस्य चेतनस्य क्वचित्चेतनान्यापारं प्रति सामर्थ्यदर्शनात् बुद्धि-
मत्त्वमित्यपि तु कार्यत्वमितीश्वरसिद्धिः । इच्छाप्रयत्नोत्पत्तावपि शरीरमपे
क्षणीयमिति चेत् अनेकान्तं तत्र तयोरनपेक्षत्वम् । कर्तृ पुनरिमौ स्वाभाविकावातो
कार्यत्वापेक्षत्वं न्यायेन । न च पूर्वाभ्यामुपलब्धो नित्यत्वे कश्चिद्विरोध । यथा हि
स्पर्शवतां सुमात्राणामतत्कर्तृकत्वेन दृष्टा शक्ति नित्यताऽनित्यत्वा च तथा बुद्धयादीनामपि
भविष्यतीति । वेदमीश्वरवादे वादिप्रतिवादिनो नराणाम् । अत एवं प्रथम ॥
आत्मविशेषः परमात्मा प्रवर्तिष्यते इति चेत् । तेषां स्वकर्मोपार्जितेन्द्रियमात्रा-
धीनं संविदां शरीरोत्तम । सर्वविषयबोधविरहात् । अकल्पनमामपि सर्व-
विषयमपि प्रत्यक्षैतत्स्यमिति चेत् । तदा शरीरनैरपेक्ष्यमात्रे तस्यैवाभिमुख्ये
कर्तृ सर्वानुग्रहकात्मकत्वादिति । शरीरान्तरस्यातिरेकाभावात् । तदाप्यनेन तथाऽऽरीतो
न शरीरे भवतीति चेत् व्यापकत्वेन तस्य विषयसर्वकर्मानुग्रहेण नित्यत्वेन च

विषयप्रकाशसमावस्थायिबुद्धौ वा विरोधाभावाभ्युपगमे ? । इतिविकल्पनिराम-
विरोधाभावमिति चेत् तर्हि शरीरिणो [illegible] ? । बुद्धिरस्य भूयसो न विकल्प्यते
इति चेत् [illegible] विरोध ? । बुद्धिसम्बन्धात [illegible] । [illegible]
[illegible] बुद्धिज्ञानो न [illegible] । तत्रापि [illegible] शरीरेषु [illegible]
[illegible] न विषयावबोध इति । तथा
[illegible] । [illegible]
[illegible] न [illegible] इति चेत् पर [illegible]
[illegible]
न [illegible] वा ? । एव इति [illegible] । [illegible]
[illegible] । न च [illegible] हेतुरस्तीति [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] । [illegible]
[illegible] न
[illegible] न [illegible]
[illegible] न [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] इति केचित् । [illegible]
[illegible] । न कि
[illegible] वा ? । न [illegible]
न भवति [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible]
[illegible] इति ॥ Nyāyakandalī
pp. 54–57

2.

"[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

अत्र [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] । [illegible] व [illegible]
सिद्धो हेतु । [illegible] वा [illegible]
[illegible] । [illegible] वा । [illegible] ।
[illegible] । [illegible]
[illegible] । [illegible]
[illegible] न [illegible] इति [illegible]
[illegible] न [illegible] इति चेत् । [illegible] । [illegible]
[illegible] । [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ॥ Gopa Com. on
[illegible] pp. 51 53

3

[illegible]

जन्यते। तेन बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकत्वमात्रेण कार्यत्वस्य व्याप्तिः प्रत्येतव्या, न शरीरित्वादिना। न चात्र कर्तृत्वसामर्थ्यं शरीरापेक्षम्। तदतिरेकेणापि [illegible] त्वेन च शरीरवत्त्वे कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेः। [illegible] स्यात्। नियमोऽपि हि शरीरे [illegible] गौरवम्। प्रथमं हि [illegible] रित्वादीनां [illegible] सर्वज्ञत्वं [illegible] सिद्धम्। प्रयोगोऽत्र। ईश्वरः सर्वोऽधिकरणादिसर्वकर्तृत्वात्। यो हि यस्य कर्ता स तदुपादानाभिज्ञः यथा घटोत्पादकः कुलालो घटोपादान [illegible] वित्। [illegible] यावत्। तस्मात्सर्वज्ञ इति। [illegible] [illegible] नित्यज्ञानादिमत्त्वं च [illegible] नित्ये [illegible] । [illegible] न चैतदपि [illegible] कर्तृत्वं [illegible] । ते च तस्य [illegible] नित्याः [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] च [illegible] कर्तृत्वमेव [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] प्रवृत्ति। [illegible] ईश्वरस्य [illegible] [illegible] च [illegible] इति [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। न [illegible] न [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible]। न च [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] ॥

अत्र प्रतिविधीयते। तत्र यावत् [illegible] कार्यत्वमनुमानं, तत् किं [illegible] १ [illegible] २ [illegible] [illegible] ३ [illegible] ४ वा स्यात्॥ यदि [illegible] [illegible] १ [illegible] २ [illegible] ३ [illegible] ४ वा। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible]

दैवेशानैकान्त्य। न चास्य नित्यत्वं व्याप्तिविरोधात्प्रमाणात् ॥ १ ॥
नापि प्रागभाव सावयवत्वस्य समवायः कार्यत्वं तस्य नित्यत्वेन व्यभिचार-
योगात्। तथाप्यनित्यत्वे कार्यस्यापि नित्यादेस्तदनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् तस्य बुद्धिमद्धेतु-
कत्वं साध्यते। किंच [illegible] पश्चात्तम्यपरिणामस्यासत्त्वेन मायातिरोऽपि
हेतुः तत्त्वावयवस्य प्रध्वंसाभावरूपत्वेन समवायिकारणसमवायिरभावात् ॥ २ ॥
कृतमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञापकत्वमपि न कार्यत्वं तस्याप्युत्पत्त्यभावात्। कृतमकृतमित्य-
कार्ये [illegible] ॥ ३ ॥ विकारित्वस्यापि कार्यत्वे महेश्वर-
स्यापि कार्यत्वप्रसङ्गः ततो वस्तुनोऽन्यथाभावो हि विकारित्वम्। तथेश्वरकार्यस्याप्य-
नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् बुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वमसङ्गतमतस्तत्त्वात् स्यात् अविकारित्वे चास्य कार्यत्वमपि
त्वमतिदुर्घटमिति ॥ ४ ॥ कार्यत्वस्य विचार्यमाणस्यानुपपद्यमानत्वात्सिद्धः कार्य-
त्वादित्ययं हेतुः। किं च। यदात्मिकं वस्तु लोके कार्यत्वेन प्रसिद्धम् [illegible]
त्ता सत्त्वलक्षणं कार्यत्वमाश्रयत्वमेवेत्यनुमानैः कार्यत्वात्तस्यापि कार्यत्वे महेश्वरा-
न्तर्गतानां बुद्ध्यादीनां परमाण्वाद्यन्तर्गतानां पाकजरूपादीनां च कार्यत्वात् महेश्वरे-
ऽपि कार्यत्वप्रसङ्गः तथा चास्याप्यपरबुद्धिमद्धेतुकत्वप्रसङ्गादनवस्थापत्तिरित्यप्रमाण
कल्पेते। अस्तु वा यथाकथंचिज्जगतः कार्यत्वं तथापि कार्यमात्रमिह हेतुत्वेन विवक्षितं
तद्विशेषो वा। यद्याद्यः तर्हि न ततः बुद्धिमत्कर्तृविशेषसिद्धिः। तेन तत्र व्याप्त्य-
सिद्धेः। किंतु कर्तृमात्रस्य। तथा च हेतोरसिद्धविरुद्धत्वं साध्यविकल्पसमत्वादि-
त्यन्तं वा। तत्र कार्यत्वं कृतबुद्ध्युत्पादकम्। बुद्धिमत्कर्तृगमकं न सर्वम्। तादृश-
भावेन च गमकत्वे [illegible] प्रति गमकत्वप्रसङ्गः। [illegible]
[illegible]। [illegible]
यत्वात्। ततो यथाभूतमपि देवकुलादेः सम्बन्धेऽपि यथा कृतमिति ज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्भवत्यपि
गमयति न तथान्यादि तस्य जीर्णत्वादीनामपि कृतमिति ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरप्रमाणा ॥
अथ द्वितीयः तर्हि हेतोरसिद्धत्वं कार्यविशेषस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात् वा जीर्णकूपप्राका-
रादिवत् [illegible] कृतबुद्ध्युत्पादकत्वप्रसङ्गः। समारोपश्चेति चेत् सोऽनु-
मानादिविषयः किं न स्यात्। प्रमाणस्य कर्तुरतीन्द्रियत्वादिसिद्धत्वात्। अथ प्रमाणाविष-
यत्वादेव कृतबुद्धिं [illegible]
वा। नार्योऽन्योन्याश्रय। तथाहि। सिद्धे विशेषसिद्धेरस्योत्पादे तदुत्पत्ती च
तेनैव विशेषसिद्धिरिति। द्वितीयपक्षेऽप्रमाणत्वात्तस्यापि तद्विशेषकत्वेनोपलम्भानम्।
तथाप्यप्रमाणात्प्रसिद्धत्वात्तत्त्वव्यत्ययः। तत्र कृतबुद्ध्युत्पादकत्वस्य विशेषस्यासिद्धेः।
तथा च विशेषाभिमतस्य [illegible] कृतबु-
द्ध्युत्पादकत्वनियमाभाव इति तस्माद् [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
त्वादिति। कृतबुद्ध्युत्पादकत्वविशेषे [illegible]। नियमस्तु वा [illegible]
[illegible]। [illegible] बुद्धिमत्कर्तृत्व [illegible]। अन्ये [illegible]

[illegible]। तेन बुद्धिमत्सृष्टं [illegible] कार्यं न [illegible] कर्तृत्वसामर्थ्यं शरीर[illegible] [illegible] न शरीरवत्त्वे कर्तृत्वं [illegible]। [illegible] यदि [illegible] [illegible] प्रति कारण [illegible] समवायी [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] अनुमितानामेव कार्येण [illegible]। [illegible]। [illegible] यस्य कर्ता स [illegible]। [illegible] कर्ता [illegible]। तस्मात्तदेव [illegible] परमात्मा। [illegible]। न [illegible] [illegible] कर्तृ [illegible]। [illegible]॥

अत्र प्रतिविधीयते। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] १ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] २ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] १ [illegible] २ [illegible] ३ [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

इच्छाप्रयत्नव्यतिरिक्तैश्वर्यस्यैश्वर्यमिच्छाप्रयत्नयोरेवाभावात् ॥ किं चेश्वरस्य जग-
न्निर्माणे यथारुचि प्रवृत्तिः १ कर्मपारतन्त्र्येण २ करुणया ३ क्रीडया ४
निग्रहानुग्रहविधानार्थं ५ स्वभावतो ६ वा । आद्यविकल्पे कदाचिदन्यादृश्येव
सृष्टिः स्यात् । द्वितीये स्वातन्त्र्यहानिः । तृतीये सर्वमपि जगत्सुखितमेव
कुर्यात् । अथेश्वरः किं करोति । पूर्वार्जितैरेव कर्मभिर्वशीकृता दुःखमनुभवन्ति ।
तदा तस्य कः पुरुषकारः । अदृष्टापेक्षस्य च कर्तृत्वे किं तत्कल्पनया । जगतस्तद-
धीनत्वमस्तु । चतुर्थपक्षमभ्युपेत्य रागोपचयमात्रं प्रसज्यते । तथा हि रागवानी-
श्वरः क्रीडाकारित्वाद्बालवत् तथा जनप्रयत्नाद्धावत् तथा ईश्वरमतो निग्रहकारा-
नुग्रहेण इति । अथ स्वभावतः सर्वजनस्यापि जगत एव स्वभावतः प्रवृत्तिरस्तु
किं तत्कर्तृकल्पनयेति । न कार्यत्वहेतुर्बुद्धिमन्तं कर्तारमीश्वरं साधयति । एवं सति
नैयायिकसिद्धान्ते घटभावानामनुत्पन्नानित्यादिभावयोऽपि स्वयमुत्पन्ना तृणा-
देः स्वभावत्वात् । किं च क्षित्यादेर्बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकत्वे साध्ये पक्षीकृतास्ते सर्वेऽपि हेतवो
विरुद्धाः । घटकुम्भकारादिवत् शरीरादिविशिष्टकर्तृपूर्वकत्वसाधनात् । न च धूमादनल-
मात्रस्यैवानुमानं दृष्टं तत्र सार्वज्ञ्यादिविशेषाणामनुपलम्भात् धूमस्य सर्व-
दा । नैवमत्र सर्वकर्तृत्वविशेषाधिकरणप्रत्यक्षाभावेन कार्यत्वस्यास्ति व्याप्तिः
सर्वज्ञस्य कर्तृत्वेऽनुमानात्प्रामाणिकी । व्यभिचारिणश्चामी बुद्धिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकानपि
विद्युदादीनां प्रादुर्भावविनाशयोः स्वभावतस्तासामबुद्धिमत्पूर्वकस्यापि कार्यस्य दर्शना-
दिति । कालात्ययापदिष्टाश्चैते । प्रत्यक्षागमबाधितपक्षानन्तरं प्रयुक्तत्वात् । तद्बाधा च
पूर्वमेव दर्शिता । प्रकरणसमाश्चामी प्रकरणचिन्ताप्रवर्तकत्वात् हेत्वन्तराणां सद्भावात् ।
तथा हि । ईश्वरो जगत्कर्ता न भवति निष्प्रयोजनत्वात् एकत्वसर्वज्ञत्वानुपलब्धत्वाशरीरि-
त्वाच्च तथा व्यापित्वाभावात् स्वकृतात्कुर्वीताप्यत इति । नित्यत्वादीनि
तु विशेषणानि तस्य व्यवस्थापनमप्रामाणिकानि यदि मतिः कल्पिता जगत्कर्तृत्वविकल्प-
व्यापारानुपपत्तिरेव । विचारासहत्वात् यावज्जीवं तु विचिन्त्यन्ते । तथाहि
नित्यत्वं विचार्यते । तदेकान्ते न घटते । तथा हि । नैकान्ते नित्य स्वभावमेकमेव
क्रियादिभिः कर्तृत्वात् । अप्रच्युतानुत्पन्नस्थिरैकस्वभावं कूटस्थं नित्यमिति हि
नित्यलक्षणमभ्युपगमात् । स्वभावभेदमनभ्युपगमे च सृष्टिसंहारादिविरुद्धकार्य-
करणमपि दुर्घटम् । नापि तस्य बुद्ध्यादीनां नित्यत्वं वाच्यम् । प्रतीतिविरोधात् ।
ईश्वरज्ञानादयो च नित्या ज्ञानत्वादस्मदादिज्ञानादिवदित्यनुमानविरोधात् । यदेव
दर्शनज्ञानादयो नित्या इत्यादि वचनादि तस्योद्दिष्टमप्रमाणीकम् । सर्वज्ञत्वमप्यस्य केन
प्रमाणेन ग्राह्यम् । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षेण तस्येन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नत्वेनातीन्द्रियार्थ-
ग्रहणासमर्थत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानेन तदविनाभाविलिङ्गाभावात् । ननु जगद्वैचित्र्या-
न्यथानुपपत्तिरूपं कार्यं तस्यैवेति चेन्न । तेन सहाविनाभावाग्रहणात् । जगद्वैचित्र्यस्य
तत्पूर्वं विनापि शुभाशुभकर्मवैचित्र्यपरिपाकोपपद्यमानत्वात् । किं चार्थं यदि
सर्वज्ञः तदा अप्रयुक्तकरणस्तैरपि तथापि कर्मभिरिमत्सयप्रतीतिरविशेष-
हृतोऽस्मदादीन् विषये प्रवर्तीति नार्थ सर्वज्ञः । तथा यद्यमेवकर्तृकत्वे वैमत्य-

[illegible]

[illegible]मानात् । किं चेतनस्य जग-
न्निर्माणे यथायथं प्रवृत्तिः १ कर्मपारतन्त्र्येण २ करुणया ३ क्रीडया ४
निग्रहानुग्रहार्थं ५ स्वभावतो ६ वा । तत्राद्यविकल्पे [illegible]
[illegible] स्यात् । द्वितीये स्वातन्त्र्यहानिः । तृतीये सर्वमपि जगत्सुखितमेव
कुर्यात् । क्रीडार्थं किं करोति । पूर्वविहितैः कर्मभिर्निर्मीयमाणा [illegible] ।
[illegible] च दुःखवतः । [illegible] च कर्मणे किं तत्कल्पनया । जगत्सृष्टि-
[illegible] । चतुर्थपञ्चमयोस्तु [illegible] प्रसज्यते । तथा हि [illegible]
[illegible] तथा [illegible] तथा [illegible] विषमत्वा-
[illegible] इति । अथ [illegible] सर्वमपि [illegible] स्वभावत [illegible]
किं [illegible] । न [illegible] लावणि । एवं [illegible]
[illegible] पि [illegible]
[illegible] । किं च [illegible] मतीयमाना [illegible]
[illegible] । [illegible] । न च [illegible]
[illegible] सर्व-
[illegible] । [illegible] व्याप्ति
[illegible] । [illegible] बुद्धिमत्त्वेनापि
[illegible] बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकत्वानि कार्यस्य [illegible]
[illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] च
[illegible] ।
तथा हि । ईश्वरो [illegible] न मनसि [illegible] ।
[illegible] तथा [illegible] इति । [illegible]
[illegible] कर्मिण्या [illegible]
[illegible] तु [illegible] । तथाऽऽ
[illegible] । [illegible] न [illegible] । तथा हि । [illegible] नित्य [illegible]
[illegible] । [illegible] किमसिद्धि किं
[illegible] । [illegible] न [illegible]
[illegible] । नापि [illegible] नित्यं [illegible] । [illegible] ।
ईश्वर [illegible] च [illegible] । एवं
[illegible] इत्यादि [illegible] । [illegible] कैव
प्रमाणेन [illegible] । न [illegible]
[illegible] । [illegible] । अत [illegible]
[illegible] चेत् न । [illegible] । [illegible]
[illegible] । किं [illegible]
[illegible] तत [illegible] कर्म [illegible]
[illegible] क्रियते [illegible] । [illegible]

[illegible] मोक्षिणो [illegible] भौमनादित्यभावात् [illegible] अन्यत्वार्थे [illegible] भवति । [illegible] [illegible] विमानेनीयन्स्यात् । कि [illegible] प्रमाणेन [illegible] स्यात् । तथा हि । सर्वं कार्यं [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । इति न [illegible] मोक्षस्य [illegible] सिद्धिः । [illegible] एव सर्वज्ञो देवो [illegible] कर्तेति सिद्धम् ॥ Gangānātha's Com. on [illegible] pp. 115-124.

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तत्प्रमाणं तर्हि [illegible] बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकं कार्यत्वात् [illegible] कार्यं चेदं तस्माद्बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकमिति प्रयोगे [illegible] । व्यतिरेके [illegible] । न [illegible] हेतुः । [illegible] कार्यत्वस्य [illegible] । नापि [illegible] । [illegible] । नापि [illegible] । नापि [illegible] । [illegible] । अत्र [illegible] न संभवति [illegible] इति [illegible] कथं [illegible] इति चेत् । उच्यते । अत्र [illegible] ईश्वराख्यो धर्मी प्रतीतोऽप्रतीतो वा [illegible] । [illegible] । प्रतीतत्वेऽपि [illegible] प्रमाणेन प्रतीतस्तेनैव [illegible] [illegible] इति [illegible] । अतो न [illegible] हेतुरिति [illegible] बुद्धिमत्[illegible] । तथा [illegible] । [illegible] । न [illegible] [illegible] । तथा [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] इति । [illegible] स [illegible] । [illegible] वा । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] । तथा सर्वज्ञ इति [illegible] । [illegible] हि [illegible]

रचना दुर्घटा । सर्वज्ञश्च सन् सकलप्राणिनां संचितशुभाशुभकर्मजन्यपापपुण्य-
परिमाणस्वरूपपरिज्ञानेन कार्यवस्तु निर्मिमाणः स्वार्जितपुण्यपापानुमानेन च स्वर्ग-
नरकयोः सुखदुःखोपभोगं ददाति तेषां नाशितात्मना । तथा चोक्तम्—

ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत्स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा ।
अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ॥ इति Manibhadra's
Com. on षड्., pp. 12-13.

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यदुक्तम्—तनुभुवनकरणादिकं विमत्यधिकरणभावापन्नं निमित्तबुद्धिमत्का-
रणपूर्वकं कार्यत्वात् घटवदिति तदयुक्तम् । तथाहि निमित्तकारणपूर्वकत्वेन
व्याप्तिः सिद्धा । कारणपूर्वकत्वमात्रेण तु कार्ये व्याप्ते कार्यविशेषोपलब्धौ कारण-
विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्दृष्टान्तप्रतिपन्नस्यैव भवति । न चाक्षरभ्रान्ते तथा प्रतीतिर्भवति ।
अथ तत्पूर्वकत्वं प्रतिपन्नमिति चेत् युक्तं तत्र घटस्य कार्यविशेषत्वमतिरिच्यते । न
चैवं परिदृश्यमानपर्वतादौ बुद्धिमत्कारणपूर्वकत्वेन संबन्धो गृहीत इति । अन्यत्र च
घटादिस्थानविशेषत्वमनस्वीकारात्पि सिद्धिसंस्थानदर्शनात् बुद्धिमत्कारणपूर्वक-
त्वस्य साधनं क्रियते । वैशेषिकं दृश्यम् । यतो न हि तत्स्थानमात्रप्रवृत्तिमात्रेण सर्वस्य
बुद्धिमत्कारणपूर्वकत्वानुमतिर्भवति । यदि तु स्यात् वल्मीकस्यापि कुम्भकारस्यापि
घटवत् कुम्भकारकृति स्यात् । तथा चोक्तम्—"अन्यथा कुम्भकारेण मृद्विकारस्य
कस्यचित् । घटादेः करणात् सिध्येद्वल्मीकस्यापि तत्कृतिः ॥" इति । तदेवं यस्यैव
संस्थानविशेषस्य बुद्धिमत्कारणपूर्वकत्वेन संबन्धो गृहीतस्तद्दर्शनेन तथाविधकारणा-
नुमानं भवति न संस्थानमात्रमिति । Sûtrakritânga Com. I iii., pp. 43-44.

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अथाहुः—भावयत्नाद्येव जगतः कार्यत्वं न प्रत्यक्षमात्रं कल्पते । मतान्नि
च प्रयोगः । विवादाध्यासितं भूभूधरादि कार्यं सावयवत्वात् घटादिवत् । तथा
विवादाध्यासितमचिरप्रसिद्धिमदीश्वरादि कार्यं महत्त्वे सति क्रियावत्त्वात् घटवत् ।
तनुभुवनादि कार्यं महत्त्वे सति मूर्तत्वात् घटवत् इति । तावत्स्वेतु दृष्टेषु तु एव क्रियते
मान्यत इति कार्यत्वस्य विभ्रमकं सावयवत्वादिरेकान्तात्मकं बोधयामासे । कार्यत्व
मनिमित्तं कथमीश्वरं प्रकल्पोपादानादिविज्ञानं चोपलभ्यत इति चेत् न कार्यत्वे
कारणविशेषोऽपि क्रियते प्रमाणतो कार्यानुमेये हृत्वमप्यपि सावयवत्वादिना कार्यत्वं
ज्ञातमिति ते च प्रतिपन्ने प्रत्येति न कथमिति चेत् । तथा हि पटमिवादीनि इत्येषु
कार्यत्वदर्शनानुमितकर्तृत्वविशिष्टात्मविज्ञानः पुरुषोऽदृष्टपूर्व विशिष्टसन्निवेशं वस्त्र
मनामालोक्यावयवसन्निवेशविशेषेण तस्य कार्यत्वं निश्चित्य तदाभिमेव कर्तृत्व-
ज्ञानमविशेषेणानुमिनोति । अवयवसमूहात्मकः कार्यत्वे सिद्धे सर्वज्ञान्तरा
छविर्मान्यतिविभुः कश्चिद् बुद्धिपरीक्षितः सिध्यतीव— ......

बुद्धिमत्कर्तृत्वमस्य उपपादनीयं शरीराद्यभावेन इत्याह विति अथ बुद्धिपाधिनोपकरणा
विज्ञानमीश्वरस्याभावेऽप्युपपन्नमिति चेत् । न । संचरणमात्रैव परकीयमतानुमते

ll. 30-33.—[illegible] etc.—The existence of समवाय is not a matter of faith, but is evidenced by the conscious experience '[illegible]' according to the old school of Nyāya, and, I believe, of Vaiśeṣika also. According to the recognised school of the Vaiśeṣikas represented by Praśastapāda, and also according to the later Naiyāyikas, however समवाय is अनुमेय—See Muktāvalī on St. XL and Dinakarī on the same. It was only fair that the Naiyāyikas should admit this and change the old dogma, in deference to the voice of a large number of opponents all ready to swear that they never *perceived* any such thing as समवाय.

ll. 35-38.—[illegible] etc.—Construe thus [illegible] (स्यात्) [illegible] :— [illegible] though placed after [illegible] in the stanza is to be construed with [illegible]. Just as the [illegible] in [illegible] i.e. [illegible] implies according to you समवाय (स्यात्) relation, so, to be consistent you should hold the same with regard to the समवाय itself. The point is made clear in the passage beginning with "[illegible] (P 33).

ll. 30-35.—[illegible] etc.—How do you say that there is no such awareness of समवाय? For we are distinctly aw[are] [of] it when we say that [illegible] is in the [illegible], or that [illegible] is on the [illegible] or that [illegible] is on the [illegible]. Here w[e are] conscious not of the [illegible] [illegible] only but also of the real [illegible] of the one in the other. Such is the argument of th[e] Vaiśeṣika in favour of समवाय. It is ans[we]red in the following lines.

Page 33.

ll. 35-49.—[illegible] etc.—Just a[s] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of all that here [illegible] is but the [illegible] of [illegible] of [illegible] and is not [a] separate entity and that th[e] connection of [illegible] with [illegible] is समवाय why can w[e] not [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] समवाय and then the connection of समवाय with its [illegible] [illegible] would be neither [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]—[illegible], p. 2. 2. If समवाय had not the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] no better than a [illegible] which is [illegible]

Vaiśeṣika [illegible]

मिलितस्य प्राप्तस्यैव प्राप्तिः समवाय'—Contra, अप्राप्तयोः प्राप्तिः संयोग' Difference between संयोग and समवाय—the former joins things that were not joined before; the latter joins things that are already joined i. e. it is the name of a relation to explain a relatedness which has been already there.

ll. 50-55—न तु घटत्वादीनां etc.—A distinction is drawn by the Vaiśeṣika between the case of घटत्व and that of the alleged समवायत्व The former is a real °त्व and a सामान्य which embraces all the व्यक्ति i.e. individual घटs within it, and so the समवाय which connects it with the व्यक्ति is a मुख्य समवाय i. e. समवाय in the primary and real sense of the term, whereas समवाय being but one व्यक्ति, समवायत्व is not a real सामान्य and therefore its existence in समवाय, and the second समवाय by which it would be expected to exist in it, will be both अमुख्य or गौण i.e. secondary and unreal. The distinction between मुख्य and गौण is pointed out *infra* p. 34. ll. 63-64.—मुख्यत्वं चैतत् etc.

नन्वेवं चैकव्यक्तित्व etc.—The fine distinction which the Vaiśeṣika has drawn between the two cases is unfounded You say that when there is but one व्यक्ति, as in the case of समवाय there can be no real जाति or सामान्य. (See Udayanācārya's famous Kārikā. "व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं संकरोऽथानवस्थितिः । रूपहानिरसंबन्धो जातिबाधकसंग्रहः" This will be explained below in Note on St. VIII. ll. 74-75.) But we answer: Where is व्यक्त्येकत्व (only a single individual) in the case of समवाय which would preclude the possibility of जाति or universal? There is a घटसमवाय there is a पटसमवाय, and so are innumerable समवायs which would require a °त्व quite as much as घटत्व. (Recall the admission of the new school of Nyāya noted above in Note on ll. 29-30).

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ll. 64-66.—मुख्यत्वं चैतत् etc.—Distinction between मुख्य and गौण मुख्य is that which is invariable; also complete characteristic and inner; गौण is the opposite of this."

ll. 67-69.—समवायश्चै etc.—So it is a false distinction to draw that the समवाय which joins धर्म and धर्मिन् is मुख्य, while that which joins समवायत्व with the original समवाय is गौण न गौण-भेदः" of the Stanza.

ll. 30-35.—[illegible] etc.—The existence of समवाय is not a matter of faith, but is evidenced by the sensuous experience 'इह तन्तुषु पटः' according to the old school of Nyāya, and, I believe, of Vaiśeṣikas also. According to the recognised school of the Vaiśeṣikas represented by Praśastapāda, and also according to the later Naiyāyikas, however समवाय is अनुमेय—See Muktāvalī on St. XI and Dinakarī on the same. It was only fair that the Naiyāyikas should admit this and change the old dogma, in deference to the voice of a large number of opponents all ready to swear that they never perceived any such thing as समवाय.

ll. 35-36.—[illegible] etc.—Construe thus: [illegible] (व्याप्ति) [illegible]:— [illegible] though placed after [illegible] in the stanza is to be construed with [illegible] Just as the [illegible] in [illegible] e. इह तन्तुषु पटः implies, according to you, समवाय (व्याप्ति) relation, so, to be consistent, you should hold the same with regard to the समवाय itself The point is made clear in the passage beginning with "[illegible]" (P 83)

ll. 30-35 —[illegible] etc —How do you say that there is no such awareness of समवाय? For we are distinctly aware of it when we say that पट is in the तन्तुषु, or that [illegible] is in the [illegible] or that [illegible] is in the [illegible] Here we are conscious not of the [illegible] and [illegible] only but also of the residence of the one in the other Such is the argument of the Vaiśeṣika in favour of समवाय It is answered in the following lines.

Page 83.

ll. 33-43—[illegible] etc.—Just as you say [illegible] [illegible] and add that here [illegible] is but the [illegible] or [illegible] and is not a separate entity and that the connection of [illegible] with [illegible] is समवाय, why can we not [illegible] समवाय and add that समवायत्व is the स्वरूप [illegible] and thus the connection of समवाय with its स्वरूप viz., [illegible] would be another समवाय and so on ad infinitum? cf. [illegible] 252. If समवाय had not the [illegible] than [illegible] which is [illegible]

Stanza VII

Another doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika school which is next criticized is the *Doctrine of Samavāya.*

Stanza VII: If there be an *absolute* distinction between धर्म and धर्मिन्, there can be no such relation as that of धर्म and धर्मिन्. If you say that the relation is due to समवाय (= वृत्ति = inherence or residence) we would point out that three realities—1 धर्म, 2 धर्मिन् and 3 समवाय—are not perceived, but only two viz., the first and the second. If it be contended that the experience 'this घट is in the घट' bears testimony to the residence—Vṛtti (Samavāya)—of the former in the latter please note that the line of argument will carry you too far, requiring you to recognise a समवाय in a समवाय and so on *ad infinitum.* If to meet this difficulty you draw a distinction between the two समवायs saying that while one is primary the other is secondary all that we need say is—the distinction is imaginary. Moreover it is contrary to common experience to say that the घट is in the घटत्व.

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l. 4. मायविनो etc.—'हुं' in अनिर is a rhetorical appendage of अपि, having no particular meaning of its own. It is sometimes used after किम्, as in the two passages cited in the text. The first is from Kumāra. II; ... and the second from Śiśupālavadha 12.

l. 7. मत्यन्तर etc.—अत्यन्त=absolute; synonym of the word अतिर of the Kārikā. The Jaina does not deny the distinction in a certain sense between धर्म and धर्मिन्; what he denies is *absolute* distinction between them. Compare the view of the Śaṅkara Vedāntin who affirms the identity (तादात्म्य) of the two and while recognising some distinction denies that it has any *real* existence, the धर्म and the द्रव्य being looked upon as a real (मिथ्या अनिर्वचनीय) appearances or aspects of the one Absolute Reality (See Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya on Br. S. ii. II. 1. 12, and Advaitabrahma ..., on समवाय).

तन्त्रगतस्यासम्भाविताभावात्। कथमशरीरस्य परमपुरुषस्य संकल्प इति चेत्। न शरीरत्वेन संकल्पः शरीरस्य संकल्पहेतुत्वाभावात्। मन एव हि संकल्पहेतुः। तदभ्युपगतमीश्वरेऽपि कार्यत्वेनैव [illegible] मनसोऽपि मानप्रसावात्। मानस्य संकल्पः सशरीरस्यैव समवस्थानादिति चेद् न। मनसो नित्यत्वेन देहापगमेऽपि मनसः सद्भावेनैवावस्थानात्। अतो निखिलजगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिविलयकुशलादिकार्यं निर्माणे कुशलतरस्य परिमितशक्तिज्ञानस्य केषुचिदपि प्रमाणतीति निखिलभुवननिर्माणचतुरोऽचिन्त्यापरिमितज्ञानशक्त्यैश्वर्योऽशरीरः संकल्पमात्रसाधनः परिमितकामानन्दीश्वराधिपतिपरमपुरुषः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरोऽनुमानेनैव सिध्यति।

यदुक्तं सावयवत्वादीनां कार्यं सत्त्व जगत् कार्यं च तदुचितकर्तृविशेषपूर्वकत्वमिति निखिलभुवननिर्माणचतुरः पुरुषविशेषोऽनुमानेन सिध्यतीति तदयुक्तम्। महीमहार्णवादीनां कार्यत्वेऽप्येकदैवैकेन निर्मितत्वे प्रमाणाभावात्। न चैकस्य सर्वस्य सकृदेवोत्पादकत्वं प्रापतम्। क्रमेणैव कर्ता स्यात्। पृथगपृथगेव कार्येषु तत्तत्कार्यैकस्वभावेन कर्तृत्वेनाविशेषमाप्तेः ।... ...

अस्मिंश्च प्रयोगे—तनुभुवनादि क्षेत्रज्ञकर्तृकम् कार्यत्वात् घटवत्। ईश्वरः कर्ता न भवति प्रयोजनशून्यत्वात् मुक्तात्मवत्। ईश्वरः कर्ता न भवति अशरीरत्वादेव। न च क्षेत्रज्ञानां स्वशरीराधिष्ठाने व्यभिचारः। तत्रापि [illegible] शरीरस्य सद्भावात्। नित्यमिति च कार्ये च नैकवृत्तेः [illegible] इति।

अपि च किमीश्वरः सशरीरोऽशरीरो वा कार्यं करोतीति। न तावदशरीरः अशरीरस्य कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः। आत्मनामपि कार्येषु सशरीरस्यैव कर्तृत्वम्। मनसो नित्यत्वेऽप्यशरीरस्य कर्तृत्वादर्शनात्। नापि सशरीरः विकल्पासहत्वात्। नापि सशरीरः विकल्पासहत्वात्। तच्छरीरं किं नित्यम् अनित्यम्। न तावन्नित्यम्। सावयवस्य द्रव्यस्य नित्यत्वे अवयवेष्वपि नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। सावयवस्य नित्यत्वेऽपि नित्यत्वप्रसक्तिविरोधात्। तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य कस्यचिदेव शरीरत्वसम्भवाभावात्। एतदेव हेतुरिति चेत्। न अशरीरस्य तदयोगात्। अन्येन शरीरेण सशरीर इति चेत्। न। अनवस्थानात्। न हि सम्भवतो निर्माणं वा। अशरीरत्वादेव न तदुपपत्तिः। नापि निर्माणस्य कार्यस्य च तादृशं मुक्तात्मवत्। कार्यं जगदित्यनुमानाभ्युपगमेऽपि कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेरिति ईश्वरानुमानं निरस्तम्। अतो सर्वानुमानेन ईश्वरानुमानं दुरनुमानमिति शास्त्रैकप्रमाणकत्वं परब्रह्मणः सर्वथा युक्तम्। — Rām. b-Bhāṣya, I. 1. 3, pp. 133-37 (Vānī Ed.)

l. 8. धर्म धर्मिणा etc.—The fact that we *relate* them is a disproof of their *absolute* distinction—an argument well-known in Neo-Hegelianism. Were they absolutely distinct, we could not so much as say that a particular धर्म belonged to धर्मिन्. As for so far as distinction was concerned it would be in the same position with respect to the धर्मिन् as that occupied by the धर्म of any other object with respect to the said धर्मिन्. In other words, the धर्म would be a total stranger to the particular धर्मिन् and would be in no way *its*. Thus, A (dravya) and A (its guṇa) would be *absolutely* distinct just as A (the dravya) and B' (guṇa of another dravya) are absolutely distinct—there being no difference between the position of A (the first guṇa) and B' (the second guṇa) with respect to A (the first dravya), on the hypothesis of bsolute distinction.

l. 11. वस्तुवृत्ति वृत्ति etc.— वृत्त्यति —A possible defence of the Vais'eṣika position.

l. 12. अयुतसिद्धानामाधार etc.—' समवाय or वृत्ति as it is called in the stanza, owing to the residence (वृत्ति) of one thing in the other—is defined as 'अयुतसिद्धानामाधार्याधारभूतानामिहप्रत्यय-हेतुः सम्बन्धः'' (The definition is taken from Praśasta. Bh. section on समवाय p. 324. Viz. ed.) Of things indissolubly connected as आधार and आधेय we say 'Here is A (आधेय) residing in B (आधार)'. This perception of the residential connection (वृत्ति) of A with B is evidence of समवाय. 'अयुत-सिद्ध'—roughly indissolubles—are thus described: ''ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्ये एकमविनश्यदवस्थमपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तौ अयुतसिद्धौ''—अयुतसिद्धयोः सम्बन्धः अवयवावयविनोः, गुणगुणिनोः, क्रियाक्रियावतोः, जातिव्यक्त्योः विशेषनित्य-द्रव्ययोः' सम्बन्धः (Tarkabhāṣā).

l. 13. 'समवाय so-called because it weaves or strings *together* ('समवायनात्) dravya and guṇa. It is also called 'वृत्ति' because it causes गुण etc. to reside (वर्तनात्) in द्रव्य

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l. 15. पिण्डितृत्ति = separate.

ll. 16-22.—समवायो समवायो etc.—Hemacandra's reply to the Vaiśeṣika's vindication of समवाय is that it is unwarranted by

[illegible] There is no प्रमाण of धर्म धर्मिन् and समवाय No doubt we see two separate stones rivetted together by lac (लाक्षा), but we do not see धर्म and धर्मिन् so rivetted together by a *third* thing corresponding to the lac in the analogy

l. 28-29.—नित्यो etc.—Besides, the समवाय is said to be 'एको नित्यः [illegible]'—which would make the घटत्व of घट reside in पट quite as well as in घट ! For the two समवायs (घटत्वसमवाय and पटत्वसमवाय) are, as you hold, but *one, eternal, omnipresent and incorporeal*" and therefore in touch with everything simultaneously like आकाश. Moreover when घट perishes its समवाय will be no more (it must be no more; for how can it exist without the घट to which it belongs ?), and as there is but one समवाय in the universe, and the one has perished, a समवाय becomes impossible thereafter !

l. 29-30—समवायभेद etc.—The Vaiśeṣika endeavours to explain the position by the hypothesis of different अवच्छेदकs (limiting circumstances, the media in which the अवच्छेदक reveals itself) belonging to one समवाय. Thus, समवाय is but one; but घटसमवाय, पटसमवाय etc. are different in consequence of the different अवच्छेदकs of the समवाय viz. घट पट etc., which are the limiting conditions or media in which the समवाय manifests itself. To this Malliṣeṇa replies: एवमनित्यत्वापत्तिः—This is virtually admitting the plurality of समवायs and their perishableness along with घट पट etc. It may be noted that later Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas have abandoned the creed of a single, eternal समवाय—which is admitted by them to be many [illegible] and perishable (अनित्य). The reason for the earlier [illegible] and [illegible] holding the doctrine of one समवाय probably was this [illegible] [illegible] found it absurd to associate the quality of number [illegible] [illegible] number itself being a guṇa which was [illegible] [illegible] to draw [illegible] by समवाय and so when they spoke of one [illegible] while that [illegible] meant was that they could not [illegible] [illegible] Similarly I think when they say नित्य [illegible] what they should mean is that there [illegible] [illegible] to it. So about [illegible]

l. 8. वस्तु वस्तित्व etc.—Th
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(dravya) and A (its guṇa
just as A (the dravya) and B'
absolutely distinct—there be
position of A (the first guṇa
respect to A (the first dravya
distinction.

l. 11. एकत्रैव सति etc.—
the Vaiśeṣika position.

l. 12. समवायिकारणताव्यव॰
called in the stanza, owing to
in the other—is defined as
हेतुः समवायः" (The definitio
section on समवाय p. 324. V
connected as आधार and आधे
residing in B (आधार)' Th
connection (वृत्ति) of A with
नियत—roughly indissol ble
स्वभाववित्वस्वरूपविशेषणाविशेषो ...
अवयवावयविनोः एकवृत्तिनो ...
विशेषके' संबन्धः (Tarkabhāṣ

l. 13. 'समवायः' so-cal
together (समवायात्) dravy
because it causes गुण etc. to

Page 33.

l. 15. विविक्तैव = separ

ll. 16-23.—समवायाश्रयं समवाये
Vaiśeṣika's vindication of समवा

निरवयवस्य प्राप्तानामेव प्राप्तिः समवायः"—Contra, "अप्राप्तयोः प्राप्तिः संयोगः" Difference between संयोग and समवाय—the former joins things that were not joined before; the latter joins things that are already joined i. e. it is the name of a relation to explain a relatedness which has been already there.

ll. 50-55—यत् पृथिवीत्वं etc.—A distinction is drawn by the Vaiśeṣika between the case of पृथ्वीत्व and that of the alleged समवायत्व. The former is a real जाति and a सामान्य which embraces all the व्यक्ति i.e. individual पृथ्वी within it, and so the समवाय which connects it with the व्यक्ति is a मुख्य समवाय i. e. समवाय in the primary and real sense of the term, whereas समवाय being but one व्यक्ति, समवायत्व is not a real सामान्य and therefore its existence in समवाय, and the second समवाय by which it would be expected to exist in it, will be both अमुख्य or गौण i.e. secondary and unreal. The distinction between मुख्य and गौण is pointed out infra p. 34. ll. 63-64.—मुख्यत्वं चैतद् etc.

समवाय चैकत्वात् etc.—The fine distinction which the Vaiśeṣika has drawn between the two cases is unfounded. You say that when there is but one व्यक्ति, as in the case of समवाय there can be no real जाति or सामान्य (See Udayanācārya's famous Kārikā: "व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं सङ्करोऽथानवस्थितिः । रूपहानिरसंबन्धो जातिबाधकसंग्रहः" This will be explained below in Note on St. VIII. ll. 4-75.) But we answer: Where is व्यक्त्यभेदः (only a single individual) in the case of समवाय which would preclude the possibility of जाति or universal? There is a घटसमवाय there is a पटसमवाय, and so are innumerable समवायs which would require a जाति quite as much as पृथ्वी. (Recall the ...mission of the new school of Nyāya noted above in Note on 29-30).

-मुख्यत्वं चैतद् etc.—Distinction between मुख्य and
that which is invariable; also, complete,
is the opposite of this."

etc.—So it is a false distinction to draw
... धर्म and धर्मिन् is मुख्य while that
... the original समवाय is गौण ... गौण-

ll. 30-35.—अस्तु सर्वं etc.—The existence of समवाय is not a matter of faith, but is evidenced by the sensuous experience 'इह तन्तुषु पटः' according to the old school of Nyāya, and, I believe, of Vaiśeṣika also. According to the recognised school of the Vaiśeṣikas represented by Praśastapāda, and also according to the later Naiyāyikas, however समवाय is अनुमेय—See Muktāvalī on St. XI. and Dinakarī on the same. It was only fair that the Naiyāyikas should admit this and change the old dogma, in deference to the voice of a large number of opponents all ready to swear that they never perceived any such thing as समवाय.

ll. 35-38.—इहेदमिति etc.—Construe thus: इहेदमिति धीर्न च (स्मृति) अस्ति।— न स्मृति though placed after अस्ति in the stanza is to be construed with धीः Just as the समवायप्रतिभास in इहेदम्, i. e. इह तन्तुषु पटः implies, according to you, समवाय (वृत्ति) relation, so, to be consistent you should hold the same with regard to the समवाय itself The point is made clear in the passage beginning with "समवाय इहत्वम्" (P 33).

ll. 30-35.—अथ सर्वं समवायस्य न ज्ञाने प्रतिभासते etc.—How do you say that there is no such awareness of समवाय? For we are distinctly aware of it when we say that पट is in the तन्तु, or that रूप is in the आत्मन् or that रूप is in the घट. Here we are conscious not of the धर्म and धर्मिन् only but also of the residence of the one in the other Such is the argument of the Vaiśeṣikas in favour of समवाय It is answered in the following lines.

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ll 38-49.—समवाय इहत्वम् etc.—Just as you say गुणादिव्यतिरिक्तं गुणी and add that here गुणित्व is but the स्वरूप or अधिकरण of गुणी and is not a separate entity and that the connection of गुणी with गुणित्व is समवाय, why can we not say समवायव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् समवाय and add that समवायत्व is the स्वरूप of समवाय, and then the connection of समवाय with its स्वरूप viz., समवाय would be another समवाय and so on *ad infinitum*? cf. समवाय समवायत्वेन गुणत्वमुपगम्यते ...

1. "सा"—Guṇaratna, p. 252. If समवाय had not the ... would be *nothing* no better than ... which is Vaiśeṣika's

Stanza VIII

The commentary on the last stanza was only a preliminary skirmish directed against one single tenet of the Vaiśeṣika preparatory to the main offensive which is now going to be vigorously conducted against the whole of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy especially against its doctrine of समवाय and its conception of the nature of आत्मन् and मोक्ष

I. Vaiśeṣika Categories and their subdivisions.

1. The *Six Padārthas* or the highest Nameables: (1) द्रव्य (2) गुण (3) कर्म (4) सामान्य, (5) विशेष and (6) समवाय. Later Vaiśeṣikas add (7) अभाव

The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra says: "धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम्," on which the Praśastapāda Bhāṣya runs as follows:—"द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां षण्णां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यतत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुः." thus fixing the number of पदार्थs definitely at *six*. Its commentator—Śrīdhara, of the tenth century A. D.—would add अभाव as the seventh to complete the list of the categories; for अभाव is as real as the rest, and yet it is not mentioned by the Sūtrakāra or the Bhāṣyakāra, not because it is not a real category but because it is dependent upon भाव. The argument, or rather the excuse, for the omission would go too far and would apply to certain other categories such as गुण etc. which are dependent upon द्रव्य. The same weakness belongs to the following remark of Udayana and his commentator "अभावस्तु स्वरूपवानपि पृथग् नोद्दिष्टः। प्रतियोगिनिरूपणाधीननिरूपणत्वात्। न तु तुच्छत्वात् [Thus the doctrine differs from that of the S. Vedānta and Prabhākara's school]" "अभावो भावरूपतया नोपदर्शित इत्य- [illegible] केचित्। तन्मतनिरासायाह। अभावस्त्विति। स्वरूपवान् प्रामाणिकः। पृथगुद्देशविषयत्वाभावे हेतुः। न तु अत्र भाव्ये मोक्ष इव। पारम्पर्य निःश्रेयस [illegible] इत्यर्थः। तथाविधाभावे हेतुमाह। प्रतियोगीति। प्रतियोगिनिरूपणं प्रमाणं तत् यत्र स्यादित्यर्थः [This is a new and very curious explanation of प्रतियोगिन् which could never have been meant by Udayana]। तदधीननिरूपणत्वादित्यर्थः। [illegible] सामान्यविशेषसमवाये [illegible] [विशेषिते] अभावोऽ-

l. 73.—अपि च लौकिकाः etc.—Even the man in the street says इह पटे तन्तवः —"there are so many threads in this piece of cloth, nobody says the cloth is in the threads. So the Vaiśeṣika argument of 'इह तन्तुषु पटः' breaks down.

पांसुपादः—he who walks barefooted on the road and has dusty feet; hence, the man in the street; cf. "[illegible] पटे तन्तवः इत्येव प्रतीतिर्भवत्"—Gunaratna, p. 251. See below Appendix 3.

References: For the Vaiśeṣika case see Vaiś. Sūtras, Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya, Nyāyakandalī, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra-Upaskāra, Muktāvalī, Dinakarī, etc.

For a vigorous criticism of the same see Bād. Sūtras with the Com. of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, etc.

Appendices.

1.

इहेदमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः" Vaiś. Sūtras VII ii-26.

"कार्यकारणयोरित्युपलक्षणम् । अकार्यकारणयोरपि दृश्यत्वात् । [illegible] ...... [illegible] ...... [illegible]"—Vaiś. Sūtras VII, ii, 26-27-28 Upaskāra.

Stanza VIII

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विरुद्धा स्यात् । इति स्वतन्त्रोऽपि निरूपितत्वात् । सत्यमीति । भावाभावत्व स्वरूपे-णैवेति वक्तिव्यतां भावस्यापि निरूप्य । विभागविभागयो तु भावः प्रत्यक्षेणैवाप्रति-रूप । वैधर्म्येकपदेऽन्योन्याभावस्यान्यायाभावविरोधी । वैधर्म्यस्य व्यतिरेकस्य तथा तत्त्वाभावस्यान्योन्याभावस्य व्यतिरेकव्याप्ती सामान्येऽन्योन्याभावस्य स्वीकृतत्वादिति भाव । अत्यन्तभावसिद्धत्वसिद्धत्व च प्रागभावध्वंसाभावयोः स्यात् एतेन समत्व इतिवक्तव्य तदपीति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥" —Kiraṇāvalī–Bhāskara.

This is justifying the recognition of अभाव as a category on the authority of a sister school—the Nyāyadars'ana—and its implied acceptance by the Vaiś. Sūtrakāra himself in the Sūtras which refer to प्रागभाव and प्रध्वंसाभाव and to अन्योन्याभाव and अत्यन्ताभाव under the names वैधर्म्य and व्यतिरेक. Here is one example of the conservative liberalism of Indian writers. This explanation, however does not cure the enumeration in the V.-Sūtra of the defect of being inexhaustive. It only justifies addition. Udayana is on much firmer ground when he says in the Lakṣaṇāvalī:" अभिधेया पदार्थाः— । स द्विविधः । भावाभाव-भेदात् । तत्र तत्त्वनिर्वचनत्वविवक्षितत्वे भाव । स च षोढा द्रव्यादिभेदेन that is to say that the Sūtrakāra had before his mind only the भाव when he penned this Sūtra.

2. The Nine *Dravyas* (1) पृथ्वी (2) जल, (3) तेजस् etc., "क्रियागुणवत् समवायिकारणम् V.-Sūtra—तमः or अन्धकार which is regarded by Mīmāṃsakas and some others as a positive dravya is according to the Nyāya–Vaiś. nothing but तेज-आभावमात्र

3. The twenty-four Guṇas 17—रूप etc., *plus* 7 गुरुत्व etc. The original Sūtra mentioned only *seventeen* to which Praśastapāda, added *seven*, वेग (Velocity), भावना (Impression—physical and mental), and स्थितिस्थापक (Elasticity)—are but different varieties of संस्कार and so are included in संस्कार by virtue of the jāti संस्कारत्व which belongs to them all. शौर्य औदार्य etc.—come under the recognized heads of Guṇas. On the number of guṇas cf. "गुणाश्च रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्व बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्चेति कण्ठोक्ताः सप्तदश । च-शब्दसमुच्चिताश्च गुरुत्व द्रवत्व-स्नेह-संस्कार-धर्म-अधर्म-शब्दाः सप्तैवेत्येवं चतुर्विंशतिर्गुणाः ॥"—P Bhāṣya; and वेग तु शौर्यौदार्यादीनामत्रैवान्तर्भावात् कैश्चिदनभ्युपगमादपि । शौर्यं प्रयत्नो-ऽपि यत्नः परावमानासहनता । तच्च प्रयत्नविशेष एव । तथाचि सामर्थ्यविशेषे

बुद्धिरीत्यर्थः । अयत्नपूर्वकप्रत्ययात्मकमेव । तस्मान्निमित्तैकी बुद्धिरीत्यर्थम् । श्रीचमागमपूर्वकत्वम् । तथैवमात्रि अदृष्टवशेन धर्माधर्मयोरनर्थकः । तस्मात् इति च वेगस्य मात्मानात्रिपरत्वात्करण अभिधानम् । —"कर्मणो धर्माधर्मयो न । तेषामदृष्टवेगसंस्कारादिपरत्वात्मनः । एव तर्हि न च नित्यम् । अदृष्टमात्रे धर्माधर्मयोरेव त्वात् । न । अदृष्टमात्रस्य भावात् । निर्गुणेऽपि गुणेन्द्रियत्वाधर्मयोरिन्द्रियवत्त्वगुणैरिति निरिति व्यवहारः" N Kandali.

4. The five कर्माणि: उत्क्षेपण etc.—"गमनग्रहणात् etc. a remark found in almost every book of the school. For उत्क्षेपण some read ऊर्ध्व (vide Pr Bhāṣya and N Kandali). Upaskāra reads उत्क्षेपण as in our printed text. कर्म is thus defined.—एकद्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षकारणमिति कर्मलक्षणम्

5. सामान्य—Generality—the principle of the co-ordination of individuals in one group. The whole passage bearing on सामान्य and the next two categories—from here to the end of the first section इति षट् पदार्थाः —occurs also in the Laghu Vṛtti on the Ṣaḍ. D-Sam: see pp. 61-62-63 सत्र त्रिविधं etc. One would suppose that the highest point to which a generalization could be carried was पदार्थत्व embracing all the पदार्थाः in one group. But this is not what the Vais thinks. Certain categories he sets aside as incapable of possessing सामान्य in the real sense of the term —which according to him, belongs to only three categories, viz., द्रव्य गुण and कर्म. This highest सामान्य he calls सत्ता, also भाव (cf. Vais. Sūtra I. ii. 4 भावोऽनुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव) which, be it noted, does not mean Existence simply but *Existence carried to the highest point of generalization*, which stops at the collective group of द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म and cannot go beyond it. This सत्ता is otherwise called परसामान्य because it is the highest सामान्य to which *real* generalization can be carried. द्रव्यत्व गुणत्व etc. are lower than this, but are higher than पृथिवीत्व घटत्व etc., and are called अपरसामान्य. A अपरसामान्य is not only a सामान्य but also a विशेष—(see

The Vais. Naiyāyikas, therefore distinguish जाति from उपाधि. For this and सामान्य and अपर उपाधि see Muktāvali and Nilakanthi.

much as it co-ordinates its individuals in a group and differentiates them from those of other groups, and is, therefore called, सामान्यविशेष. This fluid conception of सामान्य-विशेष which was held by the old Vaiśeṣikas is endorsed among later writers by Keśavamiśra in his Tarkabhāṣā

cf. "सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम्"—Vaiś. Sūtra I. ii. 3. "सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं च । तत्र परं सत्ता । अपरं सत्तापेक्षया द्रव्यत्वादि । [illegible] सामान्यस्य [illegible] च [illegible] । [illegible] सामान्यस्य [illegible] [illegible]—[illegible] सामान्यमपरमपि तथा । परं तु सामान्यं विशेषसंज्ञामपि लभते [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] विशेषसंज्ञा। तथा च [illegible] सामान्यमेव विशेषसंज्ञम् ।' —Upaskāra on V S. I.ii. 3. "भावोऽनुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव ।" V.S. I.ii.4. द्रव्यत्वं गुणत्वं कर्मत्वं च सामान्यानि विशेषाश्च' —V.S. I. ii. 5. "अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः" V S. I. ii. 6. [illegible] विशेषा [illegible] [illegible] सामान्यविशेषसंज्ञाभिधानं ।" Upaskāra, ibid. "सदिति यतो द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु सा सत्ता । V.S.I. ii. 7 द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरं सत्ता V S. I. ii. 8.

"न तु द्रव्यगुणकर्मस्वरूपैव सत्ता [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । न च सत्ता [illegible] [illegible] इति [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] । सत्ता [illegible] । तथा च [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] । न च [illegible] सत्ता । [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] सत्ता । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ Upaskāra, ibid. "गुणकर्मसु च भावान्न कर्म न गुणः" V.S.I.ii.9.

न हि कर्म कर्मसु वर्तते न वा गुणो गुणेषु न वा गुणः गुणे कर्मणि वा । सत्ता तु गुणे कर्मणि च वर्तते तेन [illegible] विशेष सत्ता ॥ Upaskāra, ibid "सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥" V S. I. ii. 10. "यदि सत्ता द्रव्यं [illegible] कर्म वा स्यात् तदा सामान्यविशेषवती स्यात् । न च सत्तायां सामान्यविशेषा [illegible] । न हि [illegible] सत्ता द्रव्यं गुणः कर्म वेति [illegible] । Upaskāra, ibid

सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं चानुवृत्तिप्रत्ययकारणम् । तत्र परं सत्ता महाविषयत्वात् । सा चानुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव । द्रव्यत्वाद्यपरमल्पविषयत्वात् तच्च व्यावृत्तेरपि हेतुत्वात् सामान्यं सद् विशेषाख्यामपि लभते । P.Bhāṣya.

सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं च । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

अनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययकारणम् ।......। तत्र सत्तासामान्यं परमनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययकारणमेव। यथा परस्परविशिष्टेषु चर्मवस्त्रकम्बलादिष्वेकस्मान्नीलद्रव्याभिसम्बन्धात् नीलं नील मिति प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिः तथा परस्परविशिष्टेषु द्रव्यगुणकर्मस्वविशिष्टा सत् सदिति प्रत्य यानुवृत्तिः सा चार्थान्तराद्भवितुमर्हतीति यत्तदर्थान्तरं सा सत्तेति सिद्धा। सत्तानु सम्बन्धात् सत्सदिति प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिः। तस्मात् सा सामान्यमेव। अपरं द्रव्यत्वगुणत्व- कर्मत्वादि अनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वात् सामान्यं विशेषश्च भवति ।......। एतानि तु द्रव्यत्वादीनि प्रभूतविषयत्वात् प्राधान्येन सामान्यानि स्वाश्रयविशेषकत्वाद्भक्त्या विशेषाख्यानीति । P Bhāṣya.

"तत्र द्वयोर्मध्ये परं सत्ता भावो महासामान्यमिति चोच्यते। द्रव्यत्वाद्यवान्तर सामान्यापेक्षया महाविषयत्वात्। अपरसामान्यं द्रव्यत्वादि एतच्च सामान्यविशेष इत्यपि व्यपदिश्यते। तथाहि । द्रव्यत्वं नवसु द्रव्येषु वर्तमानत्वात् सामान्यम् गुणकर्मभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वाद्विशेषः ततः कर्मधारये सामान्यविशेष इति। एवं द्रव्यत्वा पेक्षया पृथिवीत्वादिकमपरं तदपेक्षया घटत्वादिकम्। एवं चतुर्विंशतौ गुणेषु वर्तमानत्वात् गुणत्वं सामान्यं द्रव्यकर्मभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वेन विशेषः। एवं गुणत्वापेक्षया रूपत्वादिकं तदपेक्षया नीलत्वादिकम्। एवं पञ्चसु कर्मसु वर्तमानत्वात्कर्मत्वं सामान्यं द्रव्य- गुणेभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वाद्विशेषः। एवं कर्मत्वापेक्षयोत्क्षेपणत्वादिकं ज्ञेयम्॥ तत्र सत्ता द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरं कथं ज्ञायत इति चेदुच्यते। न द्रव्यं सत्ता द्रव्यादन्यत्वार्थे एकद्रव्यत्वात् एकैकस्मिन् द्रव्ये वर्तमानत्वादित्यर्थे द्रव्यत्ववत्। यथा द्रव्यत्वं नवसु द्रव्येषु प्रत्येकं वर्तमानं द्रव्यं न भवति किन्तु सामान्यं विशेषलक्षणं द्रव्यत्वमेव एवं सत्तापि। वैशेषिकमते हि अद्रव्यं वा द्रव्यं अनेकद्रव्यं वा द्रव्यम्। तत्राद्रव्यं द्रव्यमा काशं कालो दिग् आत्मा मनः परमाणवः। अनेकद्रव्यं तु द्व्यणुकादिस्कन्धाः। एकद्रव्यं तु द्रव्यमेव न भवति। एकद्रव्यवती सत्तेति द्रव्यलक्षणरहितत्वान्न द्रव्यम्। एवं न गुणः सत्ता गुणेष्वभावात् गुणत्ववत्। यदि हि सत्ता गुणः स्यात् न तर्हि गुणेषु वर्तेत। निर्गुणत्वाद्गुणानाम्। वर्तते च गुणेषु सत्ता। सन् गुण इति प्रतीतेः। तथा न सत्ता कर्म कर्मसु भावात् कर्मत्ववत्। यदि च सत्ता कर्म स्यात् न तर्हि कर्मसु वर्तेत। निष्कर्मत्वात् कर्मणाम्। वर्तते च कर्मसु भावः। सत्कर्मेति प्रतीतेः। तस्मात् अर्थान्तरं सत्ता। Maṇibhadra's Com. on Ṣaḍ. Dars Sam. pp. 61–62.

"तत्र द्रव्यत्वादिकं स्वाश्रयेषु द्रव्यादिष्वनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुत्वात् सामान्यमुच्यते। स्वाश्रयस्य च विजातीयेभ्यो गुणादिभ्यो व्यावृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुतया विशेषोऽप्युच्यते। ततोऽपरं सामान्यविशेषरूपत्वात् सामान्यविशेषसंज्ञां लभते। अपेक्षाभेदा- देकस्यापि सामान्यविशेषव्यवहारो न विरुध्यते॥ —Guṇaratna's Com. on Ṣaḍ-Dars Sam. p. 276.

"केचित् पुनः प्राहुः। सामान्यं त्रिविधं महासामान्यं सत्तासामान्यं सामान्य- विशेषसामान्यं च। तत्र महासामान्यं षट्स्वपि पदार्थेषु पदार्थत्वबुद्धिकारि। सत्ता-

much as it co-ordinates its individuals in a group and differentiates them from those of other groups, and is, therefore called, सामान्यविशेष. This fluid conception of सामान्य-विशेष which was held by the old Vaiśeṣikas is endorsed among later writers by Keśavamiśra in his Tarkabhāṣā

cf. "सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम्"—Vaiś. Sūtra I. ii. 3. "सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं च। तत्र परं सत्ता। अपरं द्रव्यत्वादि। तत्र सामान्यस्य यद्विशेषस्य च स्वरूपं बुद्धिरेव। अनुवृत्तिबुद्धिः सामान्यस्य व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिर्विशेषस्य—परमपि सामान्यमपरमपि सत्ता। परं तु सामान्यं विशेषसंज्ञामपि लभते यथा द्रव्यत्वं द्रव्यमितरेभ्यो व्यावर्तयत् सत्येव भावं गुणो भेदं कर्मेति विशेषमपस। तथा च द्रव्यत्वादीनि सामान्यानामेव विशेषत्वम्।"—Upaskāra on V S. I.ii. 3. "भावोऽनुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव।" V.S. I.ii.4. "द्रव्यत्वं गुणत्वं कर्मत्वं च सामान्यानि विशेषाश्च"—V.S.I. ii. 5. "अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः" V. S. I. ii. 6. अन्त्या विशेषा नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयोऽपि विशेषत्वात् सर्वथैव सामान्यविशेषभिन्नाभिधानं।" Upaskāra, Ibid. "सदिति यतो द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु सा सत्ता।" V.S.I. ii. 7. द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरं सत्ता V. S. I. ii. 8.
न तु द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्यः पृथग्भावेन सत्ता नाशुप्रत्येयो द्रव्यगुणकर्मभेदेन तथा। यतो हि यदीयं जगति तदभावे भेदानापत्ते तथा सत्ता स्यात्। न च सत्ता तेभ्यो भेदेनानुपलभ्यते इति तद्व्यतिरिक्तेऽपि भाव इत्येति। द्रव्यत्वादेरप्यन्यथा। तथा पक्षान्ता। यथा च बहुसमवायावयवत्वेऽपि द्रव्यत्वाभावेन तेभ्यो भेदस्य सिद्धत्वात्। यतु तेभ्योऽन्यत्र भेदाभावे तदनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्ग। समवायोऽपि पुनरिति। न च व्यतिरिक्तस्यैव सत्ता। पर्यवसानानुपपत्तेः। अन्यतरत्वं भवतापत्तेः तैव सत्ता। अन्यत्रापि सत्तैकत्वमन्यत्रापृथक्त्वेन भेदाभिधिपि स्यात्॥ Upaskāra, Ibid. "गुणकर्मसु च भावान्न कर्म न गुणः" V.S.I.ii.9. "न हि कर्म कर्मसु वर्तते न वा गुणो गुणेषु न वा गुणं गुणे कर्मणि वा। सत्ता तु गुणे कर्मणि च वर्तते तेन द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेव सिद्धेव सत्ता॥ Upaskāra, Ibid. "सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च॥" V S. I. ii. 10. "यदि सत्ता द्रव्यं गुणः कर्म वा स्यात् तदा सामान्यविशेषवती स्यात्। न च सत्तायां सामान्यविशेषा द्रव्यत्वादय उपलभ्यन्ते। न हि भवति सत्ता द्रव्यं गुणः कर्म वेति कैश्चिदनुभवः।
Upaskāra, Ibid.

सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं चानुवृत्तिप्रत्ययकारणम्। तत्र परं सत्ता महाविषयत्वात्। सा चानुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव। द्रव्यत्वाद्यपरमल्पविषयत्वात् तच्च व्यावृत्तेरपि हेतुत्वात् सामान्यं सद् विशेषाख्यामपि लभते। P.Bhāṣya.

सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं च। व्यक्तिव्यापकत्वमधिकदेशवृत्तित्वं व्याप्यत्वमल्पदेशवृत्तित्वमपि तयोर्विशेषो ... अनुगताकारप्रत्ययजनकत्वेन अनुवृत्ति वर्तमान-

to which they belong from other dravyas (स्वाश्रयविशेषकत्वात्) They reside in each of the नित्यद्रव्य—one in each individual unit—viz., अणु, आकाश काल दिक्, आत्मन् and मन Just as we distinguish cows from horses owing to certain physical features, so do yogins perceive the distinction of atom A from atom B both of which belong to the substance of the same genus, despite all their homogeneity in point of shape quality etc. This must be in virtue of something in A which is not in B—and that something is called विशेष There is one विशेष for each नित्यद्रव्य and no विशेष belongs to more than one द्रव्य ; therefore, it does not serve as a basis of co-ordination and so, unlike जातिसामान्य such as द्रव्यत्व etc which are सामान्यविशेष, these are pure विशेष.

According to the older conception of विशेष विशेषs are of two kinds first, those that are *relative* and consequently not incompatible with सामान्य these are सामान्यविशेषs (see supra); secondly those that are *ultimate* and *absolute* The latter are अन्त्य and नित्यद्रव्यवृत्ति Later Nyāya takes note of the latter only and in it, it is not अन्त्यविशेष (as distinguished from सामान्यविशेष) which is described as नित्यद्रव्यवृत्ति but अन्त्य and नित्यद्रव्यवृत्ति are both predicates of the subject विशेष cf. "अन्त्यो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिर्विशेष परिकीर्तितः— Bh. Pariccheda and "अन्त्येऽवसाने वर्तते इति अन्त्य यदपेक्षया विशेषो नास्तीत्यर्थः । घटादीनां द्व्यणुकपर्यन्तानां तत्तदवयवभेदात् परस्परं भेदः । परमाणूनां परस्परं भेदको विशेष एव । स तु स्वत एव व्यावृत्तस्तेन विशेषान्तरापेक्षा नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥"—Muktāvalī on the same अत्रान्यतमानुमानस्य व्यवर्तकत्वं सविशेषम् किं विशेषेणेति चेत् । अन्यावर्तकत्वस्य व्यावर्तकज्ञानाभावात् । तत्र व्यावर्तकान्तरापेक्षायामनवस्थानात् । ननु विशेषेष्वपि अन्यद् इति चेत् । तत्र धर्मिमात्रस्यापेक्षया स्वतोव्यावृत्तत्वमेव नियतम् । यत्र च नित्यद्रव्ये विशेषा नियताः । तद्व्यावृत्तं च विशेषान्तरं आवश्यकत्वेन विशेषेष्वेव तेषां व्यावृत्तत्वात् आवश्यक च विशेषवत्ता व्यावृत्तत्वेन विशेषानाक्रमणात् इति भावः । [illegible] व्यावृत्ते तत्रत्य तत्र विशेष एवेत्यादि । तदीनानुविशेषरूपमिदमिति भावार्थः ॥

Cf. "अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः" V Sūtra I. ii. 6.

"ननु च यत्र विशेषरूपत्वे सति न तत्र कि सामान्यविशेषसंज्ञकेऽवर्णनीये इति [illegible] । अन्त्यत्वेति । अन्यथा विशेषा नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो [illegible]

सामान्यं त्रिपदार्थवृत्ति [illegible] । [illegible] तु [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ।" ibid. p. 277

तत्र सत्ता द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्यो etc.—Next it is shown how सत्ता (the महासामान्य) is a पदार्थ outside th groups of द्रव्य गुण and कर्म cf "द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरं सत्ता" Vais Sûtra I. ii. 8

(1) न द्रव्यं सत्ता ।"। सत्ता is not a द्रव्य because it is lacking the characteristic mark of a द्रव्य which is that it should be made of many constituent द्रव्य (अनेकद्रव्य), or of no द्रव्य (अद्रव्य) but never of single constituent द्रव्य (एकद्रव्य). Like द्रव्यत्व सत्ता resides in each द्रव्य And nothing which resides in single द्रव्य can be a द्रव्य itself. But सत्ता does reside in each single द्रव्य (एकैकस्मिन् द्रव्ये वर्तमानत्वात् ... एकद्रव्यवती च सत्ता इति द्रव्यलक्षणविलक्षणत्वात् [illegible]). According to the Vaiseṣika अद्रव्यं वा etc.—"a द्रव्य is without a constituent द्रव्य or has many constituent द्रव्य, but never single (un tary) constituent द्रव्य; for example, आकाश काल, दिक्, आत्मन् and परमाणु are द्रव्य devoid of constituent द्रव्य, while bodies such as द्व्यणुक (duads), त्र्यणुक (triads), etc., are possessed of many constituent द्रव्य—viz, the parts of which they are composed (See Mukti-Dinakari). But the सत्ता fulfils neither of the two conditions: it is एकद्रव्यवती that is, it exists in a single द्रव्य—e. g. गोत्व in a single cow—no less than in many cows; and it is, therefore, not a द्रव्य

(2) "गुणे न गुणः सत्ता। सत्ता is not a गुण For it resides in a गुण. And a गुण can never reside in a गुण गुण being themselves निर्गुण

(3) "कर्मसु न सत्ता कर्म।" सत्ता is not a कर्म For it resides in a कर्म And कर्म cannot reside i कर्म कर्म being themselves निष्कर्म.

6. विशेष :—cf. Prasastapâda Bh. and Nyâyakandali. pp.321-22. विशेष—rather a certain class of विशेष, according to the original notion of विशेष which was more comprehensive than the later are resident in नित्यद्रव्य and are ltimate, they are absolutely exclusive and thus they serve to distinguish the dravyas

to which they belong from other dravyas (स्वाश्रयविशेषकत्वात्) They reside in each of the नित्यद्रव्य—one in each individual unit—viz. अणु, आकाश काल, दिक्, आत्मन् and मनः. Just as we distinguish cows from horses owing to certain physical features, so do yogins perceive the distinction of atom A from atom B both of which belong to the substance of the same genus, despite all their homogeneity in point of shape quality etc. This must be in virtue of something in A which is not in B—and that something is called विशेष There is one विशेष for each नित्यद्रव्य and no विशेष belongs to more than one द्रव्य; therefore it does not serve as a basis of co-ordination and so, unlike अपरसामान्य such as द्रव्यत्व etc which are सामान्यविशेष, these are pure विशेष.

According to the older conception of विशेष विशेषs are of two kinds first, those that are *relative* and consequently not incompatible with सामान्य these are सामान्यविशेषs (see supra); secondly those that are *ultimate* and *absolute* The latter are अन्त्य and 'नित्यद्रव्यवृत्ति Later Nyāya takes note of the latter only and in it, it is not अन्त्यविशेष (as distinguished from सामान्यविशेष) which is described as नित्यद्रव्यवृत्ति but अन्त्य and नित्यद्रव्यवृत्ति are both predicates of the subject विशेष cf. "अन्त्यो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिर्विशेषः परिकीर्तितः—Bh. Pariccheda and "अन्त्यत्वे इति यतोऽन्यो विशेषो नास्तीत्यर्थः । घटादीनां द्व्यणुकपर्यन्तानां तत्तदवयवभेदात् परस्परं भेदः । परमाणूनां परस्परं भेदको विशेष एव । स तु स्वत एव व्यावृत्तः अतस्तत्र विशेषान्तरापेक्षा नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥ —Muktāvali on the same "ननु अन्त्यपरमाणुत्वादिना व्यावर्तकता परिकल्प्यते किं विशेषेणेति चेत् । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] ॥

Cf. "अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः" V Sūtra I. ii. 6.

"ननु च [illegible] सामान्यविशेषभेदेनाभिधीयते इति [illegible] । [illegible] । अन्त्या विशेषा नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो [illegible]-

[illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] ॥"—Upaskāra on the same.

तथा च प्रशस्तपादः—विशेषा इति—The passage thus quoted from P Bhāṣya is found verbatim in the printed editions, with just one slight variation—[illegible] for [illegible]—which too is reading of one of the MSS. The original passage, which is longer concludes as follows: "अन्त्यविशेषेष्विव परमाणुषु कस्मान्न स्वतः प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिः कल्प्यते इति चेत्। तादात्म्यात्। इहातदात्मकेष्वन्यनिमित्तः प्रत्ययो भवति। यथा घटादिषु प्रदीपात् न तु प्रदीपे प्रदीपान्तरात्। यथा गवाश्वमांसादीनां स्वत एवाशुचित्वं तद्योगादन्येषां तथेहापि तादात्म्यादन्त्यविशेषेषु स्वत एव प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिः तद्योगात् परमाण्वादिष्विति॥ P Bh. on विशेष

7 तथा अयुतसिद्धानां etc.—

अयुतसिद्धौ—The term is explained as परस्परपरिहारेण पृथगाश्रयानाश्रितौ i. e. which do not reside in separate आश्रय to the exclusion of each other e. g. तन्तु and पट which do not reside in separate आश्रयs to the exclusion of each other For the literal meaning of the word अयुतसिद्ध see Ṣaḍ-Darśana-Sam., Guṇaratna's Com p. 278 "[illegible]" For the oft-quoted definition see Tarka-Bhāṣā "ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्ये एकमविनश्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ। तदुक्तम् तावेवायुतसिद्धौ द्वौ विज्ञातव्यौ ययोर्द्वयोः। अवश्यमेकमपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते॥" See Praśasta Bhāṣya and Nyāyakandalī.

इह तन्तुषु etc.—समवाय defined as the इहप्रत्ययहेतुः—the special cause which accounts for such judgments as इह तन्तुषु पटः [illegible] judgment of distinction between तन्तु and पट, and yet of their indissoluble union.

II Explanation of th text of th Stanza.

1. According to the Vaiśeṣika, of th things existent, viz., the six padārthas, only some possess सत्ता

अस्तित्व—the very स्वरूप of a thing belongs to सामान्य etc., but it does not form the basis of any अनुवृत्ति or co-ordination in their case, and is, therefore, distinguished from that fuller and more real अस्तित्व which belongs to द्रव्य गुण and कर्म. The latter is technically known as सत्ता and is the basis of सत्प्रत्यय and अनुवृत्तिप्रत्यय i.e. judgments of existence and co-ordination. The reason why no judgment of co-ordination and therefore सामान्य is possible in the case of सामान्य विशेष and समवाय is that in the case of सामान्य it would lead to अनवस्था (a सामान्य in a सामान्य and so on *ad infinitum*); in the case of विशेष it would contradict its very nature (रूपहानि) to possess सामान्य; and in the case of समवाय there will be the lack of that very सम्बन्ध viz. समवाय which is required for holding the सामान्य for समवाय cannot exist in a समवाय (असंबन्धात्). This famous Kārikā of Udayanācārya—"व्यक्तेरभेद etc."—is found in his Kiraṇāvalī, a commentary on P. Bhāṣya.

This stanza of Udayanācārya has been explained in numerous books on Nyāya. Let us quote two explanations, one given briefly by Guṇaratna in S. D. S. Com.: "अस्य व्याख्या । व्यक्तेरभेद एकव्यक्तिवृत्ति सामान्यम् । आकाशे व्यक्तेरभेदान्न जातित्वम् १ । पृथिवीत्वे जाती यदि भूमित्वमुच्यते तदा तुल्यत्वम् २ । परमाणुत्व जातित्वे ऽङ्गीकृते पार्थिवाप्यतैजसवायवीयपरमाणुषु संकर ३ । सामान्ये यदि सामान्यमङ्गीक्रियते तदा तत्सामान्येऽप्यपरं सामान्यमित्यनवस्थितिः ४ । विशेषेषु यदि सामान्यं स्वीक्रियते तदा विशेषस्य रूपहानि ५ । यदि समवाये जातिरङ्गीक्रियते तदा संबन्धाभाव ६ । केन हि संबन्धेन तत्र सत्ता संबध्यते । समवायान्तराभावात् ।" p. 276; the other in Jayanārāyaṇa's Vivṛti of Upaskāra: "व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वमित्यादिना न जातिः । अभेदः एकव्यक्तिकत्वं तुल्यत्वं व्यक्तिसाम्यम् । परस्परात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरणयोरेकत्र समावेशः संकरः अनवस्था अप्रामाणिकानन्तपदार्थकल्पना, रूपहानिः स्वरूपहानिः असंबन्धः संबन्धाभावः । अस्यार्थः । आकाशस्य व्यक्तेरेकत्वात् आकाशत्वं न जातिः । घटत्वकलशत्वयोस्तुल्यत्वम् । भूतत्वमूर्तत्वयोः संकरः । जातिमत्त्वे सामान्यत्वं न जातिः । विशेषस्य व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिजनकस्वभावस्य विशेषत्वं जातिः स्यात् तदा जातिमत्त्वात् द्रव्यादिवद् विशेषाभावादेव स्वतो व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिजनकत्वं न स्यादिति विशेषत्वं न जातिः । अन्यथा स्वरूपहानिः स्यात् । तथा च विशेषो यदि जातिमान् स्यात्तदा जातिमत्त्वात् द्रव्यगुणकर्मान्यतमः स्यात् । विशेषत्वस्य जातित्वे द्रव्यगुणकर्मान्यतमत्वापत्त्या विशेषस्य स्वरूपहानिरिति । समवायत्वं संबन्धाभावात् समवायत्वं न जातिः । समवाये समवायाभावात् संबन्धाभावाद्व्याप्त्यनुपपत्तेः । इत्यादिविवादपदमस्ति समवाया इति मते मैत्रम् ।

सन्नपि स्वविषयतादि समवायेन न भाति स्यात् । समवायस्य आधिते समवायसंबन्धाभाव एव चात्मा इत्यादिवक्तव्यमीयम् । प्रायावयवेषु संयमः स्वनुषेव सानि सा च पुनरुत्पन्नो नास्तीत्याह ।"

2. यथा चैतन्यं &c.—Second line of the Stanza. Another curious doctrine of the Vaiś. is that ज्ञान is *absolutely* distinct from आत्मन् (a particular variety of the general relation of धर्म and धर्मिन् discussed in the last stanza)

अत्यन्तम्—absolutely distinct; the word is not subordinated to any compound, and it thus yields the idea of *absolute* distinction, not some distinction. The latter the Jaina too is prepared to hold.

अत्यन्तभेदे etc.—Absurd as the doctrine is, it requires to be given some appearance of reasonableness. Hence औपाधिक in the stanza, which means arising from an उपाधि i. e. conditioning circumstance, which in the present case is समवाय. Thus, the line means: चैतन्य or ज्ञान is absolutely distinct from आत्मन् but is connected with आत्मन् by समवायसंबन्ध; in other words, ज्ञान is an adventitious, not an essential, attribute of आत्मन्.

अनात्मत्वे etc.—If आत्मन् were not distinct from ज्ञान, the cessation of ज्ञान which must take place in the state of मोक्ष would mean the cessation—the death—of आत्मन्. Hence the Vaiś. doctrine of आत्मन् as separate from ज्ञान. "दुःख-जन्म-प्रवृत्ति etc.—in Nyāyasūtra I. i. 9. It means Pain, Birth, Activity, Passion, Error—of these every preceding one being destroyed every succeeding one is destroyed also; thus, in the state of मोक्ष all the special गुणs of आत्मन्, viz. बुद्धि etc. cease to exist.

3. यथा न संविद्—A third curious doctrine of the Vaiś. is that in the state of मोक्ष there is no संविद् (ज्ञान) or आनन्द; बुद्धि सुख etc. are all extirpated from आत्मन् in that state.

नवानामात्म etc.—Syllogism to prove that the nine विशेषगुणs of आत्मन्, viz. बुद्धि etc., must cease to exist in the state of मोक्ष. It is based upon the हेतु सन्तानत्वात् i. e. because they are streams i. e. none of them is permanent nature of आत्मन्, but streams of qualities continuously flowing on the ground of आत्मन्.

न ह वै सशरीरस्य etc.—This is a text of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, declaring that when अशरीरम् is rid of the body—as he must be in the state of मोक्ष—सुख and दुःख touch him no more

अस्ति च etc.—The verses quoted here, with the exception of couplet No. 5 occur in स्या मञ्जरी p. 508. The latter has one more couplet which gives the list of the six [illegible] । [illegible] A recent edition of the स्याद्वादमञ्जरी quotes in the footnote a somewhat different list "[illegible]"—इति [illegible]" The list of the text differs from both (Text p 39 l. 118).

सुभूतं etc.—सुभूतम् (noun) = A good (ironical and therefore = bad) doctrine indeed, has been formulated by them ! सुभूतम् (adverb) = with excellent (ironical) reason. For the irony contained in the word the commentator compares [illegible] etc.—which is quoted in the Kāvyaprakāśa.

III. Criticism of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines detailed above :—

1. [illegible] etc.—It is a piece of great audacity to restrict सत्ता to the three padārthas द्रव्य गुण and कर्म when the idea of existence is undeniably predicable of all the padārthas.

सत्ता [illegible] etc.—Just see how the word सत्ता is formed : It is an abstract noun from सत्—existing, pres part. of अस् to exist. It is, therefore wholly equivalent to अस्तित्व—and since अस्तित्व is the very essence of thing which you are prepared to predicate of all the पदार्थs (see supra) the plea that अनुवृत्तिप्रत्यय or co-ordination is possible in the case of the first three and is absent from the rest is baseless. For अनुवृत्तिप्रत्यय is possible in the case of all the categories. For just as we say [illegible] is a सामान्य [illegible] is a सामान्य, [illegible] is a सामान्य and so on, thus referring to a common idea (अनुवृत्तिप्रत्यय) of सामान्य running through all its specimens in the same way we have this विशेष that विशेष a third विशेष and so on, which shows that we have a general idea of विशेष which we recognize in all the विशेषs. Similarly in the

case of समवाय there are several समवायs taken with their several सम्बन्धिषु —which reveal one general idea of समवाय.

स्वरूपसत्त्वसाधर्म्येण—It may be contended that in consequence of all the categories having certain स्वरूप of their own, and therefore likeness in this particular सत्ता which really belongs to the first three is erroneously extended to the rest. Thus, in consequence of false ascription (अध्यारोप) of सत्ता to सामान्य etc. we imagine that the अनुवृत्त runs through them also, whereas, as a matter of fact, what belongs to them is mere अस्तित्व (not an अनुवृत्तसत्ता) as their स्वरूपसत्त्व *i. e* as the very being of those categories. The Jaina s answer to this argument is that if the ascription of सत्ता to सामान्य etc. be false for the reason that we are thereby ascribing common nature to things that are ally diverse, the same thing could be said about सत्ता as applied to द्रव्य गुण and कर्म and one would be as much an अध्यारोप (false ascription) as the other. The Vais'esika might reply that सत्ता as traced in द्रव्य गुण and कर्म is real, while in the rest it is unreal, for there cannot be a false ascription unless there is reality somewhere and that is in सत्ता as perceived in द्रव्य गुण and कर्म But this division of सत्ता into मुख्य and गौण,—मुख्य in the first three cases and गौण in the last three—could be reversed with equal justice, if only the distinction between real and unreal is to be secured somehow

सामान्यादिषु बाधकसद्भावात् etc. But it may be urged that the अस्तित्व in the case of the सामान्य etc. is गौण wing to the difficulties mentioned above (see bove). But, in truth, the difficulties are quite imaginary If the admission of सत्ता in सामान्य leads to अनवस्था, why not in द्रव्य? I द्रव्ये there is th स्वरूपसत्ता (their very being) already and admission of another सत्ता (सामान्य) would lead to similar अनवस्था Then, s to विशेष, there should be no harm in ascribing to them सत्ता, for that will not interfere with their nature, as is supposed, but will on the contrary confirm it. Besides, विशेष which is totally devoid of सामान्य is found nowhere. Lastly the समवाय would lose its very being, unless it

possessed a स्वरूपसत्ता i. e. existence of something that makes it what it is viz., स्वसत्ता which gives it its peculiar character of अविष्वग्भावसम्बन्ध (indissoluble relation)

किं च वैशेषिक।—Moreover the सत्ता cannot be a distinct reality added unto the द्रव्य etc. from without. If सत्ता be *absolutely* distinct from द्रव्य etc. the latter would be असत्. It may be urged that they acquire सत्त्व in consequence of their possessing सत्ता. But the answer to it is—If they are असत् in themselves, सत्ता cannot make them सत्; if they are सत् in themselves, सत्ता can add nothing and is therefore superfluous. If all the भावs have got their स्वरूपसत्ता—their own individual being—what can सत्ता add to them or it? If it be urged that a भाव is neither सत् nor असत् before it becomes invested with सत्ता and that it becomes सत् after it is so invested, all we need say is that it is useless hair-splitting for nothing can be neither सत् nor असत्, it must be one or the other or as we Jainas prefer to maintain both.

cf. "अथ सामान्यम्। तद्द्विधा—परमपरं च। तत्र परं सत्तासामान्यं द्रव्यादित्रिपदार्थव्यापि। तथा चोक्तम्—"सदिति यतो द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु सा सत्ता" । अपरं च द्रव्यगुणत्वे गुणत्वकर्मत्वात्मकम्। तत्र न तावत्सत्तायाः पृथक्पदार्थता युज्यते। सत्सत्वं वा सदिति प्रत्यय स भिन्नसत्तानिबन्धन इत स्वत वा? । तत् भयथासत्तानिबन्धनसत्ताप्रत्ययमेव निरूपोऽप्यनवस्था। अथ स्वत एव सत्तावद् द्रव्यादिष्वपि स्वत एव सत्प्रत्ययो भविष्यतीति किं भिन्नसत्ताकल्पनया स्वरूपसत्तया? । किं च—द्रव्यादीना किं सतां सत्तया सत्त्वम् उतासताम्? । तत् यदि सतां स्वत एव सत्प्रत्ययो भविष्यति। किं सत्ता? । असत्त्वे तु शशविषाणादिष्वपि सत्तायोगात् सत्त्वम् स्यादिति । तथा चोक्तम्— स्वतोऽर्थाः सन्तु सत्तावत् सत्तया किं सदात्मनाम्? । असदात्मसु नैषा स्यात् सर्वथातिप्रसङ्गतः ॥" इत्यादि । एतदेव द्रव्यादिपरसामान्येऽप्यायोज्यम्। तुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वात्। किं च—अस्माभिरपि सामान्यविशेषात्मकस्य वस्तुनः कथंचिदभिन्नत्वमेवेति। तस्य च कथंचिदत्यन्ताभिन्नं द्रव्यपदार्थेनैव प्राप्तमिति ॥ अथ विशेषा ते चात्यन्तव्यावृत्तिबुद्धिहेतुत्वेन परिकल्प्यन्ते। तदेवं चिन्त्यते—या तेषु विशेषबुद्धि या व्यावृत्तिविशेषपरिकल्पना अविकल्पा। अनवस्थानात्। ततः स्वरूपतो च यद्वद् द्रव्यादिष्वपि विशेषबुद्धि स्यात् किं द्रव्यादिव्यतिरिक्तैर्विशेषैरिति । द्रव्यादिव्यतिरिक्तास्तु विशेषा अस्माभिः एकत्वानेकत्वे सर्वस्य सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वादिति । तस्तु प्रक्रियामात्रम् ।

यथा—नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयोऽन्त्या विशेषाः नित्यद्रव्याणि च चतुर्विधाः परमाणवो मुक्तात्मानो मुक्तमनांसि च—इति [illegible] ।"

2 ज्ञानमपि यदेव etc.—If ज्ञान is to be supposed to be *absolutely distinct* from आत्मन्, the ज्ञान of Mr Caitra is in the same position with respect to his आत्मन् as the ज्ञान of Mr Maitra that is to say both the ज्ञानs would be equal strangers to the आत्मन् of Mr Caitra, and there is no reason why his ज्ञान should serve him better than the ज्ञान of any other person in determining the nature f things; in fact there is no such thing as *his* ज्ञान all ज्ञानs being equally foreign to him. An explanation may be offered by the other side: ज्ञान is bsolutely distinct from आत्मन्, but it is connected with आत्मन् by समवायसंबन्ध, and hence the ज्ञान of Mr Caitra is not in the same position with respect to him as the ज्ञान of Mr Maitra; for the former is connected with him by समवाय relation which the latter is not. But this explanation can be easily scotched. According to your notion of समवाय it is एक नित्य and व्यापक, and therefore it is impossible that ज्ञान should reside in Caitra and not i M itra; and since आत्मन् e also व्यापक according to your theory the ज्ञान which takes place in one आत्मन् takes place in all the आत्मन्s and any knowledg which Caitra has acquired will belong to Maitra also!

यथा च घटे etc.—Moreover according to the Vais' theory when the रूप of an bject is destroyed nd another is substituted, the bject gets destroyed also a new bject taking its place with the new रूप Similarly when ज्ञान perishes आत्मन् would be e pected to perish too

अस्तु समवायेन tc.—Let us concede that it is possible for ज्ञान to be connected with आत्मन् by समवाय r lation. But a q estion still remai to be answered By what relation is the समवाय connected with ज्ञान and आत्मन्? By another समवाय? That w ll mean an ending series of समवायs—अनवस्था. Of itself? Then, why should not ज्ञान and आत्मन् be connected of themselves, without requiring समवाय relation to effect the connection?

अथ यथा प्रदीपः etc.—A possible argument on the side of the Vais' As it is the nature of a प्रदीप to illumine, so it is the nature of समवाय to connect. It, therefore, does not require to be brought into connection with ज्ञान and आत्मन् by any other connection. Answer: Why should it not similarly be the nature of ज्ञान and आत्मन् to be self-connected? Moreover the analogy of प्रदीप will not fit in. प्रदीप is a द्रव्य i. e. धर्मिन् and प्रकाश its धर्म; and according to you धर्म and धर्मिन् are absolutely distinct. So how could a प्रदीप have प्रकाश for its very self or being? And if प्रकाश be not the very self of प्रदीप, it would be absurd to cite प्रदीप as an example of a द्रव्य which illumines both itself and others. If प्रकाश be absolutely distinct from प्रदीप and yet प्रदीप is capable of illumining itself as well as other objects, there is no reason why घट, पट should not do the same

अपि च तौ etc.—Next, are the two स्वरूपे of समवाय viz., that of connecting itself and of connecting others (आत्मन् and ज्ञान in this case) distinct from the समवाय or one with the समवाय? In the former case, how can they be its स्वरूपे, unless they are connected with it by another connection which would similarly require to be connected by a third and so on *ad infinitum*? In the latter case, there remains only समवाय in the field, and the old difficulties continue as before. Therefore just as you say एवं समवायिषु समवायः and no second समवाय is required to connect the first समवाय with the समवायिन्s, in the same way why can we not say ज्ञानमपि आत्मनि without requiring a संबन्ध like समवाय to connect ज्ञान with आत्मन्?

✓ अथापि कर्तृ etc.—It may be urged that a distinction between आत्मन् and ज्ञान is required owing to their being related as कर्तृ and करण आत्मन् being the कर्तृ and ज्ञान the करण Answer: The position of ज्ञान is different from that of an ordinary करण such as a scythe (दात्र) ज्ञान is an internal करण while the scythe is an external करण cf. चक्षुः etc. N w If an internal करण could be shown which was absolutely distinct from कर्तृ, the argument of bsolute distinction between ज्ञान and आत्मन् would hold water but not otherwise. We say दीपेन पश्यति देवदत्तः

यस्मात् here ग्रीव and चक्षु are both करण but on that account the two are not in the same position of अनन्यत्वे with respect to देवदत्त.

अपि च तात्त्विकभेदो etc.—Moreover it should be noted that the example of the carpenter (कर्तृ) and his tool (करण) does not point to an absolute distinction between the two. The carpenter has to resol e—which is process of आत्मन्—to use the tool and thus undergo a परिणाम of आत्मन् nd assimilate the tool with himself in order to work on the wood. So in this sense even the carpenter and his tool may be said to be not absolutely distinct. In the same way आत्मन् resolves to know a particular object by means of his ज्ञान undergoes परिणाम and assimilates the ज्ञान with himself, and thus the tw becoming one produce the effect, viz., knowledge of the thing (संवित्ति).

एवं कर्तृकरणयोरभेदे etc.—Now the unity of कर्तृ and करण being proved we have one question to put to the pponent: Is the ज्ञान o संवित्ति, which is the effect of the united action of कर्तृ and करण resident in ( ) आत्मन् or (b) विषय? If (a) in आत्मन् that is all we care to pro e. If (b) in विषय, how does that mean consciousness (चैतन्य) in आत्मन्? If the consciousness (चैतन्य) in the person springs from संवित्ति in the object, why does it not arise in another person? For there is no difference between the position f one person and another, in as much as the विषय with its संवित्ति is absolutely extraneous to the person.

एवं ज्ञानात्मनोरभेदे etc.—If ज्ञान and आत्मन् are one, how is their relation of कर्तृ and करण to be accounted for? Answer: By the analogy of serpent who makes a coil of his body by his body It may be said that the कर्तृकरणभाव in the case of the serpent is simply imaginary Criticism How can it be said to be imaginary when we actually see the effect, viz., the coil, which is new state of rest different from the former state of motion? N amount of imagination could make us believe that pillar was going to wind itself into a coil.

किं च चैतन्यम् etc.—Next, consider the word चैतन्य It is the abstract noun from चेतन which means आत्मन्. Thus चैतन्य means the भाव or स्वरूप of आत्मन्. Now how can a भाव or स्वरूप of a thing be absolutely distinct from a thing?

यदपि चेतन etc.—The Vais' argues that आत्मन् is no doubt चेतन but that is not without a cause (स्वतः), but is owing to चेतना coming to reside by समवाय relation in आत्मन् as is shown by actual प्रतीति (experience). Answer : If you are prepared to accept the evidence of प्रतीति you must admit that आत्मन् is by nature 'उपयोगात्मक' i. e. of the nature of consciousness. For nobody is aware of being first अचेतन–that is, lacking in consciousness, and afterwards becoming चेतन in consequence of connection with चेतना or of चेतना coming to reside by समवाय relation in him who was at first अचेतन [उपयोग is thus defined in the Tat. Rāj Vārt. "बाह्याभ्यन्तरहेतुद्वयसंनिधाने यथासंभव उपलब्धुश्चैतन्यानुविधायी परिणामः उपयोगः" i. e. उपयोग is the modification that takes place in the knowing mind (उपलब्धृ) in accordance with its चैतन्य when the external and internal हेतुs are present.] On the contrary he is always aware of himself as ज्ञाताहम् which implies सामानाधिकरण्य i. e. appostion unity of आत्मन् and ज्ञान

भेदे तथा प्रतीतिः etc.—This सामानाधिकरण्य could take place even when there was भेद. Answer But no er unless th re were अभेद in some way or another In यष्टिः पुरुषः (when we speak of a "man," who is straight and stuff like a stick as a "stick") there is no doubt सामानाधिकरण्य (appodition, unity) inspite of भेद. But be it noted that there the सामानाधिकरण्य is figurative, and not real. The figure, however arises from the अभेद of certain qualities of the stick and the man, a figure being always based pon foundation of reality [see Kāvya-Prakāsa Ullāsa II]. In the same way our consciousness of ज्ञाताहम् in आत्मन् shows that the आत्मन् is essentially ज्ञ or चेतन; without this, one could never say ज्ञाता अहम् any more than घट could say so.

चैतन्याभावात् etc.—But it may be contended that जड can never say ज्ञानवान् because जड does not possess चैतन्य But the answer to it is that similarly if आत्मन् does not essentially possess चेतना it can never be aware of being चेतन as shown above. And so, if आत्मन् is अचेतन it should be जड and incapable of knowing things, which is absurd.

ज्ञानवानहम् etc.—It may be further contended that the consciousness ज्ञानवानहम् would prove a distinction between ज्ञान and आत्मन्, for the former is that which is possessed (e.g. धन) and the latter is he who possesses (e.g. धनवान्). But the contention is untenable. For who possesses the consciousness ज्ञानवानहम् in your theory? Not the आत्मन्; for आत्मन् is supposed to be जड i.e. devoid of ज्ञान in himself like घट. You cannot assert that आत्मन् is जड (i.e. essentially devoid of ज्ञान) and yet be able to say ज्ञानवानहम् without contradiction.

ज्ञानवानहमिति हि प्रत्यये etc.—For when I say ज्ञानवानहम् I am supposed to have known both the विशेषण and the विशेष्य-सम्बन्ध etc.—See K. P. Now let us inquire how the विशेषण and the विशेष्य in the present case are known—whether स्वतः or परतः? It cannot be स्वतः For according to the Vais ज्ञान (the विशेषण) and आत्मन् (आत्मन् the विशेष्य) are not self-revealed. It cannot be परतः For in that case one ज्ञान would require to be revealed by another ज्ञान and so on ad infinitum (अनवस्था). Therefore, आत्मन् is not in himself जड (devoid of ज्ञान) by nature, who afterwards comes to possess ज्ञान by समवाय relation as the result of the working of इन्द्रिय etc.

5. तथा मुक्ति etc.—Next, it is held by the V [illegible] that in मुक्ति there is neither ज्ञान nor आनन्द, since ज्ञान and आनन्द are streams (सन्तान of attributes, a stream of cognitions and a stream of joys, i.e. pleasurable feelings) and all streams must cease at some point. Criticism: What is meant by their being streams—सन्तानत्व? Does it mean a series of states which go on producing themselves independently of one another and one after another? Or does it mean the states

which go on springing into existence one by one, but residing in a common abode? The former alternative involves the fallacy of सव्यभिचारत्व i. e. प्रवाह in this sense does not necessarily imply cessation. For घट, पट etc. are running on in an unceasing stream. The second alternative presents a conception of प्रवाह which does not fit in with the example of प्रदीप. Moreover in the case of पाकजगुणोत्पत्ति (a new गुण produced in atoms by means of heat), there is a continued stream-धारा-of products, but no absolute cessation. Besides, there may be a continuous stream and no absolute cessation; for there is nothing to render such a position impossible: a suspicion like this would arise in the mind and make the hetu "inconclusive".

किं च स्याद्वाद etc.—Besides, according to the Syâdvâda of the Jainas there is no अत्यन्त उच्छेद-absolute annihilation of any thing, all things being regarded as persisting in the midst of change: cf. उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत्.

न हि सशरीरस्य etc.—This text of the Upanisad admits of a better interpretation than that placed upon it by the Vais. Thus: It need not mean that in the state of मोक्ष when the आत्मन् is free from the body there is an end to both सुख and दुःख. It should only mean that आत्मन् in that condition is free from the pair of सुख and दुःख that is to say from such सुख as is bound up with दुःख i. e. the सुख of संसार. It does not preclude the existence of pure, unmixed सुख-such as is proper to मुक्ति. Mallinatha seems to read सत्तया for वाव सन्तम् in the Upanisad. सत्तया = निर्विशेषसत्तावस्थम्—occupying the state of मुक्ति or Perfection.

सुखमिति etc.—The first half of the verse is the first line of Verse 20 Adhyâya VI of the Bh. Gîtâ. Here सुख need not mean merely दुःखाभाव-a negative condition of the absence of sorrow. For सुख is not a mere negative state of आत्मन्.

न च दुःखविरहो मोक्ष etc.—Who would care for the negative state of दुःखाभाव which the Vais. holds forth as the state of मुक्ति? Such a state would be no better than that of a stone which too possesses दुःखाभाव (यो हि यस्य etc.—cf. न्या. म. p. 506). The Vais. मुक्ति is well-ridiculed in the famous passage "वरं etc."

वराकित etc. Some out of sheer despair of pessimism may prefer even दुःखाभाव to the present condition of mixed दुःख and सुख. But it should be noted that even they throw off the poison and honey only with the desire of being thereby happy Thus, happiness is always the desired end.

कि च यथा प्राणिनां etc.—Moreover just as we regard दुःख as undesirable and सुख as desirable in the संसारावस्था, so we should be expected t regard दुःखनिवृत्ति as desirable and सुखनिवृत्ति as undesirable in मोक्षावस्था If मोक्ष were such a negative state of दुःखाभाव as you suppose it to be, no wise man would care for it. But many wise men do care for it. This implies that मोक्ष is regarded by them as state of positive joy (सुख).

ननु धृति etc.—Does not even Homer nod? If wise men too long for happiness, they are not wise men to that extent, longing of every kind being inconsistent with wisdom and the source of bondage. Answer: It is the longing for the pleasures of संसार that makes for bondage, not the noble desire which opens up the path to wisdom.

अपि च मोक्षावस्थायाम् etc.—The Jaina out of the fulness of his merciful heart sympathises with the opponent and tells him how after all, he does gree with him to some extent, inasmuch as he too admits some so t of गुणोच्छेद-annihilation.

बुद्धि tc.—बुद्धि in the Vais. system means ज्ञान. ज्ञान says the Jains, is of five kinds (1) मति, (2) श्रुत, (3) अवधि (4) मनःपर्या(र्य)य and (5) केवल (See Tattv Sûtra; also supra). Of these the first four, which are क्षायोपशमिक—i. e. arising from उपशम (quelling, precipitation; not, destruction) as well as क्षय (destruction) of Karma—cease as soo as केवलज्ञान arises. But the केवलज्ञान which embraces within its range all द्रव्य with their पर्याय (modes) persists in th condition of मोक्ष In fact, it is the characteristic feature of मोक्ष Thus there is partial agreement with the Vais. to the extent of the first four varieties of ज्ञान बुद्धि etc.—See व्याख्यान.

वर्तते तु etc.—The सुख arising from worldly objects ceases in the state of मोक्ष because the वैषयिक कर्म which was the source

of the sensations of pleasure and pain in worldly experience has been exhausted. So, in the condition of मोक्ष there is endless infinite सुख of spirit, but no दुःख because अधर्म the source of दुःख is no more

धर्मेण सुखस्यापि etc.—Following the same line of reasoning it may be argued that सुख would also cease because its source—viz. धर्म—is no more. Answer धर्म is the source of वैषयिक सुख i.e objective pleasures, and so, धर्म ceasing, वैषयिक सुख would also cease Not, however the आत्मसुख i.e the spiritual joy of आत्मन् which is inherent in him. On धर्म and its relation to सुख and the आत्मा transcending धर्म and its सुख as much as अधर्म and its दुःख compare the Vedānta doctrine.

इच्छा द्वेष etc.—इच्छा and द्वेष of course cease, because they are varieties of मोह

प्रयत्न etc.—Ordinary प्रयत्न i.e. effort in the direction of क्रिया ceases, because in मोक्ष nothing remains to be done But there still persists the one special kind of प्रयत्न which has brought about the destruction of वीर्यान्तराय the impediment to मोक्ष consisting of spiritual inertia or slothfulness.

The प्रयत्न however is admitted to be "ineffective How will it then satisfy the definition of गुण = कार्यकारणत्व?

धर्माधर्मौ etc.—धर्माधर्मौ alias पुण्यपाप must, of course cease in the state of मोक्ष

संस्कार etc.—This is a kind of मतिज्ञान and it ceases as soon as मोह is destroyed.

It will be noticed that Malliṣeṇa has thus passed in review all the special attributes of आत्मन् as held in the Vaiś' system and shown how far according to himself they persist in the state of मोक्ष

For a knowledge of the Vaiś. categories the best books to read are the Vaiś Sūtras with Upaskāra, Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya and Śrīdhara's Nyāya-Kandalī. For आत्मन् and the doctrine of मुक्ति consult the same; also, the Muktāvalī and the Dinakarī and the Rāmarudrī.

For the nature of आत्मसुख and its relation to ब्रह्म see Madhusūdana's Siddhānta-tattva-bindu Com., and Vedānta Sūtras I.1.II, with differences between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

Stanza IX

Different views as regards the size (परिमाण) of आत्मन्।

(i) आत्मन् is विभु (all-pervasive, infinitely vast in size) according to the Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Sāṁkhyas, Yogins and Vedāntins of the Śāṁkara School. [*N B* With the first two its विभुत्व consists in the possession of a positive परिमाण which does not seem to differ in character from that which belongs to अणुत्व; with the third and the fourth, in its essential freedom from the bondage of मूर्ति; with the last, in the negation of all limiting उपाधिs inclu ding spatial limitations.]

(ii) आत्मन् is अणु (infinitesimal) according to the Vedāntins of the Rāmānuja-and Vallabha-Ācāryas' schools.

(iii) आत्मन् is मध्यमपरिमाण adjusting itself to the size of the body in which it dwells. This is the Jaina view. This, says the Jains, is borne out by our consciousness; for we are not conscious of ourselves as either infinitely vast, or infinitely small (infinitesimal), but as co-extensive with our own physical body—["कायप्रमाणत्वमात्मनः स्वयं संवेदनात्..."].

Of these (i) comes up for criticism as a tenet of the Vaiśeṣika school which is now under examination.

शरीर ऐवे......व्याप्तिविरि—The gunas of Ātman, such as चैतन्य etc., are found within the limits of the body. From this the natural inference is that Ātman is co-extensive with the body (शरीरपरिमाण). This is clear from the example of घट etc., which, as all agree, exist only where their gunas (रूप etc.) are found and not elsewhere and yet these fools who ignore facts place the Ātman outside the body! [यत्रैव यो दृष्टगुणः स तत्र कुम्भादिवत् निष्प्रतिपक्षमेतत् etc.]

यदि पुष्पादीनां etc.—The case of a flower emitting its fragrance beyond itself is no exception.

वैस्रसिका प्रायोगिका च etc.—Involuntary and voluntary; natural and voluntarily (that is volitionally) caused. cf Bījavṛtti pp. 200 and 232.

विवक्षा हि तिविधिपरधैवे विपाक:—शीतोष्णस्पर्शवासनेषा विधि: क्षिपपर्धैवे विवक्षायत्तो विपाको द्रष्टव्य: । प्रयोग: पुरुषकारवशात्समवर्धमानसम्पद: । प्रत्य भावपि द्विविधा विधा विवक्षा प्रयोजनविधिता च । See Tatvârtha.

न च स्वेष्टसाधनं नाम —A very frequently used argument and phrase. cf. b ll. com. on Sûtrak

यच्च मन्त्रादीनां etc.—The case of मन्त्र (magic spells or incantations) is cited by the opponent as showing *actio in distans*. But this is explained away by the Siddhântin as really a case of their *devatâs* going out to the spot where the effect takes place.

अनाचार इव—The negative (नञ्-अ) sometimes connotes not mere negation or absence, but badness (कुत्सा); *e. g.* अनाचार is not mere absence of आचार, but bad आचार. Similarly असत्य means not only those who ignore truth but those who espouse the opposite of truth *i. e.* wretched falsehood.

II भावार्थस्तवम् : Substance of the Stanza—

आत्मा सर्वगतो न भवति etc.—A परार्थानुमान with an अन्वय-व्यतिरेकि-हेतु and a negative साध्य

न चायमसिद्धो हेतु:—The author next shows that the हेतु in the above अनुमान is free from all fallacies. The only fallacies that could possibly be suspected in th present case are those of ( ) an असिद्ध (स्वरूपासिद्ध) हेतु (b) an अनैकान्तिक हेतु and (c) a विरुद्ध हेतु. That none of them exists in the present case may be shown as follows:—

(a) यदि च बुद्ध्यादयो etc.—The above अनुमान is not vitiated by an असिद्ध (that is स्वरूपासिद्ध) हेतु. For the हेतु is predicable of the पक्ष. The *gunas* of आत्मन्—बुद्धि etc., are not found every where. Vide the following from S ridhara's Nyâyakandali: "सर्वगतोऽप्यात्मा देहप्रदेशे ज्ञातृत्वं । शरीरस्योपभोगायतनत्वात् । अन्यथा तस्य वैयर्थ्यात्" Nyâyakandali p. 62. आत्मन् is everywhere but its ज्ञातृत्व takes place within the limits—confines—of the body

अथात्मनः—व्यापकत्वेन etc.—A possible objection: Take another गुण of आत्मन्—viz. अदृष्ट. It is a निमित्तकारण of everything

at rises into being, and is *everywhere*. So, it operates at remotest places and produces effects which I am destined to enjoy r suffer. Now unless अदृष्ट were everywhere—even in the remotest places—its गुण viz. अदृष्ट could not be *there*, and o could not produce the things.

अपरार्थेन etc.—Mark the weak spot in the above argument: the *Pūrva pakṣa* has not proved that the अदृष्ट ca not perate *from here*. The author, however makes a bolder attack, directing is criticism against the very doctrine of अदृष्ट and revealing situation which makes the existence of God (favourite doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas) superfluous. As a proof of अदृष्ट the Vaiś. cites phenomena which cannot be explained by any known causes—*e.g* the natural properties of fire, air etc. (अग्नेरूर्ध्वज्वलनं etc.) All ultimate properties of things are thus determined by अदृष्ट The uthor asks Could not these properties be regarded as *the very nature* of fire, air etc rather than be accounted for by an obscure cause ! which we know nothing and which you dub अदृष्ट ? It is silly to ttempt to xplain the bscure by the obscure. The Vaiśeṣika would reply by a question What endows them with that nature? What makes their nature what it is?—If not अदृष्ट ? The autho : Indeed? The अदृष्ट will then account for every variety in Creation, thereby making the doctrine of the existence of God superfluous! [Mark that to account for the variety of Creation is not the same thing as to account for Creation itself—unless Creation and its variety may be regarded as a single fact—one integral or concrete reality—not an impossible position in itself. Moreove It may be noted that the early Vaiśeṣika philosopher did not explain Creation by th hypothesis of Divine Creator but that of the mysterious something—which he called 'अदृष्ट'—the Unseen]

(b) न चैकान्तिक etc.—The हेतु is not ऐकान्तिक i. e. is conclusive for want of invariable concomitance between the हेतु and the साध्य—the हेतु सर्व उपसर्पणवत्वे being in every case accompanied by the साध्य— सर्वतो न व्याप्ति

(c) नापि विरुद्धः etc.—Much less is the हेतु— विरुद्ध i.e. proving the very opposite of what is intended to be proved. There is not a single instance to break the universal concomitance between the हेतु and the साध्य.

आत्मन् तथा आत्मानो बहुत्वसिद्धेः—See Vaiśeṣika Sū. p. 87 Nyāyakandali p. 88.

The Vaiś. holds that आत्मानः are many and that each of them is all-pervasive (विभु). This says the author would create inter penetration of आत्मनाम्, and the consequent confusion of their बुद्ध्यादि, and also of their सुखदुःख etc.

This difficulty the opponent may perhaps endeavour to meet by holding that the experience of सुख and दुःख takes place, with every individual आत्मन्, *within the limits of the body*. But, in that case, ज्ञान—whose case is similar to that of सुखदुःख inasmuch as all of them are गुणs of आत्मन्—would be confined to the limits of the body so that it could not go forth to the spot of the fire and cause it to burn in the particular manner in which it does. And this would be cutting off the ground on which the case of the all-pervasiveness of आत्मन् is attempted to be based. [Vide supra आत्मनां च सर्वगतत्वे...]

Not only would our आत्मानः—together with their बुद्ध्यादि and their सुखदुःख—get hopelessly mixed up *inter se* but also with God!

किं च आत्मनः etc.—Moreover, the आत्मन् would be then living in every possible world—earth heaven and hell—at one and the same time.

✓ अथ शरीरमात्रव्यापकम् etc.—How does आत्मन् localise himself in the body? *In toto* or *in part*? In the former case, the position reached would be exactly the one which is maintained by the Jains. In the latter case आत्मन् would be a substance possessing parts—which is absurd. Moreover, the experience of pleasure and pain would not belong to the whole but only to a part of आत्मन्!

अचलत्वो व्यापकत्वात् *etc*—The Vaiś. argues: If आत्मन् were not all pervasive and were consequently far away from the particles of matter which have to be set in motion in order to build a body out of it for its abode, then it could not exercise any influence on the particles and could not eventually produce the body and be its own and it would thus be eternally मुक्त —liberated!

The author: This argument could be easily met by denying the necessity of adjacence between the cause and the material on which it has to act: Compare the case of the magnet operating on piece of iron.

V ise: If distance (व्यवधान) were no bar to action would not the whole wo ld of particles be drawn to आत्मन् and produce prodigious body?

The author Are not all the particles equally in contact (संयुक्त) with आत्मन् on your hypothesis of विभुत्व and therefore equally entitled to get corporealized?

The Vais No; they would be selected for the purpose by अदृष्ट

The author (Siddhāntin): The same principle f selection could wo k amongst th distant (असंयुक्त) particles, and prevent the imaginary rush for corporealization.

आत्मनः सदा सावयवत् etc.—The Vaiśeṣika grant for the sake of rgument that the corporealization of आत्मन् is somehow possible. Yet he says, difficulty remains: It means then that part of आत्मन् enters every particle of the body i which it becomes incarnate This will be fatal position—involving the consequence that आत्मन् is a कार्य i. product out f certain ingredients!

Now according to the law of homogeneity of Cause and and Effect these ingredients should be themselves आत्मन्s. Thus, the position reached is this Several आत्मन्s dwell in one body and combine to produce single आत्मन् dwelling in the same

body! This is impossible. Supposing it is possible, it means loss of personal identity and liability to disintegration of components and therefore death.

To this the Jaina replies : He is prepared to accept the consequences as a matter of fact, he does hold that somehow—in a certain sense—आत्मन् is possessed of parts (सावयव) and is a product (कार्य). The former i. e. सावयवत्व arises from its possessing innumerable प्रदेश. "आकाश too," say समवाय and प्रशस्त authors of प्रशस्तपादभाष्य," "has got देश (extension), since it can possess contact with all मूर्तद्रव्य at one and the same time." In certain works (e.g तत्त्वार्थ) a distinction is drawn between अवयव and प्रदेश but it is too fine and may be left out of consideration for the purposes of the present argument. प्रदेश is sometimes called अवयव and since the Jaina holds that आत्मन् has got प्रदेश, he may well make an admission that आत्मन् is सावयव—and in that sense आत्मन् is a कार्य too, in his system.

घटादीनां कार्यत्वे etc.—The Jaina denies the force of the argument contained in the foregoing parallel. He says Our explanation of the nature of the effect which we call घट is not that it is a new creation arising from the संयोग of the कपाल which are homogeneous with घट but that the घट arises as a change of state from the original state when it is worked upon by the potter A द्रव्य is said to be a कार्य when abandoning one form it assumes another This is true of the internal quite as much as of the external world. And in this sense आत्मन् must be admitted to be a कार्य It may be that in making a घट you have to bring together (संयोग) the तन्तु, but it is not the only manner of producing things (cf कार्यमुत्पद्यमानं [illegible]" S'amkara on Br Sū. II. ii. 17). We must recognise the endless variety of ways in which things are produced in nature.

न चोत्पद्यमान etc.—The Jaina turns the tables against the Vaiś. In the matter of the argument that द्व्यणुक परिमाण would involve

मूर्तत्व and therefore अनित्यत्व which is inconsistent with the natur
of आत्मन् Far from अनित्यत्व (change) interfering with persona
identity it is the *sine qua non* of its consciousness. "I remembe
what I saw" would be impossible but for difference between hi
who saw and him who remembers, and the change from on
to the other between the state of seeing and the state o
remembering And this fact is inconsistent with absolut
नित्यत्व of आत्मन् *i. e.* unchanging personal identity or consciou
ness.

अयमात्मा शरीरपरिमाणो etc.—The Vādi might urge I
आत्मन् were only as large as the body it would be मू
(possessed of extension) and in that case, how could it ente
the body? For two things possessed of मूर्तत्व cannot inter
penetrate each other and so the body must remain withou
a soul (आत्मन्)!

To this the Jaina replies What is a 'मूर्त द्रव्य'? Does i
mean a द्रव्य which has limited size? In that sense आत्मन् i
मूर्त and we see nothing wrong in holding that propositio
In fact, it is just the proposition we have been urging
Secondly मूर्तत्व may be interpreted to mean रूपादिमत्त्व *i. e*
possession of रूप etc. But in that sense, मूर्तत्व is not a necessar
concomitant of शरीरपरिमाणत्व *i. e.* असर्वगतत्व Thus, fo
example, मनस् is असर्वगत but not रूपादिमत् [मनस् accordin
to the Vais'eṣika school is not सर्वगत See Vais' Sū. an
Nyāya-Sūtra]

In the former sense (असर्वगत), a मूर्त can penetrate a मू
e. g. मनस्. Even in the latter sense, (रूपादिमत्), मूर्त things ar
sometimes found to do it *e. g.* water penetrates sands.

अयमात्मा शरीरपरिमाणो etc.—Another objection to the Jain
doctrine of body-sized आत्मन् Does the आत्मन् grow in size
If it does, it must part with its former size as it goes o
assuming larger sizes—*i. e.* it is अनित्य and may well b
expected to perish with the body If it does not, its size doe
not keep pace with the growing size of the body and this i
abandoning the dogma of body-sized आत्मन्

The author replies : आत्मन् may well relinquish its former size without ceasing to be. Take, for example, the case of a serpent which can change its size at different times by expanding or contracting its hood.

पर्यायैस्तस्य etc.—This contains the gist of the Jaina position which is a recognition of unity-in-difference change-in-permanence आत्मन् is substantially नित्य modally अनित्य

अथात्मनः कायपरिमाणत्वे शरीरखण्डने etc.—Another objection to the doctrine of body-sized आत्मन् is—that the mutilation of the body would involve mutilation of आत्मन्

Answer : It is so as a matter of fact. When the body is mutilated a few out of the total number of the प्रदेशs of आत्मन् continue to remain in the mutilated body and the rest have gone off with the part of the body cut off Hence it is that the part cut off is often found throbbing with life— which is a clear evidence of the existence of some प्रदेशs of आत्मन् dwelling in it. Would not the आत्मप्रदेशs dwelling in the part cut off thereby become a separate and independent आत्मन् ? No; the आत्मप्रदेशs are dwelling not in the whole but a fraction of the body and cannot therefore be regarded as a single, independent whole. Besides, there cannot be many आत्मानः dwelling in parts which together make *one* continuous whole. For in that case, there would be no unity of consciousness ; the cognitions would fall asunder like those obtained through different bodies.

कथं खण्डितावयवो etc.—If it be asked—How do the parts unite once more ?—the answer is They were never absolutely separated in the manner in which a lotus-fibre is separated from the parent stock. That is only temporary and the reunion may be brought about by अदृष्ट

तथा चात्मा etc.—चेतनत्वेऽपि अनुमान with a negative व्याप्ति It is contended that an आत्मन् being चेतन must be limited in size; for only an अचेतन—like आकाश—could be unlimited in size. Next, if it is limited in size the limits must be imposed by the body; for its गुणाः—ज्ञान etc.—are manifested in the body

समुद्घात etc.—This refers to the Jaina doctrine that the soul of an अर्हत् may at times fill the whole universe. This, however is occasional, and therefore does not interfere with our main thesis—that आत्मन् is not विभु but शरीरपरिमाण.

समय—Smallest division of time moment, instant (Jacobi).

Read समुद्घात for समुद्घातम which is an obvious misprint. Vide Abhayadeva's com. on Bhagavati Sûtra XIII 10 cited in the note on p. 66 of स्याद्वादमञ्जरी published in the "Arhata-mata-prabhâkara Series" which explains how according to the Jaina doctrine the कर्मांशs are drawn together and mixed with आत्मप्रदेशs and thereby the कर्मन्s are suffered and exhausted by the Kevalin (the pure, emancipated) sage. For this, his आत्मप्रदेशs have to spread through the universe.

चतुर्दशरज्ज्वात्मक—For this Jaina Cosmography see Tattvârthâdhigama Sûtra iii-6, and Lokaprakâśa Sarga 12

Appendices.

1. For the Jaina view of the nature of Âtman—cf.

जीवोत्ति हवदि चेदा उवओगविसेसिदो पहू कत्ता ।
भोत्ता य देहमत्तो ण हि मुत्तो कम्मसंजुत्तो ॥
कम्ममलविप्पमुक्को उड्ढं लोगस्स अंतमधिगंता ।

—Pañcâstikâya 27

जीवो उवओगमओ अमुत्ति कत्ता सदेहपरिमाणो ।
भोत्ता संसारत्थो सिद्धो सो विस्ससोड्ढगई ॥
जीवः उपयोगमयः अमूर्तिः कर्ता स्वदेहपरिमाणः ।
भोक्ता संसारस्थः सिद्धः स विस्रसा ऊर्ध्वगतिः ॥

—Dravyasaṅgraha—2.

जीवसिद्धिः चार्वाकं प्रति; ज्ञानदर्शनोपयोगलक्षणं नैयायिकं प्रति; अमूर्तजीवस्थापनं भट्टचार्वाकद्वयं प्रति; कर्मकर्तृत्वस्थापनं सांख्यं प्रति; स्वदेहप्रमितिस्थापनं नैयायिक-मीमांसक-सांख्य-त्रयं प्रति; कर्मफलभोक्तृत्वव्याख्यानं बौद्धं प्रति; संसारस्थव्याख्यानं सदाशिवं प्रति; सिद्धत्वव्याख्यानं भट्टचार्वाकद्वयं प्रति; ऊर्ध्वगतिस्वभावकथनं माण्डलिकग्रन्थकारं प्रति—इति मतार्थो ज्ञातव्यः—Com.

This summarises very beautifully the differences of the Jaina school with other schools in regard to the several points concerning the nature of आत्मन्.

2. For the पूर्वपक्ष and its arguments which have been answered in the text, vide the following:—

व्यवस्थातो नाना—Vais. Sutra III ii-20.

नानात्मानः कुतः व्यवस्थातः—Upaskāra.

यस्य तु नानात्मानः तस्य सर्वेषामात्मनां सर्वगतत्वेन सर्वशरीरसंबन्धेऽपि न साधारणो भोगः यस्य कर्मणा यच्छरीरमारब्धं तस्यैव तद् उपभोगायतनं न सर्वेषाम्। कर्मापि यस्य शरीरेण कृतं तस्यैव तत्फलति नापरस्य। एवं शरीरोपभोगनियमः कर्मोत्पत्तिनियमात् इत्यभिप्रायः।

—N Kandali p 87

विभुत्वं चात्मनो योगस्पर्शवत्त्वात् वायोरिवागमप्रमाणावगतम्। ते यदा स्थिते। न च ततः प्रत्येकं संयोगवतो यो कार्यं मतिमुपैति। अतिप्रसङ्गात्। न चात्मसमवेतस्यादृष्टस्य साक्षात् द्रव्यान्तरसंबन्धो घटते इति स्वाश्रयसंबन्धद्वारेण तस्य संबन्ध इत्यावाच्यम्। तत्र समस्तपूर्वदेशसंबन्धमयमात्मनो विभुत्वं सिध्यति। स्वभावत एव योगस्पर्शवत्त्वं नातिदृष्टिरिति चेत् कोऽयं स्वभावो नाम?। अप्रेक्ष्यविशेषमयत्वं स्वभाव इति अभिव्यक्तस्य विभुत्वादिप्रसङ्गस्य योगोऽवलम्बं न स्यात्। अथातीन्द्रियः कोऽपि स्वभावः आशुविशेषविधाने पावकादूर्ध्वगमनं दृश्यते इति गुरुगुणे कः प्रद्वेषः?।

—N. Kandali p. 88.

"एवं चात्माकार्त्स्न्यम्"—Br S. II. ii. 34.

यथैकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विरुद्धधर्मासंभवो दोषः स्याद्वादे प्रसक्तः एवमात्मनोऽपि जीवस्याकार्त्स्न्यमपरो दोषः प्रसज्येत। कथम्? शरीरपरिमाणो हि जीव इत्यार्हता मन्यन्ते। शरीरपरिमाणतायां च सत्यामकृत्स्नोऽसर्वगतः परिच्छिन्न आत्मेत्यतो घटादिवदनित्यत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत। शरीराणां चानवस्थितपरिमाणत्वात् मनुष्यजीवो मनुष्यशरीरपरिमाणो भूत्वा पुनः केनचित् कर्मविपाकेन हस्तिजन्म प्राप्नुवन्न कृत्स्नं हस्तिशरीरं व्याप्नुयात्। पुत्तिकाजन्म च प्राप्नुवन्न कृत्स्नः पुत्तिकाशरीरे संमीयेत। समान एष एकस्मिन्नपि जन्मनि कौमारयौवनस्थाविरेषु दोषः। स्यादेतत्। अनन्तावयवो जीवस्तस्य त एवावयवा अल्पे शरीरे संकुचेयुर्महति च विकसेयुरिति। तेषां पुनरनन्तानां जीवावयवानां समानदेशत्वं प्रतिहन्यते वा न वेति वक्तव्यम्। प्रतिघाते तावन्नानन्तावयवाः परिच्छिन्ने देशे संमीयेरन्। अप्रतिघातेऽप्येकावयवदेशत्वोपपत्तेः सर्वेषामवयवानां प्रथिमानुपपत्तेर्जीवस्याणुमात्रत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्। अपि च शरीरमात्रपरिच्छिन्नानां जीवावयवानामानन्त्यं नोत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम्। अथ पर्यायेण बृहच्छरीरप्रतिपत्तौ केचिज्जीवावयवा उपगच्छन्ति तनुशरीरप्रतिपत्तौ च केचिदपगच्छन्तीत्युच्यते—

—Saṁkara's Com. Ibid,

न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः" Br S. II. ii. 35.

न च पर्यायेणाप्यवयवोपगमापगमाभ्यामेतद्देहपरिमाणत्वं जीवस्याविरोधेनोपपादयितुं शक्यते। कुतः। विकारादिदोषप्रसङ्गात्। अवयवोपगमापगमाभ्यां ह्यनिशमापूर्यमाणस्यापक्षीयमाणस्य च जीवस्य विक्रियावत्त्वं तावदपरिहार्यम्। विक्रियावत्त्वे च चर्मादिवदनित्यत्वं प्रसज्येत। ततश्च बन्धमोक्षाभ्युपगमो बाध्येत कर्माष्टकपरिवेष्टितस्य जीवस्यालाबुवत्संसारसागरे निमग्नस्य बन्धनोच्छेदादूर्ध्वगामित्वं भवतीति। किं चान्यत्। आगच्छतामपगच्छतां चावयवानामागमापायधर्मवत्त्वादेवानात्मत्वं शरीरादिवत्। ततश्चावस्थितः कश्चिदवयव आत्मेति स्यात्। न च स निरूपयितुं शक्यतेऽयमसाविति। किं चान्यत्। आगच्छन्तश्चैते जीवावयवाः कुतः प्रादुर्भवन्त्यपगच्छन्तश्च क्व वा लीयन्त इति वक्तव्यम्। न हि भूतेभ्यः प्रादुर्भवेयुर्भूतेषु च निलीयेरन्नभौतिकत्वाज्जीवस्य। नापि कश्चिदन्यः साधारणोऽसाधारणो वा जीवावयवानामाधारो निरूप्यते। प्रमाणाभावात्। किं चान्यत्। अनवधृतस्वरूपश्चैवं सत्यात्मा स्यात्। आगच्छतामपगच्छतां चावयवानामनियतपरिमाणत्वात्। अत एवमादिदोषप्रसङ्गान्न पर्यायेणाप्यवयवोपगमापगमावात्मन आश्रयितुं शक्येते।

—S'aṁkara Com. ibid.

अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः

—Br S. II. ii. 36.

अपि चान्त्यस्य मोक्षावस्थाभाविनो जीवपरिमाणस्य नित्यत्वमिष्यते जैनैः। तद्वत्पूर्वयोरप्याद्यमध्यमयोर्जीवपरिमाणयोर्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादविशेषप्रसङ्गः स्यात्। एकशरीरपरिमाणतैव स्यान्नोपचितापचितशरीरान्तरप्राप्तिः। अथवान्त्यस्य जीवपरिमाणस्यावस्थितत्वात् पूर्वयोरप्यवस्थयोरवस्थितपरिमाण एव जीवः स्यात्। ततश्चाविशेषेण सर्वदैवाणुर्महान् वा जीवोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यो न शरीरपरिमाणः॥

S'aṁkara's Com.

Rāmānujāchārya holds that आत्मन् is अणुपरिमाण not subject to संकोच and विकास (expansion and contraction) as in the Jaina system, but its ज्ञान is capable of संकोच and विकास the perfect विकास being accomplished in th condition of मोक्ष. This विकास is its natural state, which is unnaturally cribbed during संसार owing to कर्म. cf. "स्वरूपपरिशुद्धात्मन ज्ञानं संकोचविकासार्हं निखिलपदार्थविषयम् अतः क्षेत्रज्ञावस्थायां कर्मणा संकुचितस्वरूपं तत्तत्कर्मानुगुणतरतमभावेन वर्तते —S'rī. Bh. I. 1. 1

वैशेषिकनैयायिकयोः प्रायः समानतन्त्रत्वात्—On the relation of the Nyāya nd Vais'eṣika systems, see Bodas' Introduction to the Tarkasaṁgraha and Keith's Indian Logic and Atomism Chap. I and II.

औलूक्यमत—The Vaiśeṣika system

यौगमत—The doctrine of the Yaugas i. e. the Naiyāyika system founded by अक्षपाद

"अक्षपादी नैयायिकानां वैशेषिकाणां च लिङ्गादिस्वरूपमभिधीयते। ते च दण्डधराः प्रौढकौपीनपरिधायिनः कम्बलिकाप्रावृताः जटाधारिणो भस्मोद्धूलनपराः यज्ञोपवीतिनो जलाधारपात्रकराः नीरसाहाराः प्रायो वनवासिनो दोर्मूले तुम्बकं बिभ्राणाः कन्दमूलफलाशिनः। आतिथ्यकर्मनिरताः धर्मनिष्ठाः। निःस्त्रीकाः सस्त्रीकाश्च तेषु उत्तमास्तु नग्ना भवन्ति। तेऽपि ब्रह्मचर्यादि संयमादिसंयुक्ताः, तत्र चाद्या अर्थात् प्रत्याहाराः प्रभातं प्रातः सन्ध्या पूजादि पराः पवित्र प्रायः सन्तोषिण प्रसन्नात्मानो भवन्ति। एते प्रातर्दन्तपादादि शौचं विधाय शिवं ध्यायन्तो भस्मनाङ्गं त्रिः स्पृशन्ति। यजमानोऽभिवन्दमानः कृताञ्जलिर्वक्ति ॐ नमः शिवाय इति। गुरुस्तथैव शिवाय नमः इति प्रतिवक्ति। ... ... तेषु ये निर्विकारास्ते स्वशीलानुगा एव व्रतमिदं धारयन्ति ॥ न स्त्रीषु न कान्तिषु न मायासु तेषां रागः कश्चन गिरिशो न जरा न मरणं। यथाप्येते च न शिवस्य पार्श्वे तद् रूपं तपोमुनीनां चिन्तयन्ति ॥ अत एव योगिनां तेषां सर्वोपरिस्तु योगमार्गः। स ध्यायमानो रागरहितो मुक्तिम् ईयते—॥ उक्तं च तैः स्वयोगशास्त्रे—॥ वीतरागं स्मरन् योगी वीतरागत्वमश्नुते। सरागं ध्यायतस्तस्य सरागत्वं तु निश्चितम् ॥ येन येन हि भावेन युज्यते यन्त्रवाहकः। तेन तन्मयतां याति विश्वरूपो मणिर्यथा ॥ एतत्सर्वं विशुद्धमेतत् साक्षात् नैयायिकवैशेषिकाणां दर्शनाद्वैतं नैयायिकवैशेषिकयोर्हि मिथः प्रमाणतत्त्वानां सङ्ख्याभेदे सत्यप्यन्योन्यं तत्त्वानामन्तर्भावनेऽल्पीयानेव भेदो जायते। ते तेषां प्रायो बहुतुल्यतया एकत्वमेवेच्छन्ति तपस्विनोऽपि विवादिनः। ते च शैवादिभेदेन चतुर्धा भवन्ति। तदुक्तम्—॥ आधारभस्मकौपीनजटायज्ञोपवीतिनः। स्वस्वाचारादिभेदेन चतुर्धा स्युस्तपस्विनः ॥ शैवाः पाशुपताश्चैव महाव्रतधरास्तथा। तुर्याः कालमुखा मुख्या भेदा एते तपस्विनाम् ॥ तेषामन्तर्भेदा भरटभक्तलैङ्गिकतापसादयो भवन्ति। भरटादीनां व्रतग्रहणे ब्राह्मणादिवर्णनियमो नास्ति। यस्य तु शिवे भक्तिः स व्रती भरटादिर्भवेत्। परं शास्त्रेषु नैयायिकाः सदा शिवभक्तत्वात् शैवा इत्युच्यन्ते वैशेषिकास्तु पाशुपता इति ॥"

—Guṇaratna's com. on the Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya.

I have quoted this passage in extenso as it gives interesting detail relating to the religious side of the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika schools. It is difficult to decide whether this was originally complement of their logical systems or a later supplement in which elements of Vedānta, Yoga and Bhakti schools can be traced.

Stanza X.

Stanza: That in this world where men are naturally inclined towards disputes and are anxious to babble out their so-called wisdom, the sage of the heretics should injure the hearts of others by preaching to them false doctrines is indeed a singular ma k of his dispassionateness!

परव्यथैव मुनिः —The sage "of others" that is to say of the heretics, viz., *Akṣapāda*, the Sūtrakāra of the Nyāya system. H is also known as *Gautama* or *Gotama* after his gotra [Gotama is a Prakrit form of Gautama]. For further information see Nyāya Vārtika Bhūmikā by Vindhyeshwari Prasad. Dr Satischandra Vidyabhusha distinguishes between Gautama or Gotama and Akṣapāda, one of whom he believes to have lived in Mithilā lo g before the Christian era and the other at Prabhāsa in Kathiawad about 150 A. D. "Akṣapāda he says, was the real utho of the Nyāya-Sūtra which derived a considerable part of the materials from the Ānvīkṣikī vidyā of G utama. Just as Caraka was the redactor of the Agnivea -tantra the Āyurveda of Ātreya, Akṣapāda was the redactor of the Ānvīkṣikī of Gautama" [Vide Dr Vidyabhushana's H. I L. pp. 47-50.]

Dr Vidyabhushana s view h wever has not been generally accepted.

Dr Keith writes " Of the personalities of G utama nd Kanāda w know absol tely nothing The personal name of the former Akṣapāda has the appearance of being nick name such as early India seems to have loved one whose eyes are directed at his feet, but it is variously interpreted and embellished with idle legends. We may well dismiss the fantastic stories invented to acco nt for his name such a that of his falling into well while bsorbed in thought and being pro ided by merciful God with pair of eyes in his feet to protect him from further mishaps, and also the other story of Vyāsa falling at his feet and his condescending to see

him with his eyes in his feet. But when so much obscurity hangs about the origin of the name, one may venture to submit a conjecture which is at any rate more plausible than the others Possibly the philosophy of आक्षपादिकी was the philosophy which aimed at seeing that is bringing to human consciousness by means of reasoning—Pramāṇas (अक्ष and अक्षपाद)-the truths relating to the Prameyas—such as Ātman, śarīra, etc. (see N S.). Its founder was अक्ष and पाद was an honorific word like the same in Praśastapāda, the author of the Vaiśeṣika Bhāṣya.

मर्म 1.—Vital parts ; those limbs of the body which are thickly studded with आत्मप्रदेश are its vital parts. [Note that the Jainas believe Ātman to be possessed of प्रदेश "जीवा पोग्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा पुणो य आगासं । देसेहिं असंखादा "—i. e. the five अस्तिकाय viz. जीव, पुद्गल धर्म अधर्म and आकाश are असंख्यातप्रदेश —Pravacanasāra. अणुगुरुदेहपमाणो उवसंहारप्पसप्पदो चेदा । असमुहदो ववहारा णिच्छयणयदो असंखदेसो वा ॥—According to Vyavahāra Naya, the conscious Jīva being without samudghāta, becomes equal in extent to a small or a large body by contraction and expansion ; but according to Niścaya Naya it is existent in innumerable pradeśas. (Dravyasaṁgraha Ed U C. Ghosal)] By प्रदेश however one need not understand material space or extension. 2. Secondarily vital parts of their systems, i. e., the essential propositions which are put forward to prove their tenets.

मायोपदेशात् etc.—Teaching deceit, in the shape of छल जाति and निग्रहस्थान [These will be explained below]

कृत्यविधौ न वा—Hema-S'abdānuśāsana II. ii 7

अस्मिन्—To this i. e. the vulgar crowd which cannot discriminate between Truth and Error

विवाद etc.—विवाद defined.

लब्धिख्यात्यर्थिना etc.—A quotation from Haribhadra Sūri-Aṣṭaka XII. 4. विवाद is that set of propositions-consisting of छल (fraudulent arguments) and जाति (objections in the

shape of futile analogues)—which a wretched man, not possessed of true greatness of soul, puts forward out of greed of money or fame.

ग्रहिल—Caught, as it were, by an evil spirit.

तथा वितण्डा—वितण्डा cavilling, from तण्ड् to strike; a pro position not founded on a constructive basis I thought; one in which the speaker does not care to associate or establish his own position (स्वपक्ष) in regard to certain truth, and indulges in mere destructive criticism. A quotation from N Vārtika on N Sūtra I. i. 1 in support of this meaning The author adds that the word rather means prattle which is lacking in judgment or discernment and therefore irresponsible.

वल्गु from वल्ग्. For the termination उ see Hema. VII. ii. 21.

[illegible] etc.—When men are naturally so anxious to defend their own positions by hook or by crook, and to cavil at others, if they get expert aid of great thinkers they are sure to abuse it. Such a preaching is like adding ghee to burning fire

[illegible]:—Rejoicing in the world and the ways of the world. cf. "[illegible]"—quoted in the footnote in the A. M. P edition of the [illegible].

[illegible] etc.—The verses occur in [illegible] of [illegible] P 11. The teaching of this branch of Logic or Nyāya-S'āstra is further justified in the [illegible] (p. 595) as follows:—

[illegible]

एपि कश्चिलद् तदुपयोगाय । यतोऽद तत्त्वाम्यासाभ्यासंरतमासीनमनेकशिष्य मध्येपात्यमानं रसस्ततत्त्वगुणरसिम्य मान्यमावसमाचार्यममार्यः कमिद्विपभिरामस्ता इत्यभिधानम गुरविमलकविपाकरपरिवमनिवदस्तरणमंगगुरवा मिता मोक्षपरिवृ् भिमात्स्यावति द्वुरामन्मीभिकी सत्स्मतिमियेयं मिया च वेश च वेद प्रामाण्यं प्रमदकार्यं कारकर्कः इत्यादि मर्मं विरस्य तहस्य सहसा तमेव एव प्रकटित भावरचकपरिवमाभिचाभितात्ममगुणवर्गसृदयाप्रवाकुक्मति तदा पम्बात मिन्दूमावपरित्वविलसितमिति भावकन्याकाम्यो यदि तदुपेक्षते न विरक्तत्तोपि तथा तस्माद् तावमात्रतिपातेऽपि यदि कल्पितिमिरेयं न शमयति तदा तस्मिन् गते तत स्वात विम्पतस्य पूता कल्मषस्थाने क्रिया स्या। मोक्षसाधनमात्रमाचार्य पण्डितो न्यायविषम । अब मानस्य सौक्ष्म्येन परिकेत यदाजिता न तच्छुता न इतरेऽपि तत्पदार्थमीमांसापदि तमेव मान्यवासीत्। ततूर्व परिमलमपि मयि तथा नैतत्त्वः वदति स याददृप्ता । तद्विचारकरणे विस्तरेण अन्यपदार्थपरिहार्य मुक्तिः। भक्ष्यपद्विस्मरणे प्रयोजनं तस्य परिकल्पनाय वर्जितम् । —N Manjari.

मायोपमेयादिति etc.—Mallinatha is now going to make this one word the basis of his commentary dealing with the exposition and criticism of some of the points of the Nyâya system.

I. न केवलं etc.—A mere knowledge of each of these sixteen पदार्थ taken singly or collectively will not suffice to bring about the summum bonum. ज्ञान and क्रिया are the two wheels of the chariot of मोक्ष which will not move if either of them is wanting. It may be urged that क्रिया is not discarded altogether but it has to be preceded by तत्त्वज्ञान if it is to bring about मोक्ष. Even if ज्ञान and क्रिया be joined together they will be of little use in achieving the end. For, the ज्ञान that is provided there is false ज्ञान. This can be shown as follows :

II. 1. तत्र प्रमाणस्य लक्षणं etc.—प्रमाण is defined as अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणम्. अर्थवत् प्रमाणम् —N Bhâsya I. 1. 1. उपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणम् —N Bh. Vârtika I. 1. 1; 'उपलब्धिहेतुश्च प्रमाणं यथेदं उपलब्धिविषया —N Bh. II. 1. 11. Here if हेतु means only a cause any cause, not necessarily an instrumental cause or करण the definition will apply to all the कारक (things participating in or associated with the क्रिया such as agent (कर्तृ), object (कर्मन्) etc.). If, however हेतु is taken to mean only करण ज्ञान and not इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष is the करण of अर्थोपलब्धि; for इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष may take place and yet for want of ज्ञान there may not be अर्थोपलब्धि

Hence, ज्ञान is the true करण and not इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष. Besides, a करण must immediately precede the effect, which ज्ञान does but इन्द्रिय does not the latter being one step remote.

यदपि भासर्वज्ञस्य etc.—Another definition of प्रमाण is "सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम्" (Nyāyasāra of भासर्वज्ञ I 1.) Here 'साधन' is all right. It means करण, and this excludes कर्तृ and कर्म of the अनुभव. It would be a definition applicable to ज्ञान and not to इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष. The right definition is "स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्."—See Pramāṇa-Nyāya-Tattvālokālaṁkāra. I 2. न्यायभूषण is a commentary on न्यायसार of भासर्वज्ञ an old Saivite writer on Nyāya.

2. प्रमेयमपि etc.—प्रमेय i. e. the object of right knowledge is of twelve kinds: (1) आत्मन्, (2) शरीर (3) इन्द्रिय (4) अर्थ, (5) बुद्धि, (6) मनस्, (7) प्रवृत्ति, (8) दोष (9) प्रेत्यभाव, (10) फल, (11) दुःख and (12) अपवर्ग.

तच्च न सम्यक् etc.—The classification is objected to on the ground that शरीर, इन्द्रिय, etc. deserve to be included in आत्मन्. For आत्मन् i. e. the आत्मन् who is associated with and subject to संसार and to whom the knowledge of the प्रमेय is prescribed, cannot be dissociated from his शरीर इन्द्रिय, etc. [Note, however that प्रमेय in the Nyāya-Sūtra does not mean logical category (प्रमाविषयं प्रमेयम्) but topics which deserve to be studied by one desirous of मोक्ष (मुमुक्षुणा ज्ञेयं प्रमेयम्) thus, आत्मन्, शरीर etc. deserve to be studied separately and in detail by a मुमुक्षु, and are in this sense प्रमेय. The criticism therefore misses the point.]

आत्मा च etc.—Another defect in the classification: आत्मन् is not प्रमेय but a प्रमातृ.

इन्द्रियबुद्धिमनांसि etc.—These three are करण, and not विषय of प्रमा and therefore not प्रमेय.

दोषाश्च etc.—दोष are thus defined in the N. Sūtra: प्रवर्तनालक्षणा दोषाः (N. S. I 1 18). They are included in प्रवृत्ति i. e. activity of the वाक्, शरीर and मनस्, all of which again are includ-

Hence, मन is the true करण and not इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष. Besides, a करण must immediately precede the effect, which मन does but इन्द्रिय does not, the latter being one step remote.

यद्वा स्वार्थ etc. — Another definition of प्रमाण is "सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम्" (Nyāyasāra of भासर्वज्ञ I. 1). Here 'साधन' is not right: it means करण and this excludes कर्तृ and कर्म of the अनुभव. It would be definition applicable to मन and not to इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष. The right definition is "स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्"—See Pramāṇa-Naya-Tattvālokālankāra. I. .. न्यायभूषण is commentary on न्यायसार of भासर्वज्ञ an old Śaivite writer on Nyāya.

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आत्मा च etc.—Another defect in the classification: आत्मन् is not प्रमेय but प्रमातृ.

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ed in three of the प्रमेय viz. शरीर, इन्द्रिय and मनस्. दुःखस्यैकविंशतिविधत्वम् i. e. Twenty-one kinds of दुःख h ve be n ennmerat-ed in the Nyāya-Sāra :— एकविंशतिभेदास्तु—शरीरं षडिन्द्रियाणि षड्विषयाः षड्बुद्धयः सुखं दुःखं चेति। Com. तत्र शरीरं प्रसिद्धम्। षडिन्द्रियाणि घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्रमनांसि। षड् विषयाः गन्धरूपरसस्पर्शशब्दसुखादि-लक्षणाः। षड्बुद्धयः षडिन्द्रियजाः। षड् विषयाः तत्फलाः। ... सर्वं दुःखमिति दुःखम्। The details of दोष given in Jayanta's Nyāya-Mañjarī are interesting :

तेषां दोषाणां त्रयो राशयो भवन्ति रागो द्वेषो मोह इति। तत्राद्यस्तेषां ...काम ...। मतिपूर्वेष्वसद्भाव... द्वेषः। वस्तुपरमार्थापरिच्छेदलक्षणो मिथ्या-ध्यवसायो मोहः। ... पञ्च एव दोषाः। ... ईर्ष्यादीनां यथानिर्दिष्टेष्वेवान्तर्भावात्। कामो मत्सरः स्पृहा तृष्णा लोभ इति पञ्चप्रकारो रागपक्षः। ... काम। ... मत्सरः। ... स्पृहा। पुनर्भवप्रतिसन्धानहेतुभूतेच्छा तृष्णा। ... लोभ इत्येवमिमप्रकार भेदाद्रागपक्ष प्रपञ्चः। द्वेषपक्षोऽपि पञ्चविधः। क्रोध ईर्ष्यासूया द्रोहोऽमर्ष इति। ... क्रोधः। ... ईर्ष्या। ... असूया। परापकारो द्रोहः। ... अमर्षः इत्येवमादिप्रकारभेदभिन्न द्वेषपक्षः। मोहपक्षस्तु चतुर्विधो मिथ्या-ज्ञानं विचिकित्सा मानः प्रमाद इति। ... मिथ्याज्ञानम्। विचिकि-त्सेति विमर्शो विचिकित्सा ... मानः। ... प्रमादः। स एव मद इति व्याख्यायते। ... एवं त्रय एवैते दोषाः। ... दोषान्तरम्। तेषां तु मोहः पापतमः इतरयोस्तु तदधीनात्मलाभत्वात्। ... मिथ्याज्ञानस्य प्रहाणेन ... मिथ्याज्ञानस्यैव भगवता सर्वेषां ... संसार दुःखमूलम्—N Mañjari pp. 500–1

दुःखस्य जन्मादीनां etc.—दुःख and इन्द्रियार्थ such as शब्द etc. are included in दुःख—the form r as the principal direct (मुख्य) दुःख, and th latter as subordinate indirect (गौण) दुःख—inasmuch as th l tte is the साधन of the former "मुख्यं दुःखं बाधनात्मकं साधनत्वं तु शरीरेन्द्रियविषयादि गौणम्"—Jayanta's N Mañjari p. 505

प्रेत्यभावापवर्गयोः etc.—प्रेत्यभाव (Being after death i. e. transmigration) and अपवर्ग (= मोक्ष emancipation) are certain states of आत्मन् and they may well be taken as included in आत्मन्—says the author. प्रेत्यभाव and अपवर्ग are thus defined in the N

Sûtra—युक्तमपि प्रेत्यभावः तद् (दुःखा)त्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्गः (N. S. I. i. 19 2-)

The right definition of प्रमेय says the author is the famous Jaina definition "उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मकं वस्तु प्रमेयम् "

2. एवं संशयादीनां etc.—संशय etc. are the other terms on the list of the पदार्थs. That they are not तत्त्व or realities can be easily shown.

तेषां मध्यादेव etc.—Only three out of the sixteen padârthas have been selected here for detailed criticism, because they are unbecoming of any one who professes to be a sage. These are छल, जाति and निग्रहस्थान

III. 1. तत्र छलम् etc.—Definition of छल. छल is a deceitful attack upon the opponent by quibbling upon his words. अवि-

[illegible] विशेषाभावेऽर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम् (N S. I. ii. 52).

तत्र [illegible]
ground [illegible]
For [illegible]
[illegible] and [illegible]
cannot be [illegible]
that [illegible]
([illegible]
one destroys [illegible]
etc. describ[illegible]
od are in [illegible]
point.]

[illegible] are
is not a [illegible] (पक्ष)
[illegible]
[illegible] of [illegible] p. 105.

[illegible] tran-
[illegible] (as states
activity of [illegible]—
in the N.

you know that in saying नवकम्बलोऽयं
[illegible]e used the word नव in the sense of
[illegible]rposely take the word in the sense of
[illegible]try to put him out by showing how
[illegible]e man was नवकम्बल in the sense of
[illegible]nkets —you re indulging in वाक्छल
[illegible]se of language.

[illegible] concerning the use of a class-term
सम्भवतोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसद्भूतार्थकल्पना सामान्यच्छलम्
[illegible]h Suppose one says "The Bråh-
[illegible]ed and somebody remarks
[illegible]r are quite natural in a Bråh-
[illegible]ly strain the argument beyond
[illegible]r speaker and attribute to him
[illegible]lows viz causal connection
[illegible] thus If Bråhmanas
[illegible]our Vrâtya (a low degrad-
[illegible]uld possess them too, for he
[illegible]would be a case of सामान्यच्छल
[illegible]ति-व्रात्य.

औपचारिके प्रयोगे etc.—When knowing that a term has been used in a figurative sense by the opponent, you purposely take it in the literal sense and attack it, it would be a case of उपचारच्छल—deceit concerning a figurative word. Example: One says मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति "—"The benches are crying out"—meaning thereby that the men seated on the benches are crying out. Here, if you purposely take the word मञ्च in the literal sense and object: "Benches are wooden; they cannot be crying out" your objection would be an उपचारच्छल. अभिधानस्य धर्मो यथार्थप्रयोगः । धर्मविकल्पोऽन्यत्र दृष्टस्यान्यत्र प्रयोगः । तस्य निर्देशे धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशे । यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीति अर्थसद्भावेन प्रतिषेधः मञ्चस्थाः पुरुषाः क्रोशन्ति न तु मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति । का पुनरत्रार्थविकल्पोपपत्तिः ? । अन्यथा प्रयुक्तस्यान्यथार्थकल्पनम् । भक्त्या प्रयोगे प्राधान्येन कल्पनम् । उपचारविषयं छलमुपचारच्छलम् । उपचारो नीतार्थः सहचरणादिनिमित्तेन । तद्भावे तद्वदभिधानम् उपचार इति (N. S. Bh. ibid) धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशेऽर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेध उपचारच्छलम् (N. S. I. ii. 55).

✓ यत्र सम्यग् हेतौ etc.—When an opponent uses a हेतु whether good or bad, the right way of dealing with it is to examine it. If, instead of doing that, you set forth an argument to prove the opposite, it is a case of जाति or bad form of criticism (दूषणाभास). जाति means class; in the present case, an argument based on class (जाति) i. e. based on vicious analogy or likeness. It is of twenty-four kinds (सा च चतुर्विंशति etc.) of which only the first four have been illustrated in the Text.

तत्र साधर्म्येण etc.—The साधर्म्यसमा जाति is that bad method of criticism in which you meet the opponent's argument based on a certain हेतु and like instances with another argument based upon a different हेतु and its own like instances without going to the root of the matter and examining which of the हेतुs has a better right to be accepted. Thus, against the argument शब्दः अनित्यः कृतकत्वात् घटवत् is set up another argument to prove the opposite, such as शब्दो नित्यः निरवयवत्वात् आकाशवत् without going into the question which of the two हेतुs together with their like instances is more entitled to our acceptance.

Sūtra—उपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणम् (इत्या)क्षपादीयोक्तलक्षणे (N S. I. 1. 19 52)

The right definition of प्रमाण says the author is the famous Jaina definition "स्वपरावभासकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् "

2. सन्ति संशयादीनि etc.—संशय etc. are the other terms on the list of the पदार्थs. That they are not तत्त्व or realities can be easily shown.

सर्वे प्रमाणादि etc.—Only three out of the sixteen padārthas have been selected here for detailed criticism, because they are unbecoming of any one who professes to be a sage. These are छल, जाति and निग्रहस्थान

III. 1. तत्र छलम् etc.—Definition of छल. छल is a deceitful attack upon the opponent by quibbling upon his words. अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्रायादर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम् (N S. I, II. 52).

Example: When you know that in saying नवकम्बलोऽयं माणवकः your opponent has used the word नव in the sense of new and still if you purposely take the word in the sense of the number nine and try to put him out by showing how absurd it was to say that the man was नवकम्बल in the sense of he who possesses nine blankets —you are indulging in वाक्छल i. e deceitful or dishonest use of language.

2 सामान्यच्छल—Deceit concerning the use of a class-term (सामान्य). सम्भवतोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसद्भूतार्थकल्पना सामान्यच्छलम् (N S. I. II. 54). Example Suppose one says "The Brāhmaṇa is learned and well behaved and somebody remarks "Learning and good behaviour are quite natural in a Brāhmaṇa" Then, if you purposely strain the argument beyond the limits intended by the latter speaker and attribute to him what he never intended to lay down viz a causal connection between ब्राह्मण्य and विद्याचरणसम्पत्ति thus: If Brāhmaṇas possess learning and good behaviour Vrātya (low degraded and illiterate Brāhmaṇs) should possess them too for he too is Brāhmaṇa —then, this would be a case of सामान्यच्छल I take विद्याचरणसम्पत्ति-कारण not विद्या-कारण.

and the religion of rituals or works (कर्म). They are also known as देवयान and पितृयाण—the Path of Gods and the Path of Manes. The earliest locus classicus of the "Two Paths" is the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. (p. 78) followed and slightly varied by the Ch. Up. (p. 145) and the doctrine is found later in the Bhag. Gītā as follows :

वेदविहिता तु हिंसा etc.—Animal slaughter practised in the course of a sacrifice is justified on the ground that it is prescribed by the Vedas, and is pleasing to gods guests, and manes. This will be discussed in order in the sequel.

मधुपर्क—See Āśv. Śrauta Sūtras II. iii. 1, 2 Kātyāyana Śr Sūt. I. ii. 22

पितृपक्ष—A tantra work of that name.

अतिथि etc.—That guests are pleased by the offer of meat is a matter of मधुपर्क —a poor argument, indeed, and perhaps sufficient to condemn the Brāhmaṇa case.

विपुला etc.—Quotations from Manu and Mahābhārata etc.

Manu (I) recognises the custom of meat-eating ; (II) at the same time he sounds a strong note of disapprobation ; (III) but he approves of, nay prescribes animal slaughter and use of meat at sacrifices to gods, in offerings and feasts connected with ancestor-worship and in the reception of guests. The Mahābhārata which ranges over much wider field of religious opinions contains many dialogues on the question of the religious ethics of Ahimsā and Himsā including मधुपर्क. Taken collectively they bear witness to (I) the prevalence of animal slaughter and meat-eating at certain period of our religious history ; (II) condemnation from the stand-point of higher ethics at the same time; (III) the animal slaughter and meat-eating permitted or prescribed in certain cases such as a sacrifice etc. and (IV) even the latter sometimes discountenanced as an institution of the अतिथि (मधुपर्क). There was, even at a very early period of our history section of religious opinion which condemned animal slaughter even for a sacrifice, and substituted vegetables

वैधर्म्येण etc.—वैधर्म्यसमा जातिः—As in the case of साधर्म्यसमा mutatis mutandis.

यदि मत्वेऽपि साध्यसाम्ये etc.—To press the analogy of the दृष्टान्त too far and thereupon argue th addition (उत्कर्ष) of such a धर्म as would be obviously absurd is उत्कर्षसमा जाति. For an illustration, see the T xt. अपकर्षेषु etc.—Similarly to press the analogy of the दृष्टान्त too far and thereupon to argue the absence (अपकर्ष) of such a धर्म as would be obviously absurd is अपकर्षसमा जाति. For an illustration see th Text.

तथा निग्रहस्थानं etc.—विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम् (N S. I. ii 60). निग्रहस्थान a positio of d feat is of two kinds: विप्रतिपत्ति and अप्रतिपत्ति. The former consists in bandoni g the original position or in taking up new position or in contradicting the first position. The latter consists in failure to meet the opponent by getting d mb-f unded and so on. There are twenty-two kinds of निग्रहस्थान, which are all enumerated i the Text. The whol Text from एवं प्रतिज्ञा to इति निग्रहस्थानम् is taken verbatim from Gunaratna s Tarkarahasya-Dīpikā on Saddarsanasamuccaya. It recurs also i Manibhadra's Laghu vṛtti on the same. The subject should be studied in the Nyāya-sūtras with Bhāṣya and Vṛtti. Jayanta's Nyāya-Mañjarī also will be found to be very illuminating.

Stanza XI

Steam Hiṁsā (Killing) even tho gh it may be enjoined by the Vedas, cannot produce *Dharma* (religious merit). *A general rule* such as *No living being should be killed* (injured)' can have no exception in any other phere. The idea of the heretics is lik the desire to get sovereignty for one s self by performing the ceremony of killing one own son

The system next criticised i the *Purva-Mimāṁsā* of Jaimini.

न धर्मनिर्माणे etc.—अर्चिरादि and धूमादि—the Path of Light and the Path of Smoke mean the religion of wisdom (ज्ञान)

and the religion of rituals or works (कर्म). They are also known as देवयान and पितृयान—the Path of Gods and the Path of Manes. The earliest locus classicus of the "Two Paths" is the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. (p. 78) followed and slightly varied by the Ch. Up. (p. 145) and the doctrine is found later in the Bhag. Gītā as follows:

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विधुतं etc.—Quotations from Manu and Mahābhārata etc.

Manu: (I) recognises the custom of meat-eating; (II) at the same time he sounds a strong note of disapprobation; (III) but he approves of, nay prescribes animal slaughter and use of meat at sacrifices to gods, in offerings and feasts connected with ancestor-worship and in the reception of guests. The Mahābhārata which ranges over a much wider field of religious opinions contains many dialogues on the question of the religious ethics of Ahiṃsā and Hiṃsā including मधुपर्क. Taken collectively they bear witness to (I) the prevalence of animal slaughter and meat-eating at a certain period of our religious history; (II) condemnation from the stand-point of higher ethics at the same time; (III) the animal slaughter and meat-eating permitted or prescribed in certain cases such as a sacrifice etc. and (IV) even the latter sometimes discountenanced as an institution of the कलियुग (वर्ज्य). There was, even at a very early period of our history a section of religious opinion which condemned animal slaughter even for a sacrifice, and substituted vegetables

for animal offerings and regarded the latter as characteristic of सात्वत only.—See Ait. Br 4 Mahābhārata, S'āntiparvan—Nārāyaṇīya section—the story of King Vasu-Uparicara and the Outras'ikh gḍins; and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.

पितृप्रायशि etc.—The performance of special S'rāddhas with meat for the manes is laid down for the growth of progeny

अश्वमेधाद्य etc.—(i) Scriptures justify the use of flesh at sacrifices where horses, bulls and even human animals (See Ait. Br iv) were slaughtered for propitiating gods. S'rauta Sūtra. (ii) They lay down its use for the reception of learned guests. See Manu., Āpastamba Gṛ etc. महोक्षं वा etc. quoted from the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti Ācā 109 (iii) They also prescribe its use for the propitiation of manes. See Manu S., Gṛhya Sūtras etc. द्वौ मासौ etc. the quotation is from Manu III—268-271.

धर्म इत्यभिधायै etc.—In criticising the Hiṃsāvāda of the Brāhmaṇas the author first cites texts from their own scriptures which condemn Hiṃsā.

न हि भवति माता etc.—T say that हिंसा is धर्महेतु is to say that a woman is both a माता and a वन्ध्या —in other words it is a contradiction in terms.

यदन्वयव्यतिरेक etc.—A cause is that whose अन्वय and व्यतिरेक are followed by the कार्य i.e. whose presence and absence determine the presence and absence of the कार्य; in other words, a cause is an invariable antecedent of the कार्य. N w can you say that हिंसा is an invariable a tecedent of धर्म? Surely not. For धर्म you admit arises from तपः and similar practices. हिंसा therefore, is not धर्महेतु

अथ न सर्वा etc.—The Brāhmaṇa replies: It is not every kind of हिंसा that we regard as meritorious (धर्महेतु) but only a special kind of हिंसा, viz. that laid down in the Scriptures.

ननु तस्य धर्म etc.—The Siddhāntin (Jaina) asks: How is हिंसा धर्महेतु? Is it that the animals do not die although they are killed? This is evidently absurd, as we see with our eyes that when you kill them they die. Or is it that the animals

retain a quiet mind even when they are being slaughtered and afterwards go to heaven ? This, too is contrary to what we actually observe. How piteous are the cries of the animals *when they are being slaughtered ! They make out in their* own language (of bleating etc.) what corresponds to such a human cry as "हा बप्पमरिए etc. "—This is evident from the expression on their face, eyes and so forth.

अपेतसामर्थ्याः etc.—The natural effect of a thing can be counteracted by certain contrivances and processes. Thus pieces of iron ordinarily heavy and liable to sink can be made to float on water when used as parts of a ship similarly a poison can be turned into a medicine Analogously हिंसा though bad in itself can become a good act.

न च वाच्यं जुगुप्सितं etc.—It is besides not a disgraceful act since the Brāhmaṇa priests who practise it, are treated with respect.

Criticism : *अयस्य तरन्ती etc.—The analogies are inapplicable.* The pieces of iron are used as parts of a ship and are thus capable of floating The Vedic mantras do not change the poor animals to a state wherein they would be beyond the touch of suffering You will say : They get turned into gods But do they ? What evidence ? There can be no sensuous evidence (प्रत्यक्ष). For the state of gods can only be supra-sensible. Nor is there evidence consisting of inference (अनुमान) pointing in that direction. For our inference will require certain mark (a हेतु) on which to base it. There is none such in the present case. Nor is there an authoritative word (शब्द) to establish it. The texts cited have no value inasmuch as their authority is at issue The two remaining प्रमाणs viz. अर्थापत्ति and उपमान are included in inference (अनुमान) and need not be considered separately

अथ यथाविधि जिनायतनादि etc.—The Brāhmaṇas: In erecting a Jaina temple many life has to be destroyed Yet this is justified by the Jainas on the ground of temple-building being a very meritorious and pious act, an act whose merit far outweighs the sin incurred in destroying small lives in the process of building The case of our animal slaughter at sacrifices is similar

देवे etc.—The Jaina : In temple-building, killing of small पृथिव्यादि is found *unavoidable*. Besides, a small loss of पुण्य incurred by destroying small life is far outweighed by the transcendent merit of temple-building. But you cannot plead inevitability in th case of हिंसा For your own Scriptures lay down जप तिथ and similar other practices as availabl for securing स्वर्ग See Gautama Dharma-sûtras, Patanjali's Yoga-sûtras, M nusmrti etc It is not so in the case of sacrificial slaughter For the same great merit can be secured by the practices bove mentioned.

प्रतिक्षतांगं etc —Cut and tortured in every limb. धावद्दिशा-not knowing which way to go ; bewildered. सौ(सौ)निकात्-far more cruel than butcher दृष्टं च तं केवल-the citing of an analogy on the strength of some little likeness is wrong It would go too far and affect inj riously many of your own positions.

न च निवृत्तस्य etc.—The outweighing merit of building Jaina temples.

तत्फलम् etc.—The *rationale* of its meritoriousness : how the sight of the idols installed therein influences the mind of the worshipper and so on. तथा च etc—पञ्चलिङ्गी work of Jines'vara Sûri, teacher of Abhayadeva.

अथ दृष्टेऽपि etc.— There is the visible merit contained in giving meat cakes to the Brâhmaṇas who are very much pleased thereby

पवित्रतरं etc.—Why not give them the holy दक्षिणा of gold instead of meat ? A very friendly proposal.

अथ न प्रत्यवायो etc.—The animal slaughter at sacrifices brings पुष्टि i. prosperity says the Brâhmaṇa. But the same can be secured by several other means. Hence, हिंसा is not necessary (व्यभिचार).

श्वेतं वायव्यं etc.—On desirous of prosperity should sacrifice a white animal to the god Vâyu—an oft-quoted text of the B âhmaṇas.

अथ तत्र स्वर्गे etc.—The animals get heaven,says the Brâhmaṇa. Who brought the news from heaven ?—asks the Jaina. Here

are the Scriptures, answers the Br The Jaina rejoins that the authority of the Scriptures will be shortly discussed and shown to be hollow In the meanwhile, he ridicules the idea of स्वर्ग associated with animal-killing.

यदि हि हिंसा etc.—If हिंसा can bring heaven, the streets of hell may be taken as closed. For, who will then have to go to the latter place ? That is to say if the worst sin could bring heaven, let us declare an end to hell !

पापमयी —A marginal note says मीमांसकाः Certainly not they but the Sāṅkhyas

किंच अपरिचित etc.—If the offering of a lower life at a sacrifice can bring hea en, why not make an offering of a higher life, for the matter of that, of your father and mother to secure a still better heaven ?

अथ मन्त्रसंस्कृतो हि etc.—The Br So marvellous is the efficacy of Vedic mantras pronounced on the victim that the result is heaven.

दृष्टं लोके etc.—The Jaina : The Vedic mantras have been found clearly inefficacious in the matter of marriage, and other ceremonies, many brides becoming widows inspite of the mantras promising a happy and prosperous married life, and many leading a happy married life even without the Vedic mantras pronounced upon them.

अथ तत्र क्रियावैगुण्यं etc.—The last stronghold of a defeated logician. The Br The ceremony in connection with mantras may have been badly performed.

The Jaina : Who can remove the doubt whether the failure of the result has been due to bad performance of the ceremonies or the mantras were inefficacious ?

अथ यथा पुत्रकामे etc.—Br : Y u be pray for "Health etc." (See the verse quoted from वायवस्य 4-6. p. 509), and the fruit of the prayer is admitted by you to be accruing in another w rld. Similarly the mantras of marriage ceremo y may bear fruit in another life. Jaina : In that case, the Samskāras

would be producing their fruits in the succeeding lives, and liberation from Samsāra would become impossible.

आरोग्यादि—The Jaina further explains that the prayer for आरोग्य in आवश्यक 4-6 p.509 is for mental आरोग्य (भावारोग्य) which makes for truthfulness and other virtues.

न च वैदिकी etc.—The Jaina quoted passages from Vedāntic writers who condemn himsā, even at sacrifices.

यद् याज्ञिकानां etc.—As regards the so-called respectability of sacrificial priests, the Jaina says that only fools respect them. He adds "Even dogs are worshipped by fools."

स्वच्छन्दवृत्तिरिति etc.—Gods could produce before themselves any delectable food by their mere will; why should they eat for your wretched meat? The gods have a 'वैक्रिय' or वैक्रियिक as distinguished from an औदारिक body which belongs to us. (See Tv Sū II. 36 and Rāja V and Sūtra-krt p. 577) वैक्रियिक-स्वरूपैकत्वपृथक्त्वादिविविधकरणं विक्रिया सा प्रयो जनमस्येति वैक्रियिकम् i. e. adjustable to various needs. औदारिक उदारं स्थूलमिति यावत् उदारे भवं उदारं वा प्रयोजनमस्येति—gross and rigid.

प्रक्षेपाहार etc.—If the gods be supposed to eat what is thrown into the sacrificial fire, it will conflict with the statement that the gods possess "mantra-bodies"

अपूर्वदेवतावादिभिः etc.—The Ritualists (Pūrva-Mīmāṁsakas) not only denied the existence of God, but even of gods apart from the Vedic word in the dative case—to which offerings were to be made. See Nirukta, and Pūrva M.Bh. Vārt

हुतमन्तरायै—The offering simply burns away in the fire and turns to ashes. It is but vain talk to say that it pleases gods.

अग्निः च योऽयं etc.—A piece of banter. The tretā fire (See Āit and S t Brs.) is said to be the mouth of 33 crores of Gods; so there is but one mouth for all varieties of gods—high medium, low. one god would be eating the उच्छिष्ट, (food from the mouth) of another god, thus surpassing even the Turk (Musalmans) who eat from a common dish, but not from a common mouth! Moreover we have heard of many

mouths to one body but not of one mouth to many bodies! Again, suppose a man praises one god and reviles another One god would thereupon pronounce a blessing and the other a curse. How are the two operations to be carried out from one mouth? Besides a mouth is but a 1/9 part of the body; if even that 1/9 part is a fire, how dangerous to the three worlds would be the 33 crores of gods!

प्रत्यवसिते—The writer is rightly disgusted with his own bantering tone.

यज्ञ कारीरि—The कारीरी यज्ञ which is prescribed for rain, does not always secure it. Even when rain follows a कारीरी यज्ञ it is not due to gods eating your offering but owing to their being pleased with the worshipper for his heart's worship. There are many ways of propitiating gods other than the sacrificial butchery which is nothing but sin.

यज्ञ उत्तम etc.—(See ante.) The deities may be supposed to have been gratified by the idea, they need not be supposed to have eaten the animal offerings. If what is thrown into fire as an offering reaches gods, why not such deleterious and objectionable substances as leaves of the nimb tree, bad oil etc.?

प्रत्यर्थितम् etc.—The true theory in this matter is this: the devotion of the worshipper taken along with certain accessories brings about the desired consequences such as rain, victory etc. This is borne out by the fact that a चिन्तामणि (the philosopher's stone) fulfils our objects inspite of its being inanimate.

अतिथीनां तु etc.—Better give your guests nicely prepared vegetable food.

पितृणां etc.—The offering made to the manes for increase of progeny often fails to secure the end. Besides, without any such offering a donkey or a pig or an ewe has plenty of progeny. Moreover the manes in their transterrestrial spheres must be engaged in enjoying or suffering the fruits of their earthly works. How could they have any desire for the rice-balls offered by their sons?

आस पिण्डेषु etc.—As to the offerings made to the manes through the mo the of the Brāhmaṇas the theory is simply ridiculous. The Brāhmaṇas get a fat belly by eating; there is nothing to show that the manes enter the body or the stomach of the Brāhmaṇas. In fact the Brāhmaṇas look like प्रेत (ghosts) when they are engaged in gluttonously devouring the dishes spread bef re them, and so far no Śrāddha ceremony need be performed.

आगमप्रमाण etc.—A dilemma: Is the Brāhmaṇical Āgama—the Veda—पौरुषेय अपौरुषेय i. e. composed by a personal (N.B.—It does not mean human being—a mistake often committed) being or not? If it is composed by personal bei g is that personal being om iscie t or not? The *former* alternative is contrary to your statement contained in th f llowing verse नास्ति (See स्याद्वादमञ्जरी of मल्लिषेण with परिमल—in which erse is quoted with the first lin the same as in this)—" There is no direct perciplent of suprasensible bjects; the truth bout things is determined by the eternal sentences of the Veda " The latter that the Veda is composed by a personal being who is not omniscient would deprive it f all thority whatsoever If now yo say that the Veda is not composed by a personal being all we need say is, it can ne er exist any more than the horn of horse You speak f the वचन of the Veda etc. But वचन—utterance which is clearly an act done by a personal being W do not hea any sound in the ky; even if we did, we should have to presume person behind it from whose mouth it emanated. All वचन is पौरुषेय e g कुमारसंभव f Kālidāsa.

वचनात्मक वेद: etc.—The Ved is heap of articulate sounds which requires body with organs such as the palate etc.

दुर्बोधपौरुषेयत्व etc.—E en after holding that श्रुति is अपौरुषेय you admit that its interpretation is पौरुषेय i. the interpretatio comes from personal being or beings—the exponents of the Vedas. Why not then allow श्रुति to be पौरुषेय?

अन्यव्यापारिहोत्र etc.—Why is the text relating to अग्निहोत्र interpreted as referring to अग्निहोत्र, and not as referring to anything else under the sun? In ther words, why have the Vedic

texts certain definite meanings in the same manner as propositions of our ordinary parlance? *E.g.* why is अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः (a Vedic text)=अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः (as we personal beings use and understand the terms), and not=[illegible] (any other irrelevant nonsense).

अस्तु वाऽपौरुषेयः etc.—Granting that it is अपौरुषेय what bearing could that fact have on the question of its प्रामाण्य? प्रामाण्य depends on the words being आप्तपुरुषोक्त, not अपौरुषेय

अथ योऽयं न हिंस्यात् etc.—विधि is of two kinds: उत्सर्ग (General rule) and अपवाद (Exception); where the two conflict the अपवाद overrides the उत्सर्ग

समानविषयत्वे etc.—But the necessary condition is that the two—उत्सर्ग and अपवाद—must relate to the same matter Illustrations as given in the text.

भवतां चोदनार्थं etc.—In the case of the question at issue, we find that the उत्सर्ग—न हिंस्यात् etc.—is for the purpose of averting hell (दुर्गतिनिषेधार्थं), while the अपवाद is for securing propitiation of gods, guests and manes—an entirely different matter So one cannot be an अपवाद of the other but is a contradiction of the other (तुल्यबलयोर्विरोधः—See Artha-Saṁgraha.)

न च वाच्यं etc.—It may be argued that the अपवाद about the Vedic *Hiṁsā* inasmuch as it relates to securing heaven relates virtually to averting hell (दुर्गतिनिषेध). Thus the उत्सर्ग and the अपवाद have the same subject-matter

Criticism: It has been already shown that the Vedic *Hiṁsā* cannot be a means for securing heaven. Moreover the विधि may be accepted as an अपवाद if there is no other recourse. But in the present case, heaven can be secured in many other ways such as जप नियम etc.—and therefore the texts about the Vedic *Hiṁsā* had better be thrown overboard as conflicting (विरुद्ध) with the general principle first laid down (न हिंस्यात्), and not treated as an अपवाद

न च प्रवेश etc.—See supra. See also Dr Bhandarkar "Vaiṣṇavism" etc.

अयं च विजिगीषवः etc.—A mere ambition which is never destined to be fulfilled.

Stanza XII

A Brief Exposition :—

स्वार्थावभासकम् एव बोधः—Thesis Knowledge, thought, or consciousness is capable of revealing *itself* nd its *object*. Take 'स्वार्थ' as द्वन्द्व compound of स्व and अर्थ [*i. e.* itself and its object: स्वस्य आत्मस्वरूपस्य अर्थस्य पदार्थस्य च], and not as their षष्ठीतत्पुरुष 'एव' excludes the opposite of which there are two cases: (1) Revealing itself only the world of objects being either nil (शून्यवाद), or a matter of mere inference (बाह्यार्थानुमेयवाद) or identical with ज्ञान itself (विज्ञानवाद); (2) Revealing other objects only itself being revealed by another ज्ञान which some consider to be अनुव्यवसाय (kind of second or after-consciousness), and some अनुमान e अनुमेय from its effect, viz ज्ञातता

प्रकाशते etc.—प्रकाशते being made predicate of बोध, the latter is suggested to the mind as a kind of light. And what is essentially of the nature of प्रकाश (light) illumines or reveals everything including itself.

निरर्थे etc.—Otherwise, *i. e.* if ज्ञान is not regarded as capable of revealing itself *i.* self-luminous (ज्ञानस्य स्वार्थविषय भासकत्वाभावे). It does not mean if ज्ञान is not regarded as capable of revealing bjects For all are agreed as to its capacity to do the latter, whatever their difference as regards the nature of the bjective world. This eliminates (2) of the foregoing paragraph from our consideration.

अर्थकथा—Talk about objects *i. e.* whether they are or *are not* etc.

तथाहि—तथाहि। अर्थकथा etc.—अन्यथा अर्थकथैव न

यदि हि ज्ञानं etc.—Now begins the argument.

If ज्ञान is not regarded as self-luminous, it would require to be revealed by another ज्ञान that by third ज्ञान and so on *ad infinitum.* Thus, while the ज्ञान is at its wit's end in the matter of revealing itself, the अर्थ (bjective reality), which is ज्ञान is unable to reveal itself and so even the talk of अर्थ becomes impossible.

— तस्मात् etc.—Therefore there is good reason to hold that ज्ञान is self-revealed (स्वसंविदित) And yet other school men maintain that ज्ञान is अस्वप्रकाश (St. 1 l. 4) i. e. not स्वसंविदित or self-revealed it being as much an object (कर्मतापन्न) of ज्ञान as any other object in the universe.

स्थिरा = स्थिर i. e. अचेतन

परेभ्यो भयात्—Afraid of their critics, whom they are too dull to meet with arguments, in spite of their case of self luminousness of ज्ञान being strong.

Fuller Exposition.

I. भाट्टास्तावत् etc.—भट्टाः—The Mimâmsakas represented by the school of Kumârila Bhatta.

ज्ञानं etc.—They hold that ज्ञान is not self-revealed, because revelation is a क्रिया and no क्रिया can have itself as its object, any more than "a gymnast however much trained can ride upon his own shoulders, or a sword howsoever sharp can cut itself."

नैतत् सारम् etc.—*Criticism* What is the exact nature of your difficulty of 'स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोध' ? Is it that the क्रिया of उत्पत्ति cannot be directed towards itself, in other words, nothing can produce itself? Or does it mean that the क्रिया of ज्ञप्ति cannot be directed towards itself? As to the former alternative, all we need say is that we do not hold it : we quite agree that ज्ञान cannot produce itself. But the second alternative we do maintain: ज्ञप्ति can be directed towards itself. When ज्ञान arises, it arises invested with that particular character just as प्रदीपालोक—the light of a lamp—springs into existence as प्रकाश or illumination. You will say If the light of a lamp springs into existence as प्रकाश i.e if प्रकाश be the very nature of light, let it illuminate *other* objects; why should it be supposed to illuminate itself? Answer: Then, is that poor thing—the light—to remain unilluminated while it illuminates others? Or is it to receive illumination from another light and so on? The first supposition is contrary to

experience, the latter involves अनवस्था—*regressus ad infinitum*—You will say The light does not make itself an object of its illumination, that is to say it does not illuminate itself, but springs into existence as illumination and in that sense it is self illuminating (स्वप्रकाश).

Answer That is all the admission we need. When we say ज्ञान is self illuminating or स्वप्रकाशक we d not mean that ज्ञान appears before itself as an object (like घट पट etc.). But just as we say ज्ञानं जानामि (I know knowledge: I am aware of the fact f my knowledge), in the same way we say प्रदीपः स्वयं प्रकाशयति

स्वात्म etc.—As to the objection that a क्रिया cannot direct itself towards itself for that would involve contradiction of कर्तृ and कर्म we reply that the supposed incongruity is justified by e perience (अनुभवसिद्धेऽर्थे विरोधासिद्धेः). Just as we experience कर्ता working town ds कर्म in घटं जानामि so do we experience it in आत्मानं जानामि If ज्ञान were not here known by itself it could not have been an object of knowledge. The ज्ञान is not known by another ज्ञान, and that by third ज्ञान etc. as it would involve अनवस्था. It may be said (this is the ज्ञातता theory of the Bhatta Mimamsakas) that ज्ञान is revealed by the revelation of its bjects. Thus: Objects are revealed as a matter f fact; this revealedness (ज्ञातता) of objects becomes impossible except on the hypothesis of a ज्ञान having been already there as its cause. But this theory involves अन्योन्याश्रय दोष. For according to it, objects are bjects of knowledge owing to ज्ञान and ज्ञान is possibl owing to objects being known. You will reiterate your explanation thus: अर्थप्राकट्य (ज्ञातता) is impossible except on the *hypothesis* of ज्ञान Thus, ज्ञान is known by अर्थापत्तिप्रमाण *i. e.* the argument of Implication. Criticism Is that अर्थप्राकट्य or ज्ञातता which presupposes ज्ञान as you say itself ज्ञात or अज्ञात? If it is अज्ञात it cannot form the basis of th revelation of ज्ञान If it is ज्ञात, it involves ज्ञातता in ज्ञातता *ad inf* (अनवस्था), one अर्थापत्ति to support another अर्थापत्ति and so on *ad inf* Besides,

ज्ञान and ज्ञातता will involve each other and there will be अन्योन्याश्रय Therefore ज्ञान is double-faced it looks towards objects and it looks towards itself, and in this way it is 'स्वसंविदित'

Objection: If अनुभूति (ज्ञान) be अनुभाव्य (ज्ञानविषय) i. e object of ज्ञान it would not be अनुभूति any more than घट, पट etc.—(which are अनुभाव्य) are अनुभूति [Râmânuja's S'ri-Bhâṣya Catuḥsûtri.]

प्रयोगस्तु etc.—Syllogism: ज्ञान though अनुभव is not अनुभूति because it is अनुभाव्य; as for example, घट; and that ज्ञान is अनुभाव्य you do not deny because you admit that it is स्वसंवेद्य (संवेद्य=अनुभाव्य)

नैवं etc.—The objection may be thus answered Just as a ज्ञातृ is experienced as ज्ञातृ so अनुभूति is experienced as अनुभूति That अनुभूति is also अनुभाव्य involves no absurdity (cf S'ri-Bhâṣya). For अनुभूति is अनुभूति in relation to the objects; it is अनुभाव्य in relation to itself. Thus things might differ according to their several relations *e. g* one may be father of his children, but son of his own father and so on.

अनुमानात् etc.—that ज्ञान is स्वसंवेद्य can be shown by an अनुमान also. Thus:—ज्ञानं स्वयं प्रकाशमानमेवार्थं प्रकाशयति प्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवत् i. e. ज्ञान illuminates objects while it illuminates itself, *because it is an illuminator e g* प्रदीप

संवेद्यस्य प्रकाश्यत्वात् etc.—Objection: संवेद्य (ज्ञान) if it is प्रकाश्य cannot be प्रकाशक. Answer: It can be प्रकाशक by removing the screen of अज्ञान

चक्षुरादेः etc.—Objection The eyes etc. are illuminators but they do not illuminate themselves; so your हेतु in the above syllogism is inconclusive. नाम नेत्रादितिः etc.—Answe: They ar illuminators as मनोन्द्रियs i. e. not as physical organs —the ey balls—but as sensuous consciousness (मनोन्द्रिय) and sensuous consciousness is self revealed (स्वसंवेद्यस्वरूप). So the above हेतु—' to be an illuminator —is not inconclusive.

तथा संविद् etc.—Another अनुमान to support स्वसंविदित्व of ज्ञानसंविद् स्वप्रकाशा अर्थसंवित्तित्वात् घट स्वप्रकाशा etc.—i. e. संविद् (ज्ञान) is स्वप्रकाश because it is revelation of अर्थ; that which is not स्वप्रकाश is not revelation of अर्थ e. g. a घट.

एवं सिद्धेऽपि etc.—Thus, when प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान both prove स्वसंविदित्व i. e. स्वसंवेदनत्व of ज्ञान it is needless to set up a series of ज्ञानs to account for the revelation of ज्ञान

इन्द्रियार्थे—See Mīm. Darś. I. 1 and Bhāṣya. ज्ञान arises from the contact of इन्द्रिय and बुद्धि with the world of Reality (सत्). The three steps are as follows First there arises ज्ञान from the contact of इन्द्रिय and बुद्धि with the world of Reality [This is the first act of प्रत्यक्ष] By it the latter is revealed (अर्थप्राकट्य). [This is the second act of प्रत्यक्ष] From this revealedness I gather by a kind of inference or implication, that there has been revelation. [This is the third act of प्रत्यक्ष]

II यौगास्तावत्—For यौगाः=नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs, see Gunaratna Com. on Ṣad.

Our ज्ञान they say is ज्ञानान्तरवेद्य i. e. illuminable by something other than itself, because it is प्रमेय—a reality—which is not divine omniscience. The point of the argument is this All प्रमेयs, with the exception of God's own knowledge which surely does not require any other light, are ज्ञानान्तरवेद्य; our ज्ञान is one of them; therefore our ज्ञान is ज्ञानान्तरवेद्य

समुत्पन्ने हि ज्ञाने etc.—ज्ञान immediately after it is born, becomes an object of mental perception (मानसप्रत्यक्ष) by a further act of the mind taking place in the same आत्मन्. It is not self-revealed. (They call this अनुव्यवसाय. This view is attributed to Murāri-Miśra in Nyāya books—See their chapter on प्रामाण्यवाद).

न चैवमनवस्था—The charge of अनवस्था levelled against the position of ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यता of ज्ञान (see ante) may be thus met Ordinarily प्रमातृ (knower) is satisfied with the knowledge of an object; when, however there arises in his mind a *desire to know* (i. e. to be aware or conscious of)

his own knowledge, a knowledge of the knowledge takes place. [In Western psychology they call it self-consciousness But I do not adopt the term because in this passage it is the very point at issue whether the consciousness is self-revealed or other-revealed.]

तद्युक्तं etc.—Answer : (1) The पक्ष (rather the साध्य of the पक्ष or पक्ष with the साध्य) is बाधित by a contrary अनुमान and the हेतु is therefore कालात्ययापदिष्ट (When one अनुमान is opposed by another अनुमान the fallacy is called सत्प्रतिपक्ष or प्रकरणसम हेत्वाभास in Brahmanical Nyāya books. कालात्ययापदिष्ट or बाधित is the name of the हेत्वाभास when the साध्य of the अनुमान is contradicted by another प्रमाण such as प्रत्यक्ष)

तथा हि विवादास्पदं etc.—Syllogism to prove that ज्ञान is स्वसंविदित (स्वप्रकाश), as against the preceding syll gism : ज्ञानं स्वसंविदितं ज्ञानत्वात् ईश्वरज्ञानवत् *i. e.* our ज्ञान is स्वसंविदित because it is a ज्ञान ; as for example God's own ज्ञान The argument is that all ज्ञान by the very nature of it is स्वसंविदित ours as well as God's.

न चायं साध्यसाधनविकलो etc.—It may be objected by the other side that the दृष्टान्त on which the generalisation is based viz. ईश्वरज्ञान is pure fiction according to the Jainas—there being no ईश्वर according to them. But th objecti n is not correct. The Jainas do admit the existence of ईश्वर as a पुरुषविशेष just as the Yogins do (क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः See Pat.'s Yoga Sū.). [If by पुरुषविशेष we are to understand a single पुरुषविशेष I am afraid the author is making an admission not justified by the general tenor of Jainism. But I suppose we can very well understand this as "जात्यैकवचनम्" numerous पुरुषविशेषs being ईश्वरs in Jaina Theology]

व्यर्थविशेषणत्वाच्च etc.—(2) Besides, the हेतु in the syllogism : ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यम् ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वे सति प्रमेयत्वात् घटवत्—is व्यर्थविशेषण or असमर्थविशेष्य as the Naiyāyikas call it (See न्या. सू. or त. भा). The विशेष्य viz. प्रमेयत्वात् is redundant, since it adds nothing to the विशेषण 'ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वे सति' which is

quite sufficient for the purpose of the argument. The stock illustration of असमर्थविशेषण is पर्वतो वह्निमान् द्रव्यत्वे सति धूमवत्त्वात् where द्रव्यत्वात् is redundant, धूमवत्त्वात् being quite sufficient for th purpose of the argument.

न ईश्वरस्य साध्यत्वम् etc.—That प्रमेयत्वात् is redundant is obvious; f it excludes nothing. There is nothing other than ईश्वरत्व which is ot प्रमेय and which would accordi gly require to be excluded by inserting the word प्रमेयत्वात्. Nor does the omission f प्रमेयत्वात् endanger the साध्य viz साध्यव्यापकत्व making the remainder of the हेतु viz., ईश्वरसाध्यत्व sometimes go with साध्याभाव i. e सर्वनिश्चित

अप्रयोजकमार्ग etc.—(3) the हेतु is अप्रयोजक o सोपाधिक i.e. ineffective, except und conditions which do not exist in the present case. Technically an उपाधि is साध्यव्यापक (or साध्यसमव्याप्तिकत्वे) सति साधनाव्यापक i.e. that which covers or is co-extensive with साध्य, b t does not cove the साधन

तत्पुत्रत्वादि etc.—The stock illustration of सोपाधिक हेत्वाभास is गर्भ (मैत्री विवादपद) श्यामः मित्रातनयत्वात् इतरमित्रातनयवत् i. e the next son of Mit ā must be dark-complexioned because t is chil l of Mitrā, like all the othe sons of that lady This argument is considered to be unsound inasmuch as it is based upon a हेतु viz. मित्रातनयत्व which is अप्रयोजक i. e ineffective or सोपाधिक i. depending upon a condition viz. शाकाहारपरिणाम (to b fed on particular kind of vegetable food). The point is this: A son f Mitrā is not bound to be da k-complexioned simply because h is son of that lady for th dark complexion really arises from one s being fed in the womb certain kind of food and not from the simpl f ct of one being son of Mitrā. I other words, the validity of the अनुमान depends et merely on the uniformity of nature, but on th *necessity* of the uniformity a i i g from the *law of causation*. The technical defi ition of an उपाधि is साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वम् (See Nil. and M kt.vali) ill pply to the ill tration foll ws:—यत्र यत्र श्यामत्वं तत्र तत्र शाकाहारपरिणामः b t not यत्र यत्र मित्रातनयत्वं तत्र तत्र शाकाहारपरिणामः th coming मित्रातनय being not शाकाहारक

उपाधिमाह etc.—In the syllogism under discussion जडत्व is the उपाधि. Thus : the हेतु here is विज्ञानान्यत्वे सति प्रमेयत्वम् but it holds good only under the conditions of जडत्व *i.e.* that which is not only विज्ञानान्यत्व and प्रमेय but *also* जड ; that alone is स्वाप्रकाशक. In fact, जडत्व is the प्रयोजक of स्वाप्रकाशत्व and is therefore the उपाधि in the present case.

स्वप्रकाशे परमुख°—जड is defined as that which depends upon another for its revelation.

किंचेति etc.—Moreover the ज्ञान and the ज्ञान of the ज्ञान (See ante) are not known to be arising one after the other.

आशुभावात्—It may be argued that they *do* arise one after the other but the succession is so quick that we fail to notice it. For example, when we run a needle into a file of lotus leaves we imagine that we have pierced all of them *simultaneously* but as a matter of fact it is obvious that they have been pierced one after another.

जिज्ञासान्तरित etc.—Answer : Between the first and the second ज्ञान comes the जिज्ञासा of the ज्ञान so you cannot say that one *immediately* follows the other and so their succession is not noticed.

न च ज्ञानानां etc.—Moreover ज्ञानs do not necessarily arise from जिज्ञासा; even without the latter in certain cases, ज्ञान does arise, provided the objects are there in the right place.

न चार्थज्ञानस्यायोग्य° etc.—Now the first ज्ञान (the ज्ञान of objects) is not in an unsuitable place so that it could not become an object of ज्ञान without a special desire to know it. For that first ज्ञान is in the आत्मन्—quite a suitable place—and would therefore become known without a जिज्ञासा on our part—the result of which would be that one ज्ञान would spring on another ज्ञान and so on *ad infinitum*. आत्मन् would thus be engaged in knowing its own series of ज्ञानs and could, therefore never turn to other विषय. The point is that without a जिज्ञासा, ज्ञान can not arise; If it did, there would be nothing to prevent ज्ञानs springing in endless succession—like particles of radium—a show to which

there would be no end, so that ज्ञातृत्व would never have the opportunity of turning again t the world of objects. Thus विषयान्तर must be interposed between the ज्ञान. But when this is done, the proposition ज्ञानत्वं हि ज्ञानं etc. (See supra) breaks down.

तस्मात्ज्ञानं etc.—Conclusion : Therefore a ज्ञान does not need another ज्ञान to reveal it; it reveals itself ; as does the last ज्ञान in a धारावाहिक ज्ञान (ज्ञान f the nature of attention where the mind continues to rest on particular object for a length of time).

Books of reference.

1. Books on ज्ञानस्वप्रकाशवाद—and न्या. कि. मञ्जरी pp. 160–65. Pandit Vol. III; तर्कताण्डव, तर्कदीपिका, चित्सुखी etc.
2. S'ri-Bhâsya on स्वप्रकृति.
3. S'loka Vârt. on Sûtra 2–4.

Stanza XIII.

Stanza: If Mâyâ is there arises the dualism of Brahman and Mâyâ If Mâyâ is not, how could the manifold world be explained ? T say that there is Mâyâ (something that is not real) and that it can d something is equivalent to saying that woman is barren and that she is a mother !

वेदान्तिभिः—The Vedântins of the S'âṅkara school. मायाम अविद्या (Nescience). It is a much-discussed problem f later S'âṅkara Vedânta whether माया and अविद्या are synonymous r different Some distinguish between the two, referring one to ब्रह्मन् or ईश्वर and the other to जीव (For more information, see Siddhântaleśa.)

I Brief Explanation: (सामान्यार्थः)

सा माया etc.—द्वयम is twofold, हि भवती भवत्, viz., (1) सत्कृत (सत्) and (2) माया.

यदि मायेति etc.—ब्रह्म being transcendental, माया is supposed to produce the world. But if it (माया) is unreal, how can it produce it? Does the horn of a horse (an absolute nothing) ever produce anything? A feat of jugglery or a mirage cannot produce any real effect. Besides, the world is too real to be regarded as a mere show

अर्थकारित्वे etc.—In मायैव च सति च च. Thus the passage माया च अर्थकृत् च—that something should be माया and *at the same time* अर्थकृत्. Cf. similar use of two चs in the Raghu.-Canto X, 6 ते च प्रापुः etc. अर्थकृत्—capable of doing something. अर्थक्रियाकारित्व is given as a definition of सत्ता (Existence or Reality), in Jaina and Bauddha metaphysics. And माया can have no सत्ता—without ceasing to be माया. Thus, to say that माया (unreal) is अर्थकृत् (real) is like saying माता च वन्ध्या च

II Detailed Explanation (व्याख्यार्थः).

न चाविद्या etc.—The Vedāntins who cite सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म and other texts of the Upanisads in support of Monism.

सर्वं तु मायेति etc.—Their syllogism to prove that the world is मिथ्या.

Criticism.—तदेतत्सर्वं etc.—Here begins the criticism. It is all idle talk.

The Vedāntin is called upon to state what he means by मिथ्यात्व—Three alternative explanations are possible.

(1) मिथ्यात्व i. e. unreality in the sense of *absolute non-existence* (असत्त्व), such as belongs to शशशृङ्ग. This however is impossible, as it involves the position असत्ख्याति (appearance of what is nothing) which the Buddhist takes up but the Vedāntin rejects [See, however Gauḍapāda Kārikās and S'aṅkara's Commentary thereon.]

" असतो मायया जन्म तत्त्वतो नैव युज्यते ।
वन्ध्यापुत्रो न तत्त्वेन मायया वापि जायते ॥ "

—Gauḍapāda Kārikās, Advaita 28

असद्गतिमासतो मायया मायया तत्त्वतो वा न कथंचन जन्म युज्यते अदतत्वात्। न हि बन्ध्यापुत्रो मायया तत्त्वतो वा जायते। तस्मादत्रासद्वादो इह सद्वादपक्ष युज्यते।—Samkara's Com.

(2) मिथ्यात्व i.e. unreality in the sense of mis-take—that is, wrongly taking A for B. This, again, would be विपरीत(अन्यथा-) ख्याति involving the reality of one o both, which too the Vedâ tin does not accept. [The word of Samkara I the I troductory portion of his Sârîraka Bhâsya where he speaks of अविद्या as परस्य पूर्वदृष्टावभासः would seem to be a acceptance f अन्यथाख्याति See, h were the commentaries on th passage.]

(3) मिथ्यात्व i.e. unreality in the sense of what cannot be desc ibed as eithe existent or non-existent (अनिर्वचनीय). [There re numerous passages which can be cited to support this sense of मिथ्यात्व in S' mkara's Bhâsya on th Brahma Sûtras. I this sense of मिथ्यात्व the uthor of the Bhâmatî bserve "न हि सदसद्भ्यां व्यवहारदर्शनात् निर्वचनीयत्वमपि हि तद्विलक्षणतैवोक्तिर्भवति।"—Bh. on Samkara Com. on II. 1. 28.]

N w the Vedântin may be called upon to explain what h means by अनिर्वचनीय Does h mean निर्वचनाभाव? N w what is that सत् or वचन which is denied by the prefix 'निर्' in the word निर्वचन?

( ) If it is Being or सत्ता (सत्) that is denied, it is once more the position of असत्ख्याति which has been already repudiated by them as non-Vedântic.

(b) If it is non-Being or असत्त्व (अभाव) that is denied it is the position of सत्ख्याति which is also unacceptabl and unwelcome to the Mâyâvâdin.

(c) S ppose निर्वचन = प्रतीत्यगोचर (that which is unthinkabl). But if the world (प्रपञ्च) is unthinkable, how could it be mad the bject (पक्ष) of the syllogism प्रपञ्चो मिथ्या etc.? Also the het प्रतीयमानत्वात् could not be predicated of the worl l, if the world is, as y say प्रतीत्यगोचर If ye explain प्रतीत्यगोचर, not as precluding प्रतीयमानत्व altogether but as im-

plying that it is not known as it ought to be known, that is to say as असत् this would be निर्वचन (असत्-) ख्याति which has been already shown to be unacceptable to the Māyāvādin.

[For the Khyātis see Commentaries on S'aṁkara's Adhyāsa Bhāṣya in the Introduction of the Brahma-Sūtra S'ārīraka Bhāṣya, Rāmānuja's S'rī-Bhāṣya Appaya-Dīkṣita's Siddhāntales'a, and Mādhava's Ṣaḍdars'ana-saṁgraha and Jhalkikar's Nyāyakos'a]

कि चेवमविद्यत्वम् etc.—The unreality of जगत् is contradicted by प्रत्यक्ष

अथ प्रत्यक्षस्य etc.—It is urged by the other side that प्रत्यक्ष can *affirm*, it cannot *deny* Thus, it is said : आहुर्विधातृ प्रत्यक्ष affirms, it does not deny; therefore the Unity which the Veda has declared, प्रत्यक्ष has no power to deny

अन्यव्यवच्छेदकत्वेन etc.—Affirmation implies negation. You cannot affirm a thing to be yellow without denying that it is black. You cannot know an empty table by itself without denying its contents. Hence we cannot regard प्रत्यक्ष to be purely affirmatory

अपि च विधायकत्वे etc.—Granting that प्रत्यक्ष i[illegible]ly affirmatory one would like to ask why should it affirm [illegible] and not [illegible] सत् and not असत्? If it affirms the l[illegible] there l[illegible] the dualism of सत् and असत्

सतो सति.—There are two schools [illegible] S'aṁk[illegible] V[illegible]ānta. One of them takes its stand upon mere सत् and rejects असत् which comes in the way [illegible] the sole reality [illegible] Brahman In-competent to pronounce any opinion on th[illegible] [illegible] since असत् is beyond it range The oth[illegible] [illegible]hool [illegible] [illegible] प्रत्यक्ष too affirms th[illegible] Brahman's pure सत्, [illegible] [illegible] po[illegible] position. " [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ।"—S'aṁkara school criticised by Rāmānuja (See Rāmānuja's S'rī-Bhāṣya, Appaya Dīkṣita's Siddhāntales'a, etc). It is the latter school that is referred to in this passage.

To say that ब्रह्म is अनाद्यनादि is not only to make it मिथ्या but also मिथ्या being inconsistent in logic.

ब्रह्मावस्तुमित्र etc.—A syllogism to prove that the world not मिथ्या

ब्रह्मादि मिथ्या न भवति etc.—Moreover in the Vedānta syllogism the hetu दृश्यत्वात् is inconclusive ब्रह्म being दृश्य as well as ब्रह्म and yet not मिथ्या If however you deny दृश्यत्व of ब्रह्म, Vedānta would be gollen for you. Nor can you cite any दृष्टान्त in support of your reasoning; for every दृष्टान्त will be found included in the पक्ष viz. अविद्या or ब्रह्म about which मिथ्यात्व (अनिर्वचनीयत्व) is going to be proved. This is what is called अप्रसिद्धविशेषण hetvābhāsa.

कि वेदशब्दार्थ etc.—Is the syllogism which is supposed to prove that ब्रह्म is मिथ्या (a) part of the ब्रह्म or (b) is it separate from it? (b) If it is separate from it, is it सत्य or असत्य? If it is सत्य why not the whole ब्रह्म? If it is असत्य, it can prove nothing. (a) If it is part of ब्रह्म it is मिथ्या like the rest of it, and cannot accomplish its task of proving मिथ्यात्व of ब्रह्म. Thus, it may be shown that Brahma cannot be the sole reality.

Cf. P. N. T. at Alokāl akhāra R tatkarāvatārikā on I. 15 pp. 34–36 Syāl Ādi-Ratnakara.

III अथवा ब्रह्मात्मवैष etc.—

किंचिदित्यमिति ज्ञानम्-"(T.Bh) otherwise called निष्प्रकारक or निर्विशेष ज्ञान. Contra. Rāmānuja who says "निर्विकल्पकमपि सविशेषविषयमेव ...निर्विकल्पकं नाम केनचिद्विशेषेण वियुक्तस्य ग्रहणं न सर्वविशेषरहितस्य"]

न च निर्विषयम् etc.—It may be objected that the निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष will take note of what सत् is not quite as much as of what सत् is—in which case it will be bearing witness to the dualism of Brahman and non-Brahman But the answer to that objection is that the प्रत्यक्ष is only विधायक and not निषेधक (cf. आहुर्विधातृ etc.), and is, therefore bearing witness to the positive Reality namely Brahman. Next, if you take the other variety of प्रत्यक्ष—the सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष it too will be found to be revealing घट पट etc. as imbued with the principle of *existence* for which our word is सत्

2 अनुमानादपि etc.—Here is an अनुमान to prove the same:— (a) विधिरेव तत्त्वं प्रमेयत्वात् विधि i. e. the Positive Reality revealed as सत् in our experience, is the only Reality because it is प्रमेय For that to which we can direct our tho ght must be something positive and n t negative. All प्रमाणs—प्रत्यक्ष अनुमान शब्द, उपमान and अर्थापत्ति—accordi gly refer to something positive "प्रत्यक्षादे—प्रमाणपञ्चकस्य स्यात् etc. (Mīm. Śl. Vārt. Abhāva Paricchedа, 17) etc. The प्रमाणs operate to reveal something positive; when something negative is known, what takes place is not that the प्रमाणs are directed to a negation but that there is no operation of the प्रमाणs at all This, of course, means that the e is no such प्रमाण as अनुपलब्धि which is supposed to be di ected to negative object (अभाव)

सतो वा नातिरिक्तं etc.—Another अनुमान to prove सत् (b) ग्रामारामादि etc.—The world w see bef re us is penetrated through and thro gh with tho ght (प्रतिभासान्तःप्रविष्ट) because it is an object of thought (प्रतिभासमानत्वात्). Whatever is a bject of thought is penetrated with thought e. g the form of thought (प्रतिभासस्वरूप). So is this whole bjective world. And, therefore, it is penetrated with thought. Tho ght or conscio sness is what we call सत् Thus, the अनुमानप्रमाण also bears witness to the existence of सत्.

T may that प्रमाण fo समानाधिकरण is not only t make it विवादक b t also निवेदक, because मान implies n gatio

अनुमानबाधित to.—A syllogism to prove that the world is not मिथ्या

प्रमाणो मिथ्या न भवति etc.—M reover in the Vedántin's syllogism the hetu प्रतीयमानत्वात् is Inconclusive, सत् being प्रतीयमान as well as सत् nd yet not मिथ्या. If however you deny प्रतीयमानत्व of सत्, silence would be golden fo you. Hor ce you cit any दृष्टान्त i support of your reasoning ; f r every दृष्टान्त will be found incl led i the पक्ष viz सर्वप्रपञ्च or जगत्, about which मिथ्यात्व (सदसद्विलक्षणत्व) is going to be proved This is what is called स्वरूपासिद्ध hetvábhása.

किं वेदवाक्यं etc.—Is the syllogism which is supposed to prove that जगत् is मिथ्या ( ) part of the जगत् or (b) is it separate from it? (b) If it is separate f om it, is it सत् or असत्? If it is सत् why not the whol जगत्? If it is असत्, it ca prove nothing. ( ) If it is part of जगत् it is मिथ्या like the rest of it, and cannot accomplish its task f proving मिथ्यात्व of जगत्. Thus, it may be shown that Brahman cannot be the sole reality

Cf. P N Tattválokálamkára Ratnákarávatáriká on I. 15 pp. 34-36 Syádváda-Ratnákara.

III. अथवा प्रमाणान्तरेण etc.—

Another statement f the Ved ntin's case nd its refutation Brahman, the pure सत् may be proved by every प्रमाण

I. प्रत्यक्ष—Pratyaksa is of tw kinds—निर्विकल्पक nd सविकल्पक, both of which prove the existence of Brahman The former of these has been thus defined अस्ति ह्या etc It is such ज्ञान as takes note of the abstract reality devoid of the धर्म (Quoted from Mimámsá-S'l ka Várttika of Kumárila) The latter is well-known. [For two differing views bout the nature of सवि and निर्वि see Tarka Bhásá and Rám. S'rt-Bh, I. 1. निर्विकल्पकं नामवामजात्यादियोजनाहीनं वस्तुमात्रावगाहि

निर्विकल्पकमिति शब्दः- (T Bh.) otherwise called स्वरूपप्रत्यक्ष or निर्विशेष ज्ञान. Contra. Râmânuja who says: 'निर्विकल्पकमपि सविशेषविषयमेव ...निर्विकल्पकं नाम केनचिद्विशेषेण वियुक्तस्य ग्रहणं न सर्वविशेषरहितस्य ']

न च निर्विकल्प etc.—It may be objected that the निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष will take note of what सत् is not quite as much as of what सत् is—in which case it will be bearing witness to the dualism of Brahman and non-Brahman. But the answer to that objection is that the प्रत्यक्ष is only विधायक and not निषेधक (cf. आहुर्विधातृ etc.), and is therefore bearing witness to the positive Reality namely Brahman. Next, if you take the other variety of प्रत्यक्ष—the सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष it too will be found to be revealing घट पट etc. as imbued with the principle of *existence* for which our word is सत्.

2 अनुमानादपि etc.—Here is an अनुमान to prove the same:- (a) विप्रतिपन्नं सत् प्रमेयत्वात् विधि i. e. the Positive Reality revealed as सत् in our experience, is the only Reality because it is प्रमेय. For that to which we can direct our thought must be something positive and not negative. All प्रमाणs—प्रत्यक्ष अनुमान शब्द, उपमान and अर्थापत्ति—accordingly refer to something positive "वस्त्वसंकरसिद्धिश्च प्रमाणाधीना स्यात् etc. (Mim. Sl. Vârt. Abhâva Paricheda 17) etc. The प्रमाणs operate to reveal something positive; when something negative is known, what takes place is not that the प्रमाणs are directed to negation, but that there is no operation of the प्रमाणs at all. This, of course means that there is no such प्रमाण as अनुपलब्धि which is supposed to be directed to a negative object (अभाव).

यद्वा या सविकल्प etc.—Another अनुमान to prove सत् (b) प्रपञ्चः etc.—The world we see before us is penetrated through and through with thought (प्रतिभासमानत्वात्) because it is an object of thought (प्रतिभासमानत्वात्). Whatever is an object of thought is penetrated with thought e. g. the form of thought (प्रतिभासस्वरूप). So is this whole objective world. And, therefore, it is penetrated with thought. Thought or consciousness is what we call सत्. Thus, the अनुमानप्रमाण also bears witness to the existence of सत्.

3. आम्नायोक्ति etc.—Th quotations, which are well-known, are taken from the Upanisads

कृत्रिम वाक्य—The Smṛtis which are man-made as distinguished from S ruti which is God-made.

सर्वं मायया etc.—All objects are but appearances of सत्, because th y are imbued with सत्ता (Existence) That with which a thing is imbued is the eal essence of that thing. Fo example पृथिवी is the real essence of घट शराव etc., which are all earthy that is, imbued with पृथिवी

लोकायति etc.—The Vedāntin is compared to a man who is drunk.

सर्वं हि वस्तु etc.—Nothing can be accepted as tru unless it is proved by प्रमाण. In the A-dvait doctrine however there is no room for प्रमाण—for प्रमाण means dvaita, that is, dualism

अथ यदि etc.—It may be rgued that the प्रमाणs have only a व्यावहारिक use, and are intended to satisfy the needs f व्यव i. e., either the vulgar mind (cf. Spinoza) or the demands of objective experience. But such an rgument will not do F where is the room for भेद in A-dvaitism ?

अस्तु etc.—Granting that there is scope for प्रमाण eve in A-dvaita, one would like to know what प्रमाण it is. Is it प्रत्यक्ष ? No. For प्रमाण only re eals the world f plurality You mentioned निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष proving सत्. But we d not recognise its validity as प्रमाण For प्रत्यक्ष is प्रमाण only whe its character accords with th character of ts object. This can never be unless the प्रत्यक्ष is सविकल्पक i. has certain characte as घटत्व पटत्व etc. N w सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष which alone deserves to be recognised as प्रमाण mongst th two varieties of प्रत्यक्ष is neve known to reveal the Positive Reality which you speak of viz pure सत्, but rated from its various forms constituting the world of plurality [See also Rāmānuja s Śrī-Bhāṣya, I. 1. 1]

प्रत्यक्षस्य च्यापि etc.—Then, as regards th remark that प्रत्यक्ष reveals only Positive Reality and is incompetent to reveal

N gation, we say it is not justified by experience For प्रत्यक्ष has double function to perform it differentiates as well as co-ordinates.

न प्रत्यक्षं etc.—We nowhere perceive सामान्य—the one pure and simple existence—divorced from विशेष. Cf Rāmānuja Srī-Bhāṣya Catus-Sūtrī. I I. I. निर्विशेषे हि सामान्ये—Mīm. Sl. Vārt. आकृतिवाद—10

तत्र प्रमाणान्तरैरनुमानं etc.—The syllogism referred to is विधिरेव तत्त्वम् प्रमेयत्वात् (See bove). Here, विधिरेव तत्त्वम् i. e. th proposition that Reality is always positive, is opposed to the evidence of प्रत्यक्ष for the latter bears testimony to negation also. The hetu is, therefore कालात्ययापदिष्ट, otherwise called बाधित

यत्तु प्रतिभासो etc.—Another हेतु given to prove the same was प्रतिभासमानत्वात् (See s pra.) As to it, we ask the question which r the प्रतिभासमानत्व —revelation to consciousness—arises स्वतः or परतः ? Evidently it does not arise स्वतः (of itself); fo nobody thinks घट पट etc., to be self-revealed. If however the revelation to consciousness is supposed to arise परतः i. e. from some *other* source, it involves the admission of something that is other which means dualism.

यत् परमपदं etc.—Then again, as regards the argument that Brahman is that principle of Existence which runs through all things and unites them in one Reality we may observe that it inv lves the admission of (1) principle that runs through the things nd (2) the things through which it runs e. the dualism of अन्वेतृ and अन्वीयमान Moreove it is absurd to think that चैतन्य (consciousness, which is but another name for Brahma) runs through घट पट etc. What uns through घट is मृत्तिका through पट तन्तु, and so on.

किं च पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्ता etc.—An अनुमान involves पक्ष and हेतु How tell us whether th y are *identical* inter se o *distinct*. If *identical*, it will be impossible to construct a syllogism, which requires different members. If *distinct*, there is the inevitabl dualism.

[illegible] etc.—The verse quoted means: If it is attempted to establish the principle of *Advaita* by means of a हेतु there will be the dualism of at least the हेतु and the साध्य If, without the हेतु, anything could be got proved by mere mandate! The point of the argument is that in proving साध्य by means of हेतु we proceed from the known to the unknown which is clear admission of the dualism of the know and the unknown हेतोरद्वैतसिद्धिश्चेत् etc.—Āptamīmāṃsā II. 26.

[illegible] etc.—The texts must be interpreted in harmony with dualism if they are to be interpreted at all. F with at [illegible]—which means dualism—they can declare nothing कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं etc.—Āptamīmāṃsā II. 25. The verse means कर्म-फल, लोक (इह and पर) विद्या-अविद्या बन्ध-मोक्ष all involve dualism.

Reference Books Saṃkara's Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya and Com. especially Bhāmatī; Siddhānta tattva-bindu; Siddhānta leśa, Rāmānuja's Śrī-Bhāṣya.

Appendix.

[illegible] (P.N T. 15).

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

रजतमिति वस्तुस्वरूपमेव शुक्तावपि प्रत्यक्षमित्युच्यते तदा रजतस्य प्रतिभेद-मपि तद् प्रतिपत्तव्य इत्यभिहितमेव भवति । केवलवस्तुस्वरूपप्रतिपत्तेरन्य-प्रतिभेदप्रतिपत्तिरूपत्वात् । अपि च विचारकमेव प्रत्यक्षमिति विचारसाधुत्वमेव विचारप्रतिपत्ता अपि विचारं तदानुपपत्ते । लोकेऽप्यनिर्वाच्यविवेकेन सम्यगर्थ प्रत्ययात् प्रतिभासेव न विवेकं करोति इत्याह कथं स्यात् । इति सिद्ध प्रत्यक्ष-बाधित पक्ष इति ॥ असत्ख्यातिवादिनश्च । यथाहो मिथ्या न भवति । अतीन्द्रियत्व-त्वात् । न एवं स एवं यथा आत्मा । तथा चायम् । तस्मात्तथेति । प्रतीयमानत्वं च तुर्येणात्मना व्यभिचारी । स हि प्रतीयते न च मिथ्या । अप्रतीयमानत्वे तु अस्य तथोपदर्शनानामनुपपत्तेरन्यथा तत्र कः श्रेयसी स्यात् । दृष्टान्तश्च साध्यविकलः । अविद्यात्मकत्वेऽपि प्रपञ्चस्तत्त्वतोऽनिर्वचनीयतायाः साध्यमानत्वात् । किं च—इदमनुमानं प्रपञ्चाद्भिन्नम् अभिन्नं वा । यदि भिन्नं तर्हि सत्यमसत्यं वा । यदि सत्यं तर्हि तद्वदेव प्रपञ्चस्यापि सत्यत्वं स्यात् । अथासत्यम् , तथापि सत्यम् असत्यत्वमत्यम् अनिर्वचनीयं वा । आद्यपक्षद्वयेऽपि न साध्यसाधक-त्वम् असत्त्वात् प्रतिपन्नमेतावत् । तृतीयपक्षोऽप्ययुक्तः । अनिर्वचनीयत्वा-देवानिर्वचनीयत्वात् ॥ ....अथाव्यवस्थितस्य यद्यपि रूप तत्त्वतस्तु सत्यत्वं नाम । न हि स्वयमसत्यमन्यस्य सत्यत्वव्यवस्थापनहेतु । अविद्यमानत्वात् । अथ इदमर्थत्वे व्यवहारोपयोगिवस्तुव्यवस्थापकत्वेन तत्त्वार्थप्रप-ञ्चव्यवहारपरत्वेऽप्यभावे अप्रमाणता इति चेत् सर्वसत्यमेव तदनुमानम् । तत्र चोद्यो दोषः ।—प्रपञ्चस्यापि सत्यता प्रसक्तेः मिथ्यात्वाभावः । मिथ्यात्वं च कल्पं नाम सत्यार्थं साधयेत् ॥

—Com. Ratnâkarâvatârikâ.

Stanza XIV

Stanza Things (वाच्य), though many are also one; though one they are also many So are th words denoting them (वाचक) both one and many Those who re not 'yours' i.e. the heretics, in considering things and words to be of a different nature from what is mentioned above, are mistaken.

वाच्यम् = अभिधेयम् viz. चेतनाचेतनं वस्तु

एकमपि also.

सामान्यरूपतया एकात्मकमपि etc.—One as the universal (सामान्य); many as the particulars (व्यक्तिभेदेन).

अथवानेकरूपमपि etc.—The enlargement of the subject and the predicate reversed.

तथा शब्दम्—So also words have a double nature of one and many arising from the double aspect, that of सामान्य and of विशेष.

अत्र वाचकवाच्ययोः etc.—Ordinarily in dvandva compound the word with the smaller number of syllables is placed first. Yet, here, वाचक (three syllabled word) is placed before वाच्य (two-syllabled). This is in accordance with th special provision about the priority of the more important (See Pāṇ. and Kātyāyana). अल्पाच्तरम् । But अभ्यर्हितं च (पूर्वम्). The वाचक is more important than the वाच्य because the latter depends upon the former As the word philosophers (the grammarians) say "There is n idea (प्रत्यय), which is not accompanied by its w rd (शब्दानुगम); all thought (ज्ञान) appears penetrated through and through with language. (See Patañjali's M.Bhāṣya and Bhartṛi's Vākyapadīya । न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके etc. I. 124.)

भावार्थस्त्वयम् etc.—Substance of the Stanza :

(1) Some schoolmen recognise only the *Universal* (सामान्य) as the Reality They are in the language of Jaina philosophy followers of द्रव्यार्थिकनय i. e. the point of view of the reality of substance (द्रव्य). Th typical representatives of this school of thought among Brāhmaṇas are preeminently the Advaitins of the Uttara-Mīmāṁsā (Vedānta) and next the Sāṁkhyas.

(2) Then again there are other schoolmen who regard particulars (विशेष) to be the only reality They belong to the पर्यायार्थिकनय i. e. the point of view of the reality of the changing modes (पर्याय). This point of view is represented by the Buddhists.

(3) There is a third school of thought which gives equal treatment to सामान्य and विशेष as principles of Reality but recognises them as absolutely distinct entities. This is द्वैत (= द्वैतवाद) point of view—which is advocated by the V iśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas.

I Discussion of the different schools.

I. संग्रहनयावलम्बिनो etc.—A statement of the सामान्यैकान्तवाद—which according to the Jainas contains only partial truth from the point of view of the संग्रहनय

सामान्यमेव etc.—सामान्य is the only reality For we do not see any विशेष apart from the सामान्य. The argument may be stated as follows :

सर्वमेकम् अविशेषेण सदितिज्ञानाभिधानानुवृत्तिलिङ्गानुमितसत्ताकत्वात्, *i. e.* From the fact that all things are equally (अविशेषेण) known (ज्ञान) and styled (अभिधान) सत् we conclude that *All is One.* Its existence is inferred from the one general notion (अनुवृत्ति) and language of सत् which we employ in respect of all things without distinction

Note that the argument is intended to prove two things : that (1) something *is* and that (2) something is the *Universal Being*

तथा द्रव्यत्वेन etc.—Another argument : द्रव्य is the only reality For the so-called particulars of द्रव्य viz. धर्म अधर्म etc. are nowhere found separated from द्रव्य *i. e.* they are known not in themselves but only as द्रव्य and, therefore, द्रव्य is their only reality

किं च ते सामान्यात् etc.—A third argument which establishes the sole reality of सामान्य by destroying the case for विशेष. Supposing विशेषs (defined as अन्योन्यव्यावृत्तात्मकाः *i. e.* consisting of reciprocal distinctions—see Dinakari on Nyāya Muktāvalī) exist, you have to meet the following dilemma : *Do they* contain विशेषत्व or not ? In other words *do they* conform to the general idea of विशेष or not ? If they do not, they have no nature of their own, and therefore no existence. If they do, that विशेषत्व is a सामान्य—which contradicts your dogma of the sole reality of विशेष.

अपि च विशेषाणां etc.—विशेष are defined as the ground or cause of व्यावृत्तिप्रत्यय—the idea of distinction. But we shall show that on reflection that व्यावृत्तिप्रत्यय is found to be an im-

possibility What is व्यावृत्ति? निखिलपदार्थेषु इतरपदार्थप्रतिषेधः (Denial of any other पदार्थ in regard to the पदार्थ in hand). Thus the denial of पटत्व in regard to घट is घटस्य व्यावृत्ति Now the questi we ask is this How can the thing—the पदार्थ under consideration—e. g. घट, which has enough work, to do in securing its own being venture to undertake a denial of other things? If it undertakes to do that wo k, it will find it too stupendous to do. So innumerable are those other things past, present and future, which it shall have to exclude from itself. They cannot be excluded unless they are *known*. And if they are *known*, the knower is nothing short of an omniscient being!—a being wh knows *all* things in the Universe from which particular thi g—a घट—is to be distinguished

न चैतत् प्रातीतिकं—It is not justified either by experience or by reaso

व्यावृत्तिश्च निषेध etc.—Besides, व्यावृत्ति is negation, nothing—which can be made an object f knowledge no more than flower of the sky

तथा चैतेभ्यो व्यावृत्ति etc —Another dilemma Are those things, from which the पदार्थ under consideration is distinguished, सत् (existent) or असत् (non-existent)? If they are non-existent the पदार्थ could as well be distinguished from the horn of a donkey If they are सत् in calling them *all* सत् you have admitted सामान्य!

या चेयं व्यावृत्ति etc.—व्यावृत्ति (exclusion, distinction) y may takes place wing to विशेष. N w tell us whether there is *one* व्यावृत्ति for all the विशेषs or one for each, nd therefore many. I the latter case, the व्यावृत्तिs will be so many विशेषs *to* to be many and *distinct inter se* constitutes the very soul of विशेष. Th व्यावृत्तिs will then require other व्यावृत्तिs to account for their विशेष. (F r व्यावृत्तिविशेषो विशेषः). N w if a व्यावृत्ति possesses व्यावृत्ति from व्यावृत्ति the व्यावृत्ति will be not-व्यावृत्ति and therefore there will be no विशेष moreover there will be an endless series of व्यावृत्ति (अनवस्था).

एवं चेत् सामान्यमेव etc.—In the former case i.e. if अनुवृत्ति is supposed to be *one*, it is an admission of सामान्य under another name, inasmuch as all the विशेष have then something in common (अनुवृत्ति).

किं चामी विशेषाः etc.—Lastly one more dilemma Are the विशेष distinct from सामान्य or are they identical with it? Distinct they are not found any more than crest of matted hair is found on the head of a frog In other words, they do not exist at all. If they are identical with सामान्य there is सामान्य and nothing else Thus is rgued out the case for the *sole reality* of सामान्य.

2. पर्यायनयान्वितस्य etc.—A statement of the विशेषैकान्तवाद —which according to the Jainas contains a partial truth from the point f view of पर्यायास्तिकनय

विविक्ताः क्षणक्षयिणो etc.—*Particulars* are the only Reality They are distinct, self-contained and momentary *No universal* is ever found part from them.

न हि गवादिव्यक्त्यनुभव etc.—When we see cows, we see this cow or that cow and so on, that is *particular* cows—each with her own physical shape colour etc.—and no such thing as a universal essence—सामान्य—of cows.

एता च पश्यन् etc.—"Here are five fingers which I distinctly see to be different from one another He who sees a common form in them might as well see a horn on his own head!" The verse is quoted, says the note in the AHP edition of स्याद्वादमञ्जरी from " [illegible] "

एकाकारपरामर्शस्तु etc.—It then remains for th विशेषैकान्त वादी to account for the idea of unity which is at th root of class-notions and class-names ('common terms'). It rises, he says, from the particulars themselves, and the particulars are born with the power of causing एकाकारप्रत्यय which they therefore, do not need to borrow from elsewh re, i. e. from an imaginary सामान्य outside them.

अपि च सामान्यमपि etc.—Similarly सामान्य too has a variety of forms. So when we speak of brindled cow we do not refer to any brindled colour of the animal, but the particular brindled colour which we see in the cow before us. So here, again, the perception of सामान्य is at the same time perception of विशेष

न हि क्वचित् etc.—The two are never experienced separately from each othe anywhere.

अन्धगजन्याय—The parable of the Elephant and the Blind Men The Elephant is not seen wholly by any of the blind men, nor is he the sum total of the partial aspects, but is the one reality which ppears different from different points of view or rather touch in the case of the blind men of the parable.

समानमतापन्नविशेष etc.—Syllogism सामान्य is in a certain way different for each individual and in certain way t is one with it because made of it, lik a dissimilar परिणाम (product), that is, a modification of bstance which though like that substance is also unlike it. Similarly we may recognise likeness (सादृश्य) in different individuals, and say this cow is like that and that cow is like this. Thus, we may demonstrate the unity-in-difference of सामान्य and विशेष In being one with the व्यक्ति the सामान्य does not lose its nature. For example, रूप and similar qualities are identical with the substance, viz, घट and yet they do not on that account cease t be गुण. If you say that it is due to some difference existing between रूप and its s bstance, we may point out that some difference exists also between like products such as घट, inasmuch as ven different bjects of the same class do bear different names.

Next the Siddhānt ritiolses विशेषैकान्तवाद :—

विशेषा अपि वैसदृश्य etc.—The reader will remember that one of the arguments gainst keeping the tw (सामान्य and विशेष) together was that the two possessed contradictory

urer. But the सामान्य according to our Siddhânta is सर्वगत as विशेष also is not, and therefore there is no flict of the धर्म of the two.

सामान्यस्य विशेषात्मं च etc.—They are somehow blend d t ther सामान्य is many inasmuch as it is inseparable from पर विशेष are one inasmuch as they are inseparable from मान्य

एकत्वं च etc.—सामान्य is *one* from the point of view of नय. From the point of view of the *whole* truth (प्रमाण as tinguished from नय—see S. Mañjari on Stanza XXIII) wever it is somehow the subject of contradictory predicates, both one and many inasmuch as सामान्य is the universal ment in like thi gs, and yet it is particularized in conse- ence of each of the things having its own individuality

एवं चानित्यं etc.—So you cannot lay down an *absolute* oppo- on between सामान्य and विशेष If you insist upon *opposition* *where* it is what we are actually contending for against other schools.

यथा यथा etc.—The example of water and fire cited to w the incompatibility of contradictory natures really points he very conclusion we have been urging Thus as water d fire they are opposed ; but as द्रव्य they are one.

11 Next we show how शब्द i. e शब्द also has got a ble nature viz. सामान्य and विशेष o one and many शब्दत्व *one* in all शब्द, and it is also *many* in the particular forms f शब्द such as the शब्द of a शङ्ख the शब्द of a शार्ङ्ग (bow), the द which is sharp or the शब्द which is soft nd so forth.

शब्दस्य हि सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वं etc.—शब्द is पौद्गलिक (material, hat which belongs to matter) and its do bl nat r of सामान्य and विशेष n be ea ily perceived.

पौद्गलिक शब्द etc.—Th t शब्द is पौद्गलिक may be shown b अनुमान Th s शब्द पौद्गलिक इन्द्रियार्थत्वात् रूपादिवत् = शब्द (sound) b longs to matt r (and thus material) because it is an

कि च वर्तते सामान्यं etc.—A series of dilemmas for the सामान्यवादी to answer: Is this सामान्य *one or many*? If one is it everywhere or only at particular places? If it is everywhere, why is it not found in the space between this cow and that cow? Besides, if it is *one existing everywhere*, why does not गोत्व embrace within its fold अश्व and अश्व as it does गो? If it (the सामान्य) is not everywhere but only at particular places, it is another name for विशेष and this, again, is contrary to the tenet of the school.

अनेकत्वे etc.—If however you hold that सामान्य is many there being such distinct सामान्यs as गोत्व अश्वत्व घटत्व पटत्व etc., it is an admission of विशेष, since the सामान्यs distinguish themselves from each other गोत्व being not the same as अश्वत्व and so on.

अर्थक्रियाकारित्व etc.—A positive argument to prove that विशेषs are the only reality. Reality is defined as 'अर्थक्रियाकारित्व' i. e. that which *does* something, serving a purpose; in other words, to *be* is to *do* (cf. Modern Pragmatism and Carlyle's characterisation of the universe as an infinite conjugation of the verb *to do*). Now this is what you can affirm only of विशेष and not of सामान्य. You cannot ride अश्वत्व or milk गोत्व; for that you require अश्व and गो, i. e. the real particulars, not imaginary universals.

तयोर्भेदाभेदे etc.—Lastly is the सामान्य different from विशेष or is it identical with it? If it is different, we do not see it so, and it is therefore only a figment of your imagination. If it is identical with the विशेष, we have विशेष only and no सामान्य. Compare similar argument of the other side at the end of the foregoing section ([illegible]).

3. [illegible]—A third view about सामान्य and विशेष is that both of them are realities, *distinct inter se*. For so we actually find them.

सामान्यविशेषौ etc.—That they are *distinct inter se* is thus shown by means of a syllogism :—सामान्यविशेषौ [illegible] ।

विरुद्धधर्माध्यासितत्वात् etc. They are *distinct* from each other because they possess contradictory properties as do water and fire. The contradictory properties are, for example, सर्वगतत्व and असर्वगतत्व : thus while सामान्य is ubiquitous, विशेष are limited to particular places.

न सामान्यात् पृथक् etc.—You may perhaps object that विशेष are not found *apart* from सामान्य We would then ask you: How then, are they found? You would reply : *As* invariably *accompanied by* सामान्य Criticism : Then it is not finding a विशेष but सामान्य *also*. Now if this were true, we should not be using a word to express a विशेष or enter into a व्यवहार founded upon the विशेष But, as a matter of fact, we do. Therefore we must recognise a विशेष apart from सामान्य

4. न चैतत् प्रत्येकमपि etc.—A statement of the *Siddhānta*. *All the three views set forth above are partial representations* of the truth. There can be no doubt that we see Reality possessed of a *double nature*, that of सामान्य and that of विशेष. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of द्रव्यं गुणः etc. as सामान्यविशेषः (See V Sūtras and Praśastapāda Bhāṣya).

वस्तुनो हि स्वरूपं etc.—अनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्ति which is said to be the very essence of Reality (see supra) is consistent only with the thesis bove laid down. When we see a cow we apprehend a certain unity of animal form, such as belongs to all individuals we call cows (अनुवृत्ताकारं सर्वसाधारणाकृतिं). But, at the same time we apprehend its distinction from other animals such as buffaloes etc. When, moreover we speak of a brindled cow thus referring to the विशेष (particular character) of the animal, we must not fail to remember that in doing so we also recognise the fact that the animal is *a cow*. We thus notice सामान्य and विशेष— *the two—in one*. [*Note* carefully the difference of this view from that of the वैशेषिक. The वैशेषिकादि recognises सामान्य and विशेष as *distinct entities* (स्वतन्त्रसामान्यविशेषवादिनः), the स्याद्वादिन् recognises them a *two-in-one* (अन्योन्यवेधम् —Stamm)].

अस्ति च सामान्यस्यापि etc.—Similarly सामान्य too has a variety of forms. So when we speak of brindled cow we do not refer to any brindled colour of the animal, but the particular brindled colour which we see in the cow before us. So here, again, the perception of सामान्य is at the same time perception of विशेष.

न हि [illegible] etc.—The two are never experienced separately from each other anywhere.

[illegible]—The parable of the Elephant and the Blind Men. The Elephant is not seen wholly by any of the blind men, nor is he the sum total of the partial aspects, but is the one reality which appears different from different points of view or rather touch in the case of the blind men of the parable.

[illegible] etc.—Syllogism सामान्य is in a certain way different to each individual and in a certain way it is one with it because made of it, like a dissimilar परिणाम (product), that is, a modification of a substance which though like that substance is also unlike it. Similarly we may recognise likeness (सादृश्य) in different individuals, and say this cow is like that and that cow is like this. Thus, we may demonstrate the unity-in-difference of सामान्य and विशेष. In being one with the व्यक्ति the सामान्य does not lose its nature. For example, रूप and similar qualities are identical with the substance, viz., घट and yet they do not on that account cease to be गुण. If you say that it is due to some difference existing between रूप and its substance, we may point out that some difference exists also between like products such as घट, inasmuch as even different objects of the same class do bear different names.

Next the Siddhāntin criticises [illegible]:—

विशेष अपि [illegible] etc.—The reader will remember that one of the arguments against keeping the two (सामान्य and विशेष) together was that the two possessed contradictory

natures. But the सामान्य according to our Siddhānta is not सर्वथा as विशेष also is not, and therefore there is no conflict of the धर्म of the two

सामान्यस्य विशेषस्य च etc —They are somehow blend d together सामान्य is many inasmuch as it is inseparable from विशेष; विशेष are one inasmuch as they are inseparable from सामान्य

एकत्वं च etc.—सामान्य is *one* from the point of view of संग्रह. From the point of view of the *whole* truth (प्रमाण as distinguished from नय—see S. Mañjarī on Stanza XXIII) however it is somehow the subject of contradictory predicates, viz. both one and many inasmuch as सामान्य is the universal element in like things, and yet it is particularised in consequence of each of the things having its own individuality

एवं चादिकं etc.—So you cannot lay down an *absolute* opposition between सामान्य and विशेष If you insist upon *opposition somehow* it is what we are actually contending for against all other schools.

पाथः पावक etc.—The example of water and fire cited to show the incompatibility of contradictory natures really points to the very conclusion we have been urging. Thus as water and fire they are opposed ; but as द्रव्य they are one.

II. Next we show how वाच्य *i. e.* शब्द also has got a double nature viz. सामान्य and विशेष or one and many शब्दत्व is *one* in all शब्द, and it is also *many* in the particular forms of शब्द such as the शब्द of a शङ्ख the शब्द of a शार्ङ्ग (bow) the शब्द which is sharp o the शब्द which is soft and so forth

शब्दस्य हि सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वं etc.—शब्द is पौद्गलिक (material that which belongs to matter) a d its double nature of सामान्य and विशेष can be easily perceived.

पौद्गलिकः शब्दः etc.—That शब्द is पौद्गलिक may be shown by an अनुमान Thus शब्दः पौद्गलिकः इन्द्रियार्थत्वात् रूपादिवत् = शब्द (sound) belongs to matter (and thus material) because it is an

bject of sensuous perception just like रूप (colour) etc. (For contrary view see शब्दनित्यताधिकरण in Kumārila's श्लोकवार्तिक).

शब्दस्य etc.—That शब्द does not belong to matter is maintained by the Vaiśeṣikas ('चौलुक' as they are also called) on the following grounds —

(1) It rests in something that is *intangible* (viz. आकाश).

(2) It experiences *no obstruction* in the way of going in or going out even in crowded place.

(3) It does not admit of being analysed into *successive parts.*

(4) It does not give push even to any fine corporeal द्रव्य

(5) It is quality of आकाश which is not matter

These five arguments are met by the Siddhāntin as follows

(1) शब्दस्यर्शनाश्रयो etc.—The attribute which we call शब्द does not rest in आकाश but in the different kinds (वर्गणा) of भाषा both intangibility of आकाश does not affect the argument.

शब्दाश्रय etc.—The substance which is the abode of शब्द must be tangible because it is an object of our इन्द्रिय found or not according as the percipient is near or far and the wind is blowing in a favourable or unfavourable direction. Parallel case the particles of matter which are the abode of गन्ध. The alleged हेतु of the V. s. is therefore असिद्ध

(2) द्विर्गतिवत् सम्प्रवेश etc.—गन्ध exists in द्रव्य which experiences no such obstruction and yet it is admittedly पौद्गलिक. So the alleged हेतु is अनैकान्तिक i.e. inconclusive not invariably pointing to the conclusion desired. It may be urged that the गन्धद्रव्य does experience obstruction; for from tightly closed box, musk will not emit any smell. The answer to it is the same is true of शब्द. Therefore the हेतु is असिद्ध i.e. not found in the पक्ष

(3) तृतीयस्य etc.—The flash of a lightning does not admit of analysis into successive parts, and yet it is पौद्गलिक. The alleged हेतु is, therefore, अनैकान्तिक.

(4) चतुर्थोऽपि etc.—The particles of a fragrant substance or dust or smoke give no push to other matter and yet they are beyond question पौद्गलिक. The alleged हेतु is, therefore अनैकान्तिक

(5) पञ्चम गुणत्वेत्व etc.—शब्द may be shown to be not a गुण of आकाश because it is perceptible by a sense of ours, like रूप which is similarly perceptible The हेतु is therefore असिद्ध

सिद्धः पौद्गलिकत्वात् etc.—शब्द being thus shown to be पौद्गलिक it follows that it is सामान्यविशेषात्मक It may be asked Are not even अपौद्गलिक things—e g आत्मन्—सामान्यविशेषात्मक? Answer: The Jainas hold that the संसारी आत्मा somehow gets attached to पुद्गल and is in a certain sense पौद्गलिक or material

यद्यपि स्याद्वादिनां etc.—Are not all things—whether पौद्गलिक or अपौद्गलिक—सामान्यविशेषात्मक according to the Jainas? Answer They are. But the truth cannot be well realised by ordinary thinking in the case of अपौद्गलिक substances such as धर्म अधर्म आकाश and काल. But it can be realised easily in the case of a पौद्गलिक द्रव्य Therefore this long digression to show that शब्द is पौद्गलिक.

अथापि नित्यशब्द°—The नित्यशब्दवादी (the Mimâmsaka) holds that शब्द is *absolutely one* the अनित्यशब्दवादी (the Buddhist) holds that it is *absolutely many* Both m y be shown to be part-truths as is done in the above paragraphs in regard to सामान्य-विशेष.

अथवा वाच्यस्य etc.—The वाच्य having been shown to be सामान्यविशेषात्मक it follows as a matter of course that वाचक is also सामान्यविशेषात्मक since in a certain way शब्द and अर्थ (वाचक and वाच्य) re held to be one.

अभिधानं चाभिधेयाच्च etc.—अभिधानाभिधेयापेक्षया स्यादभिन्नमभिन्नं च।
स्वपरिमितिरूपात्मे क्षणम् भवत्यनपेक्षतोऽपि भेदो नापि शब्दो न चार्थः।

object of sensuous perception, just like रूप (colour) etc. (For contrary view see वायुविचारणाधिकरण in Kumārila's श्लोकवार्तिक).

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(4) चतुर्थोऽपि etc.—The particles of a fragrant substance or dust or smoke give no push to other matter and yet they are beyond question पौद्गलिक. The alleged हेतु is, therefore, अनैकान्तिक

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यथापि नित्यैक etc.—The नित्यैकत्ववादी (the Mimâmsaka) holds that शब्द is *absolutely one*; the अनित्यत्ववादी (the Buddhist) holds that it is *absolutely many* Both may be shown to be part-truths, as is done in the above paragraphs in regard to सामान्य-विशेष.

अथवा वाच्यस्य etc.—The वाच्य having been shown to be सामान्यविशेषात्मक it follows as a matter of course that वाचक is also सामान्यविशेषात्मक, since in a certain way शब्द and अर्थ (वाचक and वाच्य) are held to be one.

अभिधानं चाभिधेयात् etc.—अभिधानमभिधेयात् कथंचित् भिन्नमभिन्नं च । क्षुराग्निमोदकोच्चारणे वदनस्य पाटनदहनपूरणाभावादपि भेदो मतो शब्दे न पूर्ण ।

छेद पिध नु । यस्माच मोदकोच्चारणे तत्रैव प्रत्ययो भवति न च भवति अन्यार्थे । तेनाभिन्नं तदर्थात् —Bhadrabāhu. [I have divided the sentences of these stanzas according to the sense and they should be so construed]

अभिधान ...अभिन्न च—अभिधान (वाचकशब्द) is distinct from and yet not distinct from अभिधेय (वाच्य). This is the proposition to be proved. Next comes the reason why it is distinct from अभिधेय.

क्षुराग्नि ...पिध नु—When yo utter the word क्षुर (razor), अग्नि (fire) or मोदक (sweet ball), neither the mouth that speaks or the ear that hears is cut, or burnt, r filled by it (*i. e.* क्षुर अग्नि and मोदक respecti ely). Theref re अभिधान is *distinct* from अभिधेय Next comes the reason why अभिधान is *not distinct* from अभिधेय

यस्माच मोदकोच्चारणे तदर्थात्—Whe one utters the word मोदक, th thing denoted by the word, viz., मोदक is presented to the mind and not anything else, it follows that the word (अभिधान –शब्द) is not distinct from its sense (अभिधेय–अर्थ).

विकल्पयोनय शब्दा etc.—Words originate from concepts of things nd vice ersa; hence, the two are related as cause and effect (respectively and ice versa); t the same time, words d not ffect things, (hence, they are distinct from each other)

अन्यत्र स्थितेष्ट तर्थे etc.—When वाचक (शब्द) conveys its वाच्य (अर्थ) it becomes transformed into the latter; it is only then that it conveys the sense. Hence it is that a particula word has particular sense only

II Another Interpretation of the Stanza

वाच्यमेकमनेकात्म

स्यानानेकमनन्तधर्मकं तत्

अनेकमनेकात्मकत्वात्   *i.e.* Reality is at once one and many

घटमर्थं etc.—When one knows an object (घट), he distinguishes it from lik as well as unlike bjects (ther clay

vessels and also घट). Thus, in knowledge, there is a negative element in addition to the positive element. It is only with the help of the former that we fix the nature of an object, which would otherwise remain nebulous floating vague undefined. Therefore सर्वमस्ति भावाभावात्मकं स्वरूपम्

पररूपाभावाद्वे etc.—If a thing had only a *positive* nature the nature would not be *its own*; it is because of its negative nature, its differentiation from other things, that a thing possesses its specific nature. If on the other hand it had only a *negative* nature, it would have no positive contents and so it would be nothing

स्वरूपपररूपाभ्याम् etc.—A thing is both भावात्मक and अभावात्मक—i is सत् or भावात्मक in its own form, it is असत् or अभावात्मक as another thing

सर्वमस्ति स्वरूपेण etc.—This sums up the अनेकान्त (भावाभाव) वाद of the J ians who believe in *being-cum-non-being* of all things from different points of view viz सत् and असत्

एवं वैश्वरूप्ये ज्ञाते etc.—Hence *to know one is to know all.* For you cannot know a thing unless you distinguish it from all things.

के तु सौगता etc.— स्वरूपादिना सर्वं पररूपादिना असत्वम् is the thesis maintained If you deny the latter as the Buddhists do, घट would be *everything*; for it is then n t असत् in any way If you deny th former घट would be *nothing*; for it has no सत्त्व in any way

सौगताः—The Vaise kas would say In rder that घट may possess its own proper nature all that you require is mutual अभाव (अन्योन्याभाव) of thi gs which are in themselves sepa rate. Why should the thin s themsel es be regarded as अभावात्मक? Answer If घट were not पटाभाव घट wo ld be पट Just as घट is a घट because घट is other than पटाभाव so घट would be घट because घट is also o ther than घटाभाव (as represent ed by पट).

सर्वं भावत्वादि etc.—अभाव is similarly द्रव्यत्व भावाभावात्मक: or अर्थान्तर; and भेदाभेद e g घट m y denote an earthen

pot only ; it may denote an earthen pot and also the body of a yogin (a technical sense of the word घट). The संकेत or convention may give rise to a number of senses connected with a single word. चौर a thief ; also rice (the latter being meaning of the word in the language of the Dākṣiṇātyas). Similarly [illegible] boy or person also, the mouth [illegible] in the language of the Easterners.

[illegible] —A technical term of the Jainas. More than 180 facts, formerly [illegible] only 3 according to the convention of the [illegible] [illegible] work of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] (A.M.P Edition, P 117 Note). Thus the same word may connote different meanings at different times. S A tras may add certain meanings. Thus [illegible] may [illegible] [illegible] for the rules relating to facts in the Vaidik books, [illegible] in T [illegible] etc.

न केवं संकेत etc —Convention is not the only ruling principle in fixing the meaning of word. Convention is guided by certain definite considerations.

[illegible] [illegible] ix—Next are recorded some differences of opinion regarding the Connotation or Denotation of terms, the Import of Propositions.

(1) [illegible]—exclusion is conveyed by words, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ([illegible]). This is the Bauddhists' view (See Dinnāga and Apohasiddhi, work of Ratnakīrti).

(2) [illegible]—[illegible] is conveyed by words ([illegible] by [illegible]), for that alone gives fixity to the sense [illegible] [illegible] cannot be presented to the mind by words except through the medium of [illegible] (See K [illegible] [illegible])

[illegible] —All propositions are mandatory according to [illegible] of the Mīmāṃsakas (See [illegible] [illegible]) [illegible]

(4) पुरुष who is neither प्रकृति nor विकृति—neither Nature nor any of its modifications—has neither बन्ध nor मोक्ष These belong to प्रकृति (*Vide* तस्मान्न ... प्रकृतिः Sāmkhya Kārikā 62).

(5) बन्ध consists in being of the प्रकृति; मोक्ष is isolation fr m प्रकृति which arises from the right understanding of the Twenty-five Principles —1. पुरुष 1. प्रकृति and 23 evolutes (विकृति) of प्रकृति

इति etc.—" What propositions contrary to all sense have not bee laid down by these fools ? "—that is, they are capable of perpetrating all kinds of bsurdities.

II Detailed Exposition:—

लोकस्तावद् etc.—

The Sāmkhya Doctrine —Man is so painstricken that there rises in him a desire to know the nature of the causes that produce the Pain. On eflectio he finds that P in is are *of three kinds* आध्यात्मिक, आधिभौतिक nd आधिदैविक.

(1) आध्यात्मिक A personal pain may be either physical or mental. The former is well-known The latter is caused by Lust, Anger Greed, Stupo Envy U easiness and Doubt. The Sanskrit or glosis of these have been thus explained by commentary of the S. K —

काम [illegible] —Explanations of these terms vary sometimes chang ing the fundamental sense in different works

All these दुःख are called आध्यात्मिक or personal, because their *remedy* lies in(... आत्मन्) आत्मनि ... —Mallinatha's ... they originate in us ?

The ... bout and their

(2) आधिभौतिक—That caused by the भूतs i. e. beasts reptiles, trees etc.

(3) आधिदैविक—That caused by *godlings, demigods* and other lower spirits.

अनेन दुःखत्रयेण अभिघात —All the three kinds of दुःख are effects of the रजस् principle (see below) which, residing in बुद्धि attacks adversely the चेतनाशक्ति. This contains an explanation of the origin and nature of *Pain*. Pain is that which is experienced by the चेतनाशक्ति as प्रतिकूल or adverse (Cf. The Naiyāyika definition of Pain also those of Spencer etc. As a matter of fact it is very difficult to define pleasure and pain for they are unanalysable and therefore cannot be split up into differentia and genus or species for the purpose of definition.) Strictly speaking however it does not belong to the चेतन but to the बुद्धि and is a product of the रजस् principle according to Sāṃkhyas.

The whole passage from सांख्यमते to पञ्चविंशतिः is extracted verbatim from Gunaratna's Com. p. 97 on the Ṣaḍ. D. Samuccaya 34 (See Appendix). The Com. is based upon the statements of the Sāṃkhya tenets as found in Vācaspati-miśra's सां. त. कौ. on the सां. का. दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ (S. K. 1)—i. e. तदभिघातके of our text.

पञ्चविंशतिः etc.—*The Twenty-five Principles* consist of :—

(1) अव्यक्त—The Unmanifest or the Potential Reality

(2) महत्तत्त्व—The Great Principle—viz. the Buddhi or Intelligence. It is generally understood as the Cosmic Intelligence i. e. Intelligence manifested in the macrocosm and hence महत्

(3) अहंकार—the Ego. Not to be confounded with पुरुष or आत्मन्. पुरुष or आत्मन् caught in the trammel of प्रकृति appears as अहम्—ego.

(4) तन्मात्राः—or the Five Essences of शब्द, स्पर्श etc. which are the seeds of the भूत

(4) पुरुष who is neither प्रकृति nor विकृति—neither Nature nor any of its modifications—has neither बन्ध nor मोक्ष These belong to प्रकृति (*Vide* "तस्मात् प्रकृतिः" Sāṃkhya Kārikā 62).

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जिज्ञासते etc.—

The Sāṃkhya Doctrine —Man is so pain-stricken that there rises in him a desire to know the nat re f the causes that produce the Pain. On reflection he finds that Pain is are of three kinds आध्यात्मिक आधिभौतिक and आधिदैविक

(I) आध्यात्मिक e personal pain, may be either physical or mental. Th former is well-known The latter is caused by Lust, Anger G eed Stupo Envy Uneasiness and Doubt. The Sanskrit originals of these have been thus explained by commentary of the S. K.—

[illegible] —Explanations of these terms vary sometimes chang ing the *fundamental sense* in different wo ks.

All these दुःख are called आध्यात्मिक e personal because their *remedy* lies *in* (अन्तः) *us* (आत्मन्) आन्तरोपायसाध्यत्वात्—Mallinatha's explanation. Not because they originate in us?

The next two varieties are caused from without and their remedy is found outside us. These are

the Unmanifest or the Potential [प्रकृतिः प्रधानं ब्रह्म अव्यक्तं बहुधात्मकं मायेति पर्यायाः —S. K. Bhāṣya. "अव्यक्तस्यामी पर्याया भवन्ति अव्यक्तं प्रधानं ब्रह्म परं ध्रुव प्रधानकमक्षरं क्षेत्रं तमः प्रसूतमिति" S. T Samāsa.]

अव्यक्तस्यामी etc.—[S. T Samāsa p. 4] Its characteristics are :—It is without beginning middle or end; it has no parts it is common to all that is to say it is an all-embracing principle; it has no qualities such as शब्द etc (the qualities are its later evolutes); and it is changeless.

प्रधानात् etc.—From प्रधान springs बुद्धि or महत्तत्त्व (cf. तत्र महदेवेति गमयते—Ṣaḍ. D S p 100. cf. प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो— S K. 5; "प्रतिविषयेषु श्रोत्रादीनां शब्दादिविषयेष्वध्यवसायो दृष्टं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः"— S.K. Bh. 'सा बुद्धिः । अयोऽध्यवसायो बुद्धिः सोऽध्यवसायो गवादिषु द्रव्येषु यस्मात् प्रतिपत्तिः एवमेतन्नान्यथा । गौरेवायं नाश्वः स्थाणुरेवायं न पुरुष " —S. T Samāsa.

अध्यवसाय—Perception determination of the character of an object positively and negatively; thought, in the fullest sense of the term, including comparison and contrast.

तत्त्वाद्यो etc.—The same as in Gunaratna's Com. Cf. [illegible] मध्ये रूपाणि । धर्मोज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यरूपाणि चत्वारि सात्त्विकानि अधर्मादीनि [illegible] तद्विपरीतरूपाणि चत्वारि तामसानि । —Gunaratna p. 100 (Cf also S. T S. अस्यास्तु द्वे रूपे अष्टौ भवन्ति तामसानि p. 5)

Mark that although we translate बुद्धि by the English word "Intellect the former in truth stands for much more than what is signified by the latter in English books on Psychology—where it is distinguished sharply from Emotion and Will The reason for adopting the word Intellect as the best English equivalent for बुद्धि is that the explanation अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः etc. accords best with the meaning of the term "Intellect" implying existential and predicative judgment. The advantage possessed by the Sanskrit term बुद्धि is that it recognises the implication of emotion and will even in intellectual determination. The word बुद्धि means lighting up or the faculty of lighting up or bringing definitely into consciousness.

( ) The *Ekdaśa* इन्द्रियs consisting of the five बुद्धीन्द्रियs or cogniti e organs five कर्मेन्द्रियs or organs of activity and मनस्, the organ of mentality

(6) The पञ्चमहाभूतs—Or the Great Material Elements: आकाश etc.

(7) पुरुष—The Cit or Ātman The last is neither प्रकृति nor विकृति

तथा चेश्वरकृष्ण etc.—Gunaratna also quotes Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā 3 a d explains it. (See Appendix)

Of the 25 principles *one* is the original प्रकृति which is in no way विकृति ; *seven* beginning with महत् i.e. महत्, अहङ्कार and the तन्मात्राs are प्रकृति-विकृति i.e. विकृति of their antecedents nd प्रकृति f their consequents o the list *sixteen* are pure विकृतिs: these are the ele en इन्द्रिय and th five महाभूतs : while *one* viz. पुरुष is neithe प्रकृति nor विकृति—he is transcendental

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषाद etc.—प्रीति (Joy), अप्रीति (grief) and विषाद (stupor or dulness—*not dejection merely*) लाघव (lightness— not in the English sense of levity but th good sense of agil ty or easy movement), उपष्टम्भ (making stand, aggressiveness), गौरव (heaviness, lack of gility or ease) are constantly tending to override one another depend upo another produce ne another nd combine with one another But when they are in state of equipoise they a called प्रकृति — which is their original an l natural con lition. Other names for th same are प्रधान अव्यक्त to. Cf. प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः । अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ सत्त्वं लघुप्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः । गुरुवरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥—S. K. 12, 13

A additional series is f und in th Sāṁkhya Kārikā and ts commentary viz. प्रकाश प्रवृत्ति and नियम i.e. light, activity d arrest or stationariness, mentioned as the f nctions of सत्त्व रजस् and तमस् respecti ely (See Bhāṣya, S K on 'सत्त्वं etc.).

सर्वभावानामके etc.—प्रकृति is also kno as प्रधान (प्रधीयते अस्मिन्निति), the Great Abod or Reservoir and अव्यक्त

रसतन्मात्रात् शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणोपेतास्त्वापो जायन्ते गन्धतन्मात्रात् पृथिवी पञ्चगुणा जायते तदेवमस्मात्पञ्चतन्मात्रात्पञ्चमहाभूतानि तथा एकैकतन्मात्रात् भूतमुत्पद्यते । एवं च पञ्चभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यो भूतपञ्चकं भवति ॥ Gunaratna's Com.—p. 101.

पुरुषस्तु अमूर्तः etc.—For a statement of the characteristics of पुरुष and reasons for the same quoted also in the Sad., see B T S. iii.

अन्धपङ्गुवत् etc.—प्रकृति and पुरुष co-operate like the Blind Man and the Lame Man who supply each other's deficiency and bring about rational movement. The reference is to the famous Sāṁkhya Parable of the Blind and the Lame. It is thus set forth in detail in Guṇaratna's Com.—कश्चित्पुरुषः सार्थेन समं पाटलिपुत्रनगरं प्रस्थितः । स सार्थश्चौरैरभिद्रुतः । अन्धपङ्ग्वपि सार्थेन त्यक्तौ तत्रैव स्थितौ । अन्धस्तु इतश्चेतश्च धावन् पङ्गुना दृष्टः । उक्तश्च 'भो भो अन्ध मा धाव । अहं पङ्गुर्गमनाक्षमोऽपि मार्गं पश्यामि त्वं तु गमनसमर्थोऽपि मार्गं न पश्यसि । अतोऽन्योन्यं संयुज्य गच्छावः' । ततः पङ्गुः अन्धस्कन्धमारोपितः तयोः पथि गमनं प्रवृत्तम् । एवमन्धपङ्गुवत्पुरुषप्रकृत्योः संयोगः ॥ ततोऽन्धेन पङ्गोः स्कन्धेनाधिरोपितेन सम्यक् मार्गं प्राप्य नगरं प्रविष्टम् । तथा प्रकृतिरपि चेतनावत्पुरुषसंयोगाच्चेतनावतीव भवति तथा पङ्गुस्थानीयः पुरुषोऽपि प्रकृतिसंयोगात् कर्ता भवति । दर्पणप्रतिबिम्बितं मुखमिव बुद्धिप्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यमात्मनि प्रतिबिम्बितं चेतयमानो मन्यते मोक्षमार्गं प्रति पुरुषः सुखदुःखादिकं चेतयमानः संसारमधितिष्ठति । (Pp. 105-106.)

विषयनिश्चय etc.—According to the Sāṁkhya epistemology it is not the Puruṣa or Citśakti that determines an objective reality but Buddhi, working in the presence of Puruṣa. This is how the determination of reality takes place —सुख दुःख etc. enter बुद्धि through इन्द्रियs. बुद्धि is like a double faced mirror in which the Citśakti is reflected on one side and the objective world on the other. The consequence of the Cit being reflected in the Buddhi is that Ātman (Cit) identifies himself with the Buddhi and the determinations of the Buddhi get transferred to the Ātman (Cit), and the Ātman thereupon refers सुख दुःख etc. to himself, that is to say regards himself as happy or miserable and so on.

शुद्ध च पश्यति—The pure transcendental पुरुष notices the determinations of बुद्धि and identifies himself with it, although

सर्वे वैराग्य etc.—Are certain attitudes of the mind which play a part even in the intellectual determination of the character of the world of objects.

इन्द्रियाणि etc.—(Cf. ... Gunaratna p. 100 Cf. S T S p. 6. ... also) Parts of this are clear reminiscences of the Bhagavad-Gītā which is unquestionably earlier than the Sāṁkhya-Tattva-Samāsa.

तस्मात् ... etc.—Cf. Gunaratna's ... also S. T. S. p. 6–7 ... —See Max Müller's "Six Systems of Indian Philosophy" where the Tattva-samāsa is rendered into English.

... etc.—Cf. S. T. S. From ... to पृथिवी जायते—taken from the S T K.

The points to note here are:—

1. That the महाभूत, according to the Sāṁkhyas spring from the तन्मात्र (essences) of their respective गुण, and of the गुण ... the preceding महाभूत or महाभूत if any: thus, आकाश springs from शब्दतन्मात्र and its गुण is शब्द; वायु springs from स्पर्शतन्मात्र plus शब्दतन्मात्र and its गुण are शब्द and स्पर्श; and so on. Not, as in the Vaiśeṣika system where वायु springs from the atoms of वायु, तेज from the atoms of तेज etc.—with the exception of आकाश which is supposed to be one eternal reality without constituent parts.

2. The evolution of the महाभूत does not take place as an evolution of one महाभूत into another say of आकाश into वायु, of वायु into तेज etc., as it does according to Vedānta (cf. ... etc. ... etc. ...) but of तन्मात्र into महाभूत; neither does one तन्मात्र beget another. It only joins itself with another and begets the next महाभूत in the series. Haribhadra, and Gunaratna in his summary of the Sāṁkhya, derive each of the महाभूत from the तन्मात्र of its special guna. cf. ... Haribhadra Ṣaḍ. 40

[illegible] [illegible] " Gunaratna [illegible]

पुरुषस्य [illegible] etc.—For a statement of [illegible] पुरुष and reasons for the same quoted [illegible] S. T S 18.

[illegible] etc.—प्रकृति and पुरुष [illegible] Man and the Lame Man who supply [illegible] and bring about rational movement. [illegible] famous Sāṅkhya Parable of the [illegible] thus set forth in detail in Gunaratna [illegible]

[illegible]

i reality he is distinct from it. Likewise बुद्धि which is un-intelligent in itself, seems possessed of intelligence, as it were in consequence of its proximity to पुरुष or चित्. The parallel passage in G naratna runs as f llows चैतन्यमात्मा स्वं बुद्धेरत्यन्त-विभक्तमिवाभाति । शुद्धस्य स्वात्मनः विच्छया बुद्धिप्रतिबिम्बितेन बुद्धौ संक्रान्तमिव बुद्धि-बोधस्वरूपस्यैव तया उपचर्यते चैतन्यमपि प्रतिबिम्बते तदा पुरुषं तु स्वं सुखादीनुपलभते । आह च पतञ्जलिः शुद्धोऽपि पुरुषः प्रत्ययं बौद्धमनुपश्यति तमनु-पश्यन्नतदात्मापि तदात्मक इव प्रतिभासते इति बुद्धिचैतन्यादि विवेक-तयैवानाद् चेतनमात्मानं मन्यते (p. 105)

Th passage attrib ted to Patanjali is not found in Patan-jali' Y ga Sûtras, but i Vyâsa s Bhâṣya on the same (Vyâsa Pat Sû. 20 वस्तु सर्वं विरूपः । नात्यन्तं विरूपः । कस्मात् । शुद्धोऽप्यसौ प्रत्ययानुपश्यः । यतः प्रत्ययं बौद्धमनुपश्यति । तम-नुपश्यन्नतदात्मापि तदात्मक इव प्रत्यवभासते । तथा चोक्तम्—अपरिणामिनी हि भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपतति ॥ p 91.)

The slip was originally Gun ratna and was afterwards repeated by Mallisena who does not seem to have either seen Patañjali Sûtras or verified the source of the quotation Possibly Gunaratna too had not, oth rwise, he could not have co f unded the languag of phorisms with that of Bhâṣya. Could it be that in the time of Gunaratna the author of the Bhâṣy was s pposed to be Patanjali himself Vyâsa being too ancient to be comme tator of P tanjali ? Perhaps not. The ery frequent practice of writing among the Jainas—a स्वोपज्ञ वृत्ति e., the uthor's wn gloss, co ld have also led to the confusion between the Sûtra-kâra and the Bhâṣya kâra

यथा च वाचस्पति ta.—See commentary on S. T K. 23. This shows बुद्धि to be not merely faculty f Intellectual Apprehensio but lso f Moral Resolve—in ther words, it is the tti le of the whole man towards bjectiv reality which implies certain intellectual acceptance regarding the nature of that reality and is therefore rendered by the word I tellect A to the correctness of the commentator's explanation of बुद्धि, Prof. Müller is sceptical. (Cf. The Six Systems ")

सत्यपरिणामेऽपि स्यात् etc.—The whole passage upto "स्फटिक यथा" including the quotations, is reproduced from Guṇaratna's Commentary on Haribhadra's Ṣaḍ. D. Samuccaya. The analogies of the mirror and the face, the water and the moon, the crystal and the adjacent red flower are easy to follow

न च बध्यते etc.—Taken from Vācaspati-miśra's Commentary (S. T. K.) on S. K. 61—स्यादेतत् पुरुषोऽगुणोऽपरिणामी कथमस्य मोक्षः । मुचेर्बन्धनविश्लेषार्थत्वात् । सवासनक्लेशकर्माशयानां च बन्धनसमाख्यातानां पुरुषे ऽपरिणामिन्यसम्भवात् । अत एवास्य न संसारः प्रेत्यभावापरनामास्ति निष्क्रियत्वात् । तस्मात् पुरुषविमोक्षार्थमिति रिक्तं वचः । If पुरुष is अगुण and अपरिणामी he is above modifications of any sort; he is not liable to undergo बन्धन; for the same reason he is devoid of क्रिया and cannot transmigrate from one life to another. Hence there is no occasion for मोक्ष in his case.

सा प्रकृति etc.—Cf. तस्मान्न बध्यतेऽसौ न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् । संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ S. K. 62

अद्धा न कश्चित् पुरुषो बध्यते ...पुरुषे उपचर्येते । यथा जयपराजयौ भृत्यगतावपि स्वामिन्युपचर्येते । तत्फलस्य कोशलाभादेः स्वामिगामित्वात् । तथा भोगापवर्गौ प्रकृतिगतावपि विवेकाग्रहात् पुरुषसम्बद्धावुपचर्येते —Vācaspati.

Guṇaratna also quotes तस्मान्न etc. and comments as follows न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते पुरुष उपचर्येते । यथा जयपराजयावपि भृत्यगतावपि स्वामिन्युपचर्येते तत्फलस्य कोशलाभादेः (c L) स्वामिनि सम्बन्धात् । तथा भोगापवर्गौ प्रकृतिगतावपि विवेकाग्रहात् पुरुषे सम्बध्येते etc.—p 107 Cf. also Vyāsa Bhāṣya, the original of Vācaspati, p. 86. The passage means Just as a king arrogates to himself the victory and the defeat of his army and thereby appropriates and enjoys the treasure of the enemy in the same way भोग and मोक्ष which strictly speaking belong to प्रकृति are associated with पुरुष by a kind of confusion between the two.

Criticism: The four absurdities of the Sāṁkhya system pointed out in the Stanza:

in reality he is distinct from it. Likewise बुद्धि which is unintelligent in itself seems possessed of intelligence as it were, in consequence of its proximity to पुरुष or चित्. The parallel passage in Gunaratna runs as follows चैतन्यमात्मा स्वं बुद्धेरप्यभि-रिव्यमभिमन्यते । सुखदुःखादयस्तु विषया बुद्धिसंचारेण बुद्धौ संक्रामन्ति बुद्धि-श्चोभयमुखदर्पणाकारा तत्रस्त्वं चैतन्यशक्तिः प्रतिबिम्बते तदा सुखदुःखे ज्ञाताहमित्युपचर्यते । आह च पतञ्जलिः शुद्धोऽपि पुरुषः प्रत्ययं बौद्धमनुपश्यति तमनु-पश्यन्नतदात्मापि तदात्मक इव प्रतिभासते इति बुद्धिगतचैतन्यमपि विषयाणि संनिधानात् चैतन्यवदिवावभासते (p. 105)

The passage attributed to Patañjali is not found in Patañjali's Yoga-Sūtras but in Vyāsa's Bhāṣya in the same (Vyāsa on Pat Sū. 20 अस्तु तर्हि विरूप । नात्यन्तं विरूप । कस्मात् । शुद्धोऽप्यसौ प्रत्ययानुपश्यः । यतः प्रत्ययं बौद्धमनुपश्यति । तम-नुपश्यन्नतदात्मापि तदात्मक इव प्रत्यवभासते । तथा चोक्तम्—अपरिणामिनी हि भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपतति ॥ p 91)

The slip was originally Guṇaratna's and was afterwards repeated by Mallinātha who does not seem to have either seen Patañjali's Sūtras or verified the source of the quotation. Possibly Guṇaratna too had it, otherwise, he could not have confounded the language of aphorisms with that of Bhāṣya. Could it be that in the time of Guṇaratna the author of the Bhāṣya was supposed to be Patañjali himself Vyāsa being too ancient to be a commentator of Patañjali? Perhaps not. The very frequent practice of writing among the Jainas—a स्वोपज्ञ वृत्ति on the author's own gloss, could have also led to the confusion between the Sūtrakāra and the Bhāṣyakāra.

तथा च वाचस्पति etc.—See commentary on S. T K. 23. This shews बुद्धि to be not merely a faculty of Intellectual Apprehension but also of Moral Resolve—in other words, it is the attitude of the whole man towards objective reality which implies certain intellectual acceptance regarding the nature of that reality and is therefore rendered by the word Intellect. As to the correctness of the commentator's explanation of बुद्धि, Prof. Müller is sceptical. ("Cf. The Six Systems)

आत्मसात्कृतेऽप्याह etc —The whole passage upto "स्फटिके यथा" including the quotations, is reproduced from Guṇaratna's Commentary on Haribhadra's Ṣaḍ. D Samuccaya. The analogies of the mirror and the face, the water and the moon, the *crystal and the adjacent red flower are easy to follow*

न च बध्यते etc —Taken from Vācaspati-miśra's Commentary (S. T K) on S. K. 61—स्यादेतत् पुरुषोऽगुणोऽपरिणामी कथमस्य मोक्षः। मुचेर्बन्धनविश्लेषार्थत्वात्। सवासनक्लेशकर्माशयानां च बन्धनसंज्ञितानां पुरुषेऽपरिणामिन्यसंभवात्। अत एवास्य न संसारः प्रेत्यभावापराभिधानोऽस्ति निष्क्रियत्वात्। तस्मात् पुरुषविमोक्ष इति रिक्तं वचः। If पुरुष is अगुण and अपरिणामी he is above modifications of any sort; he is not liable to undergo बन्धन for the same reason, he is devoid of *क्रिया and cannot transmigrate from one life to* another Hence there is no occasion for मोक्ष in his case.

अत प्रकृति etc —Cf तस्मान्न बध्यतेऽद्धा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित्। संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः॥ S. K. 62

यथा च क्वचित् पुरुषो बध्यते पुरुषे उपचर्येते। यथा जयपराजयौ भृत्यगतावपि स्वामिन्युपचर्येते। तद्भावेन भृत्यानां तद्भागित्वात् तत्फलस्य च कोशलाभादेः स्वामिनि सम्बन्धात्। भोगापवर्गयोः प्रकृतिगतयोरपि विवेकाग्रहात् पुरुषसम्बन्ध उपपादितः—Vācaspati.

Guṇaratna also quotes तस्मान्न etc. and comments as follows न तस्मात् बन्धमोक्षौ तात्त्विकौ पुरुषे उपचर्येते। यथा जयपराजयावपि भृत्यगतावपि स्वामिन्युपचर्येते तत्फलस्य कोशलाभादेः ([illegible]) स्वामिनि संबन्धात्। तथा भोगापवर्गौ प्रकृतिगतावपि विवेकाग्रहात् पुरुषे संबध्येते etc—p 107 Cf. also Vyāsa Bhāṣya, *the original of* Vācaspati, p. 86 The passage means: Just as a king arrogates to himself the victory and the defeat of his army and thereby appropriates and enjoys the treasure of the enemy in the same way भोग and मोक्ष which strictly speaking belong to प्रकृति are associated with पुरुष by kind of confusion between the two.

Criticism: The four absurdities of the Sāmkhya system pointed out in the Stanza.

1 ( ) To be चित् and to be devoid of Intelligence or Consciousness is a contradictio in terms. चित्—to know or be conscious; चिन्त्—to think from which the word चित् has come connotes thought o knowledge. [As matter of fact 'चित्' is Vedic 'चित्'-to know] If it be not its function to know itself and that which i other than itself viz. the Objects a Reality (cf. स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् —PNT-kára I 2. for this doctrine of the Jai ns) the चित् is no longer चित्. For i that case it would be no better than such dead matter as घट which does not know itself or anything other than itself. Similarly Rāmān jācārya holds that Cit knows itself as well as its object (See S ribhāṣya I. I. 1).

(b) Moreover चित् has a form or corporeal shape (is 'अमूर्त') nd th refore it is impossible for it to be *reflected* in बुद्धि reflection being possible nly in the case of things which ar possessed of corporeal form (मूर्त मूर्तद्रव्यम्). Then, as regards the प्रतिबिम्ब i. e., the response f पुरुष to the influence of बुद्धि it is impos ble without the response producing परिणाम i. e. affectio o modification of पुरुष. The presence of बुद्धि could bring bout no change in पुरुष, unless पुरुष was possessed of संवेदन. Without पुरुष parting with its original character it could not be said t be *subject* to सुख nd दुःख. And the moment it is admitted that the original character is lost and a new one acquired the operation of losing one nd acquiri g th other is क्रिया which makes पुरुष कर्तृ—which is contrary to the Sāṁkhya tenets. The analogy f th cry stal points in the sam direction. If it be not due to a certain action in the crystal that it catches reflection how is it that an opaque stone does not catch it? Therefore, it is plain that चित् (पुरुष) is कर्तृ and a भोक्तृ—that is, a कर्तृ and a भोक्तृ directly and not thro gh बुद्धि. According to Rāmānujācārya, चित् is possessed of कर्तृत्व of itself, but of भोक्तृत्व through बुद्धि—though both really and ot fictitiously as S'aṁkara holds स्वपरविभासिनी स्वप्रतिपत्तम्—This, like the foregoing passage is not found in Patañjali's Sūtras, but in Vyāsa' Bhāṣya; and there again, it is introduced with the words " तथा चोक्तम् " on

which Vâcaspati adds—"पञ्चशिखेन" i. e. by Pancaśikhâcârya, an ancient teache of the Sâṁkhya System. The passage is thus explained by Vâcaspati-Mis ra : "तथा चोक्तं पञ्चशिखेन अपरिणामिनी हि भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्रमा । अत एव प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव परिणामिनि बुद्धिस्थेऽर्थे संक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिं बुद्धिवृत्तिमनुपतति । —Pat. Yoga 20 Com.

It is argued that भोक्तृशक्ति is in reality above परिणाम and प्रतिसंक्रम i. e., modification or activity but being reflected in बुद्धि which is subject to them, it itself comes to be regarded as subject to them. But how can that which is admittedly a mere उपचार, i. e a false ascription, be of any use in the investigation of truth? Moreover if सुख-दुःख of which we are all undeniably conscious as belonging to ourselves that is to our आत्मन्, do not belong to the आत्मन्, they will have to hang in the air so to say since बुद्धि is incompetent to possess them, it being held to be जड (dead, insensate thing).

2. अत एव च जडा etc.—We cannot very well predicate विषयावगाहन (knowledge of objects) of बुद्धि if the latter is जडा i. e. unconscious or insensate.

ननु अत्यन्तमुक्तं पुरुषम् etc.—The explanation is reiterated that the neighbouring चितिशक्ति is reflected in बुद्धि and thus बुद्धि becomes possessed of it as it were (चेतनावदिवावभासते). But to it a reply may be easily made that a man is reflected in a mirror but that does not make the mirror living. चैतन्य and अचैतन्य are inherent in things and cannot be altered even by an omnipotent being. Moreover the "इव" "as it were in your statement (चेतनावदिवावभासते) is clear admission of unreality. Cf. Sankara स्वभावस्येश्वरेणाप्यन्यथाकर्तुमशक्यत्वात् चेतनं चेतनस्वभावं स्वभावेनैव अचेतनमचेतनं न स्यात् । Br Sûtra II. ii. 10

अत एव धर्मादयस्तु etc.—Similarly the eight spiritual qualities and Egoism (अहङ्कार) belong to आत्मन्, not to बुद्धि

3. आकाशादीनां च etc.—That आकाश and the ther महाभूत have prung from the essences of their qualities is a doctrine contrary to all experience Apart from the bsurdity of matter springing out of the essences of qualities, there is the initial

paradox of calling आत्मा अनित्य which all other schools of thinkers are agreed in regarding as नित्य. (The author is here overlooking the Vedāntin—See Ved. Sūtrās II iii. and the Bhāṣya thereon)

निर्गुणत्वादित्यादि च युक्ति etc —For the Sāṅkhya claims to be a सत्कार्यवादिन् as against the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika who are असत्कार्यवादिन्s, and are, therefore, stigmatised as "अर्धवैनाशिक". Besides, how can the परिणामिकारण (i e the stuff of which an effect is made) be a गुण (quality) of its कार्य ? Or rather how can the गुण of a कार्य be its परिणामिकारण i. e be the very stuff of which the कार्य is made ?

पाय्वादीनां च etc.—पायु etc. cannot be called इन्द्रियs i. e. organs or senses as distinguished from limbs. The former are parts of the organism which perform functions which nothing else can perform. The functions वचनादान गमन, विसर्ग आनन्द etc. which are ascribed to वाक्, पाणि पाद etc.—called कर्मेन्द्रियs —respectively can be performed by other limbs as well, for example we can communicate our ideas by finger-signs etc. Thus वाक् etc. are limbs and not organs. If they are to be regarded as organs despite this, there will be no fixed number of इन्द्रियs, many other limbs being entitled to the same rank

4 यतोऽयं प्रकृत्यात्मना etc.—You admit that पुरुष confounds himself with प्रकृति This is exactly what one understands by बन्ध If that is not बन्ध what else is बन्ध ? Therefore, it is hard to deny—while making this admission—that बन्ध belongs to पुरुष

बन्धः प्राकृतिक etc —The Sāṅkhya speaks of three kinds of बन्ध—

(1) प्राकृतिक—that consisting in the worship of प्रकृति by confounding it with आत्मन्. Cf. [illegible] ये प्रकृतिमुपासते तेषां प्राकृतिको बन्धः [illegible] —S. T K. on verse 44 p. 290.

(2) वैकारिक—that consisting in the worship of the विकारs, viz. भूत, इन्द्रिय अहंकार and बुद्धि mistaking them for आत्मन्

Cf. वैकारिको बन्धो येषां विकारानेव भूतेन्द्रियाहंकारबुद्धीः पुरुषबुद्ध्योपासते तान् प्रतीदमुच्यते दशमन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः। भौतिकास्तु शतं पूर्णं सहस्रं त्वाभिमानिकाः। बौद्धा दश सहस्राणि तिष्ठन्ति विगतज्वराः। S T K Ibid.

(3) दाक्षिण—that consisting in attachment to 'दक्षिणा' i. e the sacrificial rites with their attendant fees, and the heaven sought to be obtained thereby Cf. इष्टापूर्तेन दाक्षिणकः। पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञो हीष्टापूर्तकारी कामोपहतमना बध्यते।—S. T K. Ibid.

The passage in the text is reproduced from Guṇaratna's Com. Cf also S. T S.

In truth, all the three—प्राकृतिक वैकारिक and दाक्षिण—are causes of धर्म and बन्ध The resulting बन्ध gives rise to संसार; and मोक्ष too eventually belongs to the same पुरुष to whom belongs the बन्ध Hence, it is absurd to hold तस्मान्न बध्यते नैव मुच्यते नापि संसरति etc. See S. K 62.

प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकदर्शनात् etc. -The Sāṁkhya explains: मोक्ष consists simply in the पुरुष being restored to his original state, when प्रकृति has ceased to act owing to the distinction between प्रकृति and पुरुष having come to be realized. But this explanation is evidently unsatisfactory For is it not the very nature of प्रकृति to be active, with the necessary consequence that the activity should never cease to exist and thus preclude मोक्ष ?

The Sāṁkhya would rejoin The activity of प्रकृति originates from पुरुषार्थ; and, therefore when the पुरुषार्थ is accomplished, the activity ceases विवेकख्याति (discrimination between प्रकृति and पुरुष) being a पुरुषार्थ

नृत्य etc.—Sāṁkhya Kārikā 59. On the analogy of an actress who retires from the stage after her work is done.

Criticism: First, the unintelligent प्रकृति is not capable of such thought as is presupposed in the analogy Secondly the प्रकृति will repeat its activity even after विवेकख्याति has taken place, just as it goes in search of a विषय even after it has once enjoyed it—a persistence which can be explained only on the hypothesis of the activity being of the very nature of प्रकृति Thirdly the analogy of the actress is fatal to the

point sought to be established; for, the actress will always have her part "once more" So the right view about मोक्ष is that it belongs to पुरुष and that it takes place when all the karmans have been exhausted The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika agrees with the Jains.

Miscellaneous absurdities in the Sāṁkhya system This supplementary portion in the text is based upon S. T. K. Cf. also S. T. S

प्रत्ययस्वरूपसंख्यापि etc.—S. T K. pp. 292-302, S. T. S. pp. 27-30 and M. M.'s Six Systems p. 268, where the Tattva-Samāsa is fully translated.

Books of Reference :

1. Sāṁkhya-Kārikā
2. Sāṁkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī.
3. Gauḍapāda's Sāṁkhya-Bhāṣya.
4. Sāṁkhya Tattva-Samāsa.
5. Kapila-Sūtras and the Sāṁkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya.
6. Patañjali' Sūtra and the Vyāsa Bhāṣya and Vācaspati-Miśra Commentary
7. Summary in the Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya and Guṇaratna's Commentary thereon.
8. Max Müller and Garbe.

Appendices.

मात्रशब्दोऽस्मात् । " बुद्धिदर्पणसंक्रान्तमर्थप्रतिबिम्बकं द्वितीयदर्पणकल्पे पुंस्यध्यारोहति । तदेव भोक्तृत्वमस्य न त्वात्मनो विकारापत्तिरिति " तथा चासुरिः — " विविक्ते दृक्परिणतौ बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते । प्रतिबिम्बोदयः स्वच्छे यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्भसि ॥ विन्ध्यवासी त्वेवं भोगमाचष्टे—" पुरुषोऽविकृतात्मैव स्वनिर्भासमचेतनम् । मनः करोति सांनिध्यादुपाधिः स्फटिकं यथा ॥ " इति— Guṇaratna's Com. p. 104.

तत्र धर्मोत्कर्षे हेतुर्भवति ऊर्ध्वं वीतरागनिवृत्तिर्भवति अधोऽधर्मोत्कर्षे भवति । तत्रैव कार्यं कस्यचित् विवेकज्ञाने हेतुर्भवति । यथा कायो । एवं कारणानां प्रति पक्षे हेतुर्भवं युज्यते हि वस्तुनि तत् इति । तस्मात् अप्रमाणमुक्तम् । तत्र

तमसी सत्त्वमभिभवता स्वकार्यप्रवृत्ति माचरतीत्यन्यो रजस्तोपष्टम्भेते भवतस्तत् स्थाप्य स्वकार्ये सत्त्वात्मकत्वं कर्येते । तदिदमुक्तम् उपष्टम्भकं रज इति । तस्मात् गुरुत्वं वरकं तम इति । तथैव रजः प्रवर्तकत्वं दर्शितम् । रजस्तु चलतया परितमिपत्वं चलयत् एकान्ततया च तमसा तत्र तत्र प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्ध चेव क्वचिदेव प्रवर्तेत इति ततस्ततो व्यावर्त्य तमोनियामकत्वादुक्त एव तत्पक्षमेव तम इति । The co-operation of the three Principles in spite of their mutual incompatibility is explained by means of the following analogies :—

"एवमेतत्—यथा वर्तितैलेऽनलविरोधिनी अथ च मिलिते सहानलेन रूपप्रकाशलक्षणं कार्यं कुरुतः यथा वा वातपित्तश्लेष्माणः परस्परविरोधिनः शरीरधारणलक्षणकार्यकारिण एवं सत्त्वरजस्तमांस्यपि मिथो विरुद्धान्यप्यनुवर्तिष्यन्ति च स्वकार्यं करिष्यन्ति च —Others deny mutual conflict of the principles since the principles are combined in varying degrees of strength (तुल्यबलानामेव विरोधो नातुल्यबलानाम्).

अहं शब्दे अहं स्पर्शे अहं रूपे अहं रसे । अहं गन्धे अहं स्वामी धनवानहमीश्वरः । अहं भोगी अहं धर्मेऽभिषिक्तोऽसौ मया हतः । अहं हनिष्ये बलिभिः परैरित्येवमादिरिति —अभिमानलक्षणोऽहङ्कारः S T S. p. 6.—where it will be noticed that अभिमानलक्षणोऽहङ्कार is used in double sense—of egoism i. e self-reference in the cognition of शब्द, स्पर्श etc., and egotism o pride as in अहं भोगी etc.

सांख्यमते किल दुःखत्रयाभिहतस्य पुरुषस्य तदुपघातहेतुस्तज्जिज्ञासा उत्पद्यते । आध्यात्मिकमाधिदैविकमाधिभौतिकं चेति दुःखत्रयम् । आध्यात्मिकं द्विविधं शारीरं मानसं च । तत्र वातपित्तश्लेष्मणां वैषम्यनिमित्तं यद् दुःखमाध्यात्मिकं देहविकृत्या ज्वरातीसारादि समुत्पद्यते तच्छारीरम् । मानसं च कामक्रोधलोभमोहेर्ष्याविषयादर्शननिबन्धनम् । सर्वं चैतदान्तरोपायसाध्यत्वादाध्यात्मिकं दुःखम् । बाह्योपायसाध्यं दुःखं द्वेधा आधिभौतिकमाधिदैविकं चेति । तत्राधिभौतिकं मानुषपशुपक्षिमृगसरीसृपस्थावरनिमित्तं आधिदैविकं यक्षराक्षसग्रहाद्यावेशहेतुकम् । अनेन दुःखत्रयेण रजःपरिणामभेदेन बुद्धिवर्तिनाभिहतस्य प्राणि नस्तत्त्वानां जिज्ञासा भवति दुःखविघाताय । तदाहि च पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वेष्विति—Gunaratna's Com on S. D Sam. p 97

एवमप्रकृतिरविकृतिः पुरुषः—यथा महदादयः प्रकृतेर्विकारास्ते च स्वकार्यं प्रति प्रकृतयः अपि भवन्तीति स्वरूपापरित्यागानित्यत्वात् । प्रकृतित्वविरहान्नित्यत्वाच्च । ततो न कदाचिदपि स्वरूपात्प्रच्यवति "—Gunaratna's Com p. 102-3

Stanza XVI

Stanza : The relation of Cause and Effect cannot be one of simultaneity; nor can an Effect come into existence after the Cause is dead. Monism cannot account for knowledge being the knowledge *of* things. Thus, the jugglery of Sugata (Buddha) has been torn to pieces.

Here begins the *Criticism* of th Bauddha doctrines :

I The First Half of the Stanza.

1. The Bauddhas hold that the प्रमाण and the फल of ज्ञान are absolutely identical. Thus, says Buddhist writer "प्रमाण etc."—In both cases, the ज्ञान itself is both the प्रमाण and the फल, consisting as it does of अधिगम In both cases *i. e.* in प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान the ज्ञान *i. e.* प्रत्यक्ष or अनुमान फल—the effect. अधिगमरूपत्वात्—परिच्छेदरूपत्वात्—*i. e.* since the ज्ञान is अधिगम or परिच्छेद *i. e.* determination of the nature of an object. There is no फल of ज्ञान except the परिच्छेद itself *i. e.* knowing an object to be such nd such; and since the परिच्छेद is प्रत्यक्ष or अनुमान प्रत्यक्ष or अनुमान is the फल of ज्ञान But प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान are प्रमाणs Therefore प्रमाण is also the फल Cf. तदेव च प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं प्रमाणफलम् N. Bind. I. 18.

Criticism

[illegible] च [illegible] etc.—Things which are absolutely non-distinct come into existence togeth *e.g.* घट and its [illegible] So if प्रमाण and फल were absolutely non-distinct they would come into existence *simultaneously* But this is contrary to the relation which is supposed to exist between them, *i.e.*, the relation of कार्य (Effect) and कारण (Cause) W take the case of the left and the right horn of cow which come into existence *simultaneously*: are they elated as Cause and Effect? N Cause and Effect demand priority nd posteriority of the two respectively [न तुल्यकालः फलहेतुभावः].

N w tak the other alternati e, which is to regard the two—प्रमाण and फल—as *successive*. This is also impossible. For in that case the कारण viz. प्रमाण would precede the कार्य viz. फल;

and as the Buddhist is a क्षणभङ्गवादी (holding that everything in the universe exists only for a single moment of time) it means that one has already passed off the stage of existence—absolutely without leaving a trace behind—before the other arrives on the scene.

किं च हेतुफलभाव: etc.—Moreover the relation of Cause and Effect is a *relation*, and as such it must subsist *in two* things. Now unless both of them *are at one and the same time*, it could not subsist in them. Hence the alternative of *succession* is impossible. How can you say here is the cause and here is the effect, unless both of them are simultaneously present before you? As the verse (quoted in one place in the Ratnākarāvatārikā) says: द्विष्ठसंबन्ध etc. *i. e.* the knowledge of the relation which subsists in two things cannot take place while only one of the things is known; the relation can be known only when both th correlates are known.

यदपि बाह्योर्थेन etc.—See न्या बि with टीका p. 103 and p. 18–19 respectively (Peterson's Edition, A. S. Bengal) The Bauddha I gloss holds, as against the Naiyāyika, that when I see नील object (e g घट), it is the नील form or likeness (सारूप्य विशेष) in the ज्ञान which occupies the place of प्रमाण (instrument f right knowledge) and not the इन्द्रिय such as the eye etc. [नीलनिर्भासं हि ज्ञानं यतस्तस्मान्नीलस्य प्रतीतिरवसीयते । येभ्यो हि चक्षुरादिभ्यो ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते न तद्वशात्तज्ज्ञानं नीलस्य संवेदनं शक्यतेऽवस्थापयितुम् । नीलसदृशं त्वनुभूयमानं नीलस्य संवेदनमवस्थाप्यते । N. B. T. p. 19]

An obvious objection to this view is that it makes प्रमाण and फल—the Cause and Effect—*one* which is absurd. But the answer to the objection is: that, here प्रमाण and फल are not Cause and Effect in the sense of जनक and जन्य but व्यवस्थापक and व्यवस्थाप्य that is to s y one explains the other not engenders it: it is *ratio* as distinguished from *causa*. Now this relation of व्यवस्थाप्य and व्यवस्थापक can very well subsist between two aspects of one and the same thing In the present case, सारूप्य or सादृश्य is the व्यवस्थापक (determinant

or regulator), and नीलरूप is व्यवस्थाप्य (determined) [See Appendix].

Criticism. The one ज्ञान which is क्षणिक‡ is too simple to have parts and so it is impossible that it should possess a two-fold nature of व्यवस्थाप्य and व्यवस्थापक. The relation of व्यवस्थाप्य and व्यवस्थापक is after all a relation, and as such must require two correlates to subsist in. The explanation that this is a case of व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभाव and not of उत्पाद्योत्पादकभाव makes no difference to this requirement. Moreover one should like to know whether the अर्थसारूप्य which is said to be अर्थवेदन (नीलसारूप्य is नीलवेदन) is निश्चयरूप or अनिश्चयरूप—that is to say whether it carries with it the conviction that the अर्थसारूप्य is there or not. If it does not, how can that which is itself अनिश्चित produce any निश्चय i.e. be व्यवस्थापक of the knowledge of reality (अर्थसंवेदन)?

Then, again, what is meant by the अर्थाकारता of ज्ञान? Does it mean the character that is impressed upon the ज्ञान as the result of apprehending the अर्थ (the object)? Or does it mean that the ज्ञान assumes the form of the अर्थ? In the former case, it is all we wanted to prove viz. that there was the अर्थ which imparted its character to the ज्ञान. In the latter case the ज्ञान would become अर्थ; for the object into which it is supposed to turn itself is अर्थ. Therefore it is not proper to hold the doctrine that the प्रमाण and the फल are absolutely one. Were they absolutely one, it would be absurd to draw any such distinction as प्रमाण and फल; for then we cannot say that सारूप्य is प्रमाण and अधिगति (अर्थसंवेदन) is फल.

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‡ The Buddhist metaphysician is so ardently committed to the doctrine of क्षणिकत्व that when he has to speak of ज्ञान he often speaks of it as ज्ञानक्षण—which is to be understood not in the sense of a moment of ज्ञान but ज्ञान enduring for a moment only. Thus, ज्ञानक्षणक्षणिकत्वम्

Suppose you were to explain : There is but *one* reality of which सारूप्य and अधिगति are but two forms—सारूप्य being the name which we give to its असारूप्यव्यावृत्ति (=to be other than non-Sārūpya) and अधिगति the name we give to its अनधिगतिव्यावृत्ति (=*to be other than non-Adhigati*.) Thus, सारूप्य and अधिगति are not two positive realities, but mere negatives characterizing a single Reality

Criticism : This is but a futile makeshift. The two व्यावृत्तिs—viz. the असारूप्यव्यावृत्ति and अनधिगतिव्यावृत्ति—cannot be *two*, without implying two स्वभावs. But two स्वभावs are an evident absurdity Moreover as प्रमाण and फल are explained as अप्रमाणव्यावृत्ति and अफलव्यावृत्ति, why can we not say that प्रमाण is प्रमाणान्तरव्यावृत्ति and फलान्तरव्यावृत्ति—that is to say the व्यावृत्ति may be व्यावृत्ति not merely from things outside the class but also from other things of the same class ? We must, therefore, admit some distinction between प्रमाण and फल, of which one is साधन and the other साध्य like कुठार and छिदिक्रिया

एवं नैयायिकैः etc.—The other extreme is held by the Naiyāyikas. They are equally wrong प्रमाण and फल cannot be altogether separate from each other since they are *one* with the same प्रमाता o subject, the प्रमाता taking the form of प्रमाण in one case and of फल in the other प्रमाता is the principle of unity the synthesizing principle of all its forms and activities. Thus, *the same person that knows an object takes* that object or abandons it or is indifferent about it. Unless this unity were recognized between the प्रमाण and the फल the प्रमाण of one person would produce फल in another person, and so everything would get into confusion. If the प्रमाण is to produce its फल it must be in the same person which means that we must recognize a principle of u ity behind them and not treat them as bsolutely separate entities.

II Another Exposition of the First Half of the Stanza :

सर्वं सत् क्षणिकं etc.—Everything is momentary (क्षणिक), because everything perishes in the presence of the destroying

agent. And the same nature which it possesses at the last moment it must possess at the beginning on coming into existence. Thus, a hammer (मुद्गर) cannot produce new nature in घट when it destroys it; the nature which the घट possesses at the end it must possess at the start—and thus, it should perish immediately after the start. In other words, it is क्षणिक. The argument is essentially this. A thing perishes. Nothing can make it perish, unless it were in its nature to perish. This nature is as much in it at the start as at the finish, and, therefore, all along the line. And nothing can prevent this nature from realising itself, i. e., the perishable thing from perishing at every moment. But an explanation may be offered by the स्थायित्ववादिन् (the advocate of continuity or permanence). The thing acquires from its progenitor a nature which keeps it *stable for some time*, and then allows it to perish. But this explanation proves too much. Even in the presence of the destroying agent it possesses the same nature, and will therefore remain stable in spite of those agents, and so will go on acquiring leases of life ad infinitum and will never perish. (This is illustrated by the analogy of a debtor who puts off his creditors from day to day and never pays the debt.) But it may be rejoined from the other side that a thing is born to persist, but it eventually perishes when it is overwhelmed by the agent of destruction. This explanation, however will not mend matters. If a thing does not perish because it is by nature stable, it is not open to say that an overwhelming force interferes with that nature and makes it perish, for nothing can destroy the nature of a thing. (It is like saying Devadatta is living and is dying.) If, however, as we see the thing does perish, it shews that it has not come into existence from its progenitor with stability stamped upon it. (If Devadatta dies, he cannot have been immortal, but was mortal from his very birth.) If a thing is not perishable it can never perish. But we see it perish. Therefore we must suppose that when it was born from its parent, it was born perishable and not

stable. Thus, perishability being found to be the nature of things, thing must perish immediately after coming into existence. This is how the Buddhist doctrine of क्षणक्षयित्व is established Cf. Gunaratna's Com. on Ṣaḍ. pp. 29 30; [See Appendix].

प्रयोगश्चैवम् etc.—Syllogism to establish the position :—

That which is perishable will not endure after its birth, as, for example घट which is in its last moment does not endure thereafter घट etc. are perishable at the time of their birth. Therefore they will not endure after the moment of their birth This is known in the Buddhistic Nyāya (logic) as the syllogism based on a स्वभावहेतु (Essential हेतु) as distinguished from a कार्यहेतु (Causal हेतु). The following passage will throw good light on the distinction : "स्वभावहेतुर्यथा घटोऽयं विनश्वरत्वात् । कार्यहेतुर्यथा अग्निरत्र धूमात् —Ṣaḍ Gunaratna's Com. section on बौद्धमत Here in the first syllogism विनश्वरत्व and घटत्व are not related as Cause and Effect, but as Essences, whereas अग्नि and धूम of the second syllogism are Cause and Effect The former is the basis of deductive, and the latter of inductive logic. In the case of the कार्यहेतु we argue from Effect to Cause ; in the case of स्वभावहेतु we argue from one essence to another

कथमयंविधो etc.—इति etc.—It now remains for the क्षणिकवाद-वादिन् to explain how we happen to recognise persistent identity of घट from the first to the last moment of its existence, if as he says, a घट cannot bide for more than a single moment of time सदृशापरापर etc —the explanation which the Buddhist gives is that *similarity* is mistaken for *identity* there is a constant flux of similar घटs, of which every preceding घट produces every succeeding घट; and all of them are so alike and so close in their succession that in spite of absolute break at every point we imagine that there is a single घट from first to last. This is owing to our अविद्या or ignorance. Cf. the doctrine of Heraclites in Greek philosophy and see Gunaratna's Com. on Ṣaḍ. p. 30

Criticism न तुल्यकाल etc.—According to the [illegible] a number of क्षण i.e. [illegible] (See supra, note) may be compared to a loose series of pearls—not a string as the Vedāntin holds but a loose series of absolutely loose units in which every preceding क्षण produces every succeeding क्षण. Now what we would fain know about this theory is—whether the preceding क्षण produce the succeeding क्षण simultaneously with their birth or in the moments which succeed their birth. In other words, are the two क्षण which are supposed to cause each other simultaneous or successive? If they are simultaneous, one of them cannot produce the other any more than one hand can produce the other hand: "न तुल्यकालः फलहेतुभावः"—as the line in the Stanza runs. If they are successive, there can be no causal relation between them, inasmuch as one has already passed away into nothingness when the other springs into existence. At the same time, we cannot discard the causal bond; for without it anything might spring out of anything. Therefore, says the Stanza, "हेतौ विलीने न फलस्य भाव"

As to whether the causal relation is merely relation of Antecedent and Consequent, see Hume and his critics,—Kant etc.

[illegible]—The Buddhist criticism of the doctrine of Permanence has no point against the Syādvādin as the latter heartily endorses the criticism with the exception of one bit viz. निरन्वयनाश i.e. such absolute destruction as leaves no trace behind of the thing destroyed. Hence the Jaina definition of सत्— उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत् the word ध्रौव्य providing for the exception. The Syādvādin's agreement with the Buddhist in the rest of the case may be seen in his doctrine of [illegible] i.e. the destruction of the पर्याय or modes every moment. His difference lies in his recognition of the permanence of the underlying द्रव्य which the Buddhist denies. This double doctrine of Permanence-cum-Evanescence the Buddhist has compared to such

propositions as "Devadatta is living; he is dying" But the Jaina Anekântavâdin sees no absurdity in such a proposition. According to him while we live we also die; for petals of life are falling away from us all the while that we are living It may be argued that Death is the proper word not for the process of the gradual falling away of the petals of life, but only for the last state of extinction, so that we cannot be said to be dying while living But this is wrong Even at the time of the final extinction, what happens is that the last petal of life falls away Thus, Death is a word which must apply to the whole process of the falling away of the petals of life and thus it is going on in the midst of life. Thus stands the Anekântavâda of Life and Death.

III A Third W y of expounding the First Half of the Stanza

According to a certain school of the Buddhists, ज्ञान is produced by अर्थ; and the same ज्ञान which is the effect cognises the अर्थ which is its cause. As a Buddhist Sûtra goes, नाकारणं विषयः that is, nothing can be a विषय of ज्ञान which is not also a कारण of the same ज्ञान

Criticism The whole theory is inconsistent with the Buddhist's favourite doctrine of क्षणिकत्व In the moment in which an अर्थ just exists it cannot produce the ज्ञान for one क्षण must be fully taken up in the act f existing, and there is no time left for the second act—the act of producing the ज्ञान And in the next moment—the moment in which ज्ञान comes into existence—the अर्थ has already passed off according to the hypothesis of क्षणिकत्व Remember that th causal relation is relation of antecedent and consequent. But your antecedent is incapable of entering into a causal relation; since it lasts only for single moment of time in which it can do nothing beyond coming into existence.

Moreover the ज्ञान will be found to be निर्विषय (without a विषय) according to the third theory of क्षणिकत्व For the विषय

has passed away before the ज्ञान comes into being, and when the ज्ञान turns towards the object, it is more than one moment since it has been dead. And निर्विषयज्ञान is a wrong ज्ञान being like the ज्ञान of the hairs of Âkâśa !

Suppose ज्ञान and अर्थ are *simultaneous*. Then, the latter will not be कारण ; for a कारण is pri to not simultaneous with, the effect, and therefore according to the principle you have yourself laid down it will not be an object too. Hence the line in the Stanza : "न तुल्यकाल: फलहेतुभाव: ।"

[illegible] फलहेतुभाव to.—Construction and interpretation of the first two lines in the light of the foregoing remarks—

Moreover the अर्थक्षण which is supposed to be the cause of the ज्ञान having already passed off, the ज्ञान will be found to be निर्विषय i. e. निर्विषय (See supra) Then, again, if that which causes ज्ञान were to be regarded that account to be also the विषय of ज्ञान इन्द्रिय would be विषय of ज्ञान also ; fo they were indisputably causes of ज्ञान But they are not held to be विषय of ज्ञान Therefore the hypothesis f the identity of the कारण and the विषय of ज्ञान breaks d wn. It may be contended that the अर्थ can be easily shown to be कारण of ज्ञान owing to its holding अन्वय and व्यतिरेक with ज्ञान just as वह्नि is sh w to be कारण of धूम by अन्वय (यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्नि:) and व्यतिरेक ([illegible] धूमाभाव:). But the contention is wrong ज्ञान does not depend upon अर्थ as धूम depends pon वह्नि ज्ञान being found even without its corresponding अर्थ e. g मृगतृष्णा without real जल. Mark that the ज्ञान is मृगतृष्णा not धूमाभाव ज्ञान ; for it is मृगतृष्णा which accounts for the प्रवृत्ति f the man the direction of the supposed water. You will perhaps say that in that case ज्ञान exists without the अर्थ, because the ज्ञान is भ्रम An answer to it is, भ्रम or no भ्रम it is ज्ञान, and the ज्ञान has come into being without the अर्थ This is all we want to prove, and it makes no difference whether the ज्ञान is भ्रम or प्रमा The case f अर्थ being entitled to be regarded as a cause f ज्ञान must depend not only upon the test of अन्वय but also of व्यतिरेक And that test अर्थ does ot satisfy in relation

to ज्ञान ; we cannot say यत्र अर्थाभावस्तत्र ज्ञानाभावः ; for in the case of मृगतृष्णिका there is अर्थाभाव and yet there is ज्ञान Moreover Yogins are able to know अर्थs before they are produced and also after they have passed away that is to say here ज्ञान takes place without the actual existence of the अर्थs. If, in this case, the अर्थs are somehow supposed to produce ज्ञान that activity would be evidence of their existence that is they would be present, and not past or future.

न निवृत्तसत्ता etc.—अत्र निवृत्तसत्ता यथा प्रत्यो नास्त्यपगमे। निवृत्ता चैव विद्यमाना नास्त्यपगमे सर्वैरुपगमः ।

It may be said by way of further argument that a प्रकाशक (e. g ज्ञान) acquires existence from its प्रकाश्य (e g अर्थ) and then becomes the प्रकाशक of that प्रकाश्य (The effect reveals the cause.) The argument, however is fallacious. Witness the case of प्रदीप which is प्रकाशक of घट and yet the घट is not produced by it. That is t say th relation of प्रकाश्य and प्रकाशक (e. g अर्थ and ज्ञान) does not necessarily imply the rela tion of कार्य and कारण Then, again, if ज्ञान is required to be produced by an अर्थ in order that the अर्थ could be its object, स्मृति which is not produced by an अर्थ could have no corres- ponding object nd it would therefore be अप्रमाण But स्मृति is प्रमाण It is the very breath of अनुमान (a प्रमाण) which is founded upon the act of recalling to mind the relation (व्याप्ति) of साध्य and साधन Next, if according to your theory the जनक (cause, कारण) alone is to be the ग्राह्य (object, विषय) how would you explain the case of स्वसंवेदन (self-reve lation of ज्ञान) which is ग्राहक of a thing (ज्ञान) which is its very स्वरूप nd not its जनक ? Fo in the single स्वसंवेदन itself there is no room for causal activity which always implies the dualism of कार्य and कारण ('स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोध'). Thus अर्थ and ज्ञान which spring from their respective sets of causes are related as प्रकाश्य and प्रकाशक not as कार्य and कारण

The Buddhist If ज्ञान is not produced by a particula अर्थ ('तदुत्पत्ति'), or does not bear the form or stamp of that अर्थ ('तदाकारता') it would be equally related to all the अर्थs in the

universe and so anything and everything would be the object of that ज्ञान—which is absurd.

Reply : ज्ञान is not produced by the अर्थ and yet it reveals that particular अर्थ because it possesses the *capacity* to destroy or keep down the obscuring veil of ignorance in the particular case. Even if you hold the view that ज्ञान is produced by अर्थ you will have to admit the doctrine of *capacity* for you will have to explain why a particular अर्थ produces particular ज्ञान which you can do only on the hypothesis of a special capacity. Then, again, the particular character of ज्ञान you cannot explain by the hypothesis of अर्थ imparting an आकार (form) to the ज्ञान. For that would make ज्ञान साकार and अर्थ निराकार the latter being no longer required to possess आकार, the आकार of the former being sufficient to account for the व्यवहार of distinctions. What सादृश्य or likeness could there be between अर्थ and ज्ञान one of which is मूर्त and the other अमूर्त? *Therefore the particular* प्रतिकर्मता *of* ज्ञान *must be supposed to* be the परिणाम (धर्म) of the apprehension of particular अर्थ. Next, as regards your contention that ज्ञान apprehends (ग्रहण) objects because it springs from objects (तदुत्पत्ति) and possesses the form of the objects, we would inquire whether these two causes operate together (समस्ते) or separately (व्यस्ते)? In the latter case, the first moment of कपाल would apprehend the last moment of घट, in-as-much as the one has produced the other (तदुत्पत्ति); जलचन्द्र (reflection of the moon in the water) would apprehend नभश्चन्द्र (the moon in the sky) in-as-much as one bears the form of the other (तदाकारता). In the former case (समस्ते), the second क्षण of घट would apprehend the first क्षण of घट, since it fulfils both the conditions, that of तदुत्पत्ति and that of तदाकारता. If, in accounting for the apprehension (ग्राहकता) of objects which belongs to ज्ञान you add to तदुत्पत्ति and तदाकारता further condition ज्ञानरूपत्वे सति which none of the above examples satisfies, even then, one ज्ञान would be the ग्राहक of the next similar ज्ञान, since it satisfies all the three conditions above laid down. Hence, the

only satisfactory explanation of why ज्ञान apprehends objects is that it possesses fitness to do so while nothing else does.

II The Second Half of the Stanza :

It criticises a doctrine of a certain other school of the Bauddhas, according to which ज्ञान is the sole reality the external world being a pure fiction.

The Argument of the Buddhists ज्ञानमात्रमपि etc.—Cf. Sad. Gupt. Com. p. 40. [See Appendix] Simple ज्ञान unspoiled by any such fictitious divisions as ग्राह्य and ग्राहक and hence free from the complexities of the external world, is the only Reality For *the external world is impossible* This may be proved by a series of dilemmas Is the external world—the बाह्यार्थ—a heap of atoms or a single body ? Not the former for there is nothing to prove these atoms—neither प्रत्यक्ष nor अनुमान The प्रत्यक्ष of Yogins makes too great a dem nd on our faith ; while our प्रत्यक्ष is out of the question, we ordinary mortals having never seen atoms even in a dream. Nor is there a possibility of an अनुमान ; for अनुमान requires th observation of invariable concomitance of the हेतु and the साध्य which in the present case is impossible for want of प्रत्यक्ष of the atoms (the alleged साध्य). Another dilemma Are the atoms नित्य or अनित्य ? If नित्य are they doing their work gradually or all at once ? Not *gradually*, for that would mean that they are slowly undergoing change in their nature *that is to say are अनित्य which is contrary to* our hypothesis. Nor *all at once* for in that case the whole universe would have been accomplished by a coup de force—in the twinkle of an eye—and the e could have been no such gradual change as we actually observ ; the atoms moreover would have ceased to exist the effect, viz., universe having taken their place. If अनित्य are they only momentary or are they lasting only for a limited space of time ? In the former case are they caused or uncaused ? If they are *uncaused* they would e ist either always or never at all temporary existence requiring dependence upon a cause. *If they are caused, are they caused by gross matter*

or by *atoms?* Not th former because according to you there is no gross matter the external world being only toms. If the latter will you explain whether the toms are to prod ce their effects while existing or not-existing, or both existing and not-existing? If *existing* whether they are to produce those effects in the first moment of their existence, or in a subsequent moment? Not in the first moment, f r it will be taken up in its own act of coming into existence. As has been remarked, Being, Acting and Causality would be all one in this case! If mere Being could be cause of the production, th toms of घट would beget atoms of पट and would become the उपादानकारण of पटाणु; for so far as Being is concerned there is no difference between the atoms of घट and the toms of पट and there will be nothing to regulate the production of घटाणु from घटाणु only and not from पटाणु. If *not-existing* they are to produce their effects, they would be perpetually producing their effects in moments other than those of th ir existence. The third alternative of combi ed *existence and non-existence* is no good; for t can fare no better than the two alternatives of which it is made up, and which have been already disposed of. W therefore, concl le that the atoms are not क्षणिक

Next, let us see whether they could be क्षणस्थायित्ववाक्षणिक i. existing longer than one moment, but still for limited space of tim This lternative is liable to the same criticism as the on to which the other lternative—that of क्षणिकत्व—was subjected

Besides, we ask whether the atoms in this case are अर्थक्रियाकारिन्—i. e doing something and producing some effect—or not? If *not* they are *nothing* no better than the ficti tious sky-fl wer If they *are*, the e are three possible positions to tak up first, that the effect which the atoms re producing is ( ) existing or (b) not-existing or ( ) both existing and not existing ( ) If it is not-existing, the atoms may as well have produced the horn of hare that is,

Criticism : ज्ञान is a क्रिया—a action,—and it, therefore, presupposes a ज्ञेय—the object to which it is directed. Thus, the existence of an external world is a necessity involved in the very act of ज्ञान It may be asked Im t a false appearance—an unreality—an object of ज्ञान as in the case of the hair in the sky (an optical delusion)? Answer: No; even in that case, one who has never seen a real hair cannot experience the delusion. Similarly dream implies the experience of a real worl L Cf S t-Bhâṣya (Khyâtis), Sâmkara Bhâṣya and Advaita-siddhi. तथा च महाभाष्यकार: i. e जिनभद्रगणि क्षमाश्रमण author of भाष्य called 'विशेषावश्यक' on a portion of the आवश्यकसूत्र (AMP—foot-note) The gâthâ [illegible] [illegible] (1703). [illegible]—Cf. the criticism of Hegel's Idealism If tho ghts were things, the tho ght of a hundred pounds in my pocket would be the same as th possession of those pounds!

न [illegible] etc.—The Syâd âdin admits the existance of both—the परमाणु and the अवयविन् As regards the proofs of परमाणु, we have both प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान: our प्रत्यक्ष in the sense that we see the परमाणु in seeing the घट; also the प्रत्यक्ष of Yogins. That we d not see the toms (अनुपलब्धि) is due to their being too small. There is also अनुमान proving the existence of toms. Thus—Atoms exist, because without them we cannot explain the gross body Of course, there is no such invariable rule that a gross body sh uld be made of toms For gross body is sometimes made of gross parts, e. g घट of तन्तु आकाश् and आत्मा re not made of any parts—पुद्गल matter at all. Where, however gross body springs from atoms the atoms somehow get combined by such forces as time etc. and thereby cause the gross body

यदपि विरुद्धधर्माध्यासादि etc.—As regards the criticism that the atom of the body would be conflicting with one another and so on, w admit the fact, but w explain it on the principl of Anekântavâda, according to which, body is one and yet manifold.

स्वोपलम्भे etc.—Next as regards the criticism that the body cannot exist in the atoms either wholly or partially and so on, we reject both the horns of the dilemma, and hold that the अवयविन् exists in the अवयवs inseparabl

किंच यदि बाह्योऽर्थो etc.—*We would call upon you to explain* how we happen to have a definite experience of नील etc. in the absence of a real ext rnal world of नील etc. You will perhaps explain that the external world which we experience is in the form of ज्ञान (ज्ञानाकारत्वम्). But this is contrary to expe rience, in which the objective reality is perceived as outside the ज्ञान If the objective reality were *in us* our experience would have been *I am* नील not *This is* नील" You will say: there are many forms of ज्ञान—one of them is the perception of अहम् while another is the perception of इदम् e. g —'This is नील In other words, both the external and the internal world are really *internal*—ज्ञानाकार But this is wrong अहम् and नील are not on the same footing अहम् is not rigidly fixed like नील what is अहम् to me is त्वम् to you not so the नील—which is the *same for all*. No doubt, what is नील to one may be पीत to another owing to optical derangement. But this is obviously a case of भ्रान्ति not प्रमा and therefore outside our reckoni g

सर्वं ज्ञानं etc.—The Vijñāna ādin (the Idealist) ex plains The ज्ञान of अहम् and the ज्ञान of नील are on the same level. The distinction drawn between अहम् and नील to the effect that the former is personal and shifting while the latter is universal and fixed is untenable for when a man thinks of himself, the self is *always* presented as अहम् and consequently there is no want of fixity in this case. To that the following answer can be made You say when man thinks of *himself* but this implies that there is something other than himself (otherwise where is the point in restricting the object of thinki g to himself? A self is correlative word which carries with it the admiss n I not-self. This is fatal to the Vijñānavāda You will perhaps explain the not-self as nothing but the self

the perception of the distinction being pure hallucination. But we refuse t accept that explanation as sound. Here is प्रत्यक्ष bearing testimony to the distinction between self and not-self, between within and without, between subject and object,—and there is no room to think that it is a भ्रान्ति

ज्ञानं ज्ञानार्थं etc.—The Vijñānavādin now endeavours to show that it is a भ्रान्ति and he relies upon the following अनुमान to pro e that ज्ञान and अर्थ are not separate : सहोपलम्भ etc. If A is invariably found with B A is not separate from B,—as, for example, an illusory moon is not separate from the real moon. Now अर्थ is invariably bound up with ज्ञान and we therefore, conclude that it is not separate from ज्ञान The अनुमान may be shown to be valid as follows : In a good अनुमान where there is no व्यापक, there should be no व्याप्य. सहोपलम्भनियम which is the व्यापक of भेद (e. g. नील पीत which are भिन्न and are therefore not always सहोपलब्ध that is, found together) is not found in the present case ; therefore its व्याप्य viz., भेद (भेद of ज्ञान and अर्थ) is not possible.

Criticism The अनुमान is faulty Th rule on which it rests, viz. wherever there is सहोपलम्भ there is अभेद is not invariabl This may be shown as foll ws : ज्ञान performs the double function of revealing itself and its objects (See Stanza and compare Rāmānuja's view propounded in his S'rī Bhāṣya gainst th S'aṅkara idealism). In its latter fun ction, it reveals नील, in its former function, नीलज्ञान Now these two viz. नील and नीलज्ञान being disclosed together, there is सहोपलम्भ. But where is अभेद ? नील and नीलज्ञान are not the same. Thus, there is no such invariable law that wherever there is सहो-पलम्भ there is अभेद The अनुमान is thus shown to be based upon doubtful rule and is therefore vitiated by—संदिग्धविपक्षव्यावृत्तिक हेत्वाभास Secondly it may be shown to be vitiated by असिद्ध हेत्वाभास also—when the so-called हेतु is not really found in the पक्ष. Thus, सहोपलम्भ is not found in ज्ञान and अर्थ between which अभेद is attempted to be established by means of the अनुमान The अर्थ is experienced *externally* in the form *This is* नील ; the ज्ञान which is experienced *internally* is not experienced at the

same time as the अर्थ. Moreover the अनुमान will be free from बाधितविषयत्व only if the प्रत्यक्ष of भेद can be shown to be misleading; and the प्रत्यक्ष can be accepted as misleading only if the अनुमान can be shown to be valid Thus there is अन्योन्याश्रय of the two प्रमाणs.

Then, again, if there is no external reality (अर्थ) to control our ज्ञान we cannot assign definite localities to things. For, in the absence of the external reality there will be nothing compelling us to assign one thing to this place and another thing to that place, and so on. The Vijñānavādin will try to explain this restriction by the hypothesis of वासनावैचित्र्य that is to say by the supposition that we assign A to a fixed place in the external world not because A possesses that place as an independent reality but because our वासना has determined that it should be assigned to that place and no other In other words, the explanation of the restriction is to be sought not in the external world, but in the internal mind.

Criticism: The explanation will not do (See Ṣad. Com. p. 40). The वासना cannot determine the places. There is the external world in which things have their definite places; our अनुभव obeys external facts and our वासनाs are deter mined by the अनुभव Thus, the final determining agent in our ज्ञान is the external world. The Vijñānavādin will perhaps attempt a clever escape from this difficulty in the following way The specific characters of various experiences require to be explained. There is no external reality which we can draw upon for the explanation, for none exists. Therefore the only possible hypothesis which will provide the explanation is the hypothesis of वासनावैचित्र्य

Criticism Is the वासनावैचित्र्य the same as ज्ञान ('बोधरूप') or different? If it is the same as ज्ञान how can there be वैचित्र्य? For in ज्ञान there is no वैचित्र्य. If it is different from ज्ञान the principle of ऐक्य is sacrificed and there is no reason why you should admit वासनावैचित्र्य and cherish such inveterate prejudice against अर्थवैचित्र्य—to which our common sense bears witness.

तथा च प्रयोगः etc.—Malliṣeṇa next proceeds to lay down syllogism to show that ज्ञान and अर्थ are two *distinct* realities. The syllogism is based upon the हेतु *that* अर्थ and ज्ञान do not possess the same character but are on the contrary opposed to each other. The points of opposition are the following: 1. ज्ञान is internal, अर्थ is external; 2. ज्ञान is posterior अर्थ is prior; 3. ज्ञान springs from कारण, अर्थ from its own causes in the external world; 4. ज्ञान is luminous (प्रकाश), अर्थ is dark (जड).

अत एवाह सुगतिशरा etc.—Mall. winding up his long commentary on this Stanza shows how to construe the third line in the light of the above remarks.

संविदद्वैतवादे—one compound word = ज्ञानाद्वैतवादे

नार्थेन्द्रिय—अर्थेन्द्रिय cannot be satisfactorily explained.

भिन्नार्थं—Another reading भिन्न(नो)मार्थे.

सुगतो मायासुत —माया —the name of the mother of Gautama Buddha. On the significance of the name is founded the view that the whole story of the life of Buddha is an allegory. This view was accepted by certain old orientalists, but is not held now by any responsible thinker.

मतत्रयम् etc.—Reference to the three ways in which the Stanza has been interpreted by M. The doctrines criticised are

1. बाह्यार्थतदाकारयोरैक्ये—The identity of प्रकाश and ज्ञान.
2. क्षणक्षय—Momentariness of all things.
3. ज्ञानार्थ etc.—Monism of ज्ञान arising from अर्थ and ज्ञान being inseparable and therefore one.

Reference Books.

1. Vijñānavāda in works of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Buddhism.
2. Keith's "Buddhist Philosophy" Ch. XIV.
3. Examination of Vijñānavāda in S'aṃkara Commentaries on the B. Sūtrās II ii.
4. Criticism in Nyāya books and in S'aṃkara's Com.
5. Idealism and Criticism of Idealism in Western Philosophy.

Appendices.

1 तदेव च प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं प्रमाणफलमर्थप्रतीतिरूपत्वात् । अर्थसारूप्यमस्य प्रमाणं तद्वशादर्थप्रतीतिसिद्धेरिति ।—N Bindu. I.

2 यदेतदनन्तरमुक्तं प्रत्यक्षं तदेव प्रमाणस्य फलम् । कथं प्रमाणफलमित्याह । अर्थस्य प्रतीतिरवगमः । सैव रूपं यस्य प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य तदर्थप्रतीतिरूपम् । तस्य भावः । तस्मादेतदुक्तं भवति । प्रापकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् । प्रापणशक्तिश्च न केवलादर्थाविनाभावित्वाद्भवति । बीजाद्यविनाभाविनोऽप्यङ्कुरादेरप्रापकत्वात् । तस्मात्प्राप्यादर्थादुत्पत्तावप्यस्य ज्ञानस्यास्ति कश्चिदवस्थाविशेषो येन प्रापकं भवति । येन कृतेनार्थः प्रापितो भवति । स एव च प्रमाणफलम् । यदनुष्ठानात्प्रापकं भवति ज्ञानम् । उक्तं च पुरस्तात्प्रवृत्तिविषयप्रदर्शकत्वमेव प्रापकस्य प्रापकव्यापारो नाम । तदेव च प्रत्यक्षमर्थप्रतीतिरूपमर्थप्रदर्शनरूपम् । अतस्तदेव प्रमाणफलम् ।

यदि तर्हि ज्ञानं प्रमितिरूपत्वात्प्रमाणफलं किं तर्हि प्रमाणमित्याह । अर्थेन सह यत्सारूप्यं सादृश्यमस्य ज्ञानस्य तत्प्रमाणमिह । यस्माद्विषयाज्ज्ञानमुदेति तद्विषयसदृशं तद्भवति । यथा नीलादुत्पद्यमानं नीलसदृशम् । तच्च सारूप्यमाकार इत्याभास इत्यपि व्यपदिश्यते ।

ननु च ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तं सादृश्यम् । तथा च सति तदेव ज्ञानं प्रमाणं तदेव प्रमाणफलम् । न चैकं वस्तु साध्यं साधनं चोपपद्यते । तत्कथं सारूप्यं प्रमाणमित्याह । तद्वशादिति । तदिति सारूप्यं तस्य वशात्सारूप्यसामर्थ्यात् । अर्थस्य प्रतीतिरूपस्यैतस्याः सिद्धिः । इतिः कारणात् । अर्थस्य प्रतीतिरूपं प्रत्यक्षं विज्ञानं यतस्तस्मादेवार्थस्य प्रतीतिरवसीयते । यस्माद्धि चक्षुरादिभ्यो विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते न तद्भावादस्य नीलस्य संवेदनं शक्यतेऽवस्थापयितुम् । नीलसदृशं त्वनुभूयमानं नीलस्य संवेदनमवस्थाप्यते । न चात्र जन्यजनकभावनिबन्धनः साध्यसाधनभावः येनैकस्मिन्वस्तुनि विरोधः स्यात् । अपि तु व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभावेन । तत एकस्य वस्तुनः किंचिद्रूपं प्रमाणं किंचित्प्रमाणफलं न विरुध्यते । व्यवस्थापनहेतुर्हि सारूप्यम् । तस्य ज्ञानस्य व्यवस्थाप्यं च नीलसंवेदनरूपम् । व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभावोऽपि कथमेकस्य ज्ञानस्य चेदुच्यते । सदृशमनुभूयमानं तद्विज्ञानम् । यतो नीलस्य ग्राहकमवस्थाप्यते निश्चयप्रत्ययेन । तस्मात्सारूप्यमनुभूतं व्यवस्थापनहेतुः । निश्चयप्रत्ययेन च तज्ज्ञानं नीलसंवेदनरूपमवस्थाप्यमानं व्यवस्थाप्यम् । तस्मादसारूप्यव्यावृत्त्या च नीलबोधरूपत्वं व्यवस्थाप्यम् । व्यवस्थापकश्च विकल्पप्रत्ययः प्रत्यक्षबलोत्पन्नो द्रष्टव्यः ।

ननु निर्विकल्पकत्वात्प्रत्यक्षमेव नीलबोधरूपत्वेनात्मानमव्यवस्थापयत्कथमिति । निश्चयप्रत्ययेनाव्यवस्थापितं सदपि नीलबोधरूपं विज्ञानमसत्कल्पमेव । तस्मान्निश्चयेन नीलबोधरूपं व्यवस्थापितं विज्ञानं नीलबोधात्मना सद्भवति ।

—N B T. p. 18.

3. ननु यदि [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] निर्निमित्तोऽयं [illegible] [illegible] इति चेत्। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] निर्निमित्त[illegible] [illegible]ति। तदुक्तम्

> नाशो न विद्यते सर्वो यथा कैश्चित्प्रकल्प्यते।
> [illegible] विपर्ययाभावे सर्वदे ॥ १ ॥
> [illegible] [illegible] यस्या [illegible]।
> [illegible] तेन [illegible] ॥ २ ॥ इति—Sad. p. 40.

4. अथ नित्यत्वमेव तदुच्यते। यथा च सति [illegible] [illegible] क्षणिकत्वम्। तथा चोक्तम्।

> जातिरेव हि भावानां विनाशे हेतुरिष्यते।
> यो जातश्च न च ध्वस्तो नश्येत्पश्चात्स केन वा।

[illegible] [illegible] यस्य [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] पुनः [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] पदार्थानां च क्षणिकत्वमिति। [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] विद्यते न वा। विद्यते चेत्, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। अथ न विद्यते [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] भवेत्। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] चेत्, तर्हि [illegible] [illegible] स्यात्। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] विनाशो भवेत्। [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] पदार्थानाम्। [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] क्षणिकत्वम[illegible]मिति। ननु यदि [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। उच्यते। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। तेन [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]ति। [illegible] च यथा [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] तथैवापि किं न [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible]मिति।
—Sad. pp. 29–30.

Stanza XVII

In this Stanza, the author criticises the S'ûnyavâda—Nihilism or the doctrine of the Absolute Void—maintained by a certain school of Buddhists.

प्रमात्रादिव्यवहार etc.—The S'ûnyavâdin denies the existence of (1) प्रमातृ (2) प्रमेय (3) प्रमाण and (4) प्रमिति

परवत् प्रमाणादि etc.—The S'ûnyavâdin has not even the bare chance of endeavouring to establish his position, which other heretical schoolmen have, inasmuch as he rejects the validity of प्रमाण altogether

अथ चेत् etc.—Explanation of the third line कुप्येत् कृतान्तः—If he accepts प्रमाण to prove his own case, it will raise his Siddhânta against him, that is to say it will conflict with his fundamental principle viz. शून्यवाद If he relies upon आगम—the word of the master—even then he so far surrenders his S'ûnyavâda. Pun upon the word कृतान्त which means both (1) Siddhânta and (2) Yama the God of Death

किं च प्रमाणं प्रमेयं etc.—If प्रमाण be rejected प्रमेय will go with it, thus enabling the only logical position, that of absolute silence. E en an assertion of S ûnyavâda makes it प्रमेय and so far contradicts the Sûnyav da itself.

अत्र च त्वदसूयि etc.—कृतान्त means also Yama, the God of Death. Yamarâja will be angry with him i. he will fall dead, caught in the snare of स्ववचनविरोध—self contradictions etc.

असूया etc.—We have both forms, असूयित् and असूयु from असूया. The latter is used by Udyanâcârya, the author of the न्या. वा परिशुद्धि also.

इह प्रमातृप्रमेय etc.—The position which the S'ûnyavâdin endeavours to maintain is that the *four principles* generally asserted by ther schoolmen viz. (1) प्रमातृ (2) प्रमेय, (3) प्रमाण and (4) प्रमिति ha e no more existence than th born of a horse —in ther words, they are a pure fiction. This may be shown as under :—

1. *There is no प्रमातृ or आत्मन्.* For there is no प्रमाण to prove him. (1) *Not* प्रत्यक्ष: Because आत्मन् is universally admitted to be outside the range of इन्द्रियs, and प्रत्यक्ष is the ज्ञान working through इन्द्रियs. Then, again it is said that आत्मन् is known by *introspection*, through the consciousness of the ego (अहंप्रत्यय). But the argument goes too far. Such consciousness arises with reference to the body also when one says, I am fair I am dark, and so on. Moreover if the ego-consciousness referred to आत्मन्, it would not be occasional, but perpetual since आत्मन् is a reality which is ever present to us. But the ego-consciousness arises as an occasional phenomenon (when I enter upon an act of introspection), and therefore requires to be explained by an occasional cause, as does the percept of lightning-flash. (2) *Not* अनुमान. Because there is no invariable mark from which one can infer the existence of आत्मन्. (3) *Not* आगम (शब्द): For आगमs are contradictory. Apart from the contradictions contained in the scriptures of each school, those which exist between the scriptures of the several schools must render this प्रमाण altogether precarious.

[For the language of this passage compare Śaṃkara's criticism of human reason.—Ved. Sû. Bh. II. 1. 11.]

2. *There is no प्रमेय* i. e. the world of objective reality. The absurdity of an external world has been demonstrated already (See supra).

3. *There is no प्रमाण.* For प्रमाण is said to be knowledge which reveals itself and others i. e. the world of objective reality (Cf. स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् P. N. T. Ālankāra I 2; also Rāmānuja's Śrī Bhāṣya—I. 1. 1.) But, where is the objective reality to render प्रमाण possible?

किं वेद्यवेदनसमकालं etc.—Here is a dilemma for the Realist to meet. Is the ज्ञान synchronous with the अर्थ or is it subsequent? In the former case, all the extant existing अर्थs of the universe being synchronous with it will have a right to be treated as its अर्थs—which is absurd. In the latter

case, the प्रकाश i. e. ज्ञान will have to be regarded as either निराकार or साकार In the former case, for want of आकार it will leave the nature of each particular object undetermined. In the latter case, the आकार will have to be regarded as either identical with or separate from the ज्ञान to which it belongs. If it is *identical* with the ज्ञान it is simply ज्ञान and nothing more i. e. it will be the same as the hypothesis of निराकार ज्ञान which has been already dealt with and disposed of. If it is *separate* from ज्ञान, it should be either भिन्न or अभिन्न If it is भिन्न it would be ज्ञेय i. e in the position of ज्ञान and would have to undergo the ordeal of the dilemma of निराकार and साकार which has been already shewn to be insurmountable. If it is अभिन्न is it its revealer as अज्ञात or ज्ञात? In the former case, i. e. if it does not require to be known in order to be the revealer of the objective world, it would reveal the world to Mr Maitra as well as to Mr Chaitra, no matter whether one knows it or not. In the latter case i. e. if it has to become the object of ज्ञान it will raise the old problems of साकार and निराकार ज्ञान with all their attendant difficulties—अनवस्था

4. *There is no* प्रमिति [illegible] seems to be a work similar to the [illegible] of S'rî Harṣa, Vedântin of the Anirvacanîyatâ or Mâyâ school.

Criticism [illegible] etc.—The usual criticism passed upon the S'ûnyavâda in Metaphysical Nihilism or the doctrine of a universal void. Cf similar criticisms of modern Agnosticism in the West.

Dilemma Is the Nihilistic proposition (शून्यता) itself sat (शून्य) or not? In the former case it can prove nothing it cannot even make claim to establish itself. In the latter case it will destroy itself, and the *Four Principles*-प्रमाण etc.—will stand unchallenged. [illegible]

[illegible] etc.—In accordance with the established practice of logicians or philosophers. Strictly speaking the above

criticism is sufficient to dispose of the doctrine of Metaphysical Nihilism as unworthy of credence. Yet, out of courtesy to the opponent, and without prejudice to the gument bove advanced, we shall enter upon a short criticism of each of the propositions laid down by him in the preceding paragraphs.

1 First, *as to the proposition that* [illegible] (आत्मन्) *is not proved by* [illegible] We agree on this point, in the sense that [illegible] lies beyond the reach of the external इन्द्रियs. But we demur to th proposition that आत्मन् is not perceived by [illegible] [illegible] i. e. introspection, i. e. the internal consciousness of the ego (अहम्) For such internal consciousness as I am happy I am miserable clearly refers to and proves the existence of आत्मन्

[illegible] etc.—The consciousness in I am happy is not bare general consciousness of happiness, b t of happiness *belonging to the ego.* It is not consciousness of the nature of [illegible] like that of [illegible] b t it is a consciousness of the nature of [illegible]

[illegible] etc.—The consciousness of one s being fair or dark in [illegible] [illegible] etc. does not necessarily prov [illegible] to be really the body It is case of the secondary application of the word [illegible] to the body its primary signification being आत्मन् Compare the master speaking f the servant as *himself* in the secondary sense of the word self

[illegible] etc.—Mallisena explains how we happen to have occasional consciousness of the go (See abov).

आत्मन् is described as [illegible] e. possessing the characteristic of going forth in consciousness— [illegible] —which may be either [illegible] (as in [illegible] etc.) or [illegible] (as in [illegible]), and the consc ousness f th ego (the [illegible]) is one kind of the [illegible] which characterizes आत्मन्. [illegible] — Jaina technical term.

[illegible] etc.—This [illegible] —in the shape of [illegible] —is determined by number of conditions such as [illegible] [illegible]

etc. which are regulated by the law of *Karma*, and is therefore occasional or caused and not perpetual although ज्ञान i.e. आत्मन् is perpetual. This may be illustrated by the example of बीज which *always* possesses the शक्ति of producing an अङ्कुर and yet puts forth the शक्ति only *occasionally* when the accessories viz water soil etc. co-operate. Thus, because अङ्कुरोत्पादन is कादाचित्क (occasional) it does not follow that अङ्कुरोत्पादनशक्ति is कादाचित्की In the same way because ज्ञातृत्व (as स्वरूपविशेष of आत्मन्) is कादाचित्क, it does not follow that ज्ञातृ (आत्मन्) is कादाचित्क

2. Next, *as to the proposition that* आत्मन् *is not proved by* अनुमान since there is no certain mark or लिङ्ग on which the अनुमान can be based, this is wrong There are *numerous* marks or लिङ्ग to prove the existence of आत्मन्—

(1) रूपाद्युपलब्धिः सकर्तृका क्रियात्वात् छिदिक्रियावत् (कर्ता च आत्मा). The perception of the objective world requires an agent of the act of perceiving; because, perception is an action, and all actions require an agent, as, fo example an action of cutting requires a cutter This agent i the act of perceiving, i e the percipient, we call आत्मन् Could the senses (इन्द्रियाणि) such as चक्षुः etc be the agents in the present case? No. They are *instruments*—like the hatchet in the act of cutting—which are dependent upon one who could wield them. That they are instruments requiring to be wielded by a person, follows from the fact that they are made of matter (भौतिक) and are therefore inanimate requiring to be put in motion by a चेतन without whose stimulus they are incapable of d ing anything If the इन्द्रियs were the real agents in the present case the following three things would happen :—

1st. I could not *remember* the experiences of particular sense after the sense happened to be destroyed, as in the case of subsequent blind ess. For the act of remembrance must belong to th same agent to whom the original experience be-

longs; and as the supposed agent of the experience via the sense is destroyed or has ceased to function the act of remembrance has become impossible.

2nd. The various experiences of the different senses—viz. seeing touching smelling, tasting and hearing—could not then be referred to common agent the senses being different. Cf. Nyāya manuals.

3rd. रूप रस etc.—the bjects of th different senses—could not be apprehended *together*; whereas our experience of रूप followed by re-collection of रस and the ttendant taste (flow of saliva) in the mouth would show that there is one person to whom belongs रूपज्ञान and रसज्ञान—a function which could not be preformed by ny single इन्द्रिय. आत्मा in this case acts like man peeping out of different windows. Therefore, the इन्द्रियs are करण and आत्मा is their driver the कर्तृ in the act.

(2) शरीरसमवायिनीभ्यां etc.—रथिकवत्

Our movements—by which we seek to acquire something or bandon something which we regard as good or bad for us, and which we direct towards acquiring or abandoning the means to that end—are not haphazard or involuntary movements but they are movements which imply an act of *will*, such as that shown in driving hariot towards definite goal and in definite manner.

(3) Next, शरीरं च प्रयत्न— —सारथिवत्. The body is ruled over by voluntary agent because it is the seat of definite activity—e. g. a chariot.

(4) (शरीरं भस्त्राध्मापयितेव) इत्यत्र—ध्मापयितृवत्. Another rgument by which शरीर could be show to be uled over by voluntary agent—the आत्मा—is the argument founded on the analogy of pair of bellows—which is filled with certain amount of air by the smith and worked to definite end.

(5) प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेष .... इत्यादि—

Another argument by analogy is furnished by the example of a machine-toy which opens and shuts its eyes as regulated by a voluntary agent.

(6) " शरीरस्य वृद्धिक्षत ... ...संरोहणात् ".—
Moreover the powers of growth and healing or repair clearly indicate the presence of an indwelling soul in the body For we observe that a house does not grow of itself or repair itself without the agency of a mason. A tree will perhaps be cited as an example of spontaneous growth and repair But as a matter of fact, the tree, too is a living organism possessing one single organ and a indwelling soul. [For the doctrine of an indwelling soul in trees etc M. refers the reader to Âchârânga Sûtra.]

(7) यथा प्रेर्ये मनः ... ...आत्मा

मनः is capable of being directed towards a definite object, like stone aimed by boy at target. That which thus directs the मनः is आत्मा

(8) आत्मचेतन etc ... ...इति आत्मा
आत्मन् चेतन क्षेत्रज्ञ जीव पुरुष are synonymous terms which denote something some reality of which they are names That something is आत्मा

(9) असत्यात्मा to ... ... अर्थोऽस्त्यतुच्छः
All simple terms such as घट etc. de ot realities; खरविषाण वन्ध्यापुत्र etc. are unrealities, but then they are compound terms.

(10) सुखादीनि... ... ...सौ आत्मा

सुख etc. re qualities, which must abide in some द्रव्य and the only द्रव्य fit to hold them is आत्मन्

3. As to आगम, those that are self-contradictory are of course worthless. But those that are declared by आप्त i. e reliable authorities can easily stand the tests of कष छेद and ताप (See infra St. 32) and are therefore प्रमाण (Cf आगमोऽस्त्यविसंवादी पूर्वापरविरोधि परीक्ष्य। परीक्ष्य भिक्षवो ग्राह्यं मद्वचो न तु गौरवात्) It may be

argued that an आप्त is one who is free from all infirmities (दोष), and since there is no one of whom w could say this, there is no आप्त and therefore no आप्तप्रणीत आगम. But the argument is based vitiated upon very narrow empiricism. N doubt, our minds are by तारतम्येन *more or less* but the very fact that the दोष admit of being made more or less points t the possibility of their being eradicated altogether An analogy is furnished in the thickening and thinning clouds which some time cover th sun.

निरवयवता—Being deprived of all parts or limbs i. e. the forces which feed them.

अनादिप्रवाहपतिता etc.—No doubt, th दोष ha e had no beginning but that is no reason why they should have no end. It is quite possible to destroy them by means of रत्नत्रय i. e. ज्ञान, दर्शन and चारित्र

क्षीणदोषस्य etc.—Whe the दोष are destroyed there rises केवलज्ञान which means सर्वज्ञत्व सर्वज्ञत्व is the acme of perfection in the matter of ज्ञान Our imperfect ज्ञान is capable of growth in th direction of perfection and the highest point to which it can be carried will be the point of perfection. [For similar argument in proof of the existence of God, see Pat. Yoga-Sūtras and Vyāsa Bhāṣya I 24 25].

तथा सूक्ष्मव्यवहित etc.—Besides there are realities which are too fine or too remote for ordinary sight, but they must be *present* (प्रत्यक्ष) to some minds, *g.* fire in mountain cave.

Moreover how true are the astronomical predictions of authoritative writers ! This fact may well be taken as one indication of सर्वज्ञत्व being possibl i the case of great teachers.

यो वाचा etc.—Quotation from Thāna ga I 1. to prove the existence of आगम

2. प्रमेये etc.—This ha been already established. (See p.)

3. अकर्तृकम् or सकर्तृकम् etc. A कर्तृ is necessarily implied in a क्रिया.

प्रमाणं समसमयभाविग्राहक etc.—H. admits both the alternatives. प्रत्यक्ष takes note of objects which exist simultaneously with the ज्ञान. स्मरण deals with objects which belong to the past. शब्द and अनुमान treat of things belonging to all times, past, present and future.

निराकारं चैतत्—They are निराकार and yet the required definiteness in determining particular objects is possible owing to the law of ज्ञानावरण वीर्यान्तराय and क्षयोपशम which make our world what it is.

शेष :—The remaining alternatives are discarded

4. प्रमिति etc.—It is the फल of प्रमाण and is revealed by self revelation. What is directly experienced or revealed as consciousness needs no teaching or proof.

फलं च द्विधा etc.—The फल may be either immediate or mediate. अज्ञाननिवृत्ति is the immediate फल of all प्रमाणs. The mediate i. e. eventual or ultimate फल of the particular प्रमाण viz. केवलज्ञान is औदासीन्य i. e. freedom from worldly interest. That of the other प्रमाणs is हान उपादान उपेक्षा बुद्धि Cf Tarkabhāṣā.

सत्त्व—The Jaina philosopher rejects such absurd doctrines as वादाः "—"Reality neither *is*, nor *is not*; nor is it *both*, nor is it *neither* He accords welcome to all and says Reality both *is* and *is not* etc.

किं चेदं प्रमाणादीनां etc.—Is the unreality of प्रमाण etc.—if it is held to be the truth of philosophy—proved by प्रमाण or अप्रमाण ?—i. e. negation of प्रमाण can prove nothing प्रमाण must be either itself real or unreal. If it is unreal it can prove nothing real, not even the शून्यवाद If it is real it contradicts the शून्यवाद which is sought to be established

तत्त्वदृष्टि lit. observation of the truth; तात्त्विक—arising from the observation of truth; untrue.

तदेव व्याघ्रतटी etc.— 'इतो व्याघ्रः इतस्तटी' between the tiger and the precipice.

Stanza XVIII

Stanza Greatly adventurous is that opponent of yours who desires to hold (the doctrine of) क्षणभङ्ग (momentary perishing of everything), while remaining unmindful of the bad consequences which would thereby stare him in the face viz.—

(1) कृतप्रणाश—what is done passing away into nothingness, leaving no consequence behind

(2) अकृतकर्मभोग—experiencing the fruits of acts for which one has not been responsible

(3) भवभङ्ग—impossibility of life hereafter

(4) प्रमोक्षभङ्ग—impossibility of emancipation from Samsara.

(5) स्मृतिभङ्ग—impossibility of memory

I. A short explanation of the Stanza

कृतप्रणाशादि etc.—The दोष or evil consequences arising from क्षणभङ्गवाद. Here four such are mentioned. There is discrepancy however between this and the explanation in the sequel, where भव and प्रमोक्ष are taken as factors of द्वन्द्व and not a षष्ठीतत्पुरुष compound.

साक्षात् etc.—Discarding direct experience in the interest of mere theory

गजनिमीलिका—Shutting one's eyes to; not completely but partially like the elephant, who is supposed to keep only one eye open while looking this side or that. We say partially because we are not unmindful of the partial truth which is embodied in the क्षणभङ्गवाद

क्षणभङ्ग etc.—Annihilation immediately after truth.

वैनाशिक etc.—The metaphysical Nihilist, follower of one of the schools of Buddhistic metaphysics. (See Kern's Indian Buddhism and Keith "Buddhist Philosophy")

अहो महासाहसिक etc.—a great adventurer; reckless combatant.

II. Fuller Exposition ;

(1) and (2). नैवात्मा पुद्गलाख्य etc.—आत्मन् according to the Buddhist is a plurality of discrete momentary ideas not the principle of synthesis and unity lying behind the ideas, like a string running thro gh a number of pearls and making a single necklace of them

तस्मात् etc.—One consequence of that position would be that the idea which was responsible for good or bad deed would pass away into nothingness, making the law of moral retribution impossible ; and, similarly the idea which under goes retribution would be so d ing without having bee the author of the deed of which it is supposed to be the retribution—which is contrary to the essence of the law of retribution.

यत् कर्मफलम् etc —The word 'कर्म' of 'कृतकर्मभोग' in the first line should be connected i thought with 'भुज' of 'भुक्तवान्' also

(3) नाऽपि परलोकोऽस्ति etc.—Moreo er there w uld be none to go to the other world in obedience to the law of Karma. भव-becoming, transmigration not only to anothe life on the earth, but also to the othe world of heaven and hell (परलोक)

अत मोक्षाकरगुप्तेन etc —Mokṣākaragupta, a Buddhist writer assigned to a bout 1100 A D by Dr Satiścandra Vidyā bhūṣaṇa He wrote work called Tarkabhāṣā following the system of Dharmakīrti.

चित्तं etc —An argument advanced by the B ddhist to prove life ft death one चित्त (idea) refers t (प्रतिसन्धत्ते) another as does th present चित्त and the e is a चित्त at the moment of death, which must be referred to by noth चित्त but this would be possible only on the assumption of a lif after death.

Criticism —The arg ment is f ulty inasmuch as one चित्त cannot refer to nother चित्त if as th Buddhist holds, it perish es bsolutely leaving no trace behind. In the rgument and the criticism, we have assumed that the word प्रतिसन्धत्ते

means begets If प्रतिसंधत्ते means calls to mind' according to the usual acceptation of the word the act of 'प्रतिसंधान' 1 that sense also will require an abiding principle to connect one चित्त with another

न च प्रतिसंधत्ते etc.—It might be urged that 'प्रतिसंधत्ते' means जनयति begets It may be added that in truth प्रतिसंधत्ते does not mean जनयति' i. e. begets. For in that case the rgument would be an अनुमान from कार्यहेतु, whereas it is given by the author as an argument from a स्वभावहेतु (For the distinction between कार्यहेतु and स्वभावहेतु see Nyāyabindu II also N B T on the same). स्वभावहेतु presupposes तादात्म्य as in अयं वृक्षः शिंशपात्वात् where वृक्ष and शिंशपा re not tw distinct entities, but one. But there cannot be तादात्म्य between two चित्त which belo g to different moments of time If the two चित्त belong to the same moment of time, how can they be di ided as प्रतिसंधेय and प्रतिसंधायक i. e. that which is th object f and that which is the gent of प्रतिसंधान ?

अस्तु वा प्रतिसंधायकत्व etc.—Granting, however that the word 'प्रतिसंधान' means begetting (जनन), the difficulty is not at all removed F how can there be a relation of the begetter' and the begotten If the two चित्तक्षण re simultaneous ? If the tw follow one another still when the second is born the first is no more, which cannot therefore be the जनक of the second.

4. अथ सर्वोपलम्भोपग etc.—F r want of personal identity there would be impossibility of that complete and final liberation from the bondage of कर्म which is the goal of all philosophies.

संतानस्तु etc.—A attempt is made by the Buddhist to tid ove the difficulty by setting up संतान stream of consciousness to d duty for an bid ng ego. But the ttempt must fail For the संतान is either eal, existing ver and above th ideas, or is nothing in addition to the ideas. In the former case, it is but an alias of आत्मन् ; in the latter the position does not improve.

अपि च केचन etc.—Further some of the Buddhists hold that मोक्ष means the production of pure ज्ञान relieved of all the disturbance caused by the forms of विषय when वासना are eradicated. But this must be impossible, for there can be no कार्यकारणभाव under the conditions of क्षणभङ्ग

भावनाप्रचयात् etc.—मोक्ष says the Buddhist, can be brought about by the intensity of भावना (meditation or pondering) about the momentariness of things. But this, too is impossible. For according to the Buddhist, there is no abiding principle which can be the seat of the भावना. Moreover an impure ज्ञान according to the law of the homogeneity of cause and effect, can only produce another impure ज्ञान and not a pure ज्ञान—each lasting for a single moment of time only And the series of impure ज्ञान thus arising must go on endlessly unless it is to be ended abruptly which is impossible.

किंच समलचित्तक्षण etc.—Moreover the impure चित्तक्षण having perished of themselves and a pure चित्तक्षण having succeeded them, there is no continuity i. e. no संतान

समानाधिकरणौ च etc.—Besides, बन्ध and मोक्ष must belong to the same person in respect of the same विषय, that is to say the same person who is subject to बन्ध is to prepare for मोक्ष and the same fetters which bind one in बन्ध have to be destroyed in मोक्ष Thus in a two-fold way identity is required for मोक्ष

(5) तथा स्मृतिभङ्गोऽपि etc.—Syllogism तथापि पूर्वदृष्टानुस्मरणे etc.—On the hypothesis of क्षणभङ्ग recollection would become impossible. For the ज्ञान that is experience has passed away and there is nothing to connect it with the ज्ञान that is memory If the author of experience and that of memory were not required to be identical. A would experience a thing and B would remember it; in other words, any man would remember anything irrespective of the need of previous experience. And, if the two have a common back-ground constituting identity it means continuity from the point of experience to that of memory—and that is abandonment of the क्षणभङ्ग theory

Moreover if on the क्षणिक hypothesis, स्मृति (memory) becomes impossible प्रत्यभिज्ञा (recognition of something that was experienced before) becomes impossible too For प्रत्यभिज्ञा involves स्मृति in addition to अनुभव

प्रत्यभिज्ञान etc.—The genesis nd the nature of प्रत्यभिज्ञा.

अथ स्मरणं ऐक्य etc.—An ttempt is mad by the Buddhist to explain memory by admitting causal connection—(in place f a continuing back-ground)—between experience and memory If A experiences an object, it is ot B that remembers it, because there is causal connection between A's experience and A memory and not between A s experience and B' memory The Buddhist makes the admission that the re s a causal connection between संततिक्षणः (उपादान) of the same संतान (continuance of consciousness) viz. अनुभवक्षण and स्मृतिक्षण

तदप्यसमीचीनं etc.—*Criticism* : Apart from the impossibility of causal connection between things that are absolutely separated by time, there is the want of identity between the author of अनुभव and of स्मृति according to that theory—which leaves the position *in quo ante*.

इति सर्वेषामनुमतम् etc.—Call for दृष्टान्त which is accept ble to both the parties and is thus capable of supporting an argument. (See न्या. सू I 1. 25)

यथा वस्मिन्नेव etc.—A verse giving th required दृष्टान्त and quoted in many places See Sūtrakṛitā ga etc.

A [particular stream of consciousness—संतान] exper ences thing and emembers it, and not B [different stream of consciousness] because that संतान on which कर्मवासना is laid becomes the seat of its फल (i. e. फल of कर्मवासना), and not any संतान *e. g* If you apply a red colour to piece of cotton the red colour will produce its effect in the same piece of cotton, and ot anywhere else."

तदप्यसाधक etc.—*Criticism* The rgument fails. For the example you ha ted does not prove your case, nor

does it disprove mine Thus, you cannot make कार्यकारणभाव the हेतु and argue as follows: यत्र यत्र कार्यकारणभावः तत्र तत्र स्मृतिः कर्पासे रक्ततावत् (the example is not a case of स्मृति), or यत्र यत्र स्मृतिर्न भवति तत्र तत्र कार्यकारणभावो न भवति

अविद्यमानस्य etc.—Recall the Syllogism. पूर्वानुभवस्तुतोऽर्थे नोत्तरकालीनां स्मृतिं जनयति । अन्योऽन्यत्वात् संतानान्तरानुभववत् ।

Now let us see whether the Buddhist's example कर्पासे रक्ततावत् affects the validity of the syllogism. It does not. यत्र अनुभवः तत्र स्मृतिः भवति is not invalidated by the example of कर्पासे रक्तता, since the example is not a case either of स्मृति or of अनुभव. That it is not a case of स्मृति is obvious. That it is not a case of अनुभव is patent from the fact that under the क्षणभङ्ग doctrine there is incessant change and कर्पास too, according to the theory is not the same for any two moments of time

स्थिरात्मनोऽपि etc.—Besides, if स्मृति could be produced by the causal relation without the necessity of recognizing a permanent background behind अनुभव and स्मृति the causal relation which exists between the teaching of the master and the understanding of the pupil would make the latter स्मृति, which is absurd.

अत एवं प्रसङ्ग etc.—Such an absurd consequence the Buddhist would try to avert by adding the condition of एकसंतानत्वे सति. Thus the understanding of the pupil does not become a case of स्मृति inspite of कार्यकारणभाव between it and the master's teaching because the two are not parts of the same संतान or stream of consciousness one belonging to the stream of consciousness which you call the master and the other belonging to the stream of consciousness which you call the pupil.

चैत्रमैत्रसन्तान्यो etc.—*Criticism*: You will substitute a stream of consciousness (संतान) for momentary ideas (क्षणिक, the संतानिन्) in order to connect अनुभव with स्मरण. But the old dilemma—Is the संतान the same as the

संतानिष्ठ or different?—and the difficulty of answering the question will soon dispose of the defence Let us put the dilemma in detail Is the संतान (contin ous consciousness) the same as the series of ज्ञानक्षण o something over and above them? I the former case (आद्ये), the position remains unimproved. In the latter case (शेषे), a question may be put whether the distinction of th संतान from the ज्ञानक्षण—the क्षणपरम्परा—is real or unreal. If it is unreal (अपारमार्थिक), the position remains status in quo ante. If it is real (पारमार्थिक) we should lik to know whether the संतान which *is supposed to be really distinct from* the क्षणपरम्परा is itself क्षणिक or otherwise. In the former case (क्षणिक) the position remains unimproved. (The attempt to seek shelter under क्षणिक संतान is like that of going 'from one robber to another'). In the latter case (अक्षणिक), the संतान is only another word for a permanent आत्मन्.

तदभावे etc.—A consequence flowing from क्षणिकत्व That is to say the क्षणभङ्गवाद not only sin against psychology by rendering स्मृति impossible, but it sins against logic also by rendering अनुमान impossible, for अनुमान proceeds on the basis of स्मृति

अपि च दृष्टेरपाये etc.—Not only would psychology and logic be thereby outraged, but even our social and economic life would become impossible

इत्येकनवतौ कल्पे etc.—Quoted in several other places. Gautama Buddha is there described as remembering one of his past lives.

चतुःक्षणिक etc.—A modified form of क्षणभङ्गवाद Things last for *four moments* only viz. those of (1) उत्पत्ति (2) स्थिति (3) जरा, (4) विनाश.

क्षणचतुष्टयानन्तर etc.—If things last for four moments only why should you go to dig ut a deposit which you have laid underground long time go? Is it not with the consciousness that the treasure y u will find is the treasure you have buried?

Stanza XIX.

Stanza That वासना (psychic impression) and that क्षणसंतति (series of क्षणs or ideas) do not fit in whether they are supposed to be identical or distinct or neither. Therefore, the opponents should rest upon your words, on the analogy of the little birds who fly away from the mast of a ship, yet, unable to see land, return to the same.

I

सा वासनेति etc.—सा = That, i. e. the वासना maintained by the Buddhists, which is said to be like a thread running through the क्षणs which without it are like so many loose pearls. वासना is defined as पूर्वज्ञानजनिता उत्तरज्ञाने शक्तिः i. e the power imparted by the anterior क्षण to the posterior क्षण

सा च क्षणसंततिः etc.—सा = That well-known in the Buddhist system.

क्षणसंततिः—A series of momentary क्षणs which seem to be the same but which in reality are new every moment like the light-rays of a lamp.

(1) न वासनाभेदेन etc.—The two viz. वासना and क्षणसंतति cannot fit in with each other as identical inter se. For if they be identical, they are either वासना or क्षणसंतति; one must be merged in the other It cannot enjoy separate existence e g घटस्वरूप which is identical with घट

केवलायां वासनायां etc.—If there is वासना alone, it is an admission of the principle of persistence.

वासनाभावे etc.—Besides if there is वासना alone, and no क्षण (क्षणसंतति) on which वासना is to operate the वासना would be no वासना. If on the other hand, you admit क्षणसंतति to be the sole reality the all difficulties stand as before (See the preceding Stanza and Com)

(3) न च भेदेन ते घटेते etc.—If वासना and क्षणसंतति are different may we know whether the वासना is क्षणिक or अक्षणिक? If it is क्षणिक why should it be recognized at all? The only reason for its recognition is to supply the principle

of permanence which is wanting in the पर्यायेष्वपि. If it is अनित्य, it violates the doctrine of universal ध्रुवत्व and the assumption that other पर्यायेs are अनित्य becomes gratuitous.

व्यतिरेकोऽपि etc.—This alternative is impossible. There must be either भेद or अभेद between द्रव्य and पर्यायेष्वपि; because भेद and अभेद are mutually exclusive, and if one is not, the other must be there.

अनुभयपक्ष etc.—Besides, if the relation is neither भेद nor अभेद it means it is unreal (अवस्तु). According to all those who do not endorse the अनेकान्तवाद of the Jainas, a thing must be either नित्य or अनित्य; a third alternative is not possible any more than the child of a barren woman.

एवं निरवकाशोऽपि etc.—The author therefore concludes that the opponent must endorse the Jaina doctrine of both भेद and अभेद. (Note that this is not the same thing as भेदाभेद).

न च तदभेदे etc.—भेदाभेद is not sum-total of भेद and अभेद with all their difficulties only added together and remaining intact. [This is the weakness of the भेदाभेद doctrine which is maintained by certain section of Vedāntins.] It is a distinct category of existence—a kind of complex reality like कुक्कुटसर्प or नरसिंह i. e. cock serpent or man-lion.

क्रमाक्रमभावि etc.—पर्यायाः etc.—The Jaina does hold that a series of पर्याय which are new every moment goes on occurring; every पर्याय while the द्रव्य is the permanent principle which connects the past, present and future पर्यायs. The series of पर्याय—the पर्यायपरम्परा—is in a way identical with the constant factor viz., the द्रव्य and is in a way distinct from it. Since the पर्यायs are designated by separate terms, and are the objects of separate cognitions they are separate from the द्रव्य and since the द्रव्य undergoes modification and assumes these various forms—the पर्यायs—they are one with the द्रव्य. Both propositions are true from different points of view. For further light on this doctrine see the exposition of सामान्य and विशेष in the sequel.

अपि च चैतन्ये etc.—Furthermore in the Bauddha system there is no room for वासना वासना according to the Buddhist, may be defined as पूर्वक्षणेनोत्तरक्षणस्य वासना—i. e. an impression produced by an anterior क्षण on a posterior क्षण But in a system where everything is momentary and the क्षणs are not synchronous and there is nothing to connect them the relation of वास्य and वासक is impossible. Musk produces its वासना in a piece of cloth because the cloth is an abiding substance and is connected with the musk.

अथ पूर्वचित्तसहजात् etc.—Another attempt on the part of the Buddhist to get over the difficulty A certain चेतना (consciousness) born with an anterior चित्त (idea) produces a posterior चित्त possessing the power of the anterior चित्त and this is वासना In other words, वासना is the name of the particular चेतना which acts like bridge between the anterior (वासक) and the posterior (वास्य) चित्त

तथाहि पूर्वचित्तं etc.—The above definition of वासना is further explained The पूर्वचित्त—the anterior चित्त— hich has for its object रूप etc. is called प्रवृत्तिविज्ञान—which is of six kinds; viz. the five रूपादिविज्ञानs (sensuous cognitions) nd the sixth चित्तादिविज्ञान (conceptual विज्ञान). Synchronous with the पूर्वचित्त is born a certain consciousness of the go, which is called आलयविज्ञान and this आलयविज्ञान produces the next चित्त inve ted with the शक्ति of the former चित्त The आलयविज्ञान is वासना आलयविज्ञान e receptacle intelligen e is so called because in t l e th प्रवृत्तिविज्ञान (आलीयन्ते प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानान्यस्मिन्निति) and the प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानs are s called because they epresent the acti e aid of consciousness (See Keith s " Buddhist Philosophy p. –3.).

शब्दे च etc —No amou t of mere change of phraseology will help the B ddhist in his predicament. The difficulty of connecting the पूर्वचित्त with the उत्तरचित्त (call them प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानs) is not lessened by tting p आलयविज्ञान (another name f वासना) between them, nless that आलयविज्ञान is dmitted to be a permanent f ctor capable f connecting the two. But in the

Buddhist system of universal impermanence (क्षणभङ्ग) there is no room for a permanent factor of consciousness.

यस्मात् वैलक्षण्यैर्येन etc.—Criticism : The particular वैलक्षण्य which accompanies the anterior चित्त cannot influence a *present* चित्त because the present—which according to the Buddhist lasts for a single moment only—can never be influenced in any way—it perishes just as it was born, without any change whatsoever—for the plain reason that it lasts for a single moment only. Nor can the particular वैलक्षण्य influence future चित्त inasmuch as it is unconnected with it, unless you suppose that the वैलक्षण्य (वासनाविशेष) is an abiding reality which in the Buddhist system it is impossible for it to be.

अन्य च युक्तिरूपेण etc.—In spite of the impossibility of वासना the author of the Stanza discussed the alternatives of its भेद अभेद etc.—This was only with a view to leading the reader to realise the necessity of recognising element of permanence in our consciousness.

II

सर्वोपरतं etc.—Second Half of the Stanza.

मायामयाः—The Buddhists, the followers of Gautama son of माया माया the name of Gautama's mother. Pun upon the word माया suggesting deceit.

पारावार—Ocean. पक्षपक्षस्तम्भ—The mast of ship.

नीति—The Science of Politics ; political prudence.

इतरथा...etc.—Otherwise, there would be a group of half-truths only such as the blind men had in the famous parable of the Elephant and the Blind Men, एकदेशिनाः catching only fringe of the total reality.

सम्यग्दृष्टि etc.—Some read सम्यक् for सम्यक्

Appendices.

1 तत्र यच्चाप्युक्तं ज्ञानजन्यप्रमाद इत्यादि [ज्ञानजन्यप्रमाद्व्यतिरेकेण दुःखाद्यात्यन्तोऽभावात् तस्य हृद्ये ज्ञानादित्वमाबः प्रसाध्यते ।] तदविचारितचितलितम् । ज्ञानजन्यप्रमाद्व्यतिरिक्त सुखदुःखाद्युत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमेऽनाभिमतात्मगुणत्वेन दृष्टान्तानागमप्रसिद्धोपलक्षक स्वरूपस्यानुपपत्तेः ।— अपि चात्मन्यात्यन्तात्मैवाद्भुतत्वानुपपत्तिरेकेण भावनानुपपद्यते । तथा यो हि निगडादिभिर्बद्धः तस्यैव तन्मुक्तिकारणपरिहाणावाह्नमभिव्यक्तिमायाति सति मोक्ष इत्यैकाविकल्पे तस्यैव कल्पमोक्षान्यतरस्य लोके प्रतिबद्धा । इह स्वरूप बन्धो यद्वोऽयमस्य च तन्मुक्तिकारणपरिहारणमस्य बाह्यप्रत्यभिव्यक्तिमपारमेति वैयधिकरण्यात् सर्वमयुक्तम् । किं च सर्वो हृदिमान् हृदिपूर्वं प्रवर्तमानः किञ्चिदिष्टमतो मम स्यादिष्टमहर्षिषामम प्रवर्तेत । इह च यदस्यापादितो मार्गोऽभ्यासे प्रवर्तमानो मोक्षो मम स्यादित्यहर्षिषम्यात् ? । सुखं तावन्नो वा । न तावत् सुखं । तस्यैवकस्य स्यापितत्वा निर्विकल्पवत्वा वैशसके व्यापारात् कर्तुमशमर्पणात् । नापि सत्ताया । तस्य सत्तानिष्पत्तिरिष्यस्य लोभैरभ्युपगमात् । किं च निरन्तरनिरन्तरतो च संसारपर्यं मोक्षार्थं प्रयासो व्यर्थ एव स्यात् यतो रागादुपरमे हि प्रवर्तते मोक्ष उपरमेष विनाश ए च निर्हेतुकत्वात्स्वत एव । तदसर्वोऽप्यनादि प्रयासो निरर्थक एव ॥ Gunaratna s Com. on Saddarsana-Samgraha p 194-9

2 उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् "—क्षणभङ्गवादिनोऽयमभ्युपगम उत्तरस्मिन् क्षण उत्पद्यमाने पूर्वः क्षणो निरुध्यत इति। न चैवमभ्युपगच्छता पूर्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोर्हेतुफलभावः शक्यते संपादयितुम्। निरुध्यमानस्य निरुद्धस्य वा पूर्वक्षणस्याभावग्रस्तत्वादुत्तरक्षणहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः । अथ भावभूत परिनिष्पन्नावस्थः पूर्वक्षण उत्तरक्षणस्य हेतुरित्यभिप्रायस्तथापि नोपपद्यते। भावभूतस्य पुनर्व्यापारकल्पनायां क्षणान्तरसंबन्धप्रसङ्गात् । —S'ankara s Com. on B S. II ii. 20

" अनुस्मृतेश्च —अपि च वैनाशिकः सर्वस्य वस्तुनः क्षणिकतामभ्युपयन्नुपलब्धुरपि क्षणिकतामभ्युपेयात् । न च सा संभवति । अनुस्मृतेः । अनुभवमुपलब्धिमनूत्पद्यमानं स्मरणमेवानुस्मृतिः । सा चोपलब्ध्येककर्तृका सती संभवति । पुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिविषये पुरुषान्तरस्य स्मृत्यदर्शनात् । Ibid Br. S. II ii. 25.

Stanza XX.

एवं क्रियावादिनां etc.—The systems hitherto dealt with were those of the क्रियावादिन्s, and they howsoever wrong in many important points, had one merit at least viz. that they all embraced क्रियावाद The system which is next going to be

examined is that of the *Cārvākas*—the *Lokāyatikas* or *Nāstikas*—atheists and materialists, who are अक्रियावादिनः.

What is meant by क्रियावाद and अक्रियावाद? One should have thought that क्रियावाद meant belief in the voluntary activity and therefore in the moral responsibility and future life of आत्मन् and अक्रियावाद denial of the same and in this sense the Cārvākas could well be called अक्रियावादिन्. Now it is probable that the word did mean that originally. But the traditional explanation as given by the Jaina commentators is different and the wording in the text would show that the same is followed by our author. By क्रिया they understand the *act of existence* (not a very probable meaning originally): thus, क्रियावादिन् means he who asserts the existence of आत्मन् and 'अक्रियावादिन्' he who denies it. Cf. etc. Śīl. Com. on Utt. XVIII, 23, p. 443, Devchand Lalbhai Series— क्रिया अस्तीत्येवंरूपा । अक्रिया तद्विपरीता ॥ Śīl. Com. on Uttara XVIII. See Appendix.

See Jacobi, S. B. E. Jaina Sūtras, Part II Introduction p. xxxv where क्रियावाद is explained as the view of those who *maintain that the soul is directly affected by actions*, passions etc.

For the name लोकायतिक etc. see Guṇaratna's Introduction to the Section on Cārvāka in Ṣaḍ. 80–86; Max Muller's "Six Systems" and Sacred Books of the Buddhists Vol. II pp. 166–172. According to Rhys Davids, in the old texts of Buddhism the word लोकायत means Nature-lore.

अनुमान etc.—The gravamen of the criticism is that the doctrine of the Laukāyatikas is based upon the recognition of प्रत्यक्ष as the only प्रमाण to the exclusion of even अनुमान.

Stanza: To the नास्तिक, who cannot know the mind of others for lack of अनुमान recognised as प्रमाण, it is not open to speak. What gulf between चेष्टा—a significant movement of limbs which implies अनुमान—and मौन! Alas! what folly to deny अनुमान!

प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं etc.—प्रत्यक्ष is the only प्रमाण says Cārvāka. See Ṣaḍ. and Sarvadarśana Saṃgraha.

For 'चार्वाक' See M Bh. and Max Muller's "Six Systems of Indian Philosophy" and Guṇaratna's Com. on Ṣaḍ p. 300 चार्वाक from चारुवाक् (=one who speaks pleasantly and therefore temptingly) seems to be the more plausible derivation of the word.

संनह्यते from सं+नह् to bind, to gird up one's loins, to put on an armour and go to war

अनु चमाह etc.— अनुमान —from अनु-after and मा—to measure, and hence to know—is so called because by means of that particular kind of knowledge, a thing, though remote in time space and nature, is *measured* out to the mind, *after* one has recollected the relation of invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) between लिङ्ग (हेतु e. g धूम) and लिङ्गिन् (साध्य e. g वह्नि).

परार्थानुमान—The context requires that by अनुमान in the first line we should understand परार्थानुमान. अनुमान is of two kinds: स्वार्थानुमान and परार्थानुमान The former is the अनुमान which is conducted for one's own enlightenment; the latter for the enlightenment of others. See Tarka manuals; also Pr N T iii. 9 (अनुमानं द्विप्रकारं स्वार्थं परार्थं च). The division is said to have originated in the Buddhist section of Indian Logic. See Keith's Indian Logic and Atomism" and Vidyābhūṣaṇa's History of Indian Logic"

अनुमानेन etc —अनुमान paraphrased as लैङ्गिक प्रमाण i. e. प्रमाण based upon हेतु

नास्तिक प्रत्येकः etc.—Etymology of the word नास्तिक See Com. on Ṣaḍ. St. 81

न च हि परस्यावगमस्य etc.—Unless अनुमान is recognised as a प्रमाण there will be no possibility of our knowing what others know or do not know and we cannot employ words to enlighten them, there being no objective in view For want of such a objective all our talk will be senseless and meaningless as that of a madman.

क्व etc.—क्व—क्व signifies a vast gulf or difference as in क्व सूर्यप्रभवो वंशः क्व चाल्पविषया मतिः (Raghu.). See Apte's Guide to Sanskrit Composition.

स्वमार्गं etc.—प्रत्यक्षमार्गं etc.

मति प्रत्यक्षेण etc.—By mere प्रत्यक्ष we cannot know the mind of others. But we do know it somehow from such marks as a cheerful face etc. Therefore we must recognise a प्रमाण other than mere प्रत्यक्ष viz. अनुमान

[illegible] etc.—This man desires to hear my words; otherwise there would not have been such marks as I observe on his face.

कथं च [illegible] etc.—How is it that [illegible] which is Atmanepadin only when it is used intransitively is here so inspite of its being used transitively? Answer: [illegible] one able to know as per rule "[illegible]" (Hema-V ii. 24).

तथा प्रमाणान्तरेण etc.—Next follows set of arguments to show that (1) we cannot determine the प्रामाण्य of प्रत्यक्ष without admitting the प्रामाण्य of अनुमान; and (2) that there is the same ground for admitting the प्रामाण्य of अनुमान and आगम as that which exists in the case of प्रत्यक्ष

चार्वाकः कश्चित् etc.—The Cārvāka f nd certain cognitions—which are based on the senses—to be always in harmony with reality and certain others—such as those based on inference or the word of teacher—to be sometimes out of harmony with reality; and so, whenever fter that experience he came across similar cognitions of the first type he considered himself justified in regarding them as true, and those of the second type as false. This could never be accomplished by mere प्रत्यक्ष—whose operations are confined to *present objects* and has no power to relate cognitions belonging to different times See Sarva. D S., Criticism of th Cārvāka by the Bauddha (see Appendix).

न चान्यं [illegible] etc.—Besides, he cannot so much as ask another man to accept proposition as true or false inasmuch

as that proposition though प्रत्यक्ष to himself is not प्रत्यक्ष (but only अनुमेय) to the other person.

तस्मात्प्रमाणान्तर etc.—Therefore one must accept a प्रमाण called अनुमान whose business it will be to prove a certain present ज्ञान as true or false on the basis of its similarity to previous experience (प्रत्यक्ष)

परलोकादि etc —On the mere ground of प्रत्यक्ष you are not justified in denying life after death For प्रत्यक्ष can address itself to the *present* only neither to the past nor to the future.

परलोकादिक etc.—It is but a piece of childish folly to feel unhappy unless life after death is denied, and also to reject the validity of अनुमान If the problem of life after death is to be discussed at all it can only be on the basis of अनुमान (or आगम) प्रमाण, the problem being outside the range of प्रत्यक्ष

किं च प्रत्यक्षस्यापि etc.—Moreover the very validity of प्रत्यक्ष will have to be established by अनुमान only For why is the water of a mirage which does not serve the purpose of bath drink etc, regarded as false inspite of its being प्रत्यक्ष ? The reason is—प्रत्यक्ष is reliable where it agrees with Reality not everywhere. Thus, it is reliable where the water you perceive serves your purpose of bath and drink ; it is un reliable where it fails you, as the water of a mirage. Now we want you to re lise that the same applies to अनुमान and आगम Where they gree with reality they are reliable ; where they do not, they are not. In other words, प्रत्यक्ष अनुमान and आगम all stand on the same level in the matter of reliability

व्यभिचारित्वेऽप्यनयो etc.—If you say that अनुमान and आगम are sometimes discovered to be discordant will Reality and are therefore unreliable we reply that th same is the case with प्रत्यक्ष also. For we do sometimes see (प्रत्यक्ष) *two* moons owing to disease in the eye. And just as we have a false प्रत्यक्ष we may have a false अनुमान or a false आगम also.

एवं च प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण etc.—So you cannot rest y ur knowledge on the reliability of प्रत्यक्ष only and so all your denials

of जीव पुण्य पापम् and परलोक based on अनुमान must fall to the ground.

एवं भूतचिन्तक० etc.—Similarly one may reject the doctrine of materialism held by the Cārvākas.

तत्र च प्रमाणपुरस्सरं—Its criticism has been set forth very well by Rāmachandra, author of *Dravyālaṅkāra* (See Peterson's Report), while dealing with the subject of स्वसंवेदन i. e. consciousness which belongs to Ātman.

न चायं भूतधर्मः—Consciousness says he, is not a property of matter. Were it a property of matter we should have found it in *every particle* of matter just as we *observe the property of intoxication in intoxicating drugs*.

कायाकार० etc.—Cārvāka: When matter assumes the form of a living body consciousness originates therein. Criticism: If the modification of matter which you call the living body be matter itself and nothing more, then we should expect the living body to be continuous with matter and not an occasional phenomenon in it. If, on the other hand the living body be regarded as something other than matter it amounts to a recognition of a non-material principle, and that would be only another name for आत्मन्. If आत्मन् had no causal connection with consciousness, consciousness would not necessarily be limited to the place where आत्मन् is. It would rise even in a dead body. If you say that certain conditions such as the presence of blood (as in a living body) is necessary it may be replied that the blood exists in a dead body and yet there is no consciousness. Next, आत्मन् is not born. If you say आत्मन् exists and yet he is originated by the भूत (a modified form of pure materialism) it would *involve persistently recurring origination of* आत्मन् in spite of its existence; for existence is, then, no bar to origination. If, on the other hand you hold that आत्मन् did not exist before and is only come into existence when matter is become a living body the question arises: How can that which is a nonentity perform the act of coming

into existence? For coming into existence is after all an act, and requires somebody or something to perform it. That which is not, and is, therefore, devoid of every conceivable power cannot perform the act of coming into existence. Therefore चैतन्य or consciousness is not a property of भूत, that is, matter

सुप्तोत्थि etc.—Explain how a man rising out of sleep comes to possess consciousness, while चैतन्य had been absent owing to want of consciousness during the sleep. Answer: We only *remember* what we had experienced before in the waking condition. The unconsciousness of sleep was due to the impediment caused by sleep. Then how is it, you will ask, that चैतन्य suffers with the suffering of the body? We answer: It is not the rule: A fine mind is often found in a wretched and diseased body Even when the body remains the same we rejoice or grieve according to our mental attitude The mind is distorted by grief and yet no change is observed in the body There must be some cause you will admit, to which the change of mind should belong namely the mind or आत्मन्. You will perhaps say: the matter undergoes change and becomes consciousness. Answer It cannot, because the two are so unlike. Properties such as hardness etc. do not belong to it. The atoms when they become gross enough are apprehended by the इन्द्रिय.

तस्य स्वरूप etc.—What is the definition of आत्मन्? Answer: That which you attack. The आत्मन् is self revealed. If आत्मन् were but matter it would be presented as this (external), not as "I" (internal).

Books of Reference:

1. Śīlānka's Ṭīkā on Sūtrakṛtāṅga II. 1. 1.
2. „ Uttarā. XVIII 23.
3. Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya, Guṇaratna's Commentary
4. Pramāṇa-Naya-Tattvālokālaṁkāra.

Appendices.

1 ये तावत् क्रियावादिनस्तेऽस्तिक्रियाविशिष्टमात्मानं मन्यमाना अपि तस्य सदा स्थित्यादिस्वरूपं नाद्यापिनिर्णीतमिच्छन्ति । उक्तं हि वाचकैः— क्रियावादिनो नाम येषामात्मनोऽस्तित्व मतमिति किन्तु न स्थितिः कर्तृत्वसौ नियमाभिनवे पूर्वभावपरिरिक्तमात्मा महोत्पत्तीति ॥...... ये त्वक्रियावादिनस्तेऽज्ञीतिक्रियामिति सिद्धमात्मानं नेच्छन्त्येव नास्तिके वा शरीरेण लौकिकमात्मानमनभ्युपगमयन्ति ।......अक्रियावादिनो नैवां सर्वथाऽपि मेयमस्तित्वमात्मनो तदभावाभ्युपगमात् । येऽप्युक्तवन्त आत्मनः प्रत्यक्षमिच्छन्ति तेषामपि तदस्तित्वाभ्युपगमेऽप्युक्तरीत्यात्मनोऽक्रिय- त्वमात् तत्त्वतस्तदभावमेवेच्छन्तीति । उक्तं हि वाचकैः—ये पुनरिह क्रियावादिनस्तेषामात्मैव नास्ति न चायमस्मा शरीरेण लौकिकमात्मत्वे प्रति प्रत्यक्षमवगमयन्तमात्मनो वा तस्मिन्निर्विशेषत्वं च सर्वथाऽनियतमेवेति ॥ S'ilanka Com. on Uttarâdhyayana XVIII.

2. यदि कश्चित् प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकुर्वीत तं पृच्छेत्—प्रमाणं प्रमाणं न भवतीत्येकान्तमनभ्युपगम्य यत् न किञ्चन तावत्प्रमाणमस्ति प्रमाणत्वे वा । न प्रमाः । अविसंवादकत्वस्याभावे प्रामाण्यविरहः । तदभिन्नो प्रतिज्ञा किं मविनाशं न लभेत् इति न्यायात् ।...किं च प्रमाणप्रामाण्यस्याभ्युपगमे वस्तुतः सर्वोपलब्धिरिति यतो यथैव स्वीकृतं लक्षणमाहात्म्यम् ॥

Saddarsana Samgraha, Bauddha Darsana.

3. तत्र सर्वं क्षणिकम् । सर्वेऽपि पदार्थाः क्षणिका न स्थायिनो पूर्वापरकालभेदेन वस्तुमात्रमिति वाचोयुक्तिः ।......नैयायिका निर्विचारा: सामान्य लोकस्य पुरस्तादपि स्थिति भेदोपलक्षणत्वेन कल्पयन्ति ॥—Guna. on Sad. p. 300.

Stanza XXI.

Stanza Oh Lord Jina! he who while seeing before his eyes one Reality which is permanent as well as possessed of production and destruction every moment, disregards your teaching (which recognises all the three is either a fool or devil.)

प्रतिक्षण etc.—उत्पाद is but उत्पत्तिमत्त्व, and विनाश पूर्वाकारपरिहार. निवैर—objection to ईर्ष्या

स्थिरम् etc.—In the midst of change.

एकत्वरूपेण etc.—Here एक does not mean *numerically one*, but *identical*.

पर्यायास्तु etc.—In view of this उत्पाद and विनाश the पर्याय (the changing modes or forms) are many; the द्रव्य is one.

आज्ञा etc.—आज्ञा from आ = completely in all its varying forms + ज्ञा = to know means the teaching which gives a complete knowledge of the पदार्थ—जीव अजीव etc.—in all their numberless aspects or attributes. [illegible]

वातकी—Suffering from mental windiness or flatulence; a fool. For the grammatical formation of the word, see Hema. VII. ii. 61

पिशाचकी—possessed by a पिशाच or devil

एकान्तवादापस्मार etc.—Epilepsy of metaphysical one-sidedness' or absolutism.

नाथ—The Lord who accomplishes the योग-क्षेम of the spiritual well being of his followers. The योग consists in furnishing new light to his followers, and क्षेम in confirming the same by means of repeated sermons.

वस्तुतत्त्वं etc.—Reality consists of उत्पाद, व्यय and ध्रौव्य i. e Production, Destruction and Permanence. (" उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत्" Tatv 39) As द्रव्य, nothing is produced or destroyed; it persists, as is indicated by our sense of identity in the midst of change. It may be argued that a false sense of identity is sometimes experienced as in the case of hair and nails—which though replaced by new products of the same kind from time to time *appear* to remain identical. The answer to that objection is that in their case there is sufficient contrary evidence to show that the hair etc. are *not* the same; whereas in the case under consideration, the identity of द्रव्य in the midst of उत्पाद and विनाश is easily established by प्रत्यभिज्ञान i. e the sense of recognition of a thing as the same as that which was seen before.

सर्वव्यक्तिषु et.—Found quoted in the Tattva. Bh. on V 29 (See Appendix). All individuals are certainly changing every

moment and yet there is no change in the midst of production and destruction (स्थिति and अस्थिति); this fact of change in the midst of permanence has its analogue in the relation of व्यक्ति and आकृति—when individuals (गो) come and go, but not their रूप (गोत्व) or universal which remains the same.

सतो द्रव्यतया etc.—Mark that permanence and change are not attributed to a thing in one and the same capacity but in different capacities—'द्रव्यतया' and 'पर्यायतया'. Mark further that the Jaina does not regard change to be a mere show or illusion as does the Māyā-Vedāntin; with him it is as much a reality as permanence which is the other half of the truth.

प्रत्यक्षेण etc.—Because we perceive change of the पर्याय and there is no reason to distrust the truth of the perception.

न चैव शङ्खे पीते etc.—That we have a certain perception may not be conclusive. For do we not perceive a yellow colour in a white conchshell, when we are suffering from jaundiced eye? Answer: But that is because the perception itself is false. It is not so, however, in the case of the innumerable पर्यायs of सुखं, दुःखं etc.—which we experience in our soul.

उत्पादादित्रय etc.—Objection to the theory of the Three-in-One viz उत्पाद, व्यय and ध्रौव्य in one Reality. Are the three different *inter se* or not? If they are they are three in number; and, then, how can *one* be *three*? If they are not, they are not three, but one; and then one is one, not three is one.

उच्यते कथंचित् etc.—Reply to the objection. They (उत्पाद etc.) are in a certain sense different from one another because their स्वरूप or characters are different from one another.

उत्पादविनाश etc.—Syllogism to prove that उत्पाद, विनाश and ध्रौव्य are different *inter se*.

न च भिन्नलक्षणत्वं etc.—भिन्नलक्षणत्व is the हेतु which can be thus shewn to be true of the पक्ष: उत्पाद, व्यय and ध्रौव्य has each a nature of its own which is not the same as that of the other two. उत्पाद is defined as 'असत आत्मलाभः'—*i. e.* coming into

being of a thing that was not; विनाश is defined as सत आत्मवियोगः i.e. loss of existence in a thing that had it before; and ध्रौव्य is defined as स्वरूपानुवर्तनम् i.e. persistence as the substance. The three definitions differ *inter se* and so do the notions defined.

न चामी भिन्न—Note that different as they are in their स्वरूप, the three are not mutually independent—उत्पाद can never be without विगम (विनाश) and स्थिति (ध्रौव्य) any more than hair could exist on the back of a tortoise; that is to say उत्पाद without the others is a pure fiction, a nothing The same as regards विनाश and स्थिति

घटमौलि etc.—Āptamīmāṁsā verse 59 A commentator relates a story to explain the meaning of the verse. A certain king had a son and a daughter The latter possessed a jar made of gold, which at the instance of the prince the king ordered to be turned into a crown This pleased the prince, but displeased the princess the king himself remaining neutral all along being the owner of so much gold whether in the form of a jar or a crown.

पयोव्रतो etc.—Āptamīmāṁsā verse 60 This is simple He who has vowed to live on milk does not take curds; he who has vowed to live on curds does not take milk; he who has vowed to live on food other than that supplied by cow takes neither milk nor curds—so there may be उत्पाद, विनाश or ध्रौव्य according to the several points of view

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Books of Reference :

1. Tattvārthādhigama Bhāṣya on V 29 and Commentaries thereon.
2. Pramāṇa-Naya Tattvālokālaṅkāra.

Appendices.

1. सर्वव्यक्तिषु नियतं क्षणे क्षणेऽन्यत्वमथ च न विशेषः।
सत्योश्चित्यपचित्योराकृतिजातिव्यवस्थानात्॥१॥
नरकादिगतिविशेषो भेद स्वाप्नोऽशयोर्भव।
हिंसादिस्तद्धेतुः सम्यक्चारित्र मुक्त इति॥२॥
तस्मादिच्छते यत्र यत्तत्वेनानुपपद्यते सर्वम्।
नास्तित्वे तद्वचनात् सर्वमपि न युज्यते भीरतः॥३॥
निष्पत्तानो न च वस्तुस्तत्त्वो नापि कारणस्योत्पत्ति।
बीजाङ्कुरयोरपि तथा विसदृशतुल्योऽपि च वक्तव्या॥४॥
सिद्धस्तेनोत्पादो व्ययोऽस्य संसारभावतो ज्ञेयः।
सीयत्वेन ध्रौव्यं त्रितयघुतं सर्वमेवं तु॥५॥

—Quoted in T tt. Bhāṣya V 29. [This portion of the Bhāṣya however has been noticed in Haribhadra's Commentary but not in Siddhasena s].

2. येनोत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं यत्सदिष्यते।
अनन्तधर्मकं वस्तु तेनोक्तं मानगोचरः॥"

यद् पूर्वमसतो भावस्योत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययोगादपि यथास्वरूपं कीर्ति वस्तु गुडादेरपि तथोपादानस्य स्यात्। पूर्वं नरकेषु यत्र तत्कालस्वभावात्वं किमुत्पाद तिति चलिष्यति?। तथोत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मकमपि यथान्योन्यापेक्षस्योपलक्षणं तदात्मस्वरूपमस्ति। तदुपेक्षितत्वं तथा भावस्यापि स्वत एव तद्विवक्षितत्वेति चार्थे पुनरपदार्थस्वरूपमिति चेत्। उच्यते। न हि विशेषोत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यशेषापगमस्य तत्समस्तरूपस्यैव निर्मूलोत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययोगात्मकमेव सदिति स्वीक्रियते। तथापि। पर्यायैकद्वयतोऽपि वा यत्र द्रव्यात्मना भेदपक्षे नियतते वा परिकल्प्यमान र्दर्शनात्। दृष्टपुद्गलेतरवस्तुनिष्पत्तियोगेन व्यभिचार इति न वाच्यं प्रमाणेन बाध्यमानस्यान्यत्वस्याप्रतिष्ठत्वात्। न च वस्तुनोऽन्यथा प्रमाणविषय तत्त्वाननिषेधनात् सर्वव्यक्तिषु नियतं क्षणे क्षणेऽन्यत्वमथ च न विशेष सत्योश्चित्यपचित्योराकृतिजातिव्यवस्थानादिति वचनात्। तथेव द्रव्यात्मना सर्वेषु वस्तुषु स्थिरैरेव पर्यायात्मना तु सर्वं वस्तुत्वमेव नियतते वा अवस्थित पर्यायानुभवतत्त्वात्। न चैवं क्षणे वस्तु नीलादिरूपोत्पादव्ययेन व्यभिचारः तस्य स्वलक्षणस्त्वात्। न यत्र कोऽप्यनुरूपो वेन पूर्वोत्तरपरिणामोऽप्यनवस्था प्रयोगतामपि निमामात्री भवेत्। न च चौराणि वस्तूनि दृष्टोपपत्तिविशिष्टानि पर्यायानुभवे स्वल्पत्वं स्वरूपविज्ञानस्याभावात्। तस्मात्तस्य यत्तस्य नियतत्वे न वा। यदि नियतत्वे उत्पादेन आत्मनो न विज्ञाने चेत् तथापि तत्पादेन व्यवस्थापयितुं चेत्। वस्तुतः तथाविधेनैकस्य तेषां पर्यायविशेषानुभवात्। तथापि।

उत्पादविनाशध्रौव्याणि स्याद्भिन्नानि भिन्नलक्षणत्वात् रूपादिवत्। न च भिन्नलक्षणत्वमसिद्धं असत आत्मलाभः उत्पादः, सतः सत्तावियोगो विनाशः। द्रव्यरूपतयाऽनुवर्तनं ध्रौव्यमित्येवमसंकीर्णलक्षणानां तेषां सर्वैः प्रतीतेः। न चामी परस्परानपेक्षत्वेन भिन्ना एव परस्परानपेक्षाणां खपुष्पवदसत्त्वापत्तेः। तथाहि। उत्पादः केवलो नास्ति स्थितिविगमरहितत्वात् कूर्मरोमवत्। तथा विनाशः केवलो नास्ति स्थित्युत्पत्तिरहितत्वात्, तद्वत्। एवं स्थितिरपि केवला नास्ति, विनाशोत्पादशून्यत्वात् तद्वदेवेत्यन्योन्यापेक्षाणामुत्पादादीनां वस्तुनि सत्त्वं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। तथा च कथं नैकं त्र्यात्मकम्। तथा चोक्तम्।

प्रध्वस्ते कलशे शुशोच तनया मौलौ समुत्पादिते
पुत्रः प्रीतिमुवाह कामपि नृपः शिश्राय मध्यस्थताम्।
पूर्वाकारपरिक्षयस्तदपराकारोदयस्तद्द्वया-
धारश्चैक इति स्थितं त्रयमयं तत्त्वं तथा प्रत्ययात्॥
घटमौलिसुवर्णार्थी नाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम्।
शोकप्रमोदमाध्यस्थ्यं जनो याति सहेतुकम्॥
पयोव्रतो न दध्यत्ति न पयोऽत्ति दधिव्रतः।
अगोरसव्रतो नोभे तस्मात्तत्त्वं त्रयात्मकम्॥

Stanza XXII

Stanza: Reality is possessed of innumerable characters; it is not possible to explain it in any other way. So, your proofs are like roars of a lion which frighten away antelopes, namely heretics.

सर्वं परमार्थेन etc.—सत् in the stanza=परमार्थभूतं वस्तु i. e. Reality viz. जीव and अजीव

अनन्तधर्मात्मकमेव etc.—The word अनन्तधर्मात्मकम् explained: अनन्त—Belonging to the three times and therefore endless.

द्वे धर्माः etc.—धर्माः or attributes are of two kinds सहभाविनः—synchronous or co-existing and क्रमभाविनः—successive.

अनन्तधर्मा etc.—Which is characterized by endless attributes, some of which are सहभाविन and some क्रमभाविनः.

स्वरूपं etc.—That is the character of Reality and no other.

अतोऽन्यथा etc.—Hence no other character can well be established in regard to the Reality.

अनेक सार्थ etc.—The second line supplies the साधन or हेतु for the statement of the first line that Reality is essentially possessed of an endless number of attributes.

तथा हि—The syllogism will run thus :

सत्तत्त्व (subject, minor term पक्ष); अनन्तधर्मात्मकम् (predicate, major term, साध्य); सत्त्वान्यथानुपपत्तेः (reason middle term, हेतु, साधन)

अन्तर्व्याप्तैव etc.—It will be noticed that no दृष्टान्त is given in the above syllogism The reason is that no दृष्टान्त is possible as will be seen below Yet the argument is sound, as it is based on अन्तर्व्याप्ति : the very idea of Being (सत्त्व) properly analysed yields the साध्य, viz., अनन्तधर्मात्मकत्व Therefore, there is no need for examples to support the inductive reasoning which establishes the major premiss. Vide Siddhasena Divākara's Nyāyāvatāra 20 and Com. thereon—"अन्तर्व्याप्त्यैव साध्यस्य सिद्धेर्बहिरुदाहृतिः । व्यर्था स्यात् तदसद्भावेऽप्येवं न्यायविदो विदुः ॥ अन्यथा हि स्वर्गमावे वा तद्भावे प्रयुज्येत आत्मनेव वा । यथाऽऽह पक्षीकृत्य । यथा सर्वं साध्यमित्यादिना हेतुं स्पृशति प्रतिपाद्य तथा परोऽपि तमनङ्गत्वं नयेत् साध्यं न प्रतिपद्येत ? । तथाप्यत्र पक्षपत्ते व्याप्ति साधनस्य साध्याक्रान्तत्वमन्तर्व्याप्तिः । तदैव साध्यस्य अन्यस्य सिद्धेः प्रसिद्धिः । बहिर्भिन्नितधर्मिणोऽप्यत्र दृष्टान्तधर्मिण्युदाहृतिः व्याप्तिप्रदर्शनस्था व्यर्था निष्प्रयोजना । तदभावाप्यर्थंत्वाविरिति । द्वितीयस्वरूपमपि निर्दिशन्नाह— तदसद्भावेऽप्येवं सैवमन्तर्व्याप्त्यभावेऽप्येवमिति व्यर्थैव बहिरुदाहृतिः । न हि तदभावात् क्वचित् सर्वत्र तद्गुणता सिध्यति । व्यभिचारदर्शनात् । तस्मादनुवृत्तिलक्षणं प्रतिबद्धो प्रकारेण प्रतिबन्ध साधनं, तन्निवृत्ते तत एव साध्यसिद्धेरबहिर्व्याप्ती दृष्टान्तासाफल्यमितिरिति न्यायविदो विदुः अत्रानुकूल्यम् इति ॥

This doctrine of अन्तर्व्याप्ति in Buddhism, was intended to meet the necessities of the case in which statements were made about the totality of things on the ground of स्वभाव Obviously there could be no दृष्टान्त in such case, the दृष्टान्त being included in the पक्ष The truth of the व्याप्ति was here justified *internally* (अन्तर्) between the हेतु and the साध्य and not sought *externally* in दृष्टान्त. What really arose from the necessities of a special

case was applied generally to all cases of Inference, and that which was originally a generalisation from particulars was treated as a generalisation above and therefore, independent of, particulars.

Earlier logicians, however had continued to follow the older logic of बहुव्याप्ति as based on generalisation from external data, viz. the दृष्टान्त. This the new school rejects यदेव [ऽह क्षणिकं सत्त्वात्] नैवं प्रतिबन्धमेव निश्चेतुं दृष्टान्ततापेक्षा साधनस्यैवा- पक्षेयोगस्य साध्ये । तेनासिद्धपदार्थमात्रार्थो दृष्टान्तमुपाददे । यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकं यथा घट इति । पक्षधर्मस्य नैवं दृष्टान्तापेक्षणे ।। "— अन्तर्व्याप्तिसमर्थनम्
—by Ratnākara S'ānti.

(See "The Six Buddhist Tracts" including one on अन्तर्व्याप्ति by Ratnākara S'ānti, edited by M. M. Haraprasad S'āstri). "The work argues that the inseparable connection between the middle term and major term can be conceived without the aid of an example in which the things signified by the two terms co-abide, nay without the aid even of a minor term in which we are to prove the co-presence of the things, *e. g.* fiery because smoky " (Dr Vidyābhuṣaṇa's " H. I. L. ").

A further refinement of logical doctrine is contained in the *Antarvyāptisamarthana* of Ratnākara S'ānti in the tenth century [? 1015 A.D *i. e.* eleventh century—Dr Vidyābhuṣaṇa] It is necessitated by considerations affecting the proof of the momentariness of things. Normally an inference gives us in the example the concomitance of the middle and the major in some object; for instance, fire on the mountain is proved from the presence of smoke with the aid of the example of the kitchen where smoke and fire co-exist. But this is impossible in the case of momentariness *ex vi termini*. Moreover the conclusion in the normal case takes the form of the presence of the invariable relation in some subject, *e g* the relation of smoke and fire in the mountain, and the inference to establish momentariness cannot be given such form. The new doctrine insists that it is possible to prove the relation within (antar) that is simply between the thing to be proved and the thing

by which it is to be proved without the intervention of something external (*bahis*) in which the relation is to exist."
—Keith's Buddhist Philosophy pp. 316–17

[illegible] etc.—A व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति i. e. a negative universal major premise. Its example, however by the very nature of the case cannot be real. Therefore, the example, निरुपाख्यं खपुष्पम् —a sky-lotus. The हेतु here is केवलव्यतिरेकी i. e. capable of entering into a negative व्याप्ति (यत्र साध्याभावः तत्र साधनाभावः) only अन्वय i. e. positive व्याप्ति being evidently impossible since every दृष्टान्त that you can think of to illustrate the व्याप्ति-यत्र यत्र [illegible] (सत्त्वं) तत्र तत्र अनन्तधर्मात्मकत्वम् will be found included in the पक्ष viz. वस्तु i. e. all Reality

[illegible] etc.—The list of [illegible] of आत्मन् [illegible] etc.—The list of the गुणादिक of आत्मन्. See Pravacanasāra and Dravyasaṅgraha.

[illegible]—

See जीवा पुग्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा तहेव आयासं ।
अत्थित्तम्हि य णियदा अणण्णमइया अणुमहंता ॥
(जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः धर्माधर्मौ तथैव आकाशम् ।
अस्तित्वे च नियता अनन्यमया अणुमहान्तः ॥)
—Pañcāstikāya, 4.

[illegible]—

See जीवा पोग्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा पुणो य आगासं ।
देसेहिं असंखादा णत्थि पदेस त्ति कालस्स ॥
(जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः धर्माधर्मौ पुनश्चाकाशम् ।
प्रदेशैरसंख्याता न सन्ति प्रदेशा इति कालस्य ॥)
—Pravacanasāra II-43.

[illegible] etc.—In the predicate अनन्तधर्मात्मकत्वम् of the line the आत्मन् (—आत्मकम्) suggests that Reality is not a mere panorama or cinema show of पर्याय, but that there is principle of permanence (ध्रौव्य) also in the midst of change (उत्पाद and व्यय). Thus सत् or Reality may be defined as उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत् (See Tattvārtha V 29.)

प्रत्यक्षेति etc.—A list of the धर्मs of द्रव्य (See Prâtibhâkhyas).

अस्य हेतोः etc.—The author does not go into the tedious process of showing that the हेतु in the above syllogism is free from all the हेत्वाभास viz असिद्ध etc.

मृगारि etc.—The master is compared to the lion, the heretics to so many deer

तव प्रमाणानि etc.—The plural number suggests that endless are the proofs which support the Lord's doctrine.

Stanza XXIII.

Stanza: When integrated, Reality is without characters; when differentiated it is without a substance. You have fully seen the truth of Seven Modes which is expressed according to different points of view—a truth which is known by supremely wise men only

अनन्तं etc.—In the last stanza, Reality was described to be अनन्तधर्मात्मक i.e. possessed of an infinite number of predicates. The same truth is now going to be formulated in the shape of the great Jaina doctrine of सप्तभङ्गी or the Seven Modes सुसंक्षिप्तम्—in a brief or condensed form.

I

Reality described *synthetically* is a द्रव्य without reference to पर्यायs the same described *analytically* is पर्याय without reference to their द्रव्य.

अपर्ययं—अविवक्षितपर्यायं—devoid of पर्याय or पर्यायs, that is to say described without reference to पर्यायs, not that a thing can really exist without the पर्यायs.

वस्तु from वस् to dwell; that in which dwell the पर्यायs or properties, the Reality consisting of the six dravyas viz. धर्म etc.

समस्यमानम्—in which the पर्यायs have been rolled up into a द्रव्य. When we say आत्मा or घट, we think of the पर्यायs as non-distinct from the द्रव्य

द्रव्यास्तिकनया: द्रव्यमात्रमाहुः etc.—The point of view of synthesis, which believes in द्रव्य and treats पर्याय as non-distinct from द्रव्य. द्रव्यास्तिकनय is also called द्रव्यार्थिकनय i. e. the point of view of the reality (अर्थिक) or existence (*अस्तिक) of द्रव्य. [For full exposition of the नय, see Tattvārtha Bhāṣya on I. 34-35.]

पज्जवनयेत्यादि=पर्याय:—more usually the last two. The first gives the Prākṛt पज्जव and is itself a Prākṛt substitute for पर्याय.

यत्पुन:—Whereas (पूर्वस्माद्विशेषोऽयं).

विभजन्—Construe विभिन्नयार्थं च.

द्रव्यगौण—In which the underlying द्रव्य is ignored.

पर्यायास्तिकनयानुयायिन:—Those who adopt the पर्यायास्तिकनय i. e. the point of view of the existence of the पर्याय only

भागा एव हि भासन्ते etc.—Only the parts or modes appear located in different ways; there is no द्रव्य anywhere apart from the parts or modes

अर्पण—So the statement depends upon what is going to be presented (अर्पित) or suppressed (अनर्पित). Sometimes the द्रव्य is presented and its पर्याय suppressed sometimes, vice versa. अत एव अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धे:—See Tattvārtha-Sūtra V 31.

ननु द्रव्यपर्यायशब्दयोः etc.—Objection: The word द्रव्य is different from the word पर्याय and so also the idea of one is different from the idea of the other. How can Reality be said to be both द्रव्य and पर्याय?

आदेश—The answer to that is to be found in the words of the text आदेश* i. e. owing to statements being of two kinds—सकलादेश and विकलादेश—synthetical statement and analytical statement on which is based the doctrine of सप्तभङ्गी.

[illegible]—which only the wisest can know. [illegible] = [illegible]—Supremely wise cf. Pāṇ V iii, 66.

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* Not used in the Kantian sense of synthetical and analytical propositions of Logic.

वेदयिक—Right knowledge which is either innate or acquired.

न पुण etc.—Teachers of other schools may be possessed of a highly trained intellect i. e. पुण yet they are not पुणवन्—eminently wise.

तथा अमाय etc.—अज्ञान may arise from (1) failure to distinguish between true and false or right and wrong; ( ) from the position which springs from the o use of S msára i. e Karma (3) from Jñána not producing its f uit and (4) from a false view (मिथ्यादृष्टि).

अत एव सम्यग्दृष्टि etc.—Hence, in consequence of मिथ्यादृष्टि or wrong vision, ven a study f the Twelve Jaina Scriptures [See "Outlines of Jainism" pp.125–146]; will become मिथ्याश्रुत i. e. wrong study in the case of heretics whe eas, even the study of heretical w rks will prove सम्यक्श्रुत or right study in th case of those who possess सम्यग्दृष्टि Th reason i that heretics when they read Jaina scriptures do not try to *understand* them (यथाविस्थितं etc.), but i terpret them in wa they *please* (स्वरुचा); whereas the foll wers f the J ina Ágam bring to bear the right kind f vision pon the meaning even of heretical works Thus, the latter have ften succeed d in discoveri g the right विधि nd विवेक i Brahmanical works, which have escaped the understanding of Bráhmaṇa commentators दृष्टि=दर्शन primarily meaning vision, comes to mean the faith which gives the vision. दर्शन=तत्त्वार्थश्रद्धान (Tattvárthádhigama I 2)

यथा हि etc.—A f w examples may be given

(1) There is passage in the Veda अजैर्यष्टव्यम् –which the Bráhmaṇas understand as referring t the sacrifice of goats (अजः). According to Jaina scholars, however it r ers only to the offering of corn which has become incapable of germination owing to lapse of time (अजन्मसामर्थ्य). Their reason for the latter interpretation is that it does not stand to moral reason to regard animal sacrifice as good—a point of view

which is given by सम्यक्त्व i. e faithful adherence to the Jaina creed and the consequent right vision.

(2) यत एव च भूतचय etc.—Another example There is the famous passage of the Br Up. "विज्ञानघन etc.— ("Full of consciousness, it springs from these material elements and sinks back into them there is no consciousness after death.") which was the subject of a sermon by Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra) to Indrabhūti. The latte who before his conversion was Brāhmana understood the passage as denying the existence of Jīva (आत्मन्) and lif after death nd thus propounding materialism. Vardhamāna knew better and he understood it as referring to the temporary eclipse of the soul's consciousness and not its absolute annihilation. Śankara rejects the view that the passage is intended to teach materialism (See Br Sūtra, Bhāṣya. See Hem. Tri. Ch. X, verses 77 78 Sūtrakrit Bk. II Brahmajāla Sutta, Ch. III; Avasyaka with Har. Vṛtti.

(3) तथा स्मार्ता अपि Next, there is passage of the Manusmriti which runs as follows न मांसभक्षणे दोषः etc. (Manu V 56) T ken literally it is self-contradictory If there be sin in meat-eating how can abstention from it be declared to be महाफला" If bstention from such sinless act as meat-eating is to be deemed highly beneficial, on the same principle abstention from other sinless acts such as worship, study charity should also be deemed beneficial! So the passage requires to be interpreted in some other way Tak न मांसभक्षणे दोषः as न मांसभक्षणे (अ-)दोष (अ being elided according to sandhi rules), अपि तु दोष and प्रवृत्तिरेषा भूतानां etc.—not in th sense of It is the way of all creatures but in the sense of "It is the breeding ground f animalcula germs or bacteria." Mallisena next proceeds to show how an infinite number of animalcula spring into life nd then perish in the process of meat-making wine-making and sexual enjoyment. [It is worthy of note how अहिंसा which was at first only one, ev though the foremost, of the Five Vratas of the Jainas, along with those of the Brāhmanas and the Bauddhas, came to acquire the position of an all-embracing vrata with the Jainas. Thus, in the Jaina Ethics, all the

other vratas including Brahmacarya are recommended not on their own account, but on account of their violating the great Law of Ahimsā.]

Another suggestion made in order to remove the contradiction in Manu's verses and also to bring it into harmony with our moral reason is to take भूतानामिति पिशाचप्रायाणाम्, (the way) of the devils ; भूत alone (See Amara III, 239). This interpretation is further supported by other passages quoted from the Manusmrti, M. Bhārata etc.

आमासु च पक्वासु etc.—आमासु च पक्वासु च विपच्यमानासु मांसपेशीषु । सातत्येन उपपातो भणितस्तु निगोदजीवानाम् ॥ १ ॥ मद्ये मधुनि मांसे नवनीते चतुर्थके । उत्पद्यन्तेऽसंख्यास्तद्वर्णास्तत्र जन्तवः ॥ २ ॥ मैथुनसंज्ञारूढो नवलक्षं हन्ति सूक्ष्मजीवानाम् । केवलिना प्रज्ञप्ताः श्रद्धातव्याः सदाकालम् ॥ ३ ॥
—Quoted from the Sambodha Saptatika of Ratnas khara Sūri (Gathās 66,65,63)—See AMP edition of the Syādvādamanjarī.

स्त्रीयोनौ सम्भवन्ति द्वीन्द्रियास्तु ये जीवाः । एको वा द्वौ वा त्रयो वा लक्षपृथक्त्वं चोत्कर्षम् ॥ ४ ॥ पुरुषेण सहगतायां तेषां जीवानां भवति अपद्रवणम् । वेणुकदृष्टान्तेन तप्तायःशलाकाज्ञातेन ॥ ५ ॥ पञ्चेन्द्रिया मनुष्या एकनरभुक्तनारीगर्भे । उत्कृष्टं नवलक्षा जायन्ते एकहेलया ॥ ६ ॥ नवलक्षाणां मध्ये जायते एकस्य द्वयोर्वा समाप्तिः । शेषाः पुनरेवमेव च विलयं व्रजन्ति तत्रैव ॥ ७ ॥

—Some anticipation of modern sexual physiology

II.

अथ केयं सप्तभङ्गी etc.—It will be borne in mind that the discussion of the Ahimsā and other texts was only by way of passing. The main point under consideration is the Doctrine of the "Seven Bhangas or Modes" and the Tw Ādesas (See supra) to which we now revert.

एकत्र जीवादौ—सप्तभङ्गीति गीयते—See Pr N T IV 14 p. 59 Taken almost verbatim from its Commentary Ratnākarāvatārikā.

"एकत्र जीवादौ etc.— For a detailed exposition of the meaning see further "प्रश्नवशात् etc....अभिहितम्" Ibid pp. 59-60.

The point of the last remark in the passage above quoted will be explained in the sequel.

Saptabhangī is d fined as a statement (वचनविन्यास) in seven different ways (सप्तधि प्रवृत्ति)—t be mentioned hereafter—of affirmation nd neg tion (विधिनिषेधयो), with the use of the word स्यात् (स्यात्कारलाञ्छितया) si gly and jointly (पृथग्भूतयो समुदितयोश्च) witho t inconsist ncy such as that rising from conflict with प्रमाण (अविरोधेनप्रत्यक्षादिबाधापरिहारेण), as the result of inquiry (प्रश्नवशात्) about each of the different predicates (धर्म) of thi g such a सत्त्व (existence) etc

प्रश्नवशात् etc—From स्यादस्त्येव सर्वम् to सत्त्वम् taken verbatim from P N T III 14 to 21:—

(1) स्यादस्त्येव सर्वम्—Statement f affirmation made ingly (इति विधिकल्पनया प्रथमो भङ्ग).

(2) स्यान्नास्त्येव सर्वम्—Statement of negation ma le singly (इति निषेधकल्पनया द्वितीयः).

(3) स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येव (इति क्रमतो विधिनिषेधकल्पनया तृतीय) Statem t f ffirmation and negation made conjoi tly but i such way as to void inconsistency which ca be done by making the affirmation nd the negation one afte the other (क्रमत).

(4) स्यादवक्तव्यमेव (इति युगपद् विधिनिषेधकल्पनया चतुर्थ) Statement of inde-crit ability arising from making affirmation nd negatio conjointly nd lso imultaneously—thus involving contradiction which can be got ove by making the statement f indescribability

(5) स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेव (इति पञ्चम) Statement f firmation and indescribability mad conjoi tly the latter which arises from combi ng affirmation and negation sim ltaneously and y t without running into the bsurdity of self-contradiction bei g added to the former affirmation.

(6) स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेव (इति निषेधकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च षष्ठ) Statement of negation and indescribability made conjointly the latter which arises from combining ffirmation and negation simultaneously and yet without the bsurdity of self-contradiction, being added to the former negation.

(7) स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति (इति क्रमतो विधिनिषेध-कल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च सप्तमः) Statement of affirmation and negation made conjointly but successively joined with that of indescribability arising from combining affirmation and negation simultaneously and yet witho t the absurdity of self-contradiction.

III.

Fuller Exposition.

(1) तत्र स्यात् कथंचित् etc.—From स्यात् कथंचित् to स्वरूपेणोपपत्तेः taken verbatim f om the Ratnâkarâvatârikâ except that M. omits स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैः and inserts the prefatory तत्र

A thing may *be* in one way in vi w of its own द्रव्य (substance), क्षेत्र (place) काल (time) and भाव (nature or property); but the same may *not be* in anothe way in view of th द्रव्य क्षेत्र काल and भाव of another thing Otherwise, the thing would lose its individuality its own self. The illustration in the text is clear

अवधारणे चायम्—एव (only which expresses exclusion) means that, and that only that is, the particular statement which we wish to make and no other

तत्रापस्त्येव to.—अस्ति w uld connote bsolute unrestricted existence, while what is meant to be conv yed is a particular existence, an existence of the thing as such and not as another thing This is why we use the word स्यात् in stead of अस्ति One connotes absolute, the other model or relative existence. For it, another word is कथंचित् In ordinary parlance, we do not use the words स्यात् or कथंचित् in very proposition, but it is always understood.

स्यात् कथंचित् etc.—A thing *is*, in its own bstance not in another s substance; *e g* घट is as पार्थिव bject, not as जलीय object; that is to say in certain way and not in any other way Hence कथंचित् which is the same as स्यात्

(2) Bhanga II. स्यात् कथंचित् नास्त्येव etc.—From स्यात् कथंचित् to घटस्य सामस्त्येनासत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् borrowed from the Ratn. Bi, 16

(See also S. R.) with a few unimportant hanges. स्वरूपादिभिरिव पररूपादिभिरपि वस्तुनोऽसत्त्वानिष्टौ.........वस्तुप्रतिनियमविरोध — सिद्धमितरथा विपर्ययाद् । अव्याकरणप्रसङ्गात् । Ratnā. the rest being omitted by H.

The reading adopted in th Text belongs to most of the Mss. and is vidently the correct reading For it agrees with the original of the Ratnākarāvatārikā and gives the sense as required by the autho xposition of the affirmation and negation as contained in th Syādvāda doctrine. See supra note on Stanza XIV p 165 "तत्र स्यात् सर्वमिति —स्व पर पररूप etc.—अस्वरूपेणासत्त्वात् स्वरूपेणासत्त्वमिष्टम्: where असत्त्व is predicated of thing not 'स्वरूपस्य' but 'पररूपेण' which requires पररूपादिभिरपि वस्तुनोऽसत्त्वानिष्टौ in the present passage. I fact, it is the very point which the critic of th स्याद् often misses and which the Syādvādi makes e t f defence of his position. Of course, it i not d ied that i the Anekāntavāda असत्त्व belongs to the thing itself and not to th other thing, and that is what distinguishes the A ekāntavāda from Ekāntavāda. But, be it noted that the असत्त्व is nowhere said to belong to the thing स्वरूपेण or 'स्वरूपादिभिः but only पररूपेण or 'पररूपादिभि Thus, does the Jain Anekā tavāda stand distinguished from the Buddhistic nihilism, and the Jaina may well claim that it is th nly f m in which the Buddhistic nihilism could justify itself to common sense.

A thing cannot be असत् 'स्वरूपादिभि but if it is not going to be regarded as असत् even पररूपादिभि ne thing would be every other thing e. nything w uld be anything, nd there w uld be nothing like thing we nature.

न चास्तित्वनास्तित्वाभ्यामिति etc.—The necessity of recognising अस्तित्व and नास्तित्व alongside of each other (though in different capacities such as स्वरूप and पररूप) may be thus shown If you want to prov anything say अस्तित्व by means of साधन (हेतु), any तत्र then that साधन will have to fulfil the condition of good साधन viz. beence from the विपक्ष e. g. यत्र अग्नित्वं नास्ति तत्र धूमवत्त्वमपि नास्ति (व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति) quite as

much as presence in the सपक्ष thus in olving नास्तित्व of the साधन alongside the अस्तित्व of the same, and vice versa. The doctrine of bsolute अस्तित्व or नास्तित्व thus breaks down. Of course, we may wish to give prominence to one or the other and so may mention one and remain silent about the other (अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धेः as Umāsvāti says Tattv V 31).

अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धेः :—For further explanation see the Tattvārtha Bhāṣya and the Rājavārtika (V 31) and Ratnā. IV p. 61. अत एव ...अवक्तव्यम्

(3) तृतीयः स्याद् सत्—See above क्रमार्पितस्य etc.—From क्रमाद् to वाच्यमवाचकम् reproduced f om the Ratnā. on Pr N T iii. 18; the rest of the passage substantially agrees with the rest of it original which is oted in the Appendix. The gist f the passage in the text is to show how अवक्तव्यत्व arises from attempting to combine simultaneously and with equal prominence the सत्त्व and the असत्त्व. There is no word in the language to do this the word सत् will connote सत्त्व and not असत्त्व; the word असत् will connote असत्त्व and not सत्त्व If may be asked Is ther no singl word which could present both सत्त्व and असत्त्व, just as there is th single word पुष्पदन्त presenting both the sun and the moon. Answer: as a matter of fact, there is not. But supposing the e were such a word, still it would present the two to the mind one after the other Question Does not the technical name सत् as declared in the Sūtra शतृशानचौ सत् (Pāṇ. III ii, 27) stand for both the शतृ and शानच् terminations? Answer: It does, but even then it does not present both th terminations to the mind simultaneously but only *one after the other* As there is no single word to express सत्त्व and असत्त्व *simultaneously* combined, so there is no Dvandva compound, nor Karmadhāraya compound, nor sentence which could give expression to th idea of

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The paragraph in th Ratnākarāvatārikā concludes with an important piece of information that 'सर्वं च सत्' केचित् पुष्पदन्तशब्दमेव एकार्थे वृत्तिविशेषात् स्यादि । न कैश्चिदपि कश्चित्प्रयोगः । सर्वेषामेकत्वासम्भवात् ।"

simultaneous combination of सत्त्व and असत्त्व [illegible] as in K. Pr [illegible]

न च सर्वथा etc.—This is a very important *nota bene*. The अवक्तव्यत्व here laid down is not *absolute* अवक्तव्यत्व—which would mean only अनभिलाप्यत्व which is absurd—, but only अवक्तव्यत्व as an element in the Anekānta position.

शेषास्त्रयः [illegible]—The last three are explained in the Ratn. on P N T iii. 19-20-21: "[illegible] etc."

न च सप्तभङ्ग वस्तुनि etc.—As against the *seven* Bhaṅgas, it may be urged, there will be an *infinite* number of भङ्ग about every thing in consequence of the infinite number of धर्म which can be affirmed or denied about that thing (see also St XIV "अनन्तधर्मात्मकमेव वस्तु— "). The answer to that objection is—Surely if you take *all* the *infinite* number of पर्याय or धर्म, the number of भङ्ग will be infinite. But in respect of each of the पर्याय the भङ्ग will be *seven* only. That is the point. The passage in the Text from एवं वस्तुनि to सप्तभङ्ग is reproduced from Pr N T iii. 37-38. See Appendix.

यथा हि सदसत्त्वाभ्यां etc.—M shows how the सप्तभङ्गी principle can be applied to धर्म other than सत्त्व and असत्त्व also, such as सामान्य and विशेष. Of the सामान्य and the विशेष the first may be taken as the affirmative and the latter as the negative; if you treat the two correlatives as standing on an equal footing it may depend upon which of them is going to be made the principal and which the subordinate: the principal being presented as the affirmative and the subordinate as the negative.

प्रतिपर्यायं etc. [illegible] etc.—Reproduced from the Pr N T iii, 39 to 42. See Appendix. The reason given for the number seven of the भङ्ग is that the प्रश्नभेद (questions) in respect of each पर्याय are seven; and the प्रश्नभेद are seven because the जिज्ञासा (curiosities) from which they spring are seven; and the जिज्ञासा are seven because संदेह (doubts) which give rise to them are seven; and the संदेह are seven because वस्तुधर्म (characters of things) in regard to which doubts may exist are seven. See Saptabhangitarangini quoted in the Appendix.

इयं च सप्तभङ्गी सकलादेश etc.—The सप्तभङ्गी in respect of each of the भङ्ग is either *Synthetic* (सकलादेश) or *Analytic* (विकलादेश). The former refers to the entire, undivided Reality and the latter to a fragment or aspect of the same thing The former is, therefore, known as प्रमाणवाक्य or Proposition of the T uth *i. e.* the whole Truth, while the latte is called नयवाक्य or Proposition *leading* to the Truth *i. e.* the proposition of particular view-point. (तत्र सकलादेश: प्रमाणवाक्यम्—विकलादेशो नयवाक्यम्). For the rejection of this view see Saptabhangitarangini.

तदर्थं चेदम् etc.—सकलादेश *i. e.* Statement of the entire, undivided Reality is thus defined "प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नानन्तधर्मात्मकवस्तुन: कालादिभि: अभेदवृत्तिप्राधान्यात् अभेदोपचाराद् वा यौगपद्येन प्रतिपादकं वच: सकलादेश:" The definition is taken verbatim from P N T III, 41, and so lso its explanation कालादिभि: सकलादेश: from Ratn. thereon. See Appendix.

The points to note in the definitio are (1) If w bring प्रमाण to bea upon the Reality before us (and be it noted that w are here dealing with Reality), we shall find that it is possessed of an infinite umber of धर्मs (प्रमाणप्रतिपन्न). (2) Now these धर्मs can, by an act of synthesis, be united togethe which is rendered possible by certain bonds of union among the धर्मs such as काल etc. (3) Th synthesis may be due either to emphasis laid upon the identity of the common elements (काल etc.) or to a supposed identity of those elements in the case of all the धर्मs. (अभेदवृत्तिप्राधान्यात्—). Lastly (4) It is necessary that all the धर्मs sh uld be iewed *together simultaneously* (यौगपद्येन).

यौगपद्येन अशेषधर्मात्मकं वस्तु etc.—प्रमाणवाक्यात्—Reproduced from the Ratnā. (See Appendix) except the last word, which in the Ratnā. is "सकलादेशात्." The points of difference between the two ādeśas are (1) In the former th entire Reality is comprehended synthetically *i. e.* with all its धर्मs taken *simultaneously*; in the latter the Reality is treated analytically *i. e.* with its धर्मs taken *one by one*. (2) In the former emphasis is laid

on the unity of the object (अभेदवृत्त्या); in the latter on the *difference* (भेदप्राधान्यात्), or the difference is superimposed upon the unity so that the unity is lost in the difference (भेदोपचारात्), or the unity is superimposed upon the difference, so that the difference is lost in the unity (अभेदोपचारेण). (3) सकलादेश depends upon प्रमाण *i. e.* the view of Truth or full-orbed Reality; विकलादेश on नय *i. e.* single point of view which takes note of merely the broken lights or fragments of Reality

काले [illegible]—भेदप्राधान्यात्—Taken verbatim from the Ratnâ. (See Appendix). When one desires to emphasise the difference of the धर्म such as अस्तित्व etc. in point of काल etc. he will find no single word to express the separate धर्म, which will, therefore, have to be done by separate words, and therefore क्रम or *succession* in the use of word will be inevitable. If, however it is not the difference of धर्म to which attention is to be called, but their synthetic unity one word may originally express a single धर्म but through that धर्म it will express the whole object with all its धर्म taken *simultaneously*

के पुनः कालादयः &c.—अभेदोपचारेण इति Now comes the much wanted explanation of अभेदवृत्ति in the definition. This, again is taken verbatim from the Ratnâkarâvatârikâ where the manner in which अभेदवृत्ति or अभेदोपचार is less through काल (Time) &c. is thus shown

(1) काल—Time. When we say स्यादस्त्येव घटः (as in the first भङ्ग) we know that at the time (काल) when अस्तित्व is there there are also numberless other qualities belonging to the object thus, owing to the sameness of time, they may be all treated as one.

(2) आत्मरूप—Nature. That which is the nature of अस्तित्व viz. to be one of the धर्म of the object, is also the nature of every other धर्म of the object; and so, owing to it, all the धर्म may be treated as one.

(3) अर्थ—Substratum That which is the substratum of अस्तित्व viz., the dravya, the same is the substratum of all the

other धर्म; so, owing to this fact, all the धर्म may be treated as one.

(4) सम्बन्ध—Relation viz. that of identity with the object. As अस्तित्व is non-distinct from the object, so are all the other धर्म. Thus *owing to the sameness of their relation to the object* they may be all treated as one

(5) उपकार—Influence. The influence which अस्तित्व exercises upon an object viz. to tinge it with its self is also the influence which all the other धर्म exercise upon that object. So owing to the sameness of the influence they may be all treated as one.

(6) गुणिदेश—The locality of the substance. Moreover the locality of the substance of all the धर्म is the same, and so, owing to it, they may be all treated as one.

(7) संसर्ग—Contact or relation. The relation which अस्तित्व bears to an object is also the relation which other धर्म bear to it. So all the धर्म may owing to this fact, be treated as one

[The distinction between सम्बन्ध (अविष्वग्भाव) and संसर्ग may be pointed out The former leans towards अभेद the latter towards भेद]

(8) शब्द—Word The word which denotes an object with the धर्म अस्तित्व, say घट, is the same as the word which denotes the object with the other धर्म. So all the धर्म may be treated as one realising their unity in the शब्द.

पर्यायार्थिकनये etc.—अभेदोपचारः क्रियते It must be carefully noted that this अभेदवृत्ति recognition of unity is possible when emphasis is laid upon द्रव्यार्थिकनय as opposed to पर्यायार्थिकनय The difference between the two is this In द्रव्यार्थिकनय it is the central द्रव्य that is adverted to or kept in mind; in the पर्यायार्थिकनय, it is the पर्याय. Now when the द्रव्यार्थिकनय is subordinated to the पर्यायार्थिकनय, which is the same thing as saying—when the पर्याय are considered rather than the द्रव्य,- the principle of unity retires into the background, and since-

the धर्मिणः are many the अर्थैकवृत्ति (unity) in question is impossible. For from this poi t of view there cannot be many गुण belonging to one and th same object at the same time. Y u will ask Is this not contrary to our experience that many गुण do belong to the same object at the same time? viz., Ans er N ; not without creating a pro t to breach in the unity of the object, which thus becomes really as many as the गुण. This may be shown by consideration of those points on which अर्थैकवृत्ति was shown to rest in the case of गुणाधिकरण.

(1) Take गुण. The several गुण do not belong to th same object *at the same time.* If they do, by that very act they would create breach in the unity and there ould be as many different substrata as there were धर्मिणः nd also as many moments of time characterising them. The gunas being many they cannot belong to th same bject t the same time. If they did, they would create a breach in th unity of the object and also the time. Thus there would b as many bjects as there are धर्मिणः characterising them, and these gain would belong to different moments of time. So the unity of time on which the synthesis was based in the previous case (गुणाधिकरण) is not valiable in the present case (धर्म्यधिकरण), and here therefore there is no possibility of अर्थैकवृत्ति (real synthesis).

(2) N xt, tak आश्रय. The आश्रयs, that is *selves*, being different, there is no possibility of th गुण coming to unity If they had all th same आश्रय, that would militate against their plurality

(3) Similarly the अर्थ or स्वभाव of the several गुण is not the same, every गुण having its wn अर्थ or स्वभाव A d so there is no possibility of अर्थैकवृत्ति.

(4) Moreover the अर्थ or स्वभाव of the several गुण being not the same, this principle of unity is also wanting in the present case. If अर्थ or स्वभाव of the several gunas were the same, this would *ipso facto* make for the unity of the gunas— which is contrary to our hypothesis of plurality of gunas.

(4) सम्बन्ध, too, are many corresponding to the many सम्बन्धिन्. For a plurality of सम्बन्धिन् must involve a plurality of सम्बन्ध. So this principle of synthesis (unity of सम्बन्ध) is also wanting in the present case.

(5) Each गुण exercises its own peculiar उपकार (infl ence) and so there are as m ny उपकार as there are गुणs (उपकारिन्). Thu there is no unity of उपकार to effect the required synthesis (अभेदवृत्ति).

(6) The गुणिदेश, too vary with the गुणs. And since they vary this is another principle of unity which is wanting in the present case.

(7) संसर्ग again, differs with the संसर्गिन्. And theref re, no unity of संसर्ग is possible i this case. So this is another principle f unity that is wanting for the synthesis.

(8) Lastly शब्द differs with each object. All the गुणs could be expressed by a single word, one word in the la guage would do d ty for all, and all the rest f the vocabulary would be superfluous. This is evidently absurd. Therefore, th re are as many words as there re gunas. And so the unity of word is also wanting in the p esent case to effect the synthesis.

तथा च etc.—Summary in the words of the Ratnākarā vatārikā with slight variation. It means Thus, the गुणाः differ in काल, आत्मरूप etc., and therefore their unity can ot be real, but only supe imposed upon their difference. The reader will n w understand the reason for introducing 'अभेदोपचारात्' in the d finition of सकलादेश

प्रमाणवाक्यस्वरूपम्—The सकलादेश is otherwise called प्रमाण वाक्य. See supra. Ratn. adds इति विकलादेशः nd then concl des with a kārikā gi ing the list of 'कालादि'. Thus :—

कालात्मरूपसम्बन्धाः सम्पर्कोपकृती तथा ।
गुणिदेशार्थशब्दाश्च कालाद्याः स्युरष्टधा ॥

पर्यायार्थिकनयस्य etc.—In this part al view of things which is called विकलादेश or नयवाक्य भेदवृत्ति or difference is real and pro-

minent, and even when there is अभेद, भेद is superimposed upon the अभेद, and the latter thrown into the background. With भेद comes also the succession (क्रम) which characterises the statement in विकलादेश. Pr N T. has here a sûtra "तद्विपरीतस्तु विकलादेशः" (iv-45) and the definition is given in the Ratn. in the words which are reproduced in the Text.

Books of Reference.

1. Pramâna-naya-tattvâlokâlamkâra with Ratnâkarâvatârikâ
2. Saptabhangîtarangini
3. P of S. C. Chakravartin's Introduction to his edition of the Pañcâstikâya.
4. "An Epitome of Jainism" by Messrs. Nahar and Ghosh Chs VIII and IX.

Appendices.

I. एकत्र वस्तुन्येकैकधर्मपर्यनुयोगवशादविरोधेन व्यस्तयोः समस्तयोश्च विधिनिषेधयोः कल्पनया स्यात्काराङ्कितः सप्तधा वाक्प्रयोगः सप्तभङ्गी ।

एकत्र जीवादौ वस्तुन्येकैकसत्त्वादिधर्मविषयप्रश्नवशादविरोधेन प्रत्यक्षादिबाधापरिहारेण पृथग्भूतयोः समुदितयोश्च विधिनिषेधयोः पर्यालोचनया कृत्वा स्याच्छब्दलाञ्छितो वक्ष्यमाणैः सप्तभिः प्रकारैर्वचनविन्यासः सप्तभङ्गी विज्ञेया । [illegible] सप्तभङ्गीति [illegible] । [illegible] सप्तभङ्गीप्रसङ्गेन [illegible] । [illegible] जीवादिवस्तुनि [illegible] सप्तविधधर्मपर्यनुयोगस्य [illegible] । [illegible] सप्तभङ्गी [illegible] । [illegible] सप्तभङ्गी- [illegible] । यदवोचाम च—

या प्रश्नाद्विधिवर्जनाभिदया बाधच्युता सप्तधा
धर्मं धर्ममपेक्ष्य वाक्यरचनानेकात्मके वस्तुनि ।
निर्दोषा निरदेशि देव भवता सा सप्तभङ्गी यया
जल्पन् जल्परणाङ्गणे विजयते वादी विपक्षं क्षणात् ॥

इदं च सप्तभङ्गीस्वरूपं प्रमाणनयसप्तभङ्ग्योः साधारणमवधारणीयम्। विशेषलक्षणं पुनरनयोरग्रे वक्ष्यते।

स्यादस्त्येव सर्वमिति विधिकल्पनया प्रथमो भङ्गः—

स्यादित्यव्ययमनेकान्तद्योतकम्। स्यात् कथंचित् स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावरूपेणास्त्येव सर्वं कुम्भादि न पुनः परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावरूपेण। तथाहि—कुम्भो द्रव्यतः पार्थिवत्वेनास्ति न जलादिरूपत्वेन। क्षेत्रतः पाटलिपुत्रकत्वेन न कान्यकुब्जत्वेन। कालतः शैशिरत्वेन न वासन्तिकत्वेन। भावतः श्यामत्वेन न रक्तत्वादिना। अन्यथेतररूपापत्त्या स्वरूपहानिप्रसङ्ग इति। अवधारणं चात्र अनभिमतार्थव्यावृत्त्यर्थमुपात्तम्। इतरथाऽनभिहिततुल्यतैवास्य वाक्यस्य प्रसज्येत प्रतिनियतस्वार्थानभिधानात्। उक्तम्—

वाक्येऽवधारणं तावदनिष्टार्थनिवृत्तये।
कर्तव्यमन्यथानुक्तसमत्वात् तस्य कुत्रचित्॥

तथाप्यस्त्येव कुम्भ इत्येतावन्मात्रोपादाने कुम्भस्य स्तम्भाद्यस्तित्वेनापि सर्वप्रकारेणास्तित्वप्राप्तेः प्रतिनियतस्वरूपानुपपत्तिः स्यात् तत्प्रतिपत्तये स्यादिति प्रयुज्यते स्यात् कथंचित् स्वद्रव्यादिभिरेवायमस्ति न परद्रव्यादिभिरपीत्यर्थः। यद्यपि चासौ न प्रयुज्यते तथापि स्याच्छब्दोऽप्रयुक्तोऽप्यर्थात् बुद्धिमद्भिः प्रतीयत एव। यदुक्तम्—

सोऽप्रयुक्तोऽपि वा तज्ज्ञैः सर्वत्रार्थात् प्रतीयते।
यथैवकारोऽयोगादिव्यवच्छेदप्रयोजनः॥

अथ द्वितीयभङ्गेन व्याख्यायन्ति—

स्यान्नास्त्येव सर्वमिति निषेधकल्पनया द्वितीयः॥ स्वद्रव्यादिभिरिव परद्रव्यादिभिरपि वस्तुनोऽसत्त्वानिष्टौ हि प्रतिनियतस्वरूपाभावाद्वस्तुप्रतिनियमविरोधः। न चास्तित्वैकान्तवादिभिरत्र नास्तित्वमसिद्धमित्यभिधानीयम्। कथंचित् तस्य वस्तुनि युक्तिसिद्धत्वात् साधनवत्। न हि क्वचिदनित्यत्वादौ साध्ये सत्त्वादिसाधनस्यास्तित्वं विपक्षे नास्तित्वमन्तरेणोपपन्नम्। तस्य साधनाभासत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। अथ यदेव विपक्षे साध्यानुगमेऽस्तित्वं तत्र साध्याभावे साधनस्य नास्तित्वमभिधीयते तत्कथं प्रतिषेध्यम्? तद्रूपस्य प्रतिषेधत्वादनुपपत्तेः। साध्य-सद्भावे नास्तित्वं तु पक्षान्तरेऽपीष्यते तेनाविनाभावित्वे साध्यसद्भावास्तित्वस्य व्यापकत्वेनैव सकृदेवास्ति नास्ति चेति प्रतीयमानत्वादिति चेत्, तदसत्। एवं हेतोस्त्रिरूपत्वविरोधात् विपक्षासत्त्वस्य व्यधिकरणस्याभावात्। यदि चार्थे भावाभावयोरेकान्तपक्षोऽभिमतः तदा सर्वथा न क्वचित् प्रवर्तेत नापि कुतश्चिन्निवर्तेत। प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविषयस्य भावस्याभावपरिहारेणासंभवात् अभावस्य च भाव-परिहारेणेति वस्तुनोऽस्तित्वनास्तित्वयोः कथंचित्तादात्म्यमेष्टव्यम्। तथा चास्तित्वं नास्तित्वेन प्रतिषेध्येनाविनाभावि सिद्धम्। यथा च प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषेध्यस्यास्तित्वस्य नास्तित्वं तथा प्रधानभावतः क्रमार्पितोभयधर्मसंवलितमपि वस्तुस्वरूपं भावनीयम्॥

अथ तृतीयं भङ्गभेदमाविष्कुर्वन्ति—

स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येवेति क्रमतो विधिनिषेधकल्पनया तृतीयः ॥

सर्वमिति पूर्वपदमिहोत्तरत्र चानुवर्तनीयम्। ततोऽयमर्थः। क्रमार्पितस्वपरद्रव्यादिचतुष्टयापेक्षया क्रमार्पिताभ्यामस्तित्वनास्तित्वाभ्यां विशेषितं सर्वं कुम्भादि वस्तु स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येवेत्युल्लेखेन वक्तव्यमिति ॥

इदानीं चतुर्थभङ्गभेदमाविर्भावयन्ति—

स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया चतुर्थः ॥

द्वाभ्यामस्तित्वनास्तित्वाख्यधर्माभ्यां युगपत्प्रधानतयार्पिताभ्यामेकस्य वस्तुनोऽभिधित्सायां तादृशस्य शब्दस्यासम्भवादवक्तव्यं जीवादि वस्त्विति। तथाहि सदसत्त्वगुणद्वयं युगपदेकत्र सदित्यभिधानेन वक्तुमशक्यम्। तस्यासत्त्वप्रतिपादनासमर्थत्वात्। तथैवासदित्यभिधानेन न तदुक्तं शक्यम्। तस्य सत्त्वप्रत्यायने सामर्थ्याभावात्। साङ्केतिकमेकं पदं तदभिधातुं समर्थमित्यपि न सत्यम्। तस्यापि क्रमेणार्थद्वयप्रत्यायने सामर्थ्योपपत्तेः। शतृशानचौ सदिति शतृशानचोः सङ्केतितसच्छब्दवत्। इत्यादिवदपि तयोः सङ्केतितमपि क्रमेणैवाभिधानात्। अत एव न समासः, तस्यापि क्रमेणैवार्थद्वयप्रत्यायने समर्थत्वात्। कर्मधारयादिवृत्तिरपि न तयोरभिधायकं तत्र स्व पक्षत्वं तयोरभिधायकमर्थमेवेत्यसमर्थमिति तदेवं सकलवाचकरहितत्वादवक्तव्यं वस्तु युगपत् सदसत्त्वाभ्यां प्रधानभावार्पिताभ्यामाक्रान्तं व्यवतिष्ठते। अयं च भङ्गः कैश्चित्तृतीयभङ्गस्थाने पठ्यते तृतीयश्चैतस्य स्थाने। न चैवमपि कश्चिद्दोषः अर्थविशेषस्याभावात् ॥

अथ पञ्चमभङ्गभेदमुपदर्शयन्ति स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति विधिकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च पञ्चमः ॥ स्वद्रव्यादिचतुष्टयापेक्षयास्तित्वे सति अस्तित्वनास्तित्वाभ्यां सह वक्तुमशक्यं सर्वं वस्तु। तत्र स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेत्येवं पञ्चमभङ्गेनोपदर्श्यत इति ॥

अथ षष्ठभङ्गभेदं प्रकटयन्ति—स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति निषेधकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च षष्ठः। परद्रव्यादिचतुष्टयापेक्षया नास्तित्वे सति अस्तित्वनास्तित्वाभ्यां यौगपद्येन प्रतिपादयितुमशक्यं समस्तं वस्तु। तत् स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेत्येवं षष्ठभङ्गेन प्रकाश्यते ॥

सम्प्रति सप्तमभङ्गमुपदिशन्ति—स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्यमेवेति क्रमतो विधिनिषेधकल्पनया युगपद्विधिनिषेधकल्पनया च सप्तम इति ॥

इतीयन् सप्तभङ्गीप्रपञ्चः। स्वपरद्रव्यादिचतुष्टयापेक्षयास्तित्वनास्तित्वयोः क्रमेणास्तित्वनास्तित्वाभ्यां समप्रधानतयार्पिताभ्यामुपलक्षितं वस्तु तत् सप्तमेन भङ्गेनोपदर्श्यते। —P N T ttvālokalaṁkāra, and Ratnākarāvatārikā Ch. IV

II. कथञ्चित् ते सदेवेष्टं कथञ्चिदसदेव तत्।
तथोभयमवाच्यं च नययोगान्न सर्वथा॥
क्रमार्पितद्वयाद्द्वैतं सहावाच्यमशक्तितः।
अवक्तव्योत्तराः शेषास्त्रयो भङ्गाः स्वहेतुतः॥

(१) विधिकल्पना, (२) प्रतिषेधकल्पना (३) क्रमतो विधिप्रतिषेधकल्पना (४) सहविधिप्रतिषेधकल्पना च (५) विधिकल्पना-सहविधिप्रतिषेधकल्पना च (६) प्रतिषेधकल्पना-सहविधिप्रतिषेधकल्पना च (७) क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां विधिप्रतिषेधकल्पना च— —Aptamimamsa with Com.

III. (a) "स्यादस्त्येव घटः (१) स्यान्नास्त्येव घटः (२) स्यादस्ति नास्ति च घटः (३) स्यादवक्तव्य एव (४), स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यश्च (५), स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्च (६) स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्च"—इति एतत्सप्तवाक्यसमुदायः सप्तभङ्गीति कथ्यते। लक्षणं तु प्राश्निकप्रश्नज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्वे सति एकवस्तुविशेष्यकाविरुद्धविधिप्रतिषेधात्मकधर्मप्रकारकबोधजनकसप्तवाक्यपर्याप्तसमुदायत्वम्।... ...। परिगणनानुपपत्त्या प्रश्नवशादेकत्र वस्तुन्यविरोधेन विधिप्रतिषेधकल्पना सप्तभङ्गी इति। ..

(b) यद्यपि तत्तद्विशेषस्यातिव्याप्त्यव्याप्त्यादिदोषापत्तेः न संभवति तथापि प्रतिपाद्यप्रश्नानां सप्तविधत्वादेव सप्तभङ्गी इति निरूपणाय प्रतिपादनम्। ननु प्रश्नानां सप्तविधत्वं कथमिति चेत्, जिज्ञासानां सप्तविधत्वात्। जिज्ञासानामपि सप्तविधत्वं किं मानम् इत्युच्यते। ननु तदेव जिज्ञासा कुत इति चेत् तत्तत्संशयानामुत्पत्तेः। संशयानां सप्तविधत्वं तु तद्विषयीभूतधर्माणां सप्तविधत्वात्। तथाहि—कथंचित् सत्त्वं कथंचिद् असत्त्वं क्रमार्पितोभयं अवक्तव्यं कथंचित् सत्त्वविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वं क्रमार्पितोभयविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वं चेति सप्तैव। एवं च एतद्धर्मविषयकाः सप्तैव संशयाः। ....—इत्युक्तप्रकारेण धर्मसप्तविधत्वाधीनं भङ्गानां सप्तविधत्वमिति बोधयितुं सप्तभङ्गीत्युक्तम् इति ध्येयम्। तदुक्तम्—

भङ्गाः सत्त्वादयः सप्त संशयाः सप्त तद्गताः।
जिज्ञासाः सप्त सप्त स्युः प्रश्नाः सप्तोत्तराण्यपि॥

( ) प्रथमे भङ्गे सत्त्वस्य प्रधानभावेन प्रतीतिः, द्वितीये पुनरसत्त्वस्य, तृतीये क्रमार्पितयोः सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः, चतुर्थे अवक्तव्यत्वस्य, पञ्चमे सत्त्वविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वस्य, षष्ठे असत्त्वविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वस्य, सप्तमे क्रमार्पितसत्त्वासत्त्वविशिष्टावक्तव्यत्वस्येति विवेकः। प्रथमभङ्गादावसत्त्वादीनां गुणभावमात्रं न तु प्रतिषेधः।

(d) इयं च सप्तभङ्गी द्विविधा—प्रमाणसप्तभङ्गी नयसप्तभङ्गी चेति। किं पुनः प्रमाणवाक्यम्। किं वा नयवाक्यमिति चेत्, अत्र केचित्—सकलादेशः प्रमाणवाक्यं विकलादेशो नयवाक्यम्। अनेकधर्मात्मकवस्तुविषयक-

बोधजनकवाक्यत्वं सकलादेशत्वं तद्धर्मात्मकवस्तुविषयकबोधजनकवाक्यत्वं विकलादेशत्वम्—इत्याहुः। तेषां प्रमाणवाक्यानां नयवाक्यानां च सप्तविध-त्वाभावात्। प्रथमद्वितीयचतुर्थभङ्गानां सकलानन्तधर्मात्मकैकधर्मात्मकवस्तु-विषयकबोधजनकवाक्यानां सर्वथा विकलादेशत्वेन नयवाक्यत्वापत्तेः। तृतीयपञ्चम-षष्ठसप्तमानामनेकधर्मात्मकवस्तुविषयकबोधजनकवाक्यानां तथा सकलादेशत्वेन प्रमाण-वाक्यत्वापत्तेः। न च योग्येन नयवाक्यमपि सप्तविधं प्रमाणवाक्यमपीति वक्तुं युक्तम्। सिद्धान्तविरोधात्। ननु धर्मिविषयकबोधजनकवाक्यत्वं सकलादेशत्वं धर्मनिष्ठधर्मविषयकबोधजनकवाक्यत्वं विकलादेशत्वमिति। तन्न। तथा च सर्वत्रापि धर्मधर्मिणोरपि धर्मिणः प्राधान्येन विषयतायाः समत्वात्। धर्मिवृत्ति-विशेषिततया धर्मस्यापि प्रधानत्वेनानुपलम्भसम्भवात्। न च स्यादस्त्येवेत्यत्र धर्मिमात्रविषयकबोधस्य जननात् स्यादस्त्येवेत्यत्र केवलधर्मविषयकबोधस्य जननात् सार्थकम् इति वाच्यम्। यतो जीवपदेन जीवत्वरूपधर्मावच्छिन्न-जीवस्याभिधानं न तु केवलधर्मिणः अस्तिपदेन च अस्तित्वविशिष्टस्य धर्मिणोऽपि तथैवास्तित्वस्याभिधानं न तु केवलधर्मस्येति सर्वत्र समानत्वात् ॥ —

अपरे तु स्यात्सप्तम्यपि वाक्यं समस्तमपि प्रत्येकं विकलादेश बहुरिदं सकलादेश इति वदन्ति। तत्र चिन्त्यते। कुत स्यात्सप्तम्यपि वाक्यं प्रत्येकं विकलादेश ?। यत् तत्तदर्थप्रतिपादकतामात्रविवक्षायाम् इति चेत्। तत्र वाक्यवाचकत्वस्यापि विकलादेशत्वापत्तेः। नापि समस्तस्यापि तदादिनानावाक्य-तदन्यार्थप्रतिपादकत्वाभावात्। तदन्यानुपलम्भेन तदर्थप्रतिपादकत्वात्। तत्र तदर्थप्रतिपादकत्वात् सकलवाक्यत्वं बहुरिदं सकलादेश इति निरस्तम्। तद्भिन्नस्यापि तस्य तदन्यार्थप्रतिपादकत्वासिद्धेः। धर्मविशेषवाक्येन तद-नेकधर्मात्मकवस्तुप्रतिपादकत्वाभावात्। सिद्धान्तविरुद्धं सकल-बोधजनकत्वेन तदात्मकानेकधर्मात्मकवस्तुविषयबोधजनकवाक्यत्वं सकला-देशत्वम्। तदुक्तम्— एकगुणमुखेनाशेषवस्तुकथनात् सकलादेश इति। तत्रार्थः—यदा अभिन्नं वस्तु एकगुणरूपेणोच्यते गुणिना गुणरूपेण विशेष-प्रतिपत्तेरसंभवात् तदा सकलादेशः। एको हि जीवोऽस्तित्वादिधर्मेण गुणरूपेण विशेषप्रतिपत्तेरसंभवात् तदा सकलादेशः। एको हि जीवोऽस्तित्वादिधर्मेण एकत्वेन अभेदस्य अभेदोपचारेण वा निरंश समस्तो वक्तुमिष्यते विभागनिमित्तस्य तत्प्रतियोगिनो गुणान्तरस्याविवक्षितत्वात्। यथामेदवृत्तिः कथं चाभेदोपचार इति चेत् द्रव्यार्थिकत्वाश्रयणे तदव्यतिरेकादभेदवृत्तिः। पर्यायार्थिकत्वाश्रयणे परस्पर-व्यतिरेकेऽप्येकत्वाध्यारोपादभेदोपचार इति। अभेदवृत्त्यभेदोपचारयोरनाश्रयणे तदनेकधर्मात्मकवस्तुविषयबोधजनकं वाक्यं विकलादेश इति प्राहुः ॥

( ) तत्र सकलादेशविपरीतत्वेन नास्तित्वमपि स्यादस्तित्वविपरीतत्वेन विरुद्ध-त्वादनेकात्मकत्वम्। तेन च सकलादेशविपरीतत्वेन न नास्तित्वमित्युक्तं भवति। तदुक्तम्—

वाक्येऽवधारणं तावदनिष्टार्थनिवृत्तये ।
कर्तव्यमन्यथानुक्तसमत्वात् तस्य कुत्रचित् ॥

Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī pp. 2-31.

IV एकत्र वस्तुनि विधीयमाननिषिध्यमानानन्तधर्माभ्युपगमेनानन्तभङ्गीप्रसङ्गादसङ्गतैव सप्तभङ्गीति न चेतसि निधेयम् । विधिनिषेधप्रकारापेक्षया प्रतिपर्यायं वस्तुन्यनन्तानामपि सप्तभङ्गीनामेव संभवात् । प्रतिपर्यायं प्रतिपाद्यपर्यनुयोगानां सप्तानामेव संभवात् । तेषामपि सप्तत्वं सप्तविधतज्जिज्ञासानियमात् । तस्या अपि सप्तविधत्वं सप्तधैव तत्संदेहसमुत्पादात् । तस्यापि सप्तप्रकारत्वनियमः स्वगोचरवस्तुधर्माणां सप्तविधत्वस्यैवोपपत्तेः ॥ इयं सप्तभङ्गी प्रतिभङ्गं सकलादेशस्वभावा विकलादेशस्वभावा च । प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नानन्तधर्मात्मकवस्तुनः कालादिभिरभेदवृत्तिप्राधान्यादभेदोपचाराद्वा यौगपद्येन प्रतिपादकं वचः सकलादेशः । तद्विपरीतस्तु विकलादेशः ॥

P N Tattvalokalamkara Ch. IV Sutra 37-45

Stanza XXIV

Next, the author shows how the Syādvāda is sound, notwithstanding that it predicates such mutually contradictory concepts as सत्त्व and असत्त्व and अवक्तव्यत्व of one and the same subject. His explanation is that the different predicates refer to different aspects of the same subject (स्याद्भेद) and therefore the so-called contradiction is really no contradiction at all.

सदसत्त्वे च—The त्व termination to be construed with सत् and असत्. Therefore स्वरूपापेक्षयास्तित्व and पररूपापेक्षया नास्तित्व and अवक्तव्यत्व

तथापि—The supposed contradiction is, first, that which exists between अस्तित्व and नास्तित्व (अस्तित्वं नास्तित्वेन सह); secondly that between विधि and निषेध that is, affirmation and denial of the same predicate of the same subject—such as अस्ति od नास्ति —in which consists the अवक्तव्यत्व ('अवक्तव्यत्वमपि विधिनिषेधयोरयुगपद्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्'); thirdly that between अवक्तव्यत्व and वक्तव्यत्व—the वक्तव्यत्व which is necessarily implied in the very statement of Syādvāda —स्यादस्ति etc. (अथवा अवक्तव्यत्वं वक्तव्यत्वेन सह).

तेषु च स्यादस्त्यादि etc.—Of the seven भङ्ग i. e. forms or constituent propositions of the Syādvāda, स्यादस्ति स्यान्नास्ति and स्यादवक्तव्य are the three primary भङ्ग; the rest are derived by compounding two or more of these three:

अनेके धर्माः सत्त्वं स्थिरत्वं etc.—विशेषणद्वारेण—' अपेक्षाभेदात्सिद्धं' is a हेतुगर्भविशेषण i. e. an adjective which constitutes the reason for the statement that the Syādvāda involves no contradiction. The reason is that no predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject absolutely but only under definite limiting conditions which thus provide the different standpoints from which the same subject may be viewed.

सहानवस्थानात् etc.—The test of contradiction is this: Do the two things *exclude* each other—as do शीत and उष्ण (cold and hot) which never subsist together? Applying this test, we do not find that सत्त्व and असत्त्व are contradictory. The सत्त्व in a घट does not *exclude* असत्त्व in that घट; *if it did, we could* not say घट *is not* घट whereas we do predicate असत्त्व ('is not') of the same घट. But the *fact* is that the घट *exists* (सत्त्व) in *itself* and does *not exist* (असत्त्व) as *other-than-itself*—सत्त्व (existence) being predicated of it from one standpoint and असत्त्व (non-existence) from the other (that of things other than itself); and neither of them *absolutely* without reference to definite aspects such as स्व-रूप and पर-रूप. The घट would not only exist as itself but as *everything* even as things other than itself (सर्वात्मकत्व) if existence were *absolutely* predicable of it; and in that case, no घट असत्त्व etc. would be needed, घट being everything!

न चासत्त्वं etc.—If on the other hand you lay hold of the negative predicate (असत्त्व), as in घट *is not* घट and regard it as *absolute*, the thing itself would be *nothing*, everything would be nothing, all universal *void*! *But the fact is, you* cannot regard it as absolute, the negation in the present case being only from the standpoint of its relation with other things (परापेक्षम्). See Dravyānuyoga xi, 13-14.

स्वं वैशेषिक etc.—The view of the Naiyāyika on this point is different from both. He does not hold that the two colours belong to the two parts of the घट and there the story ends. Nor does he hold that contradictory as they are they belong to the same घट in its different aspects viz. the two parts. But he holds that the two colours produce one चित्ररूप and the latter belongs to the one—whole—घट while the former belongs to the parts. See Tarka Saṁgraha Dīpikā p. 11.

यदा निरोध्य स्याद् etc.—Cf. Ratnāk. p. 85 on P N T III. 8

It should be noted that the Jaina doctrine of "Syād-vāda" is not a statement of the absolute identity of Being and Non-Being but only a statement of their relation to the same subject from *different viewpoints*. Thus a thing *is* from one viewpoint viz. from the viewpoint of *itself* and *is not* from another viewpoint, viz. the *viewpoint of things other-than-itself*. Mark that according to this explanation Being and non-Being are not implicitly contained in each other and so reconcileable—as in Hegel's system— but are to be referred to different aspects of the thing, and so there is no contradiction whatsoever. According to the Syādvāda, the contradiction is not a fact transcending or confounding the laws of logic that is to say a fact which because it is a fact has somehow to be accepted whatever the difficulties of thought—as is done in the *Anirvacanīyatāvāda* of the S'aṅkara school—; it is a fact perfectly amenable to the laws of logic, a fact which logic easily succeeds in showing to be no contradiction at all, inasmuch as the supposed contradictory elements refer to two different aspects of the same reality. Cf. यदा निरोध्य स्याद् (Text) Cf. स्वरूप निरोध्य Ratnāk. Part. V pp. 85-86. Mark three points in the Jaina doctrine: (1) The Jaina does not hold that Being and Non-Being are *absolutely* the same "न यत् .... Ratn. III. 8. p. 85. (2) Nor does he hold that Non-Being exists as inseparable from Being (ibid p. 86). (3) What he holds is that Being and Non-Being

are predicable of the same subject. Cf. स्यात् अस्तित्वेन etc.
—Saptabhangi-tarangini, pp. 52-51 pp. 66-87

The Jaina doctrine is illustrated in the text by the example of a 'मेचकरत्न' (many-coloured gem) and a 'चित्रपट' (multi-coloured piece of cloth) which may be at once red and black, red in one part and black in the other. Here both the colours are in the same पट even though in different parts of it. If you say that here a certain part is red and a certain other part is black, and so the two colours are not predicated of one and the same thing ([illegible]), it will be easy to reply that they are so predicated (तथापि चित्रपटोपलब्धेः), although with reference to particular parts i.e. कथंचित्, somehow, with reference to this part or that. If you think that this is only an ingenious escape from a difficult position and that the colours after all belong to different things (पटावयव) and not to the same thing (चित्रपट) i.e. its different aspects (स्वरूपपररूप)‡ we shall give you another illustration which is not open to any such objection. It is the illustration of one man bearing such mutually contradictory predicates as father, son, uncle, nephew etc., which are perfectly reconcilable in so far as they refer to different relationships of the same man. Cf "अस्तित्व नास्तित्व [illegible] । यथा—एकस्य देवदत्तस्यापेक्षया पितृत्वमन्यापेक्षया पुत्रत्वं च परस्परमविरुद्धम्—" Sapta. p.51.
Cf. S'âmkara Bhâsya on Brahma Sûtra. II. I. 14.

Moreover the स्वरूप and the पररूप of a thing may refer to the द्रव्य क्षेत्र काल or भाव of that thing. See Sapta. pp. 43-45

स्वोत्प्रेक्षितरूपताः—Struck down or confounded by their one-sided dogmatism. पतन्ति—lie low on the ground where they are liable to be trampled upon by every passer by on the road.

स्खलन्ति—(1) err ; or (2) fall down speechless like a man who has met with an accident on the road.

‡ As to what one should take as the स्वरूप and the पररूप of a thing such as घट different views are noticed in the Saptabhangi-tarangini, pp. 39 to 45 ; also in the Râjavârtika, pp. 24-34.

नेन च विरोधदोषे etc.—The charge expressly laid against the Syādvāda and answered in the Stanza is that of विरोध or contradiction. It stands however for a host of other faults also ('उपलक्षणात्') viz.—(2) वैयधिकरण्य (3) अनवस्था (4) संकर (5) व्यतिकर (6) संशय (7) अप्रतिपत्ति (8) विषयव्यवस्थाहानि each of which is explained and answered in the sequel (See Saptabhaṅgī-Taraṅgiṇī pp. 81–83).

वैयधिकरण्य Dislocation, absence of a common abode: सामान्य and विशेष—one positive and the other negative in character—are opposed to each other and cannot have a common abode or location, any more than heat and cold which never subsist together. You will perhaps explain that in a certain aspect a thing is an abode of सामान्य and in another aspect it is an abode of विशेष. But, then, we are entitled to ask: Is this done by a single nature of the thing or has that thing two natures corresponding to the two aspects? In the former case, the difficulty of वैयधिकरण्य remains status quo. In the latter if two natures are required for the two aspects two again will be required for each of the two natures and so on ad infinitum. This is the अनवस्था mentioned above as fault No. 3

Moreover there is संकर or confusion fault No. 4—Thus: That nature by which the thing becomes an abode of सामान्य by it it becomes an abode of both सामान्य and विशेष—which is absurd, for the reason that it involves संकर or confusion between सामान्य and विशेष in a common abode. ("सर्वेषां युगपत्प्राप्तिः संकरः" S. T.).

Next there is the fault of व्यतिकर or exchange of natures. Thus: by that very nature by which thing is the abode of सामान्य it would be the abode of विशेष also, and vice versa. This, however is absurd, since सामान्य and विशेष would in that exchange their natures and take each other's place (परस्परविषयगमनं व्यतिकरः S. T.).

Next there is the fault of संशय (No. 6)—do bt arising from the difficulty of ascertaining the exact nature of thing in

regard to सामान्य and विशेष And from the same arises अप्रतिपत्ति (Ne, 7) or failure to understand the position, thus throwing the whole science of logic into confusion विषयव्यवस्थाहानि (No, 8).

The reader if the carefully compares the explanation of संशय and व्यतिकर here given with those given in the Syādvāda-taranginī, he will perceive some slight difference.

All these faults fail to apply to स्याद्वाद which is a philosophy of different kind altogether For the सामान्य and विशेष in Jaina philosophy are not independent concepts as in Nyāya and other systems. The word विरोध in the stanza may primarily signify the particular दोष called विरोध in the narrow sense of the term and then indicate by way of उपलक्षण the rest of the series of दोषs beginning with वैयधिकरण्य Or the word may be taken in the general sense of दोष, and may thus include the whole group of दोषs viz. विरोध वैयधिकरण्य etc. For full answer to the objections see Sapta-bhangī-taranginī pp. 81-82.

अतः स्याद्वाद to —F further elucidation of विरोध and its kindred दोष vide the excerpts given in the Appendix from the Saptabhangī-taranginī pp. 87 88.

Books of reference

1. Āptamīmāṁsā and Aṣṭasahasrī.
2. Saptabhangī taranginī.
3. Rāja-Vārtika with Commentary
4. Ratnākarāvatārikā on P. N. T.
5. Guṇaratna's Com. on Ṣaddars'ana-samuccaya.
6. Anekāntajayapatākā.

Appendices

1. [illegible]
[illegible]

इति चेन्न उभयथाभावात्। संशयहेतुरिति चेन्न विशेषलक्षणोपलब्धेः। विरोधाभावात् संशयाभावः। सर्वेषामेतद्विरोधे नित्यत्वादिवत्।

Rāja-Vārtika pp. 24–26

2. स्वं घटस्य स्वद्रव्यं मृद्द्रव्यं परद्रव्यं सुवर्णादि। घटो मृदात्मनास्ति सुवर्णात्मना नास्ति। घटस्य स्वद्रव्यात्मनेव परद्रव्यात्मनाऽपि सत्त्वे घटो मृदात्मको न सुवर्णात्मक इति नियमो न स्यात्। तथा च द्रव्यप्रतिनियमविरोधः।— स्वं घटस्य स्वक्षेत्रं भूतलादि परक्षेत्रं कुड्यादि। घटः स्वक्षेत्रेऽस्ति परक्षेत्रे नास्ति। घटस्य स्वक्षेत्र इव परक्षेत्रेऽपि सत्त्वे प्रतिनियतक्षेत्रत्वानुपपत्तिः। परक्षेत्र इव स्वक्षेत्रेऽप्यसत्त्वे च निराधारत्वापत्तिः। तथा घटस्य स्वकालो वर्तमानकालः, परकालोऽतीतादिः। तत्र स्वकालेऽस्ति परकाले नास्ति। घटस्य स्वकाल इव परकालेऽपि सत्त्वे प्रतिनियतकालत्वाभावेन नित्यत्वमेव स्यात्। परकाल इव स्वकालेऽप्यसत्त्वे सकलकालासंबन्धित्वेनाखपुष्पत्वापत्तिः। कालसंबन्धित्वमेव हि वस्तुत्वम्। तत्र च घटो घटत्वेनास्ति पटत्वेन नास्ति। पाण्डुत्वेनास्ति श्यामत्वेन नास्ति। स्वक्षेत्रेऽस्ति परक्षेत्रेनास्ति। स्वकालेऽस्ति परकालेनास्तीति सर्वत्र बोध्यम्।—Sapta. pp. 43–45

3. ननु अस्तित्वमेव वस्तुनः स्वरूपं न पुनर्नास्तित्वम्। तस्य पररूपाश्रयत्वात्। यदि च पररूपापेक्षमपि नास्तित्वं वस्तुनः स्वरूपं तदा पटगतरूपादिकमपि घटस्य स्वरूपं स्यात्। इति चेन्न। उभयस्यापि स्वरूपत्वे प्रमाणसद्भावात्। तथाहि—घटस्य स्वरूपावच्छिन्नास्तित्वं पररूपावच्छिन्ननास्तित्वं च प्रत्यक्षेणैव गृह्यते। घटो घटत्वेनास्ति पटत्वेन नास्तीति प्रतीतेः। अनुमानप्रयोगश्च—अस्तित्वं स्वाभावेन नास्तित्वेनाविनाभूतं विशेषणत्वात् साधर्म्यवत्। यथा साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्याविनाभावि तथास्तित्वं स्वाभावेन नास्तित्वेनाविनाभूतम्।............। एवं नास्तित्वं स्वाभावेनास्तित्वेनाविनाभूतं विशेषणत्वात्। वैधर्म्यवत्। इत्यनुमानेन तदविनाभावसिद्धिः —Sapta. pp. 52–53.

4 कथञ्च विरोधः। कथमेकमेव कुम्भादि वस्तु सत् असत् भवति?। सत्त्वं असत्त्वपरिहारेण व्यवस्थितम् असत्त्वमपि सत्त्वपरिहारेण अन्यथा तयोरविशेष स्यात्। तस्मात् यदि सत् कथमसत्?। अथासत् कथं सदिति?। तदनवदातम्। यतो यदि येनैव प्रकारेण सत्त्वं तेनैवासत्त्वम् यस्यैव चाधारे तस्यैव चाधारत्वेन तदा स्याद्विरोधः। यदा तु स्वरूपेण घटादित्वेन स्वद्रव्येण हिरण्यादित्वेन स्वक्षेत्रेण नागरादित्वेन स्वकालेन वासन्तिकादित्वेन सत्त्वं पररूपादिना तु पटत्वमृत्पिण्डत्वादिनाऽसत्त्वम्, तदा क्व विरोधगन्धोऽपि?। ये तु सौगताः सदसत्त्वं नाभ्युपयन्ति तेषां घटो परोक्षत्वप्रसङ्गः। तथाहि—यथा घटस्य स्वरूपादिना सत्त्वं तथा यदि पररूपादिनापि स्यात् तथा सति घटादिवत् पटादिरूपतया कथं न सर्वात्मकत्वं भवेत्?। पररूपेण तु असत्त्वे प्रतिनियतोऽसौ सिध्यति। अत एव

धर्मिणि प्रधानत्वं किं तु स्वरूपमेव तदिति चेत् अहो बलवान् मोहोऽपि तर्हि नित्यानित्यत्वा वस्तुस्वरूपा । न खलु धर्मेण सर्वं धर्मेणान्तरं धर्मितुमर्हति । विधिप्रतिषेधकल्पना विषयत्वोऽप्यालम्बनयोरैक्याभावात् । अथ इत्थं तत्वान्तरगम्यो न च मानुमन्यत एवेति किमिहाभिन्नमान्यम् ॥

—Ratnākarāvatārikā Part V pp. 85-86.

5 ननु अनेकान्तवादे विरोधाद्यष्टदोषाः संभवन्ति । तथाहि—एकत्र वस्तुनि विधिप्रतिषेधरूपयोरस्तित्वनास्तित्वधर्मयोर्न संभवः । शीतोष्णस्पर्शवत् भावाभावयोः परस्परं विरोधात् । अस्तित्वं हि भावरूपं विधिमुखप्रत्ययविषयत्वात् । नास्तित्वं च प्रतिषेधरूपं निषेधमुखप्रतीतिविषयत्वात् । यत्रास्तित्वं तत्र नास्तित्वस्य विरोधः, यत्र च नास्तित्वं तत्रास्तित्वस्य विरोधः । इति विरोधः (१) ॥ अस्तित्वस्याधिकरणमन्यत् नास्तित्वस्य चाधिकरणमन्यदिति वैयधिकरण्यम् (२) ॥ येन रूपेणास्तित्वं येन च रूपेण नास्तित्वं तादृशरूपयोरपि प्रत्येकमस्तित्वनास्तित्वात्मकत्वं वक्तव्यम् । तत्र स्वरूपान्तरकल्पनायां अपरापरस्वरूपकल्पनयानवस्था (३) अप्रामाणिकपदार्थपरंपराकल्पनया विश्रान्त्यभावादनवस्थोच्यते ॥ येन रूपेण सत्त्वं तेन रूपेणासत्त्वस्यापि प्रसङ्गः, येन रूपेण चासत्त्वं तेन रूपेण सत्त्वस्यापि प्रसङ्ग इति संकरः (४) । सर्वेषां युगपत्प्राप्तिः संकरः इत्यभिधानात् ॥ येन रूपेण सत्त्वं तेन रूपेणासत्त्वमेव स्यात् न तु सत्त्वं येन रूपेण चासत्त्वं तेन सत्त्वमेव स्यात् न त्वसत्त्वम् इति व्यतिकरः (५) परस्परविषयगमनं व्यतिकर इति वचनात् ॥ सत्त्वासत्त्वात्मकत्वे च वस्तुन इदमित्थमेवेति निश्चेतुमशक्तेः संशयः (६) । ततश्चाप्रतिपत्तिः (७) ॥ ततः सत्त्वासत्त्वात्मकवस्तुनोऽभावः (८) ॥

—Sapta. pp. 81-82.

For reply to this set of objections read —

6. अत्र प्रत्यभिधीयते । कथंचित् प्रतीयमाने स्वरूपापेक्षया विधिनिषेधौ सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः प्रतीयमानयोर्न विरोधः । अनुपलम्भसाध्यो हि विरोधः । न हि स्वरूपादिना वस्तुनः सत्त्वे सत्येव पररूपादिभिरसत्त्वस्यानुपलम्भोऽस्ति । स्वरूपादिभिः सत्त्वस्येव पररूपादिभिरसत्त्वस्यापि प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात् । न खलु वस्तु सर्वथा भाव एव स्वरूपं स्वरूपेणेव पररूपेणापि भावप्रसङ्गात् । .... नापि स्वरूपेण भाव एव पररूपेणाभावात् पररूपेणाभाव एव न च स्वरूपेण भाव इति भावाभावयोरेकत्र वस्तुनि वैयधिकरण्यमप्रतिपत्तिः इति चेत् प्रमाणप्रमेयस्वरूपानभिज्ञानविलसितमेतत् । स्वरूपादिभिर्हि विधिविषयेण भावसत्त्वं प्रमाणसत्त्वं पररूपादिभिः प्रतिषेधविषयस्य अभावस्वभावत्वात् इत्येकाधिकरणत्वसिद्धेरेकवस्तुनि भावाभावयोर्वैर ॥...... ....

Incidentally a reply is given to the S'ânkara Vedântin :—

ननु सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरेकत्र वस्तुनि प्रतीतिर्मिथ्येति चेत्। बाधकाभावात्। विरोधो बाधक इति चेत्। परस्पराश्रयात्। सति हि विरोधे प्रतीतेरनेन बाध्यमानत्वात् मिथ्यात्वसिद्धिः। तस्यां च सत्त्वासत्त्वयोर्विरोधसिद्धिः इति॥

किं च विरोधस्तावत्त्रिधा स्यात् बध्यघातकभावेन सहानवस्थानात्मना वा प्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धकरूपेण वा। तत्राद्यः अहिनकुलाग्न्युदकादिविषयः। स चैकस्मिन् काले वर्तमानयोर्द्वयोः सति भवति संयोगस्यानेकाश्रयत्वात् द्वित्ववत्। नासंयुक्तमग्निं नाशयति सर्वत्राग्न्यभावप्रसङ्गात्। ततस्सति संयोगे बलीयसोत्तरकालं बाध्यते। न हि तथाऽस्तित्वनास्तित्वयोः क्षणमात्रमप्येकत्र वृत्तिरस्तीति परैरभ्युपगम्यते यतो बध्यघातकभावो विरोधस्तयोः कल्प्येत। यदि चैकत्रैतयोर्वृत्तिरभ्युपगम्यते तदा तयोस्तुल्यबलत्वान्न बध्यघातकभावः॥ नापि सहानवस्थानलक्षणो विरोधः स चैकत्र कालभेदेन वर्तमानयोर्भवति यथा आम्रफले श्यामतापीततयोः। उत्पद्यमाना हि पीतता पूर्वकालभाविनीं श्यामतां नाशयति। न हि तथाऽस्तित्वनास्तित्वे पूर्वोत्तरकालभाविनी। यदि स्याताम्— अस्तित्वकाले नास्तित्वाभावाज्जीवसत्तामात्रं सर्वं प्राप्नुयात्। नास्तित्वकाले चास्तित्वाभावात्तदाश्रयो बन्धमोक्षादिव्यवहारो विरोधमुपगच्छेत्। सर्वथैकान्तासतः पुनरात्मलाभाभावात् सर्वथा च सतः पुनरात्मलाभभावस्तयोर्नैवोत्पादस्तदसत्त्वात् युज्यते। तथास्तित्वनास्तित्वयोः प्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धकभावलक्षणोऽपि विरोधो न सम्भवति। यथा—सति मणिरूपप्रतिबन्धके वह्निना दाहो न जायत इति मणिदाहयोः प्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धकभावो युक्तः न हि तथाऽस्तित्वकाले नास्तित्वस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वं नास्तित्वकालेऽप्यस्तित्वस्य तथाविधा कार्यस्य प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात् इति।

ननु शीतोष्णस्पर्शयोरिवैति सहानवस्थानं तदयुक्तम्। एकत्र धूपकडुच्छुकादावेकदैव शीतोष्णस्पर्शयोरन्यत्रापि विरोधासिद्धेः।

यथैकत्र धूपकडुच्छुकयोर्युगपत् शीतोष्णस्पर्शयोर्विरोधाभावः तथा सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरपि।

एतेन वैयधिकरण्यमपास्तम्। सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरेकाधिकरणतया प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात्।

यच्चान्यदुक्तमनवस्थादिदूषणं तदपि नावकाशं लभते। अनन्तधर्मात्मकस्य वस्तुन एवं प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नत्वेनाभ्युपगमात्। अनवस्थादिदूषणं परस्परापरिहारेण स्थितत्वात्॥ एतेन सङ्करव्यतिकरावपि निरस्तौ प्रतीतिसिद्धे वस्तुनि दोषाभावात्। दोषाणां प्रतीत्यसिद्धार्थविषयत्वात्॥ संशयादयश्च पूर्वमेव निरस्ताः। इत्यलं विस्तरेण।

अथ प्रकृतम् । विवक्षितार्थाभावे प्रतिपत्तिरेवेति मिथ्यात्वमपि निश्चेतुम् अशक्यं प्रतिभासमानं पूर्वं प्रति ताद्रूप्येणावभासमानत्वात्। दोषापेक्षितं

मिथ्यात्वं प्रकारिता हेतुः प्रयोक्तव्यः प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्। न च हेतुः स्वरूपेण ज्ञापको भवत्यप्रसिद्धः। येन रूपेण हेतोरेकान्तत्वं तेन च रूपेण [illegible] न साध्य इति हेतोरसम्भवात्, तयोर्हेतुसाध्ययोः हेत्वेका- न्तमिति मिन्नत्वात्। न हि तयोर्मिथ्यैकान्तानभ्युपगमेन रूपेण साध्यत्वं तेन रूपेण हेतुत्वं च सम्भवतीति संशयः। येन रूपेण साध्यत्वं तेन रूपेण हेतुत्वमेवेति व्यतिरेके वा साध्यसाधनयोर्विरोधो वा सम्भवति तथाऽनेकान्तप्रसिद्धया- मपि विरोधादिदोषाभावात्।

वस्तुतत्त्व—अनेकान्तप्रसिद्धयां सर्वेषां प्रकारिणामपि प्रसिद्धिरेव। एका- न्तेनाकारस्य वस्तुस्वरूपस्याभावात्॥

—Sapta. pp. 81-90.

Stanza XXV

स्यादित्यव्ययम्—स्यात् originally pot. 3rd sing of अस्, is here employed as an adverb. This means that the word will not change its form even if the subject and the predicate be in the plural number: thus स्यादित्यादि not स्युरित्यादि This conver sion of a verb into an adverb seems intended for fixing the title by which the essential character of the doctrine may be designated.

आवर्तनीय—स्यात् to be construed with—(1) नाशि, (2) नित्यं (3) सदृशं (4) विरूपं (5) वाच्यं (6) न वाच्यं (7) सत् and (8) असत्— which make fo r Syādvāda propositions:

(1) स्यान्नित्यम्, स्यादनित्यम्—the two together making single proposition

(2) स्यात् सामान्यम्, स्याद्विशेष ,,

(3) स्यादभिलाप्यम्, स्यादनभिलाप्यम् ,,

(4) स्यात् सत्, स्यादसत् ,,

[illegible] सुधा Chief of the wise. [illegible] etc.—This is why the Truth of Jaina philosophy is compared to nectar

यथा हि पतितस्य etc —The utterances of the Master are compared to eructations which follow upon his having drunk to his fill the nectar of Truth. The s ggestion is—When the

very emanations of nectar are so fragrant, how much more fragrant must be the nectar!

अथवा—Perhaps the commentator realised that his analysis of the simile made it a bit coarse. पर्याप्तम्—to their heart's fill

एते चत्वारोऽपि—Of the propositions mentioned above No (1) in आदीपमाव्योम॰ St. V No. (2) in अनेक॰ St. XIV Nos. (3) and (4) in अपर्ययं वस्तु॰ St. XXIII which deals with the सप्तभङ्गी doctrine.

Stanza XXVI

य एव दोषाः etc.—The destructive criticisms of the *Nityavāda* and the *Kṣaṇikavāda* destroy each other and thereby lead to a higher synthesis in the same way as the enemies of a king may destroy themselves by mutual warfare and thereby serve to bring about his undisputed sovereignty

I Untenability of अनित्य (क्षणिक) वाद—नित्यवादी प्रत्यवतिष्ठते etc.—The *Nityavādin's* (*Eternalist's*) *criticism of his opponent.* He thus argues his case: If all things be अनित्य the cause and the effect will fall on two different moments of time, and so at the moment when one *is* the other *is not.* Now how can that which *is* act upon that which *is not*? And if a thing cannot *act* it cannot *be* for *to be is to act* (अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं सत्त्वम्). Thus it may be shown that things can never be अनित्य That a अनित्य thing is incapable of *acting* (अर्थक्रिया) may be thus shown by means of a dilemma : Is the अनित्य thing सत् while it acts or is it असत्? Not the former For in that case, the अनित्य thing would be operating upon its contemporaneous effect which is impossible; for if that were possible all things being contemporaneous with one another would be causes of one another which is absurd. Nor will the latter alternative do. For how can a thing that is असत् possess causal power any more than a शशविषाण (the horn of a hare)? And no third alternative is possible Therefore the

original hypothesis of क्षणिकत्व breaks down, and that of स्थिरत्व rises in its place.

II Untenability of स्थिरवाद—The *Kṣaṇikavādin's criticism of Sthiravāda*:

The Kṣaṇikavādin argues his case thus:

सर्वं क्षणिकं सत्त्वात्—All things are क्षणिक because they are possessed of सत्त्व क्षणिकत्व being a necessary condition of सत्त्व. That क्षणिकत्व is a necessary condition of सत्त्व may be thus proved: First, remember that सत्त्व means अर्थक्रियाकारित्व (Cf. James's Pragmatic Theory of Truth), for that is the very definition of सत्त्व and so when अर्थक्रिया is impossible सत्त्व is impossible. Now let us consider whether a thing that is not क्षणिक, in other words what is स्थिर can ever be अर्थक्रियाकारिन्. That it can never be may be shewn by means of the foll wi g dilemma: Does the thing that is supposed to be स्थिर exercise अर्थक्रिया step by step (क्रम) or all at once (यौगपद्य)? It cannot do so *step by step*, for that involves the loss of स्थिरत्व — the thing having already changed, i. e. ceased to be स्थिर the moment th first step has been taken. If the thing continues to be the same even afte the first step is taken there will be no cessation of the acting suited to the first step and thus there will be no possibility of a second step ever being taken. If, on the other hand the thing is supposed to change by the first tep it loses its स्थिरत्व by so doing. For to be no longer in the former state means to be अस्थिर. There is possible way out of this difficulty. Suppose it is held that the thing remains the same all along the steps, but waits the arrival of सहकारिन् or auxiliary cause in going from step to step; thus the changes are rung out not on the original thing which retains its sameness and therefore स्थिरत्व but only on the series of सहकारिन्s. B t this makeshift does not really obviate th difficulty but only pushes it a little further on. Thus, if the thing remains the same in spite of the arrival of the सहकारिन् it means the सहकारिन् has exercised no influence upon the original cause. Now we ask why has it not? Is it

that it was waiting for another सहकारिन् to come to its aid ? If so it only launches you upon अनवस्था a regressus ad infinitum Let us now take the other alternative viz., that of action *all at once* (युगपद्). It will be readily seen that this is impossible. Nothing can put forth activities in all directions and accomplish its effects all at once in a single moment of time Supposing it can, all its work will be finished in the first instant of time, leaving the thing without क्रिया and therefore different from what it was before —which amounts to a confession that the thing is अनित्य

सर्वमेवान्यदुपपन्नं etc.—The logical result of the above conflict is that the हेतु put forward by each of the two parties is found to be vitiated by the हेत्वाभास called 'विरुद्ध' *i. e* the हेतु ('सत्त्वात्') which proves the very opposite of what it is intended to prove.

अत एव नित्यानित्यपक्ष etc.—The aobve line of reasoning with respect to नित्य and अनित्य is to be applied mutatis mutandis to the dogmas of सामान्य and विशेष as held by the other schools

सुन्दोपसुन्दवत्—Mutual destruction like that of the two demon-brothers Sunda and Upasunda.

Here is the story [illegible]

द्वादशाङ्गविद्—For the Jaina canon and its divisions see Weber's article in Ind Ant (1888 and 1892), Enc. Rel. and Ethics, Art. on "Jainism" Jaini's "Outlines of Jainism.

सर्वार्थे इत्यादि—Hem. V vi 35.

Stanza XXVII.

The doctrine of स्याद्वाद or अनेकान्तवाद as it is otherwise called is not a doctrin of mere spec lative interest—one intended to solve mere ontological problem—but has a bearing upon man s psychological and spiritual life. This is the point of Stanza XXVII in which the author shows how it is impossible to explain सुख-दुःख (मोक्ष), पुण्य-पाप and बन्ध-मोक्ष—except on the hypothesis of अनेकान्तवाद

I

1. एकान्तनित्ये *etc.*—If आत्मन् be *exclusively* नित्य the experiences of happiness and misery will thereby be rendered impossible. For to be नित्य means t be unchangeable, and there cannot be experiences of happiness and misery one after another unless आत्मन् could pass (change) from one state to another It will be said by way of a defence f the नित्य-आत्मवाद that the आत्मन् does not change, only its states change. This however may be met by asking Do the states remain separate from the आत्मन् or are they *one* with the आत्मन्? In the former case how co ld they be ssociated with आत्मन्? Besides, they would be entire strangers to आत्मन्, as foreign to it as any other thing i the universe. I the latter case they are as good as not, and th old difficulty of accounting for change consistently with the नित्यत्व of आत्मन् remains the same. Moreover if आत्मन् is exclusively possessed of a particular nature, how can there be y difference or cha ge of states such as on from सुख to दुःख?

(2) पुण्य and पाप, too re impossible on the hypothesis of exclusive नित्यत्व For the experience of सुख and दुःख are

brought about by पुण्य and पाप— which means that they should exercise a certain activity and this is impossible if आत्मन् is कूटस्थ नित्य i. e. unchangingly eternal. Remember that the Jaina does not deny the eternality of आत्मन् provided it is eternality-with-change.

(3) बन्ध and मोक्ष are similarly impossible on the hypothesis of exclusive नित्यत्व. बन्ध is the union of karmic matter (कर्मपुद्गल) with every portion of आत्मन् like that of fire with a piece of iron; while मोक्ष is the annihilation of all कर्मन्. Now both of these would be impossible under the hypothesis of exclusive नित्यत्व. Thus:—बन्ध is a kind of संयोग and संयोग is अप्राप्तस्य प्राप्तिः i. e. obtaining what has not been obtained already. Thus, there are two distinct states involved in the notion of संयोग—the previous absence and the later presence which are inconsistent with the hypothesis of changeless नित्यत्व of आत्मन्. Moreover we would ask: How does a changeless and uniformly enduring आत्मन् suddenly happen to incur the trammels of बन्ध? Again, was he not मुक्त before the chains of बन्ध came to be put on him? Then, again, does the बन्ध make any change in the आत्मन् or not? If it *does* he is अनित्य like any other mortal thing such as a piece of hide. If it *does not* so as to keep the आत्मन् निर्विकार the presence or absence of the बन्ध matters nothing to him who remains as unaffected as आकाश by the change.

2. एवमनित्यैकान्तवादेऽपि etc.—The doctrine next criticised is the other side of the Truth regarded as the *whole* Truth viz absolute अनित्यत्व of आत्मन्. An absolutely अनित्य thing is that which is निरन्वयोच्छेदधर्मक i. e. that which undergoes absolute annihilation.

(1) If आत्मन् is so absolutely अनित्य as to undergo such an annihilation it means an end to the law of Retribution—which requires personal identity of कर्तृ and भोक्तृ.

अथ क्षणिकेऽपि etc.—Supposing the doctrine of the absolute अनित्यत्व of आत्मन् is so modified as to substitute सन्तान of आत्मन् i. e. continuity for identity: thus, not the identical आत्मन् but

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the continuous stream of consciousness which we call आत्मन्, is both बद्ध and मुक्त karma being transmitted from one life to another in the shape of वासनारूप i.e. as impressions left on the सन्तान by karmans—on the analogy of colour which transmits itself from one piece of cloth to another. But the second position is no more tenable than the first. For the सन्तान and the क्षण which are substituted for आत्मन् and बुद्धि are pure fictions, and so they have been shown in the commentary on St. XVIII.

(2) Similarly under the hypothesis of absolute अनित्यत्व of आत्मन्, the resulting lack of personal identity and the passing away of the original बुद्धि make पुण्य and पाप and their consequent सुखदुःखादिभाव impossible; in other words, they take away all sense from the law of Retribution. Moreover if आत्मन् is अनित्य in the sense of क्षणस्थायी i.e. existing only for a single instant he cannot be the author of पुण्य and पाप. For the single instant is the length of time just sufficient for it to come into existence, and there is nothing left to prepare for doing पुण्य or पाप. [Note that a क्षण is by hypothesis and definition an infinitesimal division of time, and so one क्षण one act.] You will say: Suppose the आत्मन् of the first क्षण produced the आत्मन् of the next क्षण and so on, so that there is continuity—mark not the identity—of being. But this explanation will not do. The law of homogeneity of Cause and Effect would require that a happy आत्मन् should beget only a happy आत्मन् and so the vicissitudes of happiness and misery in the आत्मन् would become impossible.

(3) Lastly under the hypothesis of the absolute अनित्यत्व of आत्मन्, बन्ध and मोक्ष are correlates which have no meaning unless they are predicated of one and the same आत्मन्.

Thus, rejecting the doctrine of absolute नित्यत्व of आत्मन् on the one hand, and of absolute अनित्यत्व on the other, the Jaina philosopher lays down the doctrine of the नित्यानित्यत्व of आत्मन् which represents the synthesis of the two extremes

(अनेकान्तवाद)- It is the doctrine of *identity-in-change*, of *unity-in-difference*, of *one-in-many*

परिणामो etc.—परिणाम defined

पातञ्जलटीकाकारोऽप्याह—See Yogasūtra Vyāsa Bhāṣya III-12. The quotation is made from Vyāsa's commentary on Patanjali's Sūtra, and so Malliṣeṇa is quite right in saying "पातञ्जलटीकाकारोऽप्याह" The foot-note in AMP edition of the Syādvāda Mañjarī—अत्र ग्रन्थकृता टीकाकारोऽप्याह इति वक्तुं समुचितम्। यत इदं पातञ्जलसूत्रम्। is evidently a mistake.

एवं सामान्यविशेष—Similarly it may be shown that it would be impossible to explain सुखदुःख, पुण्यपाप and बन्धमोक्ष if we held the doctrines of absolute सामान्य and absolute विशेष, absolute सत् and absolute असत्, absolute अभिलाप्य and absolute अनभिलाप्य.

II

अथोपसंहारकाव्यम्—

परैः It has the double sense of "others" i. e. non-Jaina-heretical-philosophers, and of "enemies" The word has been used before in this double sense (परैः). such doctrines as give only a part-view of Truth (वस्तुनो ह्येकदेशविषयत्वेन प्रवृत्ति नियमदर्शिनीति) दुर्नीतिवृन्द

परिषत्सु Construe पक्षेषु इति यावत्

तावकास्मत्पक्षैः—By *lakṣaṇā* as in मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति where मञ्चस्थाः पुरुषाः See Kāvya P. II.

सम्यक्त्वादयो etc.—सम्यक्त्वादि and other psychic qualities are the भावप्राण of Siddhas i. e. the mental qualities which have become their very breath. Hence, Siddhas are classed among जीव, not-withstanding the absence of ordinary vital airs (द्रव्यप्राण) in their case. The root जीव् means to possess vital airs or life. The vital airs in the case of Siddhas are the सम्यक्त्वादि and similar qualities.

दशविधप्राण—These have been enumerated in the foot note of AMP edition: पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि मनोवाक्कायबलानि आयुष्, उच्छ्वास and निःश्वास.

Stanza XXVIII

सदेव etc —The author is next going to explain what is meant by (1) दुर्नय (2) नय and (3) प्रमाण

प्रमाणनयैरधिगम—Tattvārtha Sūtra I 6.

जीवाजीवास्रव —These are (1) जीव (2) अजीव (3) आस्रव (4) बन्ध (5) संवर (6) निर्जरा and (7) मोक्ष See Tattvārtha I 4.

अर्थो etc.—अर्थ derived from the root ऋ, means that which is determined or known; all knowables.

निर्णीत II as निश्चय निर्णीत, i. e. in the sense of commandment, that is, in the sense of 'must be' not—'may be'

नय वैतावत्—Nayas are the points of views which disclose only *partial* truths. See below

प्रमाणं प्रमाणम्—*Pramāṇa* is the doctrine of Syādvāda, which lays bare the *whole truth* which is the synthesis of extremes and not absolute extremes or fragmentary truths. प्र in प्रमाण suggests completeness of view For the two varieties of प्रमाण viz. प्रत्यक्ष and परोक्ष see Tattvārtha VII 12. Pr N T Part II 2 etc. and III 1 etc.

सदेव— When a partial truth is put forward as the whole truth e. g सदेव—' It is, and is *only* ' it is दुर्नय i. e. a false proposition.

अप्रधानप्रधानात् नपुंसकत्वम्—Neut. gend. That is 'सत्' When we do not know the sex (अप्रधानप्रधानात्) of the child we use the neut gender e. g when we say कि तस्य पुत्रो जातम् ?'

सत्—When partial truth is put forward as in the proposition "सत् = It is, without excluding, that is, denying its contradictory by an 'एव' It is नय i. e. partial truth thus, अस्ति घट is illustration of नय But to say सदेव and thus exclude the element of असत् absolutely is दुर्नय प्रमाण is synthesis of सत् and असत् which is expressed in the स्यात् which is the only प्रमाण view Thus (1) सदेव is दुर्नय सत् is नय स्यात् सत् is प्रमाण एकान्तदृष्टिः—One-sided vision of the elephant, the idea is that the elephant does not keep both his

eyes open, but only one or the other as he turns this way or that.

सदेव सत्—स्यात् (कथंचित्) सत् (वस्तु). It is from a certain point of view implying that it is *not* from another point of view This is a statement of the *whole* Truth. There is nothing ‘दृष्ट’ or ‘इष्ट’ (which we see or which we should like to see) which contradicts it; while there are objections in the other case (विरोधे) *i. e.* the case of laying down absolute propositions like those discussed in the preceding stanzas.

सदिति त्रिधार्थः—Here we have exemplified दुर्नय नय and प्रमाण in the case of (1) सत्. Similar examples may be framed with respect to (2) असत् (3) नित्यत्व (4) अनित्यत्व, (5) वक्तव्य and (6) अवक्तव्य (7) सामान्य and (8) विशेष. These are the eight पक्ष mentioned supra—See St. XXV and Commentary

दुर्नीतपथं etc.—Construe the words in the Stanza thus त्वमेव आस्थः, आस्थः from अस् to throw or cast off *i. e.* reject, refute. For the grammatical form see below त्वमेव-you and you alone, न तीर्थान्तरीया अपि not even the gods of the other schools

तीर्थान्तरीयास्तत्त्वं etc.—That is to say they fail to see the whole truth through दुर्नयैः

दुर्नयं नयति—यथा कश्चित् etc.—One who knows the Path of Truth and is benevolently disposed towards others makes travellers abandon the path which is beset with ‘thieves’ (‘दुर्नय’); next, he shows them the Path which is possessed of t least the negative virtue of being not bad though it is not positively good (*i. e.* नय); and, lastly he points out to them the path which is not only not bad but positively good (*i. e.* प्रमाण).

आस्थ इत्यत्र ते —A r of अस् (Hema 78 [illegible]). See Hem III. iv 60. IV i. 103, and IV iv 31. अस्यतेः—अस्थः

प्रमाणादृष्टा etc.—Strictly speaking प्रमाण alone is Truth and not नय. For नय to the extent that it does not disclose the whole truth may be said to be Error

अनुयोगद्वार—In the journey from अनुयोगद्वार to प्रमाणद्वार (names of Âgamas) *i.e.* from Inquiry to Establishment of Truth,

[illegible] हि etc.—[illegible]—Exposition of the word

[illegible] etc.—See विशेषावश्यक भाष्य on St. 77 [illegible]

[illegible] etc.

See also S'II's Com on Acār I. i. p. 3.

[illegible] etc.—Here are two words of the same form ('नय'), one being form of [illegible] at the end of the compound the other a noun ending in अ The commentator need not have made this attempt to explain way [illegible] (See K. Pr VII) which is after all not a ery serious fault in a we k of logic or philosophy

तथापि प्रथमं [illegible] etc.—The author of the Stanza has arranged the three subjects दुर्नय etc. in the order of their degree of importance o ascending values; Mallisena's business as commentator is to *explain* the terms, and so he will take up नय before दुर्नय, knowledge of the latter being hardly possible without that of the former

नय प्रमाणपरिगृहीतार्थैकदेश —Definition of नय नय may be defined as "प्रमाणपरिगृहीतार्थैकदेशग्राही i.e apprehension of part of the object, the whole of which is revealed only by प्रमाण Take प्रमाणपरिगृहीत with अर्थ and not एकदेश fo what distinguishes प्रमाण from नय is that it re eals the *whole* truth while नय reveals but *part* of the whole truth f further support of this, see Devasūri's definition f नय (P N T Ch VII) quoted in the sequel [illegible] i.e.—Where [illegible] qualifies [illegible] and not [illegible] Note f rther that नय is not simply [illegible] but [illegible] that is t ny knowledge of part of the *Truth* and not merely of a part of ny object whatsoever whether real or imaginary Thus, नय so far as it goes, deals with Reality tho gh with only part of Reality Is not नय, then, प्रमाण *pro tanto ?* The question and the answer will be found in passage of Pr N T Ratna, quoted in the sequel.

[illegible]— A part or a fragment, not necessarily one part or one fragment. अंश –[illegible] (Pr. N T)

[illegible] वस्तु—नय is so called because it conveys (from नी) to the mind Reality as possessed of that particular धर्म or अंश to which one desires to advert, although as a matter of fact that Reality is possessed of numberless धर्म (cf. [illegible] ...Ācār. I 1. p. 3). Since नय operates upon a Reality which has been already revealed by प्रमाण नय follows प्रमाण Cf प्रमाण...... Rāj. p. 65 Besides, numberless are the नय, because numberless are the धर्म belonging to a thing, and any one or more of them may be adverted to by the speaker

According to the explanation here given नय conveys the Reality to the mind (वस्तु नयति प्रापयति [illegible]); in the Bhāṣya, on Tv Sūtra, नय is explained as conveying the mind to the Reality

[illegible]—The quotation is made from the [illegible] of Siddhasena Divākara.

[illegible] etc.—As many are the statements of नय as are the ways of speaking about a thing

तथापि [illegible] etc.—The infinite number of नय has been reduced to the following seven नैगम etc. The Tatv Sūtra enumerates five नय viz. नैगम, संग्रह, व्यवहार, ऋजुसूत्र and शब्द (नैगम-संग्रह-व्यवहार-ऋजुसूत्र-शब्दा नयाः T. V 1. 34) and afterwards divides नैगम into two and शब्द into three (आद्यशब्दौ द्वित्रिभेदौ—Tv 1, 35). The two says the Bhāṣya, are देशपरिक्षेपी and सर्वपरिक्षेपी; the three are साम्प्रत समभिरूढ and एवंभूत. (For explanation, see below)

[illegible]—The अभिप्राय or the point of view of the speaker may have reference either to अर्थ or to शब्द i. e. thought, or the word in which the thought is expressed. Since these are the only ways in which the mind can approach Reality we may take it that a division of नय which is founded upon them, so far as their foundation is concerned, is exhaustive. The points of view which have reference to

thought are all included in the first four नयाः, while those which have reference to its verbal form in the last three.

The infinite number of नयाः and their reduction to seven types proceeds upon the principle of व्यास (Diffusion, or Detailed treatment) and 'समास' (Condensation, or Brief treatment) respectively says Devasūri "स व्याससमासाभ्यां द्विप्रकारः (Pr N T vii. 3); व्यासतोऽनेकविकल्पः (vii. 4.); समासतस्तु द्विभेदो द्रव्यार्थिकः पर्यायार्थिकश्च (vii. 5); आद्यो नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारभेदात् त्रेधा (vii. 6.); पर्यायार्थिकश्चतुर्धा ऋजुसूत्रः शब्दः, समभिरूढ एवंभूतश्च (vii. 27.) [For explanation see below]. Here is adopted another principle of division besides that of अर्थ and शब्द adopted above, viz., द्रव्यार्थिक and पर्यायार्थिक, the first three नयाः being referred to the former and the last four to the latter.

तत्र नैगमः etc.—The Naigama viewpoint takes note of (1) सत्ता—the highest सामान्य which groups together द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन् in one class; (2) the अवान्तर सामान्य i. e. lower intermediate universals, such as द्रव्यत्व, गुणत्व and कर्मत्व which are confined to द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन् respectively (see supra), and are, therefore lower than सत्ता though higher than घटत्व etc.; (3) the ultimate विशेष, each of which is unique in itself; and lastly (4) the [illegible], which distinguish their bodies from other objects and are regarded as distinct from सामान्य. All these doctrines are well-known in the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system and so the author remarks later on "[illegible] नैगमप्रभवौ वैशेषिक-नैयायिकौ.

Mark that the Naigama viewpoint recognises both सामान्य and विशेष yet it does not amount to अनेकान्तवाद, inasmuch as it regards each of these as absolute and self-sufficient, whereas अनेकान्तवाद looks upon them as different aspects of the same reality. One exception, however is admitted to the absolute distinction between सामान्य and विशेष in the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system. It is the recognition of द्रव्यत्व and other अवान्तरसामान्यs as 'सामान्य-विशेष' (see Vaiś. Sūtras and Bh. Ta ka Bhāṣā etc.).

[illegible] Let us now turn to their works and see what explanations they give of this N ya. A different explanation

of नैगम will be found in the Tat. Sûtra-Bhâṣya and the Râjavârtika with its Com. where नैगम is said to be "अर्थसंकल्पमात्रग्राही नैगमः"—according to which a नैगम view consists in apprehending thing which is intended See also its illustration A third explanation will be fou d in the passage quoted from Pr N T of Devasûri, for which see infra. and Appendices. Dr Satischandra s explanation agrees with the one expressed in the text, except in one point, for which see his History of Indian Logic.

2. संग्रह etc.—It is the view which ignores all विशेष and takes note of सामान्य only

3. व्यवहार etc.—The Vyavahâra view point presents things as they appear to the 'vulgar' ey i. e. it does not care for the logical or scientific method of ascertaining Truth and does not believe in things unseen, that is, such as lie beyond the range of human experience. All प्रमाण according to it must be subordinated to experience and that, too, common experience. Accordingly it sees no reason to admit either सामान्य or विशेष, both of which it regards as contradicted by common experience. The category of सामान्य if it existed, inasmuch as it embraces the whole world, would make us all omniscient! [The criticism would apply with special cogency to the Naiyâyika's doctrine of Sâmânyalakṣaṇâ-pratyâsatti See Tarka-Kaumudi]. Nor is the category of विशेष justified by our actual experience; for, what we perceive is a घट and not the ultimate particulars (विशेष,) which are supposed to consist in§ or belong† to atoms or perish every minute.‡

The only reality is the reality of what actually exists, what we all feel and handle, what exists in the living present, not in the dead past or the imaginary future, both of which lie outside the range of प्रमाण and therefore of the real.

§ The Buddhist v w † The Nyây Vais. view

‡ The Buddhist view The toms and their विशेष are नित्य according to the Nyâya Vaiseṣika.

यथा च सर्वथुक्तत्वात् etc.—See the Tr Sūtra Bhāṣya I. 3..

लौकिक etc.—It is the point of view such as belongs to the common folk; it is not strictly correct; it refers to reality such as is accepted and understood by the vulgar mind.

(4) ऋजुसूत्र It agrees with the सङ्ग्रह point of view in recognising the reality of the present only either of the past or of the future as the two latter are no more real than the horns of a hare—which do nothing and therefore are nothing. Besides, the real is the simple—which does not admit of any division. Thus, the indivisible atoms are the only reals; they coagulate and act and not the so-called bodies or gross reality. That which is its own, and not what is foreign to it, is the real in a thing.

(5) शब्द.—It is the point of view which finds single object denoted by a variety of synonymous terms. At the same time, it recognises differences of objects arising from differences of gender number tense mood (mood), person or—

(6) समभिरूढ—This view-point recognises differences of sense even in the case of synonymous terms, corresponding to the etymological suggestions of differing connotations, and is thus contrary to शब्द. For example इन्द्र, शक्र, पुरन्दर—although synonymous, convey different senses owing to the difference of connotation suggested by their several etymologies. Thus इन्द्र signifies the lord of gods, शक्र the powerful god पुरन्दर the destroyer of the cities, and so on, notwithstanding they are पर्याय from the शब्द point of view. In other words, while the शब्द considers the denotative aspect, समभिरूढ considers the connotative aspect of words.

(7) एवंभूत—This point of view recognises the propriety of applying a word to an object only while it is justified by the then character of the object. Thus, घट which means that which does (√घट्) i. e. performs the work of carrying water is applicable to the object only while it is actually performing the work on the head of a water-carrier not while it is lying idle.

The mere *capacity* to perform that work, such as belongs to a घट before it is used or after it has been used and laid aside does not justify the application of the word to the घट in either of the two latter states. For capacity after all is nothing, no better than 'the horn of a hare' It is the actuality that counts. If we were to allow such an extension of the correct explanation of the word, the word घट would apply to the shells or the lump of clay even before the घट has been actually made or after it has actually ceased to exist.

नय संग्रहोक्ता: etc.—(1) The नैगमनय distinguishes between सामान्य and विशेष, and recognises both The former is regarded as the principle of unity or co-ordination— अविशेषसामान्य —by which we know things as one belonging to the same class; the latter is its opposite.

(2) The संग्रहनय comprehends the whole universe in a single concept— that of Being or Existence—which covers everything.

(3) The व्यवहारनय accepts Existence as it finds it embodied in each particular object. Men in their daily avocations of life are guided by this point of view

(4) The ऋजुसूत्रनय refers to the changing पर्याय only as distinguished from the abiding द्रव्य For all Reality according to it is perishable, constantly departing from the state of existence.

(5) The शब्दनय recognises differences of connotation (but not of denotation) in accordance with the differences in the forms of words, such as इन्द्र शक्र, पुरन्दर etc

(6) The समभिरूढनय goes further and recognises differences of अर्थ, that is denotation, corresponding to those of their different etymologies.

(7) एवंभूतनय declares that thing bears a particular name only while it performs the क्रिया which entitles it to bear that name not always.

Note that these partial view-points become positively false and therefore दुर्नय when they mak not only statements of

part-truths, but *go farther and put forward part-truths as whole truths.*

नैगमनय etc.—Many heretical systems have glimpses of part truths and are so far right. But they are narrow and deny the other sides of truth, and there lies their folly. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems fall under नैगमनय; the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya are cases of संग्रहनय; the Cārvāka is largely based on व्यवहारनय; the Buddhists follow ऋजुसूत्रनय; the grammarians शब्दनय.

एकं च लोकोत्तरम् etc.—See Devasūri Pr. N. T. and Ratnā.

नीयते etc.—There, 'नय' is defined as the particular point of view by which a part of the whole Truth—which only the Jaina scripture has declared—is apprehended.

स्वाभिप्रेतांशात् etc.—The नय is नय so long as it confines itself to its limited area of truth; but it becomes दुर्नय—नयाभास—when it grows aggressive and ventures to deny other parts of the truth.

The question whether नय is प्रमाण *pro tanto* is thus discussed in the Ratn :—

ननु प्रमाणमेव स्वार्थव्यवसायकत्वादिप्रमाणलक्षणम् । स्वार्थैकदेशव्यवसायलक्षण-प्रमाणलक्षणानुपपत्तेः प्रमाणमपि तथाविधस्य प्रमाणत्वं न स्यादिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । नयस्य स्वार्थैकदेशनिर्णीतिलक्षणत्वेन स्वार्थव्यवसायकत्वासिद्धेः । नय-विषयस्य वस्त्वंशस्य ... यदि वस्तु तदा तत्परिच्छेदी नयः प्रमाणमेव । वस्त्वपरिच्छेदे ... प्रमाणत्वम् । न च वस्त्वंशः वस्तु ... नयो मिथ्याज्ञानमेव स्यात् तस्याप्यवस्तुविषयत्वात् ... चेत् तदयुक्तम् । वस्त्वंशस्य वस्तुत्वावस्तुत्वपरिहारेण वस्त्वंशतया प्रतिज्ञानात् । तथा चाहुः—

नायं वस्तु न चावस्तु वस्त्वंशः कथ्यते बुधैः ।
नासमुद्रः समुद्रो वा समुद्रांशो यथैव हि ॥
तन्मात्रस्य समुद्रत्वे शेषांशस्यासमुद्रता ।
समुद्रबहुता वा स्यात् तत्त्वे क्वास्तु समुद्रवित् ॥

यथैव हि समुद्रांशस्य समुद्रत्वे शेषसमुद्रांशानामसमुद्रत्वप्रसङ्गात् समुद्र-बहुत्वापत्तेर्वा तेषामपि प्रत्येकं समुद्रत्वात् । तस्यासमुद्रत्वे वा शेषसमुद्रांशानामप्यसमुद्रत्वात् क्वापि समुद्रव्यवहारायोगात् । समुद्रांशः समुद्रांश एवोच्यते तथा स्वार्थैकदेशो नयस्य न वस्तु स्वार्थैकदेशानामवस्तुत्वप्रसङ्गात् वस्तु-

मूलनयापेक्षया: मान्यतस्तु येषांनामानन्त्यात्तुल्येन कथितापि नयसङ्ख्यापरत्वात् नयाः। किं तर्हि यत्संप्र एवासौ तावद्वतीनयसङ्ख्यामानात्। ततो सर्वेषां प्रवर्तमानो नय त्यापत्तेरप्रत्यवतावभावो न प्रमाण नापि मिथ्याज्ञानमिति।

Taken individually there is no end to नय (व्यासतोऽनेक विकल्पः); but in a condensed form (समासत) that is, generically they may be divided into two: (1) द्रव्यार्थिक and (2) पर्यायार्थिक. The former takes note of the द्रव्य and the latter of the पर्याय

द्रवति द्रोष्यति अदुद्रुवत् तांस्तान् पर्यायानिति द्रव्यम्। तदेवार्थः। सोऽस्ति यस्य विषयत्वेन स द्रव्यार्थिकः। पर्येत्युत्पादविनाशौ प्राप्नोतीति पर्यायः स एवार्थः सोऽस्ति यस्यासौ पर्यायार्थिकः। एतावेव च द्रव्यास्तिकपर्यायास्तिकाविति द्रव्यस्थितपर्यायस्थिताविति द्रव्यार्थपर्यायार्थाविति च प्रोच्येते।

—Pr N T Ratna.

The first of these viz. द्रव्यार्थिकनय is subdivided into (1) नैगम (2) संग्रह and (3) व्यवहार

(1) धर्मयोरित्यादि etc.—नैगम-which may be said to be an abbreviated form of 'नैकगम' says Devasûri,—is the statement in which of tw धर्म or two धर्मिन् or one धर्म and one धर्मिन् one is subordinated to the other

धर्मयोर्धर्मिणोर्धर्मधर्मिणोश्च प्रधानोपसर्जनभावेन यद्विवक्षणं स नैकगमो नैगमः। धर्मयोर्धर्मिणोर्धर्मधर्मिणोश्च मुख्यामुख्यरूपतया यद्विवक्षणं स एवम्। नैकगमात्मको यस्यासौ नैगमो नाम नयो ज्ञेय।   —Pr N T

सच्चैतन्यमात्मनि etc —Illustratio of नैगम in which, f two धर्म one is principal and the othe is subordinate सच्चैतन्यमात्मनि i. e.—In आत्मन् there i (सत्) consciousnes (चैतन्य) here चैतन्य and सत् both re धर्म, but ne of them, viz चैतन्य is the s bject a d therefore principal. सत् (e ist ng) is subordinated (being m de a विशेषण that s, predicate) to th oth r viz. चैतन्य (which is विशेष्य—the subject) सच्चैतन्यमात्मनीति धर्मयोः।

अत्र चैतन्याख्यस्य व्यञ्जनपर्यायस्य प्राधान्येन विवक्षणम् विशेष्यत्वात् सत्त्वाख्यस्य तु व्यञ्जनपर्यायस्योपसर्जनभावेन। तस्य चैतन्यविशेषणत्वात्। इति धर्मद्वयगोचरो नैगमस्य प्रथमो भेदः।   —Pr N T Ratna.

वस्तु पर्यायवद्—An ther illustration of नैगम i which of two धर्मिन् one is principal a d the other s bordinate The

passage may be construed in t o ways (1) पर्यायवद्द्रव्यं वस्तु or (2) वस्तु पर्यायवद्द्रव्यम्. In (1) द्रव्य and वस्तु are the two धर्मिन्s of which द्रव्य—the subject—is the principal and वस्तु—the predicate—is subordinate. O (2) of the two धर्मिन्s, वस्तु (Reality)—the subject—is principal and पर्यायवद्द्रव्यम् (द्रव्य with its attributes)—the predicate—is subordinate.

वस्तु पर्यायवद् द्रव्यमिति धर्मिणोः ।

अत्र हि पर्यायवद् द्रव्यं वस्तु वर्तते इति विवक्षायां पर्यायवद् द्रव्याख्यस्य धर्मिणो विशेष्यत्वेन प्राधान्यम् । वस्त्वाख्यस्य तु विशेषणत्वेन गौणत्वम् ॥ यद्वा । किं वस्तु पर्यायवद् द्रव्यमिति विवक्षायां वस्तुनो विशेष्यत्वात् प्राधान्यम् । पर्यायवद् द्रव्यस्य तु विशेषणत्वात् गौणत्वमिति धर्मिद्वयगोचरोऽयं नैगमस्य द्वितीयो भेदः ।   —Pr N T.; Ratn.

क्षणमेकं etc.—A third illustration of नैगम— in which of one धर्म and the other धर्मिन् one is principal and the other subordinate. Here विषयासक्तजीव—the धर्मिन्—is principal, and क्षणमेकं सुखी—the धर्म—is the predicate and therefore subordinate.

क्षणमेकं सुखी विषयासक्तजीव इति धर्मधर्मिणोः ।

अत्र हि विषयासक्तजीवाख्यस्य धर्मिणो मुख्यता । विशेष्यत्वात् । सुखलक्षणस्य तु धर्मस्य गौणता । तद्विशेषणत्वेनोपसर्जनत्वात् । इति धर्मधर्मिगोचरोऽयं नैगमस्य तृतीयो भेदः ।   —Pr N T.; Ratn.

धर्मद्वय°—When th principal nd the subordinate are regarded as *absolutely* separate, we drift into नैगमाभास.

धर्मद्वयादीनामैकान्तिकपार्थक्याभिसन्धिर्नैगमाभासः ।

धर्मद्वयम्, धर्मिद्वयम्, धर्मधर्मिद्वयं च प्रतीतम् । तेषामैकान्तिकपार्थक्येनाभिसन्धिरभिप्रायो नैगमाभासो नैगमदुर्नय इत्यर्थः ।

यथात्मनि सत्त्वचैतन्ये परस्परमत्यन्तं पृथग्भूते इत्यादि ।

आदिशब्दात् [illegible] सर्वथा पार्थक्येन कथनं तदाभासत्वेन ज्ञातव्यम् ॥

नैयायिकवैशेषिकदर्शनं नैगमाभासतया ज्ञेयम् ॥

यथा वस्तु तत् तत् द्रव्यं पर्यायो वेत्यादि ।

[illegible] इत्यादि [illegible] । [illegible] द्रव्य [illegible] पर्याय न [illegible] । [illegible]

जीवा न मुक्ताः संसारी च । यः समकारी पर्यायः स क्रियाक्रमः क्रियाकर-णेत्यादि । Pr N T ; Ratnā.

यथात्मनि० etc.—Illustration of नयाभास To regard सत्त्व and चैतन्य or द्रव्य and जीव in the above illustrations as *absolutely* separate is नैगमनयाभास

(2) सामान्यमात्र०—सामान्यमात्रग्राही परामर्शः संग्रहः ।

सामान्यमात्रमशेषविशेषरहितं सत्त्वद्रव्यत्वादिकं गृह्णातीत्येवं शीलः सम-एकीभावेन पिण्डीभूततया विशेषराशिं गृह्णातीति संग्रहः । अयमर्थः स्वजातेर्दृष्टेष्टाभ्यामविरोधेन विशेषाणामैकरूप्यतया यद् ग्रहणं स संग्रह इति ।
—P N T Ratnā.

संग्रहनय is one in which only the universal is taken note of the particular being quietly overlooked.

अयमुभय etc.—It is of two kinds पर and अपर (corresponding to the पर and अपर सामान्य of the Vaiśeṣikas).

परसंग्रहनय is one in which pure द्रव्य is apprehended in its highest universality that is as pure सत्, all the विशेष (particulars) being overlooked । अशेषविशेषेष्वौदासीन्यं भजमानः शुद्ध-द्रव्यं सन्मात्रमभिमन्यमानः परसंग्रहः III. विश्वमेकं सदविशेषात्

सत्ताद्वैतं etc.—When, however an aggressive statement is made denying the विशेष we pass from नय to नयाभास

III. सत्ताद्वैतं स्वीकुर्वाणः सकलविशेषान्निराचक्षाणस्तदाभासः । यथा सत्तैव तत्त्वं ततः पृथग्भूतानां विशेषाणामदर्शनात् । अद्वैतवादिदर्शनान्यखिलानि सांख्यदर्शनं चैतस्याभासतया मन्तव्यम् ।

द्रव्यत्वादीन्यवान्तर etc.—अपरसंग्रहनय is one in which a द्रव्य is apprehended under any of the lower universals. द्रव्यत्वादीन्यवान्तरसामान्यानि मन्वानस्तद्भेदेषु गजनिमीलिकामवलम्बमानः पुनरपरसंग्रहः ।

धर्माधर्मे०—III when the द्रव्य viz. धर्म अधर्म &c. are apprehended under the one head of द्रव्यत्व and their particular features viz. धर्मत्व अधर्मत्व etc. are overlooked, it is a case of अपर-संग्रह.

द्रव्यत्वादिकं etc.—When, however you do not rest content with grouping धर्म अधर्म etc. together in one class viz. द्रव्य, but

go a step further and deny their particular distinguishing traits (विशेष), you fall into अपरसंग्रहाभास

यथा द्रव्यत्वमेव etc.—Ill. of the above यथा—द्रव्यत्वमेव तत्त्वं ततोऽर्थान्तरभूतानां द्रव्याणामनुपलब्धेरिति । अयं हि द्रव्यत्वमेव तत्त्वमिति अभ्युपगच्छति तद्विशेषानपि तु धर्मादिद्रव्याण्यपह्नुते इत्यपरसंग्रहाभासनिदर्शनम् ।

(3) संग्रहेण...व्यवहारः etc.—When things which are brought together by संग्रह are affirmed and then distinguished as from an ordinary conventional point of view—it is व्यवहारनय

संग्रहगृहीतान् सत्त्वादीन् विभाज्य न तु निषिध्य वा व्यवहारविषयत्वेन विभजते स व्यवहारनयः ।

यथा यत् सत् etc.—Ill. That which exists (सत् Reality) is ither द्रव्य or पर्याय. Now as matter of whol truth, द्रव्य and पर्याय are not separable, and yet सत् (got by संग्रह) is here divided into the *two*—द्रव्य and पर्याय.

य पुनः etc.—If you go further and insist upon an *absolute distinction of द्रव्य and पर्याय you commit* व्यवहाराभास *For* in reality ther is no such bsolute distinction. That is, from the ordinary or व्यवहार point of view we can llow you to speak of द्रव्य *and* पर्याय but if y u insist upon their *absolute* distinction we must point out that you re going beyond your rights. You re setting up व्यवहार for परमार्थ that is, सत् for सत्य

The philosophy of the materialist (चार्वाकदर्शन) is good example of व्यवहाराभास *For*, while he adopts the common peopl point of view in affirming the existence of matter (as constituting ur self) we may not object, but when he goes further and claiming to be philosopher he denies the existence of जीव (our spiritual self), he falls into व्यवहाराभास

चार्वाको हि प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नं जीवद्रव्यपर्यायादिप्रविभागं कल्पनारोपितत्वेन प्रत्याचष्टे । अविचारितरमणीयं भूतचतुष्टयप्रविभागमात्रं तु स्थूललोकव्यवहारानुयायितया समर्थयते । इत्यस्य दर्शनं व्यवहारनयाभासतयैवाभिहितम् ।—Ratn.

पर्यायार्थिकश्चतुर्धा *etc.—Four more varieties of* नय re added. These are sub-divisions of पर्यायार्थिक :—(1) ऋजुसूत्र (2) शब्द (3) समभिरूढ and (4) एवंभूत.

(1) ऋजु वर्तमान etc.—ऋजुसूत्र point of view is one in which the *actual phenomena* (attributes or changes occurring in a substance) are principally recognised. It is called ऋजु—straight, because it does not bend towards the past or the future.

ऋजु अतीतानागतलक्षणवक्रपरित्यागात् प्राञ्जलम्। [illegible] हि द्रव्यं सदपि पर्यायाधारत्वेऽपि पर्यायेषु [illegible]। प्राधान्यया [illegible] P N T.; Ratn.

यथा सुखविवर्तः etc.—Ill "At present there is a feeling of joy in me." अनेन हि वाक्येन क्षणस्थायि सुखाख्यं पर्यायमात्रं प्राधान्येन प्रदर्श्यते, तदधिकरणभूतं पुनरात्मद्रव्यं गौणतया नार्प्यते।

सर्वथा द्रव्यापलापी—When, however you go further and deny the substance—the आत्मन्—to whom the joy belongs, you fall into the error of ऋजुसूत्राभास—as, for example, the Buddhist does. यथा तथागतमतम्। तथागतो हि प्रतिक्षणविनश्वरान् पर्यायानेव पारमार्थिकतया समर्थयते तदाधारभूतं तु प्रत्यभिज्ञादिप्रमाणप्रसिद्धं त्रिकालस्थायिद्रव्यं तिरस्कुरुते।

(2) कालादिभेदेन (कालकारकलिङ्गसंख्यापुरुषोपसर्गभेदेन) Thus we may distinguish between the क्रिया—when we say बभूव or भवति etc.—according to the different terminations applied to the root—notwithstanding that there is a single क्रिया of Being behind th m.

तद्भेदेन etc.—But if we go further and distinguish between the क्रियाs as if they were so many realities distinct from each other as बभूव भव etc. we fall into the error of शब्दाभास

(3) पर्यायशब्देषु etc.—समभिरूढ is one in which meanings of words are distinguished in accordance with their different etymologies. Thus, इन्द्र etc. (See supra, and Pr N T.)

पर्यायध्वनीनां etc.—But if anybody thinks that corresponding to the different synonyms इन्द्र शक्र etc. there are different individuals he commits समभिरूढाभास

(4) शब्दानां स्वप्रवृत्ति etc.—Whe a word is taken to signify an object with the क्रिया connoted by its etymology it is एवंभूत (See supra and Pr N T).

एतेषु चत्वारः etc.—Another principle of divisions of the seven, the first four are अर्थनयाः, and the last three शब्दनयाः.

पूर्वः पूर्वः etc.—every preceding नय is wider than every succeeding नय, every succeeding नय is more limited in extent than every preceding नय This may be shown as under :

सन्मात्रगोचरात् etc.—It may b objected that, according to the above, नैगम should be wider tha संग्रह but as a matter of fact, संग्रह is the widest, inasmuch as it deals with all that is (सन्मात्र). But the bjection can be easily met; संग्रह deals with only Being; नैगम with both non-Being and Being. नैगम is thus, wider

सद्विशेष—व्यवहार deals with particular forms or entities of Being while संग्रह with general Being संग्रह is, therefore wider than व्यवहार.

वर्तमानविषय—ऋजुसूत्र is concerned with the present nly व्यवहार with the past, present and future. व्यवहार is thus wider than ऋजुसूत्र

कालादिभेदेन etc.—शब्दनय deals with अर्थ which it regards as differing according to the diff rences of time (tense) etc. ऋजुसूत्र makes no such distinction, and is therefore wider

प्रतिपर्याय—समभिरूढ dist guishes between the अर्थs of even synonymous terms e. g इन्द्र, शक्र etc. according to their varying etymologies. शब्द does ot do that. शब्द is, therefore, wider than समभिरूढ.


क्रियाभेदेन—एवंभूत is confined to अर्थs only while they perform particular क्रिया and thus it distinguishes between अर्थs according to the क्रिया connoted by the term. समभिरूढ distinguishes पुरंदर from शचीपति but it pplies the term to Indra en when he is not engaged in destroying cities. समभिरूढ is thus wide than एवंभूत.

नयवाक्यमपि etc.—Just as there is प्रमाणसप्तभङ्गी so also there is नयसप्तभङ्गी—th difference being that the former is of the nature of सकलादेश th latter of विकलादेश (See ante.)

भाष्यचूर्ण्यादि etc.—Tattvârtha Bhâṣya etc. are the principal sources of information regarding नय.

प्रमाणं तु etc.—प्रमाण or the view of the whole truth embraces all the नय. The नय become प्रमाण when स्यात् is added unto them cf. Samantabhadra : नयास्तव .etc."

तत्र द्विविधं etc.—See Tattvârtha Sûtra, Bhâṣya and Com. I, 15-16.



Appendices.

I. The authors of the सम्मतितर्क and its commentary divide the schools of नय into two kinds: (1) द्रव्यास्तिक and पर्यायास्तिक i. e. (1) those who believe i s bta ce, and (2) those who believe in modes. The first believe i the principle f unity or permanence the second in that of di ersity or change—corresponding respectively to the two categories of सामान्य and विशेष—o to use the l ng ge of सम्मति संग्रह (संग्रह) and विशेष (विशेष). [संग्रहविशेषौ द्रव्यपर्यायौ सामान्यविशेषपर्यायौ—Com] These are the only tw fundamental नय, the othe नय

mentioned by other write s being subsidiary varieties of these "[illegible] द्रव्यार्थिकपर्यायार्थिकभेदे [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] i. e. the principle of the mal division is one of dichotomy and therefore no ther variety is possibl alongside of it, all the other varieties which are mentione l in other books falling under one or the other of these two ([illegible] —Sanmati. [illegible] "—Com.)

The द्रव्यार्थिकनय is next divided into शुद्ध or simple and 'अशुद्ध' or complex, represented respectively by the unitarian Vedāntin and the trinitarian Sāṅkhya. Both these schools of द्रव्यार्थिक while they criticise their pponents from their own standpoi ts are themselves criticised by the पर्यायार्थिकनय Befor proceeding to subdivide the latter it may be mentioned as note-worthy that the uthor of the Sanmati does not mention नैगमनय But the commentator notes it nd gives d rivation which is more probable than that given by [illegible] the uthor of the P N Tattvā lokālaṁkāra ("[illegible]) and others. Thus he says "[illegible] नैगमनय [illegible] नित्य [illegible] — [illegible] नित्य [illegible] नैगमनय । [illegible] नित्यानित्य [illegible] ।" i. e. नैगमनय is the method of rriving t bsolute conclusion regarding the nature of things, e. g. something is नित्य and something lse is अनित्य निगमन technical term of I dian Logic, which means deduction or arriving at conclusion from premises. It is to be noted that according to नैगमनय different things have different natures, such as, नित्यत्व or अनित्यत्व that is, some are नित्य and some are अनित्य not that one and the same thing m y have

different aspects such as विस्तार and अविस्तार The latter is the प्रमाण or whole view while the former is only a नय or part-view

व्यवहारनय is the common-sense or popularly accepted view of things. Thus the commonly accepted view which speaks of प्रमाण प्रमेय and प्रमिति is an example of व्यवहारनय (लोकप्रसिद्धव्यवहारानुसारेण प्रतिपत्तिभेदेनव्यवहारेण प्रमाण-प्रमेय-प्रमिति-प्रतिपादनं व्यवहारनयनिरूपणं परीक्षकैः समाश्रितमिति व्यवहारनयाभिप्रायः —Com.)। So far we have been dealing with द्रव्यार्थिकनय Next we come to पर्यायार्थिक ऋजुसूत्र is the naive view which takes note of what appears to be only now and here (वर्तमानक्षण-वैवस्यमात्रवर्तिनं वस्तुतत्त्वं तावतैकसमयवर्तिवस्तुग्राहकत्वात् ऋजु सूत्रयतीति ऋजुसूत्र—Com.). The Buddhist क्षणभङ्गवाद view that all reality is क्षणिक is an example of this kind. It arises from confining the attention to things here and now that is ऋजु. Similarly विज्ञानवाद—another Buddhist view—which attempts to avoid all the difficulties of epistemology by regarding ideas as the only reals may be looked upon as ऋजुसूत्र Or one may get rid of even this trouble, that of affirming the reality of विज्ञान and thus hold the simplest of all doctrines, viz. शून्यवाद The first is the doctrine of Buddhist realists सौत्रान्तिक and वैभाषिक; the second of the योगाचार and the third of the माध्यमिक.

Next, शब्दनय —"शब्दनयस्तु ऋजुसूत्राभिमतवस्तुन एकत्वे पर्यायैः [illegible] व्यवहारमभ्युपैति । तथाहि—तट तटी तटम् इति लिङ्गविभिन्न[illegible] शब्दैर्भिन्नमेव वस्तु यदि तत्त्वं पर्यायभेदमनङ्गीकुर्वन्[illegible] । [illegible] कथं न भिद्यते ? ... [illegible] आपः इति [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । न चैवं [illegible] इति [illegible] । [illegible] । इति [illegible] ।

It will be noticed that शब्दनय insists upon punctiliousness of language so much so that it would not permit the use of the plural आपः for a drop of water or even दाराः (although

grammatically correct) instead of [illegible] where the first is wrong. Of course, this would involve a great deal of revolution in the use of words, but this is necessary if we are to avoid looseness of language and secure complete correspondence between language and things, expression and things expressed. शब्द recognises the distinctions made by the ऋजुसूत्र [illegible] distinctions due to language. Moreover it frankly admits that in doing so it has frequently to override [illegible]

समभिरूढ—carries the punctiliousness of language still further ([illegible]). It recognises differences of things corresponding to those of synonyms. [illegible]

[illegible]

"[illegible]" i. e. एवंभूत goes even beyond समभिरूढ. While the latter insists upon recognising distinctions of things corresponding to distinctions of synonyms, एवंभूत would confine the word to the thing just while it performs the function which it connotes.

2. [illegible] is thus characterised in the Rāja-Vārtika [illegible] which is explained as follows: [illegible] It primary varieties are said to be '[illegible]' and '[illegible]' also called [illegible] and '[illegible]' which practically convey the same meanings. The words are explained as follows: [illegible]

मार्थोऽस्य न द्रव्यमेवो तद्व्यस्यास्यासिति द्रव्यार्थिकः । पर्याय एवार्थोऽस्य उत्पादव्ययात्मानो न ततोऽन्यत् द्रव्यमिति पर्यायार्थिकः । अथवा द्रवति गच्छति [illegible] इत्यर्थः । [illegible] गच्छतीति द्रव्यं कारणम् । द्रव्य-मेवार्थोऽस्य कारणमेव कार्यं नार्थान्तरं, न च कार्यकारणयोः कश्चिद्भेदः अनुमान-मेवाप्रामेव पर्यायरूपमस्यासीति द्रव्यार्थिकः । परि समन्तात् आयः पर्यायः । पर्याय एवार्थः कार्यमस्य न द्रव्यम् [illegible] व्यवहाराप्रवर्तनात् न लोके कार्यकारणमपेक्षणीयमिति पर्यायार्थिकः । अथवाऽर्थमर्पं प्रयोजनं द्रव्यमेवार्थोऽस्य प्रत्ययाभिधानानुप्रवृत्तिलिङ्गदर्शनस्य [illegible] द्रव्यार्थिकः । पर्यायोऽर्थः प्रयोजनमस्य [illegible] पर्यायार्थिकः ।

Next the नय are classified and defined as follows:

(1) अर्थसंकल्पमात्रग्राही नैगमः—which is explained thus निगच्छत्यस्मिन्निति निगमनमात्र वा निगमः निगमे कुशलो भवो वा नैगमः तस्य भेदो व्यापार निगम means that to which one goes, i e object aimed at, the idea of an object (अर्थसंकल्पमात्र) as distinguished from its accomplishment; the end, purpose intention objective. नैगमनय—a statement with ref rence to the objecti e. It is illustrated thus: अर्थसंकल्पमात्रग्रहणं नैगमः [illegible] कश्चित् पुरुषं परशुं गृहीत्वा गच्छन्तमवलोक्य [illegible] गच्छति भवान् इति स आह प्रस्थमानेतुमिति । [illegible] [illegible] प्रस्थ इति [illegible] व्यवहारः e g A man goes out, axe i hand, to fell a tree, take some wood out of it and make a प्रस्थ (woode measure for measuring grain). When aske l why are you going ? he answers for a प्रस्थ Now here the immediate bject of going is to cut tree, but he says for a प्रस्थ —which is done with reference to the final purpose of going.

(2) स्वजात्यविरोधेनैकत्वोपनयात् समस्तग्रहणं संग्रहः—'संग्रह is that in which many are *collected* etc *one* w thout contradicting their own nature e g when one says सद्द्रव्यं घटः—the स्वभाव (स्वजाति) of घट is not denied, but it is subsumed under the higher category of सत् । Similarly all the घट whethe r made of gold or clay may be called by the class-name घट which does not deny the individual natures of different घट and yet belongs

together all the [illegible] and calls them by a class-name, [illegible]. ([illegible])

(3) यतो विधिपूर्वकमवहरणं व्यवहार:—When without denying the general (संग्रह) one specifies particular for that alone would serve his purpose the नय is called व्यवहार (विधिपूर्वकम्-अवहरणम्)—taking out (अवहरणं) part from the class, affirmatively (विधिपूर्वकम्) that is, without denying the truth of संग्रह. The necessity and scope of this नय are thus explained in detail: [illegible]

This detail shows that व्यवहार is the opposite of संग्रह and takes note of the particular instead of the general which is the viewpoint of संग्रह

(4) ऋजुसूत्र:—[illegible] ऋजुसूत्र i. e. the straight or direct point of view which takes note of the present only for this alone is directly the object of knowledge.

(5) (शब्द:) स च [illegible] — शब्द is the नय which insists upon accuracy of language. It tolerates no looseness of language in point of gender number etc. if it conflicts with reality not even if it be allowed by grammar. (See the examples given here.)

(6) [illegible] समभिरूढ —[illegible]

पर्यायशब्दं भिन्नार्थमिति । नानार्थसमभिरोहणात् समभिरूढः । इन्दनादिन्द्रः शकनाच्छक्रः पूर्दारणात् पुरन्दर इत्येवं सर्वत्र । अथवा यो यत्राभिरूढः स तत्र समेत्याभिमुख्येनारोहणात् समभिरूढः ।

Synonyms connote differences of meaning and so they should be employed with strict adherence to their connotation This is the point o view of समभिरूढ —i. e the presentation of the connotation before the mental eye

(7) येनात्मनाभूतस्तेनैवाध्यवसाययतीत्येवंभूतः which is explained:

येनात्मना येनाभिधेयेन भूतः परस्तेनैवाध्यवसाययति । यथेन्द्रस्य परमैश्वर्यपरिणामो यदा वर्तते तदा तदैव युज्यते न सामस्त्येनान्येषु तत्परिणामाभावात् । इत्यपितस्यापि शब्दस्य स्वाभिधेयक्रियापरिणतिक्षण एव युक्तोऽयमिति ॥ अथवा येनात्मना येन रूपेण भूतोऽर्थस्तेनैवाध्यवसाययति यथा गच्छतीति गौरिति यदैव गच्छति तदैव गौरिति न स्थितो न शयित इति । पूर्वोक्तसामान्यार्थसमर्थाभावात् इत्येवम् ॥ अथवा येनात्मना येन ज्ञानेन भूतः परिणतस्तेनैवाध्यवसाययति यथेन्द्रोपयोगपरिणत आत्मैवेन्द्रोऽग्न्युपयोगे चाग्निः इत्यादि शब्दार्थयोरेकत्वम् एवंभूत उच्यते ॥

8. The author of the Tattvārtha-S'loka-Vārtika observes:

सामान्यादेशतस्तावदेक एव नयः स्थितः ।
स्याद्वादप्रविभक्तार्थविशेषव्यञ्जनात्मकः ॥ I. 33

—In its most general form नय is but one, and it consists of the presentation of a particular truth—which is part of the comprehensive truth which is expressed in स्याद्वाद He next divides them into two main types संक्षेपाद् द्वौ विशेषेण द्रव्यपर्यायगोचरौ ॥ i. e. द्रव्य and पर्याय (the latter including गुण)—of which the first comprises the three नैगम संग्रह and व्यवहार, and the second the remaining four ऋजुसूत्र शब्द समभिरूढ and एवंभूत The term 'नय' is explained thus नीयते गम्यते येन श्रुतार्थांशो नयो हि सः —i. e. that by which *part* of the truth is conveyed. The different नय mentioned in the Tattva-Sūtra (I. 33) spring from the two primary नय, द्रव्य and पर्याय (समस्त गोचरार्थिका नीयन्ते वैशेषिकाः । ते नया इति व्याख्याता नाना द्रव्यपर्यायत्वात्). The author rejects the view of those who hold that there are four नय, सामान्य and विशेष being added to द्रव्य and पर्याय The ground for the rejection is that they are included in द्रव्य and

दर्शन Next, 'नैगम' is defined तत्र संकल्पमात्रस्य ग्राहको नैगमो नयः and is explained in two ways: (1) संकल्पो निगमस्तत्र भवोऽयं तत्प्रयोजनः e.g. [illegible] and (2) [illegible] नैगमो [illegible] नयः । It is distinct from संग्रह and व्यवहार for these refer only to a part of नैगम—संग्रहे व्यवहारे वा [illegible] । नैगमस्य [illegible] । नैगम being thus shown to be indispensable the total number of नयs is seven and not six as some have urged. Others, again speak of nine नयs thus—पर्यायनैगम, द्रव्यनैगम, द्रव्यपर्यायनैगमश्चेति । तत्र [illegible] [illegible] । द्वितीयो द्विधा । शुद्धद्रव्यनैगम, अशुद्धद्रव्यनैगमश्चेति । तृतीयश्चतुर्धा शुद्धद्रव्यार्थपर्यायनैगम, शुद्धद्रव्यव्यञ्जनपर्यायनैगम, अशुद्धद्रव्यार्थपर्यायनैगम, अशुद्धद्रव्यव्यञ्जनपर्यायनैगमश्चेति नवधा नैगमः । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ।

Next coming to संग्रह, the term is thus defined and explained

> एकत्वेन विशेषाणां ग्रहणं संग्रहो नयः ।
> स्वजातेरविरोधेन दृष्टेष्टाभ्यां कथंचन ॥
> समेकीभावसम्यक्त्वे वर्तमानो हि गृह्यते ।

Next is व्यवहार which is defined and explained as in the Rājavārtika:—

> संग्रहेण गृहीतानामर्थानां विधिपूर्वकः ।
> योऽवहारो विभागः स्याद्व्यवहारो नयः स्मृतः ।

Next ऋजुसूत्र—

> "ऋजुसूत्रं क्षणध्वंसि वस्तु सत् सूत्रयेदृजु ।
> प्राधान्येन गुणीभावाद् द्रव्यस्यानर्पणात् सतः ।

Next शब्दनय—

> कालादिभेदतोऽर्थस्य भेदं यः प्रतिपादयेत् ।
> सोऽत्र शब्दनयः शब्दप्रधानत्वादुदाहृतः ॥"

Lastly समभिरूढ—

> "पर्यायशब्दभेदेन भिन्नार्थस्याधिरोहणात् ।

नयः समभिरूढः स्यात् । e.g. इन्द्रः पुरन्दरः शक्र इत्याद्या भिन्नगोचराः । [illegible]—i.e. synonyms are really words with different meanings.

In conclusion, the division of नय into अर्थनय and शब्दनय and their comparative extents are thus stated in the T. Sl. Vārtika:

तत्रर्जुसूत्रपर्यन्ताश्चत्वारोऽर्थनयाः स्मृताः ।
त्रयः शब्दनयाः शेषाः शब्दवाच्यार्थगोचराः ॥
पूर्वपूर्वनयो भूमविषयः कारणात्मकः ।
परः परः पुनः सूक्ष्मगोचरो हेतुमानिह ॥
सन्मात्रविषयत्वेन संग्रहस्य न युज्यते ।
महाविषयताभावाभावार्थान्नैगमान्नयात् ॥
यथा हि सति संकल्पस्तथैवासति वेद्यते ।
तत्र प्रवर्तमानस्य नैगमस्य महार्थता ॥
संग्रहाद्व्यवहारोऽपि सद्विशेषावबोधकः ।
न भूमविषयोऽशेषसत्समूहोपदर्शिनः ॥
नर्जुसूत्रः प्रभूतार्थो वर्तमानार्थगोचरः ।
कालत्रितयवृत्त्यर्थगोचराद्व्यवहारतः ॥
कालादिभेदतोऽर्थमभिन्नमुपगच्छतः ।
नर्जुसूत्रान्महार्थोऽत्र शब्दस्तद्विपरीतवत् ॥
शब्दात् पर्यायभेदेनाभिन्नमर्थमभीप्सितः ।
न स्यात् समभिरूढोऽपि महार्थस्तद्विपर्ययः ॥
क्रियाभेदेऽपि चाभिन्नमर्थमभ्युपगच्छतः ।
नैवंभूतः प्रभूतार्थो नयः समभिरूढतः ॥

The Tattva Sl. Vārtika applies the principle of सप्तभङ्गी to the नय—which is detailed in the commentary as follows:

इह सप्तभङ्गीमस्य संभवादिति तत् षड् प्रत्येकं षड् नैगमस्य संग्रहस्य व्यवहारादिभिः सह वचनात्। पञ्च व्यवहारस्य। ऋजुसूत्रादिभिश्चतस्रः ऋजुसूत्रस्य शब्दादिभिस्तिस्रः शब्दस्य समभिरूढैवंभूताभ्यां द्वे समभिरूढस्यैवंभूतेनैका इत्येकविंशतिर्मूलनयसप्तभङ्गाः।

4. Siddharsi's commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara deals with the subject of नय in full detail, and like the commentary on the Sanmatitarka, it shows how the different systems of Brāhmana and Bauddha philosophy represent particular नय or partial viewpoints only that is to say they are नय and not प्रमाण. See—

अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम् ।
एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो नयस्य विषयो मतः ॥

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… एतेनात्र देशे कालेन [illegible] मौलमवगमीत ।
… यथा [illegible] प्रमाणे [illegible]
[illegible] सामान्यविशेष [illegible] विशेषेण [illegible]
उपपद्यते … ॥

तयोरपि [illegible] अनेकान्तप्रकाशकत्वमुपपद्यते [illegible] ज्ञानस्यानेकधर्मविशेषात्मकत्वेन प्रमाणोपपत्ते । … ॥

अन्यत्रापि समस्तासामवस्थासिद्धोऽनेकान्तप्रकाश इति चेन्न तत्रापि प्रमाणप्रमेयाद्यात्मकं सर्वमात्मवेद्यं भवति, अन्यथाप्रमाणत्वं सर्वं तत्रैव विद्यते इति परस्यापि मतो न व्यवस्थानुं स्यात् तदभ्युपगमोऽभ्युपगमक्षतिः । …

ननु सर्वं किंस्वं मन्यते इति [illegible] इत्यपि । अनन्त धर्मात्मकमपि वस्तु समधिगम्यैकधर्मविशिष्टं नयति प्रापयति संवेद्यमारोपयतीति नय प्रमाणप्रवृत्तेरुत्तरकालभावी परामर्श इत्यर्थः । तस्य विषयो गोचरोऽभिमत अभिप्रेतोऽनेकधर्मविशिष्टधर्मात्मकेन विशिष्ट परतोऽसौ व्यावृत्तिज इत्यर्थः ॥

ननु चाविभागस्य प्रमाणस्योत्पादसमये मतिज्ञाने तत्र किंनयप्रवृत्तौ च प्रमाणोत्तर प्रतिपत्तव्य इति ।

न तत्र प्रमाणव्यापारत्वं दृश्यते किं तर्हि? तदनन्तर नय। नयस्तु प्रमाण [illegible] प्रमाणस्य [illegible] तत्र प्रमाणसामर्थ्येन गृहीत इति व्याख्यानं दृष्टं तत्र [illegible] इति तत्र प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नार्थैकदेश परामर्शो नयः इति वक्तव्यम् । [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] इति । [illegible] [illegible] च [illegible] । तथापि [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible]—[illegible] [illegible] इति । [illegible] न [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] इति चेत् उच्यते । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] वा । [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] च स्यात् । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । तथापि [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] नैगम । ते इव केवलं सामान्यं [illegible] संग्रह । ते [illegible]

घटादिकं पदार्थमभिप्रेयन्ति तदभिप्रायकल्पो व्यवहारः । ये सौगतास्तु क्षणक्षयिणः परमाणुलक्षणा विशेषाः सत्या इति मन्यन्ते तदभिप्रायकल्प ऋजुसूत्र इति । तथा ये मीमांसका रूढितः शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिं वाञ्छन्ति तदभिप्रायकल्पः शब्द इति । ये तु व्युत्पत्तितो ध्वनीनां प्रवृत्तिं वाञ्छन्ति नान्यथा तदभिप्रायकल्पः समभिरूढ इति । ये तु वर्तमानकालभाविव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमधिकृत्य शब्दाः प्रवर्तन्ते नान्यथेति मन्यन्ते तदभिप्रायकल्प एवंभूत इति । सर्वेष न त कथन विकल्पोऽस्ति वस्तुगोचरो योऽत्र नयसप्तके नान्तर्भवतीति सर्वाभिप्रायसंग्राहका नया इति स्थितम् ॥

Since the different systems of Bauddha nd Brâhmani philosophy arise as shown above, from the fact that their teachers have failed to see things whole it follows that their teachings are not प्रमाण If so, question arises: Why has the subject of partial viewpoints—called नय—been discussed here, in connection with प्रमाण? The answer given is: Because नय, though wrong (अप्रमाण) as statements of whole truth, do deal with part truth, (प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नार्थैकदेशपरामर्शो नयः) and so come to be considered in the chapter on प्रमाण Siddharsi next proceeds to show how all अभिप्राय or truths which the different systems purport to convey are embraced in the classificatio of नय which is here given. Thus, अभिप्राय सामान्यद्वारेण व्यवहारेण प्रवर्तेत । Next, अथवा सामान्यरूपो विशेषरूपो वा । P N T [These—सामान्य and विशेष—agai may be taken as independ nt of each othe (विकल्पितौ—severed distinct,) or only one of them may be recognised and th other verlooked r only the popular view—as distinguished from the logical view—of सामान्य nd विशेष—may be accepted.] Similarly शब्दोऽपि रूढितो व्युत्पत्तितश्च । व्युत्पत्तिं agai may be सामान्यनिमित्त-प्रयुक्त or तत्कालभाविनिमित्तप्रयुक्त Thus will arise th different नयs.

5. भवन्ति नैगमादयः—यदुक्तं च "नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारर्जुसूत्रशब्दसमभिरूढैवंभूता नयाः । एते च द्रव्यास्तिकपर्यायास्तिकलक्षणे नयद्वयेऽन्तर्भवन्ति । द्रव्यमेव परमार्थतोऽस्ति न पर्याया इत्यवधारणपरो द्रव्यास्तिकः । पर्याया एव परमार्थतः सन्ति न द्रव्यमित्यवधारणपरः पर्यायास्तिकः । तत्राद्यास्त्रयो द्रव्यास्तिका भेदास्तु पर्यायास्तिकाः । पूर्वस्मात्तत्रोऽपि सामान्यस्य द्विविधो विपर्ययोऽभिप्रायः । तत्र नैगमव्यवहारौऽभिप्राय संग्रहस्य विषय । कथम् ? । यतो नैगम-नयाभिप्रायेण द्रव्यमुपचारेण द्रव्यात्मकमुपचारात् विषय-

[illegible] Com. on [illegible] This illustrates the [illegible] in their relatio to th problem of the nature of s bstance and forms or modes.

6 [illegible]

वचनं च लिङ्गवचने भेदं ते च ते पर्यायध्वनय-इन्द्रः शक्रः पुरन्दर इत्यादयस्तथा प्यन्येव च। तदेवमविशिष्टमानसमानवाच्याद्युपाधिकस्यान्य शब्दिता। अतिक्रान्तयो रि नामादिष्वपूर्वोक्तमपि विशिष्टवचनपर्यायध्वनिवाच्यमेव प्रतिपद्यते, अयं तु भावघटमेव समानलिङ्गवचनपर्यायध्वनिवाच्यमेव च प्रतिपद्यत इत्यनयोर्भेदः। शब्दमात्रस्थितिरस्मिन् वस्तुन्येव यत्र ध्वनिः प्रवर्तते न समानलिङ्गवचना अपि सत्र इत्यभिमन्यते। अतो नयान्तरस्य भिन्नता। एवमन्येष्वपि नयेषु विशेषणानि यथासंभवमौचित्यपरिभावनया सूक्ष्मधिया द्रष्टव्यानि। तस्यार्थपरिसमाप्तिरपि "स्थापि गस्य मात्रमेवाभिहितमस्य शब्दत्वेन संमतो योऽर्थो यथाविज्ञातत्वं यदि पुनरपि यतो ज्ञानविशेष इत्युपचारात् सोऽपि ज्ञानत्वतो नय उच्यते। "न च निषेध्यति यत् निश्चयमतादेवतावादि द्रव्यवचनविशुद्धतरस्वमतं पतत् द्रव्य पुरुष कुम्भो नाम कुम्भकमिति। न अर्थं कश्चिद्वचनभेदोऽस्ति। तत्तथा। तादृशं पर्यायवचनान्तराद्यस्मात् समासोऽभिप्रेतः स्यात्। किंतु कुम्भ घटो इति समस्त शक्ति भिन्नते इत्यस्ति वचनभेदः। यत् मतमेव तथाप्युपलभ्य मुपादानम्। न तत्र वचनाभेदेऽपि कुम्भकलशयोः पर्यायता गम्यते। भिन्नजातीय मप्युपादानमात्। तथाहि—कुटनत्वेन घट उच्यते कुम्भनेन तु मास्वभिमात् पतये तत्कृतो शब्दसमेऽस्यनयोः पर्यायवचनता'। नैवम्। भिन्नजातीयत्वात् तादृशातिशयस्याविरूपत्वात्। यथा च पृथिव्यामस्तीति भूपत्वेः कुम्भत्वेन एव यथा विवक्षित इत्यनयोः पर्यायवचनत्वम्। कश्चित् इत्युक्तमिति वाच्यतयाभिधित्सितं कुम्भत्वेन एव पर्यायनीतिरिति। अस्मात्कं तात्पर्यं संगृहाणा, अन्वित्य अन्य याणि भाव्यमिति ॥ "च स्यात्समस्ताभिप्रायमिति"—स्यात्समस्तैव भावक्रियया स्यात्- वाच्यक्रिया तदं न निर्दिश्यतीत्यर्थः। यदा स्यात्स्थित एव तथाशीला भिन्नते तदा घटो न भवति किंतु योऽस्मिन्नतत्त्वतो नयाद्यत्तथेत्थं द्रष्टव्येति भावार्थः ॥ समाप्ता नया ॥

—आवश्यक-हारिभद्रीयवृत्तौ नयाधिकारः

The importance of this long extract lies in the fact that the doctrine of नय is traceable to the Sûtras or Âgamas. In th first few lines the illustrations of नैगमनय referred to in the Sûtras (see our Text p. 162–168 St. XXVIII) are explained in detail. These are old and obscure, but the commentator does his best to explain them. Next a very important point is introduced viz. the distinction between निश्चय and व्यवहार नय that is the scientific view and the popular view This corresponds to the distinctio drawn in Vedânta between the points of view of परमार्थ and व्यवहार—which has also its parallel in Buddhism. A very interesting point, which is supported by an extract from the Prajnapati (one of the Âgamas), is

the strange doctrine that as a matter of absolute or scientific truth every object—*e. g.* even a black bee—possesses all the five colours but only one of them is patent—the black in the case of the bee—while the rest are latent. A similar doctrine regarding the constitution of matter is held by Ramânujâcârya who says that when a piece of mother-of pearl is mistaken for silver it is because the silver is in the mother-of-pearl; and so is even serpent in a rope!

7 नत्थि नएहिं विहूणं सुत्तं अत्थो य जिणमए किंचि ।
आसज्ज उ सोयारं नए नयविसारओ बूया ॥
[नास्ति नयैर्विहीनं सूत्रमर्थश्च जिनमते किञ्चित् ।
आसाद्य तु श्रोतारं नयान् नयविशारदो ब्रूयात् ॥]

इति वचनाज्जिनमते सर्वेऽपि पदार्था नयैर्विचारणीयाः । इत्यतो द्रव्यमङ्गलं नयैर्विचारयन्नाह—

एगो अणुवउत्तो णेगमस्स णेगमववहारस्स ।
संगहणस्स एगं तस्स चिय संगहं ओघ ॥
[एको ऽनुपयुक्तो नैगमस्य नैकेऽप्यनेकानि नैगमव्यवहारयोः ।
संग्रहस्यैकं सर्वमिव ऋजुसूत्रे भिन्नं ॥]

अनुपयुक्तवक्त्रादेर्नैगमनयस्य मतेनैकोऽनुपयुक्तो वक्ता आगमत एकं द्रव्यमङ्गलम् । अनेके चानुपयुक्तवक्तारस्तु अनेकान्यपि द्रव्यमङ्गलानि । सर्वं हि नय सामान्यं विशेषांश्चाभ्युपगच्छन्नेव । तत्र विशेषवादिनो व्यवहारस्य एकोऽनुपयुक्त एकं द्रव्यमङ्गलम् अनेके चानुपयुक्ता अनेकान्यपि द्रव्यमङ्गलानीत्युपगमात् तस्य विशेषाणां पृथक् विवक्षितत्वादिति । संग्रहनयस्य तु सकलसामान्यवादिनो मतेन सर्वेऽप्यनुपयुक्ता एक एव द्रव्यमङ्गलम् । सर्वेषां द्रव्यमङ्गलस्यैकत्वात् सामान्यस्य च विवक्षितैकत्वात् । इति गाथार्थः ॥

उज्जुसुयस्स एगं अणुवउत्तो आगमओ एगं दव्वावस्सयं पुहत्तं नेच्छइ ।
तिण्हं सद्दनयाणं जाणए अणुवउत्ते अवत्थू ॥
[ऋजुसूत्रस्यैकं निरवयवमिदं सर्वं च सामान्यम् ।
त्रि शब्दनयानामविशेषं अवस्तु ॥]

ऋजुसूत्रनयमतेनैकोऽनुपयुक्त एकं द्रव्यमङ्गलम् । एवमपि कस्मिंश्चित् काले । तथा भिन्नमेवापि । [illegible] स्यात् अविरतवक्ता अपि तु व्यक्त्यन्तरे सत्यमस्येभावात् । तथाहि—निरवयवमेवेदम् । पूर्वोत्तरकालविशिष्टत्वमुपगतमिति । नित्य यस्यापि नास्तीदं सविशेषं स्यात् । अत आह—सर्वं नित्यमपि कथञ्चित् विविधविकल्पादिति । अविरमापि निराशित्वात् सर्वस्यं न स्यात् । अथवा—सर्वं च सामान्यमेव स्वभावात् । इति ऋजुसूत्रं सामान्यमेवाभिप्रैति न तु विशेष [illegible] निश्चित । इति एवम—नि सामान्याद् भागान्यविरहितत्वात्, लघुत्वात्, अनादि

सत् सामान्यविरहितं न भवति यथा खरः। तस्मादेकस्माद् द्रव्यमद्रव्यसामान्या दव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् तद्व्यतिरेके चाद्रव्यमद्रव्यतापत्तिप्रसङ्गात् सामान्यस्य च विश्वव्यापित्वे स्वात्वैकमेव संग्रहनयमते द्रव्यमद्रव्यम् इति स्थितम् ॥ इति गाथार्थः ॥

अथ विशेषवादिमतनिरासकं कथयति — नहि वनस्पतेरपि द्रव्यमद्रव्यापि न सम्भवन्ति यथा हि वनस्पतिरितिशब्दे चूत-कुसुम-लता वीरणादयो विशेषा एव प्रतीयन्ते न पुनस्तद्व्यतिरिक्तः कश्चिद् वनस्पतिः एवमिहापि द्रव्यमद्रव्यमित्युक्तेऽत्र पृथक्त्वस्वरूपलक्षणा विशेषा एवावभासन्ते न तु तद्भिन्नं किञ्चित् सामान्यम् अतः किं पृथग् ग्रहीतव्यम् अनर्थकमभिधीयते— निस्सामन्नभावो नत्थि विसेसो सरूवं न इति. इति विशेषवादिना मते सामान्यवादी संग्रहः प्राह — नहि यत् यत्र वनस्पतिरित्युक्ते द्रुमादय प्रतीयन्ते अत एव ते तदन्वयव्यतिरेकमूलाः हस्तस्ये चाङ्गुल्य इव यस्मिन्नुच्यमाने यद् प्रतीयते तत् ततो व्यतिरिक्तं न भवति यथा हस्त इत्युक्तेऽङ्गुल्यादय प्रतीयमाना हस्तात् न व्यतिरिक्ताः प्रतीयन्ते च वनस्पतिरित्युक्ते द्रुमादयः तस्मात् न वनस्पतिव्यतिरिक्ताः ततो न सामान्यव्यतिरिक्तः कोऽपि विशेषः समस्ति। इत्येवमेव सर्वेषां द्रव्यमद्रव्यमिति। अथोपसंहारमाह स्तोऽपि सामान्य मात्रेण द्रव्यादीनां सर्वेषामपि वनस्पतिसामान्यरूपतां समर्थयन्नाह—

> चूओ वणस्सइ च्चिय मूलाइगुणो त्ति तस्समूहो व्व।
> गुम्माइओ वि एवं सव्वो न वणस्सइविसिट्ठो ॥
> [=चूतो वनस्पतिरेव मूलादिगुण इति तत्समूह इव।
> गुल्मादयोऽप्येवं सर्वो न वनस्पतिविशिष्टः ॥]

चूत आम्रो वनस्पतिरेव वनस्पतिसामान्यं न व्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थः इति प्रतिज्ञा। मूल-कन्द-स्कन्ध-त्वक्-शाखा-प्रवाल-पत्र-पुष्प-फलादिगुणत्वादिति हेतुः मूल इत्यादयस्ति दृष्टान्ता इव यो यो मूलादिगुण स स वनस्पतिसामान्यरूप एव यथा चूतसमूहः मूलादिगुणश्च चूतः तस्मात् वनस्पतिसामान्यरूप एव। गुल्मादयो ऽप्येवं वाच्या। तथाहि—निम्बादयो विशेषतयाभ्युपगम्यमाना गुल्मोऽपि वनस्पतिसामान्यरूप एव मूलादिगुणत्वात् गुल्मसमूहवत् इति। एवमन्येषामपि स्वपरविशेषाणां वनस्पतिसामान्याद्व्यतिरिक्तत्वं भावनीयम्। तद्व्यतिरेके सर्वत्र द्रव्यपर्यायेष्वप्येतद् वाच्यं प्रमाणम्। तस्मात् सामान्यमेवास्ति न विशेषाः ॥ इति गाथार्थः ॥

किं च—

> सामन्नाओ विसेसो अन्नोऽनन्नो व होज्ज जइ अन्नो।
> सो नत्थि खपुप्फं पिव अनन्नो सामन्नमेव तयं ॥
> [=सामान्याद् विशेषोऽन्योऽनन्यो वा भवेद् यद्यन्यः।
> स नास्ति खपुष्पमिव अनन्यः सामान्यमेव तत् ॥]

यो विशेषवादिना। सामान्याद् विशेषोऽन्यो वा स्यात् अनन्यो वा इति विकल्पद्वयम्। तत्राद्यो विकल्पः यदि सामान्याद् विशेषोऽन्य इति सामान्यव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् खपुष्प-वत्—इह यद् यद् सामान्यविनिर्मुक्तं तत् तद् नास्ति यथा गगनादिकम्

सामान्यविपरीतस्य विशेषस्यापि [illegible]ऽनुपपत्तेः तस्मात् सामान्यमेवास्तीति । [illegible] इति द्वितीय पक्षे [illegible] यदि सामान्यमेवास्ति [illegible] सामान्यात्मकत्वात् [illegible] [illegible] तत्र [illegible] यथा सामान्यमेवास्ति [illegible] सामान्यात् विशेष इति सामान्यमेवास्तीति । यदि [illegible] तदा सामान्येऽपि विशेषव्यवहारः [illegible] तर्हि न कश्चित् [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] [illegible] तस्मात् सामान्यमेवास्ति न विशेष । इति [illegible] [illegible] इति गाथार्थ ॥

[illegible] सामान्ये [illegible] विशेष[illegible] [illegible]
न विसेसत्थंतरभूयमत्थि [illegible] [illegible] ।
[illegible]भावाओ [illegible] ॥
[न विशेषार्थान्तरभूतमस्ति सामान्य[illegible] [illegible] ।
[illegible]भावात् [illegible] ॥]

[illegible] यो सामान्यवादिन् [illegible] [illegible]-[illegible]-[illegible]-[illegible]विशेषेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं [illegible] अर्थान्तरं वा । अर्थान्तरं तर्हि [illegible] तत् विशेषव्यतिरेकेण [illegible] [illegible]भावात् [illegible] । न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]स्यात् विशेषवादी [illegible] । [illegible] हि [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] विशेषविषय एव इति विशेषवादिन समर्थक इति भाव । [illegible] [illegible]तथापि नास्ति विशेषस्य [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] विशेषेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं [illegible] द्वितीयपक्षे तर्हि विशेष एव तत् [illegible] [illegible] विशेषाणामपि [illegible] । यदि च विशेषेऽपि सामान्य[illegible] [illegible] तर्हि न कश्चित् [illegible] न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ इति गाथार्थ ॥

[illegible] समर्थयते

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ।
नत्थि विसेसत्थंतरभावाओ [illegible] ॥
[[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ।
नास्ति विशेषार्थान्तरभावात् [illegible] ॥]

[illegible] विशेषेभ्योऽन्य को नाम [illegible] [illegible]-[illegible]-[illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] । तस्मात् [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] इति [illegible] [illegible]— [illegible] तस्मात् [illegible] सामान्यवादि[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] हि विशेषेभ्योऽर्थान्तर[illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] हि विशेषेभ्योऽर्थान्तर [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ इति गाथार्थ ॥

किं पुन [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] विशेषान् समर्थयन् [illegible]—

नै नैगमव्यवहारौ लोकव्यवहारतत्परौ सो च ।
यास्य विशेषभो तौ ते तद्गामिनौ री ति ॥
[न्यदृ नैगमव्यवहारौ लोकव्यवहारतत्परौ स च ।
प्रायेण विशेषमतस्मात् तौ तद्गामिनौ ह्यपि ॥]

यद् यस्मात् नैगमव्यवहारौ लोकव्यवहारतत्परौ स च लोकव्यवहारस्त्व नानाविध- प्रायेण विशेषतो विशेषनिष्ठ एव दृश्यते सामान्यस्य अत्यल्पत्वात् लोके प्रयोगात् । अतः तेना इत्यादौ क्वचित् कथित् कथंचित् सामान्यस्यापि दृश्ये व्यवहारः, इति अभिप्रायः । अत एवं तस्मात् तौ नैगमव्यवहारौ ह्यपि तद्गामिनौ विशेषानुगामिनौ ॥ इति भावार्थः ॥

—विशेषावश्यक Commentary

8. सिद्धसेनीया पुनः षडेव नयानभ्युपगच्छन्ति । नैगमस्य संग्रहव्यवहारयो- रन्तर्भावविवक्षणात् । तथाहि—यदा नैगमः सामान्यमभिप्रैति तदा स संग्रहे- ऽन्तर्भवति सामान्याभ्युपगमपरत्वात् । विशेषाभ्युपगमनिष्ठस्तु व्यवहारे । आह च सिद्धसेनीयमतानुसारिभिरूक्तोऽप्युक्तम्—" जो सामन्नग्गाही स नेगमो संगहं गओ अहवा इयरो ववहारमिओ जो तेण समाणनिद्देसो । तत्र सिद्धसेनीयाभिप्रायेण षडेवैते नयास्तयो द्रव्यार्थिकपर्यायार्थिकौ कर्तव्यौ न सप्तेति ॥—Com. on विशेषावश्यक सूत्र

9 Mallisena's Commentary contains a reproduction of the following Sûtras of Pramânanaya-tattvâlokâlaṁkâra—

स्पष्टं प्रत्यक्षम् । अनुमानाद्याधिक्येन विशेषप्रकाशनं स्पष्टत्वम् (II. 2,3) । तद्द्विप्रकारम्—सांव्यवहारिकं पारमार्थिकं च (II. 4) । सांव्यवहारिकं बाह्येन्द्रियादिसामग्रीसापेक्षत्वादपारमार्थिकम् प्रयोजनमस्येति सांव्यवहारिकं बाह्येन्द्रियादिसामग्री सापेक्षत्वादपारमार्थिकम् अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः । पारमार्थिकं पुनः पारमार्थिकं उत्पत्तौ आत्ममात्रापेक्षम् अवध्यादिप्रत्यक्षम्—Com. Note that सांव्यवहारिक is ordinary प्रत्यक्ष whil पारमार्थिक is extraordinary प्रत्यक्ष no such di tinction that f t e eal and the unreal being implied with h the phraseology which is borrowed from Vedânta and Buddhi n had this meaning] तत्राद्यं द्विविधम्—इन्द्रियनिबन्धनमनिन्द्रियनिबन्धनं च (II 5) । एतद् द्वितयमवग्रहेहावायधारणाभेदादेकशश्चतुर्विकल्पकम् (II. 6) । The text omits the definit ns f अवग्रह etc. s bei g too well known ('प्रसिद्धत्वात्), but they m y well be reproduced here विषय- विषयिसन्निपातानन्तरसमुद्भूतसत्तामात्रगोचरदर्शनाज्जातमाद्यमवान्तरसामान्याकार- विशिष्टवस्तुग्रहणमवग्रहः (II. 7) । अवगृहीतार्थविशेषाकाङ्क्षणमीहा (II. 8) ,

ईहितविशेषनिर्णयोऽवायः (II. 9) । स एव दृढतमावस्थापन्नो धारणा (II.10) । पारमार्थिकं पुनरुत्पत्तावात्ममात्रापेक्षम् (II. 18) । [[illegible] —Com.] तद्विकलं सकलं च (II. 19) । तत्र विकलमवधिमनःपर्यायज्ञानरूपतया द्वेधा (II. 20) । अवधिज्ञानावरणविलयविशेषसमुद्भवं भवप्रत्ययगुणप्रत्ययं रूपिद्रव्यगोचरमवधिज्ञानम् (II. 21) । संयमविशुद्धिनिबन्धनाद् विशिष्टावरणविच्छेदाज्जातं मनोद्रव्यपर्यायालम्बनं मनःपर्यायज्ञानम् (II. 22) । सकलं तु सामग्रीविशेषतः समुद्भूतसमस्तावरणक्षयापेक्षं निखिलद्रव्यपर्यायसाक्षात्कारिस्वरूपं केवलज्ञानम् (II. 23) ।

The subject goes back to the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, (See T. Sūtra and T. Rāja Vārtika)—where मतिज्ञान is divided into इन्द्रियनिमित्त and अनिन्द्रियनिमित्त (तदिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तम्— I. 14) इन्द्रियनिमित्तं स्पर्शनादीनां पञ्चानां स्पर्शादिषु पञ्चस्वेव स्वविषयेषु अनिन्द्रियनिमित्तं मनोवृत्तिरोघज्ञानं च । This is further subdivided into अवग्रहेहावायधारणाः (I. 15), and each of these four is defined as follows तत्राव्यक्तं यथास्वमिन्द्रियैर्विषयाणामालोचनावधारणमवग्रहः । अवग्रहो ग्रहो ग्रहणमालोचनमवधारणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । अवगृहीतं विषयार्थैकदेशाच्छेषानुगमनं निश्चयविशेषजिज्ञासा चेष्टा ईहा । ईहा ऊहा तर्कः परीक्षा विचारणा जिज्ञासेत्यनर्थान्तरम् । अवगृहीते विषये सम्यगसम्यगिति गुणदोषविचारणाध्यवसायापनोदोऽपायः । अपायोऽपगमः अपनोदः अपव्याधः अपेतमपगतमपविद्धमपनुत्तमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । धारणा प्रतिपत्तिर्यथास्वं मत्यवस्थानमवधारणं च । धारणा प्रतिपत्तिरवधारणमवस्थानं निश्चयोऽवगमः अवबोध इत्यनर्थान्तरम् ।

स्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागमभेदतस्तत् पञ्चप्रकारम् (P. N. T. III. 2) । तत्र संस्कारप्रबोधसम्भूतमनुभूतार्थविषयं तदित्याकारं वेदनं स्मरणम्, तत् तीर्थकरबिम्बमिति यथा (III. 3, 4) । अनुभवस्मृतिहेतुकं तिर्यगूर्ध्वतासामान्यादिगोचरं सङ्कलनात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् । यथा तज्जातीय एवायं गोपिण्डः गोसदृशो गवयः स एवायं जिनदत्त इत्यादि । (III. 5,6) [तिर्यक्सामान्यं च [illegible] । ऊर्ध्वतासामान्यं च पूर्वापरविवर्त्तव्यापि [illegible] ।—Com. [illegible] —Com.] उपलम्भानुपलम्भसम्भवं त्रिकालीकलितसाध्यसाधनसम्बन्धाद्यालम्बनमिदमस्मिन् सत्येव भवतीत्याद्याकारं संवेदनमूहापरनामा तर्कः (III. 7, 8) । यथा यावान् कश्चिद् धूमः स सर्वो वह्नौ सत्येव भवतीति तस्मिन्नसत्यसौ न भवत्येव । [[illegible]

[illegible] कारकवीर्यम् । [illegible] साध्य-साधनयोर्[illegible] व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । [illegible] [illegible] गोचर। [illegible] [illegible]।
इदमस्मिन् सत्येव भवतीत्यादिवचनादिदमस्मिन् सति न भवतोभयाकारं साध्य-साधनसम्बन्धालम्बनम् । [illegible] [illegible] सोऽपि [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] इति [illegible]। [illegible] स तर्क इति [illegible] इति च [illegible]—Com.] अनुमानं द्विप्रकारं स्वार्थं परार्थं च (III. 9) । तत्र हेतुग्रहणसम्बन्धस्मरणकारणकं साध्यविज्ञानं स्वार्थम् (III. 10) । पक्षहेतुवचनात्मकं परार्थमनुमानमुपचारात् (III. 23) । [पक्षहेतुवचनस्य च परार्थतया [illegible] प्रमाणप्रयोगे सति उपचारादित्युक्तम् । कारणे कार्योपचारादित्यर्थः । प्रतिपाद्यगते हि [illegible] कारणं [illegible] । कार्ये कारणोपचाराद्वा । प्रतिपादकगतं हि [illegible] तत्र कार्यं [illegible]—Com.] आप्तवचनादाविर्भूतमर्थसंवेदनमागमः (IV. 1) उपचारादाप्तवचनं च (IV. 2).

The same subject will be found in Hemacandra's Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. प्रमाणं द्विधा। प्रत्यक्षं परोक्षं च (I. 1. 9-10) इन्द्रियमनोनिमित्तोऽवग्रहेहावायधारणात्मा सांव्यवहारिकम् (I. 1. 21)। अक्षार्थयोगे दर्शनानन्तरमर्थग्रहणमवग्रहः (I. 1. 27)। अवगृहीतविशेषाकाङ्क्षणमीहा (I. 1. 28)। ईहितविशेषनिर्णयोऽवायः (I. 1. 29)। स्मृतिहेतुर्धारणा (I. 1. 30).

अविशदः परोक्षम् (प्र. मी. १-२-१) ॥ स्मृति-प्रत्यभिज्ञो-हा-ऽनुमाना-गमास्तद्विधयः (१-२-२) ॥ वासनोद्बोधहेतुका तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः(१-२-३)॥ दर्शनस्मरणसंभवं तदेवेदं तत्सदृशं तद्विलक्षणं तत्प्रतियोगीत्यादिसंकलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् (१-२-४) ॥ उपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः (१-२-५) ॥ साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम् (१-२-७) ॥ तद् द्विधा स्वार्थं परार्थं च (१-२-८)॥ स्वार्थं स्वनिश्चितसाध्याविनाभावैकलक्षणात् साधनात् साध्यज्ञानम् (१-२-९) ॥ यथोक्तसाधनाभिधानजः [विवेक] परार्थम् (२-१-१) ॥ वचनमुपचारात् (२-१-२) ॥

Note 1 वासनोद्बोधहेतुका (प्र. मी.)—'संस्कारप्रबोधसम्भूतं' (Text) The text adds अनुभूतार्थविषयम्.

2. दर्शन-स्मरणसंभवं (प्र. मी.) अनुभव-स्मृतिहेतुकं (Text). The text omits the details तदेवेदं to तत्प्रतियोगि and inserts तिर्यगूर्ध्वतासामान्यादिगोचरम्.

3. उपलम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं (प्र. मी.)—उप (उ in the text is a misprint)-लम्भानुपलम्भसंभवं (Text). The text substitutes for

व्याप्तिज्ञान of (प्र. मी.) "[illegible] [illegible]" which is only an [e]xplanation of the nature of व्याप्तिज्ञान of प्र. मी. It adds that [illegible] is another word for [illegible]

4. [illegible]—the definition of [illegible] given in प्र. मी. where [illegible] is charactetrised as "[illegible]" i. e. the conclusion or hypothesis without which the position becomes [a]bsurd.

[illegible] (प्र. मी. १-२-९) If is thus explained by Hemacandra himself in his स्वोपज्ञवृत्ति—"[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] i. e. Two ways of understanding [illegible] in the present case: (1) कार्य ([illegible]) used for the कारण ([illegible]) and (2) कारण ([illegible]) used for the कार्य ([illegible]).

[illegible]—See Tv Sūtra I.16. Bhāṣya Rāj Vārt. and Com.

[illegible]— " II. 5.

तिर्यक्सामान्य—See "[illegible] [illegible]—Com. on Pravacanasāra. सामान्य is of two kinds which [a]re graphically described as horizontal (तिर्यक्सामान्य) and vertical (ऊर्ध्वतासामान्य); the f[o]rmer represents unity in the plurality of different indi[v]iduals of the same class, the latter represents unity in the plurality of different conditions of the same individual. Cf. also तिर्यक्सामान्य

[illegible] । [illegible] (Ratnâkarâvatârikâ on P.N.T. III. 5).

उपलम्भानुपलम्भ—Arising from the presence and absence.

त्रिकालीकलित —resting upon the eternal relation of concomitance between साध्य and साधन Pr N T III. 7

ऊह—Otherwise called तर्क, *e. g* whatever धूम there is is only when there is वह्नि; it is not when वह्नि is not. See Pr N T with Ratna. III. 7

अनुमान द्विधा etc.—See Pr N T with Ratn. III. 9.

आगमस्वरूप—The primary sense of आगम is the knowledge of things which springs from the word of a reliable person (आप्त); *its secondary sense is the word itself. Pr N T* with Ratn. IV 1,2.

प्रमाणस्वरूप—Cf. Tarka books Muktâvali and Nîlakanthî etc.

Reference Books.

1. Tv *Sû. Bhâṣya. Sarvârtha-Siddhi.*
2. „ Râjavârtika.
3. Pramâṇa-Mîmâṁsâ.
4. *Pr N Tattv with Ratnâkarâvatârikâ.*
5. „ Syâdvâda-Ratnâkara.
6. Saptabhangî T.
7. *Sammatitarka with Commentary*
8. Nyâyâvatâra with Commentary
9. Vis'eṣâvas'yaka.
10. "*A History of Indian Philosophy*"—*by S. N Dasgupta* Vol I pp. 176–179
11. "Indian Philosophy"—by Radhakrishnan Vol. I pp. 299–302.
12. A History of Indian Logic"—by S C. Vidyâbhûṣaṇa pp. 170–171.
13. "An Epitome of *Jainism*"—*by Nahar and Ghosh* Ch. VII pp. 8–102.

Stanza XXIX.

[illegible] etc.—Refer to the Brahmanical geography of seven islands and seven oceans. As against it, the Jaina holds that the oceans and the islands are infinite in number. For Brahmanical and Jaina cosmographies see Barnett's "Antiquities of India" pp. 196–99.

The Stanza. According to Jainas, souls are infinite in number. The stanza contains criticism of the contrary doctrine.

[illegible] etc.—If there be only finite number of souls, a time is conceivable when all the souls shall have achieved मुक्ति leaving the world empty; or the once emancipated soul should return to the world to keep it ever populated! The second alternative is absurd, for all thinkers are agreed that emancipation once accomplished is accomplished for ever; in fact, it would be contrary to the notion of emancipation to suppose that emancipated souls are born again in the world and subjected to the round of births and deaths. For is not emancipation an end of *all karmans*? And if *all karmans* have once ended, how can there be return to bondage? Is not bondage necessary result of karmans only? The first alternative is also impossible. For it would be contrary to the very nature of the world (संसार) to be emptied of all souls.

दग्धे बीजे etc.—Quoted also in the Rāj Vārt. p. 361, which the editor traces to तत्त्वार्थसार

सति मूले—Vide Yogasūtras. II 12.

[illegible]—The com. by Vyāsa on the same. [illegible] in the AMP edition of the Syādvādamañjarī is mistake for [illegible]

सत्सु क्लेशेषु—While the root, viz. the passions, lasts, the abode of [illegible] *produces their fruition; but not when the root is* eradicated. For example, paddy which is rice with their encasing husk will become the seed of the next paddy crop, but

the paddy from which husk has been removed or which is scorched by fire will never do so.

[illegible] etc.—In the same way the abode of karmans, while it is wrapped in passions, has the power to germinate into Samsāra but when it is stripped of them, or the root is scorched it is no longer capable of doing so [illegible]—burnt deliberately

[illegible] etc.—The three varieties of the fruition of karman are (1) जाति (quality of birth) (2) आयु (duration life) and (3) भोग (joy or suffering).

[illegible]—Vide Nyāyasūtras IV i 64 When the passions have been destroyed no action (कर्म) makes for fruition

[illegible]—One whose wisdom was mutilated or incomplete having been hindered by jñānāvaranīya karma.

[illegible]—Discovered and taught by the master

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]—Tr Sūtras II, 13–14. Souls of Earth Water and the Vegetable Kingdom are immobile; and those of Light, Air and those possessed of two or more senses are mobile.

[illegible] etc.—Those that have lived are living or will live, i. e. [illegible] connotes potential as well as actual life

[illegible]—[illegible] are called [illegible] and [illegible] etc [illegible] [illegible]. By [illegible] we here understand not vital airs but vital energies manifested either on the physical or the mental plane The former are called [illegible] and the latter [illegible] The point of calling both of them [illegible] is to emphasise that one set of activities is as much a part of life as the other That the [illegible] at first meant not the vital airs but all organs of vital activity may be seen in the [illegible] of the Upanishads. And this fact throws a new and interesting light on the meaning of '[illegible]' as a spiritual exercise. It will not then mean a control of the vital airs of exhalation and inhalation but a

control of the very physical basis of life. The Jains extends the meaning still farther

छेवट्ठं (Hem. V. II, 80)—[illegible] from the root छिद्.

पुढविमाई छच्चा etc.— छज्जीवकायाः a compound dissolved in two ways: (1) छण्णां जीवनिकायानां समाहार: छज्जीवनिकायम् (2) छण्णां जीवानां काय ...[illegible]

The six kinds of संसारि जीवs are those of (1) Earth, (2) Water (3) Fire, (4) Air (5) Vegetable Kingdom and (6) Animal Kingdom, called respectively (1) पृथ्वीकाय (2) अप्काय (3) तेजःकाय (4) वायुकाय (5) वनस्पतिकाय and (6) त्रसकाय. See Âcârânga Sûtra I Adh. 2 Tattvârtha II, 13–14.

पुढविमाईणं पुणरवि etc.—[illegible] Sil. com on Âcâr. Sû. I. II. 79 84, 85 and Sil. com pp.30–31.

Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson asks us to note and rightly. The Jains belie as that water itself (not as is so often supposed the animalcule living in it) is inhabited by Ekendriya Jiva called Apkâya ekendriya. See Heart of Jainism " p. 98.

[illegible] etc.—The six classes of Jivas may be arranged thus in the ascending order of their numbers:

त्रस– तेज– पृथिवी– अप्– वायु– and वनस्पति-कायिक.

The तेजःकायिक are infinitely more numerous than the त्रसकायिक: similarly still more numerous are पृथिवीकायिक: still more numerous are अप्कायिक; still more are वायुकायिक; infinitely multiplied in number are वनस्पतिकायिक and so on.

ते च व्यवहारिका etc.—The वनस्पतिकायिक are व्यावहारिक and अव्यावहारिक

गोला etc.—Quoted partly in Sil. com. Âcâr. [illegible] (p. 59). See Bhagavati X, XI.

[illegible] etc.—Even if we were to put together all the Jivas who have attained निर्वाण (मोक्ष), who are now attaining it, and who will attain it hereafter still their number falls infinitely short of the number of निगोद. Hence the

world will never get emptied of souls, and the Saṁsâra will never end. As many fresh souls are supplied from the reservoir of निगोद as pass out into मुक्ति.

अमितेते वेदम्—Certain Brahmanical Schools share this doctrine

Mrs. Sinclair learns from a S'v Sâdhu that *nigoda* is a kind of hell in which are thrown evil Jîvas who have committed specially heinous sins like murder and who have no hope of ever coming out. See her Heart of Jainism " p. 272

Evidently this statement that they have " no hope of ever coming out -does not agree with the statement in the text. See also Herbert Warre p. 45

गोलाय असंखिज्जा etc. = गोलाश्च असंख्येया असंख्यनिगोदो गोलको भणित। एकैकस्मिन् निगोदे अनन्तजीवा ज्ञातव्या। सिध्यन्ति यावन्तः खलु इह संव्यवहारजीवराशेः। आयान्ति अनादिवनस्पतिराशेस्तावन्तस्तस्मिन्॥

There are inn merable spheres (गोल) in the Universe and in each sphere there are innumer ble reservoirs (निगोद) of Jîvas; and in each such again, there are innumerable lives or souls (जीव). From this infinite reservoir or rather from the particular part which lies immediately bel w animal life, that is, the vegetable kingdom (वनस्पतिराशि) there emerge souls to make up the deficiency caused by the emancipation of the souls that achieve मोक्ष from time to time

" The storehouse of unevolved *Jîvas* is the region called *nigoda* where an infinite numbe of them exist from all eternity The *nigoda* is the portion of the universe situated below the hells Here evolution is almost at a stand-still and is proceeding so slowly as to be lmost imperceptible. From this condition *jîvas* are constantly pass g into the h gher states of volution."—Champat Rai J in " Key of Kn wledge p. 715.

[illegible] मैयामिति [illegible] ।.. ..

कथं पुनरिदमवगन्तव्यं सचित्ता पृथिवीकायिका इति । उच्यते—तासामिति शरीरेष्वन्वये । अभिव्यक्तापि मनुष्यशिरोवाग्भावादिव इति । न हि [illegible] पृथिवीकायेषु [illegible] [illegible] । तस्मेतत् । अन्यत्रापि [illegible] [illegible] । यथा [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । यद [illegible] [illegible] न चेह तथाविधं किञ्चिच्चेतनाभिङ्गमस्ति । नैतदेवम्—यद्यपि [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । तस्मादेव [illegible] [illegible] स्पष्टं सातविम्बते च । [illegible] [illegible] सचित्ता पृथिवीति स्थितम् ।

S'il. Com. on Acārānga I. ii. 34.

सचेतना आपः क्वचित् जातभूमिस्वभाविकसंभवत्वात् । दर्दुरवत् । अथवा सचेतना अन्तरिक्षोद्भवा आपः [illegible] [illegible] । मत्स्यवत् ।

सचेतनं तेजो यथायोग्याहारोपादानेन वृद्धि[illegible] [illegible] पुरुषवत् । [illegible] [illegible] जीवा सिद्धा इति ।

चेतनावान् वायुः अपरप्रेरिततिर्यग्गतिमत्त्वात् । गवाश्ववत् । For these see Sīlāṅka's Com. on Ācārāṅga I vi. 50 and Sarvārthasiddhi on Tatt. Artha II. 14 "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । तत्र [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ।

—Sarvārtha-Siddhi II 13

A similar doctrine of sentiency of matter held by a certain school of Vedāntins the basis of Upaniṣad text is noticed by S'aṃkara in his Com. on Br. Sūtra II. i. 4.

Stanza XXX

सर्वैव etc.—प्रवादाः The blatant heresies.

अभियातिके etc.—Hem.

मत्सरिणः Full of jealousies or angry passions. The poss. term applied in the sense of excessiveness. Quoted in S. K. on Pān. V iii. 91

अन्योन्यपक्ष etc.—पक्षप्रत्यये etc.—पक्ष is so called because it is put forth (पच्यते पक्षीक्रियते) as possessed of the साध्य by means of the हेतु. It is thus the presentation of the साधन (हेतु) in order to prove the साध्य (धर्म).

न घट मीमांसकानां etc.—The Mīm. hold that शब्द is नित्य; the Buddhists on the other hand hold that शब्द is अनित्य. Here is an example of two schools diametrically opposed to each other.

समयोऽति et.—समय explained in different ways: "(1) सम्यक् एति गच्छति शब्दोऽर्थेति ... that by which the word goes well to the Reality—the teaching in which the word harmonises with truth. समयमिति—Hem.

(2) यद्वा सम्यगवैपरीत्येनायन्ते ज्ञायन्ते जीवाजीवादयोऽर्था अनेनेति समयः ... Teaching which gives correct knowledge of the nine categories viz. जीव, अजीव etc.

(3) अथवा सम्यगयन्ते ... आगम The teaching of the Master in which the ... come ... categories come to their own, that is to ... appear ... their true nature.

(4) अथवा समय—The doctrine of उत्पाद, व्यय and ध्रौव्य (See supra notes on St. V pp. 31 3) which has been declared by the Master as "the Mother" (cf. ...) that is to say good and kind like a mother.

न पक्षपाती—Not leaning exclusively towards either side. When there are no passions such as jealousy and hatred, there is no partisanship.

यत् समय इति etc.—Yours i.e. proclaimed by you. Has Mahāvīra proclaimed the Jaina Āgamas? Yes in a way. For

ननु पुनरिदमवगन्तव्यं सचित्ता पृथिवीकायिका इति । उच्यते—तदुपलीन शरीरेषु नन्वे । अविद्यमानेऽपि तदीयचैतन्ये [illegible] इति । न हि [illegible] [illegible] पृथिवीकायेषु [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] । यथा कस्यचित् पुंस [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] चेतना न चैतन्यता [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । अतु [illegible] न चेह [illegible] [illegible] । नैतदेवम्—[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] हि [illegible] चेतनाद्वित्त्रीणां [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] च । [illegible] [illegible] पृथिवीति स्थितम् ।

Śīl. Com. o Ācārāṅga I. ii. 84

तथैतदा [illegible] कश्चित् [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] तथैतदा [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] ।

तथैतत् तेजो [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ।
[illegible] [illegible] जीवा [illegible] इति ।

चेतनावान् वायुः [illegible] । [illegible] ।
For [illegible] see Śīlāṅka's Com. on Ācārāṅga I. vi. 50 and Sarvārthasiddhi on Tattvārtha II. 14 "[illegible] च [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] तेजोऽत्यनेन [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ।

—Sarvārtha-Siddhi II 13

A similar doctrine of sentiency of matter held by a certain school of Vedāntins on the basis of an Upaniṣad text is noticed by Śaṁkara in his Com. on Br. Sūtra II. i. 4.

Stanza XXX

सर्वैव etc.—प्रवादाः The blatant heretics.

प्रतिद्वन्द्विते etc.—Hem.

मत्सरिणः Full of jealousies or angry passions. The post-term applied in the sense of exclusiveness. Quoted in S. K. on Pān. V ii. 94

अन्योन्यपक्ष etc.—पक्षः प्रत्यक्षे etc.—पक्ष is so called because it is put forth (पच्यते व्यक्तीक्रियते) as possessed of the साध्य by means of the हेतु. It is thus the presentation of the साधन (हेतु) in order to prove the साध्य (धर्म).

न च मीमांसकानां etc.—The Mīm. hold that शब्द is नित्यः, the Bauddhists on the other hand hold that शब्द is अनित्य. Here is an example of two schools diametrically opposed to each other.

समयेति etc.—समय explained in different ways: "(1) सम्यग् एति गच्छतीति संकेत that by which the word goes well to the Reality: the teaching in which the word harmonizes with truth. समयेति—Hem.

(2) यद्वा सम्यगवैपरीत्येनेयन्ते ज्ञायन्ते जीवाजीवादयोऽर्था अनेनेति समयः सिद्धान्तः The doctrine which gives correct knowledge of the above categories as जीव अजीव etc.

(3) अथवा सम्यगयन्ते ... समय आगम The teaching of the Master in which the above-mentioned categories come to their own, that is to say appear in their true nature.

(4) अथवा समय—The doctrine of उत्पाद, व्यय and ध्रौव्य (See supra Notes on St. V pp 31-3) which has been declared by the Master as the Mother (cf. प्रवचनमाता) that is to say good and kind like a mother.

न पक्षपाती—Not leaning exclusively towards either side. When there are no passions such as jealousy and hatred there is no partisanship.

तव समय इति etc.—Yours i.e. proclaimed by you. Has Mahāvīra proclaimed the Jaina Āgama? Yes in a way. For

although the Gaṇadharas have presented it in the form of the Sūtras, it is Mahāvīra who has been the real author of the teaching

नयानशेषान् etc.—Welcoming all the नयs without distinction His teaching is like a necklace of pearls, wherein every system has its proper place like a pearl. This synthetic teaching is the Syādvāda. A similar claim can be made by the Vedāntin of the Śaṅkara school who holds the doctrine of अनिर्वचनीयता

[illegible] etc.—In the Syādvāda, discordant notes are blended so as to make a perfect harmony In it all the 'little systems' find their great conciliator or peacemaker As rivers mingle in the ocean, so do all systems mingle in the Syādvāda.

न [illegible] etc.—How is it that we do not see the Syādvāda in the 'little systems'? The question has been answered by Siddhasena Divākara who, identifying Mahāvīra with his great teaching says "Oh Lord! all views find their place in you like rivers in the ocean; you do not appear in them just as an ocean does not appear in the rivers.

[illegible] etc.—Another way of construing the passage is to take [illegible] as an enlargement of the subject [illegible] and make [illegible] (corresponding to [illegible] in the correlative passage) the predicate.

[illegible]—The author seems a bit too anxious to avoid [illegible] and [illegible] So he would not say that the second explanation is [illegible]

Appendices.

(१) [illegible] यथा—[illegible] [illegible]

एमिमयेकं संयेतं संसिमान्य मिथो गमनाद्यनुगतौ [illegible] कर्म सामान्यं विशेषेषु ॥ १ ॥ तथा संयोगस्य [illegible] [illegible] सर्वोऽपि भवतीति कुरुते । तस्या भावने वा [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] इति भवनात् । [illegible] च संयोगं [illegible] कर्यचित् । तत्र [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ २ ॥ तथा [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] प्रतिषेधस्य । कथं ॥ ३ ॥ तथा [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ ४ ॥

(१) वैशेषिकैर्विशेषैश्च यथा [illegible] तथा मतमिति । इति [illegible] जायते । तस्मात् [illegible] । [illegible] प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाण तत्रैकं पृथक्त्वं पृथक्त्वं [illegible] प्रमाणम् । [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] प्रमाणत्व च [illegible] [illegible] ॥ १ ॥ एतमेव [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । न च निरोधवाधकाने । [illegible] [illegible] । निरोधादेरमनेक [illegible] केन । तथा च [illegible] ।

एकं येन् [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ।
एकं येन तु [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥

इति को निरोध इत्यादि । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ २ ॥ एवं सैव [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] इति ॥ ३ ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] च [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] च [illegible] [illegible] ॥ ४ ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] च [illegible] ॥ ५ ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ ६ ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ ॥ [illegible] सामान्यं [illegible] सामान्यविशेष [illegible] । सामान्यविशेष [illegible] । [illegible] हि [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] सामान्यं [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] सामान्यविशेष [illegible] । [illegible] सामान्यं च [illegible] सामान्यविशेष । [illegible] सामान्य विशेषता च [illegible] ॥ ७ ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ ८ ॥ एवं सैव [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

वैधर्म्यं परमाणोरन्त्यस्य सामान्यविशेषासम्भवता वक्तव्यमवति तस्मादीषां परमाणूनां
भिन्नतायां तस्मात्स्वतन्त्रमेतामुपेक्षितावापद्यते ॥ १ ॥ एवं देवस्वाम्य" सर्वं
द्रव्यमात्रमयोपाधानमस्मादिशेषात्तदस्त्यापाधस्यो भिन्नतां वैधर्म्यं तस्मा-
त्मना तस्मात्सविशेषसमवायस्य स्यात्। एवमात्मसादिष्वपि वा भाव्या ॥ ११ ॥
योगिना नित्ये तु द्रव्यानुपदिपर्यायेषु परमाणुषु मुक्तात्मसु च प्रत्यक्षार्थं विलक्ष-
णोऽयमिति प्रत्ययो वैधर्म्यो भवति तेऽन्त्या विशेषा इत्यत्र तुल्याकृतिगुणक्रियस्वं
विलक्षणं योगमं स्वाभावमुत्पन्नमानं स्याद्वादमेव साधयेत् ॥ १४ ॥ एवं वैशे-
षिकैरवैशेषिका आत्मवादैकान्त्यमुपदिशन्त्यपि तदतिरेकापोहन्त्वं ततो कर्म
मोक्षासत्ता नास्ति ॥ किं च । अनेकान्ताभ्युपगमे तत्त्वेन द्रव्य परस्परविभक्ते-
ष्ववयवावयव्यादिषु मिथोवर्तनक्रियाया यदुक्तमनवस्थादिदूषणमुपनिपतति तदपि परिहृतं
भवति । तथाहि । अवयवानामवयविना मिथोऽवस्थानं मेरोरप्युपगम्यते पैराणि
कापिभिर्वै द्रव्य कथंचित् । तत्र धर्मानुयोगमर्हति । अवयवेष्ववयवी वर्तमान-
स्तिरेकदेशेन वर्तेत किं वा सामस्त्येन । एकदेशेन तावत् । अवयवस्यो
निरवयवत्वाभ्युपगमात् । सावयवत्वेऽपि तेभ्योऽवयवी भिन्नः, तयोरनेकान्तास्तरभिम-
तस्य निरूपणानवस्थाप्रसंगे । अथ तेभ्यो भिन्नोऽवयवी सर्वेषु च सर्वं वर्तत
इति वाच्यम् । एकदेशेन सामस्त्येन वा । एकदेशपक्षे पुनरवतारणेन दूषणावस्था ।
अथ सामस्त्येन तेषु स वर्तते तदयुक्तमेव । प्रत्यवयवमवयविना परिसमाप्त-
तथावयविबहुत्वप्रसङ्गात् । ततश्च तेभ्यो भिन्नोऽवयवी न विकल्पयोग्यः भवति ।
अन्यभिन्नतेऽन्यावयविभावव्यवस्थाभावो वा स्यादिति चेत् न । अनेकान्तस्याभ्य-
सम्भ्युपगमात् । किं तर्हि भेदोऽप्यविभिन्नत्वतस्ते विवक्षया तदर्थाविपरीतोऽवद
वैयधिकरण्यमभ्युपगम्यते । ज्ञानवित्प्रतिभासभेदेषु सर्वभावपदार्थेषु मिथो भिन्ना
भिन्नतया प्रतिभासनात् । अन्यथा प्रतिभासमानानामन्यथा परिकल्पने अतीव
प्रसक्तातिप्रसङ्गापत्तेरपि प्रसङ्गात् । एवं संयोगिषु संयोग समवायिषु समवायो
द्रव्येषु गुणो व्यक्तिषु सामान्यं वस्त्वन्तरं मिथोऽभ्युपगम्यमानानामपि तेषु वर्तनक्रियायां
सामस्त्यैकदेशविकल्पाभ्यां दूषणानि । तदेवमेकान्तभेदेऽनेकदूषणोपनिपातात्ते
ऽन्ये च दूषणानुत्थानादनेकान्ताभ्युपगमाच्च मोक्ष इति । अतो यस्मादेव
भवतीयं वितर्कवानेकान्तोऽभ्युपगत । किं भेदैकान्तकल्पनया अस्थान स्यासमता
परिक्षेपितेति ? ॥

(१) सांख्याः तावद्रजस्तमोभिरन्योन्यं विमर्दैरभिभवैर्विर्भिन्नं प्रधानमभिदधाना
यस्मात् प्रकृतेः महदादिसमोक्षसमये प्रवर्तनवितर्कवनौ निवृत्तौ स्वीकुर्वाणाश्च
सर्वं तस्मादेकान्तमतैर्मुक्त्यभावप्रसङ्गः स्यात् ॥ ?

मीमांसकास्तु स्वयम प्रधानात्मस्वरूपैकान्तैकाधरेकान्तं प्रतिपद्यमानास्त्वभि
धत्ते तदेषां सर्वज्ञोपवर्णनं नार्हति । अथवा अन्यस्य तत्स्वरूपस्य च नित्यत्वैकान्तं

मेति तेऽप्येवं पर्यनुयोज्याः। [illegible] नीतिमनुसरणा। [illegible] स्यात्। [illegible] तु प्रत्यक्षमीप्सितस्य भवेत्। [illegible] विवक्षितेति ॥

—Guṇaratna's Com. on Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya.

—:—

Stanza XXXI

विभव &c.—वैभव = विभव Wealth प्रज्ञादिभ्यश्च Pāṇ. V.iv 38. प्रज्ञादिभ्यश्च Hem VII. ii. 165. [illegible] वृत्ते etc.—Or वैभव the quality and th act of विभु i. e. all-comprehensiveness.

[illegible] etc.—The best of the adorable viz. the Pañca Parameṣṭhins to whom obeisance is offered in the famous formula " णमो अरिहंताणं " etc.

[illegible] सिद्धेभ्यो etc.—Why Arhats first? Are not they lower than the Siddhas? Do not the Arhats bow to the Siddhas on entering the life of asceticism? [illegible] सिद्धेभ्योऽपि तु [illegible]

[illegible] etc.—They do. But it is the teaching of the Arhats that reveals the existence of the Siddhas. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] —विशेषावश्यकभाष्य–३२३१

[illegible]—Siddharṣi Ālamkāra. [illegible] etc.—[illegible] in the sense of to cross being Ātm. pada [illegible] may have to be defended by the rule of elasticity of the rule as to padas ([illegible]), or it may be taken as a form of [illegible] to dry up which M. seems to prefer.

[illegible] etc.—A very ingenious bit of commentary. Why is there the plural number in [illegible] and [illegible] when the person to whom they refer is but one? Answer: It is intended to suggest that there are numberless souls

in the position of the author who venture to describe the greatness of his teaching but fail to do it justice. Thus, the plural number instead of betraying egotism places a banner at the top of the palace of humanity

पृ स्रग्धिरागि—Up to this from I to XXXI stanzas, the metre was स्रग्धरा That is XXXII is शिखरिणी

Stanza XXXII.

विप्रतारक—deceitful

अव्यभिचारि—His teaching is in no point wrong and consequently he is able to show that no other system which differs from it can claim to be altogether right (सम्यगिचारि).

अभ्यधीष etc.—Exclusion of all the other systems from the claim of bringing salvation to mankind

इतरे—The wretched heretics.

मायाकारा—Jugglers i e the deceitful teachers

शाम्बरीप्रयोग—Practice of the science taught and practised by the demon शम्बर i e sorcery

अन्धं करोति etc.—अन्ध that which blinds + तम darkness = अन्धतमसम् For the affix अ applied to तमस् see अवसमन्धेभ्यस्तमस: Pan. V.iv 79; Hem VII.iii. 80

व्यत्ययविद्यायत etc —Twofold error of confounding, सत् with असत् and असत् with सत् A with not-A and not-A with A.

अदेव च द्विदेव—Thus the Error is what is technically known in the Jain S'astras : विपर्यय मोहनीय कर्म. विपर्यय ... [illegible] See T ... Artha S ... VIII.9 ... [illegible] ... is of two kinds ... The former is of three kinds (1) सम्यक्त्व-मोहनीय (which makes right faith or perception defective) (2) मिथ्यात्व-मोहनीय (that which leads to ... y from right faith or perception)

and (3) सम्यक्त्वमिथ्यात्व (mixed right and wrong faith)—Jaini's Outlines of Jainism p. 92. On मिथ्यात्वमोहनीय Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson writes: "The last of the eighty-two fruits of sin (मिथ्यात्व-मोहनीय) is the most terrible of all for it deprives a man of the power of believing in the truth. He is forced by it to believe in a false instead of in a true god and in an evil guru and not in good ones and in a false creed instead of the true faith." ("The Heart of Jainism —p. 139).

तत्र च पञ्चाशके See Hem. Yogaśāstra II 3.

अविसंवादिवचन —Whose teaching never swerves from Truth कष-च्छेद-ताप—the three tests of real gold. The same are explained in the Gāthās पाणवह.. ..... See below

कष—T avoid the life f sin such as Himsā, and practise Dhyāna Adhyayana i. e. meditation, study etc. Mark the h mogeneity f Brāhmana and Jaina religious disciplines and practices.

छेद—To see that the outward con luct is in harmony with the laws of धर्म and makes f r purity

ताप—To undergo pain and bondage connected with the the life of Jīva.

पाणवहाइ आदि etc.—

पाणवहाईणं पावट्ठाणाणं जो उ पडिसेहो ।
झाणज्झयणाईणं जो य विहि एस धम्मकसो ॥
बज्झाणुट्ठाणेण जेण न बाहिज्जए तयं नियमा ।
संभवइ य परिसुद्धं सो पुण धम्ममि छेउ त्ति ॥
जीवाइभाववाओ बंधाइपसाहगो इह तावो ।
एएहिं परिसुद्धो धम्मो धम्मत्तणमुवेइ ॥

—Traced to हरिभद्रसूरिकृत पञ्चवस्तुक अनुयोगद्वार by AMP

तीर्थान्तरीयाणां हि etc.—The teachers of the other schools of thought teach doctrines which cannot stand the test laid down above (कष च्छेद a d ताप), and are therefore, ot gold but

base metal. They can only sink the world in the depths of false knowledge

त्राता—One who has saved himself and knows how to save others (स्वयंतरतिपरतारकः).

त्वयि etc —त्वयि = त्वय्येव च दृश्यन्ते

कृतधियः=कृता-संस्कृता -बुद्धिर्यैस्ते कृतधियः विद्वांसः—Those who have made their intellect; those who have cultivated and refined their mind the wise

कृता in कृतधिय:-परिष्कृता i. e. refined, cultivated adorned, i e adorned with wisdom कृता in कृतवर्मा-व्यङ्गा वर्मभाषया (प्रतिपं विवारपारिकर्मण्ये प्रयमागत्वात्).

Sl. 1. वैदग्ध्यशस्त्रद्योतित etc.—One shining with bright weapons consisting of arguments or reason.

प्रामाणिकपथगामिनः—Those who tread the path which is प्रामाणिक or which belonged to those who are प्रामाणिक Not much difference in sense. It means—those who tread the path of reason or those who follow reason.

हेमसखाः—Who have powerful friend in the shape of thought arising from this Song of Praise addressed by Hemâcârya to Jina Mahâvîra.

तेषां दुर्नयदस्यु—They are never afraid of the robbers namely false systems of philosophy

आयासेन विना—They easily reach the city of शिवपुर—the scriptures or teaching of Jains

Sl. 2 चतुर्विध—(1) शब्द (Grammar) (2) आगम (Scriptures) (3) साहित्य (Literature and Rhetoric) and (4) तर्क (Logic). See Note on p. 7 and in the Supplementary Notes.

Hemâcârya s wo ks in all these branches are well known. (See Introduction)

Read सस्तीर्थविसंवादे and दुरीत-समवाय

दुरीत-समवाय —Where man y an evil has been averted by insistent regard for a lo g time. दुरीत-समय has been inter

prated as महान् विशाल (See Hiralal Hansraj's Gujarati translation) But I do not think गरीयः means महान् and समवलब्धविशाल here.

दिव्याञ्जनम्—The miraculous application which gives a new power to the eye.

Sl. 8 अल्पमतयः स्रजं मया—

Let those whose hearts are pure wear this commentary on the praise of the last Tirthamkara (Lord Mahâvira) like a garland made of a few dotrines which have been gathered here and which are like tempting flowers resting on the trees of different systems of philosophy

मयाल्पविदुषा—A good expression of modesty

स्वर्गीय गुरुतामुर्वी ख्यातिरिति—to be construed with अनुमिति in the second line. It means the inference that he is the teacher of gods on this earth त्रैलोक्यविस्तारिणी to be construed with मतिमानयम्—from the high imagination which extends thro ghout th three worlds. निर्व्याजम्—rightly honestly इत्येति यथास्थितं यथोक्तं ब्रुवेति.

ऐकान्तिकमित्यादि—Construe with सत्य—full of consistency or greement with truth. The verse is relative clause, to be construed with है निरवद्यता of the next line.

Sl. 6 माधवेन्दुमण्डन—Who is in th माधवेन्दुमण्डन like the Kaustubha gem on the breast of Vishnu.

नन्दतु—May he (उदयप्रभसूरि—the guru of मल्लिषेण) rejoice

Sl. 7 शाकेषुशिशिरकरार्के—i. e. in the Saka year 1214 मन्वग्१४ (चतुर्दश मनव), रविमृ१२ (द्वादश आदित्याः).

दीपमहसि—On the day of Divâli the thirtieth day of Âśvina.

Sl. 8. साहाय्यात्—Composed and made particularly fragrant by th co-operation or rathe help of जिनप्रभसूरि

Sl. 9. कलिकाले जिनसदृशम्—One who has been like Jina (Lord Mahâvira) owing to his achieving victory over Kali.

क्रियताम्—This is a commentary on the Song of Praise com posed by Hemâcârya but, truth to say it is not intended to be so much a literary composition as an expression of bhakti towards Hemacandra.

निवेद् etc.—' I do not submit it to the judgment of scholars

वस्तुस्थितम् etc.—The author is confident that there is plenty of spontaneous thought in his work.

Supplementary Notes

कलिकालसर्वज्ञ—A title well deserved by one who was probab y the most learned man of his time

अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदिका—The name of the text commented upon by Mallisena. It means the work in which the claims of other (non-Jaina) systems of philosophy as expressions of Truth (*i. e.* the whole Truth) are disproved.

स्याद्वादमञ्जरी—The name of the commentary In disproving the claims of other systems, the Jaina does not allege that they are wholly untrue, but maintains that they are broken lights of one entire Truth for which J inism stands in its doctrine of Syâdvâda—*i. e.* the doctrine of May be or partial truths.

सारस्वत ......मन्त्र —

श्रीदेवतावतारे च तीर्थे ब्राह्मीविभासना ।
तस्यै साधुमते तस्याराधनीयत्यचिन्तयत् ॥
निर्वीर्येऽस्मादिविद्यस्य वाक्यमन्यस्य वल्गति ।
आराधनाय तत्काश्मीरं गन्ती मनसोऽभवत् ॥
गत्वा तावत्तले ताम्रलिप्त्यां रैवतकं ययौ ।
तत्र तपस्विद्रुमाणां नेमिश्रीतीर्थपात ते ॥
ध्यायता ना सितांबर देवी भाषामयीत्यति ।
न्यस्य तस्या निशा नीता पद्मासनानुपासनात् ॥
सिद्धमातृकोऽनेकस्यत्र स्तोम लीला विचक्षिणात् ।
अनुज्ञामिव सिद्धानतीति प्रभुः ॥

—Prabhâvakacarita of Candraprabha Sûri, Hema. Prabandha vv 42–46.

उदयन —Author of न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि a न्यायवार्तिक See Introduction.

वृषभादि—See Hemacandra s Abhi lhânacintâmaṇi I. 42.

रैवत—Girnar made h ly by its association with the name of Neminâtha, twenty-second Tirthank ra, sai l to be contemporary an l kinsman of Krsna.

ब्राह्मीसरस्वती. The name points to the original solidarity of Jaina and Brāhmaṇa beliefs

सोम—सोमचन्द्र, the name of हेमचन्द्र before he became a 'सूरि'

गिरवारसता—गिरा सारसतो (सन्ता) वरम to be construed with अमृत.

चातुर्विद्यनिर्माणैकब्रह्मा—Like Brahmā who made the four Vedas, Hemacandra made the four vidyās viz. लक्षण आगम साहित्य and तर्क In earlier Gujarat inscriptions चातुर्विद्य is often used for the four Vedas declared by Brahmā.

For चातुर्विद्य—Cf. Prabhāvakacarita—

"सोमचन्द्रस्ततश्चन्द्रोज्ज्वलप्रज्ञाबलादसौ ।
तर्कलक्षणसाहित्यविद्या पर्यच्छिनद्द्रुतम् ॥

—Hema. 37

Cf. also श्रीसिद्धराजेन चातुर्विद्यानां पुरः श्रीहेमाचार्यान्वितस्य विचार्य ....कर्णोपकण्ठस्थित श्रीहेमाचार्ये प्राह—Prabodha cintāmaṇi, where the four branches of Knowledge are according to Tawney "त्रयी the triple Veda; आन्वीक्षिकी logic and metaphysics; दण्डनीति the science of government and वार्त्ता practical arts." This meaning does not seem likely in view of the consensus of explanation given by Jaina writers that the word means लक्षण (Grammar) आगम (Canon) साहित्य (Literature including Poetics) and तर्क (Logic including Metaphysics.)

Bhoja, King of Mālava is said to have composed a set of four विद्याs which differed from the above in two They are śāstras of (1) शब्द (2) अलङ्कार (3) दैवज्ञ ज्योतिर्विद् or ज्यौतिष-) and तर्क

Cf. अतो हि भोजराजोऽपि विद्वच्चक्रशिरोमणिः ।
शब्दालङ्कारदैवज्ञतर्कशास्त्राणि निर्ममे ॥

Prabhāvaka-Hema. 76.

For the meaning of लक्षण cf. ibid—

संक्षिप्तश्च पृथुश्चायं समयेऽस्मिन् व्याकरणः ।
लक्षणं तत्र निष्पत्तिः शब्दानां भारती ॥

पाणिनेर्महत्वं येऽरसाहूयितम च हिताः ।
व्याकरणसूत्रस्य बोधेऽस्तीरम्मताविते ॥

— „ 82-83.

श्रीहेमचन्द्रोऽभवतत्तोऽस्य व्याकरणसमम् ।
सार्धं चतुर्मासे भीमत् सिद्धहेमाख्यमद्भुतम् ॥
सीमि लक्षणपञ्चेषु निषधिद्धिप्रदम् ॥

— 96-98.

For the origin of the use of the word सूत्र in this sense, Cf. एवं तुमरि भगवतः पाणिनेराचार्यस्य सूत्रं प्रवृत्तम् ।— Vyâkaraṇa Mahâbhâṣya, I troduction. The reason for the word सूत्र as app led to Grammur will be found in the following passage which precedes it. अथैतस्मिन्नन्यतोपदेशे सति किं कर्तव्यं ? प्रतिपदं प्रतिपत्तव्यः कर्तव्य ? । ... ... एवं तर्हि लक्षणं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ? किंचित्सामान्यविशेषवल्लक्षणं प्रवर्त्यम् ।—M. Bhâṣya *i. e.* Grammar lays down general rules, and does not deal with each individual word in the language. Cf. also सूत्रम् लक्षणमेवैते विभाषालक्षणविधीन्यम् व्याकरणं तु लक्षणमिति विदेव —Durga's Com. on Yâska's Nirukta where सूत्र-forms in accordance with different senses.

सप्तदशलक्षमितसूत्रबद्धम् —Vid. "यमीतारेषामसारणिस्थानस्तोकैः पञ्चेवेकलक्षणमिता सर्वसूत्रेषु मार्गं निवारितवान् —Prabandhacintâmaṇi; Kumârapâla Prabandha; also श्रीकुमारपालेते तु सुत्वाद्दि समस्ता स्वार्थं पठिता । अष्टादशदेशेष्वमारिपरहो दापिता । चतुर्दशरेषु चैत्यकोटिसहस्रेषु च जीवरक्षा कारिता "—Kumârapâla Prabandha of Jinamaṇḍana gaṇi.

त्रिवर्ग—See Hemacandra's Abhidhânacintâmaṇi II. 234.—
" धर्मार्थकामास्तु त्रिवर्गः स्यात् लोके सर्वं त्रिवर्गमयम् ।
स्वरूपाधर्मं चैव सर्वं कार्यं तथा ॥

मतादशदोषवर्जित—Cf. अन्तराया दानलाभवीर्यभोगोपभोगगाः । हासो रत्यरती भीतिर्जुगुप्सा शोक एव च ॥ कामो मिथ्यात्वमज्ञानं निद्रा चाविरतिस्तथा । रागो द्वेषश्च नो दोषास्तेषामष्टादशाप्यमी ॥—Abhidhâna I. 72-73.

अन्तरायनाश—Destruction of अन्तराय, one of the *Karmans*, the eighth the last, which impedes ज्ञान

महाप्रातिहार्यसंपद्—This consists of the following: अशोकवृक्षः सुरपुष्पवृष्टिर्दिव्यध्वनिश्चामरमासनं च । भामण्डलं दुन्दुभिरातपत्रं सत्प्रातिहार्याणि जिनेश्वराणाम्

ऐर्त्त य" (Pravacana Sároddhára XXXIX, 440) *i. e.* मणोकरण इत्यवधि, दिव्यध्वनि चामर, आसन, भामण्डल (प्रभामण्डल) भेरी and छत्र

Cf. " मणोकरण परपुष्पवृष्टिर्दिव्यो ध्वनिश्चामरमासनं च । भामण्डलं दुन्दुभिरातपत्रं सत्प्रातिहार्याणि जिनेश्वराणाम् —Quoted in नन्दिसूत्र हारि-भद्रीयवृत्ति The whole section on जिनस्तुति in Haribhadra's Com. on Nandisûtra, will be found interesting in this connection.

के एवं चाणं etc.—Âcârânga I. iii. 1-4. Sûtra 122.

आत्मसाधनतारक etc.—Who brings about his own salvation only अन्तकृत्—Who puts an end to his karmans. केवली is अतीतानागतवर्तमानवस्तुविस्तरार्थवेदी and is described as मुण्डमात्र मुण्डभावमस्तकभावितविरतिलक्षण । that is, leading a life of asceticism, with the outward symbol and the inner mentality of the shaven-headed. मुण्डकेवली is thus described: "तविरी पम निर्वेदात्मनिस्तरणं तु च । आत्मार्थं संप्रवृत्तोऽसौ सदा स्यान्मुण्डकेवली ॥" —Intense as is the asceticism of the मुण्डकेवलिन् he still aims at *his own* salvation, and not of the world of living beings, as does the Tîrthankara. Compare the distinction between अर्हत् and बोधिसत्त्व or बुद्ध in Buddhism.

चतुस्त्रिंशदतिशय—Thirty-four excellences, 4 सहोत्थ (सह-जन्मा) congenital 11 कर्मक्षयजा *i. e.* accruing from the destruction of karmans, and 19 देवकृत (देवकृता) made by gods. For f rther details see the footnote on p. 22 of Árhata-Mata-Prabhâkara edition of प्रमाणमीमांसा

निशीथचूर्णी etc.—In the Nisîthacûrni, 1 th Uddesa

गुणस्थान—*i. e.* Stages in the evol tion of the soul (Jaini). These are thus enumerated in Gommatasâra Jîvakând verses 9 10:—मिच्छो सासणमिस्सो अविरदसम्मो य देसविरदो य । विरदापमत्त इदरो अपुव्व अणियट्ट सुहमो य ॥ उवसंतखीणमोहो सजोगकेवलिजिणो अजोगी य । चउदस जीवसमासा कमेण सिद्धा य णादव्वा ॥—*i. e.* There are fo rteen stages of the soul (गुणस्थान) (1) False belief (मिच्छो or मिथ्यात्व). (2) Backsliding (सासादनसम्यक्त्व or सासादन); (3) Mixed right a d wro g beli f (मिश्रोऽविरत); (4) Right faith not acted on, that is, lacking in विरति or abstention (अविरतसम्मो अविरतसम्यक्त्व); (5) Beginni g of right conduct (देसविरदो-देशविरत

(a partial renunciation). (6) Slight negligence as to right conduct ([illegible] i. e. [illegible] and yet [illegible] occasionally), (7) Right conduct free from all negligence ([illegible] the other i. e. right conduct without negligence [illegible]) (8) Initiation to the higher life ([illegible] i. e. unprecedented or unique); (9) Incessant pursuit of the higher life ([illegible]); (10) Condition almost devoid of desires ([illegible]); (11) Condition entirely devoid of desires ([illegible]) i.e. (12) Infatuationlessness ([illegible]), (13) Omniscience in the embodied condition ([illegible]) and lastly (14) Omniscience ([illegible]). When this perfection is reached the soul is called Siddha or Perfect. (See Jaini's Outlines of Jainism pp. 105–106 and for fuller account, Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson's "Heart of Jainism pp 185 to 192, section the fourteen steps to Liberation from Karma).

[illegible]—Kevalins who were versed in all the parts of the Jaina Cano These are six nd they are e umerated in the Abhidhânachintâmani Ch. I 33–34—[illegible]

[illegible] etc.—The whole stanza in the [illegible] runs as follows—" [illegible]

For [illegible] and the ge i which he lived of. "[illegible] [illegible]"—Malayagiri's Com. on Nandisûtra.

St. III.

स्वयं वा परो वा etc.—Cf. "परो व्यक्तं वा मा वा विषयद् मतिमान् वा । मातिवत्स्या विद्या भाषा स्वपरगुणस्पर्शिनी "—quoted in the footnote in A.M.P edition of Syadvādamañjarī p. 12 from Hemacandra's S'reṇikacaritra II 32

न भवति धर्मः etc.—Tattvārtha-Sūtra-Sambandha-Kārikā 29 attributed to Umāsvāti by Malliṣeṇa (For the quotation and the authorship of the work see Introduction p 4 of AMP edition of तत्त्वार्थ).

St. VI.

In Notes p. 68 on Page 29 ll. 175–178 of the text read: "The passage that follows is reproduced verbatim in Guṇaratna's T R. D pp. 261–62" for "...... ...is taken verbatim from...... शिपिविष्ट—S'iva. See स्थाणुर्भवः शिपिविष्टो वैरवी "—Abhidhānacintāmaṇi II 112

सम्योगद्रव्यादिविभागनियमे etc.—बुद्धि इच्छा प्रयत्न संस्कार परिमाण पृथक्त्व संयोग and विभाग

St. VIII

किं शिखण्डिना सत्तायोगेन—Possession of सत्ता which is fruitless. The allusion is to the famous character (शिखण्डिन्) in the Mahā Bhārata whom Bhīṣma refused to fight because he was originally a girl. शिखण्डिन् was thus neither male nor a female and, therefore the word stands for what is fruitless. The whole passage is borrowed from Hemacandra's Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā I 1. 3. यदि द्रव्यादित्रयवृत्तित्वं सत्त्वं तदा सामान्यादेरपि स्यात् । तत्रोपचारात् सत्त्वमस्त्येवेति चेत् असत्वं तत्प्रयोगेऽपि कुतः सत्त्वम् । यदि तु स्वरूपसत्त्वं प्रयोगः । स्वरूपसत्त्वं द्रव्यादावप्यस्त्येवेति चेत् तर्हि किं शिखण्डिना सत्तायोगेन । सत्तायोगात् सत्त्वमिति न समाधानम् । सत्तासम्बन्धात् सदिति चेत् सद्भावमेवाद् सत्तोपलक्षणस्य सत्तासम्बन्धसम्भवात्—see pp. 49 50

शाब्दिकाः—Grammarians.

स्तुति etc.—स्तवे गानमेते च तापरिये [illegible] । [illegible] भव-
[illegible]—[illegible] is the state immediately preceding
[illegible]

[illegible]—See तत्त्वार्थसूत्रभाष्य on II 5—[illegible] [illegible]—where [illegible] is
something like the सिद्धि of Yoga. See Syādvāda-Ratna.

St. IX.

[illegible]—Rāmacandragaṇi. See Jainagranthāvalī
p. 73

गन्धहस्तिभाष्य—तत्त्वार्थभाष्य is said to have been a commentary by Samantabhadra on तत्त्वार्थसूत्र which is lost. आप्तमीमांसा of Samantabhadra is its Introduction, which has two commentaries one short (अष्टशती) and the other long (अष्टसहस्री) by Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda respectively. The last three are available and have been printed.

St. X

वैशेषिकनैयायिकयोः समानतन्त्रत्वात्—For the latest discussion on the relative chronology of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya Sūtras see Dr H. N Randle Indian Logic in the Early Schools pp. 6–8 I agree in his conclusion.

यौगमत—The Nyāya system of Akṣapāda Gautama. The kinship of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika is paralleled by the close connection of their religious schools, i.e. शैव and पाशुपत which both belong to Śaivism. Guṇaratna observes [illegible] [illegible] शैवा इत्युच्यन्ते वैशेषिकास्तु पाशुपता इति ॥
The practice of योग perhaps in a striking form, which seems to have given the name 'यौगाः' to the Naiyāyikas (the school of गौतम अक्षपाद) was, however, no less a feature of the Vaiśeṣika school. Thus, Praśastapāda, a great Vaiśeṣika concludes his Bhāṣya as follows:

"योगाचारविषयस्या यस्तोपचिता मौनद्रम् ।
सर्वे वैशेषिके वाक्ये तस्मै कल्पते नम ॥"

For " the whole text from सर्वं सविचा to इति स्थितम् is taken verbatim from Gunaratna's Tarkarahasyadipikâ " read "The whole text from सर्वं सविचा to इति स्थितम् is reproduced verbatim in Gunaratna s Tarakarahasyadipikâ."

In the Bibliography suggested at the end, add Hemacandra's Pramāṇamimāṃsā.

सर्वोपलब्धिवेदं प्रमाणम्—Vâtsyâyana Bhâsya on the Nyâya-Sûtras, p. 94, l. 5. Quoted also in the Pramāṇamimāṃsā I. I. 8 p. II.

St. XI

चातुर्गतिकसंसारे etc.—नारक, तिर्यक् मनुष्य and देव enumerated here in the ascending order—perhaps with the exception of Tirthamkaras who though men are reckoned as superior to gods. For the classification see Tattvârtha-Sûtra.

त्रेताग्नि—The three fires viz. दक्षिण आहवनीय and गार्हपत्य

आत्मलाभ—सम्यक्त्वप्रतिरोधिना and

धूमोर्णा—सारमेयाः गण इति भाष्यकाराः—says AMP.—I do not know on what authority

व्रतातिचार—' व्रतस्खलन' AMP =failure to observe the vow

आधाकर्मादि॰—आधाय साधुं चेतसि प्रणिधाय यत् क्रियते भक्तादि तदाधाकर्म । इत्येतदधिकारीति यद्योग । आधाकर्म साधुनिमित्तं चेतसा प्रणिधानं यथा कुत्रस्य साधो कारणेन मम भक्तादि पक्तव्यमिति । आधया कर्म पाकादिक्रिया आधाकर्म । तद्योगात् भक्ताद्यपि आधाकर्म । ... —Preparing a dinner with the object of serving it to Sâdhu.

नवकोटि to.— १ स्वयं हननं २ अन्येन घातनं ३ अपरेण हन्यमानस्यानुमोदनं ४ स्वयं पचनं ५ अन्येन पाचनं ६ अपरेण पच्यमानस्यानुमोदनं ७ स्वयं क्रयणं ८ अन्येन क्रापणं ९ अपरेण क्रीयमाणस्यानुमोदनम्—इति नवकोटिपरिशुद्धिविधाने स्थानाङ्गे सा ४०२ "—AMP foot note on p. 68.

[illegible] etc.—" [illegible] "—AMP footnote on p. 89

Add as an Appendix to the discussion relating to हिंसा verses अहिंसा the following interesting and parallel passage from Kumârapâla Prabandha of Jinamaṇḍanagaṇi—

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]मेतैर्मांसितप्रमाणापि [illegible]॥ अन्धे तमसि मज्जामः पशुभिर्ये यजामहे। हिंसा नाम भवेद्धर्मो न भूतो न भविष्यति॥ ... ...अप भागम्। यज्ञार्थं पशवः सृष्टाः स्वयमेव स्वयंभुवा। यज्ञोऽस्य भूत्यै सर्वस्य तस्माद्यज्ञे वधोऽवधः॥ ओषध्यः पशवो वृक्षास्तिर्यञ्चः पक्षिणस्तथा। यज्ञार्थं निधनं प्राप्ताः प्राप्नुवन्त्युच्छ्रितीः पुनः। इत्यादि मनुस्मृते हिंसा वेदोक्तहिंसाया धर्मसाधनत्वं प्राक् [illegible]। उत्तरम्। वेदत्रयम्। यथा स्कन्दपुराणे—अग्निष्टोमीयमिति वा पशवालम्भनकारित्वं। ता न प्रमाणं [illegible] ता मतामिह॥ वृक्षांश्छित्त्वा पशून् हत्वा कृत्वा रुधिरकर्दमम्। दग्ध्वा वह्नौ तिलाज्यादि चित्रं स्वर्गोऽभिलष्यते॥ तथा श्रीमद्भागवतपुराणे [illegible] उक्तम्— ये त्विह दाम्भिकाः दम्भयज्ञेषु पशून् विशसन्ति तानमुष्मिन् लोके वैशसे नरके पतितान् विशसयन्तो यातयित्वा विशसन्ति इत्यादि॥ मीमांसायाम् "अन्धे तमसि मज्जामः पशुभिर्ये यजामहे। हिंसा नाम भवेद्धर्मो न भूतो न भविष्यति॥" श्रीभागवतपुराण [illegible] शासन [illegible] "तथैव [illegible] । न वेदोक्ता हि तत्त्वदाः प्रायेण [illegible] ॥ किंच "यज्ञार्थं पशवः सृष्टा इत्यपि वदति स्मृतिः। तन्मोक्षमन्त्र स्मरतो यदपि न किं पुरा॥ यदि यज्ञार्थं पशवः सृष्टास्तर्हि [illegible] किं न कुर्वते। अहिंसा परमो धर्मः स हिंसया कथं भवेत्॥ न तोयजानि पद्मानि जायन्ते ज्वलनेऽग्नौ॥ तथा च धर्मशास्त्रे—"आत्मवत् सर्वभूतेषु [illegible]। धर्मस्याधिगमोपायः [illegible]॥ इति॥ श्रीमीमांसायां पद्मपुराणम्— [illegible] नाहं स्वर्गफलोपभोगतृषितो नाभ्यर्थितस्त्वं मया। संतुष्टस्तृणभक्षणेन सततं साधो न युक्तं तव। स्वर्गे यान्ति यदि त्वया विनिहता यज्ञे ध्रुवं प्राणिनो यज्ञं किं न करोषि मातृपितृभिः पुत्रैस्तथा बान्धवैः॥" इत्यादिभिरुपदिश्यमानः [illegible] श्रीचौलुक्यो वैदिक मार्गस्याप्रमाणत्वममन्यत॥

—Kumârapâlaprabandha.

2. अविवेकश्रीमतो ॥ ११ ॥—[illegible] धर्महेतुः [illegible] हिंसा [illegible] इत्यर्थः। तत्रैव कारिकायामुक्तम्— [illegible] न [illegible] इति। [illegible] वेदा [illegible]। न [illegible] हिंसादिपापेन [illegible] च पुष्ट इत्यर्थः। न च वैदहिंसाया पापजनकत्वे [illegible] निर्धर्मत्वमुपपत्तिरिति वैद। वेदहिंसायाम् [illegible] [illegible] एव पापजनकत्व [illegible] वरतए। [illegible] युधिष्ठिरादीनां स्वधर्मेऽपि [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible]। इति [illegible]। [illegible] इति श्रुतिषु वेदातिरिक्तहिंसा [illegible] [illegible] यदि न तु वैदहिंसायां [illegible]

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पात्रकपरिपात्रता etc.—' तत्रैव [illegible] अर्थपरत्व [illegible]। तथापि तत्समापि [illegible] [illegible] गीयते —प्रथमवत्सरैव [illegible] [illegible] यम्। तत्र यदि न [illegible] तदन्यमासेऽपि। [illegible] [illegible]ऽन्यतामपम इत्येवा द्वितीये दिने [illegible]। [illegible] भवति तत्र [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। अथ [illegible] [illegible] परिचारकाणां [illegible] तत [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] च पात्रकपरिज्ञान[illegible]। अथ प्रतिदिवसं [illegible] न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] सीतायां वा [illegible] [illegible] परिवासयन्ति। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] न पीतायं [illegible]।"—[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] तथैव।"—AHP footnote on p. 89

Add as an Appendix to the discussion relating to हिंसा versus अहिंसा the following interesting and parallel passage from Kumārapāla Prabandha of Jinamaṇḍanagaṇi.—

1 [illegible] मांसं [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] न [illegible] परित्यजेत् ॥ १ ॥ न [illegible] मांसं न [illegible] न [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥२॥ इति [illegible] ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] च न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ [illegible]— [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ १ ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥२॥ [illegible] मांसं न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] मांसं [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ ३ ॥ [illegible]—[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible]—[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ १ ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] ॥ २ ॥ [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ ३ ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ ४ ॥ [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible] ॥ न [illegible] [illegible] इति ॥ न [illegible] [illegible] न [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ॥ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

इत्यादीन्यपि वैदिकहिंसाप्रकाशकानि वाक्यानि प्रमाणानि ॥ अन्धे तमसि मज्जामः पशुभिर्ये यजामहे । हिंसा नाम भवेद्धर्मो न भूतो न भविष्यति ॥ — अथ मनुः । यज्ञार्थं पशवः सृष्टाः स्वयमेव स्वयंभुवा । यज्ञोऽस्य भूत्यै सर्वस्य तस्माद्यज्ञे वधोऽवधः ॥ ओषध्यः पशवो वृक्षास्तिर्यञ्चः पक्षिणस्तथा । यज्ञार्थं निधनं प्राप्ताः प्राप्नुवन्त्युच्छ्रितीः पुनः । इत्यादि वचनतो हिंसा वेदोपदिष्टत्वात् धर्मत्वमङ्गीकार्यं [illegible] । इति—तदयुक्तम् । नैवम् सत्यम् । यतः स्कन्दपुराणे—भक्षितेऽपि भवेत् [illegible] । सा च प्रमाणं [illegible] सा सतामिह ॥ [illegible] पशून् हत्वा कृत्वा रुधिरकर्दमम् । यद्येवं गम्यते स्वर्गो नरके केन गम्यते ॥ तथा श्रीभागवतपुराणे पञ्चविंशस्कन्धे उक्तम्—“ये त्विह वै दाम्भिका यज्ञेषु पशून् विशसन्ति तानमुष्मिन् लोके वैशसे नरके पतितान् विशसन्ति इत्यादि ॥ मीमांसायाम् “ अन्धे तमसि मज्जामः पशुभिर्ये यजामहे । हिंसा नाम भवेद्धर्मो न भूतो न भविष्यति ॥” श्रीभागवतपुराणे [illegible] [illegible] यथैव [illegible] । न वेदवाक्ये हि तत्त्वतः प्रायेण [illegible] ॥ किंच यज्ञार्थं पशवः सृष्टा इति वदति स्मृतिः । [illegible] न किं कुरुते ॥ यदि यज्ञार्थं पशवः सृष्टास्तर्हि व्याघ्रादिभिर्भक्ष्यमाणाः किं न दुष्यन्ति । अहिंसा परमो धर्मः स हिंसायां कथं भवेत् ॥ न तोयजानि पद्मानि जायन्ते जातवेदसः ॥ तस्माच्च धर्मसमु[illegible] [illegible] । धर्मस्यापि [illegible] [illegible] ॥ इति ॥ श्रीभीष्मरामायणे [illegible]— नाहं स्वर्गफलो[illegible] मया । [illegible] साधो न युक्तं तव । स्वर्गे यान्ति यदि त्वया विनिहता यज्ञे ध्रुवं प्राणिनो यज्ञं किं न करोषि मातृपितृभिः पुत्रैस्तथा बान्धवैः ॥” इत्यादिभिः [illegible] श्रीजैनमतमेव [illegible] ॥

—Kumârapâlaprabandha.

2. अविवेकधर्मीमतो ॥ १, ६ ॥—[illegible] [illegible] इत्यर्थः । एतेन [illegible]— [illegible] इति । [illegible] । न [illegible] । न च वेदहिंसाया [illegible] । वेदहिंसा[illegible] [illegible] । यत्तु वेदहिंसाविहिताया एव पापजनकत्वमिति तत्तत् । [illegible] । युधिष्ठिरादीनां स्वधर्मेऽपि युद्धे हतानि[illegible] प्रायश्चित्तश्रवणात् । [illegible] । [illegible] । इति मार्कण्डेयवचनात् । [illegible] तीर्थेषु इति श्रुतिस्तु वेदविहितहिंसा[illegible] न तु वेदहिंसाया [illegible] मीमांसादिके

इहस्मपिति चेद् । दुःखात् दुःखं जलाभिषेकवन्न जाड्यविमोकः ॥ १८ ॥ नाह
यथिकृता हिंसादिरूपेण दुःखात्मकयागेन च दुःखात् दुःखं न दुःखाभावेन भवति न तु
जाड्याविमोकोऽपि वैकल्पिकमिति । दुःखविमोकस्तत्रविद्भिर् इत्त विदिते । यथा जाड्या-
र्तस्य जलाभिषेकात् दुःखमित्विरेण भवति न तु जाड्यविमोकः इत्यर्थः । तदुक्तम्—
यथा पङ्केन पङ्काम्भः सुरया वा सुराकृतम् । भूतहत्यां तथैवैकां न यज्ञैर्मार्ष्टुमर्हति ।
—Sāṃkhya-sūtras with Bhāṣya.

3. A few texts bearing on the subject of अहिंसा will also be found in Māṭhara Vṛtti   the Sāṃkhya Kārikās.

4. For   fairly long list of texts bearing on अहिंसा and यज्ञ and translated in the various vol   mes of the   Sacred Books f the East   see   *Ahimsa*   in ( ) J ins religion, (b) in Buddhism and ( ) in Brahmanism on pp. 30–3. and   Sacrifice—(d) Relati   value or worthlessness   f sacrifice,   d symbolical sacrifice   on pp. 482–83 in Winternitz   Concise Dictionary f Eastern Religion.

5. A most interesting and instructive treatment f the   bject with   long list of quotations made from the MBh and the Purāṇas and the Smṛtis will be found in the edition of the Sāṃkhya Kārikas with Sāṃkhya Tattvakaumudi annotated by Balārāma Udāsina of Benares

The texts of Śruti, Smṛti, Mahābhārata and Purāṇas, as well as the views f Sāṃkhya, Vedānta and Bhakti schools of religion cited in the Syādvādamañjari and in the extracts given above leave no doubt that there was   strong body of   pinion even in Brahmanism which revolted against हिंसा even वैदिकहिंसा (e. हिंसा prescribed in Śāstras,   uch as animal sla ghter in   sacrifice). This trend of thought seems to have come d wn from times earlier than the rise of Jainism and Buddhism, mainly in the Bhakti and Jñāna schools as disting-uished from the ritualist school of Brahmanism.

St. XII

मीमांसकभेदगुरुमतम्—The school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is one of the two famous schools of Mimāṃsā   e. Pūrva Mimāṃsā;

the other being that of Prabhākara or 'Guru' as he is generally styled. The differences of the two schools on certain problems of philosophy are radical. See Dr Ganganath Jha's thesis on the " Prabhākara School."

मीमांसा—see supra.

लब्ध्युपयोग—अर्थग्रहणशक्तिर्लब्धिः उपयोग अर्थग्रहणव्यापारः
(Footnote in AMP p. 95)

" लब्ध्युपयोगौ भावेन्द्रियम्—लब्धिरुपयोगश्च भावेन्द्रियं भवति । लब्धिर्नाम गतिजात्यादिनामकर्मजनिता तदावरणीयकर्मक्षयोपशमजनिता चेन्द्रियाश्रयकर्मोदयनिर्वृत्ता च जीवस्य भवति । सा पञ्चविधा । तद्यथा । स्पर्शनेन्द्रियलब्धिः, रसनेन्द्रियलब्धिः घ्राणेन्द्रियलब्धिः, चक्षुरिन्द्रियलब्धिः श्रोत्रेन्द्रियलब्धिरिति — Tattvārtha Sūtra II 18 and Bhāṣya. भावेन्द्रिय i. e. subjective sense. Sense-faculties are of two kinds: (1) लब्धि (it is the attainment of manifestation of the sense-faculty by the partial destruction subsidence and operation of the knowledge-obscuring karma relating to that sense.); (2) उपयोग (the conscious attention of the soul directed to that sense.)—Tattvārtha translated by Mr J L Jaini The Sacred Books of the Jainas More briefly " इन्द्रियनिर्वृत्तिहेतुः क्षयोपशमविशेषो लब्धिः तन्निमित्तः परिणामविशेष उपयोगः । (Headnote to the Tattvārtha-S'loka-Vārtika on T. S. II. 18).

स्वप्रकाशमित्यर्थः—Partly drawn from Ratnaprabhācārya's Ratnākarāvatārikā on P N T (p 37) and simplified Cf. अत्रैव वदन्त्यपरे—ननु न स्वसंवेद्यं वेदनस्य रूपम्। स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् स्वस्य परोक्षमेवाध्यक्षं ज्ञानमङ्गीकरणीयम्। तदेतदसमीचीनम्। यतः—किमुत्पत्तिः ज्ञप्तिर्वा स्वात्मनि विरुध्येत? उत्पत्तिः सा विरुध्यताम्। न हि ज्ञानमात्मानमुत्पादयतीति वयमभ्युपगच्छामः। अथ ज्ञप्तिः, सैवमात्मनि विरोधमध्यास्ते। तदात्मनैव ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशकत्वमप्युपपन्नत्वात् प्रकाशात्मनैव प्रतिभासमिच्छामेयरन्। अथ प्रकाशात्मनैव प्रदीपालोकोऽयमुत्पन्नस्तथाविधानिति परप्रकाशकोऽस्तु, आत्मानमपि प्रकाशयतीति तु कीदृग्वृत्ती नीतिः ? इति चेत्। ननु किं तेनाप्यपरालोकेन प्रकाश्यमानः स्यादाहोस्वित् आलोकान्तरात् वा प्रकाशेनापि प्रतिभास्यम् ?। प्रथमे प्रथमपक्षः। द्वितीयेऽपि सैवानवस्थापत्तिः। अथ नासौ स्वप्रकाशे कर्तव्यमपेक्षते प्रकाशान्तरं स्वयमेव प्रकाशरूपत्वात् स्वप्रकाशक एवेति चेत् ज्ञानेऽपि तुल्यमिदं। यदि स्वयमपि ज्ञाने कर्तव्यं प्रति न समर्थं स्वयं ज्ञानं प्रतिभासमानं स्वरूपप्रकाशकं तस्य

[illegible]। यथा तु ज्ञानं ज्ञानान्तरेणापि [illegible] तद् भाति यथा प्रदीप [illegible] तथा [illegible] ! — — —

[illegible]—— इत्यादि [illegible] प्रमाणलक्षणे ॥ Hemacandra's Pramāṇamīmāṃsā for the necessary grou[nd] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ज्ञानं [illegible] इन्द्रियाणां [illegible]। [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] भवति च [illegible] —इत्येवं [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । तत्र हि [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । यदपि [illegible] ज्ञानं तदपि [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] । तेन [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] च [illegible] ॥

[illegible]—The whole of this is substantially and also verbatim taken from Ratnaprabhācārya Ratnākarāvatārikā Cf. अथ [illegible] [illegible]—अहो [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] च [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । तथाहि—ज्ञानं [illegible] [illegible] ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वे सति प्रमेयत्वात् [illegible] [illegible] यथा [illegible] तथा [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] हि [illegible] [illegible] न पुन [illegible] । न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] सति [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] प्रमाणत्वम् । [illegible] तु तथापि [illegible] [illegible] ।

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । तत्र च [illegible] तत्र हेतो: [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] ज्ञानं स्वसंविदितं ज्ञानत्वात् ईश्वरज्ञानवत् । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] इति चेत् । [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] एव [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] हेतु । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] इति [illegible] । न [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] हेतु: । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] इति [illegible]—[illegible] [illegible] । तथापि—ईश्वरज्ञानान्यत्वे प्रमे[yatvāt] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible]

परप्रकाशकेऽभिहितं हि ज्ञानस्य लक्षणम् । न च ह्यर्थं ज्ञानस्वरूपम् इति सिद्धं ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशकत्वं ज्ञानस्य स्वात्मन्येव समन्वायितत्वं ज्ञानस्य स्वात्मैव ज्ञानं विहाय समवभासमानस्य च स्वसंवेद्यता ज्ञानस्य व्यवस्थापयतीति ॥

यच्चोक्तं स्वसंवेद्यत्वे हि ज्ञानमेवाज्ञानसमवेतं स्यादि तदपि भाषितमात्रम् । स्वरूपमपि ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानसमवायसमवायिनो ज्ञानादिकलक्षणात् । ज्ञानस्यात्मन्यनुपलक्षण मुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गमतिविषयमिति चेत् । तदसाधु । विज्ञानात्मनाविरुद्धसार्थकज्ञानस्यो-त्पादप्रतिपादनात् । न च विज्ञानात्मस्वरूपत्वं सर्वेषामात्मनां तत्प्रसङ्गे । अविज्ञाति तेष्वपि योगक्षेमेषु नोपपद्येत तदुपलक्षणमिति । न व्यवस्थापकत्वमभिप्रायम् । आत्म समवेतस्यास्य तदुपलक्षणाद् इति विज्ञानात्मनोर्व्यवस्थापकत्वे ज्ञानोत्पादप्रसङ्ग । ज्ञानमुत्पन्नमपि नाम्नेयम् । को दोष इति चेत् । यस्येयमेव तज्ज्ञानमात्मनोऽन्यस्य ज्ञानोत्पादप्रसङ्ग । यद्यपि चैवमेवायम् । स्वपरावभासज्ञानोत्पादस्वरूपसामर्थ्येनात्मनो व्यापाराद् न विषयान्तरसंचार स्यात् । इति न ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यत्वमपि युक्तिमार्गमवगाहते ॥

1. The position of the Jainas on the problem, whether ज्ञान is स्वप्रकाश (स्वसंवेदक) or परप्रकाश (परप्रकाश्य) is thus stated in the P N T स्वपरव्यवसायिज्ञानं प्रमाणम् (I. 2.) ज्ञानादन्योऽर्थः परः (I. 15.) स्वस्य व्यवसायः स्वस्य परस्य च, यथा तु स्वस्य परस्य (I 20).

2. See on a kindred point, Anantavirya लघुवृत्ति on Māṇikyanandin's परीक्षामुखसूत्र —

ननु भवतु नाम स्वव्यवसायात्मकत्वं प्रमाणं तथापि तत्प्रामाण्यं स्वतः परतो वा । न तावत् स्वतः अविप्रतिपत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । नापि परतोऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । इति मतद्वयमाश्रित्य तन्निराकरणेन स्वमतमवस्थापयताम् ॥ ...... अभ्यासदशायां स्वतोऽनभ्यासदशायां च परत इति । तेन प्रागुक्तानवस्थानिरासः । न चाभ्यस्त दशायां परतः प्रामाण्येऽनवस्था समाना । ज्ञानान्तरस्याभ्यस्तविषयस्य स्वतः प्रमाणभूतस्याङ्गीकरणात् ॥

In a portion of his commentary Malliṣeṇa has drawn upon Hemacandra's gloss on his (Hemacandra's) own work— प्रमाणमीमांसा —

अन्यथानुपपत्त्यैकलक्षणे ज्ञानस्वरूपमुपलम्भयत् । नैवं दोष । स्वप्रकाश-त्वेनैवास्य सम्भवोपलम्भसम्भवात् । न चाप्रमूर्तस्यात्मनः दोष । अर्थापेक्षया प्रमूर्तत्वात् स्वापेक्षयाऽप्रमूर्तत्वात् । स्वपरप्रकाशकस्य विपुलस्य ग्रहीतृत्वाभावात् । न च स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोध । प्रदीपवदविरोधे विरोधासिद्धेः । भ्रान्तावपि स्वसंवेदनसिद्धि । यथापि ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमात्मनैवाय प्रकाशयति प्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवत् तैलादिकस्य प्रकाशकत्वात् । मुख्यप्रत्यक्षसिद्धमपि चेत्

न । व्यामनिराससहितारेण प्रमाणस्योपक्रमे । न च मेघादिभिरनैकान्तिकता । तेषां मतेन्द्रियत्वसामान्येनैव प्रमाणत्वात् मतेन्द्रियाणां च सर्वेषामनैकान्तिकत्वे न व्यभिचारः । तथा केचित् स्वसंवेदना अर्थप्रतीतिरित्याहुः । न स्वसंवादो न प्रमाणत्वं प्रतीतिरियं यतः तथा चक्षुरादि अर्थग्राहकत्वं प्रत्यक्षादिभिरभ्युपगतं च गोचरत्वात्प्रमाणादि ज्ञानमात्रादिविषयत्वादपि ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धत्वमसमर्थम् । ज्ञानं च स्वपराभासि ज्ञानविषयत्वात् केचित् स्वप्रकाशं परप्रकाशं चाहुः वस्तुत्वात् कथम् । केचित् परप्रकाशमेव वस्तुत्वात् वदन्तीति चेत् न । व्यापकस्य अभावात् । न खलु दृष्टस्य वस्तुत्वात् परप्रकाशकत्वम् अपि तु इन्द्रियादिविशिष्टत्वात् ॥

Of the Hemacandra, <u>स्वपराभासी परिणाम्यात्मा प्रमाता</u> ॥ Pr. M.
स्वमात्मानं परं चार्थमाभासयितुं शीलं यस्य स स्वपराभासी स्वोन्मुखतया बाह्य भासनात् घटमहं जानामीति कर्मकर्तृक्रियाणां प्रतीतेः । अन्यथा स्वप्रकाशे प्रमाणाभावात् । न च स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधः स्वप्रकाशकत्वेन विरोध प्रतीतत्वात् । नहि प्रदीपः स्वप्रकाशे परमपेक्षते । अनेनैकान्तनित्यक्षणिकवादिनिरासः ॥
(P Mim. 1.1.43 & Com.)

Note that Hemacandra's defi ition f प्रमाण differs from that f th uthors f the P ikṣām kh Sūtra nd its Vṛtti. H maye यदा च परिच्छिन्नमर्थं परिच्छिन्दत् प्रमाणेन सिद्धं सिद्धं साधनं तथा च गृहीतग्राहित्वं धारावाहिकज्ञानानामपि प्रामाण्यमनुज्ञातम् । ततोऽपूर्वार्थनिर्णय इत्यलक्षणम् । यथाहुः स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् इति । तथा अपूर्वार्थविज्ञानम्-इति च तथा—गृहीतमगृह्णन् इव गृहीतग्राहिणोऽपि प्रामाण्यम् । (१ १-४) ॥

अत्रार्थे द्रव्यापेक्षया वा गृहीतग्राहित्वं विवक्षितमुतेव पर्यायापेक्षया वा । तत्र पर्यायापेक्षया धारावाहिकज्ञानानामपि गृहीतग्राहित्वं न घटते । क्षणिकत्वात् पर्यायाणाम् । तत्कथं तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं विशेषणमुपादीयते । अथ द्रव्यापेक्षया । तदयुक्तम् । द्रव्यस्य नित्यत्वादेकत्वेन गृहीतग्रहीष्यमाणावस्थयोरभेदः । तत्र कं विशेषमाश्रित्य प्राग्गृह्यमाणग्राहिणः प्रामाण्यं न गृहीतग्राहिणः । अपि च व्यवहारिणां गृहीतग्राहित्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यमिष्यत एव ॥

प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि ज्ञानं बाधविवर्जितम् ।—Nyāyāvatāra 1.

—इह च स्वसंवेदनसिद्ध ज्ञाने विशेषणद्वयं स्वपराभासि इत्येन ये ज्ञानमात्मानं ज्ञानं मन्यन्ते तत्संवादिनो बौद्धविशेषा ये च परात्मकेन मीमांसक नैयायिकादयः ते निरस्ताः ॥—Com. by Siddharṣi

सर्वज्ञानमनत्मार्थं मत्वान्यार्थं परिच्छ्रम ।
इति केचिदनात्मज्ञ प्रमाणमाहुत सिद्धा ॥

[illegible]

—Nyāyaratnākara pp. 319-21.

In the Bibliography given at the end of the Notes on this Stanza, add Catuḥ-Sūt I, Sūtra I after Śrī-Bhāṣya on [illegible]

To the list add

4. Tatt. Artha Sū. ka Vārtika I Sūtra 10, Verses 35 etc.

And, for Śloka Vārtika on Sūtra 2-4 substitute Kumārila's Śloka Vārtika on [illegible] relevant verses, more especially Sū. Vārt. n 163 etc. on Sūtra V

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[illegible] to and [illegible] etc." are quotations which seem t h ve been borrowed from Devasūri's Syādvāda-Ratnākara, the author own commentary on P.N.T. where they are quoted

आहुर्विधातृप्रत्यक्षं etc.—This verse, with a difference, occurs in the Tattvārtha S'loka Vārtika as a reply to the verse as it stands here. (See Astasahasri Gāndhi Nāthārangā Jaina Granthamālā, pp. 94-95) Thus—

आहुर्विधातृप्रत्यक्षं न निषेद्धृ विपश्चितः ।
न नानात्वागमस्तेन प्रत्यक्षेण विरुध्यते ।

भवतु नाम विधातृप्रत्यक्षमनिषेद्धृ च तथापि तेन नानात्वविधायिनो वा गमस्य [तत्स्वरूपता सीमा इत्यस्य] निरोध एवमपि एकत्वविधायिन इव । विधान स्यानिषेधात् । कथमेकत्वमनिषेधत् प्रत्यक्षं नानात्वमात्मनो निरुणद्धीति चेत्, नानात्वमनिषेधदेकत्वं कथं निरुणद्धि ? । तस्यैकत्वविधानेन नानात्वप्रतिषेधकत्वमिति चेत् तौल्यत्वस्य किम् ? । न प्रत्यक्षादिसमभिनिविष्टं मानसं वा स्वसंवेदनमेक त्वात्मा सर्वं इति विधातुं समर्थं नानात्वमेव तस्य प्रवृत्तेः । योगिप्रत्यक्षसमर्थ मिति चेत् पुरुषमात्मत्वमपि विधातुं तदेव समर्थमस्तु तत्पूर्वकागमप्रमेयत्वविरोधः । स्वसंवेदनमात्रतया लैकत्वस्य विधायकमिति चेत्, तथाप्येवा लैकत्वस्य तदेव विधायकमनुपपन्नताम् । कथं—

यथैव च समाम्नायं विधातृ न निषेद्धृ वा ।
प्रत्यक्षत्वात्तथान्यैरप्याम्नायैस्तत्तथा कृतम् ॥

यदेवं प्रत्यक्षं तस्य विधायकं परस्य न निषेधकं वा, प्रत्यक्षत्वात्, प्रत्यक्षवत् । विपर्ययो वा अनिषद्धविपर्ययात्मकं प्रत्यक्षमनिषेधमेकत्वविधायिनामिदेशेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धत्वमेकत्वात्तिविद्धं । न च विधायकमेव प्रत्यक्षमिति नियमोऽस्ति निषेधकत्वमपि तस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात् ॥

It will be noticed that while the verse in the te t l the Vedāntic plea, the verse in the T S Vārtika is a reply to it in the same language taking up the contrary position.

अस्ति ह्यालोचनाज्ञानं etc.—This verse (Mīm S'l Vārtika on Sūtra IV (Pratyaksa), 112) has been explained thus by Pārthasārathi i his commentary यत् ... ...सर्वमेव ज्ञानं सम्बन्ध विकल्पात् सविकल्पकमेव न निर्विकल्पकमस्तीति मन्यते तं प्रत्याह— अस्तीति । प्रथममिन्द्रियसम्बन्धानन्तरमपि वस्तुमात्रगोचरं सविकल्पकात् प्रत्यक्षमिति निर्विकल्पं प्रतीतिनिमित्तमाशेषविकल्पं शुद्धवस्तुविषयं तदाहे हि निर्विकल्पं प्रत्यक्षं स्यात् अस्पष्टमप्यस्य च तत्सामान्यविशेषौ विषयो न संभव तीति प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तिरिति । न विशेषो न सामान्यं तदानीमनुभूयते । तयोराधारभूता तु व्यक्तिरेवावसीयते ॥

प्रत्यक्षाद्यवतारः स्यात्—This is the Mīmāṁsaka's and Vedāntin's plea for refusing to admit अभाव as a विषय of प्रत्यक्ष or any of the other प्रमाण recognised by the Naiyāyika, and consequently to setting up a special प्रमाण to apprehending अभाव called अनुपलब्धि. The verses on this point run as follows in Mīm. Śl. Vārt. V 17-18:—

> प्रत्यक्षाद्यवतारस्तु भावांशो गृह्यते यदा ।
> व्यापारस्तदनुत्पत्तिरभावांशे जिघृक्षिते ॥

—*i. e.* प्रत्यक्ष is possible when something positive or the positive aspect of a thing, is apprehended; but when अभाव—a negation or negative aspect of thing—has to be apprehended, the method by which this is done is the fact of 'तदनुत्पत्ति'—*i. e.* प्रत्यक्ष etc. do not arise here to testify to anything positive. This is made clear in the next verse in the Mīm. Śl. Vārt.

> न तावदिन्द्रियेणैषा नास्तीत्युत्पाद्यते मतिः ।
> भावांशेनैव संयोगो योग्यत्वादिन्द्रियस्य हि ॥

निर्विशेषं हि सामान्यं etc.—The preceding verse (Mīm. Śl. Vārt. V,—आकृतिवाद 9) will explain this:

> अन्योन्यापेक्षिता नित्यं स्यात् सामान्यविशेषयोः ।
> विशेषाणां च सामान्यं ते च तस्य भवन्ति हि ॥

—तथामात्रं हि भाव सामान्यं तदन्यमस्तु बहु विशेष स्यात् एवं च विशेषाणां विशेषत्वं तदन्यस्यासौ भावात् निर्विशेषं । तेनान्यतरेण विना नान्यतरस्य सम्भवात् तस्मात् सिद्धिरिति—

अतोऽनुपपत्तिं दृष्टान्तरूपं प्रयोगेण दर्शयति—निर्विशेषं न सामान्यं भवेच्छशविषाणवत् । सामान्यरहितत्वाच विशेषास्तद्वदेव हि ॥ निर्विशेषं सामान्यं नास्तीति तथा विशेषाः सामान्यरहिता न सन्तीति विशेषरहितत्वात् सामान्यरहितत्वादिति हेतुद्वयम् ॥......

> तेन नात्यन्तभेदोऽपि स्यात् सामान्यविशेषयोः ।

The reader will notice how the Mīmāṁsaka, in recognising this aspect, admits the Jaina doctrine of अनेकान्त.

निर्विशेषं हि सामान्यम्—This occurs in Kumārila's Śl. Vārt. Ākṛti. Cf. सर्वस्तु इति ... । ... ...

भिन्ना सा च न सिध्यति ॥ (Sl. Vārt Ākṛtivāda 5) विशेषमात्र एवं च न सामान्यमतिर्भवेत् । सामान्यमात्रबोधेन न निर्भिन्ना विशेषधीः ॥ (Ibid. 6) —"यदि सामान्यमात्रं स्वरूपमेव वस्तु स्यात् सामान्यं यथा सौरभेयस्य तयोरपि गोत्वमपीति सामान्यबुद्धिर्न स्यात् । यदि तु गोत्वादिसामान्यरहितविशेषा महत्त्वमात्रसामान्येऽप्यत्र महासामान्य सम्बन्धेन वस्तुनीक्षिप्ते यथा वेदान्तवादिभिरिष्यते तदा गोत्वमयोर्भं शाबलेयोऽयमिति विशेषबुद्धिर्न स्यात् ॥'
—Nyāyaratnākara, Com. on Sl Vārt.

Kumārila makes a very close approach to the Jaina view on the subject when he says: "अन्योन्यापेक्षिता नित्यं स्यात् सामान्यविशेषयोः । विशेषाणां च सामान्यं ते च तस्य भवन्ति हि । निर्विशेषं न सामान्यं भवेच्छशविषाणवत् । सामान्यरहितत्वाच्च विशेषास्तद्वदेव हि ॥" (Sl. Vārt Ākṛti 9–10), and further on in answering the objection of विरोध Kumārila says "विशेषत्वाभेदमप्यात्मुपगम्य न दुष्यते । सामान्या न्यथिकारे विशेषे चैवमूहिता । सामान्यानन्यवृत्तित्वं विशेषाणैकतात्मता । एवं च परिहर्तव्या भिन्नाभिन्नत्वकल्पना ॥ केनचिद्ध्यात्मनैकत्वं नानात्वं चास्य केनचित् । सामान्यस्य तु यो भेदं ब्रूते तस्य विशेषता ॥ सर्वविपर्ययेऽप्युपेतव्यं विशेषैक्यं च वाचितः । यथा कल्माषवर्णस्य यथेष्टं वर्णनिग्रहः ॥ चित्रत्वाद्वस्तुनो- ऽप्येवं भेदाभेदावधारणम् । सामान्यांशे तु निष्कृष्य भेदो येन प्रताय्यते ॥ (Sl Vārt. Ākṛti 54–57)—which N R. elucidates in words which remind us of the Jaina doctrine of सामान्य and विशेष regarded as two aspects of one reality "यदि सर्वेकरूपमेव सामान्यं स्यात् भवन्नरूपाश्च एव विशेषा तयोरेकत्वं विरुध्येत । यदा तु विशेषा अपि सामान्यात्मनानेकरूपाः सामान्यं च विशेषात्मनानन्तमपि तदा को विरोध इति । एतत्सामान्येनैव कल्पमेकस्मैस्तु —तथाच एवमिति । अतएव सर्वमपि केनचिदिति । गोत्वं हि शाबलेयात्मना बाहुलेयाद्भिद्यते । स्वरूपेण च न भिद्यते । तथा व्यक्तयन्तराण्यपि व्यक्ति सामान्यात्मना न भिद्यते स्वरूपेण च भिद्यते इति भवेदभेदावविरोध । इत्यभिधानमपि हि मिथ्यात्वमपि सुसत्त्वापेक्षमेवास्तु । एकमपि हि किंचित्पेक्षया ह्रस्वं किंचिदपेक्षया दीर्घं भवेदेकोऽपि चैत्रो पित्रपेक्षया भिन्नोऽपि स्वपुत्रापेक्षया न भिद्यते । अनेनैवानेकत्वमपि परिहर्तव्यम् । तदेव हि वस्तुरूपेण सर्वं सर्वदा चैकमपि सामान्यादिरूपेणानेकं भवतीति न विरोध इति ।...... ... समानार्थं हि वस्तुनि न एव वर्णो निष्कृष्य दर्शयितुमिष्यते न एव वस्तो दर्शयितुम् । एव नानारूपे वस्तुनि सर्वस्य भेदाभेदयोः संभव इति ।"

देशोपलक्षितविशेषात् etc.—(Āptamīmāṃsā 26) is thus explained in अष्टशती—अविशिष्टमपि सामान्यं सामान्यतद्वतोरपि भेदे स्यात् ।

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रसिद्धिविरोधः कथं न स्यात्? । [illegible] सर्वं सर्वस्य सिध्येत् ॥

कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं etc.—(Āptamīmāṃsā 25) is thus explained in अष्टशती—कौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्मेति वा कुशलमकुशलं च कर्मेति वा पुण्यं पापं च कर्मेति वा कर्मद्वैतं न स्यात्। तदभावात् [illegible] कर्मद्वैतं न स्यात्, [illegible] । [illegible] लोकद्वैतं न स्यात्। [illegible] इति चेत्। [illegible] विद्याविद्याद्वयं बन्धमोक्षद्वयं च परमार्थतः [illegible] न [illegible] इति [illegible] इति चेत्। [illegible] ॥

St. XIV

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते। अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥—Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya I. 124, which the commentator explains as follows [illegible] ॥...... Cf Max-Müller's view that there can be no thought without language. Note however that Bhartṛhari's dictum is intended to apply to सविकल्पक consciousness (in the sense of 'सविकल्पक' as used in the Yoga-Śāstra) only. Cf Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya (I. I. 1)—'सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे—सिद्धे शब्दे अर्थे सम्बन्धे च'—with Kaiyyaṭa's gloss—[illegible] इति बोध्यम्। [illegible] ॥

ते च प्रत्यनीकपक्षाः etc.—For full exposition of the नय see notes on Stanza XXVIII and the books of reference mentioned therein. The Jaina claims that all the different philosophical systems, except his own, embody partial truths, while his system is the only one which presents the Whole Truth. Thus, Reality which is the primary synthesis of द्रव्य (substance) and पर्याय (mode) is grasped only fragmentarily

by the other schools, some apprehending and emphasising one aspect and some the other

ते च द्रव्यास्तिकनयावलम्बिना etc —For the best exposition of this subject, see the section on नयनिरूपण in Abhayadeva s commentary on Siddhasena Divākara s Sammati-tarka. (Purā tattva-mandira Edition Vol. II, pp. 271–310).

ते च द्रव्यास्तिकनयावलम्बिनो मीमांसकभेदाः—I was wondering what could be the point of भेदाः in मीमांसकभेदाः —I then remembered th passages which I have quoted above from Kumārila and his commentator In view of these passages, Kumārila and his commentator certainly deserve to be assimilated with the Syādvāda school and not classed as mere द्रव्यास्तिकनयावलम्बिनः' For full exposition f द्रव्यास्तिकनय and पर्यायास्तिकनय and the schools which severally fall under them, see Abhayadeva Commentary on Sammatitarka, Chapters on Naya Mīmāmsā.

तथा च पण्डित—स्वामु पण्डितस्वामान्यनिरास etc.—I think the title of this w rk by Pandita Asoka (as the colophon runs)—who is assigned to circa 900 A D is really सामान्यदूषण(दिक्)दिक् and n t सामान्यदूषणदिक्प्रसारिता " as found in M M. Dr Haraprasāda Sāstri's edition of Six B ddhist Nyāya Tracts" p blished by th A. S. Bengal and accepted in AMP edition of the Syādvā I -manjari footnote, प्रसारिता there being only a predicate of °दिक् a d meaning has been set forth

The concluding verse which follows this as summary f the book is as foll s पञ्चस्वप्यङ्गुलीषु (corrected in the P eface into–स्वंगु) न पञ्चसत्वङ्गुलीः सिद्धं सामान्य प्रतिभासते न च विषयाकारद्वैतं तथा । ना स्वात्मव्यवस्थितेऽत्र हि विभासन्ते न वासितत तस्सरवकल्पनासौ कुर्विचरमसंवेदसमन्वितस्थलसी ॥ a. Generality is not found residing in the five fingers whose attributes (e states or phenomenal being) we pprehend by perception; no does it appear in the idea f form which is pprehended by conception. What is perceived is the same fingers distinctly (then in निर्विकल्प now in सविकल्पक ज्ञान). Therefore there is no such

thing as Generality (जाति or सामान्य). That several reals produce one idea and are denoted by one word arises from our confounding likeness with unity or sameness. The general line of reasoning is thus indicated in the opening portion of the work: [illegible] च सामान्यं [illegible] । [illegible] । [illegible] ॥

[illegible] ॥

Jāti. The word जैनैः denotes both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems altho gh more often in this work, the Nyāya. But I have not been ble to trace to their source these hetus, which look like sūtras either of the Nyāya or th Vaiśeṣika system, but are not found in thei existing sūtras. Cf [illegible] ।
[illegible] — Ś'l. Vārt. VI 105 where the commentator presents the Jaina doctrine as follows
[illegible] ॥

" In Kārikās 106–123 [of this section of the Ś'l. Vārt.] we find refutation against the Jainas, who believe sound to be material and tangible, to travel f om its place of origin to our auditory organ, and to consist of component parts (pudgalas). [This is criticised in the foll wing verse]

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

(VI 107 108).

This belief in the substantiality of sound must have had originally more supporters than the Jainas. In Europe too it has been upheld for a long time and is expressed by Lucretius in his De natura rerum. —"The Vaiśeṣika System' by Dr Faddegon, p. 169

In connection with the passage on शब्दपौद्गलिकत्व contained in this Stanza and its commentary consult particularly शब्दनित्यताधिकरण in Kumārila's Śloka Vārtika, the Nyāya Sūtras II. ii, and शब्दपौद्गलिकत्ववादनिरास in Abhayadeva's commentary on Sammatitarka (Gujarat Purā-tattva-mandira edition Vol. II)

On p. 16. of the Notes with reference to "यौगास्तु—The Vaiśeṣikas would say" please note that the term यौगाः very often stands for Naiyāyikas, but may apply sometimes to Vaiśeṣikas also. Here the subject is more in the line of the Vaiśeṣikas than of the Naiyāyikas; and therefore I have said "The Vaiśeṣikas" etc.

[illegible]—Quoted in Ratnākarāvatārikā I. 9

[illegible] (p 91 of the Sanskrit text)—The verse has been quoted by Hemacandra in Pramāṇamīmāṃsā p. 44. Before him, it was quoted by Siddharṣi in his commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra. (Siddharṣi, the author of Upamitibhava-Prapañcakathā, completed it in 906 A.D.)

[illegible] etc.—Quoted also by Devabhadra who lived in the second half of the twelfth century that is about a hundred years before Malliṣeṇa

Cf. [illegible]
—Com. on Sanmatitarka p. 173, Purātattva Edition. [illegible]

o the doctrine of negative denotation is a logical necessity of S'ûnyavâda. The doctrine is endorsed by other schools of Buddhism also Cf. Stcherbatsky's "Conceptions of the Buddhist Nirvâṇa p. 155 footnote 3 But the school of Digṇâga have a special theory of their wn about the meaning of words according to which words express nly relations, or mutual negation (अपोह = [illegible] = [illegible] = अन्यापोह = परिच्छेद) between point-instants. For an exposition f this subject see Ratnakirti's Apoha Vada one of the Six Buddhist Tracts collected and published by Haraprasâda Sâstri (A S. Bengal Series). Note, h wever that th doctrine is not always put forward in the extreme form in which it has been taken by its critics: cf. नास्माभिरपोहशब्देन विधिरेव केवलोऽभिप्रेत नाप्यन्यव्यावृत्तिमात्रं किन्त्वन्यापोहविशिष्टो विधिः शब्दानामर्थः ततश्च न प्रत्येकपक्षोपनिपातिदोषावकाशः —Ratnakirti's Apohasiddhi" p. 3.

The s bject of अपोह was hotly discussed by the Buddh ists, the Jainas and the Brâhmaṇas in the age of Kumârila and also in the f w centuries before and after him. See Kumârila's S'loka-Vârtika, which contains special section on the criticism of अपोह Both the criticism and the original doctrine have been examined at great length in the section on अपोह–[illegible] in Abhayadeva's commentary on Sammatitarka pp. 178–270 which refers lso to the contributions of Uddyotakara and numerous other logicians to the discussion of this great question. See also S'ântarakṣita's "Tattva-samgraha" with Kamalaśila's Pañjikâ ") and for a brief discussion, Siddharṣi's commentary on Nyâyâvatâra pp. 4–5. The subject has been also fully discussed from the Naiyâyika (Brâhmaṇa) point of view in the Nyâya-mañjari of J yanta. See Vol I pp. 290–327

अपोहे [illegible] etc.—As Kumârila contends: [illegible] [illegible] परिनिश्चितम् । [illegible] ॥ Note, however that in Kumârila's philosophy [illegible] is nly the other side of विधेय both of them being aspects of the same reality

विधिवादिवत् etc.—These are different from the विधिवादिन् referred to in the com. on Sammatitarka "अत्र.विधिवादिन मेव गृहीत." whose "सिद्धे व्युत्पत्ति" means that the denoted object is a positive reality and not an empty negation (अपोह). The विधिवादिन्, the नियोगवादिन् and the प्रैषवादिन् are different forms of one commo doctrine that every proposition (वाक्य) is a positive or negative *mandate* (आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात्–Pūrva Mīm. Sūtra) no proposition being in its ultimate effect, a mere statement of fact. Even sentences with a verb in the indicative mood are understood by them as subordinate to some other sentence which has a erb in the imperative mood. Thus all such texts as तत्त्वमसि सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् are subordinate to such central texts as यदात्मापहतपाप्मा सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः विजिज्ञासितव्यः etc. (See the concluding paragraphs of Rāmānuja's Srī-Bhāṣya on जिज्ञासाधिकरण (I. i. 1) and his exposition of समन्वयाधिकरण (I. i. 4) Thus logical attitude may be compared with that of the present-day Pragmatists in American and European philosophy The following passage in L. P. Jack "The Education of the Whole Man," on disguised imperatives will be found interesting: "Then it was that it flashed upon me with the f rce of a revelation that all philosophies and sciences, without exception —both those I agreed with and those I disagreed with—were *injunctions to live in a particular way and avoid living in other ways* They all come to their spear-point, so to speak, in some kind of *injunction*. They were all disguised imperatives. Behind the information was the *command*, which took the form, "Live in this way and void living in that." Commands disguised as information. On the subject of कार्यार्थ-सिद्धे व्युत्पत्तिर् सिद्धे etc. see Nyāyamanjari of Jayanta Vol. I.

St. XV

पञ्चप्रत्ययानपि etc.—Cf. पञ्चविपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात्। अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधाष्टधा सिद्धिः॥—S. K. 47 पञ्चविपर्ययभेदा अविद्यास्मिता-राग-द्वेषा-भिनिवेशाः यथासंख्यं तमो-मोह-महामोह-तामिस्रान्धतामिस्रसंज्ञकाः। पञ्चविपर्ययविशेषा S. T. K. ibid. The latter are the technical terms of Sāṅkhya philosophy for अविद्या etc. of Yoga which are thus defined in Patañjali's Sūtras (1) अनित्या-शुचि-दुःखा-नात्मसु नित्य-शुचि-सुखा-त्मख्यातिरविद्या (Pat. Yoga sūtras II 5), (2) दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेकात्मतेवास्मिता (II 6); सुखानुशयी रागः (II. 7), दुःखानुशयी द्वेषः (II 8); स्वरसवाही विदुषोऽपि तथारूढोऽभिनिवेशः (II. 9). For further light on each of these which are collectively called "क्लेशाः" by Patañjali, and "विपर्ययाः" by Vyāsa by way of giving a synonym of क्लेश, see Vyāsa-Bhāṣya.

मानुष्यकस्य etc.—Cf. अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति। मानुष्यश्चैकविधः समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः॥" (S. K. 53) As regards details cf. Tattva Kaumudī, Māṭhara-Vṛtti and Sāṅkhya-Candrikā gave दैव or दिव्य for दैवम् of text and place it after तैर्यग्योन is the same. The foot-note of Vācaspati's on मानुष्यश्चैकविध will be found interesting: मानुष्यश्चैकविधः ब्राह्मणत्वाद्यवान्तरजातिभेदस्याविवक्षया संस्थानस्य चतुर्ष्वपि वर्णेष्वविशेषात्।

बाधिर्यकुष्ठता etc.—अशक्ति (Infirmity) which is second on the list after विपर्यय is of twenty-eight kinds, of which eleven are इन्द्रियवधs and seventeen बुद्धिवधs, nine of the latter being the opposites of nine तुष्टि (Complacencies) and eight the opposites of eight सिद्धि (Attainments) (एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा। सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम्—S. K. 49) S. T. K.— बाधिर्यं कुष्ठिताऽन्धत्वं जडताऽजिघ्रता तथा। मूकता कौण्यपङ्गुत्वे क्लैब्योदावर्तमन्दताः —thus mentioning मन्दता instead of उन्मादः as found in our text.

तुष्टिनवकविपर्ययविपर्ययाः etc.—The nine तुष्टिs (Complacencies) are thus classified in the S. K. "आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः। बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च च नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः॥" While accepting that आत्मन् is distinct from प्रकृति if man stops there and does not strive to realise the distinction by

भगवा, मम्म etc. he suffers from तुष्टि (Complacency) regarding the Self (आध्यात्मिकी). This is of four kinds: (1) प्रकृति (Nature), (2) उपादान (Means) (3) काल (Time) and (4) भाग (Luck)

(1) The first is thus explained in S T. K. आध्यात्मिकयस्तेषे विवेकसाक्षात्कारो हि प्रकृतिपरिणामभेदः स च प्रकृतिरेव करोतीति कृतं ध्यानाभ्यासेन तस्मादेवमेवास्स वत्स इति यथोपदेशेऽप्यत्स तिष्ठतः तुष्टिः प्रकृतौ सा तुष्टिः अम्भआख्या अम्भ इत्युच्यते —It is the attitude of complacently resting in प्रकृति instead of rising to the realisation of the true nature of पुरुष—the result of a kind N tural Fatalism. It is esoterically known as सलला (2) The second या तु प्रव्रज्यादि विवेकख्यातिर्न सा प्रकृतिमात्राद्भवति मा भूत् सर्वस्य सर्वदा तन्मात्रस्य सर्वान् प्रत्यविशेषात् प्रव्रज्यायास्तु सा भवति तस्मात् प्रव्रज्यामुपाददीथा कृतं ते ध्यानाभ्यासेनायुष्मन् इत्युपदेशे या तुष्टिः सोपादानाख्या —One may accept the view that Natural Fatalism (प्रकृति) is wrong because Nature is the same for all and consequently the विवेकख्याति of one who is content with the fatalism of Nature is no good. But if he thinks that Asceticism is all that one has to add he is mistaken F r without the practice of ध्यान mere asceticism is us less. (3) The complace cy of such a man is comp acency in regard to Means (उपादान) This complacency is es teriolly known as 'सलिल' या तु प्रव्रज्यापि सद्यो न निर्वाणमिति सैव कालपरिपाकमपेक्ष्य सिद्धिं ते विधास्यति अलमुत्तप्ततया तव इत्युपदेशे या तुष्टिः सा कालाख्या—ओघ इत्युच्यते ॥ T imagine that प्रव्रज्या in the fulness of time with bears fr it and therefore ध्यान is unnecessary is wrong This kind of complacenc — pathetic belief in the potency of time—is कालाख्या तुष्टि which is esoteri ally known as ओघ (4) "या तु प्रकृतेर्न कालान्नाप्युपादानाद्विवेकख्यातिः अपि तु भाग्यादेव यत इव मदालसापत्यान्यतिबालान्यपि मातुरुपदेशाद् विवेकख्याति प्राप्य मुक्तानि अतस्त् तस्मात् भाग्यमेव हेतुर्नान्यद् इत्युपदेशे या तुष्टिः सा भाग्याख्या सा वृष्टिरित्युच्यते ॥" When the realisation of the dis tinction between पुरुष and प्रकृति (विवेकख्याति) is regarded as a matte of pure luck (e. g the children of मदालसा who practised neither प्रव्रज्या nor ध्यान before realising the distinction), it is kind of तुष्टि which is called भाग्य and is esoterically known as वृष्टि Next comes the group of five बाह्यतुष्टिs, which with the

four internal (आध्यात्मिकी) mentioned above make up nine in all. (1) The वैराग्य (cessation of attachment to worldly life) is necessary for realising the distinction between प्रकृति and पुरुष but it is not all. There are some people, however who imagine that the renunciation of the five विषय—शब्द स्पर्श रूप रस and गन्ध is enough; or if they renounce objects of comfort and enjoyment (विषय) for any of the following reasons it is all that they need do. These reasons are: (1) The trouble and the humiliation involved in earning wealth—अर्जन. The renunciation caused by this motive is esoterically known as 'पार'। (2) The trouble involved in protecting it from the depredations of robbers and from accidental loss. This is renouncing a thing in order to escape the trouble of protecting it (रक्षण),—which in esoterical language is called 'सुपार' (3) To cease to care for wealth for the reason that after all it will be exhausted is the kind of renunciation arising from the sense of क्षय and is esoterically known as 'पारापार' The thought that enjoyment of विषय after all whets the desire of enjoyment all the more may be the reason for renunciation in some cases. This, which rises from reflecting on the nature of भोग is not, however all that is needed. It is called भोग (दोषदर्शन) तुष्टि and in esoteric language अनुत्तमाम्भस् (5) Lastly all enjoyments involve हिंसा Desisting from विषय with this idea, is तुष्टि from the idea of हिंसा—called esoterically 'उत्तमाम्भस्'

ऊहो दुःखविघाता etc.—Next, we come to सिद्धि (Attainments). These are enumerated as follows "ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः। दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ (S. K. 51)—S. K. T. adopts its own order for explanation. (1) अध्ययनम्—विधिवद्गुरुमुखादध्यात्मविद्यानामक्षरस्वरूपग्रहणम्—i.e. Study of the letter of the Śāstra under a teacher. This is called 'तार' (2) शब्दः— शब्द इति पदं शब्दजनितमर्थज्ञानमुपलक्षयति—Study of the meaning of the Śāstra. (3) ऊहः—ऊहो आगमाविरोधिन्यायेनागमार्थपरीक्षणम्—also called सुतार as distinguished from the first two which constitute श्रवण. ऊह = Reasoning in harmony with the Scriptures. It is called 'तारतार' in mystic language. (4) सुहृत्प्राप्तिः

—Discussion with friends: = स्वोत्प्रेक्षितं मननमनन्तरमेव आसुहृत्संमतम् न्यायेन सर्वपरीक्षितमपर्वे न प्रमाणे न यावत् सुहृत्मिसंवादितमिति संवादते अतः सुहृदां प्रावितस्तत्वमतिहृतं सत्तमानां वाति सुहृत्प्राप्तिः This is known in mystic lore as 'रम्यक' (5) दानं = प्रविविविक्तत्वस्य (From दैप् शोधने to purify) One's own ज्ञान has to be confirmed by discussion with friends. This purification takes place when the विवेकख्याति is absolutely freed from संशय and विपर्यास together with their वासना or संस्कार (अविप्लव- शुद्धिः सा च संशयविपर्ययवासनानां परिहारेण विवेकसाक्षात्कारस्य स्वच्छप्रवाहेऽवस्थापनम् —This सिद्धि is known in esoteric language as सदामुदितम्. In addition to these five, there are three principal सिद्धिs consisting of the distinction of the three kinds of दुःख viz. आध्यात्मिक आधिभौतिक and आधिदैविक. These are called प्रमोद मुदित and मोदमान

संचरप्रतिसंचर—For this reading of the AMP edition, one may read संचरप्रतिसंचर—which are used elsewhere for evolution and involution respectively

For "the whole passage from सोऽयमपरे to पञ्चविंशति is extracted from Gunaratna's com. p. 97 on Sad. D Samuccaya 34" in the Notes p. 169 read "The whole passage ......is reproduced in Gunaratna's com. ......" For the Note on महत्तत्त्व—generally understood as Cosmic Intelligence—consult Keith's Sāṁkhya System p. 79 where the earlier view is distinguished from that of the Samkhya Kārikā where Stress is laid on the 'intellect as psychological." On p. 171 of the Notes read "The same are reproduced in Gunaratna's com." instead of "The same as in... ..On p. 174 of the Notes, for "The slip was originally Gunaratna's etc." read "The slip was originally Mallisena's, which has been repeated by Gunaratna ....Could it be that in the time of Mallisena (read this for 'Gunaratna')" On p. 175 ll. 1-2 for "The whole passage.......is reproduced from Gunaratna's commentary" read "The whole passage is reproduced in Gunaratna's commentary"

नात्मगुणार्थोपकार—In the AMP edition p. 123 footnote नात्मगुणार्थेन is said to be वैशम्पायनविवेक: Evidently this is a

mistake, arising from the figure of [illegible] which as a matter of fact is as much a property of Sāṁkhya as of Vedānta. वादमहार्णव seems to be a work of Sāṁkhya, as is clear from the co text where a number of authorities are quoted in support of the Sāṁkhya theory: Patañjali (This should be Vyāsa, the commentator of Patañjali who may well be regarded as an authority on Sāṁkhya which is a sister science of Yoga), Vācaspati Miśra, Āsuri and Vindhyavāsin. Ābhayadeva Sūri, a Jaina writer is also said to have composed work of the same name (see the Praśasti of Prabhāvakacarita, verse 4 [illegible]—...वादमहार्णवोऽस्य विदितः"

विन्ध्यवासी त्वेवं भोगमाचष्टे—Vindhyavāsin is well known as contemporary of Vasubandhu who lived in the third century A. D. As regards his indentification with Ísvarakrṣṇa, the author of the Sāṁkhya Kārikas see J. R. A. S 1905. But this hypothesis is now definitely rejected and we know that the name of this dweller in the Vindhyas was Rudrila, as we see from a verse cited by Kamalaśīla in his commentary on the Tattva Saṁgraha of Śāntarakṣita which runs as follows: "यदेव दधि तत्क्षीरं यत्क्षीरं तद्दधीति च। वदता रुद्रिलेनैव ख्यापिता विन्ध्यवासिता —i. e. The Sāṁkhya philosopher—Rudrila—who identifies cause and effect in his सत्कार्यवाद—is indeed a man of the jungle of the Vindhya mountain who does not know what is milk and what is curds and how one differs from the other.

तथा आसुरि—आसुरि was a direct pupil of कपिल. For the Sāṁkhya गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा vide—एतत् पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ। आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्॥—S. K. 70. Māṭhara applies the later names between पञ्चशिख and ईश्वरकृष्ण as follows. पञ्चशिखेन तस्मात् भार्गवोलूकवाल्मीकिहारीतदेवलप्रभृतीनागतम्। See also p. 39 of Keith "Sāṁkhya System.

St. XVI

[illegible] etc.—Quoted in Ratnākarāvatārikā (Pariccheda I. p. 4, 2).

सर्वे सौगतमितेत् etc.—Note that this doctrine of the Naiyāyikas which is the opposite of that of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti is similarly rejected. This is in order to establish the resulting अनेकान्तवाद of the Jainas. अथवा पूर्वमिदमन्यथा— व्याख्येयम्। सौगत क्षिरेधं प्रमाणयन्ति-सर्वे सत् क्षणिकं etc. cf. सत्त्वक्षणिकं यथा जलधरः सन्तश्च भावा इमे सत्ताशक्तिरिहार्थकर्मणि मिथेः सिद्धेषु सिद्धा न सा। नाप्येकैवविधान्यदापि परकृतैव क्रिया वा भवेत् द्वयापि क्षणभङ्गमेवमितरत् साध्यैव विश्राम्यति॥ Fo a statement of क्षणभङ्गवाद see Ratnakīrti's Tract on 'क्षणभङ्गसिद्धि' and Keith's "Budhist Philosophy" pp. 181–184, also S'āntarakṣita's T ttva-Saṃgraha with Kamalas'īla Pañjikā—Section on स्थिरभावपरीक्षा (G.O.S.Tattvasaṃgraha Vol. I). For its criticism, see Śaṁkara Bhāṣya on Br. Sūtras II ii, 19–22. The Jaina position is thus argued and summed up by Hemacandra who quotes अर्थक्रिया न युज्येत नित्यक्षणिकपक्षयोः। क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां भावानां सा लक्षणतया मता॥" cf. also Guṇaratna's com. on क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्काराः Ṣad. Darśana Sam. verse 7 pp. 30–31. On p. 195 of the Notes, in l. 3 from the bottom read Br Sū'ras II, ii, 11–17 and in the last lines Prajñākara Gupta's date is given in Dr Vidyābhūṣana's I. L about 940 A. D" On p. 199 of the Notes—for If ere is and "we cannot in ll. 6 and 7 read if there are" and " we could not" respectively For " S'ad Com." read " Ṣad. Com of Guṇaratna; and the same for " S ad " on p. 202. To the list of Reference Books add 6 Abhayadeva's Com. on Sammatitarka, 7 Nyāyabindu of Dharmottara with Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmakīrti 8. S'āntarakṣita's Tattva-Saṃgraha with Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā, 9 " Six Buddhist Tracts " 10. Mahāyāna Sūtrālaṁkāra Mādhyamikā Vṛtti, 11. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, 12. Account of Buddhist schools in Kern's "Indian Buddhism" 13 Keith's "Buddhist Philosophy" 14 Sogen's "Systems of B ddhist Thought" 15. Suzuki's 'Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism" 16 and Stcherbatsky's Introduction to his " The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa

St. XVII.

इदं शून्यतापत्तिदूषितम्—For S'ūnyavāda see Madhyamikāvritti, Stcherbatsky's "Buddhist Concept of Nirvāṇa" and Keith's "Buddhist Philosophy" Ch XIII—"The Negativism of the Madhyamaka."

For an examination of the doctrine from the Brāhmaṇa point of view see Kumārila's S'lokavārtika, sections on निरालम्बनवाद and शून्यवाद. For the Jaina examination, See Com. on Sammatitarka, [illegible].

कुशलाकि चैतन्यं हि—Quoted in Ratnākarāvatārikā on P.N.T. VII 55 p. 142. The whole commentary on "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] आत्मा" and "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]" (P. N. T. VII 55,56), both in Ratnākara and Avatārikā, contains good dissertation on the nature of Ātman according to the Jainas. See in this connection, Pravacanasāra. For the Buddhist examination of rival doctrines see "Tattvasaṃgraha with Pañjikā Vol I., section on आत्मपरीक्षा S'l. 171–349 pp. 79–130.

For the interesting question of the nature of Ātman according to other schools, consult Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī, Rāmānuja's S'ribhāṣya etc. On p. 211 of the Notes in ll. 3 & 4 from the bottom "bservation" is a wonderful misprint for "obscuration." It puzzled me for few minutes to find out with what word it could have been confounded. On संवृति i. e. concealment or obscuration, see Suzuki's Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism. संवृति corresponds to "लोकसंवृतिसत्य" which conceals (by the आवरणशक्ति of अविद्या or माया) the "परमार्थसत्य" which lies beyond it.

ज्ञानावरणादि [illegible] etc.—"[illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] । [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]"—i. e. ज्ञानावरण which is the first of the four obscuring Karmans. वीर्यान्तराय—[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] i. e. the Karman which obstructs the exercise of moral will; moral weakness. See A. M. P. edition of Pramāṇamīmāṃsā pp. 16–19 footnotes.

क्षयोपशम—Wearing out and ultimate cessation of karman. न अस्माद्भवे... —मध्यमाप्तमिका मुधा—I have no doubt the correct reading is " मध्ये माध्यमिका मुधा —the reference being to the famous Madhyamaka or Mādhyamika school of Buddhism.

" The relation between mental and material things is a case of causation but of a special kind since it may be said to be simultaneous, in lieu of subsequent. This raises a difficulty as suggesting the Vijñānavāda theory that there is no real externality in things, but a mistaken and illusory attribution of externality to that which is internal, as can be shown from the fact that we always experience an object and its cognition together. The Sautrāntikas reject this view; the facts are, they argue, clearly that what we see are objects, as external not merely internal modifications of consciousness, to which in point of fact we do not in everyday life attend as such. The idealist admission that things appear as if external undermines their whole position for the conception of externality could not rise without real ground. There is no real difficulty as to simultaneity between the object and the perception of it we do not, as the objection to this possibility seems to imply first know the object and then know the perception but the object by contact with the sense organ impresses its form on the cognition, and then from the form we conclude by inference the existence of an external object which causes it, just as we infer nourishment from a thriving appearance nationality from language and love from emotion. The object moulds our knowledge without ceasing to be itself Cognition cannot explain our objects; in itself it is the same nd there would be no differentiation of objects if objects were derived from it. The diversity of cognitions in an observer himself remaining the same is explicable only by the operation on him of external things, a fact which gives us the realisation of the self as the conscious subject (ālaya-vijñāna) in whom individual cognitions (pravṛtti-vijñāna), caused by external things appear from time to time.

The Vaibhāṣikas, though realists, object to this doctrine of the Sautrāntikas—indeed a fanciful etymology gives them their name because of their habit of styling the doctrine of inferability contradictory chatter (viruddha bhāṣā)' If knowledge is thus reduced to inferability then there is no object of perception, and, this being so there is no basis for the observation of the invariable concomitance, which is the essential ground of inference, and we shall have a complete contradiction with all actual experience Knowledge, in fact, is of two kinds; perception as indeterminate, that is free from the operation of imagination which is authoritative, and determinate perceptio which is worked up by imagination and so is not directly authoritative, although what is inferred serves as basis for action and common acceptance; we can verify by action the truth of inferences, and we can accept statements on authority as resting ultimately on perception.

—Keith's "Buddhist Philosophy" pp. 161 162.

St. XVIII

Add as an Appendix :—

[illegible] &c.—This has a parallel both in language and in thought in the following paragraph of P N T Ratnākarāvatārikā Pari. VII, p. 143 :—

[illegible]

अन्यत्वं हि स्मृत्यसंभवे तावदयुक्तम्। तत्र कार्यकारणभावाभिधानेऽपि भावभ्रमः।
न हि कार्यकारणभावादिभ्रमे तत्तत्सिद्धत्वादीनामन्यतमो दोषः प्रतिपद्यते।
नापि सन्तानविशिष्टत्वेन विद्यते। यदि कार्यकारणभावात् स्मृतिरिष्यते तदुपमति
दोषेऽस्ति दृष्टान्तः। यथा—"यस्मिन्नेव हि संताने आहिता कर्मवासना। फलं तत्रैव
संधत्ते कार्पासे रक्तता यथा॥" इति कार्पासरक्ततादृष्टान्तोऽस्त्येवेति चेत् तदसाधीयः
साधनशून्यत्वात्। अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभावात् साधनम्। यदि कार्यकारणभावो यत्र
तत्र स्मृतिः कार्पासे रक्ततावदिति अन्वयः संभवति। नापि यत्र न स्मृतिस्तत्र न
कार्यकारणभाव इति व्यतिरेकोऽप्यस्ति। असिद्धत्वाच्चाप्रमाणत्वाच्च दूषणम्। यदि
यथोऽन्यथानुपपत्तेः हेतोः कार्पासे रक्ततादिदृष्टान्तेन कथितोऽप्रतिपाद्यते। किं च।
यथाऽन्यस्यापि कार्यकारणभावेन स्मृतेरपरिच्छित्तिः तथा शिष्याचार्यादीनामपि
कार्यकारणभावसद्भावेन स्मृत्यापि स्यात्। अथ नायं प्रसङ्गः। एकसंतानत्वे सतीति
विशेषणमिति चेत् तदयुक्तम्। भेदाभेदपक्षाभ्यां तस्योपक्षीणत्वात्। क्षणपरम्परा-
व्यतिरिक्तो हि क्षणपरम्परैव सा तथा च संतान इति न किंचिदतिरिक्तम्।
भेदे तु पारमार्थिकोऽपारमार्थिको वासौ स्यात्। अपारमार्थिकत्वे तस्य तदेव दूष-
णम्। पारमार्थिकत्वे स्थिरो वा स्यात् क्षणिको वा। क्षणिकत्वे संतानिनिर्विशेष-
त्वमिति किमनेन स्वपक्षीयस्य स्वेनान्तर्गतकल्पीकारवादित्वम्। स्थिरत्वप
क्षेऽनभ्युपेतः प्रकाशत्वं परमार्थसत्स्वरूपम्। अयमेव चित् पुनरात्मतया
स्थिरतया परमोनिक्षिप्तः प्रसिद्धः॥"—P N T Ratnākarāvatārikā.
Ch. VII pp. 142-143.

Cf. a similar line of argument in S'āmkara Bhāṣya on Br. Sū. II ii. 25—अनुस्मृतेश्च.

Appendices

1. In Hindu and Jaina accounts of Buddhist philosophy we find mention of only four schools, viz. (1) the Mādhyamikas, or nihilists, (2) the Yogācāras, or subjective idealists, (3) the Sautrāntikas or representationists and (4) Vaibhāṣikas or presentationists. The chief tenets of each of these schools are supposed to be summed up in the well-known stanza :—

> अर्थो ज्ञानसमन्वितो मतिमता वैभाषिकेणोच्यते
> प्रत्यक्षो नहि बाह्यवस्तुविसरः सौत्रान्तिकैराश्रितः॥
> योगाचारमतानुगैरभिमता साकारबुद्धिः परा
> मन्यन्ते बत मध्यमाः कृतधियः स्वस्थां परां संविदम्॥

These four probably represented the principal classes of Buddhists who flourished in India at a time when militant

Vedāntism was hurling the missiles against the moribund faith of Sugata.

—Sogen's Systems of Buddhist Thought"

Malliṣeṇa does not mention any of these four schools by name, but they are just those which have been criticised by him. The doctrine attributed to the Madhyamaka in the last line of the Stanza makes it identical with the doctrine of "Para-Brahma" as maintained in the S'ankara school. The Jaina, like the other schoolmen, takes it be the doctrine of [illegible] in the sense of Universal Void or Emptiness which is the very opposite of S'ankara's Universal Plenum (पूर्ण—cf पूर्णमिदं पूर्णमदः पूर्णात् पूर्णमुदच्यते । पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ।" Upanisad.)], and yet it is curious that as a representative text of the [illegible] Malliṣeṇa quoted a passage ([illegible]) which has been tribated to Dināga (See Randle's Fragments from Dināga " and Pārthasārathi on Mīm. S'l. Vārt and Uddotakara's Nyāya-Vārtika and Vācaspati's N V Tātparya) who was certainly not a Mādhyamika S'ūnyavādin.

S'abarasvāmin and Kumārila—the great Bhāṣyakāra and Vārtikakāra respectively of the Mīmāṃsā Darśana— however use the word [illegible] not in the sense of Universal Void, but as negation of distinction between [illegible] and [illegible], the [illegible] i. e. the particular form, being one which cannot be said to be either that of [illegible] or that of [illegible]. The [illegible] is thus different from [illegible] in which only one of the tw viz. [illegible] is supposed to possess the [illegible], thus rendering the reality of the other superfluous. Both these ha e been considered apart from the [illegible] f Stanza XVII.

Cf. [illegible]

ह्युपरतिः । तस्मात् अन्यादृशस्यापि भविष्यतीति चेद् यदि स्वप्नप्रत्ययस्य मिथ्याभावः जाग्रत्प्रत्ययस्यापि तथा भवितुमर्हति । अथ प्रतीतिस्वप्नाभावस्य हेतुः न लभ्यते प्रत्ययत्वात् अयमन्य इति वक्तुम् । अन्यस्तु स्वप्नप्रत्ययस्य मिथ्याभावो निर्विषयत्वमता । कुत इति चेद् । समिद्धस्य मनसो दौर्बल्याद् निद्रा मिथ्याभावस्य हेतुः समाप्ती स्वप्नान्ते च । सुषुप्तस्याभाव एव । अचेतयमान एव हि सुप्त इत्युच्यते । तस्माज्जाग्रतः प्रत्ययो न मिथ्येति । ननु जाग्रतोऽपि कारणदोषः स्यात् । यदि स्याद् अवगम्येत । स्वप्नदर्शनकालेऽपि नावगम्यत इति चेद् । तत्र प्रबुद्धो अवगच्छति निरालम्बनं मे मन आसीदिति ॥

शून्यस्तु कथम्—अर्थज्ञानयोराकारभेदं नोपलभामहे । प्रत्यक्षा च नो बुद्धिः । अतस्तद्भिन्नमर्थरूपं नाम न किंचिदस्तीति पश्यामः ॥ स्यादेतदेवं यद्यर्थाकारा बुद्धिः स्यात् निराकारा तु नो बुद्धिः आकारवान् बाह्योऽर्थः । स हि बहिर्देशसम्बद्धः प्रत्यक्षमुपलभ्यते । अर्थविषया हि प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः न बुद्ध्यन्तरविषया । क्षणिका हि सा न बुद्ध्यन्तरकालमवस्थास्यत इति । उत्पद्यमानैवासौ ज्ञायते । ज्ञापयति च अर्थान्तरमिति यदुच्यते तन्न । न ह्यज्ञातेऽर्थे कश्चिद् बुद्धिमुपलभते । ज्ञाते तु अनुमानादवगच्छति । तत्र यौगपद्यमनुपपन्नम् । ननु उत्पन्नायामेव बुद्धौ ज्ञातोऽर्थ इत्युच्यते नाज्ञातस्तावत् । अतः पूर्वं बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते पश्चाज्ज्ञातोऽर्थः । सत्यम् । पूर्वं बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते न तु पूर्वं ज्ञायते । भवति हि कदाचिदेतद् यज्ज्ञातोऽप्यर्थः सन् अज्ञात इत्युच्यते । न चार्थव्यपदेशमन्तरेण बुद्धेः रूपोपलम्भनम् । तस्मान्नाव्यपदेश्या बुद्धिः अव्यपदेश्यं च नः प्रत्यक्षम् । तस्मादप्रत्यक्षा बुद्धिः । अपि च साकारमेवास्माकं बुद्धेरेवाभावः नार्थस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य सतः । न चैतदेवम् । अनाकारामेव बुद्धिमनुमिमीमहे । साकारं चार्थं प्रत्यक्षमेवावगच्छामः । तस्मादर्थालम्बनः प्रत्ययः । अपि च नियतनिमित्तस्तन्तुष्वेवोपादीयमानेषु पटप्रत्ययः । इतरथा तन्त्वादानेऽपि कदाचिद् घटबुद्धिरविकलेन्द्रियस्य स्यात् । न चैवमस्ति । अतो न निरालम्बनः प्रत्ययः । अतो न व्यभिचरति प्रत्यक्षम् ।"

—S'abara Bh. on P. Mim. I. 1. 5.

—Note that the second paragraph begins with "शून्यस्तु" and yet ends with "निरालम्बनः प्रत्ययः"—thus making little distinction between शून्यवाद and निरालम्बनवाद. The same is the case with the Vārtika also.

See also Kumārila's S'l. Vārt on निरालम्बनवाद and शून्यवाद, and S'ankara Bh. on II. ii. "वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्"

2. "The fundamental doctrine of this Mādhyamika school has been imperfectly understood and grossly misrepresented by the so-called scholars of Buddhism in Europe, and latter

day India. Most of them give the appellation of Nihilism to this school, simply because Nâgârjuna applied the terms S'ûnyatâ or emptiness to express his conception of human life and truth. S ûnyatâ, however......does not imply 'nothingness; it simply expresses "the everchanging state of the phenomenal world" or absolute restrictedness of the nonmenal side of the universe"—Sogen's "Systems of Buddhistic Thought —p. 194. Sogen approvingly cites the following passage from Suzuki's "Outlines of Mahâyâna Buddhism"—

S'ûnyatâ simply means conditionality or transitoriness of all phenomenal existence. It is synonym for *anitya* or *pratîtya* Therefore, 'emptiness' according to the Buddhists, signifies negatively the bemes of particularity the non-existence of individuals as such, and positively the ever-changing state of the phenomenal world, a constant flux of becoming, an eternal series of causes nd effects. It must never be understood in the sense of annihilation or absolute nothingness; for nihilism is as much condemned by Buddhism as satire realism

Similarly in regard to the क्षणभङ्गवाद Mr Sogen says that it asserts the "momentariness" of the phenomenal world only leaving the noumenal reality untouched. I agree that the original teaching of Gautama Buddha probably amounted to this only but I am not sure whether the later Buddhists did not go f rthe If Mr Sogen's interpretation of क्षणभङ्गवाद is correct, it coincides with the Jaina's "उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत्।"

St. XIX.

लौकायतिकमतम्—The word लोकायत originally meant scientists who based their conclusions on observation or Nature-lore (see Rhys Davids's note in his Introduction to Kûtadanta Sutta, in Dialogues of Buddha" Vol. II. S. B. B. p. 166. See also Haraprasâd Sastri's Lokâyata," a Bulletin of the Dacca University

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St. XX.

चार्वाक—Now derived by some from चारुवाक् =Sweet-tongued has been derived in Siddharsi s commentary on Nyāyāvatāra and elsewhere thus चर्व अदने चर्वन्ति भक्षयन्ति तत्त्वतो न मन्यन्ते पुण्यपापादिकं परोक्षं वस्तुजातमिति चार्वाकाः (Hem. Uṇādi 37)

Borrowed, in some parts almost verbatim with a change of order in some lines from Hemacandra s Commentary on his प्रमाणमीमांसा cf. "व्यवस्थान्यधीनिषेधानां सिद्धेः प्रत्यक्षेतर प्रमाणसिद्धिः १-१-११। — —चार्वाको हि कतिचित्प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तीः संवादित्वेनाव्यभिचारिणीरुपलभ्यान्याश्च विसंवादित्वेन व्यभिचारिणीः पुनः कालान्तरे तादृशीतराणां समानधर्मतया प्रमाणेतरते व्यवस्थापयेत्। न चायं स्वप्रतीतिगोचराणामपि प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तीनां परं प्रति प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं वा व्यवस्थापयितुं प्रभवति। तस्माद्यथादृष्टप्रत्यक्षव्यक्तिसाधर्म्यद्वारेणेदानीन्तनप्रत्यक्षव्यक्तीनां प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यव्यवस्थापकं परप्रतिपादकं परोक्षान्तर्गतमनुमानरूपं प्रमाणान्तरमुपासीत। अपि च अप्रतिपित्सितमर्थं प्रतिपादयन्नसौ लौकिको न परीक्षक इत्युन्मत्तवदुपेक्षणीयः स्यात्। न च प्रत्यक्षेण परचेतोवृत्तीनामधिगमोऽस्ति। चेष्टाविशेषदर्शनात् तदवगमे च परोक्षस्य प्रामाण्यमनिच्छतोऽप्यायातम्। परलोकादिनिषेधश्च न प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण शक्यः कर्तुम्। सन्निहितमात्रविषयत्वात्तस्य। परलोकादिकं चाप्रतिषिध्य नायं सुखमास्ते प्रमाणान्तरं च नेच्छतीति डिम्भचेष्टितम्। किं च प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यर्थाव्यभिचारादेव प्रामाण्यं तथार्थप्रतिबन्धलिङ्गशब्दद्वारा समुन्मज्जतः परोक्षस्याप्यर्थाव्यभिचारादेव किं नेष्यते। व्यभिचारिणोऽपि परोक्षस्य दर्शनादप्रामाण्यमिति चेत्। प्रत्यक्षस्यापि तिमिरादिदोषादप्रमाणस्य दर्शनात् सर्वत्राप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः। प्रत्यक्षाभासं तदिति चेत् इतरत्रापि तुल्यमेतदन्यत्र पक्षपातात् ॥"

Cf. Sāṃkhya tattvakaumudi "अनुमानं प्रमाणमिति वदता लौकायतिकेन अप्रतिपन्नः संदिग्धो विपर्यस्तो वा पुरुषः कथं प्रतिपद्येत। न च पुरुषान्तरगता अज्ञानसंदेहविपर्ययाः शक्याः अर्वाग्दृशा प्रत्यक्षेण प्रतिपत्तुम्। नापि मानान्तरेण। अनभ्युपगमात्। अनवधृताज्ञानसंशयविपर्यासस्तु यं कंचन पुरुषं प्रति वर्तमानोऽनवधेयवचनतया प्रेक्षावद्भिरुन्मत्तवदुपेक्ष्येत। तदनेनाज्ञाना- दयः परपुरुषवर्तिनोऽभिप्रायभेदाद्वचनभेदाद्वा लिङ्गादनुमातव्याः इत्यकामेनाप्यनुमानं प्रमाणमभ्युपेयम् ॥ —i. e. In short, all or social intercourse, including the discussion of a proposition with the opponent, depends upon the assumption that अनुमान is a valid form of thought (प्रमाण).

As regards the unreliability of अनुमान as a प्रमाण Gunaratna narrates an interesting story alluded to in the following couplet of Saddarśana-samuccaya of Haribhadra:
"एतावानेव लोकोऽयं यावानिन्द्रियगोचरः। भद्रे वृकपदं पश्य यद्वदन्त्यबहु-श्रुताः॥ (8D) अस्यार्थं तन्मतम्—कश्चित् पुरुषो नास्तिकमतवासितान्तःकरणो निजां जायामास्तिकमतनिपुणमतिं स्वमताधिरूढां विधित्सुः अनेकाभिर्युक्तिभिः प्रतिबोधयति। सा तु यदा न प्रतिबुध्यते तदा स एवमनेनोपायेन प्रतिबोधयत्येनां इति स्वचेतसि विचिन्त्य निशायाः पश्चिमे यामे तया सार्धं नगरान्निर्गत्य तां प्रत्यवादीत्—प्रिये य इमे नगरवासिनो जना परोक्षविषयेऽप्यनुमानादिप्रमाणाभ्यासात् कोऽपि च बहुश्रुततया व्याप्तिकल्पनया निश्चयं कुर्वन्ति तेषां अस्मिन् चतुर्थेऽमिति। तदा स नगरद्वारात् चत्वरं यावत् ... पांसुप्रकरे राजमार्गे हस्तोपरि स्वकरयोरङ्गुलिभिर्वृकपदानि सम्यक् कृत्वा ... प्रातः ... स्वगृहं जगाम। ततः आयतस्वामि प्रातः ... लोको राजमार्गे मिलितः ... बहुश्रुता अपि ... प्रत्यवोचन् ... वृकपदानि ... इत्यादि। ततः स ... निजां जायां ... भद्रे वृकपदं पश्य इत्युक्तवान्॥

The principles of the school are thus summarised in the Saddarśana Samuccaya.

लोकायता वदन्त्येवं नास्ति जीवो न निर्वृतिः। धर्माधर्मौ न विद्येते न फलं पुण्यपापयोः॥ एतावानेव लोकोऽयं यावानिन्द्रियगोचरः॥ भद्रे वृकपदं पश्य यद्वदन्त्य(J पि॰)बहुश्रुताः॥ पिब खाद च चारुलोचने यदतीतं वरगात्रि तन्न ते। न हि भीरु गतं निवर्तते समुदायमात्रमिदं कलेवरम्॥ (vv 80–83).

Appendix.

"यच्चानुमानं प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणं ... बालोऽपि ... स्वार्थानिर्णायकं प्रमाणमित्युच्यते। प्रत्यक्षस्य च प्रामाण्यमेव व्यवस्थाप्यते। कश्चित् प्रत्यक्षमर्थाविसंवादकत्वेन प्रमाणमपि—प्रमाणलक्षणं अर्थ-निर्णायकत्वात् अनुमानस्याप्युपपत्तेः। न च तथैव प्रत्यक्षमपि ... तस्य निश्चितत्वात्। ... यथा ... यदि ... स्यात्। एवं मतो ... प्रतिपादयेत् यथा—अनुमानं प्रमाणं ... इति। ... प्रमाणं ... प्रमाणं ... प्रमाणमित्युच्यते। ...

ष्यते । यदेव तस्य प्रमाणत्वेनाभ्युपगतत्वादिति चेत् तदप्ययुक्तम् । यदि नाम परो गौणप्रमाणत्वेन प्रमाणमित्यभ्युपगच्छति किं भवताऽपितदभ्युपेयते नैवासौ मतिमान्यते । यो ह्यसौ परमेव नियममिति मन्यते किं तस्य मारयितुमन्येनापि इष्टि-यता पुन एव दीयते । तदेवं मनवचनमात्रकैः प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये व्यवस्थापयतो भवतोऽनिष्पन्नोऽपि व्यवस्थानमात्रस्य प्रामाण्यम् ।—Śīlāṅka's Commentary on Sūtra Kṛtāṅga p. 17

एवं नास्तिकाभिमतो भूतविकारोऽपि निराकार्यः—Cf. Śīl. Com. on Sūtra-Kṛtāṅga pp. 15–17: न पृथिव्यादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मास्ति तद्ग्राहक प्रमाणाभावात् ।—यत् चैतन्यं तेषामन्यत्वे समुदितेष्वेव कायाकारपरिणतेष्वपि प्रादुर्भवति यथा मद्याङ्गेषु समुदितेषु मदशक्तिरिति—। तदेवं भूतव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽभावाद् भूतानामेव चैतन्याभिव्यक्तिः ... इति ।......। यद्य च यो भूतव्यतिरिक्तोऽपरः परलोकानुयायी पदार्थो न विद्यते कथं तर्हि मृत इति व्यपदेश इत्याशङ्क्याह ।—कायाकारपरिणतौ चैतन्याभिव्यक्तौ सत्यां तदूर्ध्वं तेषामन्यतमस्य विनाशे अपगमे वायोस्तेजसो वोभयोर्वा देहिनो देवदत्ताख्यस्य विनाशः अपगमो भवति ततश्च मृत इति व्यपदेशः प्रवर्तते ।—। इति भूतव्यतिरिक्तचैतन्यादिपूर्वपक्षः ॥—तत्र यदुक्तं यथा भूतेभ्य परस्परसव्यपेक्षसंयोग समुत्पन्नचैतन्यमुत्पद्यते तत्र विकल्पयामः किमसौ संयोगः संयोगिभ्यो भिन्नोऽभिन्नो वा । भिन्नश्चेद् तत्पृथगुपलभ्येत ।—अभिन्नो भूतेभ्यः संयोगः तदा वक्तव्यमिदम्—किं भूतानि प्रत्येकं चेतनानि अचेतनानि वा ।—। यदप्युक्तं यथा मद्याङ्गेभ्यः प्रत्येकमविद्यमानाऽपि प्रत्येकं मदशक्तिः समुदाये प्रादुर्भवतीति तदप्ययुक्तं यतस्तत्र किण्वादिषु या न काचन न भवती च शक्तिरनुगम्यते —। किं च भूतचैतन्याभ्युपगमे मरणाभावः ... नैवास्ति । तत्र मृतकाये वायोस्तेजसो वाऽभावादभावस्तद्वत् तस्य सिद्धिस्तेषाम् । तथापि मृतकाये कोष्ठोपलम्भवेर्बं वायोरनल औष्ण्यस्य च पाकिमनामस्य दर्शनात्प्रेरितिरिति । अथ सूक्ष्मः कश्चिद्वायुविशेषोऽभिमतो तदोपगत इति मतिरिति एवं च जीव एव नामान्तरेणाभ्युपगतो भवति ॥

To the list of Books of Reference add 5 Nyāya Sūtras. 6 Praśastapāda Bhāṣya with Nyāyakandalī.

St. XXI.

वस्तैक्ये etc.—Cf. "प्रत्यक्षे प्रत्यक्षे प्रत्येक सदसत्त्वयोः तदृत्त्यपदिष्टे पुन। योगिनाम दर्शनि एव विचार प्रत्यक्षणात् । एवोंकारपरिक्षणपरस्परत्वाद्धारो पलब्धपुरुषाद्धातुभेद इति स्थितं प्रत्ययं तत्त्वं तत्प्रत्ययात् ॥"—Ratnākarāvatārikā.

St. XXII

अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं हेतोः — अन्यथानुपपत्ति—Otherwise-inexplicability; impossibility except on a particular hypothesis; *e.g.* the existence of धूम is impossible except on the assumption that there is वह्नि also. Cf. साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतुः —Parīkṣāmukha-Sūtra, where अविनाभाव is divided into two varieties, अविनाभाव of co-existence and अविनाभाव of succession:— सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः. We are further told how the former *i.e.* सहभाव can be सहभाव of two companions or that of the pervader and the pervaded सहचारिणोर्व्याप्यव्यापकयोश्च सहभावः. The क्रमभाव similarly may be क्रमभाव of mere antecedent and consequent or of cause and effect पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कार्यकारणयोश्च क्रमभावः. This relation is determined by तर्क (तर्कात्तन्निर्णयः). The P N. T. states that according to Jainas only two अवयवs are necessary in a syllogism viz पक्ष and हेतु, and thus distinguishes the Jaina view from that of other schools: "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]" Next, P N T. mentions how the हेतु may be stated हेतुप्रयोगस्तथोपपत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्तिभ्यां द्विप्रकारः । सत्येव साध्ये हेतोरुपपत्तिस्तथोपपत्तिः, असति साध्ये हेतोरनुपपत्तिरेवान्यथानुपपत्तिः । यथा कृशानुमानयं पाकप्रदेशः सत्येव कृशानुमत्त्वे धूमवत्त्वस्योपपत्तेः असत्यनुपपत्तेर्वा । अनयोरन्यतरप्रयोगेणैव साध्यप्रतिपत्तौ द्वितीयप्रयोगस्यैकत्रानुपयोगः ॥ (P N T. III. 29–31)

अन्तर्व्याप्त्यैव—Cf. अन्तर्व्याप्त्या हेतोः साध्यप्रत्यायने शक्तावशक्तौ च बहिर्व्याप्तेरुद्भावनं व्यर्थम् ॥ (Ibid. 37) अन्तर्व्याप्तिः [illegible] साध्यसाधनयोर्धर्मिणि [illegible] । बहिर्व्याप्तिः [illegible] साध्यसाधनयोर्धर्मिणि [illegible] ॥

On p. 237 in l. 14 from the bottom, for the words in the rectangular brackets read:—[It should be eleventh century according to the date given by Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa which is 1045 A. D]

St. XXIII.

न च पुष्पवत्स्यादित्—I am afraid the AMP footnote 'पुष्पस्यापरो धर्मविशेषः.......' has missed the point. For the correct explanation of "पुष्पदन्तौ पुष्पवन्तावेकोक्त्या शशिभास्करौ" — Hema. Kośa.

St. XXIV

Cf. तस्य [प्रमाणस्य] विषयः सामान्यविशेषाद्यनेकान्तात्मकं वस्त्विति P N T ५-१ See the same author :—Devasūri's—Commentary Syādvāda Ratnākara Pt. 5 pp. 736. After stating the objections of the यौगs (Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas) the writer quotes the following verse which enumerates them "संशय—विरोध-वैयधिकरण्य-संकर मथोभयं दोषः । अनवस्था व्यतिकरमपि जैनमते सप्त दोषाः स्युः ।" These are answered in detail and the section concludes as follows

ततो यदाहुः प्रतिनियतस्वरूपवस्तुप्रतिपत्त्यभावात्मकमप्रतिपत्त्यभाव संशयो यथार्थनिश्चयाभावाद् इत्यादि ॥ १ ॥ —तदिदं विरोधस्य प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नस्वरूपतया नास्तित्वार्थं भेदाभेदयोः परिकल्पयितुं युक्तम् ॥ २ ॥ नापि वैयधिकरण्यम् । एकाधिकरणत्वेन निर्बाधबोधे भेदाभेदयोः प्रतिभासमानत्वात् ॥ ३ ॥ नापि उभयदोषानुषङ्गः । तत्स्वरूपपरिच्छिन्नात्मकस्वरूपान्तरात्मकत्वेऽस्य वस्तुनः केवलभेदाभेदाभ्यां जात्यन्तरत्वात् । न खलु भेदाभेदयोरन्योन्यनिरपेक्षयोरेकत्वं जिघृक्षितमस्माभिरिति येनायं दोषः स्यात् । तयोस्तेषामपोरेव तदभ्युपगमात् तथाप्रतीतेश्च ॥ ४ ॥ नापि संकरव्यतिकरौ— स्वरूपेणैवार्थे तयोः प्रतीयमानत्वात् ॥ ५ ६ ॥ नाप्यनवस्था । धर्माणां धर्मान्तराभावात् । धर्मिणोऽनेकरूपत्वं न धर्माणां धर्मान्तरं इत्यभिधानात् ॥ ७ ॥—P N T Ratnākara pp. 740–743.

Appendices.

अत एव विरोधस्योपलम्भाभावात् वैयधिकरण्यम् etc.—Much of the commentary of this stanza has been borrowed from Hemacandra's Com. on his Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā and the same recurs in the later Saptabhaṅgī-Taraṅgiṇī. cf.—

1. "द्रव्यपर्याययोरैकान्तिकभेदाभेदपरिहारेण कथंचिद्भेदाभेदस्याश्रयणात् विरोधः। न खलु दृष्टे विरोधपरिहारम्। निर्विशेषविषयवत्कथयेनैव वस्तुन-

संपाताद् शीतोष्णवत् ॥ २—अन्य केनचिद्रूपेण भेदः केनचिदभेदः । एवं सति भेदस्यान्यदधिकरणम् अभेदस्य चान्यद् इति वैयधिकरण्यम् ॥ ३—यं स्वरूपं पुरोधाय भेदो यं चाश्रित्याभेदस्तावप्यात्मानौ भिन्नाभिन्नौ आत्मीयरूपान्तराभ्याम् प्राप्नुतः तथा च अनवस्था ॥ ४—येन रूपेण भेदस्तेन भेदश्चाभेदश्च येन चाभेदस्तेनाभेदश्च भेदश्चेति संकरः ॥ ५—येन रूपेण भेदस्तेनाभेदो येनाभेदस्तेन भेद इति व्यतिकरः ॥ ६—भेदाभेदात्मकत्वे च वस्तुनो विविक्तेनाकारेण निश्चेतुमशक्तेः संशयः ॥ ७—ततश्चाप्रतिपत्तिरिति न विषयव्यवस्था ॥ नैतत्—प्रतीयमाने वस्तुनि विरोधस्यासंभवात् । यत्संनिधाने यो नोपलभ्यते स तस्य विरोधीति निश्चीयते । उपलभ्यमाने च वस्तुनि को विरोधगन्धावकाशः । शीतोष्णयोरपि कस्मिंश्चिदेवावयवेऽस्ति तदा नास्ति विरोधः । एकत्र चित्रपटीज्ञाने नीलेतरयोरविरोधोपलम्भात् । एतेनैव पदार्थेष्वेकत्र भावाभावयोरपि विरोधाभावः प्रत्युक्तः प्रत्यक्षेणैव विरोधानुपलम्भात् । एतेन वैयधिकरण्यदोषोऽप्यपास्तः । तयोरेकाधिकरणत्वेन प्रागुक्तविधिना प्रतीतेः । अनवस्थादूषणं तु स्याद्वादस्य तत्त्वानन्तधर्मत्वसिद्धेरेव समर्थनत् । द्रव्यपर्यायात्मके वस्तुनि द्रव्यपर्यायात्मनैव भेदः भेदाभेदयोस्तयोरेवाभिधानात् द्रव्यरूपेणाभेद इति द्रव्यरूपेणाभेद एतत्स्वरूपं । यौ च संकरव्यतिकरौ तौ मेचकज्ञाननिदर्शनेन समान्यविशेषदृष्टान्तेन च परिहृतौ ॥ अथ तत्र तथा प्रतिभासः तथाप्यनेकान्तवादे सर्वथैवास्तु प्रतिभासस्यापलपितुमशक्यत्वात् । निर्णीते चार्थे संशयोऽपि न युक्तः तस्य तदप्रतिपत्तौ दुर्घटत्वात् । प्रतिपत्तौ च अप्रतिपत्तिरिति साहसम् । उपलभ्यमानत्वादनुपलम्भोऽपि न सिद्धस्ततो नाभाव इति दोषाष्टकं द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं वस्त्विति ॥

2 न च द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकत्वेऽपि वस्तुनः क्रमसंभविता भवेत् । सा हि क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां व्याप्ता । द्रव्यपर्याययोरन्यतमस्यापि व्यापकत्वात् । क्रमेण हि वस्तु उपरतस्य कार्यो न क्रमेणार्थक्रियां कर्तुं समर्थं । अक्रमेण हि वस्तुनः कार्यो न क्रमेणार्थक्रियां कर्तुं समर्थः । समर्थस्य क्षेपायोगात् । न च तत्सहकार्यपेक्षा युक्ता । द्रव्यस्यापि कार्यस्य सहकारिकृतोपकारानपेक्षत्वात् । पर्यायात्मा च क्षणिकत्वेन पूर्वापरकालासंबन्धप्रतीतिभावात् । नाप्यक्रमेण युगपदेव सर्वकार्याणि कृत्वा पुनरकुर्वतोऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वमस्तु कृतस्य करणायोगात् । द्रव्यपर्यायात्मके यो दोषः स अक्रमवादेऽपि समानः । तस्मान्न यो दोषो द्रव्यपर्यायात्मके वस्तुनि इति वचनादित्याह—

पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारस्वीकारस्थितिलक्षणपरिणामेनास्यार्थक्रियोपपत्तिः ॥
१ । १ । ३४ ॥—

पूर्वोत्तरयोरयपर्यायोर्विवर्तयोर्यथासंख्येन यौ परिहारस्वीकारौ ताभ्यां स्थितिः सैव लक्षणं यस्य स चासौ परिणामश्च । एतेनास्य द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकत्वार्थक्रियो- पपत्तौ । अयमर्थः । न द्रव्यरूपं न पर्यायरूपं नोभयरूपं वस्तु येन तत्तदभावी दोष स्यात् । किंतु स्थित्युत्पादव्ययात्मकं शबलं जात्यन्तरमेव वस्तु । तेन तत्तत्सहकारि संनिधाने क्रमेण युगपद्वा तां तामर्थक्रियां कुर्वत तद्व्यतिरिक्ता चोपपादितार्थकर्प- तद्विपरीतो नित्यानित्यपक्षद्वयोक्तदोषाभावात् अनवकाशमानिरोध बहुलान्दूषणानिर्दोषत्वं भावस्य न व्यापकानुपलब्धिबलेनार्थक्रियाया नापि तद्व्याप्यस्य सत्त्वस्य निवृत्तिरिति सिद्धं द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकं वस्तु प्रमाणस्य विषय ॥
—Com. on Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā pp. 45–46

Stanza XXV



Note that reference is here made to those fundamental problems of Ontology on which the philosophers, not only of India but of the whole world, are divided, and which, therefore provide suitable principles for their classification (1) Some are *Eternalists'* in regard to *all* things; they believe that everything is *permanent*. Some are *"Non-Eternalists"*; they believe that *everything changes* Intermediate betwee the two are *"Semi-Eternalists* ; they believe that some thing are permanent, while others not; in other words, som chang while others do not. To the first category belong Vedāntins of the Śāmkara school, who believe that one eternal principle, Brahman, is the only reality They have however to recognise the fact of change o impermanence even if they may not consider it necessary to e plain it, hange, according to them, being unreal and irrational and therefore, by its very nat re incapable of explanation. T th second category belong the Buddhists who believe in impermanence change of all things. All the other schools of thought fall between these two extremes, which are represented in the history of Greek Philosophy by Parmenides and Heraclitus, and in Modern European Philosophy by Spinoza and Hume. Between th two fall all other schools of thought, which accept both the extremes in one way o another In the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika

school, some things are regarded as permanent, and others as impermanent. Things, accordingly fall in two distinct classes; nothing being at once permanent and impermanent, as with the Jainas. The Sāṁkhya school also takes the doctrine of Prakṛti and Vikṛti, that is to say of one eternally changing Prakṛti. Virtually this makes the nearest approach to the Jaina doctrine of [illegible] and [illegible] but it still differs from it, inasmuch as in the Sāṁkhya view the two viz., Prakṛti and Vikṛti are not regarded as *two aspects of one Reality from different points of view* as in the Jaina Philosophy. I do not know however whether this difference should be regarded as substantial and essential, or as formal and of no moment. Pātañjala Yoga and those schools of Vedānta which are known as Bhedābheda and Viśiṣṭādvaita belong to this intermediate class, as far as they endorse the view of the Sāṁkhya.

(2) Another principle of the classification of philosophers is their attitude regarding the problem of the *Universal* and the *Particular* or the One and the Many. The differences among philosophers in this matter run on parallel lines to those which divide them on the question of Permanence and Change. Compare on the problem of the Universal and the Particular the controversies of Realism, Nominalism and Conceptualism in the history of European Philosophy.

(3) The third point on which Philosophers are divided is the competence or incompetence of words to capture the nature of Reality when it is found to be consisting of contradictories from opposite points of view. All philosophers agree that Reality cannot contain contradiction from one and the same point of view. But the Jaina maintains that it can and it does contain contradiction, although from different points of view. According to the Vedānta of the Śaṅkara school this only points to unreality and irrationality (Māyā, Avidyā, Anirvacanīyatā), or contradiction in Reality or Truth.

(4) *Being vs. Non-Being* is another problem which divides philosophers. This division also, like No (2) runs parallel to that in No (1) The two are not only reconcileable, but always coexist, although as viewed from different view-points, according to Jainas. The two extremes were harmonised by Heraclitus in th category of Becoming which however sinks back into that of non-Being

Stanza XXVI

These controvers es f नित्यवाद् and अनित्यवाद् go back to the Brahmajâla Sûtta f the Buddhist canon where a ccord is made f the various schools f Brâhmanas and recluses who hold different views. Among them are Eternalists (Sassatikâ), Non-eternalists (Asassatikâ) Semi-eter nalists, Annihilationists (Uccbedavâdı). Thus some are reported as holding— Eternal is the soul; and the world, giving birth to nothing new is steadfast as a mountain peak as a pillar firmly fixed and though these living creatures transmigrate and pass away fall from one state of existence and spring up in nother yet they are for ve and ever Again it is said There re brethre some recluses and Brâhmaṇas who are Eternalists with regard to some things, and in regard to others Non-eternalists. Some recluses and Brâhmaṇas are Semi-eternalsts, and maintain that the soul and the world are in some respects eternal and in some not. (S B B. Brahmajâla Sutta)

In some of these doctrines, on may see Anekântavâda of the Jainas. Also This world is neither finite nor yet infinite.

अवक्तव्यस्य इत्यत्र पूर्वधर्मद्वयो etc —O it the commentator Vâcaspatimisra, puts a note "सर्वस्य आदिपदोक्त धर्मस्याप्यवक्तव्य सम्बन्धः" i. e. सर्वं incl des, besides itself, स्यात् and अवक्तव्य

Stanza XXVII

[illegible] :—Definition of [illegible] as given in Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya

[illegible] etc.—and [illegible] etc.—Quoted in the Ratnākarāvatārikā Ch. VII 5 pp. 145 and 148 respectively

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Stanza XXVIII

[illegible] —This is a strange misprint in the Notes on p. 293 for [illegible]

नैगम—None of the commentators' explanations of the word seems to be satisfactory and there is, besides, no certain tradition the point. Probably it riginally meant the point of view invol ed in coming *from the general to the* particular in which both the general and the particular get equal recognition. Compare निगमन of the Nyāya school in which one comes to the particula from the general or universal, both of which are equally real.

संग्रह—The viewpoint of th comprehension and consequent merging of particulars i the universal. (com. सम् prehendere—to take—ग्रह्).

ऋजुसूत्र—Superficial point of view Probably applied at first t those who read the Sūtras superficially witho t the light of the commentary

शब्द, समभिरूढ and एवंभूत—In these nayas exaggerated importance is attached to the form of expression in the ascending orde शब्द—In it differences of grammatical forms mak realities different. समभिरूढ—I it differences implied by different synonyms cause differences I Reality एवंभूत—It takes note of the present condition only and unless an object is possessing the kriyā at the time, the nam will not be pplied to it.

Stanza XXIX.

यथा चोक्तं वार्त्तिककारेण—अत एव न विद्वत्सु मुच्यमानेषु etc.—" अर्थं मनो न विशयते "—A. M. P. But Śrīdhara quotes this in his Nyāyakandalī p. 88, "एकानुमेयविशेषतः" etc.

पृथिव्यादीनां जीवत्वसिद्धेः तात्मीयम् etc.—I cannot agree with Jacobi and other writers who see primitive animism in the Jaina doctrine of Universal sentiency. To me it appears to be a conscious and deliberate expression of sympathy with all Nature which is based on the belief that all its objects are endowed with life. I would rather go without the early date if it rests only on this ground than accept this humiliating characterisation of its great religious tenet.

Stanza XXX.

अन्ये त्वेवं व्याचक्षते—Evidently Malliṣeṇa seems to know earlier glosses on the Dvātriṁśikā, written or oral.

अन्योन्यपक्ष etc.—The derivation of the word पक्ष given by M and found elsewhere also (see Commentary on the "Nyāya pravesa") is clearly far-fetched. पक्ष implies the metaphor of one wing of the bird as opposed to the other wing, this word having originated in the atmosphere of debate.

यथा हि समुदितानि etc.—Unlike the Vedāntin who demonstrates अनिर्वचनीयता and gives rise to gnosticism—although unintentionally—the Jaina establishes harmony among all the darśanas by recognising that all are partially right rather than that every one is partially wrong.† This implies however that the Jaina steps in only after other systems have done their work, it may be, even of mutual recriminations.

S. B. E. Vol. XLV Introduction, p. xxxiii.

† That the present work displays the latter feature shows how difficult it is to live up to one's ideal.

Appendix

[illegible]—[illegible] सर्वेषां [illegible] प्रतिपद्यते। [illegible] वस्तुनः सर्वात्मकत्वात्। [illegible] सामान्यस्य [illegible]। [illegible] इति [illegible]। [illegible] ॥

नैयायिकास्तु—द्रव्यत्वादिकं सामान्यविशेषमनुमन्यन्ते। [illegible] द्रव्यत्वादिकं सामान्यविशेषः। [illegible] सामान्यम्। [illegible] न द्रव्यं कर्म न द्रव्यमिति [illegible]। [illegible] सामान्यविशेषात्मकत्वमेव [illegible]। [illegible] न सामान्यविशेष इति बोध्यम् ॥

सौगतास्तु—[illegible]। [illegible] नैकत्वम्। [illegible]। [illegible] चित्रज्ञानं न [illegible]। नापि [illegible]। [illegible] सौगतानामभिमतम् ॥

चार्वाकास्तु—'पृथिव्यापस्तेजोवायुरिति तत्त्वानि। तत्समुदाये शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञा।' इति [illegible] पृथिव्यादिभूत[illegible] वदन्ति। तत्र न पृथिव्यादि[illegible]। [illegible]। नापि पृथिव्यादि[illegible]। [illegible] पृथिव्या[illegible] ॥

मीमांसकास्तु—[illegible] ज्ञानम्। [illegible] इति वदन्ति। [illegible] ज्ञानं स्वीकृतम्। [illegible] ज्ञानं स्वीकृतमिति। एवं [illegible] स्वीकुर्वन्ति सर्वेषाम् ॥—Saptabha gītara g nl

[illegible]—[illegible] ॥—Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra pp 155.

तत्सम्बन्धात्सिद्धिर्भानाभावात्—(Sāṃkhyasūtra V 56) । न च सत्स [illegible]सिरोधेन इति वाच्यम् । प्रकाशमेदेनाविरोधात् । यथाहि जीवस्य विम्बत्वेन तद् एकत्रैव यतप्रतिबिम्बत्वेन नानात्वमिति तद्वत् । यथा वा रक्तं स्फटिकोपरिस्थ-त्वेन घटपटादिसम्बन्धेन भासते तथैव सर्वं जगत् तत्सम्पर्कात् सत् चैतन्यादाम [illegible] भासतीति । एवमेवात्मस्यापि तत्सत्तामविरुद्धम् । यथा हि [illegible] प्रकाशवत्तयाभिः तत्सम्बन्धगुणसम्पन्नाभिरनन् भवति तथैव प्रकृत्या सह सम्बन्धमिति ॥—Sāṃkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya.

Stanza XXXI

बहूरुत्वयाबलादिपरतया-[illegible]. बहूरुता literally means the state of being possessed of good powerful thighs, hence of powerf l legs.

दुर्भेदं तत्सैन्यम्—I think Mallinātha is wro g in rejecting the better known √तृ to cross (अतिक्रमणार्थे वर्तिः) nd preferring the obscure √तृ t dry up (तृ शोषणे). The reason which he assigns fo his preference of the latt (दुर्भेदं तत्सैन्यम्) is not very weighty being rightly countered by his second thought— अपितु वा आत्मनेपदम्

Stanza XXXII

सिद्धान्त—Cf the t tles स्मार्तसिद्धान्त and सिद्धान्त-सिद्धान्त of Kṛṣṇānanda.

स्वयम्भू—a thor of वर्णरत्न not of "धर्मरत्नाकर" Th supplementary not occurring on p. 3 '3 1 slip, which has been corrected on p. xiii of the Introduction.

Appendix A Various Readings

I

Page 1

A. B. E. Cm. begin with ॐ नमः सर्वज्ञाय; C. ॐ नमो वातरायाय H. ॐ नमः श्रीसर्वज्ञाय नमः D F G omit

3. B F K. read रागद्वेषमुपरहितं

10 F. G यमथि for ययन्ते

P ge 2.

17 A C. E. F °रूपसमारब्धानि Bm. Cm. Dm Em H कृत्स्नसमारब्धानि B कृ समारब्धानि

19 G Bm. भूपाल for समाराज; H omits कृपापाल G reads श्रीवासुनजीवित°

20. Bm. चरसारविविधविरहित for चरसारविस्पावि

21 H adds तदनवातिरिक्ततरांगमा after विराज

22. Am. omits शुचिवित् after विरचित

23 G reads स्वयमद्योगवमद्वन्द्वेरा

26 A. Bm. etc परिवृद् fo H s पवेंद्

29 Am Bm Cm omit विपद after पदीर

30 A omits यव सांजन्तविभाग

31 B adds अतीनरेतमिति fter तथा

33. Am reads कारणस्विद्वान्त Am. तद्वयोऽस्य

31.—40. H omits from तथाऽजीता to चक्रातिशय

Page 3

40. G omits जनवान् after प्रणयन

50 Am. omits अपि after तीर्थनिवारणेन

51 D कवर्ते for कवरं; Am reads विज्ञानस्य fo विज्ञानमस्य H वैदं for वृ

55 D E H. read मर्ते परपद् वा वा वा दृश्यर्थे तु परपद् for तस्मादृश्यमानम् etc.; but H notes the latter on margin as पाठान्तरम्

67 D F H read वनात् पुनात् for वने पुनात्

P ge 4.

76. Am. omits अधेन after विशेषेण

80 G omits विशेषतरत्वाभि after धीरधेनामिति

Page 5.

81 Am. Bm. Cm Dm Em अनुमानाभाव or अनुमानाभाव

82. Am. omits [illegible] प्रसिद्धत्वात्
84 Am. and D read [illegible] for [illegible]
85 A omits [illegible] after [illegible]
89 A omits [illegible] after [illegible]
94. A. B C. F G H. read [illegible] for [illegible]
95 and [illegible] for [illegible]
98. C. omits [illegible] after [illegible]
99 G [illegible] for [illegible]
100 G [illegible] for स्तुति
104. Am. [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 6.

106. Am reads [illegible]
107 H. reads [illegible] for [illegible]
110 G H. [illegible] for [illegible]
111. C. omits [illegible] after [illegible]
115 F reads [illegible] for [illegible]
117 A C. D E. F G [illegible] fo [illegible] Bm. [illegible] for [illegible]
119 H [illegible] for [illegible]
121. Am reads [illegible] for [illegible]
122. Am omits [illegible]

Page

134 H [illegible] for [illegible] Am reads [illegible]
135. Am omits इति after [illegible]
137 D reads [illegible] and omits from [illegible] to [illegible]
138 A. C. E. F G H. and Am. add [illegible] (Am. [illegible]) [illegible] after [illegible] but Am omits from [illegible] to [illegible]
140 G [illegible] for [illegible]

II

2. A. [illegible] for [illegible]
3. Am reads [illegible] for [illegible]

5. Am. Bm. [illegible] for [illegible] Am omits [illegible] after [illegible]

Page 8

10 E. reads [illegible]

12 D E. and Am Em. read [illegible] for [illegible]

13. Am. G. H add [illegible] before [illegible] H [illegible] for [illegible]

15. D [illegible] for [illegible] Am reads [illegible] for [illegible]

21 G Am [illegible] for [illegible]

24. A. [illegible] for [illegible]

III

1 D F H [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 9

4 A. C. G Cm. omit [illegible]

6. H [illegible] for [illegible]

10 A. C. F and Am [illegible] for [illegible] F [illegible] for [illegible]

11. D [illegible] for [illegible]

12 Am. [illegible] for [illegible]

13. Am. Dm. read [illegible]

16. Am. omits [illegible] after [illegible] Bm. Cm. Dm. Em. read [illegible]

17 D add [illegible] before [illegible]

18. E. [illegible] for [illegible]

20 G. omits [illegible] before [illegible]

22. G omit [illegible] before [illegible]

24 D [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 10.

[illegible] D F [illegible] for [illegible]

24. F [illegible] for [illegible]

2 A. [illegible] for [illegible]

[illegible] H add [illegible] before [illegible] F [illegible] for [illegible]

IV

2 Am. Bm Cm Dm. Em [illegible] for [illegible] Dm. omits [illegible] before [illegible]

Page 11.

[illegible] F reads [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 17

93. Am. [illegible] for [illegible]. G [illegible] for [illegible]
94. A reads [illegible] for [illegible]
96. H. [illegible] for [illegible]
98. D. [illegible] for [illegible]
99. B E F [illegible] for [illegible] ; Am [illegible]
    H. omits [illegible] after [illegible]
101. A. H. [illegible] for [illegible]
103. Dm. [illegible]
109. Am. omits [illegible] before [illegible]
111. H reads [illegible] । Cm. omits [illegible] after [illegible]
113. B C. D E. F G H. [illegible] for [illegible]
116. A. C. D E. F G omit [illegible]
117. Fm reads [illegible] C. E F G H. [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 18.

118. A. C. E. G H. read [illegible] Am reads [illegible]
121. D reads [illegible], F [illegible] for [illegible]
125. K. [illegible] for [illegible] ; Am. [illegible] for [illegible]
134. Am. omits [illegible] after [illegible]

Page 19

143. Am. omit [illegible] after [illegible]
153. Am omits [illegible] after [illegible] Am. F [illegible] for [illegible]
155. C E. G H. omit [illegible] after [illegible] Bm. Cm. Dm read [illegible]
158. F G H. K इति वे for इति वेद् ।
161. Am. Dm. [illegible] । H. [illegible] for [illegible]
164. Am Bm D E. [illegible] for [illegible]
165. Am. reads [illegible]
167. B C. G H. K. add [illegible] before [illegible]

Page 20

172. Dm omits [illegible] before [illegible] Dm. [illegible] for [illegible]

175. F रचयितृ for रचय
176. Am Bm Dm. read [illegible] A. [illegible]
    F [illegible] for [illegible]
1 7 F adds इति after अनुमवात्
181 H [illegible] for [illegible] Am. [illegible] for [illegible]
1 … E. adds [illegible] after [illegible] A B C D. H. [illegible]
    [illegible] for [illegible]
18… A B D F G H K. Dm Cm. [illegible] E [illegible] for [illegible]
    and [illegible] for [illegible]
189 F omits वस्तु

VI

Page 21.
  4 K reads [illegible]
  6 D. [illegible] for [illegible]
  9 A C. E. read [illegible]
  12 B. E. F G H. [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 22
  3… A. B. C. E. K [illegible]
  31. Am. omits [illegible] before [illegible]
  36. E. [illegible] for [illegible]
  38 F [illegible] for [illegible]
  40 Em. omits [illegible] after [illegible]
  42. C. G K [illegible] B [illegible]

Page 23.
  45 Am. Dm add [illegible] after [illegible]
  51. A B. C D E. F G H K. [illegible] for [illegible] for
    [illegible] F omits [illegible]
  52. Am. Cm. Fm. omit इति before [illegible]
  53. B. D F H add [illegible] before [illegible]
  …4 Am. Bm. Cm. Dm. Em. omit [illegible] before [illegible]
  …7 Cm read [illegible] A C D H [illegible]
    Bm. Dm. B. E. G K [illegible] and E. [illegible] for
    [illegible] Bm reads [illegible]
  …0 A. B. D F. H. [illegible] for [illegible]
  1. Am. [illegible] Dm. F G [illegible] C. reads [illegible] for [illegible]

64 [illegible] for [illegible]
65 Am. H. read मात्वंतो न मातरीता मातव
66. Dm. [illegible] Am. D. [illegible] ; F [illegible]

P ge 24.

72 Dm. reads [illegible]
67 Am reads [illegible] for [illegible] and adds [illegible] before [illegible] F omits [illegible] after [illegible] nd reads [illegible]
91. Bm. reads [illegible]

Page 24

103. A तत् for तैषाम्
107 Am [illegible]
111 F [illegible] for [illegible] H reads [illegible]
112. Dm. [illegible]
115. Am [illegible]

Page 26

120 D F H H [illegible] before [illegible] Am. omits g Am. D. read [illegible]
122. Am. reads [illegible]
124 A. H. [illegible] for [illegible] Bm. [illegible] F omits from [illegible] to [illegible]
129 A [illegible] C. D E. G H K. [illegible] for [illegible] D [illegible] for [illegible]
130. A. H. न हि for नहि
131 Bm. reads [illegible]
132. H reads [illegible] for [illegible]
135. A. [illegible] fo [illegible]
142. D [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 27

157 B. omits [illegible]
164. K. [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 28

166. Am. omits [illegible] be or [illegible]

169 Am. omits एव after कर्तृत्वम्
181. A. B. F H. K. read अनुतमापन्नं प्रथमं मिलित्य and omit नाद्दर्थ मुख्यारित्वादिना

Page 29

194. G H कृष्णा for कृपया
197 F omits पश्चादपि before कर्तव्यमिप्राय
214. A. D. E F K. इत्य for इति

Page 30

218. G omits fro n सुमेरुत्वमात्रयोगात् to स्वभावेन अगन्ति
219 H सहितेन for सहितस्य
220. O. reads तानि संदेहेन वा and omits तानि सहेतुत्वमात्रमात्रम वा K अपते for स्वव्यस्त
222. K. स्वतात्विरस्वरूपाणि for स्वरूपाणि
227 K. अवस्थिती for स्थिती B. K. क्रिति for इति G adds इति after वेत्र यासीते ; K. omits वेत्रत्वम् before वक्तव्य.

VII

Page 31.

4. A. B. C. D E. F G H K. add इति after अनुभवते
5. B. C. F K. add अविशेषे after अतिविशेषे
H adds स्वभावदर्शिन after अनुमितिमात्रे
10. B. omits अपि after विशते
12 D reads अनुपपन्न for अनुप
13. A. B. C. D E. F G H K समवायभावत् for समवायाभावात्

Page 32

14. Am H. व्याख्यायते for आख्यायते
17 Am F मिलि for मति
22. D प्रतिमात्मन for प्रतिमात्र D. omits from किंतु इत्येतेन to न प्राप्ते प्रतिपाल
25. Om. omits न before यते D. H K. add यते before समस्त
26. Am. reads व्यापकत्व; O omits नित्यत्व after स्वरूप; D E, F
27 G. H. K. read यथायथाक्रमेण विज्ञं व्यापकमपूर्वं च तत् (G K.) तत्) यदि संगमिति &c etc.
25. G K. तत्त्व fo तत् in some.
30. Am. reads स्वभावाभेदादिति

31 Am. ज्ञाने न for न ज्ञाने
F reads अथ वर्ण न तमवायस्य प्रतिमान for अथ वर्ण सम-
वायस्य न ज्ञाने प्रतिमासवर्ण
H. प्रतिमानर्ण for प्रतिमानं
36. A. ह्रोदमिति मति fo ह्रोदमिति ह्रोदमिति
B. F G H K read ह्रोदमितिमियतिरेवमिति

Page 33.

38 D तथा च f r यथा
40. E. omits वस्तमर्त after मात्रं
45. H. reads इति मत्व एव समवाय इव समवायत्वं for इव समवाये
समवायत्व
47 A. B. C. D E. F G H K. add एवं after समवेत
A. B. C. D E. omit एवं after समवायत्वं
50 Cm. reads महत्वादविषय f r सादविषय
Am. Bm. Cm. Dm. Em. omits इव after सामान्य
52. Dm. reads स्वरूपविषयगुणस्व for स्वरूपविषयस्वविषयगुणस्व
56. Reading of A. B. C D E F G H. K.; some add विषयिक
before चेत Am. reads जातिविषयत्वमिति चेत B reads
जातिविषयत्वमी for जातिविषयत्वमी. D adds इति after गुणत्वमी
61. Am. reads समवायापि व्यभिचारात्

Page 34.

69 D reads प्रतापत्र for साधन

VIII

Page 35.

18. G omits from गुणकर्मणो to गुणत्वं सामान्यं
20. F वरादिषं for वरनादिषं

Page 36.

37 D. E. G. H K गुणं न भवति । F गुणत्वमेव न भवति
35. B. omits तथा before न तथा कर्म
D F G H K. यथा fo तथा
43. A आकृति fo गुणाकृति
49 Cm Dm. गुणत्वाविरत f r गुणत्वमविरत

Page 3

54. C omits कारणं after अकारणत्व.
H वचो गुणि for वाचो

61-65. C. omits from सर्वेष सत्ता to व्याप्तिसत्ता and from स एव सति to समपि निषेध

71. F स्वरूपसत्ताग्राहि: K स्वरूपसत्ताग्राहि स्वरूपत्व for स्वरूप

Page 38.

85. C. आत्मनो वैशेषिकगुणानां for आत्मविशेषगुणानां

91. A. D विशेषगुणानां for वैशेषिकगुणानां

Page 39

109 B. मोक्ष fo सुख

122. Am. Dm. G H. सम्यग्ज्ञानोपदिष्टमार्ग इत ; E. वन्तार्थ for तात्पर्य

123. Am अप for अत्र

125 Am. adds सुखमिति चोपपत्तिरुक्ता before सुखसमवायिता etc.

Page 40

130 Dm. विशेषेषु fo अशेषेषु

134. C. omits from बहुत्वादयमपि to सत्तादिसामान्यम

136 A. F G H K. स्वरूपसत्त Am स्वरूपसत्ताशक्त for स्वरूपत्व.

139 F adds नैव before भवति

142. C. सुख for दुःख

144. Am H omit गुण after विशेषेषु

Page 41.

166 Am. eads सर्वमनुवेरेव निषेधत

168 Am. H omit च afte विचारे

Page 42.

179 F G H. read स्वपरप्रकाशकस्वभावता

181. B. H प्रमाणत्वं for प्रमाकरणत्वं

183 E. G स्वरूप for स्वरूप H. स्वपरप्रकाशकस्वभावी f r स्वपर etc.

184. C F H. K. विभक्तत्व for विभक्तत्व

187 Am. reads तथेतरसमपि ज्ञानम्

195. Dm. omits ज्ञानत्वं before एकान्तेन

198. B. D E. F G H K. Am omit दीर्घेण before बहुधा

199 Reading f D F G H. some om t सति after तथा च

201 A B. C D. E. परिणामे च or परिणामेन

202. Am. reads तृतीया समर्थं स्पष्टयति

Page 43.

213. Am. Dm. read वेद्यवेदकत्व च परिच्छिन्न

213 A B. C D. E. F G H. K अमेरे तथा [illegible] अपि
216. B. [illegible] for परिकल्पना
217 Am. omits अपि after अमेरे
226. F समानाधिकरण for समानाधिकरणतया

Page 45.

257 Am. Cm. A. C. G H. [illegible] for साध्य
263. F adds [illegible] after [illegible]
269 C. omits [illegible] after [illegible]

Page 46.

286 Am [illegible] for [illegible]
287 Bm. Em. C. H. K add [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] मानात् after [illegible] [illegible]
298. Am. reads [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 47

305 B. D. F H. K. add [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] नास्ति ततो मोक्षो [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] after [illegible]
311 A. B. C. D. E. F G H. K. add [illegible] न [illegible] (K. [illegible] न) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] (K. [illegible]) [illegible] [illegible] मोक्षः after [illegible] मोक्षः

Page 48.

331 A. G H. K [illegible] for [illegible]
337 Dm. [illegible] [illegible]
340 G omits [illegible] [illegible]

IX.

1. D. omits [illegible] before [illegible] and adds [illegible] after [illegible]
2. A. B. C. D E F G H K add अपि after [illegible] A C D F G H K. add [illegible] after [illegible] A. B. C D. E. F G H K. read [illegible] for [illegible]
6. K. [illegible] to [illegible]

Page 49

26. E. F [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 50.

36. D [illegible] for [illegible]

37 Reading of G H K., some read सत्यायन्ते for सत्यपन्ते
39 F omits सावने after सर्वगतम्
40. D भवकारित्वं for भावकारित्वम्
41. H. एकमविरत् for एकमविरत्
42. A. C. D. G तैव H. K. स एव for तेन
43. C. D F G H. K विरुद्ध for विरोध
48. Am D H. add तत after व्यापका
49 G reads परस्परापेक्षे H. परस्परप्रसक्ते K. परस्परापेक्षे
51. B. F read समजसमाप्त्यनुपपत्तेः
53. B D read शुभाशुभकर्मविपाकेन Am omits संबंध। B. C. D F G H. K. सम्बन्धिन for संबन्धेन D दुःखितत्वे for दुःखित्वे

Page 51

61. A B C H. read अभ्युपगमेनार्थं दोषः
63 G मताङ्गीकार for अभिमता ।
65 H omits किञ्च before देशान्तर
68. Cm. नियमाभावात् for नियमासंभवात्
— Am. संयुक्तस्यकर्मणे for संयुक्तस्याप्यकर्मणे
78. Dm. omits समासीसे

Page 52

81. Dm A B. C. E F omit आत्मा after आत्मभिः
88 A. B C E F G H. K read प्रत्यार्थकारत्वात्
94. A B C. D E. F G read संयोगारम्भत्व for संयोगात्मत्वं
98. Cm. omits अपि स्यात् ite आत्मा.
101. D reads अनित्यताप्रसङ्गात्
102. Am. adds आत्मनः before प्रतिसंधानम्
103. D स्मरामि for स्मरति

Page 53.

106. A कृति B. F G H K क्रियाः E. C. कृति for कृते
107 A. B. C. D G परिमाणत्वे some परिणामत्वे
109 B. परिणामत्व for परिमाणत्व
113 D omits from आत्मावयवानामित्यनित्यता to प्रतिषेधनात्
117 K reads प्रवेशानुपपत्ति for अनुमाने
118. D तथापि प्रतिपिण्डते for तथाऽपि
122. H. omits परिमाण before परिणामे

126 A. F G K. omit [illegible] before [illegible]

128 B. C. D. F read प्रतिसंख्यात्म for प्रतिसंख्यात्म etc.

X

Page 54.

4 H वाच्ये for वाच्ये

Page 55

11 D. K. reads ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यभावात् for ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यभावोभावात्

13. Am. reads [illegible] D. reads [illegible] etc.

14 D omits अपि after [illegible]

17 B. इव for इत्युक्तम् D. reads प्रमाणपरिग्रहात् for प्रमाणमात्र

19 Am. अर्थवित्तौ A. B. C E F G H K. तत्संगतौ and D अप्रामित्यौ for तत्प्रामाण्यसिद्धौ

21. A. omits यद् after अभिप्रेतम्। F omits तत्र after अभिप्रेत. F reads श्रीमत्वात्

25. D. F read इव for एव after प्रसङ्गेन

27 D H. K. read तथा प्रतिसंख्यास्याज्ञानविलक्षणं विलक्षणं for तथा विलक्षणं etc.

Page 56

37 Am. Dm. Fm A E. [illegible] for [illegible] D [illegible] for [illegible]

40 Am पुराणाकृति for पुराकृति

43. D K. इतिविध for इ विविध

44. A B. C. D. E. F G H. K अभिप्राय for अभिप्राय

47 Am adds हेतुत्व afte प्रत्यभिज्ञानं D omits सर्व after पूर्व

49. A. B. C. D. E. F G H. पूर्वापूर्व for पूर्वापूर्व

52. Dm. E omit समस्तानां A. omits समस्तानां

Page 57

58 F हेतोः for हेतोः। K adds प्रवृत्ति after इति

59 D. omits तद् before प्रमाणिकानो

61. D. reads प्रवृत्तिर्

61. D तद् for यत्र E. अर्थान्तरेषु for अर्थान्तरविषयेषु

62. D. H निमित्तार्थं for निमित्तत्वमार्थं

65. D omits च before इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षे

66. C. omits from ग्रामात्ते to तत्र after तत्रापि
67 A. B C. D E F add च after अव्यवहितत्वे F कार्य for करण।

69. यत्र for अन्यत्र
73. Am. reads स्वपरव्यवसायकत्वं

Page 58

78 E. omits प्रमेयत्वाभावात् after कारकत्वात् and reads दुःखप्रमेयाभावः
79 D F A. C. F प्रमेयाभाव for प्रमेयत्वाभाव
79 Bm. Dm. add अनुपपत्त after मोह
82. K. व्यापारकत्वात् for व्यापारात्मकत्वात्
83. F फलेन for फले
87 Am. reads तद्वर्णं ग्राह्यमिदं प्रमेयमिति तु समीचीनं
88. E. F G H. K. अनुमेयापीदं for अनुपेयापीदं
90 D. प्रत्यक्षं for प्रत्यक्षत्वात्
93. A. omits रूपम् after प्रकार
102. F प्रेतार्थो for प्रेतार्थो
103. F omits कथितं after विवक्षया
104 K विशेषितं H. विशेषयति
106. G omits प्रमाणमा after असौ.

Page 59.

108. E. वाक्यस्य for वाक्यत्वस्य.
112 D F G add तु after प्रमाणत्वात्
113. A B. प्रमिति for प्रतीति
114 E. reads हेतुप्रतिबन्धग्राह्यं for हेतुप्रतिबिम्बग्राह्यं
114. C. adds [illegible] after प्रत्यक्षत्वात्
115. Am. reads साधर्म्येण प्रत्यक्षत्वं
125. H प्रयुज्य fo प्रयुज्यते
125 A. B H. add [illegible] after प्रयुज्यते
127 Cm. reads न पुनर्वैधर्म्येण
130 D किंचित् for कंचित्
131. D, F add अपि after पूर्वं

183 A omits अपि after अनित्य

Page 60.

138. G omits इत्यामासे before इत्यादि
144 A. B. E. G H. निरतुयोज्यानुयोगा
146. D F K. add भवति after नियतस्पर्श
14 Bm. Em. चेन्द्रियस्यमपि for चेन्द्रियमपि
149 Cm. omits तत् before तत्र पुनरपि
153. A. G add तत् before नायार्थ
153. Am. omits तदि before सर्वार्थ
156. D. omits इति after तत्

Page 61.

158. Am. Dm. अपेक्षया for अपेक्षित
159 D. वैलक्षण्य for विलक्षणकार्यत्वे D प्रत्ययान्तर for प्रत्ययान्तरस्य

XL.

13. H reads प्रतिविम्बस्य
15 D. दिवा for दिवाम
16. Bm. reads चोदितार्थ

Page 62.

19 B. omits अन्यार्थे before प्रतिनियते.
24. D omits पुनरा वैलक्षण्यं after सर्वत्र
32. F omits एतस्यां ......त्यादि after सर्वं
37 G omits प्रतीतिर् and reads मन्यते
38 A. अनवस्था F अनवस्था for अवस्थान
34. H. omits यस्तु एव वचनस्य । न चोपि कारणिका .... वान
37 B. C D E. F G read अभावेन
41. A. B. C. D E. F G K इति for भवति

Page 63

43. Cm reads चोदप्रामाण्यवादस्य
44. K. वैलक्षण्य for वैलक्षण्य.
45. A. B. C. D. E F G. अभिनिवेश
4 Dm. reads चोदनाप्रामाण्यमपि
47 D अनुपपत्तिरपि F G अनुपपत्तिः for अनुपपत्तिरपि.

46. D omits चत् after इति
52. C. गतार्थत्वात् for गतार्थत्वे
53. K. विपाग्ने for विभाने
57 Am. reads अवम्योगापन्नेन समतया
61. Am. reads प्रतिपादितेषु विषयादिषु
62. A C. D F.G H. K. सीमितादिषु some सीमितविषयादिषु
64 D सावर्ण्यमात्रेण for सावर्ण्यद्वारेण
65. D विषमत्व for विभागत्व

Page 64.

72. Am. Bm. Cm. Dm. and D निमार्ग some मतार्थ
75 B. वैदिकविधिविधाने for वैदिकवचिविधाने
77 D युक्तार्थेन for युक्त्योपार्थेन
81. D भूरिकाम for भूतिकाम-
82. Cm. K. साध्यमानत्वात् for साध्यत्वात्
87 F omits परिभवस्तथा after विवेक
88. B. C. K संस्कृति H सहिति for संस्कृति-
91. B. नमसार: for नमस्कार-

Page 65.

92. A. B. D F G H.K. पारमर्षो, C.परमर्षो another परमार्थो
95. F सर्गो मरक for स्वर्गे नरके
97 H K मातृपितारिन्नपापत्वेन
98 C. तथा for यथ
99 H. मविनत्वमहीयपामाव्
101. K. omits विषाद before गर्भपात
105. Dm. omits दिया before पैशुन्ये
108 Am. omits यथा before युध्यन्ते
109 G adds समाधिकाम after धर्मिकाम
114. Am. reads निपातनिमापिन
116. A. वेदस्यापर्यवसित: another वेदस्य पर्यवसित
K. सम्पूर्ण for सम्पूर्ण

Page 66.

121 K. पूर्वे for निपूर्वे-
134. Am reads कामना हि निमित्ते.
136. G adds पूर्व after दृष्टत्व

137 K. [illegible] for [illegible]
138 A. B. D E. F G H. K. °[illegible] another °[illegible]
139 Cm. K. [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 67

147 D. H. [illegible] another [illegible] for °[illegible]
153. A. B. C. add इति after [illegible]
157 D E. H. [illegible] for [illegible]
158. K. omits [illegible] before [illegible]
166. A. D F G add [illegible] after [illegible]

Page 68.

166-67 Am Cm. °[illegible] । Dm. reads [illegible] On the margin of Cm. there is note explaining this reading by the word [illegible] । A. [illegible] B C. D E. G [illegible] F H. [illegible] K. [illegible] । for [illegible]
177 A. H. [illegible] for [illegible]
178. H. [illegible] । H. omits from [illegible] to [illegible]
179 A. B. D [illegible] for [illegible]
180. A. B. [illegible] for [illegible] । one MS reads [illegible] for [illegible]
182. K. [illegible] for [illegible]
184. Cm. omits [illegible] after [illegible] K. [illegible]
185. K. [illegible]
186. A. K [illegible] for [illegible]
189 B. omits [illegible]; another reads [illegible] for [illegible]

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192. [illegible] [illegible] for [illegible]
193 Am. D E read [illegible]
195 H. [illegible] for [illegible] F G K. omit [illegible] after [illegible]
196. Am. omits [illegible] before [illegible].
197 K omits [illegible]
199. Cm reads [illegible] for [illegible] A F G omit [illegible] [illegible] after [illegible]
200. F adds [illegible] after [illegible]

203. B अनुपलंभात् *for* अनवबोधात्
204. K. adds मुख्या after आकृतयः and omits मञ्जुघ्नता before मेत्रप्रयाः
205. Cm. reads यदि च for यदपि
206. Am. विमृद्धाने
214. A. B. D add यत् before वचनं

Page 70.

231. F omits अवधात् after अवधारयो।
233. D. वचनात् for वचीयाच्
234. Cm. D read अवधानात् for अवधारणात्
235. B. व्यापायमेतस्ते
239. F omits वाक्येन after प्रयुक्तेन A. अयापोयते.
240. Cm. वर्तते for प्रवर्तते.

Page 71.

248. Am. मुख्य for मुख
256. Cm. कालमवरोधि for कालविरोधि Cm. स्वरादि for स्वरातः
258. Dm. पक्षे परिहारः
262. K. omits सिद्ध after अपि

Page 72.

263. D सर्वहेतुत्वं *for* सुयविरोधत्वं
272. A. C. H. K. वाक्यस्य; one reads वाक्यवाक्यस्य
274. D omits मानाविरोधं before अवयाचो.
276. A. प्रवचन for वचन। D. समवद् for भवद्
280. D H. कब्दुः for कब्दुपदुः
281. Am. and K. read एवं सूयतां वमतवंसमित्यादि स्वोन्नयवचनप्रमितत्वानुपातेन वेदविहिता हिंसाया अन्यत्रप्रत्यामितत् अपरे वतादिप्रीतिसिद्धयपि
282. K. वर्म for दृष्टवं
283. B omits तस्य after अतत्व
284. Am. and H. read मात्रबेन स्पष्टतयसिद्धत्वाचारे दुरवगतिन्नयाप्यकामावतनतो न दुरवगतिसिद्धि
285. A. G H. add यदानन्दं before देवतादि K. परितोषेन for परितोषणे
G H. add एवं सूयतां वमतवंसमित्यादिवोत्सवचनप्रमितत्व नियतत्वेन मुख्यपुरुषाद् before वेदनिषिद्धिर्हिंसा

180. A. K. प्रीतिः for वृत्तिः. C. adds विशुद्धचक्रे B. C. D. E. F omit [illegible] [illegible] च before वृत्ति ।
D. G H. प्रीतिः for वृत्तिः. K. [illegible] for स्थितिमती.

Verse XII.

Page 73.

2. H. बोधानां for पीतानां ।
4. A. reads सर्वस्य पदार्थस्य च ।
5. D F omit from इति विचार्य to बोधस्यापि सत्त्विद्रि ।
6. G omits [illegible] and reads [illegible] for स्वार्थ [illegible] । A. adds तु after [illegible] ।
10. H reads [illegible] ।
17. B. स्वार्थं for स्वस्य तत् ।
18. D. च सर्वसिद्धिं for सततं ।

Page 74.

22. G [illegible] for [illegible] ।
24. B. H. [illegible] one MS. [illegible] G [illegible] for [illegible]
A. C. D. E. K. read only [illegible]
29 Am. Dm. read [illegible] for चैत्र
32. D [illegible] for [illegible]
46. K omits होम.

Page 5.

49 Dm. omits अपि after [illegible]
50. Cm reads सर्वसंसिद्धौ ।
55. G adds [illegible] यथा [illegible] [illegible] सर्वेतरा च [illegible] after सर्वेतरा and omits [illegible] ।
56 B. [illegible] for [illegible]° ।
57 D [illegible] for [illegible]° ।
59 Cm F read [illegible] for परो
60. H. reads [illegible] ।
61. F [illegible] for [illegible] ।
63. B. [illegible] for [illegible] ।
65. Bm Em. read [illegible] ।
67 F मात्रानां for [illegible] ।
71. C. D E. F G. H. K. [illegible] for [illegible] of one Ms.

Page 76.

73. Dm. omits पञ्चस्य before प्रत्यनुमान° ।
76. A. B. C. प्रतिसिद्ध for प्रसिद्धे ।
79 Am. reads विशेषण for विशेष्याय ।
79 A. C. अप्रमेय च for °चा
81. D सोपाधिकत्वात् for सापाधिकत्वात् ।
84. Am. omits च after प्रमेयत्वे ।
91 Am. reads °यभिज्ञातासम्भवेन ।
96. H. reads च हेतव् for सम्भेवमेतद् ।

Page 77

103. Am. reads तथापि च व्यावभित्यपरापर° ।
Om. reads तथापि पैशापमिन्नपरापर ।
K. add व्याप्य after अर्थे ।

Verse XIII.

2 H. omits यदि after त्रिकाय
11 H. परप्रत्यये for अपरत्वे
18. D. सर्वोपिवादिविपरीतस्य for सर्वोपात्ता

Page 78

19 D E. F मार्गेण वेत्यादि
22. D. adds अन्याक्षेपो भविष्यन्त्या कार्यसिद्धि(के?)र्हि अनन्यम् after आदिरूप
23. D कार्यार्थे for वाक्यार्थे
25 Dm. मात्रस्तत्त्वं
35. A. H. add हि after सर्व
36 A. B. Dm. read पश्यामि f r पश्यन्ति A. B. E. G K. omit आरामं तस्य पश्यन्ति न तत्पश्यति कश्चन
37 C. reads इति समयात् for इति न्यायात् । A. B C. E. G H अर्थेऽपरमा for अर्थं तु ।
43 B. H. omits असत्स्यापि after अन्यपरत्वे
46. B. omits स before प्रमाण ।
53. D reads प्रतिवेदयति ।
56. Dm. reads °भयत्वेन तत्तत्स्वविशेषणत्वेन तत्तत्स्वपदि ।
59. B. omits प्रतिपद्य after प्रतिवेष ।
62. D reads वस्तुन्यपाश्रित for शुन्यवसितम ।
64 H. सिद्धि K. सिद्ध for सिद्ध ।

Page 80

65. F आहतचित for आहतमात्रावित ।
68. Am. A. G. omit तेषां before केवली ।
72. D reads अहिंस for अहिंसात्
76. Am. reads परमाणव सर्वस्य परमार्थतो विविक्तस्य निवर्तन- त्वात् [illegible] स्यात् ।
77. D. Om read इदं च [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] यह परमाणव [illegible] for अथवा प्रकारान्तरेण etc., but H. adds this before अथवा
79. Dm. A. E. omit द्वितीयस्य after [illegible] ।
81. F [illegible] for [illegible] ।
82. Om. reads [illegible] [illegible] ।
87. Am. reads यत [illegible] [illegible] B. यदा for यत ।

Page 81.

101. E. adds तस्मात् after [illegible] ।
105. D. omits from [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] ।
107. A. K. omit [illegible] after [illegible].
115. A. Om. D K. read [illegible]° ।

Page 82.

117. C. D H. K. गतस्तेऽपि for गतस्तेऽपि
118. Am. omits हि after तर्हि ।
118. C. D. E G K. read [illegible] सिद्धं ।
121. B. C. रम्यते ; some गम्यते for लभ्यते
122. Om. omits नित्य before निर्वाण
124. F omits from [illegible] to [illegible]
     G omits from [illegible] to [illegible] ।
125. Dm. reads एव च for एवम्
131. B. omits [illegible] after [illegible] ।

Page 83

141. B. C. [illegible] for [illegible] ।

Verse XIV

2. Om. reads परिकल्पित for प्रकल्पित ।
3. H omits [illegible] after [illegible]
5. H. सर्वं for [illegible] ; Dm. reads [illegible] for °[illegible]

6. Om., Fm. omit सर्वं after अनेक ।

8. A. C. E. F G विशेषासमवेतत्वात् for विशेषेतरसमवेतत्वात्

10. H. reads एकात्मकत्वं for एकानेकात्मकत्वं ।

20. F adds सम्बन्धितया after आत्मतया ।

Page 84

22. F omits शब्दं before निर्वक्ति ।

25. Am reads सामान्यत्वात् for सामान्यात्

35. C. omits व्यावृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुत्वं लक्षणम्

38. Dm. reads सत्त्वात् for सत्त्वमात्रत्वात्,

45 K. reads सर्वं न व्यावृत्ति

Page 86.

48. H. omits अन्यथा before अनुगमे

53. C. E. F G H. K. read सामान्यविशेष for °षात्।

67 Dm. reads भेदाद्विभागात्

Page 87

71. D कदाचित् for कस्यचित् Dm. reads °भेदोपचारात् for °भेदोपयोगात्

75. Am. Dm. Fm. read तथा instead of तथा हि

85. Dm. reads सर्वेषामपेक्षमनुपपन्नम् । एवं सामान्यस्थाने विशेषत्वं विशेषस्थाने च सामान्यत्वं मद्ज्ञानेन सामान्येऽपि यथा यथा etc.

92. D omits तथा after वक्तुम्

Page 88.

99 K. omits तत्र before सत्त्व.

101. Dm Fm. विशेषरूपत्वे for विशेषात्मकत्वे

107 A. C. D E F G विभिन्नं for अभिन्नं C. D. F G omit कथंचिदभिन्नं

112. D reads सामान्यविशेषता for °रूपता

114. D reads व्यपदेशसम्भवात् for व्यपदेशादिभेदसम्भवात्

115. Om. तत् for यत् ।

Page 89.

122. A. K. read, some omit it: तत्परिणामस्वरूप विवक्षित परिणामात् before कथंचित्

123. D. omits कथंचित् ।

124 F omits कर्पविन्दुर्माव्यावितर्त्व
125. H. reads कथाप्रेव for प्रेवा ।
126. H. reads वातकलाप
129 C. reads विपरीतं for विपरीतं
130. H. सुत्रार्थ for सूर्व
141. A. पराश्रयात् for परमाश्रयत्.

Page 90.

145. K. निर्मिती fo निष्कर्मी
147 A. अविविक्त for अविवेक
154. R. भाष्यूत for भाष्यूते
162 K. omits कर्तृस्वीतान्यान्वितत्वमन्वाच्यमित्ता॰
165. D omits वस्तुस्वरूपात् afte तात्पर्य

Page 91.

176. Cm. reads सत्वं
180 Dm. reads तत्वं वाच्यमिति मात्रचायते
183. H. omits विज्ञानेन
185. A. D reads वक्तव्यमाणस्तमर्थं ; some others वक्तव्यमाण-त्वादिविशेषमर्थं B. C E. F G H K. omit विना before समर्थ
190. D माध्यमत्वेन for माध्यमत्वे K omits तस्मात् before स्वत्वेन

Page 92

196. Am adds एवं before वाक्येन
204 A B. D G read तत्त्वमित्यत् for वचनात्
205. Cm. सर्वेषां for सर्वेषाम्
216 Cm. reads वचनात्मात् for यथानात्
247 Am. एवं for वदेव Cm. अर्थेन
230 A. B D. F G omit तत्र before व्यवहार Cm reads भीतिस्थापनानुमानात् for वीतरूप
231. Cm. omits तु after वाचारेण
232. F व्यतिरेकेण for अविनाभावेन
235. H व्याप्ति for देशान्तरो
237 H. दूषित for दूषण
239 Am omits तु after अनुमानप्रमाण

Page 94

40 Dm. reads °चैरिति सूप

247 Am. reads प्रवृत्तोत्तर-

248. Dm. reads त्रिगुणात्.

250 C. adds रूप after प्रतिरूप

251 Cm. omits न पुन before विशेष-

257 Am. reads फलसमितार

Verse XV

3. B omits चित् before चित्पदार्थ-

6 D omits स्तोम before प्रवृत्ति

Page 95

8—9 D reads समानता for समानस्वरूप and omits आत्मन-

15 16. C. परिहरं for प्रतिहरं C. धर्मि for धर्मे

Page 96

31 Cm reads विश्वकोशनम्

35 Am reads त्रिवरसरसीता सत्तम

41 Dm. read समस्त पु इतिष्यामि

43 Am. reads समास्तरीति विधस्वामि

47 A. B. C D E. F G H.K. Dm. omit तथा before सर्व

Page 97

62 C G H K अमरत्वात् some अमरत्वक:

64. B D. E H K. भवमात्रे for आत्माने

Page 98

8 Dm. read त्रिवारसप्तविंशेयत्वात्.

91. C. मतिज्ञानता for मतिज्ञानकता

100 Dm. reads भगुण इव प्रतिभास and omits स्वात्मम्

Page 99

105. C. F Dm. read वेदनसमीतमात्रे

112. B. omits अपि after मात्र

123. C. D E G K. सर्वोषां some सर्वोर्षा for सर्वोष्ट.

130 Dm omit वेदे before मानुषितः सद्भ.

Page 100

141. A E G H K omit इति वेद before न

142. some read वद् before सूत्रे

4

149 C. [illegible] for [illegible]
151. A [illegible] for [illegible]
153. A. E. omits [illegible] before [illegible]

Page 101.

164 Dm reads [illegible] Am. [illegible]
165 A B [illegible] for [illegible]

XVI

Page 102

5. Cm omits [illegible] after [illegible]
6 Am omits [illegible] before [illegible]
9 A C. reads [illegible]
11. Am reads [illegible] for [illegible]
13. D F G H. read [illegible]
K omits [illegible] after [illegible]
19. K omits [illegible] इति
22. K. [illegible] for °[illegible]
25. Am reads [illegible]

Pge 103

30 A B. C. D E. F G. H K read [illegible] after [illegible] and before [illegible], some others omit it.
32. Dm. [illegible]
40 Am. Bm F read [illegible]
43. D [illegible] for [illegible]
48. G adds [illegible] after [illegible] and before [illegible]
K. [illegible] fo °[illegible]
50 A. B C. D E. F G H. K. read [illegible] after [illegible]
B. C. G add [illegible] before [illegible]

Page 104

58. H. [illegible] for [illegible]
55. A. B C. D E F G H K read [illegible] before [illegible], some others omit it.
62. Am. Dm. read [illegible]

70 A B C, D E, F G H K. omit एव after [illegible]
72. Cm reads [illegible]
74 A. B. C D E. I H K. add [illegible] before [illegible]

Page 105

82. H. F [illegible] for [illegible]
84. F omits तत् before [illegible] some read it.
86. Dm. omits [illegible]
102. A omits [illegible] before [illegible]

Page 106.

104 D omits [illegible] before [illegible]
107 H. K. read [illegible]
114 H. [illegible] for [illegible]
121. D [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 10

130. F omits from [illegible] to [illegible] after [illegible] and before [illegible] *D* reads [illegible]
13. A B. C F G K omits [illegible] after [illegible]
134 D adds [illegible] after [illegible]
13. C. [illegible] for [illegible]
141 Gm. reads [illegible] for [illegible]
1 0 Dm. read [illegible] [illegible]

Page 10

153. K. omits [illegible] after [illegible]
1 6 Cm. adds [illegible] after [illegible] H K. omit [illegible] D omit [illegible]
15 F omit from [illegible] to [illegible] for [illegible]
1 9 Cm D G [illegible] for [illegible] Dm omits [illegible]
16 Cm. reads [illegible]
16 C. adds [illegible] before [illegible]
171 K. [illegible] for [illegible]
172. C. [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 109

179 H K omit सर्वं परमाणु-
184. H. समानमेतत् for समानमेतेन
185 B. C. E. F G H. [illegible] for [illegible]
187 E omits निरपेक्षत्वात्
188. C adds [illegible] after अपेक्षातो हि

Page 110

206. C reads [illegible] [illegible]
210 A B C. D E. F G H. K. read [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] before [illegible] [illegible] some omit it. A. B. C. H. G Fn. [illegible] some विरोध for [illegible]
225. B H. K. [illegible] fo [illegible]
226. Cm. omits [illegible] after [illegible]

Page 111.

244. B. H विशेषा for प्रवेशा

Page 112.

256. A B. C. D E. F G H. K Dm. [illegible] for [illegible] of them.
258. D H. [illegible] for [illegible]
264. B. omits [illegible] before [illegible]
265 D [illegible] for [illegible]
260 K. adds प्रतीति before [illegible]
271 H. [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 113

281 A. D E F G H. K. omit [illegible] before [illegible]
292. Cm. reads [illegible] !
295. Am. Bm. read [illegible]
296. H. omits [illegible]
297 C. adds [illegible] after [illegible]
299 D [illegible] ! [illegible]

Page 114.

311. Am. reads °[illegible] for °प्रकृति
316. A D G H. K. read [illegible] after [illegible] some omit it.

322. A C. विसादृश्यात् for विसादृश्यात् of some.
327 C. D E. F G H K. दुर्वि for दुर्विदर्थ

Page 115.

342 A. B C. स्वदृष्टमित for स्वमित

Verse XVII

7 F omits विचंद्
10 Cm स यथार्थं
11 A. B. C. F [illegible] some अप्रमाणिक.
15. D reads [illegible]

Page 116

21 C H [illegible] F प्रमाणांगीकरणात्
23. C. D. K. [illegible]
26. F सर्वेषां for सर्वथा. C. omits तत्र after विषये ।
31 D [illegible] for [illegible]
38. Dm omits पर before परिच्छिन्नं

Page 117

50. A omits च after प्रमेय
51. Cm. reads प्रतिक्षेपणे निर्णीत
52. Am. reads प्रमेय वाच्य

Page 118.

67 D [illegible] for [illegible]
69 D प्रतिविप्रौ विप्रतिपत्ते fo प्रतिविप्रतिपत्ते
71. Am. reads सिद्धित्वात्
6. Am. Cm. omi च befo e सिद्धि
9 A. D E. G [illegible] for [illegible]
81. B. C. F G K. अनुयोगात् for अनुयोगात्
89 इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षे° ।

Page 119

101. A. C. G H Dm mit हि after यदि
103. A E Fm. [illegible] for [illegible]
106. D H. K. [illegible] for [illegible]
109 Cm. [illegible]

P ge 120

1 2. Dm. Fm. [illegible] for [illegible]

123. O. G पाठभेद for यथोक्त
126. Bm. Dm. Em. read वस्तुस्थितिरे°
130 D adds after सम्मोहाय—
आगमो [illegible] [illegible] विभुः ।
[illegible] न [illegible] ॥
131 D adds after स प्रमाणमेव—
[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥
135 O [illegible]
139 O [illegible] for प्रमाण
141. D [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 121.
144. D omits [illegible] before परिणामतारतम्य.
161. D omits [illegible] before [illegible]
161. B. [illegible] fo [illegible]
164 A. read [illegible]

Page 122
170. A C [illegible] for [illegible]
176 A B. C omit [illegible] च

XVIII

5. Cm. reads [illegible] —[illegible]°

P ge 123
16 K. adds [illegible] after [illegible]
25. C. [illegible] fo [illegible] Cm reads प्रतिसन्धानयोगात्

Page 124
44. C omits [illegible]
52. Bm [illegible] Cm. [illegible]
K. [illegible] for [illegible]
55. K omits [illegible]

Page 125
71 Cm. omits [illegible] Ito तथा
72. C. [illegible] for [illegible]
76. K [illegible] for [illegible]

XIX.

Page 126

1. D H तपागतम
2. A. E. F G H read वस्तरार्पणां
7. A. B. C. D E. F G H अकामात् for अकामसमागात्

Page 127

12. A. B. C. read मुस्तव
14. K. reads वासना स्यात्
17. A C. D E F G सितिहते B K. असतिहते; some व्यवसितहने.
22. Cm. reads न वरते

Page 128.

44. B reads पूर्वकस्लेन for पूर्वसलेन
46. B. reads स्थिरमचकरय

Page 129

69. Dm. Fm. read मेदारित्वर्यां
61. K omits लगार Cm मूलानि Am. स्तानि for पूतानि
70. K. reads प्रतिपत्वले
73. D. अनेकवार for अनेकानवार
5. K. omits सर्वत्र before वस्तुन
77. F omits अयमीति

XX.

Page 130.

1. A. B C. D E. F इमातिमर्दः G कतीद्मातिमर्दः H K इमातिमात्त

Page 131

14. B. G कौशप्रतिपत्त C लोकप्रतिपत्त
17. B H अविवेन for अवबेन
28. Cm. तव for अतम

Page 132

51. K. reads प्रतिवद्धिद्वारा Am सनुप्यवने for सनुप्यमते.
61. K. adds मूलेष्वा after परिणतेष्व
62. B. C E. F G H K. omit आत्मन स्वयोगस्व before ओतुमे A. B. C E. G H. K omit स्वरोमा before स्यात्; some read it

Page 133

71 F Am. read [illegible]

73. A. B. C. E. F G H. K read परिणमते

76. B. omits [illegible] and reads for [illegible] for [illegible]

78. A. B. C. D E. G H. read प्रमाणत्व for प्रामाण्यत्व

XXI

Page 134

12. C. E. G चैव (o तु) स्यात् for चैव

13. A. B. C. D. F G H. [illegible] for [illegible]

25. D [illegible] for [illegible] A. B E. H. [illegible] for [illegible]

Pag 135

32. D. प्रतिपालन for परिपालन

35. D. reads [illegible]

43. G omits [illegible] [illegible] and omits from [illegible] to परम्परा

50 A. B G E F K. [illegible] for [illegible]

54 A. B C. D E. F G H K omit इति after [illegible]

Page 136

56 G omits [illegible]

60. A C. G K. omit [illegible] after [illegible]

XXII

3. C. G H read [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 137

10 E. [illegible] F H [illegible] for [illegible]

24. D [illegible] D [illegible] for [illegible]

25. A. C. E. and Dm. [illegible] K. [illegible] for [illegible]

26. Cm. reads °[illegible] for °[illegible]

Page 138.

34. A B. E. F H. K. read [illegible]

36. F and Cm. [illegible] for [illegible]

37 D omits [illegible]

40. A. B. C. E. F G H K. and Dm. [illegible] for [illegible]

43. E. F G read [illegible]

44. D omits [illegible]

46. Cm. omits [illegible] before [illegible]

49 D. read [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and omits from [illegible] to [illegible]

XXIII

Page 139

5. A B C. E. F G K read पुनः पर्योधा-

24 A. पर्योत्सुकता for पर्योत्सुकपार्यकता

26 H. इत्यतो for इति

Page 140.

30 *Some omit* वर्के.

47 A. B. C. D E. F G K. परिणमते; H परिणमन्ते

Page 141.

55. A. B. C. D E. F G K. इत्यादिषु some इत्यादय

Page 142.

97 D H सूत्रस्तुतिः F K. and Am. सूत्रस्तुताः for सूत्रानुवादिः

98. A B. C G K. omit अपि before प्रसङ्गे

101. G. C. K and Om. read पक्षसदशानि

Page 143.

116. Om. भगवन्ति D भवन्ति for आप्नोति

117 B. स्थापितसारसत्ता for स्थापसत्ता

120. A. B. C. D E. F G H K. सर्वं for पशुर्वं.

Page 144.

137 D and Am. परिवहनात् for परिवहनात्

151. B. सारतम्या A. C. E. F G K. सारतम्यात्मना for सारता सत्यात्मनी.

Page 145

161-5-6. B. H D. add इत्यस्य विवेचनया A B. G F K. इत्यस्य च विवेचनया C. इति विवेचनया before एवं सर्वेषु etc.
C. रचना for विधिवत्ता

176. B. E. G H. K. omit प्राधान्य and read अभेदयुक्ता A C. प्रधान for प्राधान्य

Page 146.

195 A. G D. and Dm. read परिपालनात्

196. G and Dm. [illegible]

200. C. D. H add प्रकार after मोदः

Page 14

223. H. reads तत्समुद्गिरन् C. D E. वैतानिकः तत्समुद्गम्

5

XXIV

Page 148.

2. B. [illegible] for [illegible] B [illegible] for [illegible]
7 Am. reads [illegible] [illegible]
12. E. [illegible] for [illegible]
13. B reads [illegible] for [illegible] D omits [illegible]

Page 149

27 Am. reads [illegible] [illegible]
30. Bm. omits तु after [illegible]; some read तु
34. A. B. C. E. [illegible] Bm. [illegible]
36. Bm. [illegible] for [illegible]
40. Am. mits [illegible]
41. Bm. [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 150.

45. A. B C. E. K. H. read [illegible] and omit [illegible]
60. A. E. H. K. [illegible] fo [illegible]
D. reads [illegible] and omit from [illegible] to [illegible] and from [illegible] to the end.
65. Bm. omits [illegible] after [illegible]
69 B. C. omit [illegible] [illegible]

XXV

Page 151.

2. Am Bm. °[illegible] for °[illegible]

P ge 152.

25. A. E. K. omit [illegible] and read [illegible]
H. read [illegible]
27 Bm. [illegible] A H. K. [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 153.

31. B. C. E. F H. omit [illegible]
34. A. B. C. D. E. F H. omit [illegible]
45. A. B. C. D E. F H. omit [illegible]

XXVI.

1. E. F H read वस्तुवस्तुत्वया
2. Am. विविधेषु for विविधावेषु

Page 154

32. Dm and D F omit कर्मेण after क्रियायां
34. Am. and D F H. K. read अविरुद्धत्वात्
39. D omits एकान्ततारिति
40. Am. and K. read द्वारकाद्वीपमध्ये for द्वारकाद्वीपेन

Page 155

42. A. B D E omit मध्यमवर्णितम्
    A. C. K. read परमात्मकानां f r परामिमात्मकानां
    D omits परामिमात्मकानां
42. D इति विचारात् for इति तत्त्वविचारात्
43. D reads वर्णितुमर्हं भवति and omits असमर्थं वर्णितुमर्हं वा
45. D मनुष्य for द्विपस्य

XXVII.

3. D H. omit वस्तु after वस्तुवस्तुतया
7. A. B. C. D E. F G H. K. यथा प्रयोग for यथा प्रयोगः
11. D अपि सूक्ष्मे for स्पष्टे
14. D omits एव and reads सर्वं पुण्य

Page 156

16. A. B. C. D E. F G H. K. add सह after वाक्यतः and omit च
18. D reads एवागतक्रमेण for एवाग्नीकृत्यापे
19. A. omits अपि after जगत्यामेव।
31. D H. भवेत् for भवत्
33. Bm. read वाच्यानां विशेष
35. Bm. and F H K. अनुपपत्तेः for अनुपपत्तिः

Page 157

41. D reads अपि after विचारपरिपाः
42. Am. निरवद्यं निरवद्यात् H. निरवद्यपरिवादे for निरवद्यवाक्ये
50. D. पूर्वावस्थ for पूर्वस्थ°

58. D [illegible] F H. K. [illegible] for [illegible]
63. A. E F H. K. [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 158.

6 Bm. adds [illegible] before [illegible]
72. B. [illegible] for [illegible]
74. D. [illegible] for [illegible]
77 D [illegible] for [illegible]
77 H. omits [illegible] before [illegible]
78 D reads [illegible] etc. and omits from [illegible] to [illegible]
78. A omits [illegible] after [illegible]
81. D reads [illegible] etc. and omits [illegible] to [illegible]
85. Dm. [illegible] E. [illegible] for [illegible]
86 Dm. [illegible]° for [illegible]°
87 D omits [illegible] after [illegible]

XXVIII

Page 159

2. A. C. D E. G omit तेन before [illegible]
F H K omit [illegible]
Am. Bm read [illegible] तेन [illegible]
7 A. D G E. F H. K. omit [illegible] after [illegible]
9. Some read [illegible] for [illegible]
11. D [illegible] for [illegible]
15. D omits [illegible] to [illegible] line 10

Page 160.

24. C D E. K. [illegible] for [illegible]
27 H [illegible] for [illegible]
29 Bm [illegible] for [illegible]
31. D omits from [illegible] to [illegible]
36. H [illegible]° for [illegible]°
44 H reads [illegible] and omits [illegible] before [illegible]

Page 161.

47 C. D omit पुन before समासान्त॰

60 D दुर्भेयसमासस्वर्प

64. Bm. omits मापपति

70. D जहिमते for कुर्व्व

D *omits from* प्रवचन *to* अयम् line 0– 1 on p. 162

Page 162

89 Bm. reads °कोकवाचितं प्रमाणं सिद्धं for °कोकापचितं प्रमाण प्रसिद्धं

87 A. स्पचरपमित Bm स्पचरमित for स्परच्यमित

92 Am. omits वर्तमान before प्रचाविवर्ते°

Page 163.

108. Bm. omits अर्थ before अभिप्रेति

109 D omits from तथैव to प्रतीयन्ते lines 109–11

109. C. K. एकत्वं for एव

110. H. पुरस्तादा॰ for पुरस्ताच्च

111. C. प्रत्यच्यते for प्रतीयन्ते

113. A C. एतेषां f r एक

113. K पर्वोपमसीनां f पर्वोपमन्त्रानां

Page 164

130. Bm. omits एवं मायते

131. D विरतैते for प्रवर्तते

138. D. repeats f om वेदनापरि to अभिव्यज्यन्ति in line 140.

139. C. D H K. nd Dm omit तरा fter प्रयुज्येत

Page 165.

157 Dm प्रचारित for प्रकाशित

170. Bm. reads कायमेवमुणी

Page 166.

179 C. D. omit और before प्रमाणं

180. D प्रतिपत्यमान for प्रतिमानमान॰

181. Am. Bm. अन for यथा.

Page 167

200. H. वस्तुतस्त्वं for वस्तु वस्त°
212 C. nd Dm. धर्मार्थं for प्रवर्तमार्थं
213. H तितिमितिवेवाव्स्वा for तिथिमतिवेवाव्स्वा
215 F omits टीका
216 A B. C. G H. K. read समस्त वस्तु-

Page 168.

221 22. F तस्मवृत्तिकं for लोमवृत्तिकं
232. A. B. C. G K. वरीयस् D वरत्वात् for परत्व.
234. A. B. D. E. F H K. सर्वोपरस्पर्स for समवलना सर्व-
236. D omits क्रिया after अनुमान.
243. H. सविग्रह for निग्रहग.

XXIX

Page 169.

A. B. C. D E F G H. K. सदृशत्वात् for सदृशत्वं in l. 3 of the टी

5. Fm निवृत्तिवत A. E. D F K. निवृत्तिमत्ता C. H निवृत्ति मत्ता G निवृत्तिमत्ता ! निवृत्तिमत्ता

18. Bm. omits स after वस्तु.
A. B. C. D K. निवृत्ति- some निवृत्ति

Page 170

27 A. B. C. D E. F G H. K. प्रतीयन्° for प्रतीय°
28. Bm. विपक्षप्रत्ययी भवति some विपक्षप्रत्ययी भवति.
29 A. B. C. D. E. F G H. K. omit प्रतीयमान nd क्षेत्र and read तत्प्रतीयमानो न प्रत्यक्षमाणो वेति.
34. A B. C E. F G H omit तथा तेन प्रमाणेन before अन्यथाप्रत्यक्ष.
42. D mits सर्वस्य before प्रकरणात्
45. A. B. C. E. F G H. K. कीर्त्यते for कीर्ति
46. D. तालव्य ; some तालिका

Page 171.

49 Bm. reads समानमात्रसत्तामात्रवृत्तित्वात्

55. A. B. C. D E. F G K. स्वाम्यादि H. मातिम्यादि for स्वाम्यादि
59 A. B C. E. G H. भवद्गुपश्च; some भगवद्गुपश्च
60 Bm. सर्वलोकाविरा H. सर्वलोकावसा for सर्वलोकावलका विरा.
64. D. F omit अभ्यवहारिका:
70 D तावत्तावता for तावता.
71. D K. अतसेव for अवागन्तव्य

XXX.

Page 172.

6 Am. भवद्गुणमीक्षिता Ac. भवत्प्रसादिता for भवद्गुणवावासिन
8. F omits from सम्यगीकृतस्य to हेतुप्रतिनिधिः पथा in line 10
10 D निरितेन A C. E निरिषेन for वैशिकेन

Page 173.

12–13 A. D omit पक्षप्रतिपक्षभाव after तस्य माता and omit पक्ष after परस्पर च
K. omits पक्ष after तस्य माता.
17 Bm. सर्व सर्वेव प्रयोगेषु C. एव सर्वेव योगेषु
24. Dm. omits हि after पक्षपातित्व
31. D रूपतया H चारुरूपतया for चारुरूपतया
36. Bm. °वन्दस्य for °वादस्य

Page 174.

60. D omits प्रत्यहं before स्वामिनिर्वर्ते

XXXI

Page 175.

4. Dm. नियमवाद् for नियमवाद
8. D omits सर्वमेव before निरिर्ष
15. Am. H. omit प्रति before प्रमाद

Page 176.

34. A. B. C. D F G H. K. add विकार after आदेवार
Bm. omits बहु before वचनमात्रेण
Bm. न न प्रत्ययद्वारा for न प्रत्ययद्वारा
34–35. D omits तावति प्रयो and reads प्रयोगमीशा for बहूनीष

XXXII.

Page 177

15 F [illegible] for [illegible]

D. K omit [illegible]

A E. omit [illegible]

C. reads [illegible]

17 Bm. [illegible] for [illegible]

19 Bm. reads—[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ॥ १ ॥

after [illegible]

21 Dm. and A. K [illegible] for [illegible]

Page 178.

42. A B. F G H K. omit [illegible]

45. A. B C. D F G and Dm. [illegible] fo [illegible]

48. Dm. reads [illegible] for [illegible]

D omits [illegible]° to [illegible] in line 50.

Page 179

50. In [illegible] D reads [illegible] for [illegible] and A B. C. D. E. F G H. K [illegible] for [illegible]

K omits Verses 1 to 5 (both inclusive) in the [illegible] and also Verse 9.

Stanza III

जइसत्तु विमग्गसे [इदमस्तु संभिइूहे समीपवरसर्वि चैतदो स्मर।
जइसत्तु विमग्गसे सदिसि परोक्षे विशालीयात् ॥]

समरू वा परो मा वा विसं वा परिवत्तउ ।
भासियव्वा हिया भासा सपक्खगुणकारिया ॥
(समतु मा वा परो मा वा विषं वा वर्तयतु (विपरतु अतिमतु वा)।
भाषितव्या हिता भाषा स्वपक्षगुणकारिका (कारिणी) ॥
Cf. परो रुष्यतु वा मा वा विषवत् प्रतिभातु वा ।
भाषितव्या हिता भाषा स्वपक्षगुणकारिणी ॥)

—Hema-S repilacaritra II. 12

प्रायस्तुभ्यः—न भवति धर्मः श्रोतुः सर्वस्यैकान्ततो हितश्रवणात् ।
ब्रुवतोऽनुग्रहबुद्ध्या वक्तुस्त्वेकान्ततो भवति ॥

—Umāsvāti ("Vācakamukhya")'s Tatt. Sūtra-Sambandha-Kārikā 29

Stanza IV

घस्मरः कर्मोपारे —Hema Śabda II. ll. 4

Stanza V

उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत् —Tattvārtha Sūtra V 29

समवायिकारणमात्मकम् —Bhāvavijayagaṇi's Vṛtti on Uttarādhyayana Adh. XXVIII. 9

अयमेव हि भेदो भेदहेतुर्वा यद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः कारणभेदश्चेति
—Untraced.

अप्रच्युतानुत्पन्नस्थिरैकस्वभावं नित्यम्

तद्भावाव्ययं नित्यम् —Tatt. Sūtra V 30.

द्रव्यं पर्यायवियुतं पर्याया द्रव्यवर्जिताः ।
क्व कदा केन किंरूपा दृष्टा मानेन केन वा ॥
[Cf दव्वं पज्जवविउयं दव्वविउत्ताय पज्जवा णत्थि

त्रिविधः खल्वयं धर्मिणः परिणामो धर्मलक्षणावस्थारूपः ।
—Yoga Sūtra III 18, Vyāsa-Bhāṣya.

सा तु द्विविधा—नित्याऽनित्या च
—Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, Section on पृथ्वी

अप्रकारणत्ववचनात् संयोगविभागौ—Section on आकाश

अभ्युदयपुरुष......समवायर्थो अभ्युदयफल
—Taken substantially and almost verbatim from Hemacandra's com. on his own Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā.

सापेक्षमसमर्थम्—A nyāya of in Hema Śabdānuśāsana and noted in the collection of nyāyas made by Hemahaṃsagaṇi.

यो यत्रैव स तत्रैव यो यदैव तदैव सः ।
न देशकालयोर्व्याप्तिर्भावानामिह विद्यते ॥ —Untraced.
Attributed to Ājīvakas in A. M P edition.

भागे सिंहो नरो भागे योऽर्थो भागद्वयात्मकः ।
तमभागं विभागेन नरसिंहं प्रचक्षते ॥ —Untraced

सर्वं वाक्यं सावधारणम्—A nyāya from Hema.44.(see supra).

Stanza VI

ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत् स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा (v. l. नरकमेव वा)
अज्ञो(न्तो)जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ॥
—Mahābhārata. Attributed to Vyāsa (and rightly) by the author of the Parīkṣāmukha Sūtra Laghuvṛtti. Found quoted in Śabara-Bhāṣya on Mīm. Sūtra I. ii. 4. Also in Māṭhara Vṛtti on Sāṃkhyakārikā 61.

अपगतमले हि मनसि......पुरुषमप्यस्य
—Kādambarī-Pūrvārdha, Peterson's edition p. 103.

सद्धर्मबीजवपनानघकौशलस्य
यल्लोकबान्धव तवापि खिलान्यभूवन् ।
तन्नाद्भुतं खगकुलेष्विह तामसेषु
सूर्यांशवो मधुकरीचरणावदाताः ॥
—Siddhasena's Dvātriṃśikā II 13.

Stanza III

अरसत्तु विमर्शे [इत्यस्तु संनिकृष्टे समीपतरवर्तिनि चैतदो रूपम् ।
अदसस्तु विप्रकृष्टे तदिति परोक्षे विजानीयात् ॥]

इमक वा परो मा वा विसं वा परियत्तउ ।
आयिवम्मा हिंसा भासा सपक्खगुणकारिया ॥
(इमस्तु मा वा परो मा वा विषं वा परिवर्ततु (विपरवत् प्रतिपातु वा) ।
अनिहितम्मा हिंसा भाषा स्वपक्षगुणकारिका (कारिणी) ॥
(Cf. परो इमक वा मा वा विसमप पतिमाइ वा ।
आयिवम्मा हिंसा भासा सपक्खगुणकारियी ॥)

—Hema-S'rapikacaritra II. 12

वाचकमुख्य —स भवति यथा सोऽनु सर्वसौभाग्यसम्पन्नो [illegible]
पुरुषेषु महापुरुषा वस्तुत्वेनाप्यतो भवति ॥

—Umāsvāti ('Vācakamukhya')'s Tatt. Sūtra-Sambandha-Kārikā 29

Stanza IV

धम्मत्था कम्मोपारे —Hema S'abda II. ii. 74

Stanza V

उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत् —Tattvārtha Sūtra V 29

[illegible] —Bhāvavijayagaṇi's Vṛtti on Uttarādhyayana Adh. XXVIII. 9

अयमेव हि भेदो भेदहेतुर्वा यद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः कारणभेदश्चेति

—Untraced.

[illegible] नित्यम् „

तद्भावाव्ययं नित्यम् —Tatt. Sūtra V 30.

द्रव्यं पर्यायवियुतं पर्याया द्रव्यवर्जिताः ।
क्व कदा केन किंरूपा दृष्टा मानेन केन वा ॥
[Cf. दव्वं पज्जवविउयं दव्वविउत्ता य पज्जवा णत्थि

—Sammati I. 12.]

त्रिविधः चायं धर्मिणः परिणामो धर्मलक्षणावस्थारूपः ।
—Yoga Sûtra III. 13, Vyâsa-Bhâṣya.

सा तु द्विविधा–नित्याऽनित्या च ..
—Praśastapâda Bhâṣya, Section on पृथ्वी

शब्दकारणत्ववचनात् संयोगविभागौ—Section on आकाश

अन्तुवायुक्तस्य ... ... आकाशस्योत्पत्तिः
—Taken substantially and almost verbatim from Hemacandra's com. on his own Pramâṇa-Mîmâṃsâ.

सापेक्षमसमर्थम्—A nyâya of in Hema Śabdânuśâsana and noted in the collection of nyâyas made by Hemahaṃsagaṇi.

यो यत्रैव स तत्रैव यो यदैव तदैव सः ।
न देशकालयोर्व्याप्तिर्भावानामिह विद्यते ॥ —Untraced.
Attributed to Âjîvakas in A. M P edition.

भागे सिंहो नरो भागे योऽर्थो भागद्वयात्मकः ।
तमभागं विभागेन नरसिंहं प्रचक्षते ॥ —Untraced

सर्वं वाक्यं सावधारणम्—A nyâya from Hema.44.(see supra).

Stanza VI.

ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत् स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा (v l. नरकमेव वा)
अज्ञो(न्यो)जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ॥
—Mahâbhârata. Attributed to Vyâsa (and rightly) by the author of the Parîkṣâmukha Sûtra Laghuvṛtti. Found quoted in S'abara-Bhâṣya on Mîm. Sûtra I. ii. 4. Also in Mâṭhara Vṛtti on Sâṃkhyakârikâ 61.

अपगतमले हि मनसि ... ...सुखमुपदेशगुणाः
—Kâdambarî–Pûrvârdha, Peterson's edition p. 103.

सद्धर्मबीजवपनानघकौशलस्य
यल्लोकबान्धव तवापि खिलान्यभूवन् ।
तन्नाद्भुतं खगकुलेष्विह तामसेषु
सूर्यांशवो मधुकरीचरणावदाताः ॥
—Siddhasena's Dvâtriṃśikâ II 13.

विश्वतश्चक्षुरुत विश्वतोमुखो विश्वतोबाहुरुत विश्वतस्पात् ।
—S'ukla Yajurveda Saṁhitā XVII. 19

जिणस्स गुणा न इमं तेमि पवासो गुणो न वा इमं ।
जं नामं भावगुणो सम्मसम्मो स भवण ॥ १ ॥
गच्छन न परिछिंदइ नामं मेयं तमम्मि देसम्मि ।
भावत्थं जिण मग्गं अवितहमी ब निम्मोहं ॥ २ ॥
वीरोवहसस सव्वो भावत्था नेव निवडोसंमि ।
कोई अवपरिसंती पिसाइ इह कमवयण कम्मा ॥ ३ ॥
एवमिह नाणमती भावत्था पेव इंति कोपंडं ।
जइ परिछिंदइ सम्मं कोवु विरोहो मये तस्स भूयं ॥ ४ ॥
—Dharma-Saṁgrahiṇī of Haribhadrācārya 870–873.

न हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि । —Untraced.
Often quoted

षट्शतानि नियुज्यन्ते पशूनां मध्यमेऽहनि ।
अश्वमेधस्य वचनात् न्यूनानि पशुभिस्त्रिभिः ॥
(v. l. वसुश्च नवभिस्त्रिभिरपि च)
—Quoted in Mahīdhara Bhāṣya on Y jus Saṁhitā Adh.24,
and in Māṭhara Vṛtti on S. Kārikā.

अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत । —Aitareya Āraṇyaka VI. 2.

सप्तदश प्राजापत्यान् पशूनालभेत । —Taittirīya Saṁhitā I. 4.

ब्राह्मणार्थेऽनृतं ब्रूयात् । —Āpastamba.

न मांसमुत्पद्यते हिंसया च प्रीतु राजन निवासरक्षे ।
ब्राह्मणार्थे सर्वमतायहारे षण्णाऽऽपृताम्यानृतमाहुरपि ॥
Cf. वहरक्ष्मके इति वंचनाये ब्राह्मणार्थे सर्वमतायहारे ।
विवाह काले रतिसंप्रयोगे प्राणात्यये सर्वधनापहारे ॥
—Vasiṣṭha Dharma Sūtra XVI. 36

ब्राह्मणानां तु वीर्येण स्वप्तः परिभुज्यते ।
(आनृशंस्याद् ब्राह्मणस्य भुञ्जते हीतरे जनाः ॥
—Manu Smṛti I. 101 b.

स्वमेव ब्राह्मणो भुङ्क्ते स्वं वस्ते स्वं ददाति च ।
Cf. Bhāgavata. —Manu Smṛti I. 101 a.

अपुत्रस्य गतिर्नास्ति । —Devī Bhāgavata.

अनेकानि सहस्राणि कुमारब्रह्मचारिणाम् ।
दिवं गतानि विप्राणामकृत्वा कुलसंततिम् ॥ —Āpastamba.

Stanza VII

आवर्जिता किंचिदिव स्तनाभ्याम् ।
—Kumārasambhava III. 54.

ददृशुः क इव सुखावहः परेषाम् । —S'iśupālavadha.

अप्राप्तानामेव प्राप्तिः समवाय ।
—Vide Praśastpāda's 'अप्राप्तयोः प्राप्तिः संयोगः' and S'rīdhara's comment thereon। अप्राप्तयोरिति समवायव्यवच्छेदार्थम् ।

अव्यभिचारी मुख्योऽविकलोऽसाधारणोऽन्यधर्मा च ।
विपरीतो गौणोऽर्थः सति मुख्ये धीः कथं गौणे ॥ —Untraced.

ईहाया मानवमेदृशः । —Hema Liṅgānuśāsana पुलि॰ 5.

Stanza VIII.

पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशं कालो दिगात्मा मन इति द्रव्याणि ।
—Vaiś. Sūtra I. I. 5 and Praśasta.

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः संख्याः परिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धयः सुखदुःखे इच्छाद्वेषौ प्रयत्नश्च ।—Vaiś Sūtra I. I. 6 and Praśastapāda Bhāṣya.

अन्तेषु भवा अन्त्याः स्वाश्रयविशेषकत्वाद् विशेषाः । विनाशारम्भरहितेषु नित्यद्रव्येष्वण्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनःसु प्रतिद्रव्यमेकैकशो वर्तमाना अत्यन्तव्यावृत्तिबुद्धिहेतवः । यथाऽस्मदादीनां गवादिष्वश्वादिभ्यस्तुल्याकृति-गुणक्रियावयवोपचयावयवविशेषसंयोगनिमित्ता प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिर्दृष्टा—गौः शुक्लः शीघ्रगतिः पीनः ककुद्मान् महाघण्ट इति तथाऽस्मद्विशिष्टानां योगिनां—नित्येषु तुल्याकृतिगुणक्रियेषु परमाणुषु मुक्तात्ममनःसु चान्यनिमित्तासम्भवाद् येभ्यो निमित्तेभ्यः प्रत्याधारं विलक्षणोऽयमिति प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिः, देशकालविप्रकर्षे च परमाणौ स एवायमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञानं च भवति तेऽन्त्या विशेषाः ।
—Praśastapāda Bhāṣya p. 168

स्वयोरेव सुखस्पर्शं सहतेऽप्यनवस्थितिः ।
क्लेशातिरेकमर्मज्ञो वासितावकसद्भवः ॥

—Udayanācārya's Dravya Kiraṇāvalī p. 181

न हि वै सशरीरस्य प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति ।
अशरीरं वाव सन्तं प्रियाप्रिये न स्पृशतः ।

—Chāndogya VIII. 12

यावदात्मगुणाः सर्वे नोच्छिन्ना वासनादयः ।
तावदात्यन्तिकी दुःखव्यावृत्तिर्नावकल्पते ॥ १ ॥
धर्माधर्मनिमित्तो हि संभवः सुखदुःखयोः ।
मूलभूतौ च तावेव स्तम्भौ संसारसद्मनः ॥ २ ॥
तदुच्छेदे च तत्कार्यशरीराद्यनुपप्लवात् ।
नात्मनः सुखदुःखे स्त इत्यसौ मुक्त उच्यते ॥ ३ ॥
इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नादि भोगायतनबन्धनम् ।
उच्छिन्नभोगायतनो नात्मा तैरपि युज्यते ॥ ४ ॥
तदेवं नित्यनादीनां नवानामपि मूलतः ।
गुणानामात्मनो ध्वंसः सोऽपवर्गः प्रतिष्ठितः ॥ ५ ॥
ननु तस्यामवस्थायां कीदृगात्मावशिष्यते ।
स्वरूपैकप्रतिष्ठानः परित्यक्तोऽखिलैर्गुणैः ॥ ६ ॥
ऊर्मिषट्कातिगं रूपं तदस्याहुर्मनीषिणः ।
संसारबन्धनाधीनदुःखक्लेशाद्यदूषितम् ॥ ७ ॥
कामक्रोधलोभगर्वदम्भहर्षा—ऊर्मिषट्कमिति ।

—Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta.

करणं त्रिविधं वेदं बाह्यमाभ्यन्तरं बुधैः ।
यथा सुखादि याचेव भवं नष्टापि चैतसः ॥

—Attributed to grammarians—Untraced.

न हि वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति"

—Chāndogya VIII. 12.

सुखमात्यन्तिकं यत्र बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम् ।
तं वै मोक्षं विजानीयाद् दुष्प्रापमकृतात्मभिः ॥ —Untraced.

—The first line is found also in the Bhagavadgītā.

वरं वृन्दावने रम्ये श्रृगालत्वमभिवाञ्छितम् ।
न तु वैशेषिकीं मुक्तिं गौतमो गन्तुमिच्छति ॥ —Untraced

मोक्षे भवे च सर्वत्र निःस्पृहो मुनिसत्तमः । —Untraced.

वड्ढं मिव कारणमत्थि नाये ।
(वत्तव्वमि अव्वत्त वड्ढं मिव कारणमत्थि नाये ।
पईंद सपत्तो महसेणवणंमि उज्जाणे ।
वत्तीसावन्ते मोहे य जगणाखिपे झाणे ।
तम्हा संसमठो महासेणवणं उज्जाणम् ॥
—Âvasyaka Purvavibhâga 539

पुण्यपापक्षयो मोक्षः —Untraced.
said to be आगमवचन

सर्वगतत्वेऽप्यात्मनो देहप्रदेशे ज्ञातृत्वम् । नान्यत्र । शरीरस्यो-पभोगायतनत्वात् । अन्यथा तस्य वैयर्थ्यात् ।
—Sridhara's Nyâyakandali.

यथा स्वार्थो व्यवस्थातः
आकाशोऽपि सदेशः, सकृत्सर्वमूर्ताभिसम्बन्धार्हत्वात् "
—Attributed in the text to the author of Dravyâlamkâra.

इस कारके —Hema S'abda III ii. 131

चतुर्भिरात्मप्रदेशैरविरहिता देवताचत्वा समतिक्र— ।

गुणादस्त्रियां नवा— —Hema S abda II ii. 77

अविकल्पात्सर्वथा तु स्याद् बुभुक्षितकमवाप्नुयात् ।
एकान्तनित्यतायां च स विनाश इति स्मृतः ॥
—Haribhadrasûri's Astaka XII. 4.

Cf. यदि च वितण्डकादिभिरिव विपक्षमन्यथापरिपुष्टिभिः मद वीतरागैः ।
न व्यवहितमतमप्रतिवर्णमानसर्वपुरुषविदुरात्ममितरपेत ॥
—J yanta Nyâyamañjari.

अनुपेत्य पक्षं यो न स्थापयति स वैतण्डिक इत्युच्यते ॥
—Uddyotakara's Nyâya-Vârtika I. 1. 1.

दुःशिक्षितकुतर्कांशलेशवाचालिताननाः ।
शक्याः किमन्यथा जेतुं वितण्डाटोपमण्डिताः ॥

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥ —Untraced.

प्रमाणप्रमेय ...नि श्रेयसाधिगमः ॥
—Gautama's Nyāyasūtra I. I. I.

अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणम् —Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya.

सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम् —Bhāsarvajña Nyāyasāra which has a commentary called Nyāyabhūṣaṇa.

स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् —Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokālaṅkāra of Devasūri and Pramāṇamīmāṃsā of Hemacandra.

[illegible]
—Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī.

[illegible] वस्तु प्रमेयम्
—Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokālaṅkāra.

आत्मशरीरे... ...मेयम् —Gautama's Nyāyasūtra.

Stanza XI

महोक्षं वा महाजं वा श्रोत्रियायोपकल्पयेत्
—Yājñavalkya Smṛti, Ācāra 109

द्वौ मासौ मत्स्यमांसेन त्रीन् मासान् हारिणेन तु ।
औरभ्रेणाथ चतुरः शाकुनेनाथ पञ्च वै ॥ —Manusmṛti III. 268.

[illegible] —Cāṇakya I. 7
also M. Bh.

[illegible]—
—Kumārila Mīm. Śl. Vārtika IV 54.

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥
[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥
[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

[=पृथिव्यादीनां यद्यपि भवनेषु विभागो विषयकार्यादिभ्यः ।
तथापि सुरेशैर्नमतोऽत्यनुकम्पा ॥
यथाम्भो मुदा विरता रक्षन्ति येन पृथिव्यादीन् ।
अतो निर्वाणगता अवाधिता आमयमेवाम् ॥
येऽपि हिरादेव इव सुभेषजिका इव सुमयुक्ता तु ।
परिणामसुन्दर इव येषा सा यामयोगेऽपि ॥—
—Jinapatisūri's Pañcaliṅgī 58–59–60.

मैत्रं ब्राह्मणमालभेत भूतिकामः—Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa(?)

पीतश्च यत्रतो वृक्षास्त्रिपैक्षा पक्षिणस्तथा ।
यज्ञार्थं निधनं प्राप्ताः प्राप्नुवन्त्युच्छ्रितं पुनः ॥
—Quoted in Hema-Yogaśāstra.

पूर्णं (v. l. यूपं) छित्त्वा पशून् हत्वा कृत्वा रुधिरकर्दमम् ।
यद्येवं गम्यते स्वर्गे नरके केन गम्यते ॥
—Found quoted in Māṭhara Vṛtti on Sāṁkhyakārikā.

आरोग्ग बोहिलाभं समाहिवरमुत्तमं दिंतु ।
[=आरोग्यं बोधिलाभं समाधिवरमुत्तमं ददतु]
—Āvaśyaka XXIV 6.

देवोपहारव्याजेन यज्ञव्याजेन येऽथवा ।
घ्नन्ति जन्तून् गतघृणा घोरां ते यान्ति दुर्गतिम् ॥ —Untraced.

अन्धे तमसि मज्जामः पशुभिर्ये यजामहे ।
हिंसा नाम भवेद् धर्मो न भूतो न भविष्यति ॥ —Untraced

अग्निर्मामेतस्माद्धिंसाकृतादेनसो मुञ्चतु । —Untraced.
Pāraskara (?)

ज्ञानचारित्रपवित्रिते भवचक्रभ्रमणस्य सि ।
स्यात्मातिथिमहे तीर्थे पापपङ्कापहारिणि ॥
ध्यानाग्नौ जीवकुण्डस्थे दममारुतदीपिते ।
असत्कर्मसमित्क्षेपैरग्निहोत्रं कुरूत्तमम् ॥
कषायपशुभिर्दुष्टैर्धर्मकामार्थनाशकैः ।
शममन्त्रहुतैर्यज्ञं विधेहि विहितं बुधैः ॥

अध्ययनात् तु यो धर्ममीहते मूढमानसः ।
स वाञ्छति पुष्पवृष्टिं कुष्माण्डिपुष्पमेव [illegible] ॥
—Attributed in th Text to Vyāsa (Mahābhārata).

चतुर्भिर्वै पशुमेव वेनत । —Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

सम्बोधने पुरुषविशेषेषु पटुः ।
न सा प्रयाति सर्वेषां सूर्येणापरसम्प्रदिवत् ॥ —Mṛgendra (?)

अग्निमुखा वै देवाः । —Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra 4.

यज्ञानामपि सर्वेषां मार्गं वेदविहितमयम् ।
अग्निहोत्रमिवैतस्य लौकिकः [illegible] ॥ —Untraced.

अतीन्द्रियाणामर्थानां साक्षाद् द्रष्टा न विद्यते ।
नित्येभ्यो वेदवाक्येभ्यो यथार्थत्वविनिश्चयः ॥
(v. L. तस्मादत्री [illegible])
—Haribhadrasūri's Ṣaḍdarśana Samuccaya.

[illegible] इति स्मृतं च ।
[illegible] ॥
—Untraced.

अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः —Taittirīya Saṃhitā (?)

न हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि —Untraced

उत्सर्गापवादयोरपवादो विधिर्बलीयान् ।
—Hemahaṃsagaṇi' Hema. Nyāya.

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥
[[illegible] ।
[illegible] ।] —Untraced.

[illegible] प्रति ।
[illegible] तु वर्जयेत् ॥ —U traced.

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥

यथा विपुलं राज्यमभिषिक्तेन संपदा ।
तथा पापविमुक्तानां ज्ञानं ध्यानं च मुक्तिदम् ॥
—Attributed to Vyāsa (Mahābhārata).

Stanza XII.

सत्संप्रयोगे इन्द्रियप्रवृत्तिजन्यमव्यक्तं ज्ञानं ततोऽर्थप्राकट्यं तस्मादर्थापत्तिः तथा प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणसोपानम्: —Based on Jaiminisūtra I. 1. 45.

Stanza XIII

ते च प्रापुरुदन्वन्तं बुबुधे चादिपूरुषः । —Raghu X. 6.

सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म नेह नानास्ति किंचन ।
आरामं तस्य पश्यन्ति न तं पश्यति कश्चन ॥
—Chāndogya Upaniṣad III 14

अनुमितात् प्रत्यक्षे न विशेषु विपश्चितः ।
कैवल्यं आगमस्यैव प्रत्यक्षेण प्रसाध्यते ॥
—Tattvārtha S'loka-Vārtika I 36 and quoted in Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī.

अस्ति ह्यालोचनाज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ॥
—Mīmāṃsā S'loka-Vārtika (Pratyakṣa) 112

यदीदं तद् ब्रह्मणो रूपम् । —Vedānta(?)

प्रत्यक्षाद्यनवतारः स्याद् भावांशो गृह्यते यदा ।
व्यापारस्तदनुत्पत्तेरभावांशे जिघृक्षिते ॥
—Mīmāṃsā S'l Vārtika V (Abhāva) 17

पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं यद्भूतं यच्च भाव्यम् ।
उतामृतत्वस्येशानो यदन्नेनातिरोहति ।
—Yajurveda's variant of Rg. X.

तदेजति तन्नैजति तद्दूरे तद्वन्तिके ।
तदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य तदु सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः । Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad.

अयमात्मा श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्योऽनुमन्तव्यः ।
—Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (without 'अनुमन्तव्यः')

सर्वं हि वस्त्विदं यत्र भेद भावाय मस्ति किञ्चन ।
अरामं तस्य पश्यन्ति न तत् पश्यति कश्चन ॥ (See Supra)

निर्विशेषं हि सामान्यं भवेत् शशविषाणवत् ।
सामान्यरहितत्वेन विशेषास्तद्वदेव हि ॥
—Mīmāṃsā Ślokavārtika V (Ākṛti) 10. (with न for हि and रहितत्वाच्च for °रहितत्वेन

हेतोरद्वैतसिद्धिश्चेद् द्वैतं स्याद् हेतुसाध्ययोः ।
हेतुना चेद् विना सिद्धिर्द्वैतं वाङ्मात्रतो न किम् ॥
—Āptamīmāṃsā II. 24.

कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं लोकद्वैतं विरुध्यते ।
विद्याविद्याद्वयं न स्याद् बन्धमोक्षद्वयं तथा ॥
—Āptamīmāṃsā II. 25.

Stanza XIV

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।
अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥
—Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya I. 124

एतासु पञ्चस्ववभासिनीषु प्रत्यक्षबोधे स्फुटमङ्गुलीषु ।
साधारणं रूपमवेक्षते यः शृङ्गं शिरस्यात्मन ईक्षते सः ॥
—Aśoka's Sāmānyadūṣaṇadik.

अभिहाणं अभिधेयाउ होई भिन्नं अभिन्नं च ।
खुरअग्गिमोयगुच्चारणम्मि जम्हा उ वयणसवणाणं ॥
नवि छेओ न वि दाहो ण पूरणं तेण भिन्नं तु ।
जम्हा य मोयगुच्चारणम्मि तत्थेव पच्चओ होइ ॥
ण य होइ स अन्नत्थे तेण अभिन्नं तदत्थाओ
(अभिधानमभिधेयाद् भवति भिन्नमभिन्नं च ।
क्षुराग्निमोदकोच्चारणे यस्माद् वचनश्रवणयोः ।
नापि छेदो नापि दाहो न पूरणं तेन भिन्नं तु ।
यस्माच्च मोदकोच्चारणे तत्रैव प्रत्ययो भवति ।
न च भवति सोऽन्यार्थे तेनाभिन्नं तदर्थात्)
—Bhadrabāhu (where?).

विकल्पयोनयः शब्दाः विकल्पाः शब्दयोनयः ।
कार्यकारणता तेषां नार्थं शब्दाः स्पृशन्त्यपि ॥ —Untraced.

सर्वमस्ति स्वरूपेण पररूपेण नास्ति च ।
अन्यथा सर्वसत्त्वं स्यात्, स्वरूपस्याप्यसंभवः ॥ —Untraced

जे एगं जाणइ से सव्वं जाणइ ।
जे सव्वं जाणइ से एगं जाणइ । —See supra. St. I.

एको भावः सर्वथा येन दृष्टः सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टाः ।
सर्वे भावाः सर्वथा येन दृष्टाः एको भावः सर्वथा तेन दृष्टः ॥
—See Supra. St. I.

स्वाभाविकसामर्थ्यसमयाभ्यामर्थबोधनिबन्धनं शब्दः ।
—Pramāṇanaya IV 11.

अपोहः शब्दलिङ्गाभ्यां न वस्तु विधिनोच्यते । —See Dīnnāga.

Stanza XV

तस्मात् न बध्यते नापि मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥
—Sāṃkhyakārikā 62.

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥
—Sāṃkhyakārikā 3.

अमूर्तश्चेतनो भोगी नित्यः सर्वगतोऽक्रियः ।
अकर्ता निर्गुणः सूक्ष्म आत्मा कापिलदर्शने ॥ —Untraced.

शुद्धोऽपि पुरुषः प्रत्ययं बौद्धमनुपश्यति तमनुपश्यन् अतदात्मापि तदात्मक इव प्रतिभासते । —Vyāsa Bhāṣya.

सर्वो व्यवहर्ता आलोच्य—मत्वा अहमत्राधिकृत इत्यभिमत्य कर्तव्यमेतन्मया इत्यध्यवस्यति । ततश्च प्रवर्तते इति लोकतः सिद्धम् । तत्र कर्तव्यमिति योऽयं निश्चयश्चितिसंनिधानापन्नचैतन्याया बुद्धेः सोऽध्यवसायो बुद्धेरसाधारणो व्यापारः ।
—Sāṃkhyatattva Kaumudī on S. K. Verse 23.

बुद्धिदर्पणसंक्रान्तमर्थप्रतिबिम्बकं द्वितीयदर्पणकल्पे पुंस्यध्यारोहति, तदेव भोक्तृत्वमस्य न त्वात्मनो विकारापत्तिः । —Vādamahārṇava (?)

विविक्ते दृक्परिणतौ बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते ।
प्रतिबिम्बोदयः स्वच्छे यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्भसि ॥ —Āsuri.

पुरुषोऽविकृतात्मैव स्वनिर्भासमचेतनम् ।
मनः करोति सान्निध्यादुपाधिः स्फटिकं यथा ॥ —Vindhyavāsin.

अपरिणामिनी भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपतति । —Vyāsa on Patañjali's Yogasūtra.

[illegible] । —Vaiś. sūtra.

नानाश्रयात् प्रकृतेरेव बन्धमोक्षौ संसारश्च, न पुरुषस्य ।
—Based on Sāṃkhyakārikā 62.

इष्टापूर्तं मन्यमाना वरिष्ठं नान्यच्छ्रेयो वेदयन्ते प्रमूढाः ।
नाकस्य पृष्ठे ते सुकृतेऽनुभूत्वेमं लोकं हीनतरं वा विशन्ति ॥
—Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad I 2. 10.

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥
—Sāṃkhyakārikā 59

तमोमोहमहामोहतामिस्रान्धतामिस्रभेदात् पञ्चावयवविपर्ययाविद्याविवेककृतो विपर्ययः ।
—Sāṃkhyakārikā 47; Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati 58,49 50, 51

क्षणस्य तदेव ग्राह्यं प्रत्यक्षक्षणविशेषसद्भावात् ।
(अतोऽन्य च सामान्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमर्थप्रतीतिरस्थिरत्वात् ।)
—Nyāyabindu I 18.

द्विचन्द्रभ्रान्तिविनिर्मुक्तरूपभेदत्वात् ।
द्वयोः सदृशमहत्त्वे सति भवत्ययेयम् ॥ —Untraced.
—See however P N Tattva-Ratna p. 43.

सर्वाकारस्वरूपस्य प्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षमर्थप्रतीतिसिद्धेः ।
—Nyāyabind I 19 20

नीलधियोऽपि हि विज्ञानं नतस्तस्माद् नीलस्य प्रतीतिरवसीयते ।
येभ्यो हि चक्षुरादिभ्यो ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते न तद्वशात् तज्ज्ञानं नीलस्य संवेदनं व्यवस्थापयितुम् । नीलसदृशं त्वनुभूयमानं नीलस्य संवेदनमवस्थाप्यते । न चात्र जन्यजनकभावनिबन्धनः साध्यसाधनभावः । येनैकस्मिन् वस्तुनि विरोधः स्यात् । अपि तु व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभावेन तत एकस्य वस्तुनः किंचिद्रूपं प्रमाणं किंचित् प्रमाणफलं न विरुध्यते । व्यवस्थापनहेतुर्हि सारूप्यं तस्य ज्ञानस्य व्यवस्थाप्यं च नीलसंवेदनरूपम् । —Nyāyabindutīkā.

वाक्यार्थं विषयः —Untraced.

न पिहाणपणा धम्मा पुंसो अत्थि अणायपं ।
निप्पुणा नेव सिझंति आरंभो सरिसवोवमा । — „
न विज्ञानपता धम्मः पुंसो नास्त्यनागते ।
निर्गुणा नैव सिद्ध्यन्ति आरम्भे सर्षपोपमाः ।
सर्वेण वस्तवेनो प हि मुक्तावभावकमताम् ।
तस्मात् प्रमेयाधिगतेः प्रमाणं मेयरूपता ॥ — „
प्रतिकर्मं क्रिया सैव कारणं सैव चोच्यते । — „
प्रत्येकं हि मयेहीचो ग्रुणोमांसं कर्म न सः । ॥ —
स्वप्रकाशबुद्धिमनसा यस्या नेत्रिभुवनोत्तरः । — „
यदि संवेद्यते नीलं कथं बाह्यं तदुच्यते ? ।
न चेत्संवेद्यते नीलं कथं बाह्यं तदुच्यते ? ॥
—Pramāṇa Vārtikālaṃkāra of Prajñākaragupta.

नान्योऽनुभाव्यो बुद्ध्यास्ति तस्या नानुभवोऽपरः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकवैधुर्यात् स्वयं सैव प्रकाशते ॥
बाह्यो न विद्यते ह्यर्थो यथा बालैर्विकल्प्यते ।
वासनालुठितं चित्तमर्थाभासे प्रवर्तते ॥ —Untraced.

अणुहूयदिट्ठचिंतियसुयपयइवियारदेवयाणूया ।
सुमिणस्स निमित्ताइं पुण्णं पावं च नाभावो ॥
(अनुभूतदृष्टचिन्तितश्रुतप्रकृतिविकारदैविकानूपाः ।
स्वप्नस्य निमित्तानि पुण्यं पापं च नाभावः)
—Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa's Mahābhāṣya on Viśeṣāvaśyaka 1703.

अप्रामाण्यकृता ये ये वास्तविकत्वा [illegible]।
[illegible] पुनः तैर्न प्रसज्यते ॥ Untraced

Stanza XVII

सर्वं एवायमनुमानानुमेयव्यवहारो बुद्ध्यारूढेन धर्मधर्मिभेदेन न बहिःसदसत्त्वमपेक्षते ।—Quoted in the *Nyāyavārttika* and attributed by Pārtha-sārathi to Dinnāga.

यथा यथा विचार्यन्ते विशीर्यन्ते तथा तथा ।
यदेतत् स्वयमर्थेभ्यो रोचते तत्र के वयम् ॥ —Untraced.

सुखादि चेत्यमानं हि स्वतन्त्रं नानुभूयते ।
मणिप्रभाङ्कुरेष्वपि सिद्धं [illegible] ॥
इदं सुखमिति ज्ञानं दृश्यते न सुखादिकम् ।
अहं सुखीति तु [illegible]ऽपि [illegible] ॥ —Nyāyamañjarī

[illegible] भावः [illegible] ।
[illegible] एवं [illegible] ॥ —Untraced.

रागाद् वा द्वेषाद् वा मोहाद् वा वाक्यमुच्यते ह्यनृतम् ।
यस्य तु नैते दोषास्तस्यानृतं कारणं किं स्यात् ॥ *
दुर्मे वाक्य —Thapaga L. L.

[illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥
* L. [illegible]; but [illegible] is evidently the correct reading.

Stanza XXVIII

[illegible] चित्तं [illegible] ।
—Mokshākaragupta.

[illegible] ।
—Untraced.

[illegible] हि संसारे [illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥—Untraced. Quoted in

इत एकनवते कल्पे शक्त्या मे पुरुषो हतः ।
तेन कर्मविपाकेन पादे विद्धोऽस्मि भिक्षवः ॥ —Untraced.

Stanza XIX.

प्रत्येकं यो भवेद् दोषो द्वयोर्भावे कथं न सः । —Untraced.

Stanza XX

नास्तिकास्तिकदैष्टिकम् ॥ —Hema S'abdānu. VI. iv. 66.

वयः शक्तिशीले ॥ —Hema S'abdānu. V. ii. 24.

न चायं भूतधर्मः सत्त्वकठिनत्वादिवत् । सर्वत्र तेषु प्रत्यादिसद्भावप्रसङ्गात् वा प्रत्येकमनुपलम्भात् ।

धर्मः सर्वो न भूतानामनुपलब्धेर्न चेतति ।
प्रत्येकमनुपलम्भात् स्याद् गुणो वा विभागवत् ॥
—Dravyālaṁkārakāra (?)

Stanza XXI.

[illegible] ॥ —Hema S'abdā. VII. ii. 61.

सर्वव्यक्तिषु नियतं क्षणे क्षणेऽन्यत्वमथ च न विशेषः ।
सत्योश्चित्यपचित्योराकृतिजातिव्यवस्थानात् ॥ —Untraced.

उत्पादादयो भिन्नाः कथमेकं त्रयात्मकम् ।
अथोत्पादादयोऽभिन्नाः कथमेकं त्रयात्मकम् ॥
घट-मौलि-सुवर्णार्थी नाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम् ।
शोक-प्रमोद-माध्यस्थ्यं जनो याति सहेतुकम् ।
पयोव्रतो न दध्यत्ति न पयोऽत्ति दधिव्रतः ।
अगोरसव्रतो नोभे तस्मात् वस्तु त्रयात्मकम् ॥
—Āptamīmāṁsā 59 60

Quoted in P. N. T. Ratn.

Stanza XXII.

उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत् । —Tattvārtha V. 29

Stanza XXIII.

मांसस्य एव हि मांसानि संसिद्धानां तथा ।
तद्वद् एव पुनः [illegible] संप्रदीयते ॥ —Untraced.

[illegible] । —Tattvārtha V 11

[illegible] सद्दादि [illegible] लोगसंभार ।
[illegible] ॥
([illegible] ।
[illegible] ॥) —Viśeṣāvaśyaka 115.

[illegible] ।

विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति । —Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II iv 12.

न मांसभक्षणे दोषो न मद्ये न च मैथुने ।
प्रवृत्तिरेषा भूतानां निवृत्तिस्तु महाफला ॥ —Manusmṛti V 56.

आमासु य पक्कासु य विपच्चमाणासु मंसपेसीसु ।
सययं चिय उववाओ भणिओ उ निगोयजीवाणं ॥
मज्जे महुम्मि मंसम्मि नवणीयम्मि चउत्थए ।
उप्पज्जंति असंखा तव्वण्णा तत्थ जंतुणो ॥
मेहुण सन्नारूढो नवलक्ख हणेइ सुहुम जीवाणं
केवलिणा पन्नत्ता सद्दहियव्वा सयाकालं ॥
इत्थीजोणीए संभवंति बेइंदिया उ जे जीवा ।
इक्को व दो व तिन्नि व लक्खपुहुत्तं उ उक्कोसं ॥
पुरिसेण सह गयाए तेसिं जीवाण होइ उद्दवणं ।
वेणुगदिट्ठंतेणं तत्तायसिलागनाएणं ॥
पंचिंदिया मणुस्सा एगनरभुत्तनारिगब्भम्मि ।
उक्कोसं नवलक्खा जायंति एगहेलाए ॥
नवलक्खाणं मज्झे जायइ इक्कस्स दुण्ह व समत्ती ।
सेसा पुण एमेव य विलयं वच्चंति तत्थेव ॥
—Sambodhasaptatikā of Ratnaśekhara 66, 65, 62.

आमासु च पक्वासु च विपच्यमानासु मांसपेशीषु ।
सातत्येनोत्पादो भणितस्तु निगोदजीवानाम् ॥

मद्ये मधुनि मांसे नवनीते चतुर्थके ।
उत्पद्यन्तेऽनन्तास्तद्वर्णास्तत्र जन्तवः ॥
मैथुनसंज्ञारूढो नवलक्षं हन्ति सूक्ष्मजीवानाम् ।
केवलिना प्रज्ञप्ताः श्रद्धातव्याः सदाकालम् ॥
स्त्रीयोनौ संभवन्ति द्वीन्द्रियास्तु ये जीवाः ।
एको वा द्वौ वा त्रयो वा लक्षपृथक्त्वं चोत्कृष्टम् ॥
पुरुषेण सह गतायां तेषां जीवानां भवति उद्रवणम् ।
वेणुकदृष्टान्तेन तप्तायसशलाकाज्ञातेन ॥
पञ्चेन्द्रिया मनुष्या एक नरभुक्तनारीगर्भे ।
उत्कृष्टं नवलक्षा जायन्ते एकवेलायाम् ॥
नवलक्षाणां मध्ये जायते एकस्य द्वयोर्वा समाप्तिः ।
शेषाः पुनरत्रैव विलयं व्रजन्ति तत्रैव—

निवृत्तिस्तु महाफला । —Manu. V 56

तु स्याद् भेदेऽवधारणे —Amarakośa III. 239

वर्षे वर्षेऽश्वमेधेन यो यजेत शतं समाः ।
मांसानि च न खादेद्यस्तयोः पुण्यफलं समम् ॥—Manu. V 53

एकत्रापेक्षितस्यापि या गतिर्भेदचारिणः ।
न सा नञुपयोगेन मान्तुं भवता युक्तिर ॥
वाक्येऽवधारणं तावदनिष्टार्थनिवृत्तये ।
कर्तव्यमन्यथानुक्तसमत्वात् तस्य कुत्रचित् ॥
—Tatt ārtha Śl. Vārtika I. vi 53.

सोऽप्रयुक्तोऽपि वा तज्ज्ञैः सर्वत्रार्थात्प्रतीयते ।
यथैवकारोऽयोगादिव्यवच्छेदप्रयोजनः ॥
T tt ārtha Śl. Vārtika I. vi. 56.

अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धेः । —Tattvārtha Sūtra V 31

Stanza XXVI

[illegible] । —Hema Śabdānu. V iv 3

Stanza XXVII.

[illegible] —Praśastapāda.

यतोऽप्यपास्यां हि मोक्षधर्मव्याप्ति तयो: प्रमाणम् ।
धर्मोपमर्देऽप्रतिपत्तेः प्रत्युत्पन्नेऽप्युपलम्भः ॥ —Untraced.
Quoted in P N T Ratnākarāvatārikā

परिणामेऽपि हि संसारे व्याहिता धर्मवासना ।
धर्मं तथैव संवरे वर्तते रचना यथा ॥

परिणामोऽस्त्यवस्थान्तरगमनं न च सर्वथा ह्यवस्थानम् ।
न च सर्वथा विनाशः परिणामस्तद्विदामिष्टः ॥

अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणामः ।
—Vyāsa on Patañjali's Yogasūtra III. 13.

प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः । —Tattvārtha sūtra I. 6.

Stanza XXVIII

स्यादव्ययादिभ्योऽथ । —Hema III iv 60.

अनन्तसुखस्या आत्मनोऽवस्थम् । —Hema IV iii. 103.

स्याद्वेशेषु । —Hema IV iv. 31.

नामाद्या अनन्ता यथा इव पुंसि नयाः । —Untraced.
नैगमादयः नयाः पञ्च विस्तरार्थं भवन्ति ।
—Tattvārtha Bhāṣya I. 35.

नोधार्थैकवचनादि तथैव परमार्थेषु । —Untraced.

सामान्य हि सामान्यमभिन्नसामान्यम् ।
विशेषेषु विभक्तार्थेषु तोभिमन्ये —U traced.

नीयते येन श्रुताख्यप्रमाणविषयीकृतस्य अर्थस्य अंशस्तदितरांशौदासीन्यतः
स प्रतिपत्तुरभिप्रायविशेषो नयः ॥ —Taken from P N T of Devasūri

धर्मद्वयात्मकमपि स्वविषये प्रवर्तमानं निश्चितविशेषात्मकं सकलमनुभवति ॥
—Pramāṇanaya VII

नयास्तव स्यात्पदलाञ्छना इमे रसोपविद्धा इव लोहधातवः ।
भवन्त्यभिप्रेतफला यतस्ततो भवन्तमार्याः प्रणता हितैषिणः ॥
—Vimalanāthastava of Samantabhadra.

तच द्विविधं—प्रत्यक्षं परोक्षं च .. —Pr N T. II 5, 6

पारमार्थिकं पुनरुत्पत्तावात्ममात्रापेक्षम् —Pr. N T. II. 18.

परोक्षं च स्मृति आगमवचनं च—Pr N T II.1,2,3,4 10,12.

Stanza XXIX.

दग्धे बीजे यथात्यन्तं प्रादुर्भवति नाङ्कुरः ।
कर्मबीजे तथा दग्धे न रोहति भवाङ्कुरः ॥ —Untraced.

सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगाः ।—Pat. Yoga Sūtra II. 13

न शुक्लेषु ..भोगा ॥ —Vyāsa Bhāṣya on the same

न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसन्धानाय हीनक्लेशस्य
—Akṣapāda (Gautama) IV I. 64.

गोला य असंखिज्जा असंखणिगोयओ हवइ गोलो ।
इक्किक्कम्मि निगोए अणन्तजीवा मुणेयव्वा ॥
सिज्झंति जत्तिया किर इह संववहार जीवरासीओ ।
एंति अणाइवणस्सइ रासीओ तत्तिया तम्मि ॥
(= गोलाश्च असंख्येयाः असंख्यनिगोदो गोलको भणितः ।
एकैकस्मिन् निगोदे अनन्तजीवा ज्ञातव्याः ॥
सिध्यन्ति यावन्तः किल इह संव्यवहारजीवराशेः ।
आयान्ति अनादिवनस्पतिराशेस्तावन्तस्तस्मिन् ॥)
अत एव च विद्वत्सु मुच्यमानेषु संततम् ।
ब्रह्माण्डलोकजीवानामनन्तत्वादशून्यता ॥
अन्त्यन्यूनातिरिक्तत्वैर्युज्यते परिमाणवत् ।
वस्तुन्यपरिमेये तु नूनं तेषामसम्भवः ॥
—Attributed to 'वार्तिककारमिश्र' in S'rīdhara's Nyāya-Kandalī.

Stanza XXX.

पुच्छति वा । —Hema V II. 130

अत्थं भासइ अरहा सुत्तं गंथंति गणहरा निउणं ।
—Viśeṣāvaśyaka 1119.

उप्पज्जेइ वा विगमेइ वा धुवेइ वा । —Untraced.

यत्रापि च सर्वविभ्रमः समुदीर्णोऽस्त्यपि नाम दृश्यते ।
न च तत्र भवान् प्रपद्यते सर्वमणुषु सरितिसनोऽक्षिपि ॥
—Dvātriṃśaddvātriṃśikā No. IV 15.

जा दव्व समुक्कं सिद्धत्तम सिज्जाइ य सो सिज्झे ।
बाहम्मुवएसेण सिद्धा गच्छंति तेण आईया ।
(यथा नमस्कारं सिद्धत्वोऽपि मनादि तु सोऽनादिक् ।)
आदिमपरोत्तेन सिद्धा गम्यन्ते तेनादिमादि
—Viśeṣāvaśyaka on 3213.

Stanza XXXII

समवान्धात् तमसः । —Hema VII. iii. 80

अदेवे देवबुद्धिर्या गुरुधीरगुरौ च या ।
अधर्मे धर्मबुद्धिश्च मिथ्यात्वं तद्विपर्ययात् ॥
—Hemacandra's Yoga-Śāstra II. 3.

पाणवहाईयाणं पावट्ठाणाण जो उ पडिसेहो ।
झाणज्झयणाईणं जो य विही एस धम्मकसो ॥ १ ॥
बज्झाणुट्ठाणेणं जेण न बाहिज्जए तयं नियमा ।
संभवइ य परिसुद्धं सो पुण धम्मम्मि छेओ त्ति ॥ २ ॥
जीवाइ भाववाओ बंधाइ पसाहगो इहं तावो ।
एएहिं परिसुद्धो धम्मो धम्मत्तणमुवेइ ॥ ३ ॥
(प्राणवधादीनां पापस्थानानां यस्तु प्रतिषेधः ।
ध्यानाध्ययनादीनां यश्च विधिरेष धर्मकषः ॥
बाह्यानुष्ठानेन येन न बाध्यते तन्नियमात् ।
संभवति च परिशुद्धः स पुनर्धर्मे छेद इति ॥
जीवादिभाववादो बन्धादिप्रसाधक इह तापः ।
एभिः परिशुद्धो धर्मो धर्मत्वमुपैति ॥)
—Haribhadra Pañcavastukaśāstra.

Note —Most of these quotations I have traced to their sources with the help of the Ārhata-Mata-Prabhākara edition of the Syādvādamañjarī published at Poona by Sheth Motilal

Ladhaji. Even when many of them I could have traced easily I have unhesitatingly utilised the work done by my predecessor as I found it both handy and on the whole reliable. I have corrected, however a few mistakes, and have traced certain passages which had been declared untraceable. The sources of a few of these quotations as given in the A.M.P edition, have appeared to me doubtful, but I regret that I have not been able to verify them, being often far away, while doing this work from my private, public and University libraries.

Appendix C Authors and Works quoted, referred to or borrowed from

A. *Brāhmaṇa authors and works quoted, referred to or borrowed from:*

(1) सांख्य—

आसुरि—a direct pupil of कपिल a prehistoric figure. See Intr p. xxxvi.

पञ्चशिख—Referred to in the M. Bhārata See Intr p. xxxvii.

ईश्वरकृष्ण and his सांख्यकारिका 1st cent B. C. See Intr p. xlix.

माठर—1st Century A. D See Intr pp. xlix to li.

विन्ध्यवासिन्—Contemporary of वसुबन्धु 3rd or 4th century A D. See Intr pp. xlvi, li.

गौडपाद भाष्य—G grand-preceptor of Saṁkarācārya; consequently he belongs to early 8th century A. D

वाचस्पति and his सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी—About 850 A. D See Intr p. lvi.

वार्षगण्य—?

(2) योग—

पतञ्जलि—150 B. C. See Wood's Introduction to the "Yoga-Sūtras and Das-Gupta's "Yoga and Patañjali in the History of Indian Philosophy" V. I. L.

व्यास (पातञ्जल टीकाकार)—1st century B. C. Earlier than Vātsyāyana, the author of the Nyāy Bhāṣya, for whose date see Introduction pp. xlix and li.

(3) वैशेषिक—

वैशेषिकसूत्र of कणाद—Their nucleus, some centuries B. C. the lower limit of their date 1st century A. D. See Intr pp. xli–xlvii.

प्रशस्तपाद (भाष्य)—Earlier than Diṅnāga who lived in the 4th century A. D. Latest date assigned 450 A. D. See Intro. pp. liv–lv and my Intro. to the Nyāyapravesá Part I (Gaekwad Oriental Series).

श्रीधर—author of the न्यायकन्दली commentary on Praśastapāda Bhāṣya—A. D. 991. See I tr p. lvii.

(4) न्याय—

अक्षपाद—or गौतम author of the Nyāyasūtra. I refer the nucleus of the work to second century B. C. See Intr pp. xlvii–liv For a fuller discussion see my paper on "[illegible]" read at the First Oriental Conference.

वात्स्यायनभाष्य—1st century A. D. but generally referred to the 3rd or 4th century See Intr pp. xlviii–lv

उद्योतकर—author of न्यायवार्तिक 1st half of the 7th century A. D See Intr. p lv

वाचस्पति—न्यायसूचीनिबन्ध(न्यायवार्तिक)कार—Beginning of the 10th century A. D See Intr p. lvi.

उदयन—author of Vaiseṣika work called किरणावलि and also of न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यपरिशुद्धि which is commentary on Vācaspati's न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका which is commentary on Uddyotakara's न्याय वार्तिक first half of the written in defence f the न्यायसूत्र of Akṣapāda against the ttacks of Buddhists such as Diṅnāga etc. Latter half of the 10th century A. D See Intr pp. lv–lvi.

जयन्त and his न्यायमञ्जरी—880 A D., little later than Vācaspatimiśra.

(5) पूर्वमीमांसा—

A system earlier than न्याय and as old as the oldest S rauta sūtras.

शबरस्वामी—400 A. D See Introduction pp. lviii–lix.

कुमारिलभट्ट—the author of the S'lokavārtika—first part of the 8th A. D See Intr lix

(6) वेदान्त—

उपनिषद्—छान्दोग्य and बृहदारण्यक Some centuries before Gautama Buddha.

(7) ब्राह्मण-स्मृति-ग्रन्थ

मनु and his मनुस्मृति

याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति

व्यास—the author of the Mahâbhârata.

ऐतरेयब्राह्मण

तैत्तिरीयारण्यक

मैत्र्युपनिषद्

B. *Buddhist authors and works* —

न्यायबिन्दु of धर्मकीर्ति—first part of the 7th century A. D (635 A. D.)

न्यायबिन्दुटीका of धर्मोत्तर—middle of the 9th century A. D. (847 A. D)

मोक्षाकरगुप्त—about 1100 A. D See Dr. S. C. Vidyâbhûsans' History of Indian Logic

सुगेन्द्र—?

तत्त्वोपप्लवसिंह ?

C. *Jaina authors and works* —

आचाराङ्ग—

स्थानाङ्ग—

आवश्यकगाथा

तत्त्वार्थभाष्य

गन्धहस्तिटीका

धर्मसंग्रहणी

निशीथचूर्णी

न्यायकुमुदचन्द्र

न्यायावतार

जीतकल्प

भद्रबाहुस्वामिन्—8th in the line of teachers after Mahāvīra svāmin. 4th century B. C.

उमास्वाति (वाचकमुख्य)—author of तत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्र and भाष्य—1st century A. D. See Intr. p. lxxix lxxx.

सिद्धसेनदिवाकर—author of न्यायावतार, सन्मतितर्क etc. 6th or 7th century A. D. See Intr. p. lxxx.

समन्तभद्र—*author of आप्तमीमांसा believed to be the author* of the lost गन्धहस्तिमहाभाष्य according to Digambaras. Contemporary of Siddhasena Divākara. See Intr. p. lxxx.

हरिभद्र—about the same time.

देवसूरि—author of प्रमाणनयतत्त्वालोकालङ्कार, and its com. स्याद्वादरत्नाकर

हेमचन्द्र—author of प्रमाणमीमांसा etc. See Introduction.

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